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"Military Romania"
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THE ESTABLISHMENT
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
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The Courage to Withstand the Test of Time

A century and a half in the ceaseless existence of an institution may mean too little or, on the contrary, quite a lot. It is a time span that, related to history itself, should not impress us but, if we take into consideration the tumult that characterises this period of a century and a half, in which only the well-made things meant to last have succeeded in doing so, we can appreciate this existence as being both natural and remarkable.

Born at the dawn of the modern Romanian Armed Forces, especially out of the need to provide solidity to a construction meant to withstand the test of time and to watch over the nation to last long in time, the institution of the General Staff (called, in different periods of its history, the General Staff Corps or the Great General Staff) has developed and distinguished itself at the same time with them. Throughout this period of a century and a half, whenever the Armed Forces have had to engage in military confrontations so that our national being could assert itself, get reunited or be kept alive, they have shared not only the joy of victory but also the sorrow of defeat. Each time, they have resumed doing their duty in the service of the nation.

Acknowledging its own mission from the very beginning, the General Staff has assumed the role of the conception and command superior body, an institutional entity that has proved necessary for any modern armed forces. It is a distinct structure that has clear attributions in managing the major problems related to the existence and activity of the military body, a pillar of stability as well as the generator of its profound changes.

Engaged in resolving the complex problems of the concrete present but compelled, at the same time, to withstand the challenges of the unpredictable future with ability and courage, the structure has played the essential role in initiating, supporting and carrying out the structural reform of the Romanian Armed Forces, so that they could set the pace in their march towards modernity. The Armed Forces that, through their own reason for being, have to subsume their effort to modernise under the ample process meant to reform and reconstruct the entire Romanian society, which is itself obliged and motivated to keep pace with the civilised world.

In accordance with the major imperative for the reform of the military body, the guarantor of our national security in the new international political environment,

the General Staff has assumed, at the same time, its own institutional reform, in search of the flexible formula that may ensure its quick reaction and effectiveness in exercising command. Although it has often been subject to major reconfigurations that have had direct effects on the position of part of the personnel, the institution has always managed to find the strength to regenerate the human resource capable, in its turn, to generate and guarantee the potential for performance it has needed in its assertion as the leading institution of the Armed Forces.

The fact that Romania has assumed the role of regional and global security provider, as well as the fact that it has got engaged, alongside the other NATO member states, in the campaign against terrorism, has brought about new responsibilities for the Armed Forces and implicitly for the General Staff that has fully proved its operational capability in generating and commanding forces in the theatres of operations to meet the responsibilities derived from the above-mentioned commitments. It is one more order of merit in the panoply the institution displays today, at the anniversary moment.

As the generator of some theoretical elaborations that have a certain value in the field of military science, the General Staff has assumed, consciously and successfully, the role of integrating and constructively capitalising on the newest concepts in the field of military theory and practice at national and international level, thus responding to the permanent need for our Armed Forces to modernise and align with the universal military values.

A retrospective outlook over the evolution of the General Staff has brought to the centre of attention the military leaders that have been invested with its command, the ones who have served the Romanian Armed Forces and nation at the highest level of military decision and action. Their names have been inscribed in the golden book of the Romanian Armed Forces and they will remain there to the glory of the institution they have served with devotion and professionalism. These are the leaders. However, we should not forget the team. The team of the General Staff, the people, more or less anonymous, whose competency and efficiency have contributed to the success of the institution. The people who have had the opportunity and determination to serve the Romanian Armed Forces from their highest command posts. It is a position consciously assumed, definitely an honourable one, but one that certainly involves continuous effort, striving, worries, concern, inquietude, and especially the burden of responsibilities. We should thus be grateful to the thousands of anonymous people who have striven throughout time for the visibility and acknowledgement of this institution. Therefore, let us salute them, as they fully deserve it.

Today, 150 years after its establishment, we can affirm that the General Staff, through the people that have served it, has the determination and especially the courage to withstand the test of time, to make history and to step in history. As a good history lesson.

 *Colonel Dr Mircea TĂNASE*
English version by
Diana Cristiana LUPU

Le courage d'affronter le temps

Un siècle et demi d'existence ininterrompue d'une institution peut-il signifier trop peu ou, au contraire, beaucoup. Un étirement temporel qui, rapporté à l'échelle de l'histoire, ne devrait être d'impressionner, mais, si l'on considère l'agitation de ce siècle et demi, qui avait duré que de choses bien construites et destinés de s'y inscrire, on peut dire que cette existence est naturelle et substantielle en même temps.

Née à l'aube de l'armée roumaine moderne, de la nécessité de donner la solidité à une construction destinée à pénétrer les temps et de veiller à l'éternité de la nation au plus de temps, l'institution de l'Etat Major Général (dénommé, dans les diverses périodes historiques, le Corps d'Etat Major Général ou le Grand Etat Major) a augmenté et elle s'est affirmé en même temps avec l'armée-même. Et lorsque l'armée a été obligée, au cours du ce dernier siècle et demi, de s'engager dans les confrontations militaires pour l'affirmation, la réalisation et la préservation de notre personnalité nationale, les deux ont ensemble partagé la joie des victoires, mais aussi l'amertume des échecs. Et, chaque fois, avec encore plus de détermination, elles ont repris le travail au service de la nation.

En comprenant sa propre mission, l'Etat Major Général a assumé, depuis son début, le rôle de l'organisme supérieur de formation et de commandement, une entité institutionnelle dont toute armée moderne a prouvé qu'elle a besoin. Une structure distincte, avec des responsabilités précises dans la gestion de grandes questions de l'existence et de l'action du corps militaire, un pilier de la stabilité, mais aussi son générateur de profonds changements.

Engagée pour résoudre des problèmes complexes du ce présente pratique, mais obligée, en même temps, d'affronter avec habilité et courage les défis d'un avenir imprévisible, la structure a eu le rôle primordial de projeter, soutenir et réaliser la réforme structurelle de l'armée, pour y imprimer le rythme dans son marche vers la modernité. Une armée obligée, par sa raison d'être, de circonscrire son effort de renouvellement au processus de réforme et de reconstruction de la société roumaine, elle-même exigée et motivée, bien sûr, de maintenir son pas avec le monde civilisé.

En accord avec la nécessité responsable de la réforme de l'organisation militaire, étant un garant de la sécurité nationale dans le nouvel environnement politique

international, l'Etat Major Général a assumé en même temps sa propre réforme institutionnelle, à la recherche de cette formule qui permettrait d'assurer la souplesse de la vitesse de réponse et l'efficacité de la mesure de la performance de l'acte de commandement. Etant souvent l'objet des reconfigurations majeures, avec des effets directs sur la position de certains membres du personnel, l'institution a toujours trouvé le pouvoir de régénérer sa ressource humaine, capable, à son tour, de générer et de garantir son potentiel de performance dont elle a eu besoin dans son affirmation ainsi l'institution fondamentale de l'armée.

La Roumanie prend le rôle de fournisseur de sécurité régionale et mondiale et elle s'engage, avec les États membres de l'OTAN, à l'action contre le terrorisme. Ces deux impératives créent à l'armée et implicitement pour l'Etat Major Général de nouvelles responsabilités dans l'exercice duquel celui-ci s'est parfaitement avéré sa capacité opérationnelle dans la constitution de forces et le commandement des forces dans les théâtres d'opérations. Un diplôme de mérite en plus dans la panoplie avec qui l'institution se manifeste aujourd'hui à son anniversaire.

Etant aussi un générateur des élaborations théoriques d'une valeur définie dans la science militaire, l'Etat Major Général a assumé consciemment et avec succès son rôle d'intégrer et d'exploiter d'une façon constructive les derniers concepts de la théorie et de la pratique militaire achevés sur les plans national et mondial, en répondant à un besoin incessant de renouvellement et de l'alignement de notre armée au système des valeurs militaire universelles.

Une rétrospective concise sur l'évolution de l'Etat Major Général met en évidence les chefs militaires qui ont été investis à son commandement, ceux qui ont servi l'armée et la nation roumaine au plus haut niveau de décision et d'action militaire. Leurs noms sont placés dans le livre d'or de l'armée roumaine et tiendront toute la gloire de l'institution qui a servi avec abnégation et professionnalisme. Ils étaient les leaders. Mais n'oublions pas l'équipe. L'équipe de l'Etat Major Général, les gens, plus ou moins anonymes, avec leur compétence et l'efficacité, qui ont construit et appuyé le succès de cette institution. Ceux qui ont eu la possibilité et la volonté de servir l'armée roumaine depuis le point culminant de son commandement. Un aspect consciemment assumé, bien sûr honorable, mais que seulement l'effort continu, les recherches, l'anxiété, l'agitation, l'insomnie et, surtout, le poids des responsabilités qu'ils ont des certitudes. C'est naturellement, par conséquent, d'être reconnaissant, à ce moment anniversaire, aux milliers d'anonymes qui ont travaillé, au fil du temps, pour affirmer et confirmer l'importance de cette institution. Et de leur donner l'honneur, parce qu'ils considérablement méritent.

Aujourd'hui, à 150 ans de sa naissance, nous pouvons affirmer que l'Etat Major Général, par les gens qui ont mis dans son travail, il avait la détermination, mais particulièrement le courage d'affronter le temps, il a fait l'histoire et il est entré dans l'histoire. Comme une bonne leçon de celle-ci.

Version française par Alina PAPOI

THE GENERAL STAFF - Architect of the Romanian Armed Forces Transformation -

Admiral Dr Gheorghe MARIN

After the disappearance of the bipolar world, the direct threats to the security of the European states have diminished, which has led to dealing with the threats as closer to their outbreak as possible. This state of play has meant an increase in the number of missions in which the forces of the European states have been deployed in areas of conflict in the Middle East, Asia, Africa as well as in the Western Balkans.

The author points out that, until the last decade of the 20th century, the traditional threats mainly consisted in territorial disagreements, ethnic and cultural disputes or competitions for gaining access to resources, while today, besides the fact that these threats have not lost their relevance, other types of threats have occurred, such as: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, emergence of non-state actors or asymmetric threats, violation of human rights and failing states.

Keywords: *interoperability; war training; responsibility and competence; forces command; transformation process*

If we carry out a retrospective analysis of the Romanian military body evolution, the role played by the General Staff as the architect of the Romanian Armed Forces transformation, no matter the period in history it may be related to, is obvious. The General Staff capacity to draw up concepts and the act of command permanently exercised by it have caused the evolution and the progress of the armed forces, the outcome being the current modern military institution. The General Staff has been the “*brains*” of all the decisions that have had a major impact on the armed forces and, implicitly, on the military policy of the country.

These days, when the General Staff celebrates 150 years of existence, we take the opportunity to recall the past and to highlight the distinct moments in its evolution. Thus, on 12 November 1859, the ruler Alexandru Ioan Cuza signed the order through which the General Staff Corps of the United Principalities Army was established. Its primordial role in the act of commanding the military institution was stated since the very beginning. Therefore, the General Staff Corps was involved, together with the Ministry of War,

Admiral Dr Gheorghe Marin – Chief of the General Staff.

in the Romanian Army modernisation process, and when circumstances imposed it, it was able to participate in the first military confrontation modern Romania got engaged in.

The Romanian Army victory in the War of Independence proved the ability of the Romanian Army, through the General Headquarters, to conceive and command military actions at war. Later on, after 1882, the year when we speak of the Great General Staff, its structure and responsibilities in preparing for and waging war would increase so that during the Balkan Wars (especially in the Second Balkan War) it played an essential role in preparing and commanding the operations.

In the years that followed, the Great General Staff focused on the shortcomings identified during campaigns and it was able to improve the command of the Romanian Armed Forces military operations during the First World War, thus contributing to the creation of the Romanian unitary state.

The participation in the First World War, the outcomes of the Paris Peace Conference and the new physiognomy of the European continent, including the map of the reunified Romania, determined essential changes in approaching the issue of the national territory defence.

In these circumstances, the Great General Staff was the promoter of a new concept for defending the country, which was to be based on bi/multilateral military agreements and treaties concluded at regional level, to be activated in the event the external threats to the new European configuration, and implicitly to our country, were amplified.

This concept was put into practice by specific organisational structures as well as by the adoption of new doctrinal principles, combat manuals and regulations, specific to that period of time. Thus, the Great General Staff directly contributed to the process of drawing up the law necessary for the organisation and functioning of the Romanian military body at that time, proving once more its analysis and conception abilities at strategic level.

In this context, the *Law regarding the organisation of the Armed Forces* in 1930 stipulated that the command of the Armed Forces was exercised by the Minister of War, through the Great General Staff and the general inspectors. The Great General Staff had the responsibility of preparing the war waging, military education and training. Military planners in the Great General Staff conducted military-political studies, as well as strategic and operational ones, which contributed to the reorganisation of the armed forces in 1936. The Chief of the Great General Staff at that time was a member of the recently established Steering Committee for the Country Defence that consisted of the president of the Council of Ministers and some other ministers. In 1937, the Chief of the Great General Staff became a member of the Ministerial Delegation for Procurement.

Because of the unfavourable political circumstances, the provisions of the regional military agreements could not come into force, which influenced the European and regional configuration at the beginning of the '40s in a negative manner. The strategic plans drawn up at that time for allocating forces on the three "battle fronts" the national territory was divided into, confirmed the fact that the Armed Forces transformation had been well grounded and that the Great General Staff was demonstrating its sense of responsibility and its competency in meeting the functional obligations. However, their application was annulled by political decisions that were rather controversial.

The Second World War was the reference event of the Romanian modern military history. The developed studies, analyses and plans and, last but not least, the manner of conceiving and leading military actions during the war highlighted, on the one hand, the quality and professionalism of the staff officers and, on the other hand, the shortcomings in the equipment for a *blitzkrieg* and not for a trench warfare as the previous conflagration had been.

After the Second World War, under the political regime that followed, the Great General Staff went through one of the most difficult periods in its existence, marked by the political interference in the functioning of the military body, as well as by ideological constraints. Nevertheless, the Great General Staff managed to maintain the national identity of the military institution, to enhance the combat capacity of the armed forces and to ensure the national defence capacity to meet the political-strategic requirements.

The *Cold War* period, when Romania was part of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, was initially characterised by the adoption of the rules and principles imposed by the leader of this organisation, the Soviet Union, as far as concepts, organisation and actions were concerned.

In the aftermath of the events in 1968 in Czechoslovakia, Romania became more and more independent within the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, fact especially materialised through organisational measures with a special impact on the activity of the Great General Staff.

This way, the development of a national defence doctrine, based exclusively on own effort, was taken into account. In this context, the concept of the *entire people's war* was developed. The foundations of the national defence industry were laid, and the Patriotic Guards were established, as the main support for the above-mentioned concept, as well as a series of units and large units, especially mechanised and armoured vehicles ones.

During the communist regime, the Great General Staff ensured, through special efforts, the continuity of the Armed Forces transformation, their equipment,

the training of commands and troops, as well as the military education modernisation, so that they could meet the requirements of the strategic environment at that time.

While the universal military art was enriched with new principles and rules, mainly determined by the revolution in military affairs and by the more and more sophisticated conflict physiognomy, the Great General Staff had to act like a living body, connected to the realities of the time and created on the modern scientific bases.

In these circumstances, the military thinking promoted by the Great General Staff had to take into account the evolution of the events in the security environment, which changed the continental and global architecture for good.

The revolution in 1989 re-asserted the indissoluble link between the armed forces and the people and opened the way towards profound democratic transformations within the Romanian society and implicitly within the military institution. The transition to a democratic society imposed a clear definition of the role and responsibilities of the structures meant to ensure national security and defence, all being sanctioned in the Constitution adopted in 1991.

The end of the *Cold War* and the new trends in approaching the concept of *defence*, in the circumstances of the lack of security guarantees at the beginning of the '90s, resulted in the fact that the military body, in general, and especially the Great General Staff, whose name was changed into the General Staff, had to cope with extremely complex problems, some of them completely new. Thus, the new strategic profile of our country depended, to a great extent, on the solutions provided to those particular problems.

The major global changes, the new relations between states, the new dialogue between the East and the West facilitated a new approach to the concepts of *defence and security*.

Romania's political option to join the European and Euro-Atlantic bodies outlined a new vision regarding the Romanian society modernisation strategy, in its attempt to assert itself in the great European family and to adopt the universal values, the democratic principles and those of market economy, as well as to observe human rights.

Being certain that its national interests can be promoted, asserted and maintained only within the Euro-Atlantic security structures, Romania considered that NATO membership was the best solution to have viable security guarantees.

By the initiation of cooperation projects and programmes, the EU and NATO member countries facilitated the acceleration of the transition process towards democracy and market economy as well as that of the accession process development for the countries in Central and Southeastern Europe, Romania included.

In this context, as an institution with a key role in ensuring the security of the Euro-Atlantic area, NATO offered to candidate and partner countries the possibility to understand the Alliance's philosophy, the essence of interoperability, to know the command and control system, the organisation, information, standardisation and logistics, as well as the details of the defence planning, assessment and decision-making processes specific to NATO.

This framework ensured the support for the development of a unitary and coherent transformation and modernisation strategy for the Romanian military institution, in order to meet the specific NATO standards. Thus, the Armed Forces restructuring and modernisation process, led by the General Staff, was developed simultaneously with the political and diplomatic actions conducted so that Romania could become a NATO member country, and the process of modelling the future structure of the Romanian Armed Forces has undergone conceptual and actional clarifications.

A priority of this process was represented by the adoption of the main laws and norms, which would ensure the optimal functioning of the military body in the circumstances of the rule of law and market economy.

From a historical perspective, the General Staff was permanently aware of Romania's real defence needs, in accordance with the concrete realities, priorities and national possibilities, and the security context of the '90s, accomplishing its tasks, with abnegation and in a professional manner.

The Necessity for the Romanian Armed Forces Transformation

As a result of the security environment profound change and of the considerable decrease in the possibility of a major military attack against Romania, the missions type and content have been adjusted, focusing on providing the necessary capabilities to carry out new missions by taking into account the forces rapid deployment and their self-sustainment in the theatres of operations.

Taking into consideration the above conditions, the General Staff had to develop new strategies regarding the organisation and use of the armed forces concomitantly with the creation of effective technical response capabilities. Based on the threats, challenges and vulnerabilities to the security environment and on the political-military evolutions at regional and global level, the goals and missions have been established, and the structure and the size of the Romanian Armed Forces have been correlated with the allotted resources.

At the same time with the dissolution of the bipolar world, the direct threats to the European states security have diminished and moved closer and closer

to their breeding ground. This situation has resulted in an increase in the European states missions carried out in conflict areas in the Middle East, Asia, Africa and the Western Balkans. If by the end of the 20th century the traditional threats were mainly regional conflicts, ethnical and cultural disputes or battles for access to resources, at present, besides the fact that these threats have not lost their relevance, other new types of threats have emerged, such as: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, non-state actors actions or asymmetrical threats, human rights violation and failed states. The ability to influence the aspects related to international security by military force represents an essential factor and the need to respond to the current crisis situations stands for many and complex reasons leading to modern armed forces transformation.

The identification of terrorism, together with organised crime and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as main threats to security, have required a change in the physiognomy of war, by increasing the military non-classical actions weight as compared to the conventional ones.

These modifications are directly reflected in the current operations for crisis management in which Romania participates either as a member of international organisations (the UN, NATO or the EU) or within coalitions. Thus, the current operations have an expeditionary character, totally different from the *Cold War* period when a static approach prevailed, focused on the territory defence. The main characteristics of the current operations are: forces deployment in the theatre should be at short notice; their objectives are restricted, often limited by constraints; frequently, the crisis management operations are long-term missions; the great interoperability is related to the need for the participating forces to be able to operate jointly; the necessity to create a rapid response force package; the forces deployment during the operations should be sustainable for a long period of time, according to the assumed commitments; the forces should be trained and equipped accordingly to cope with the full spectrum of missions.

As a result, during the last decade, at the level of the Euro-Atlantic bodies and member states, essential changes have occurred regarding doctrines, training procedures, and forces and organisational structures, new types of equipment and assets being purchased. At the same time, steps were initiated aiming at increasing the usability of forces in operations. Moreover, we can appreciate that during the last decade, military operations have dethroned the superiority of the technical factor/component, underlining the importance of a complex of factors, out of which the most important ones are *interoperability and training*.

The Romanian Armed Forces have had to face these challenges and this meant the initiation of an ample transformation process in which the General Staff played and is still playing the leading role.

The accession to NATO initially required for the beginning of a restructuring and reform process to cover the entire military body, an ample and complex one, that was conceived, planned and coordinated, as expected, by the General Staff. After the accession, Romania's Armed Forces transformation has been planned and carried out as part of NATO transformation process in order to achieve a modern force structure, downsized, professionalised, adequately equipped, deployable, interoperable, having a self-sustainment and multi-dimension protection capacity.

The Romanian Armed Forces transformation process has been associated with the North-Atlantic Alliance transformation where NATO requirements for personnel staffing, the high costs to sustain the troops in the theatre, the significant differences between the military equipment technology of the advanced state members of the Alliance and the equipment of the Romanian Armed Forces are prerequisites for the transformation process.

In this respect, the General Staff stands for the engine of this process and plays an essential role in the transformation of the armed forces from a massive, heavy, oversized structure into a modern, well-equipped and trained military body, having only territorial responsibilities, able to participate in providing the national territory integrity and security, and to carry out operations on the national territory, within NATO area of responsibility, as well as on an extended strategic environment permanently influenced by factors that require change.

The Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy

In order to have a unitary coordination and achieve the transformation goals, the General Staff has developed the *Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy*, a document that represents the medium and long-term vision on the Romanian Armed Forces size, training and equipment to participate in future operations. According to this strategy, having 2005-2006 as the starting point, and up to 2025, the Romanian Armed Forces transformation process has been carried out and will continue its development in three distinct stages, determined by the forces reorganisation and the deadlines to accomplish the *Force Goals*, and NATO and the EU integration requirements.

The *Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy*, through its proposed scope, establishes objectives not only in the force structure field but also at the level of the other central structures of the Ministry of National Defence. To this end, the General Staff has drawn up the *Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy Implementation Plan* that includes goals, timelines and stages, tasks and responsibilities, as well as coordination measures and the necessary resources supply to achieve

the transformation goals. The plan also contains details about the structural evolution, the planned financial support and the way to achieve the transformation process synchronisation with NATO transformation process.

Currently, the first stage of the transformation process, the basic restructuring phase, has been completed, the Romanian Armed Forces size matching their new missions and the available resources, a new way to create and conduct forces to take part in stability and support operations being also promoted.

During the current stage that started two years ago – operational integration into NATO and the EU structures – the main effort will be focused on the continuation of forces readiness and of the major acquisition programmes, on the reorganisation of military education, the increase in our contribution to NRF and the EU, as well as on extending the implementation of some interoperability requirements of the *Force Goals* at the level of non-deployable military units. In this context, the concepts development, experimentation and implementation provide a logical basis for organising and relating strategies, doctrines, concepts, processes and procedures necessary to transform the military body, establishing the framework to achieve the capabilities the Romanian Armed Forces need.

We have also focused on the military capabilities planning and development to achieve the operational effect required by the specific standards in a designated environment, in a specified period of time and to maintain the effect for a specific period of time, their efficiency being directly connected to the synergy obtained while combining and using them in a definite environment (interoperability).

Thus, during the capabilities development process, to meet the assumed NATO and the EU commitments, we have taken into account the following domains:

➤ *Implementation of the new Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Information, Informatics, Surveillance and Reconnaissance concept.* The programmes under development are as follows: command posts, brigade and division size, an integrated communication and information system to equip the structures made available to NATO, C2 air system to integrate within *NATINADS*, C2 air system within *ACCS (NATO Air Command and Control System)*; C3 systems on Frigate 111 and frigates T22R type, Naval Communication and Information System and the Surveillance and Control System for the Black Sea.

➤ *Intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities at the operational and strategic level*, by implementing *SINCER* – Monitoring Integrated System in short wave frequencies, *GISSINT* – Geographical Information System at strategic level, *SIGINT* – Monitoring system for information from electromagnetic sources, *SIBDRE* – Informatics System for Electronic Warfare Database, achieving a *HUMINT* national capability able to provide *HUMINT* teams' deployment in support of national

contingents participating in NATO-led operations (*HUMINT* Centre of Excellence has already been established in this respect, available for NATO member states' personnel to be trained).

➤ *Manoeuvre Capabilities by increased rapid deployable forces*, providing airlift capabilities (by our own C-130 and also as party to C-17- SAC initiative), completing with transport aviation – short/medium carrier – C-27J SPARTAN, as well as by our active involvement in the *European Air Transportation Fleet (EATF)* initiative. At the same time, for the air transportation of our troops to/from the theatres of operations and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) missions, IAR-330 PUMA helicopters are currently undergoing a modernisation process in compliance with and according to NATO standards. 11 out of 13 helicopters have already passed the initial evaluation phase.

➤ *Effective engagement capabilities* by carrying out several major procurement programs aimed at ensuring the secure participation of some advanced combat individual systems in multinational operations, in urban area, accomplishing air police missions, engaging in complex missions of air defence and support of ground forces deployed, conducting air-to-air, air-to-ground joint operations completed with precisely striking of targets and operating under any meteorological conditions.

We have also focused on achieving survival and self-protection capabilities aimed at providing effects limitation following any enemy attack with conventional arms and CBRN, including the limitation of terrorist attacks against the own forces and infrastructure deployed in a theatre of operations while providing freedom of movement and reactive capacity to our forces.

A military capability planning process both at national level and in NATO and the EU context represents a key function of the strategic planning process that is accomplished based on a specific algorithm including the following elements: identifying the security environment trends and evolutions; getting to know the new trends in military equipment and technologies; establishing a general military level of ambition; evaluating the current capabilities while identifying possible shortcomings; initiating concrete measures to fix up the identified deficiencies also assuming the creation of new military capabilities, if necessary.

Further on, we will have to identify that weaker element within any particular capability in order to apply corrective actions. This way, we intend to increase both the quality and effectiveness of the achieved capabilities, and we will be able to develop new capabilities with less effort, eliminating the duplication of our actions.

It is rather difficult not only to create a particular capability but also to keep it operational according to definite standards, if we take into account the continuous decrease in the allocated resources. To preserve the NATO certified units' readiness

at the level of assumed standards should become a top priority of all the entitled structures actively participating in this quite complex process in which research and development should play a crucial role in achieving at least minimum appropriate capabilities necessary to meet our international commitments. Therefore, throughout the current phase and the next one as well, this activity should be increased by participating in capabilities' development initiatives since their project phase both at national level and within NATO and the EU or with other partners, on bilateral bases.

From this point of view, conducting different activities specific to the capabilities development process will be focused on those elements that fully contribute to the achievement of a particular capability: training, doctrine, organisation/structure, personnel, equipment, force readiness and deployment capacity; financial resources planning to develop the required capabilities while concentrating the efforts on national key domains (distribution of budgetary resources, share common experience and expertise to meet interoperability standards; prioritisation of those domains involving common projects under NATO and the EU coordination).

It is obvious that the General Staff endeavours aimed at coordinating and accelerating the Romanian Armed Forces transformation process will not end in 2025. They will continue permanently, to ensure the Romanian Armed Forces appropriate pace required by the continuous adaptation to the rapidly changing security environment in order to effectively and efficiently respond to the new security threats at regional or global level.



THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GENERAL STAFF IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NATIONAL STATE DEVELOPMENT

Academician Dan BERINDEI

The establishment of the General Staff was an important moment in the assertion of Romania as a European entity. The armed forces played an important role in bringing our country into line with the developed states of the continent, particularly in achieving the aspirations of the nation and making a change in the international status of Romania. The author states that the General Staff was one of the factors that would ensure the success of such complex processes.

During the reign of Alexandru Ioan Cuza and then at the beginning of the one of Carol I, a spectacular development and strengthening of the Armed Forces of the Romanian national state took place. The number of infantry regiments increased, the cavalry and artillery were given full attention and an engineering regiment was established.

Less than two decades after, the War of Independence would confirm the level reached by the Romanian Armed Forces.

Keywords: *national armed forces; armed power; disciplinary measures; battlefield; French military mission*

The Romanians underwent an extraordinary historical process in the 19th century. They entered modernity, with delays and setback, unquestionably, yet, on the whole, between the Phanariote principalities of the first decades of the century and the kingdom at the end, the leap was remarkable. If the Romanian villages lagged behind, while the towns and, especially, the Capital gradually aligned themselves to the realities of the more advanced part of the European continent, there were still areas in which the steps taken were very important, some of them being the military ones.

During the period of the *Organic Statute* (in Romanian, *Regulamentul organic*), the rebirth of the national army took place, but under the auspices of the occupying Russian army, with some of the cadres and arms supplied by the great protector power. However, the emancipation movement skilfully used the opportunity offered. Many young boyars enrolled in this reborn army, which asserted its national being. In 1839, Felix Colson, a foreign witness to the Romanian realities, noted that

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the soldiers of the Romanian regiments were “*excellent*”. Each branch found a framework for assertion; units of infantry, cavalry and artillery were formed; territorial units of *dorobantzes* and servants were organised in Moldova. In 1844, the armed forces of Wallachia had 5 806 soldiers and officers, and the ones of Moldova – 1 554. The regiments were provided with flags, schools and training camps were organised and some officers were sent to train abroad, in Russia and Prussia. Moreover, the military issues represented a general concern for the elite of the time. Not incidentally, Nicolae Bălcescu wrote his historical studies on the armies of the two principalities.

The Revolution of 1848 represented “*a test of fire*” of this young Romanian army only in Wallachia, because Moldova was rapidly subjected to the Russian military occupation. Army units were involved in the revolution from the beginning, officers like Christian Tell and Nicolae Pleșoianu were involved in the outbreak of the revolution, Gheorghe Magheru becoming one of its Generals. The counterrevolutionary attempts of Colonels Ion Solomon and Ion Odobescu failed and the camp organised by Magheru in Râureni was the last chapter of resistance of the Wallachian revolution before the invasion of the armies of the Sultan and of the Tsar.

After the revolution, during the Balta Liman reigns, many efforts were made to maintain the regular military units, the government of the Tsar, who patronised its organisation, being concerned about its attitude during the revolution; during the Crimean War, an attempt was made even to include it in the Russian army. However, the Balta Liman rulers, especially Barbu Știrbei, organised more thoroughly the border guard and *dorobantzes* units.

After the end of the Crimean War, with the strong development of the Union movement, the army found itself in the centre of attention. The ad hoc Assembly of Moldova, which allocated a part of its works to the organisation of the future united country, gave a full meaning to the “*national armed forces*”. On 25 October/ 6 November 1857, a “*resolution*” (*încheiere*, in Romanian) was unanimously adopted by the 75 deputies present, which decided the organisation of the “*national armed powers*” of the United Principalities, which, “*in case of invasion, should be able to demonstrate sufficient power*”. The guarantor powers were also demanded the right “*to set up defence fortresses*”, which “*would be occupied only by the national armies of the Principalities*”. This national military power was going to be used “*only in defending their homeland*”. The army was involved in the crucial events in early 1859. The fact that Alexandru Ioan Cuza was the actual commander of the Moldavian Army was, among other things, an argument for his election as a ruler in Iași, while in București,

General Barbu Vlădoianu's refusal to initiate the repressive actions desired by some members of the Regency (*Căimăcămie*, in Romanian) represented an important component of the complicated electoral process of choosing the ruler.

The double election started a new page in our national history. Romania was formed, but the process was only at the beginning and it was to be accomplished in the near future through gaining the independence and gathering the nation within the same borders. Given these circumstances, special tasks would devolve upon the army. Gathering the two armies in the camp at Florești, in the summer of 1859, revealed the unity that was established in the military field as well, through the vote on 24 January and the importance given to the military factor.

On 11/23 October 1859, through an Order of the Day, the Prince assumed the *"superior command of the entire Romanian Army"*, highlighting the unity of the United Principalities military forces. In the message from 6/18 December the same year, addressed to the legislative bodies, the Prince defined his goals for the army: *"With the help of the best trainers from all branches, I will form a good officers and NCOs commanding staff and I will see that, in keeping with the increase in the available assets, our war material will develop and meet the requirements of modern science. It is in this way that reliable cadre will be formed that [...] will make room among them to all Romanians called for defending the homeland"*.

The establishment of the General Staff of the United Principalities, on 12/24 November 1859, represented a normal stage in the complex process meant for setting up unique military structures and the modern organisation of the young national army. The fact that the Prince assumed command of the *entire* army and the *unique* staff was established meant that, from then on, the army was a *Romanian* one. In the corps of the General Staff would be included officers *"coming from both armies and only those possessing special military knowledge, acquired through systematic studies"*. Colonel Grigore Gărdescu was the first to hold the highest position, followed by Major Istrate Sămeșescu. The latter was replaced by General Ion Emanoil Florescu, who previously held the dignity of Minister of War in Wallachia. General Florescu would also be, before the administrative unification in 1862, the head of both Ministries of War in Wallachia and Moldova in the summer of 1860.

The establishment of the General Staff was part of the complex process of unification of the two armies, but also of their modernisation. During the reign of Alexandru Ioan Cuza and then at the beginning of the one of Carol I, a multiform development and strengthening of the armed forces of the Romanian national state took place. The number of infantry regiments increased, the cavalry

and artillery were given full attention, an engineer regiment was established. Since May 1860, a law concerning the training of the United Principalities Army provided the smooth process of the unification and alignment of the Romanian army units with the European standards of the time; in fact, since the spring of 1859, measures had been taken to unify the uniforms. On 1/13 September 1862, the Romanian military units were equipped with tricolour flags bearing the inscription *Honor et patria*. There was also a unification of the military education in the autumn of 1862, the Prince being pleased with the fact that within it, “for the first time, there are together students from both sides of the Milcov”.

After extensive debates, on 27 November/9 December 1864, the *Law for the organisation of the armed force* was passed, which took into account the *permanent army*, the *militias* (made up of guards and dorobantzes) and the *crowds* (*gloatele*, in Romanian), in case of necessity, being considered the country’s male population between 17 and 50 years. A law regarding the reorganisation of the Ministry of War, in October 1862, was followed, in 1863, by the reorganisation of the General Staff, which would consist of four sections: *Army correspondence work*; *Topographical work*; *Engineering and artillery works* and *Public works concerning the army*. Also in 1863 there were created three regional headquarters in București, Iași and Craiova. The country was provided with seven infantry regiments, to which an elite mountain troops battalion, two cavalry regiments, one artillery regiment, a Danube squadron and the new branch of engineering added. Various boards, commissions and committees, as well as the thorough organisation of the administration of justice and the disciplinary measures in the military added to the measures taken regarding the military institution. The training of the troops belonging to this national army was very important. Young officers were trained in the country, as well as in military schools in France, Italy, Belgium and Prussia, or through the participation in the military operations on the battlefields of Italy, Mexico or Africa.

An important role was also played by the first French military mission sent by Emperor Napoleon III in the United Principalities. The efforts made, during the same years, to equip the army, among others, by creating, in 1861, the Directorate of artillery establishments, which comprised the Pyrotechnics and the Arsenal in Bucharest, as well as the Târgșor Powder Factory, were accompanied by the numerous weapons imports from abroad. Rifles, carbines and pistols, as well as cannons were brought from outside the country, the very effort being made to harmonise the Romanian Army with the other armies on the continent.

The military assessment of the reign of Alexandru Ioan Cuza was made by the Prince himself, in the autumn of 1865, in a letter which he sent to Emperor Napoleon III. The Prince showed him, among other things, that his country's army had 75 000 rifled muskets, other 25 000 cap guns and 72 rifled firearms, as well as a permanent army of 20 000 troops, whose number could be tripled, if necessary, and with an additional 20 000 border guards and dorobantzes. The Emperor was also informed regarding the development of the factories that contributed to the material procurement of the army.

The establishment of the General Staff was an important moment in the assertion of Romania as a European entity. The army's role was to bring our country in line with the developed countries of the continent, particularly to achieve the aspirations of the nation and to bring a change in Romania's international status. The General Staff was one of the factors that would ensure the success of such complex processes. Less than two decades after, the War of Independence would confirm the level reached by the Romanian Army to whose success the General Staff, established in the autumn of 1859, really contributed.

English version by
Iulia NĂSTASIE



THE GENERAL STAFF IN THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP SYSTEM

Major General Nicolae TABARCIA

Starting with 1990, the General Staff has undergone several stages of organisation, its evolution being consistent with the stages of the armed forces reform, it coordinates. This evolution has been particularly aimed, on the one hand, at simplifying and streamlining the act of leadership at the level of the entire armed forces and, on the other hand, at getting closer to and being interoperable with the similar structures of the NATO member states armed forces.

Consequently, as the author highlights, starting with this year, several measures have been taken for the reorganisation of the Armed Forces, in general, and of the central structures of the Ministry, in particular. This period has been full of changes, most of the newly created structures representing the initial components necessary for taking the next steps in the structural evolution of the General Staff.

Keywords: national defence; international engagements; defence planning; force structure; transformation strategy

Since its establishment as the superior conception and command body of the Romanian Armed Forces,

the General Staff has been assigned to put into practice, promote and consolidate a military policy exclusively subordinated to national interests and aspirations. The evolution of this body that is specific to any modern army has been aligned with the trends of the time, going through different stages, from simple forms, existing at the middle of the 19th century to the current complex and multifunctional structure.

The organisation and operation stages have been decisively determined and influenced by the system of coalitions and alliances in which Romania has been part, by the military policy objectives and orientations, by the development of the constitutive elements of the national defence, as well as by the mutations and innovations occurred in the theory and practice of the universal military practice.

On 12 November 1859, when Prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza signed the *High Order of the Day no. 83*, through which the General Staff Corps of the United Principalities Armed Forces

Major General Nicolae Tabarcia – Director of the General Staff.

was established, it had “four offices of different sizes, in accordance with the assignment each would have in the classification of the needs of the Staff Corps”¹, which would soon, in 1860, be named sections.

Permanently involved, along with the Ministry of War, in the continuous process of the Romanian Armed Forces modernisation, the General Staff was, in turn, the beneficiary of these military body transformations.

In 1863, there was the first reorganisation of the General Staff, on four sections (I – *Army Correspondence Works*, II – *Topographical Works*, III – *Engineering and Artillery Works*, IV – *Public Works*).

The *Law regarding the organisation of the armed forces*, adopted in 1868, completed in 1872 and 1874, stated that the Armed Forces Staff was divided into the *General Staff*, composed of Division and Brigade Generals, for commanding army corps, divisions and brigades, and the *Staff Corps*, which was composed of officers from the rank of colonel to the one of captain, meant for various military missions. Therefore, one can notice that the General Staff of the Armed Forces was not yet a distinct structure of the Ministry of War, the generals and officers in its composition being, at the same time, commanders of large units and units.

In the context of reopening the so-called “*Eastern issue*” and the imminent confrontation between the Tsarist and Ottoman troops in the south of the Danube, by the *High Decree no. 959 relative to the headquarters of the Romanian Armed Forces during the concentration*, on 27 April/9 March 1877, it was established – for the first time in Romania – the *General Headquarters*, a structure which should provide a better concentration of the armed forces and the conduct of military operations depending on the evolution of the political and military situation. The actual leadership of the General Staff went to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces.

After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire and the withdrawal of troops on the national territory, the General Headquarters continued to operate until 1 August 1878, when the armed forces were demobilised. It therefore can be noted that the War for Independence, the first great confrontation of the modern Romanian Armed Forces, pointed out the need for a complex structure of the General Staff, able to generate human resources for the General Headquarters, the strategic command body at war, established when the mobilisation was declared, intended to command the forces and means in the area of operations and organised to meet the complex requirements of future military confrontations.

On 29 November 1882, the *Armed Forces General Staff* was established, which thus became a distinct structure within the Ministry of War. The creation

¹ *High Order of the Day no. 83*, in *Statul Major General, istorie și transformare*, Centrul Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, București, 2004, p. 22.

of such a body was one of the most important military reforms adopted at the end of the 19th century, being required by the need to be in line with the trends throughout Europe and, especially, the need to cope with the complexity of the act of command of the military institution. Directly subordinated to the Ministry of War, the Armed Forces General Staff was in charge of studying the issues of military organisation, preparing the war waging (mobilisation, troops concentration, various theatres of operations preparation, military geography and topography), preparing various related services necessary for the military, drafting and updating the map of the country, studying the military forces of various states and continuously observing their military affairs. In 1885, the *Law regarding the staff service* was passed, which distinguished between two of its components: the *Armed Forces Staff Service* (named the Great General Staff) and the *Major Commands Staff Service* (army staffs, army corps, divisions). In 1899, the *Regulation on the Law of Staff Service* was approved, which stated the command structures of the armed forces in wartime: the *Ministry of War*, the *General Staff* (the operational command structure within the General Headquarters) and the *Great General Staff* (the sedentary part). One can therefore notice that, at war, the Great General Staff had two components: the *active part* (one that, in the General Headquarters, became the General Staff of the Armed Forces, in relation to the supreme command or the great commander – the King – of the mobilised Armed Forces) and the *sedentary part*, invested with the tasks of recruitment, organisation, staff training, internal guard, intelligence etc. Moreover, this normative act clearly established the general attributions of the staff service and the special functions of the Chief of the General Staff of the mobilised armed forces.

The General Staff gradually increased its power, diversified its structure, improved the personnel staffing and training level, becoming, in the eve of the First World War, a complex body, able to coordinate the military reform process and lead it in peacetime and at war.

Mobilisation plans and war hypotheses developed before Romania entered the First World War stipulated that the senior leadership bodies of the armed forces would be the General Headquarters and the Ministry of War. The General Headquarters consisted of a General Staff and four subdivisions – called echelons –, each consisting, in turn, in departments, services, commands, detachments.

After Romania entered the war, the General Headquarters broadly preserved its original structure.

Between December 1916-May 1918, the General Headquarters was reorganised in several steps, seeking to obtain an optimal formula in order to simplify and streamline the act of command. On 11 December 1918, to coordinate the military

operations meant for the liberation of this part of the national territory, the Forces Command in Transilvania was created. Although it did not have a rigorously established command structure, it was the first command structure meant for the strategic operations command of the Romanian Armed Forces that acted under the General Headquarters.

After the end of the military operations, the role of the General Headquarters considerably diminished being disbanded, on 20 March 1920, upon the completion of military demobilisation. The Great General Staff returned to the forefront, being in charge of the settlement of domestic and international problems of the Romanian Armed Forces.

In the interwar period, in the campaign plans, together with the General Headquarters, we find a different strategic command structure – the *Group of Armies*. While the General Headquarters was designed for commanding forces on all three *fronts* (east, west and south), the *Group of Armies* should conduct actions on the *front* that required most of the forces and assets.

During the years of the Second World War, the created legislative framework stipulated the continuation of the Great General Staff, subordinate, in some periods, to the Ministry of War or just in relations of cooperation with it. Through the *Ministerial Decision no. 3000* on 10 December 1941, the military command was removed from the task of the Ministry of National Defence, which became only in charge of legal, procurement and administration duties. The command in the field of operations fell under the Chief of the Great General Staff. Its organisation on departments and offices specific to operational command structures (intelligence, operations, services, transport etc.) enabled the easy transition to the establishment of the General Headquarters (mobilised and demobilised many times, depending on the military operations on the eastern front and the requirements of the German Armed Forces alongside which the Romanian armed forces fought).

The Romanian General Headquarters directly conducted only the operations of the 4th Romanian Army and the air and naval forces that acted to support it, between 22 June and 16 October 1941. In November 1941, the General Headquarters was named the *Armed Forces Great General Staff*, consisting of the Army Staff, the Aeronautics Staff and the Navy Staff. In June 1942, the Great General Staff formed and sent the General Headquarters to the operational area, with the mission to stay in contact with the large units on the front and to intervene at the German command regarding the use of Romanian troops. From late 1942 until 23 August 1944, the Romanian Armed Forces did not have an operational command structure at the strategic level, the Great General Staff being only a military organisation with responsibilities primarily related to forces generation for ongoing or future operations.

Between 23 August and 7 September 1944, after Romania separated from the Axis and joined the United Nations, the Great General Staff became again the operational command structure at the strategic level of the Romanian Armed Forces and effectively conducted its operations. From 7 September 1944, when the Romanian Armed Forces were subordinated to the 2nd Ukrainian Front and until the end of the Second World War, the Romanian Great General Staff was deprived of its operational command attributes, a situation that perpetuated in the first decades of the *Cold War* period.

During this period, the Great General Staff also comprised an operational component, in which the primary role belonged to the intelligence and operations directorates.

An initial reorganisation of the Great General Staff took place at the beginning of 1949, through the emergence of a new section and the reorganisation of the existing ones. Thus appeared the *Sections of Signalling, Cadres (Staff), Staff Training, Staff Recruitment, Regulations, Administration, Policy, Censorship and Military Publications*. The two deputy chiefs of the Great General Staff added, after the Soviet model, a political second commander, which was later called *political deputy*.

On 15 February 1951, the *2nd Section Intelligence of the Great General Staff* became the *Intelligence Directorate of the Great General Staff*. Also, due to the increasing role of other sections, the need to transform them into directorates became obvious. According to a project of organisation of the Great General Staff, issued in 1956, at that time there were 4 directorates – *Operations, Planning-Mobilisation, Military Transport, Military Topography* – and six sections directly subordinate to the Chief of the Great General Staff – *Secretariat, Staff, 12th Section/Cipher, Signalling, Military Censorship* and the *Historical Section of the General Staff*. Operations Directorate was clearly the highest rated, having most of the sections in its organisation – Operations, Operational Training, Aviation and Air Defence, Regulations and the *Military Culture* review.

The need to express its own options within the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and to directly exercise the command of own troops within common exercises or in the event of a military action determined the leadership of the Great General Staff to consider the establishment of an operational component, called the *Romanian Front*, formed from most of our country's armed forces, which should act on an independent direction. After the moment of 1968, and especially after the passing of *Law no. 14 of 1972 on the national defence organisation of the Socialist Republic of Romania*, in which the concept of *the entire people's war* was adopted and implemented, the issue of a new operational structure of strategic level, called the *General Headquarters*, was raised again. In the context of the membership of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, of the Romanian military contribution

to preparation actions only with tactical and operational command structures, the allies accepted the solution of establishing an operational structure of strategic level (front), consisting of the sections and offices of the Infantry and Tanks Command, completed with personnel and signal technique, in keeping with an organisation plan and chart established by the Great General Staff. To this Romanian *Front*, there were subordinated all the forces acting on the south strategic direction (two Romanian armies and a Bulgarian one, air, naval and air defence forces) and it received orders from the Romanian Minister of National Defence. Along with establishing this operational structure, the issue of the creation, within the national defence system, of the General Headquarters, as an operational command of strategic level, stipulated in the mobilisation and operational documents of the Romanian Armed Forces, but not operationalised until 1989, although several large exercises were conducted, some of which at strategic level.

Until the current structure, since 1990, the General Staff has undergone several stages of organisation, its evolution following the stages of the military reform, which it has coordinated. This evolution has particularly sought, on the one hand, to simplify and streamline the act of command in the Armed Forces and, on the other hand, to get close and become interoperable with the similar structures of the NATO member states armed forces². As a result, since 1990, extensive measures to restructure the Romanian Armed Forces, in general, and the central structures of the ministry, in particular, have been taken (*figure 1*). This period has been very dense in changes, most of the newly created structures representing the initial components for achieving the next steps in the structural evolution of the General Staff.

Subsequently, between 1993 and 1997, the existing structures underwent major transformations, as follows:

- in 1993, the *Organisation, Mobilisation and Procurement Planning Directorate* was reorganised in the *Organisation and Mobilisation Directorate* and the *Planning Directorate* transformed in the *Personnel Directorate*;
- in 1994, the *Great General Staff* transformed into the *General Staff* and the *Personnel Directorate* became the *Personnel Inspectorate*;
- in 1995, the *Personnel Inspectorate* transformed in the *Personnel Directorate*.

Romania's status from that period in relation to the North Atlantic Alliance and its intention to accede to NATO favoured the initiation of a comprehensive reform process to reorganise the command structures of the Romanian Armed Forces and to adapt them to the tendencies of their evolution.

² The data and information are extracted from the organisation charts of the central structures of the Ministry of National Defence (the archive).




Figure 1: The Organisation of the General Staff between 1990 and 1993

This context required the projection and operationalisation of a national command and control structure, at strategic level, a smooth and flexible one, able to plan and conduct independent or joint military actions, interoperable and compatible with NATO leadership structures. On 14 April 1997, the *Romanian Government Decision no. 110 on the organisation of the Ministry of Defence* came into force. It was an important step, especially for the General Staff, because this echelon adopted, on 30 April 1997, as a novelty element, the *“Joint”-type organisational structure*, specific to the similar echelons of the NATO member states armed forces (*figure 2*).

In 1998, the first *Framework-Plan regarding the Romanian Armed Forces restructuring and modernisation* was developed, approved by the Supreme Council of National Defence. At the same time, the *Emergency Ordinance no. 7/1998 on the social protection of the personnel made redundant* following the restructuring of the Armed Forces was promoted and approved.

If the period 1997-2000 can be seen as an early and exploratory one, the period 2001-2003 is a stage in the revival and relaunch of the efforts for attaining the established goals (*figure 3*). To understand the real scale of our efforts, we consider it important to review the dynamic of the armed forces starting even from 1989. At the beginning of the restructuring process, the armed forces had 320 000 military positions, 180 000 in 2000, 140 000 in 2003, and at the end of 2007 it reached 90 000.

The *“Force Structure – 2003”*, approved by the *Resolution of the Supreme Council of National Defence no. 073 on 28.05.2001* stipulated the achievement of a compact force structure that was efficient, effective, flexible and compatible with NATO standards, up to 140 000 people (112 000 military and 28 000 civilians).

The change, in 2004, of Romania’s status of *“de facto” member state* to *“full-fledged member state”* within NATO led to assuming responsibilities in the organisational structure within the Romanian Armed Forces, able to ensure interoperability of own structures with those of the other NATO member states armed forces. In this context, the General Staff has been actually involved in tailoring defence planning documents to meet the specific requirements of the new status, in rethinking the concept of national defence and correlating it with the collective defence one, as well as in constantly reviewing the forces structure so that it meets the requirements of both the Alliance and the international commitments undertaken by Romania in the military field.

To achieve this goal, the General Staff developed conception documents that clearly highlighted the evolution of the Romanian Armed Forces structures in the short, medium and long term, such as: *“The Conception of restructuring*




Figure 2: The Organisational structure of the General Staff (1995-1997)




Figure 3: The organisation of the General Staff between 2000 and 2003

the Romanian Armed Forces in the period 2003-2007”, “*Force Goal – 2007*”, “*Force Goal 2007 – fundamentally reviewed*”.


Thus, through “*Force Goal – 2007*” fundamentally reviewed, developed on the basis of security prognoses in the medium term (5-10 years) and the opportunities and risks at home and abroad, it was sought the agreement of objectives with the priorities so that the forces structure could meet the minimum requirements imposed by the need for a credible defence capability and a degree of interoperability planned and undertaken by Romania in line with the NATO Ministerial Directive.

By 2004, the changes at the level of the force structure targeted certain objectives, particularly the development of reorganisation at the operational and tactical level and staff cut, with the purpose of a gradual resizing of the force structure in accordance with the capabilities that were to be achieved with the Alliance. For these reasons, this period is now considered as a reform and not a transformation one.

Because, in the period 2000-2005, the Alliance and the EU drew up programmatic documents that established the objectives and transformation stages until 2025, it was necessary for the Romanian Armed Forces to develop a document that summarised the transformation requirements and established the specific course of action of the Romanian Armed Forces in order to promote their own interests in the field of transformation. Thus, in 2006, the *Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy* was developed. Both this document and its implementation plan were the object of the *Planning>Monitoring>Assessment>Review* process, the outcome of this cycle being the review, in 2007, of the Strategy, with the purpose of planning a new force structure, with capabilities that are specific to NATO requirements for the 2009-2018 planning period. In the revised form, the *Transformation Strategy* sets the purpose, level of authority, objectives, period of applicability, with its stages, transformation domains and implementation mechanisms. Moreover, from the same organisational considerations, at the level of the General Staff it was established a structure specialised in the issue of the transformation process in order to manage the fulfilment of specific objectives at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

The *Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy* thus becomes a programmatic document, applicable to all structures of the Ministry of National Defence, which establishes the guiding principles and main objectives to be achieved, in stages, during 2006-2025, to ensure the success of the Romanian Armed Forces transformation process and its synchronisation with the military transformation of NATO and the European Union.

Consequently, transformation in the field of leadership, command and control is aimed at redesigning the existing structures to optimise the decision-operational



(*) Double-hatted structure: General Staff and Defence Intelligence General Directorate

Figure 4: The organisational structure of the General Staff (2008)

act in order to provide effective leadership to the forces in peacetime, to easily adapt the command system in crisis situations, at war, or to accomplish missions in civil emergencies, applicable both for commanding forces in national defence missions, in a limited period of time, as well as for connecting with an allied headquarters on the national territory or abroad, achieving planning, organisation, execution and control in an integrated, logical and coherent system.

At the end of 2008, the structure of the General Staff was improved (*figure 4*).

Currently, after completing the first stage, the second stage of transformation takes place – *the stage of operational integration in NATO and the EU*, which covers the period 2008-2015. During this phase, medium-term transformation objectives will be completed: the standardisation and continuation of forces operationalisation; the continuation of major procurement programmes; the reorganisation of military education; the increase in the contribution to NRF and the EU; the extension of the implementation of certain requirements for interoperability at the level of *force goals* in non-deployable units.

Briefly analysing the work of the General Staff, in correspondence with the historical stages covered and its vocation, it has ensured the management of the military body, which, beyond its intrinsic specificity, has not represented a separate domain, governed by different rules. It has permanently adapted to the requirements of the time and represented one of the pillars of the foundation and implementation of Romania's defence policy.

We must also note that, given the circumstances of the allocation of insufficient budgets for the armed forces, the General Staff has sought and found solutions to support this programme of modernisation of the military institution, although the implementation of procurement programmes and the achievement of interoperability with the NATO member states armed forces has been delayed. Nevertheless, internally, through the correlation of plans and programmes with the allocated resources, the established objectives on improving the combat capability of the Armed Forces were achieved, and, externally, credibility was gained and our country received the invitation to join the North Atlantic Alliance.

The essence of all the above-mentioned facts may be reduced to the conclusion that the Romanian Armed Forces are not exclusively dedicated to a defensive war, but rather a vehicle for increasing confidence and security, as well as one for carrying preventive actions to consolidate peace regionally and globally.

English version by
 **Iulia NĂSTASIE**

THE PERSONNEL AND MOBILISATION STRUCTURE WITHIN THE GENERAL STAFF – Performances of the Human Resource Management –

Brigadier General Gabriel GABOR

The process of modernising human resource management has started with developing the Concept of human resource management in the Romanian Armed Forces, whose strategic goal has been to develop a modern management system, capable of ensuring the maintenance of competitiveness in the military employment market.

The achievement of this goal has involved, in the author's opinion, the implementation of a new military career management system; the introduction of a new system of assessment of the military, which provides the framework and organisational tools in meant to improve and streamline the activities of each military man and to support analysis and selection processes for selection committees; the development of a set of principles and rules defining the functions of the Romanian Armed Forces professionalised military personnel, based on which the new organisational charts of the military structures have been projected and materialised.

Keywords: *recruitment and selection; linguistic competence; allied structures; personnel structures; military career*

Motto: *"It is not difficult to see how important personnel is in the armed forces; the quality of the armed forces and subsequently the outcomes always depend on the quality of the personnel".*

Marshal Alexandru Averescu



Starting from the assertion that man, with his aspirations and needs, is the most important asset of a society, we may state that an institution essentially based on the human factor, as the armed forces are, could not have gained the prestige and respect it enjoys without a cadre of carefully selected and highly trained people, permanently adapted to the assigned missions and tasks. This fact would not be possible without the existence of a structure that has a well-defined role and place to manage the available human resource. The act of birth of the personnel structure within the General Staff was signed on 12 November 1859, when, by the "High Order no. 83", the General Staff Corps of the United Principalities was established, meant to be a unique military structure related to conception and organisation in the armed forces.

Brigadier General Gabriel Gabor – Chief of the Personnel and Mobilisation Directorate within the General Staff.

Between 1859 and 1865 there was a “*pioneering period*” in the field of personnel and mobilisation. In this time interval, there were searched for and provided solutions to the numerous and highly difficult to solve problems that emerged in the process of building modern and efficient armed forces. Numerous normative acts were drawn up and put in practice. Among them, we mention the following: the “*Law regarding military hierarchy*”, which established two large categories of officers: the corps of combat officers and the corps of non-combat or assimilated officers; the “*Law regarding the promotion to rank*” – established rigorous criteria regarding the cadres promotion; the “*Law regarding recruitment*”, which regulated the fact that the military service should be compulsory for all the inhabitants but allowed for the rich young people to be replaced or exempted from it in exchange for a sum of money; the “*Regulation on payroll service*” – regulated the personnel monthly payment depending on the rank and position; the “*Law regarding the organisation of armed power*”, which established the elements of armed forces, namely permanent armed forces (with reserves), militias and crowds; the “*Law regarding the officers position*” – established the positions in which officers could be found: active, available, non-active, reserve and retired; the “*Regulations regarding periodical convocations of reservists, as well as the infantry and cavalry dorobantzes*”, and the “*Regulation on the crowds call and training*”.

In 1862, the first important reorganisation of the Ministry of War took place, as a result of the political-administrative unification of the two principalities, through which three directorates were established: the 1st – Personnel and Military Operations, the 2nd – Administration and the 3rd – Accountancy and Artillery and Engineers. Colonel Alexandru Christea was appointed Director of the Personnel and Military Operations Directorate. He was soon replaced with Major Gheorghe Catargiu.

The aim of the Personnel and Military Operations Directorate was to “*form active armed forces*”. It was responsible for keeping record of the generals and officers in the Staff Corps, as well as for the deployment and discipline of the troops, marches, manoeuvres, for the adaptation of the military regulations and for the publication of the ruler’s decrees.

The Constitution in 1866 stipulated that the ruler was the “*head of the armed power*” and was entitled to bestow military ranks in conformity with the law; it established the annual regulations on the armed forces contingents. The foreign troops stationing on the national territory was permitted only under the conditions of a special law. Moreover, it stated that the military service was compulsory for all the citizens and established the conditions for promotion, the officers’ positions, as well as the situations in which they could lose their ranks, honours and pensions.

The next period was one of adjustments, continuous adaptation to the requirements of the time, of searching for the most appropriate organisational forms that could

assure the effective leadership of the defence system, which explained the frequent changes and restructurings of the military system in its aggregate. As a matter of fact, the armed forces and consequently the personnel structures have always been subject to restructuring and reorganisation. From a service to a directorate organised into offices or a directorate organised into services and sections, the personnel structure has permanently adapted to the requirements of the time.

Once the organisational structure was changed, the missions of the personnel structures were changed accordingly, which resulted in a specialisation and a clearer differentiation of the competences related to different types of issues.

Thus, in 1870, the Personnel and Military Operations Directorate was organised into three offices and it was responsible for recruitment, military justice, personnel record keeping, organisational problems and military pensions. The year 1884 added a new office to the directorate, and as far as responsibilities were concerned, new responsibilities were added, such as military statistics, reservists and the changes in their situation, decorations. In 1889, General George Manu reorganised the directorate, redistributing the tasks, and changed its name into the Staff Service and Infantry Directorate.

The year 1891 brought a new reorganisation of the ministry and of the personnel structure that changed its name into the Infantry, Cavalry and Personnel Directorate. In April 1901, the Personnel Service, created in 1899, merged with the 1st Infantry Directorate. The Personnel and Infantry Service was created to function with five offices out of which one carried out the tasks of the former Infantry Directorate, the other ones performing specific tasks in the field of personnel. The year 1912 brought a new change. The Personnel Service was separated from the Infantry Directorate and tasks related to statistics and war veterans were added to the initial ones. The Service was organised into sections and offices and was led by a superior director having the general or colonel rank. The tasks established by law evinced a clearer differentiation regarding the expertise of the sections and offices and a stricter specialisation related to different types of issues.

The following years deepened the above-mentioned specialisation and required for new structures to be established, having the office level, focused on different personnel domains and categories: decorations, public servants, military clergy, the Armed Forces Superior Council, military students, reserve officers, NCOs.

The aggravation of the political and military situation in the fourth decade of the 20th century required for the adoption of a complex of measures meant for the enhancement of the military system structure and leadership. Thus, the Personnel Directorate was reorganised and raised to the rank of division. It was led by a director who had the following responsibilities: staffing the land forces; recruitment;

rise in rank of the military personnel (active and reserve); decoration of personnel; preparation of the works of the Superior Council of the Armed Forces and implementation of the Council's decisions.

After 23 August 1944, under the Soviet occupation and the pressure exercised by the Allied Control Commission, the Romanian Armed Forces underwent a new transformation process.

In 1949, within the Great General Staff there were 13 sections, among which Section 4 Organisation-Mobilisation, Section 5 Cadres (staff) and Section 7 Personnel Recruitment. After 1951, the Great General Staff was reorganised in four directorates, through the concentration of some sections (Operations, Planning-Mobilisation, Military Transportation, Military Topography). In July 1959, the Sergeants and Master Sergeants Corps, a structure of cadres borrowed from the Soviets and imposed on the Romanian Armed Forces on 14 July 1950, was disbanded and replaced by the NCOs and Warrant Officers Corps, a category of cadres that had a tradition in the Romanian Armed Forces.

The period of time between 1968 and 1989 brought new changes in the personnel and mobilisation structures depending on the responsibilities of the Great General Staff. They were called, in turn, the *Organisation and Mobilisation Directorate* and *Cadres and Education Directorate*, and they had responsibilities in the field of managing human resources, drawing up mobilisation plans, military structures organisational charts and statistical activities.

Between 1990 and 1993 the Cadres and Education Directorate was reorganised through establishing the *Personnel Directorate* and assigning the tasks related to education to the *Inspectorate for Culture and Education*. In 1991, Lieutenant General Nicolae Şchiopu was appointed Chief of the Directorate.

The Great General Staff was reorganised, in 1994, and its name was changed into the General Staff. The *Organisation, Mobilisation and Procurement Planning Directorate* was reorganised becoming the *Organisation and Mobilisation Directorate*. Brigadier General Ion Lulache was appointed Chief of the Directorate. In 1996, he was replaced by Brigadier General Nicolae Oprea.

The period of time between 1990 and 1997 brought new conceptual approaches to the human resource management system, and the specialised structure participated with personnel in drawing up new normative acts in the field of personnel and mobilisation, materialised through the adoption of *Law no. 80 regarding the military personnel status* and of *Law no. 46 regarding the population preparedness for defence*.

On 1 May 1997, the General Staff was restructured and had 8 joint-type directorates that covered the entire system of domains and tasks related

to the Armed Forces. The Organisation Mobilisation Directorate was renamed the Personnel, Human Resource Staffing and Mobilisation Directorate, and was led by Major General Petre Barangă between 1999 and 2004.

Between 2000 and 2001, the Personnel, Human Resource Staffing and Mobilisation Directorate was reorganised and became the Personnel and Mobilisation Directorate and the Organisation, Personnel and Mobilisation Directorate respectively, and contributed with specialised personnel to the drawing up of the *Military Career Guide* and other normative acts in the field of human resource management and the armed forces mobilisation, as well as to Romania's accession to NATO and the EU. In 2004, Brigadier General Ion Rizea was appointed Chief of the Directorate and, in 2005, he was replaced by Brigadier General Ioan Grecu.

In March 2007, following the reorganisation of the General Staff, the Organisation, Personnel and Mobilisation Directorate became the *Personnel and Mobilisation Directorate*, consisting of two services (personnel and mobilisation), sections, a technical secretariat and independent offices. It also coordinated the zonal military centres. Rear Admiral Victor Barbu was appointed Chief of the Directorate. The part related to organisation was subordinated to the Structures and Armament Planning Directorate.

Following the reorganisation in 2008, the Sociological Investigations Section was subordinated to the Human Resource Management Directorate, and the Psychology Section was transformed in the Psychological Assistance Office and the Psychological Laboratory. Brigadier General Dumitru Seserman was appointed Chief of the Personnel and Mobilisation Directorate until February 2009. This is the structure in which the directorate functions now.

The intensification of the reform and restructuring process, starting in 1995, has imposed the necessity to project an effective human resource management system to meet the Romanian Armed Forces current and future requirements and commitments in the context of the accession to NATO and the EU. The process of human resource management modernisation started once the *Concept of Human Resource Management in the Romanian Armed Forces* was drawn up. Its strategic objective was to develop a modern management system, capable of assuring the military institution competitiveness on the labour market. The achievement of this objective presupposed:

- to implement a new military career management system, to introduce the selection commissions in order to provide the favourable conditions so that the principles of transparency, equal chances and fairness with regard to the promotion of military personnel and their interest in self-improvement and own career projection could be applied;

- to introduce a new military personnel assessment system to provide the organisational framework and instruments to enhance and render effective the activity of each military man, as well as the support for the selection commissions in the analysis and selection process;
- to draw up a set of principles and norms designed to define the positions of the professionalised military personnel in the Romanian Armed Forces, norms and principles that lie at the basis of the new military structures organisational charts. Moreover, the *Law regarding the status of volunteers* was completed, following the elimination of conscription, law that contributed to the acceleration of the process of the military personnel professionalisation, in accordance with the necessity to assure interoperability with the armed forces of NATO member states, as well as the *Concept of training, professional development and utilisation of the NCOs and Warrant Officers in the Romanian Armed Forces* that lies at the basis of the redefinition of the place and role of the NCO/Warrant Officer in the military;
- to put in practice a new recruitment and selection system able to assure the enhancement of the quality and number of the candidates for the military profession, as well as the public opinion awareness regarding the role and place of the armed forces and the military profession in society;
- to create the legal framework for the development of the professionalised military personnel linguistic competence, which lies at the basis of achieving the necessary infrastructure.

The periodical assessments of the way in which the provisions of the *Concept of Human Resource Management in the Romanian Armed Forces* are met have evinced a series of malfunctions. In order to eliminate them, it has been necessary to establish some priority strategic directions meant for the human resource management modernisation, in accordance with the Armed Forces requirements related to the transformation and full integration into the Alliance structures.

To this end, the *Concept regarding the Modernisation of Human Resource Management in the Romanian Armed Forces* was drawn up, based on the following general principles – priority assurance of the units combat capabilities; promotion of transparency; assurance of equal chances; separation of policies and execution; assurance of interoperability with NATO and the EU similar structures; integrated management; selection of the most valuable personnel, in accordance with job description; assessment of performance and potential; enhancement of the status and of the image of the armed forces and the military profession – and aiming at the following strategic directions: modernisation of the human resource management institutional framework; attraction and generation of the human

resources that have a high potential for the military profession; efficient use, development and maintenance of competent human resources in the military system.

The application of these principles and strategic directions will assure the achievement of a competitive system of individual career management and will allow for the identification of the military personnel to fill vacant positions, obeying the principle *“the right man with the right education at the right place, at the right time and with minimum cost”*, taking into consideration the armed forces needs, job descriptions, and the options of the military personnel. With this end in view, the Directorate has drawn up the project for the *Directive regarding the individual career management* that comprises its objectives, domains, and organisation, as well as the specific responsibilities for the specialised departments, at all hierarchical levels, selection commissions, commanders, the counselled military personnel and career managers.

The implementation of the individual career management system is not the panacea for all the malfunctions in the armed forces human resource system but it is surely a decisive step in order to meet the requirements related to the full professionalisation of the domain.

Starting from the motto: *“the quality of the armed forces and subsequently the outcomes always depend on the quality of the personnel”*, the Personnel and Mobilisation Structure, through its well-defined role and place, has permanently contributed to the military personnel selection and preparation to accomplish the mission of the General Staff in its 150 years of existence. As a main component of the General Staff, the structure has undergone, as it has been mentioned, multiple changes and structural reorganisations, assuring the achievement of the specific tasks, namely to organise, command and manage the human resource, to create and staff force structures, to establish a system for the promotion of the military profession, for the military personnel recruitment and selection and to contribute to the drawing up of the specific normative acts related to the military and civilian personnel.

English version by
 ***Diana Cristiana LUPU***

THE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE 150 YEARS SINCE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GENERAL STAFF

Brigadier General Dr Dan PLĂVIȚU

Currently, Military Intelligence Directorate is a military intelligence service at strategic level, capable of providing the necessary information for all the levels of military and political-military command. The purpose of the entire military intelligence activity, as an intrinsic part of national defence, is to provide the conditions necessary for the successful achievement of Romania's military or non-military operations and actions, in partnership with its allies.

Today, more than ever, the concerns of this structure are focused on the modernisation and improvement of the military intelligence activity, as a guarantee of the provision of national defence and security and of the promotion of the state's fundamental interests, in accordance with the current and future realities, in which the direct military threat is replaced with the transnational, technological and information one.

Keywords: *national identity; sphere of influence; Warsaw Pact; armed forces; defence of Transilvania; territorial integrity*

The year 2009 marks the anniversary of 150 years since the General Staff of the Romanian Armed Forces was established, occasion on which, on 12 November 1859, Prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza decreed, through the High Order of the Day no. 83, the creation of the 2nd Section, the *first military intelligence structure* within the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the United Principalities. The new structure was responsible “*for all that is related to the statistical activities and regards the tactical and strategic activities such as military surveillance and routes, manoeuvre combination or control, position selection and military camps strengthening*”¹. The Section was led by Second Lieutenant Gheorghe Slăniceanu, assisted by Second Lieutenant Ștefan Fălcoianu. The two officers subsequently confirmed their expertise, advancing in the military hierarchy until they reached the rank of General and the highest military position, the one of Minister of War.

The development of the Military Intelligence Service of the Romanian Armed Forces has been

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¹****, *Direcția Informații Militare – ficțiune și adevăr*, Editura Romcart, București, 1994, p. 23.

influenced by the significant changes occurred within the regional and continental political and military environment that have affected Romania throughout times. The top moments of the military intelligence are connected to the fight of the Romanian Armed Forces during the *War of Independence* (1877-1878), the *First World War* (1916-1918) and the *Second World War* (1941-1945), as well as to the decisive moments in Romania's history such as the signing of the *Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact* (23 August 1939) and the *Vienna Awards*, in the summer of 1940.

We will further approach the milestones of the history of the Military Intelligence Directorate of the Romanian Armed Forces.

During the War of Independence, the *2nd Section* became part of the General Headquarters and was assigned new roles required by the war. The attacks on the strongholds of Plevna, Grivița and Vidin, carried out without taking into account the intelligence on combat conditions that were timely signalled by the Section, resulted in heavy losses for the Romanian troops. That fact drew attention on the significance of the military intelligence and subsequent steps were undertaken in order to develop the young military intelligence service.

Following the War of Independence, the first Romanian military attachés were sent to mission abroad. The military attaché positions in Paris, Brussels, Vienna, Rome, Berlin, Ankara, Belgrade, Athens, London, Sofia and Moscow were created by 1916. From that moment, new missions were assigned to the *2nd Section*, which were included, in 1884, in the Staff Service Regulation, such as the “*study of other countries' armed forces, permanent observation of military affairs and study of scientific issues of interest for the armed forces*”².

Starting in 1907, the name of the structure was the “*2nd Section – Operations, Study of Foreign Armed Forces, Intelligence and Stages*”; its tasks were better defined and more comprehensive.

In 1916, based on the High Decree no. 2784, dated 14 August, the Great General Staff underwent an ample process of reorganisation, with the purpose of being ready for the state of war. On that occasion, the Military Intelligence Service was also reorganised as the *2nd Intelligence Bureau* of the Military Attaché Service and of the Press, which was part of the General Headquarters and then, the *5th Bureau – Intelligence and News Surveillance* of the General Staff. It was estimated, in the documents of the time, that the “*national war was the great challenge the intelligence had to cope with*”³ taking into account, among other things, that the Romanian Armed Forces were deployed along a 1 400 km front (the longest in Europe) and the enemy they faced had the most powerful and modern armed force in Europe at that time.

² *Regulamentul Serviciului de Stat Major*, 1884.

³ *Direcția Informații Militare...*, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

An important moment in the process concerning the reorganisation of the Military Intelligence Service was represented by the paper called “*Instructions on the intelligence service’s organisation and functions*”, approved by the Chief of the General Headquarters, General Constantin Prezan, in 1917. That paper set the military intelligence’s doctrine and took the military intelligence service out of the authority exerted by various departments of the General Staff, whose rules such as “*The Regulation on the campaign service*” laid down limits related to the initiative, planning and performing of the intelligence collection activities.

At the beginning of the 1917 campaign, the Romanian Armed Forces had a reshaped and enhanced intelligence service that, “*for the fights in the summer of 1917, worked a lot and timely provided everything*”⁴. Given the exchange of intelligence with the allied military commands of that time, the overall offensive on the Italian front was timely signalled by the military intelligence service and it was a significant success in the domain of intelligence activities.

In 1925, the Intelligence Section within the General Staff was raised to the level of “*Division*” and worked as the *2nd Division of the General Staff* until 1927, when its previous name was reinstated. In the following period, the activities carried out by the *Military Intelligence Service* were paid special attention. Thus, capabilities for intelligence collection, specific methods and procedures and appropriate manuals and regulations were developed. Specialty-related courses were held and instructions on the intelligence tasks of the border troops, gendarmerie, customs, post (office) and railway agents were drawn up, as well as studies on the structure of the intelligence service by radio and encrypted communication within the Romanian Armed Forces. It was that precise moment when suggestions were made on the setting up of two border radio goniometry posts, which proved that the Service intended to upgrade its equipment for intelligence collection. Studies and political-military analyses performed by specialists in this domain had an exceptional level of professionalism and were focused on the analysis of data related to countries and strategic armed forces, to their economic, social, military and political capabilities as well as to their intents and military and non-military modus operandi.

In 1924, the General Staff decided to establish a secret intelligence service following the pattern of the French civilian intelligence service and attached it to the *2nd Section*. The founder and the first chief of this structure until 1940 was Mihail Moruzov. With few exceptions, documents in the archives do not refer to that period of time and a record kept in the Archives of the Ministry of National Defence stipulated that the documents of the Armed Forces’ Secret Service were

⁴ Paul Ștefănescu, *Istoria serviciilor secrete românești*, Editura Divers-Press, București, 1994, p. 48.

destroyed by Moruzov himself before being taken into custody by the communists, and they were almost completely destroyed by the bombings in August 1944.

Between the two world wars, Captain Ioan Tomoroveanu, an officer of the *2nd Section*, suggestively summarised the particular character and dynamism of the military intelligence activity: *“Today, intelligence is not what it used to be. Studies, even periodical ones, on the situation of the service are more than necessary because, as far as intelligence is concerned, we are never at peace but at war all the time”*⁵.

In early 1939, the *2nd Section* and the *Secret Intelligence Service* made an ample study on the expansion of Germany to the Eastern and Southeastern Europe, on the potential stances of certain countries in that political-military context with focus on the implications on Romania; the conclusions of the study represented a basis for outlining the Romanian foreign policy at that time. Aspects of the study were confirmed by the later events and marked the commencement of the Second World War. The number of papers drawn up by the *2nd Section* from 1927 to 1939 is impressive and thus it made available the necessary intelligence for the leadership of the Armed Forces and of the Romanian state that decided upon the preparations to enter the war. It is worth noticing the impartiality of the studies and analyses performed by the *2nd Section*, and its papers remained unbiased even given the influence exerted by the political decision-makers of that moment.

In 1939, the *Military Intelligence Service* got hold of the German-Hungarian operation plans against Poland and Romania and, consequently, the General Staff took the appropriate measures to defend Transilvania.

Nevertheless, in the dramatic summer of 1940, Romania lost more than 100 000 square kilometres of the national territory and more than 7 million people. The Military Intelligence Service timely informed on the events that jeopardised the Romanian interests and thus it paid its contribution to keeping the national identity under the difficult circumstances encountered by Romania. The whole military intelligence system was committed to the general effort of the Romanian Armed Forces during the operations performed by the Romanian troops, from the smallest echelons, on both Western and Eastern fronts.

In 1942, relying on the collected intelligence, the uncertainty concerning the possibility for the Third Reich to win the war took shape. Two years later, the *2nd Section* estimated that *“the fact that Germany was losing the war became undeniable”*⁶, and the following conclusion was reached, according to which *“Romania’s ultimate hesitation should be removed and the moment when it should*

⁵ *Direcția Informații Militare... , op. cit., p. 76.*

⁶ Arhiva Ministerului Apărării Naționale, Marele Stat Major, file 2853/1944, p. 17.

leave the Axis must be chosen taking into account the situation of the German forces on the Romanian territory”⁷.

After the end of the Second World War, despite the fact that Romania made significant contribution to the victory of the allied powers and to the fact that it “shortened” the war by approximately 6 months (through its 22 divisions that were sent to combat), Romania was considered a defeated country and, beyond the obligations imposed by the war compensations, it entered under the Soviet Union’s influence. From 1944 to 1947, under the actions of the Soviet Allied Control Commission, the 2nd Section lost its information-operational characteristic and even its name and became “The 2nd Section for intelligence combat training and foreign affairs”, and its strength was downsized by 85 per cent.

After 1958, the focus was laid on the development of the military intelligence activity and mainly on the protection of the Romanian vital interests. Thus, the intelligence cooperation within the Warsaw Treaty Organisation was limited to issues of general interest and no information-operational commitment by Romania was performed. At the same time, the attempts to establish a structure meant to coordinate the intelligence activities within this organisation were tactfully and consistently avoided by Romania.

In 1964, Romania made public its decision to defend its interests, independence, national sovereignty and territorial integrity. The military intelligence was reshaped the same year and the *Armed Forces Intelligence Directorate* of the General Staff was established.

In 1968, the *Armed Forces Intelligence Directorate* timely informed about the military intents of the Soviet Union against Czechoslovakia and, thus, immediate measures were taken to increase combat readiness of the Romanian units and large units. Surveillance and radio reconnaissance capabilities were developed.

In 1990, following the post-revolution circumstances, the name of the *Intelligence Directorate* of the General Staff was changed into the *Armed Forces Reconnaissance Directorate*. In 1993, the name of *Military Intelligence Directorate* was reinstated and the basic foundations of the new service were established, with the purpose of supporting the integration of Romania in the Euro-Atlantic structures. That was the moment when Romania opened its Military Representation office to NATO.

In 1999, the Defence Intelligence General Directorate was established and both the Military Intelligence Directorate and the Military Counterintelligence Directorate were subordinated to this structure and since 2003, by assuming

⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 20.

responsibilities specific to the J-2 structure, the Military Intelligence Directorate has again been operationally subordinated to the General Staff. As a result of the fact that Romania joined NATO and the European Union, the issue of national intelligence structures' adjustment to the methods and cooperation performed at the level of the Alliance and of the European community, especially of the military intelligence structures, was obvious. This process related to the adjustment and harmonisation to meet the requirements of the NATO and EU intelligence structures was a difficult and challenging one, because of numerous structural contrasts and ways of approaching things at the level of the two bodies. Among the most important factors that influenced this process there were interoperability (capability to share information) and compatibility amid similar services of the allied countries' armed forces.

Thus, the current structure of the Military Intelligence Directorate is the indicator of successive changes in the reform process of the Romanian Armed Forces as well as the image of a modern system, facing a continuous development.

Throughout its evolution, the Military Intelligence Service of the Romanian Armed Forces has been permanently characterised by development trends, in order to tailor itself to meet the new political and military conditions. Having a simple and less developed structure at the beginning, the current Military Intelligence Service has diversified its procurement, missions and collection capabilities to better serve the interests of a modern Romania that joined NATO and the EU, being able to provide information to the political-military and military decision-makers that is needed to fulfil their missions and especially to avoid strategic surprise at the military and non-military levels.

Nowadays, more than ever, the concerns of the Military Intelligence Directorate are connected to the modernisation and enhancement of the military intelligence activities, as a guarantee for defence and national security and for the promotion of the basic interests of the country, in compliance with the current and future realities, particularly because of the fact that the direct military threat is replaced by the transnational, technological and information one.

Currently, the Military Intelligence Directorate is a strategic level intelligence service able to provide information needed at all military and political-military levels. The goal of the whole military intelligence activity, as an inherent element of the national defence, is to ensure successful conditions for the military and non-military operations performed by Romania along with its allies.

The development of the military intelligence capabilities, as an inherent core part of the process concerning the transformation of the Armed Forces and a desideratum related to the achievement of the intelligence supremacy,

consists of new approaches as far as the collection capabilities are concerned (*HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT, OSINT, GEOINT, MEDINT* etc.). In this respect, the process meant for the reorganisation of the specific capabilities of military intelligence (analysis and collection) is in full progress at the level of all services of the Armed Forces, the large units and units, a process which is also aimed at developing the integrated management capabilities and at merging the multi-source information into a unitary conception.

Moreover, for the Military Intelligence Directorate, the development of capabilities related to synthesis, assessment, analysis and forecast is still a priority. The multi-source analysis has become an active and dynamic tool that is necessary to ensure that the commanders and decision-makers at the political and military levels are timely brought up to date.

Last but not least, the development of the capabilities concerning the intelligence management and secure communications that provide interoperability between the collection and the analysis is a goal permanently pursued by the leadership of the Military Intelligence Directorate, simultaneously with ensuring the capability to duplicate the databases in case of critical events and disasters (including in case of conflict).

The participation in the theatres of operations of the military intelligence special detachments consisting of mixed structures and specialised ones such as *HUMINT, SIGINT* and *IMINT*, through the national intelligence cells and staff intelligence officers within various multinational command structures, has represented a real challenge for the Military Intelligence Directorate. The military intelligence structures that have been operationally led by the Military Intelligence Directorate and deployed to the theatres of operations have been manned by more than 1 200 officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers, representing a figure which is of approximately 13 per cent of the total strength of the Romanian Armed Forces participating in the international missions so far.

During the participation of the national intelligence structures in the theatres of operations, from 2003 to 2008, three NCOs lost their lives and other four intelligence officers and NCOs were wounded.

Through the military intelligence activity performed by the personnel of the Military Intelligence Directorate, especially in the theatres of operations, the Romanian Armed Forces General Staff has achieved international acknowledgment, as well as a well-deserved appreciation within NATO and the EU.

THE OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE – A Century and a Half of Existence within the General Staff –

Brigadier General Dr Dumitru SCARLAT

In the author's opinion, the Romanian Armed Forces participation in wars, its military successes and failures cannot be understood and assessed unless a minimum reference is made to the activity of the superior conception and command body – the Great General Staff, the Great Headquarters respectively.

Thus the operations structure/ the Operations Section of the Great General Staff, through the quality and timeliness of the specific documents drawn up, as well as through the original solutions and the practical measures taken to solve some difficult and complex strategic-operative situations, imposed itself during the First World War as one of the central elite bodies of our armed forces.

The Operations Section directly influenced the victorious path of our armed forces, making a distinctive mark on the physiognomy of the most significant moments of the War of National Reunification.

Keywords: *foreign aggression; manoeuvre organisation and command; national defence system; modern military body; national territory*

The history of the central structure meant for military operations, from the establishment of the first organisational entity for operations – the 2nd Section, to the present-day complex configuration – the *Operations Directorate* within the General Staff may be looked upon as one significant chapter in the history of the Romanian Armed Forces during the last 150 years.

From the 1859 Unification of the Romanian Principalities to 1877, all political efforts were oriented towards the achievement of the supreme purpose assumed by the Romanian society: to gain the national sovereignty and to bring Romania into line with the modern European states. Among these internal events, one can mention the reforms initiated by Prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza, those performed in the military domain having a noteworthy impact on the subsequent political and military developments.

Permanently acting as a structure directly subordinated to the General Staff of the Romanian Armed Forces, the Operations Directorate

Brigadier General Dr Dumitru Scarlat – Deputy Chief of the Operations Directorate within the General Staff.

has remained closely tied to the destiny of the General Staff. Therefore, the evolution of the Operations Directorate is circumscribed to the structural changes of the General Staff, the central body in the elite of the Romanian military, which has manifested as a true *“brain of the armed forces”* since its setting up to now.

Based on the Order of the Day no. 123 signed by Prince Al. I. Cuza on 14 December 1859, the first central military operations structure was established as a component of the General Staff of the Romanian Armed Forces. The creation and functioning of this highly specialised operations body only one month after the establishment of the General Staff – 12 November 1859, represented a reference moment in the process of crystallisation and modernisation of the national military system, a fundamental prerequisite for steadily increasing the operational and combat capacity of the young armed forces of the United Principalities.

Taking into consideration its essential role for increasing the readiness, conducting the preparations of the armed forces for war and leading the military operations through campaigns, the central operations structure – office, section or directorate – gained a lot of attention and substantial support from the highest military leadership, and through the years it has become a high-class standard for the Romanian Armed Forces, an elite, fully professional body, filled with the most competent, righteous and perfectly honest staff officers.

The central operations structure of our armed forces has demonstrated its inherent values in the most dramatic circumstances experienced by the Romanian nation during the last 150 years. In this respect, the main operations structure prepared, planned and led the military operations, usually with positive results, throughout six major campaigns (1877-1878; 1913; 1916; 1917; 1919; 1941), coordinating at least ten operations at strategic and strategic-operative levels, both on national territory and far away from the own borders, and involving hundreds and tens of thousands of military men.

The beginnings, the exact circumstances of the establishment of both the General Staff and its specialised operations structure are rigorously mentioned, in a chronicle style, in the archive of the 1st Regiment of the Line. Hence, in the respective documents there are written down records about some military exercises conducted in the presence of Al. I. Cuza, in Iași, in 1859, just a few months after the Unification of the Romanian Principalities. Prince Cuza observed the need for establishing a superior body in charge of commanding the training activities and requested a study to settle the question. Consequently, on 12 November 1859, the High Order of the Day no. 83 was issued by which Al. I. Cuza approved the establishment of the *General Staff Corps of the United Principalities Armed Forces*. As a central military service, the institution would comprise officers of all ranks,

including colonels, with special military knowledge “*achieved through systematic studies*”. Setting up the General Staff Corps was aimed to conduct “*the execution of technical military operations*” and to carry out special missions.

The founding document of the first specialised central operations structure is the Order of the Day no. 123, issued on 14 December 1859, based on the High Order of the Day no. 83, only a month after its signing, and intended to settle the order of battle of the first General Staff.

In accordance with the provisions of the High Order of the Day no. 83, the General Staff was organised on four sections. Even if there were not given particular names to the sections, their roles and functions resulted from the analysis of attributions and responsibilities stipulated within Article 7 of the High Order of the Day no. 83. Simultaneously, each section was staffed with a section chief, 3-4 officers and 2-3 assistants (except for the 4th section). Through the corroboration of the content of both founding documents – the High Order of the Day no. 83 and the Order of the Day no. 123 –, as well as through the comparative analysis of the attributions of the four sections, we can draw the following relevant conclusion: because of the responsibilities it was assigned with, the 2nd Section meets all the requirements for being considered the first specialised operations structure of the Romanian Armed Forces. As a functional component of the General Staff, it can be named the “*Military Operations Section*”, as it was known for a long time until after the Second World War.

The previous statements are sustained by the missions assigned to the 2nd Section on the basis of the High Order of the Day no. 83, as follows: executing topographical surveys and geodesic works to map the country and providing the other cartographical materials, absolutely needed for the adequate training of the staff officers and carrying out specific tasks; drawing up studies, strategic and tactical plans for troops and higher military leadership in view of the preparations required by facing any external aggression; executing specific military training activities; leading the marches of different military echelons; organising and leading the manoeuvres; establishing and preparing particular military dispositions.

Moreover, it is worth mentioning the names of the four officers appointed to serve in the first operations structure: chief – Second Lieutenant Gheorghe Slăniceanu and his assistants, Second Lieutenants Nicolae Dona, Constantin Barozzi and Ștefan Fălcoianu. All of them confirmed, in the course of time, their own character and military value by becoming first-class personalities of the Romanian military institution. Mention should be made that all of them took part in the War of Independence.

The evaluation of the results obtained by the staff officers employed in military operations between 1859-1877 stands out as an extremely positive summing up. One can notice especially the outstanding professionalism, loyalty and responsibility proved by these military specialists who fulfilled the assigned tasks, overcoming the difficulties and preponderantly unfavourable conditions (frequent reorganisations of operations structures; the lack of traditions and longer practical experience etc.).

Immediately after the establishment, together with all the other subdivisions of the General Staff, the 2nd Section was faced with a first difficult exam, represented by the obligation to urgently unify the armed forces of the Romanian Principalities in order to create a unique, modern, viable and efficient military institution that was always ready to serve the Romanian nation. A remarkable contribution towards increasing the combat capacity of the armed forces through manoeuvres and operational and tactical exercises belonged to the staff officers specialised in planning and conducting military operations. They were requested both to realise the concept of the scenarios needed for applications and to lead tactical echelons during training activities.

The Operations Section during the War of Independence

An intense staff activity, especially in the operations functional area, started with the autumnal manoeuvres held in September-October 1876, occasion on which the territorial and permanent troops were mobilised. The *General Headquarters* was established for the first time, headed by Colonel Gheoghe Slăniceanu – Chief of the General Staff, and seconded by Colonel Constantin Barozzi – Deputy Chief of the General Staff. Obviously, the staff officers working in the operations functional area at the level of the General Staff were entrusted with full responsibilities for preparing, planning and conducting the exercises and manoeuvres involving the four divisions, as well as the infantry and cavalry brigades. These staff officers were assigned the mission to identify, propose and set down the best possible concentration areas and combat disposition of our troops during the strategic operations meant to cover the Danube river line, to cross over, to march and to occupy the combat disposition near Plevna.

27 April 1877 is to be remembered as a milestone in the organisational evolution of the operations structure, when this specialised body is mentioned by the name of “*Operations Section*” for the first time since its establishment.

Even if the after action reviews and subsequent analyses have drawn attention to some deficiencies in planning and conducting operations during the military actions in Plevna, it does not mean they diminish in any way the services

and qualities proved by the staff officers of the Operations Section: high conceptual and analytical capacity, initiative, creativity, self-sacrifice and abnegation, unreserved attachment to the noble cause of the national independence.

The Operations Section between 1878 and 1916

After the conclusion of the War of Independence, the Romanian troops passed, in August 1878, from the state of war to the state of peace, the staff officers being assigned to different staffs and branches on the positions they had filled before the war. The Operations Section continued to function as a component of the General Staff – exercising all the prerogatives proper to a central consultative body, consisting of two distinct structures: the *General Staff* and the *Staff Corps*.

Taking into consideration the lessons learned during the 1877 campaign and under the influence of the European military evolutions, the General Staff expanded its own organisational activities and, in 1882, transformed itself into the Great General Staff, comprising three main sections. Through the assigned missions, the 1st Section represented, at that time, the central operations structure of the Romanian Armed Forces. Step by step, the 1st Section continuously improved its own structure and functionality, taking upon itself more and more functional responsibilities. Therefore, after 1912, the Operations Section became the main component of the Ministry of Defence, able to efficiently coordinate and unitarily guide the doctrinal and planning processes, organisation, command and control of the military forces of the national defence system.

Through the specialised body of the Operations Section, from the very beginning, in 1882, the Great General Staff was invested with full authority to prepare all the preliminary studies that were needed for deploying and leading the armed forces during operations at war.

Drawing studies and hypotheses with regard to the actions of armed forces at war, and considering the potential enemies and the probable theatres of military operations, relevant theoretical contributions were made for solving essential problems that affected the functionality of the highest echelon in charge of military decisions. To be successful, such an approach implied long years of prodigious work and remarkable intellectual efforts. With regard to the strategic command and control, the simple reading of the documents drawn up in this period of time points out their inherent qualities as being prestigious achievements of the Romanian military thinking. The ideas, conclusions, principles and procedures comprised in the hypotheses concerning the most probable ways of engaging Romania in a possible war have remained surprisingly topical even after all these years. They are interesting not only for historians but also for military planners,

and point out the personality features of their authors in the area of moral qualities – responsibility, reliability, loyalty and patriotism, as well as in the area of professional qualities – professionalism, exceptional competence, significant military and general education, sustained by their deep understanding of contemporary political and military evolutions.

The Operations Section during the War of National Reunification (1916-1919)

The participation of the Romanian Armed Forces in war, the military successes and failures cannot be understood and appreciated unless we even minimally mention the activities performed by the highest military conception, command and control body – the Great General Staff, respectively the General Headquarters –, the last one representing the wartime organisation of the highest national command.

As it was proved by the concrete evolutions of the military situation on the “*Romanian battlefield*”, the operations structure (Operations Section) of the General Headquarters, through its original solutions and measures taken to settle difficult and complex strategic and operational circumstances, imposed itself during the war as one of the elite central structures of our armed forces.

Between 1913 and 1916, the central operations structure of the Romanian Armed Forces consisted in the 6th Operations Office, which was part of the 3rd Section, one of those three sections which formed the Great General Staff. Starting with the mobilisation of the General Headquarters – 15 August 1914, the operations structure was represented by the 1st Operations Section, belonging to the 1st Echelon organisational chart of the active part of the General Headquarters. In the following period, a lot of reorganisations took place regarding the personnel, missions and responsibilities of the Operations Section, all of them being strongly influenced by the personality of Ion Antonescu, who was then a Major, appointed as chief of the 1st Operations Office.

After Romania entered war in August 1916, for the next 3 years, the “*destiny*” of our country would identify almost entirely with the “*uniform*” worn by Romanian soldiers, which would together pursue a glorious path strewn with victories, defeats and considerable sacrifices, at the end of which they would have laid the strong foundation of transforming into reality the long lasting national dream – the historical aim of achieving full state unity.

As an essential component of the General Headquarters, by both its successful outcomes and unfortunate errors, the Operations Section exerted a direct influence

upon the engagements of the Romanian Armed Forces throughout the war, leaving its distinct mark on the physiognomy of the most significant battles during the War of National Reunification.

The Operations Section during the Interwar Period (1920-1939)

In the first years after the war, together with the other sections of the Great General Staff, the Operations Section became actively involved in the process of developing a new military national system, corresponding to the new realities of the country (more varied and longer borders – 3 400 km), to the dynamics of the balance of power at international level, as well as to the tendencies observed in the organisation of the armed forces of certain developed states.

At the same time, taking into consideration the combat experience and the lessons learned from the war and in order to include the new theoretical knowledge in the current activities, another reorganisation of subdivisions was required to improve the functionality of the Operations Section, as well as a series of actions meant to review the operating procedures and to form highly specialised staff officers in the functional area of military operations.

A favourable aspect of the structural changes within the Operations Section was that these changes were corroborated with the ones imposed by the assigned missions and the need for operationally managing the risks to national defence and for properly meeting the exigencies of the military alliances Romania was part of.

Moreover, some organisational and functional changes in the structure of the Operations Section were generated by the profound transformations produced in the military domain as a consequence of the technical and scientific revolution of that time. As a result, the operations planning and conducting were radically transformed after the Romanian military system started embracing and applying new modern strategic and operational concepts, namely manoeuvre warfare, movement warfare, combined armed forces operations etc.

In 1920, when the Romanian Armed Forces returned to peacetime organisation, the status of the Operations Section was radically changed within the Great General Staff, meaning that it was increased from “*office*” to “*section*”. Implicitly, it meant that the “*Operations Section*”, which was formed only within the General Headquarters, therefore only at war, would from then on become a permanent and distinct operations structure in peacetime as well.

During this period, the organisational and functional stability of the Operations Section provided continuity and highest quality to all staff activities, as well as

conceptual and doctrinal coherence in the development and implementation of the documents needed for planning and conducting operations.

During the interwar period, the Operations Section was dimensioned in accordance with the missions assigned through the internal regulations of the Great General Staff, which mainly referred to the development of campaign plans that were required by the necessities of defending the national territory through own forces or within the military alliances Romania was part of. It goes without saying that the Operations Section was actively involved in all the preparatory works, as well as in conducting the activities that were agreed upon through the military conventions concluded between Romania and other countries, especially within the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente.

The Operations Section during the Second World War and in the First Post-war Years (1939-1947)

Together with all the other subdivisions of the Great General Staff, the Operations Section succeeded in providing a unitary and efficient command of all the military operations conducted, being able to solve complex and difficult problems, many of them exceeding the classical frame of strategy and military tactics of those days. Among the solutions adopted by the Operations Section and materialised into strategic command documents, there are the Operational Directives issued on 23 and 30 August 1944, from which we can point out the following guidelines and courses of action: the correct order of priorities (missions); combining strategic cover (classical combat) with fighting “*in hotbeds*” (in localities or along the lines of communication); the manoeuvre on interior directions; the maintenance of strategic initiative by outrunning the enemy in action etc.

Between 12 May 1945 and 30 December 1947, the Operations Section of the Great General Staff placed in the centre of its attention the return to the peacetime organisation of the armed forces, aiming to create a modern military body, strong enough to be able to defend national borders and homeland independence. Just after the end of the war, convincing efforts were undertaken by the staff officers of the Operations Sections to develop a national Romanian military doctrine and national military strategies. According to the chief of the 3rd Operations Section, Colonel N. I. Dragodănescu, such documents were intended to create “*new armed forces, representing a real military power, based on the inherent virtues of the Romanian people, formed through the implementation of the lessons learned from the war in keeping with the necessities of the future*”.

The Establishment and Evolution of the Operations Directorate between 1948 and 2009

The complex and contradictory evolutions of the internal political and social situation have directly and indirectly influenced the activity of Operations Directorate. Through its assigned responsibilities, mainly at strategic and operational level, the Operations Directorate has permanently represented the highly specialised “hard core” of the General Staff, consequently being less exposed to the negative effects generated by certain political influences.

In order to increase the operational capability of the structures subordinated to the General Staff, the Operations Directorate organised training and evaluation activities for all level headquarters, with positive results regarding the many-sided problems of accomplishing specific missions and objectives and completing assigned tasks.

After the 1989 Romanian revolution, especially lately, the Operations Directorate has joined the irreversible path of improving and increasing the qualitative level of all activities, meeting the requirements imposed by the military reform, and remaining in the elite of the General Staff. The arguments in favour of such a conclusion consist in the constant positive appreciations of certain Romanian and NATO political and military personalities made to the staff of the Operations Directorate who have taken part in different NATO and EU missions.

Under the coordination of the Operations Directorate, through the participation in real missions abroad, the units and military personnel have gained real experience and very good theoretical knowledge. The tasks assigned to the Romanian units and staff personnel working for multinational headquarters have been fully achieved, in keeping with the assigned mandate, the tasking orders and the standard operating procedures (SOPs) specific to each operation.

Beginning with the participation of the Romanian peacekeeping battalions in international missions under the aegis of the United Nations in Angola, and continuing with the deployment of a Romanian detachment in Albania to join the *Alba* Mission conducted by NATO, the “test by fire” and proof of maturity of the Romanian Armed Forces has been represented by the participation in the theatres of operations in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan since 2000.

As far as Afghanistan is concerned, the Romanian Armed Forces have been taking part in missions in this theatre of operations with combat units/sub-units and staff personnel since February 2002, mostly within the US-led coalition (*Enduring Freedom*) but also in the NATO-led *International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)*. Gradually, as the *ISAF* became more and more important,

most of the forces of the Romanian contingent in Afghanistan were transferred to this mission, beginning with August 2006, when the Romanian battalion was assigned with providing the security of Zabol province, having an US subunit under its subordination. In order to accomplish this mission, it was necessary to build up command elements and distinct structures meant to provide combat and logistic support, and, as a consequence, the Romanian personnel participation increased from 500 to 800 troops. At the same time, the Romanian Armed Forces take part in the efforts of training the Afghan National Security Forces, deploying two Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams beginning with October 2008 and June 2009 and therefore increasing the Romanian contribution in Afghanistan to 1 048 troops. Currently, the Romanian military participation in Afghanistan consists of 990 troops within the *ISAF* and 58 troops in the US-led *Enduring Freedom* mission.

In Iraq, Romania participated in operation *Iraqi Freedom* from the very beginning of the military actions on Kuwait's territory with the 383rd NBC Defence Company from the 81st Mechanised Brigade, with 70 troops, subordinated, from April to October 2003, to the US Forces. After the major military operations were concluded by the US and UK forces, beginning with July 2003, Romania participated with military units and staff personnel in the process of stabilising the Republic of Iraq during the operations *Iraqi Freedom*, *Iraqi Sunset*, *NTM-I* and the UN mission *UNAMI*. Until the end of our country's participation in Iraq, a total number of 8 415 Romanian troops were deployed.

In recognition to the significant contribution and efforts made by our country, beginning with November 2006, Romania held the position of deputy chief of staff for operations in the Coalition's *Multinational Force Iraq – MNF-I* (Brigadier General – with one star), in charge of coordinating the actions conducted by the countries contributing to the Coalition, other than the US.

On 4 June 2009, in the presence of the Romanian President, the ceremony of ending the missions assigned to the Romanian Armed Forces in Iraq was held in Tallil military base, in which the Commander of the Multinational Forces in Iraq, the US Ambassador to Baghdad, the Chief of the Joint General Staff of the Iraqi Armed Forces, local authorities and the US brigade commander which coordinated the Romanian battalion participated.

In the Balkans, Romania took part in the *IFOR* mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina from March to December 1996 with one Engineer Battalion (200 troops) and staff personnel. Beginning with 20 December 1996, the tasks of this mission were assumed by *SFOR* and, implicitly, the Romanian military were subordinated to it. Step by step, following the change for the better made by *SFOR*, the multinational force structure gradually assumed other forms of organisation, which required

the deployment into the theatre of operations of new Romanian subunits, including a military police platoon, a national intelligence cell, and additional positions in *SFOR* NATO Headquarters in Sarajevo. In November 2004, the *SFOR* mission under the aegis of NATO ended, its responsibilities being handed over to the European Union (*EUFOR*), which assumed command of the new force, with a new name, *ALTHEA*.

Beginning with 2000, the Romanian Armed Forces became actively involved in the theatre of operations from Kosovo as well.

Nowadays, in the Balkans, there are still deployed a Romanian *Infantry Detachment* (ROFND), in Pec, with 86 military assigned with providing security and freedom of movement along the lines of communication within the area of responsibility, the *national intelligence elements*, a *military police platoon* in charge of maintaining public order in particular areas, and *33 military* within the multinational headquarters from Prishtina, Pec and Sarajevo.

Through the participation in these operations, the Romanian Armed Forces have fully contributed to promoting Romania's vital political and military interests, consolidating the credibility of our country, initially as partner, later on as a NATO member, as well as a member of US-led coalitions. The benefits that have been gained cover both the operational experience and the prestige of the Romanian Armed Forces.

From the viewpoint of operational benefits, the most relevant ones may be considered as follows: field experience in theatres of operations with omnipresent asymmetric threats; improved combat training and experience for units and staff personnel in accordance with Coalition or NATO standard operating procedures; improved skills of the Romanian military personnel for planning and conducting combat missions; increased interoperability level; field verification of the viability characterising weaponry and military equipments in order to identify their limitations; improved concept for military purchases; operational testing of weaponry and military equipments in combat circumstances, and based on observed limitations, revision of major acquisition programmes of the Romanian Armed Forces.

As for the benefits regarding the image of the Romanian Armed Forces, Romania has proved to be a credible partner in NATO and coalition operations, a contributor to collective security as well as a reliable security provider in different areas, as follows: fully supporting international efforts in the fight against terrorism; winning the hearts and minds of the local population and authorities; increasing the capability of local security forces and delivering humanitarian assistance, which obviously have impact on the effectiveness of diplomatic approaches

and own credibility among allies and partners; contributing to collective security; promoting the image of the Romanian Armed Forces among the local population and authorities.

To conclude, we reckon that 150 years after the establishment of the Operations Directorate and the General Staff, it is obvious that the operational state of the Romanian Armed Forces structures is a standing functional priority, a proper response to the evolution of the security environment, NATO transformations and the commitments assumed by Romania within the European Union and at the international level.

In the 2009 anniversary year, the Operations Directorate is exactly where it has permanently been placed throughout its one century and a half existence: *in the elite of the Romanian Armed Forces.*

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THE CREATION OF THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

– Initiative with Major Impact of the Romanian Armed Forces –

Colonel Dr Vasile BOGDAN
Major Constantin-Emilian BELEAGĂ

The author reckons that, through the establishment of the force structure for special operations, the national political-military decision-makers are provided with a viable instrument, able to achieve strategic results.

The preparation procurement of and state-of-the-art equipment make these forces a power multiplier of conventional forces by the fact that they are able to use force not only selectively but also in proportion to the size of the threat. In addition to achieving significant power and resources savings, the collateral damage and adverse effects caused by conventional responses are limited almost to the minimum.

In turn, the special operations component manages to ensure an effective coordination of the implementation of political and military decisions in the structures of special operations forces of the Romanian Armed Forces.

Keywords: *political-military decisions; special operations; training and doctrines harmonisation; military objective; conventional forces*

The proliferation of the new risks and threats to the democratic nation states, of military and non-military nature, forced not only Romania but also the other NATO member states to reconsider their ways to defend and promote national values and interests. A milestone in this process was the NATO Summit in Riga on 28-29 November 2006, which addressed “NATO Transformation in the New Global Age”. Following the discussions at the heads of state and government level, it was agreed a joint action plan to further enhance the Alliance’s capabilities, focusing on upgrading the unconventional means. The concrete measures were stipulated in *NATO Special Operations Forces (SOF) Transformation Initiative – NSTI* through *NATO SOF Training Education Programme – NSTEP*.

Definitely, the evolution of the Romanian *Armed Forces Special Operations Forces* has subsumed under NATO’s Strategic Concept related to transformation in the field. Thus, there should

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be highlighted the approaches and the measures taken at national level to form a robust SOF structure able to fulfil its strategic role in the new geopolitical context. The emphasis has been placed on examining the need to establish a command and control structure (C2) at operational-strategic level, as well as the role it is meant to play within the national and allied command structures in support of both national and Allied strategic goals.

To achieve this desideratum, NATO's short- and medium-term effort in transforming *SOF* across the Alliance will be examined. A special importance is going to be given to the measures that have marked the evolution of the Romanian Armed Forces *SOF* and to the actions taken at national level to achieve the subordinate structures interoperability with the similar structures in NATO member states. The efforts made at the level of the Alliance lately to transform the *Special Operations Forces* and the modernisation of the command/control structures emphasise the interest in adapting the capabilities to respond to the new threats in the security environment. Thus, through expanding the existent structures and establishing new ones, *SOF* structures in NATO member states can be better used to support the achievement of the Alliance strategic goal.

The reference to the concept of *special operations* in the *Military Strategy of Romania* in 2000 is the starting point for the establishment of *SOF* structures in the Romanian Armed Forces. Two years later, during the Supreme Council of National Defence session on 5 April 2002, the members decided to set up an appropriate structure able to conduct special operations. Following this major political decision, on 1 March 2003, it was established the *SOF* land component: the 1st Special Operations Battalion. Simultaneously, at the General Staff level, within the Operations Directorate, the *Counterterrorism and Special Forces Service (CSFS)* was established. This structure was accountable for planning and management in five key areas of responsibility: combating terrorism, psychological operations, information operations, civil-military operations and special operations. Subsequently, in 2007 the *CSFS* turned into *Special Operations Service*.

These measures were supplemented by the establishment, in 2005, of a specialised training structure. Hence, the Paratrooper Training School was restructured as *SOF* Training School and starting 1 May 2005 the *SOF Training Center* was established within its framework.

SOF establishment continued with the creation of the *Naval SOF Group*, on 1 April 2006, under the Navy Staff. Moreover, the promulgation of *Law 346 regarding the organisation and functioning of the Ministry of Defence*, the same year,

represented another cornerstone for the *SOF* creation. At Article 30, paragraph d) the document stipulates the joint character of *SOF* structures and it states the main tasks. Furthermore, Article 31 insists on C2 prerogatives during operations both within the national borders and outside them.

The end of 2008 brought about new changes in the *SOF* structure. On 1 September, it was established the *Combat Search and Rescue Detachment (CSRD)*, under the Air Force Staff. This step was followed by the restructuring of the Special Operations Service within the Operations Directorate, on 21 November. As a result, two new *SOF* structures emerged – the *Special Operations Component Command (SOCC)*, as joint operational command under the General Staff, and the *Special Operations Office* within the Operations Directorate.

The process of creating the Romanian Armed Forces *SOF* was continued by the establishment, on 1 August 2009, of the 1st Special Operations Regiment that, besides the 1st *SOF* Battalion, comprised two paratrooper battalions. The measure was intended to expand the range of response options in the field of special operations.

The role of the *SOCC* is to strengthen *SOF* units' ability to train and operate in multinational environments in support of national and Allied interests. Due to its joint nature, under the authority of the Chief of the General Staff, *SOCC* must ensure not only the implementation, at the operational-strategic level, of the political and military decisions in two sensitive areas: special operations and combating terrorism, but also to advise military decision-makers on the use of *SOF* units. In order to accomplish these requirements, *SOCC* should be structured and manned so that it can perform properly the C2 function for *SOF* units on the operational continuum, both within the national border and abroad, in different theaters of operations. The experience of other NATO member nations has shown that the C2 structure must comprise J1 to J8 functional modules. The benefit of this structure is that during peace it provides administrative support in all *SOF* related areas, whereas during crisis and war, the functional modules can be reorganised as operations, support and communications centres.

The responsibilities of the special operations component in the field of special operations will be aimed at:

- a) human resource management for the Romanian Armed Forces *SOF* structures;
- b) management of the intelligence and data during the planning and execution of joint special operations;

- c) planning and conduct of joint special operations at the strategic and operational level;
- d) operational command of the Romanian Armed Forces *SOF* operational structures tasked to fulfil missions on the national territory as well as abroad;
- e) management of the financial and material resources for the *SOF* structures;
- f) establishment of procurement policies and technological research needs;
- g) coordination of the training process and harmonisation of doctrine, regulations, manuals and *SOF* specific regulatory provisions with those of NATO;
- h) coordination of the readiness enhancement process for the *SOF* structures available to NATO/EU and monitor the maintenance of the reached operational level;
- i) ensure standardisation and interoperability of national *SOF* structures with those similar to other NATO member states;

The responsibilities of the special operations component in the fight against terrorism are aimed at:

- a) operational command of the national *SOF* structures taking part in counter-terrorist operations abroad, directly or through the multinational headquarters in the theatres of operations;
- b) coordination of the subordinate *SOF* structures within the Ministry of National Defence with similar structures within the National Prevention and Defence against Terrorism System during the management of terrorist crisis;
- c) *SOF* resources management (weapons, ammunition, equipment and other specific means used during the operations to fight against terrorism);
- d) standardisation of the resources provided by the Ministry of National Defence and achievement of the equipment interoperability with the other structures from the national defence system.

To sum up, the establishment of a viable *SOF* provides the national decision-makers with a structure having unique capabilities, able to fulfil strategic objectives. Due to its training and the last generation equipment, *SOF* is a force multiplier for the conventional units, able to use force not only selectively but also at a proportional scale with the level of threat. Besides the economy of force achieved, it is beneficial as it reduces the colateral damages and minimises the adverse reactions caused by conventional responses.

However, tactical skills and experience do not always guarantee the success of special operations; they have to be supplemented with a viable C2 structure, able to control and monitor the way tactical *SOF* units carry out political and military directives. Therefore, the establishment of the *SOCC* ensures the needed coordination for the implementation of political and military decisions across the *SOF* structures in the Romanian Armed Forces.

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THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE ROMANIAN ARMED FORCES LOGISTICS – Conceptual Determinants –

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All modern armed forces, as the authors emphasise, constantly reconfigure their combat structures, while granting a similar priority to the logistic support units. In this context, the authors consider that all political and military factors should be aware that missions, irrespective of their type, cannot be fulfilled without an adequate logistic support.

The year 2009, with all the problems triggered by the global economic crisis, must be, at least at the conceptual level, an important milestone in the transformation of the Romanian Armed Forces logistics. This need for transformation has been materialised by the specialised personnel of the Logistics Directorate of the General Staff through the development of the Romanian Armed Forces Logistics Strategy. This document, particularly important for logistics, incorporates NATO member states efforts to adapt the latest approaches in the field to meet the practical way in which the national economy can sustain its armed forces.

Keywords: *logistic support; combat power; operational requirements; financial resources; national economy; computer systems*

The military history of the Romanian people points out that there have been age-old logistic concerns in the way of manifestation of the military actions, regardless of the size and the territory they have occurred. During the short reign of Alexandru Ioan Cuza, who has remained in the Romanian history as the Prince of the Unification, there were laid the bases of and it was begun the organisation of the Armed Forces, so that it could be in line with the requirements of modernisation of that time. We can thus say that during his reign, the birth act of the military administration was signed, the military logistics of today. After the complete merge of the ministries of war in Moldavia and Wallachia, the Decree no. 202 on 9 October 1862 was signed, through which the organisation of the new Ministry of War was established. In keeping with that decree, the organisation of the ministry stipulated the existence of a new structure – the “2nd Directorate, General Administration”. It was composed of the 1st Division and the 2nd Division. The first was organised in two sections, the 1st Section Military Quartermaster Personnel, Military Transport and Encampment

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and the 2nd Section Hospitals. The second division was also organised in two sections: 1st Section 1 Military Pay, Accounting Journals, Internal Administration of Corps, Funds and Accountancy and 2nd Section General Budget Deposits, Material Deposits, Pensions, Laws and Archives¹.

From then on, the military administration has known a constant evolution in terms of organisational structures, procurement, modernisation and conception of the logistics of military actions.

Alongside the entire Romanian Armed Forces, continuing the glorious military traditions, the logistic structures have made a major contribution to building the national unitary state, to defending the integrity, independence and sovereignty of the country.

Successor of these valuable traditions, the *Logistics Directorate* was established, within the General Staff, on 30 April 1997, with responsibilities in the functional areas of logistics – supply, maintenance, transportation, quartering, operational medicine and essential services for life – so that, through the specialised personnel employed, it could be a guarantor of the capacity of this structure to meet the challenges.

In order to respond to the more and more diverse and complex threats determined by the current developments in the international security environment, the military body must, in turn, develop technologically, conceptually and structurally.

In the current framework, characterised by an extreme complexity, at the General Staff, the *Logistics Directorate* increases its role of essential component of the military system, and logistic support becomes a permanent requirement, meant to provide the energy necessary for armed forces to achieve and maintain a high degree of efficiency to meet the assigned missions.

Logistic Support – A Constant Need

Logistic support is considered as the operational component for the materialisation of all the theoretical aspects in the daily activities of any type of military structure operating at peace, in crisis situations or at war. In one way or another, it has been present throughout history in all that meant military action, it affects the current activity of military structures and will transform in the future to effectively respond to the needs caused by the consolidation of the security environment at the global level.

It is estimated that logistics has been associated, ever since its early days, with the military domain, with the purpose of unitarily defining the entire range of measures and activities related to the conditions necessary for troops living and fighting. The concept of *logistics* finds its origins in the early times of history, long before our era, in the Ancient Times. The etymology of the word comes, according to some authors, from the Greek *logisteuo*, which means, first of all, *to manage*.

¹ Ioniță Botoș, Matei Obogeanu, *Intendența Armatei Române de-a lungul timpurilor*, Secția asigurare tehnico-economică a presei și tipăriturilor a Ministerului Apărării Naționale, București, 1992, p. 65.

After other opinions, in the ancient Greek as well there was the word *logistikos*, which can be translated in “to think, to judge, to calculate logically, a master in calculations”. This term could be associated with that person in a community who was in charge of its assets and used them in a logical manner so that the losses could be minimum and the benefit could be maximum. The Romans were the ones who used the term *logista* for the administrative officer. The administrative officers were major players in the organisational structure of the Roman military, especially during the expansion of the empire. Their responsibilities were related to ensuring the march of legions, the night and winter camps or the organisation of supply and transport of war booty from the captured territory. The importance attributed to these officers is given by the fact that they were in direct subordination to the great commander. Alexander the Great had in its staff a senior official with responsibilities similar to the Roman one. Moreover, in the Byzantine military, there was an officer with responsibilities for procuring and organising the military affairs, and through the term *logista*, identical with the Roman one, it was set the supply and accounting work. There are opinions that, during the Byzantine Emperor Leontos VI, the concept of logistics was associated to the military domain, representing the entire range of organisational and supply measures that could generate a military victory in the confrontation with the enemy.

Later, in the 17th century, the French military started to use the term *loger*, which meant to detail the way in which, by applying the military knowledge specific to those times, there were organised and planned transportation, supplies, feeding and provision of other specific conditions for a moving army to be able to achieve its objectives².

The one who managed to address theoretically the concept of logistics is the Baron de Jomini, who could be considered the father of this concept, because, although he was contemporary with other major theorists of war, was the only one who devoted a study to the problems of military administration and reunited them, in a rather unitary manner, under the name of logistics. Jomini did not believe he was able to define this concept in a clear and comprehensive way, but thought that logistics was “*part of the art of war*”.

The theoretical bases of modern logistics are laid by George Cyrus Thorpe, an American marine officer. In his work, “*Pure Logistics*”, Thorpe believes that the main function of logistics is to “*provide all human and military resources for waging war*”. The concept will be developed, will be given weight in planning operations and will be recognised by the commanders of the armed forces of the states with aspirations for leadership in the regional and world politics during the Second World War.

In the Romanian Armed Forces, the logistics functions have been carried out by specialised structures of the General Staff or branches commands.

² Georgeta Emilia Mocuța, *Logistica – instrument și concept în continuă evoluție*, in *Buletinul AGIR*, no. 2-3/2009.

The concept of *military logistics* was defined and founded in the early '90s, at the Armed Forces Services Command and became functional through the establishment of the first structures of logistics, management and execution.

Principles and Definitions in the New Romanian Armed Forces Logistics Strategy

All modern armed forces permanently reconfigure their combat structure, while granting a similar priority to the units that provide logistic support. In this context, we consider that all political and military factors are aware that missions cannot be fulfilled without an adequate logistics support, whatever the missions.

The year 2009, with all the problems brought about by the evolution of the global economic crisis, must be at least at the conceptual level a milestone in the transformation of the Romania Armed Forces logistics. This need for transformation was materialised by the specialised staff of the Logistics Directorate of the General Staff through the drawing up of the Romanian Armed Forces Logistics Strategy. The document, very important for the logistics field, incorporates the efforts to adapt the latest approaches in the field of NATO member states to the practical way in which national economy can sustain its armed forces. In this strategy, the central place is occupied by the Logistics Directorate – the logistics command structure at the strategic level with your major responsibilities in managing material resources, movement and transport, host nation support, maintenance, medical support operations, campaign services infrastructure, civil emergencies, training and improvement of logistics staff. Combat power is the measure of military effectiveness of any such structure. To be quantified, the combat power is the result of a certain equation that has three elements relating to each other. It is the *conceptual component*, the *moral component* and the *physical component*.

The *conceptual component* refers to the process of theoretical approach that defines the power to fight and, in turn, is structured in three subcomponents: the principles of war, military doctrine and development of the ability to fight – the term *fighting* in this context refers to the general term of military actions, not being directly associated with a certain level of carrying them: tactical, operational or strategic. The *moral component* refers to the ability to make people fight and consists of leadership, motivation and management. The *physical component* represents, in fact, the means by which the fight is led. These are considered to be: the fighters, technical equipments, logistics, training and preparation level³.

Logistics has a special importance for generating combat power and is one of the main elements of the physical component and, in addition, through the support provided to the staff, it is one element of the moral component of combat power.

³ ****, *Army Doctrine Publication*, London, f.a., p. 43.

The logistic system ensures a connection between logistic sources and combat forces⁴. Therefore, logistics is considered a military force multiplier with which a certain military structure, no matter how complex it would be, can act⁵.

From this brief presentation, one can notice that logistics has its place and role in determining the effectiveness of military structures. In this context, logistic support is oriented and functions as an impetus in carrying out missions, through observing a set of *principles*, which, in short, will be presented in the following lines.

Responsibility means that the logistic execution structures are responsible for implementing the logistic support of the forces in its structure and for subordinate structures. *Authority* gives chiefs/commanders of military services/commands full rights on the available logistic resources. *Focusing the effort* implies that the entire logistic effort is primarily directed to meet operational requirements and successfully complete missions. *Continuity in the logistic support* includes identifying and assessing in advance the needs and opportunities for logistic support. *Cooperation* is aimed at combining all planning and implementation efforts for the achievement of logistic support required to accomplish the mission. *Coordination* seeks to synchronise the activities and efforts in order to achieve maximum efficiency in providing logistic support. *Flexibility* provides the opportunity to reshape logistics structures in relation to the nature, value and mission of forces. *Simplicity* means drawing up logistic plans, orders and procedures in a way that does not cause confusion, in accordance with operational requirements, through the widespread use of administrative and operational standardisation. *Economy* is the optimisation of the volume of logistic support so that financial and material resource consumption is minimised and ordered based on priorities. *Visibility* requires knowledge and the rapid development of the exchange of information regarding the availability of logistic support. *Mobility* is the ability of deployment/redeployment, in a short time, while achieving logistic support for maintaining combat forces capacity. *Sufficiency* is the ability to provide material resources and essential services of quality and in sufficient quantities, in the right place and timely so that the conditions for achieving the mission could be secured. It is very important to understand that no military action will be initiated without the sufficient quantities considered essential for supporting it.

In the content of the *Romanian Armed Forces Logistics Strategy*, a set of concepts meant to clarify and delineate some general aspects of the theoretical approach of this complex field that is the logistics were defined. These definitions have generated debate in the advisory forums organised at the level of the specialists who work mostly in the implementation area, which entails the logistic support of military structures, precisely to benefit from an experience that leads to a pragmatic approach to those concepts. Thus, the set of concepts, presented below, are meant

⁴ Bixi-Pompiliu Mocanu, Constantin Rizea, Liviu Scrieciuc, *Sprijinul logistic în operațiile multinaționale*, Editura Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, București, 2006, p. 157.

⁵ ****, *British Military Doctrine*, London, 1996, p. 98.

to guide logistics activities for the next period. At the same time, we agree that these concepts are improvable and that the evolution of the military body will lead to the respective corrections, if they are required.

The *Romanian Armed Forces Logistics Strategy* is a unitary set of functional areas, activities and specialised military structures, which provides the material resources and services necessary for fulfilling specific missions by the armed forces.

Production Logistics is the Romanian Armed Forces logistics component that deals with research, design, testing, development, manufacture, centralised procurement of major equipment systems, IT systems, national military communications networks and related services.

Consumption Logistics – logistics of forces – is the Romanian Armed Forces logistics component that is responsible for the management of material resources and services necessary for the support of forces. Consumption Logistics has the following components:

- *basic logistics* – with the role of executing common missions in the following areas: management of material resources, intermediate and complex maintenance, movement and transport, medical rehabilitation, provision of logistic support during the operationalisation of the forces participating in operations, electronic management of logistic data and flows, codification of materials, environmental protection, recovery and disposal of material goods, delaboration of ammunition and destruction of hazardous materials, the military structures specific to basic logistics are the logistic bases, subordinated to the armed forces services and branch commands;

- *operational logistics* performs specific tasks to ensure all resources in the needed quantity and quality, at the given time and place, in order to allow the forces to live, train or participate in operations. These missions involve the provision of essential logistic needs during operations and ensure a certain level of independence of the units from the re-supply of a logistics base. The operational logistics includes carrying out the tasks in the following areas: campaign services, ammunition and fuels-lubricants supply, transport, medical insurance, quartering, equipment recovery-disposal, medical evacuation and maintenance of combat level.

The military structures specific to operational logistics are logistic support battalions, companies or platoons, under the responsibility of combat forces and commands.

Multinational logistics is that part of the consumption logistics intended to provide the logistic support of operations through multinational forces and assets, such as: leading nation, specialised multinational integrated logistic support etc.

The *integrated logistics system* includes command and implementation structures, organised on hierarchical levels, permanently adapted to the missions of the forces for which they provide specific support as well as functional relations between these structures.

The logistic support is the entire range of activities that take place with the purpose of making available to the armed forces the material assets and logistic support necessary for their existence, freedom of movement and action in order to fulfil specific missions.

Defining Elements of the Current Logistic System

❖ Strong Points of the Current Logistic System

The current logistic system, through its components, is able to provide resources for operationalising the forces. Through the created legislative framework, it allows for the development of integration programmes for the logistics structures made available to NATO in the force structure generated for the participation in operations under the command of the Alliance. The structures of the system are capable of providing the logistic support of the forces engaged in military actions in theatres of operations, through their own resources or through bilateral or multinational agreements. Through the work of developing and promoting legislative documents in the field of organisation and functioning of the military logistic system, it is ensured the functionality of the legislative process, for the implementation of the norms and, where it is the case, the implementation of adopted NATO standards. The current logistic system ensures the use, development and modernisation of some military capabilities of strategic, air and naval lift, through the agreements signed with civil companies or within the Alliance. Moreover, it also provides the functioning of a specialised maintenance system that enables the efficient operation of the military equipment in the military units. At this point, there are facilitated the conduct of certain outsourcing activities, particularly of some services with a certain degree of specialisation necessary for the structures of the Romanian Armed Forces. The development of the process of recovery/donation of surplus military equipment, as well as the one of destruction/delaboration of surplus and/or hazardous ammunition stored is provided at a constant pace. The specific operating procedures facilitate the logistic support of civil emergency interventions. The regulations and specific structures provide the necessary preconditions for the work process in legal conditions and for the prevention of work accidents, ecological incidents/accidents and fires.

❖ Limitations of the Current Logistic System

The structural and functional fragmentation and the lack of full capacity to provide commanders with real logistic support result in an incomplete exemption of combat units from administrative tasks. As a result of low computerisation in the field of logistics, commanders, especially the ones at the upper echelons, have low awareness of the division and distribution of resources. This leads to limited effectiveness in terms of their use. The logistic support of forces in theatres of operations is based, to a great extent, on bilateral or multilateral arrangements, because of the lack of national sustained and solid logistic support. The maintenance process is in progress with some interruptions. The insufficient allocation of budgetary resources to cover the required funds to conduct programmes for procurement and planned acquisitions leads to major delays in their achievement and a really serious aspect is the consumption of financial resources just to pay these delays to the partners whose contractual obligations have not been met.

❖ Risks and Vulnerabilities

We reckon that maintaining the structural and functional configuration of the current logistic system can generate the development/deepening of the following risks and vulnerabilities: • delay in the implementation of the logistic commitments made to NATO and the EU; • failure to provide logistic support to forces so that NATO requirements could be met; • additional costs to support operations within the Alliance, resulting from lower administrative and operational interoperability with NATO logistic structures and with Alliance member countries; • massive accumulation of surplus materials and significant increase in the costs of their management; • increased risk of explosion of banned and hazardous fire ammunition in storage; • delay in the procurement of advanced military logistic structures; • achievement of inconsistent management of material resources.

Where Will We Be Tomorrow ?

The way in which the armed forces will reshape will also change the way in which future conflicts will be approached. Military experts see this transformation as a process of rethinking the priority objectives and the structure of the armed forces, from the model adopted during the *Cold War* to a new type of forces, able to carry a much broader range of missions and to ensure the dominance at strategic level at any point worldwide, which is already happening. This means not only new technologies but also changes at the level of doctrine, a new philosophy of training, leadership and organisational structure, increase in the availability of equipment and facilities and, last but not least, well-trained troops in new areas⁶.

Future military transformations will bring about new challenges and dilemmas for the Romanian Armed Forces. Ever since nowadays, it has been identified the need to ensure an optimal balance between the need for well-trained and modern forces, correlated with the increased number of missions and scarcer resources. It is obvious the need to reduce inventory levels, to reduce the quantities of materials that must be used for certain periods, but especially to ensure mobility of these stocks for the reaction time to be significantly shortened. We need to consider a new approach to military logistics management, which can be perceived not only as a central point of future logistic support, but as a point of support for the forces effort to strike the necessary balance between the state of preparedness and the needed modernisation⁷.

English version by
 **Iulia NĂSTASIE**

⁶ William Grisoli, *Army Transformation*, Department of the Army Transformation Office, Carlisle, US Army War College, February, 2002.

⁷ Charles S. Mahan Jr., *The Challenges of Fielding the Army's Objective Force*, in *Army Magazine*, October, 2001, p. 128.

THE STRATEGIC PLANNING DIRECTORATE

– Interface between the General Staff and the Euro-Atlantic Bodies –

Brigadier General Dr Virgil BĂLĂCEANU

The participation of the Romanian Armed Forces in missions abroad, especially their results in NATO missions and within certain coalitions prove, in the author's opinion, in addition to the image of a confident member and a real contributor to collective security, the fact that, at least as far as operational interoperability is concerned, we are placed at the same level with the other NATO member states.

This participation would not have had the expected results without the support of a proper planning that, as the author points out, falls under the Strategic Planning Directorate. Based on specific regulations, the forces planning for the missions, abroad enables the use of force outside the Romanian state and, once the Supreme Council of National Defence approves it, becomes the milestone in this field to guide the other defence efforts.

Keywords: *force structure; military capabilities; operational planning; military training; anti-Hitler coalition; flexible command*

NATO and the EU are the main organisations that have as “*raison d’être*” the insurance of security, stability and/or economic prosperity, which are fundamental tasks agreed upon by all member states, which have individually made a freely assumed engagement to participate in their implementation. The complexity and multidimensional aspect of the current and especially the future security environment are real challenges for the accomplishment of these tasks. This is the reason why NATO and the EU are interested in permanently developing the mechanisms to respond to the new and continually changing challenges posed to security.

The specific security mechanisms of these bodies are aimed at quantitatively diminishing the individual efforts and, at the same time, are focused on their qualitative component. In this respect, the integration of each member state’s contribution is a prerequisite for the success of the collective action. In other words, in the two organisations,

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the member states participate in consultations, followed by decisions and engagements, ending with their accomplishment.

Therefore, in order to attain the established goal, we have to take into account not only the quality of every state's contribution, but mostly the cumulated effect of these individual contributions, which is conditioned by the appropriate cooperation among member states, on the one hand, and between these member states and the international organisations they are part of, on the other hand.

In this context, creating a proper connection between the organisations and the elements in their structure becomes obviously important. This would allow the optimum information transfer between the bodies and their components on at least two levels: the *functional-institutional one* (decision-making mechanisms, engagement assuming) and the *operational one* (engagements accomplishment, participation in training and common operations).

For the Romanian Armed Forces – a NATO and EU member state – developing skills to work with these organisations becomes a need and, at the same time, a wish and comprises *all the actions taken for re-shaping and tailoring capabilities on the institutional-functional and operational coordinates of the two organisations*.

The harmonisation of the conceptual apparatus, the creation/improvement of the internal mechanisms and the transformation of the force structure and military capabilities are objectives whose accomplishment will enable and facilitate an efficient and effective participation together with partners or allies in order to attain common goals.

The accomplishment of these objectives is one of the most complex challenges that the General Staff had and still has to face, as a *representative* and *catalyst* of the accession and, later, of the integration of the Romanian Armed Forces and Romania in the Euro-Atlantic structures. The complexity of the challenge has been given by the need for accepting, identifying resources, planning and organising in order to meet the mandatory pre-accession requirements and post-accession engagements, at the same time with periodically tailoring and re-tailoring our structure to meet the assumed objectives.

As a structure specialised in and responsible for prospecting the future and projecting the organisational and operational options of the military body, through the areas of expertise and responsibilities given, the Strategic Planning Directorate is known (and acknowledged) as the main entrance through which the information and requests coming from the Euro-Atlantic structures arrive at the General Staff.

The planning of military capabilities, standardisation, planning of their use in missions, development of strategies and scenarios, doctrinal regulations, operational planning, relations with international organisations are areas of expertise of our Directorate.

Based on all these prerequisites and using the connection provided by the undertaken measures and the results obtained, the Strategic Planning Directorate's role as an *interface between the General Staff and the Euro-Atlantic organisations* is built.

Relationship with NATO and the EU

The relationship of the Romanian Armed Forces with the two organisations is marked by the *"time seal"* of Romania's accession to NATO and the EU. Thus, while the relation with NATO is rather *"old"*, the one with the EU is quite recent. Nevertheless, taking into account that the two organisations are relatively similar, the approaches taken to NATO are also applicable to the EU.

In accordance with its two levels, the relationship with NATO and the EU implies, on the one hand, the development of the ability to be actively involved and to actively participate in all the activities and processes of the two organisations in order to ensure the timeliness in assuming engagements, and on the other hand, the complete accomplishment of engagements, through observing the required quality parameters.

The first level, the *functional-institutional one*, particularly focuses on the Romanian participation in the consultation and decision-making process within the reunions of the working groups and committees subordinated to NATO and the EU, in the representation activity, in staffing HQs etc. The second level, the *operational one*, the most important of the two, focuses on the engagement of national forces in NATO and EU missions (planning, use of force, doctrines, training, procurement etc.).

Although different from the conceptual and practical point of view, the two levels overlap, the activities developed on one level have implications on the other, they interact and influence each other, generating cumulative effects. This is the reason why we do not necessarily wish to present the differences between the two, but rather to highlight the importance of their connection and the role played by the Strategic Planning Directorate in this respect.

Background

One and a half century of existence of the General Staff is, first of all, the outcome of the conceptual, organisational and implementation effort of establishing, equipping and modernising the Romanian Armed Forces, synchronising the military organisation with the evolutions at regional and global level. In the already known historical moments, this was an effort combined with the conduct of military operations in the wars for defending the very existence of the nation, waged by the expansionist forces, more or less close to our country.

This effort, made over the years by structures within the General Staff bearing different names and having different responsibilities, following the historical evolution, aimed at preparing the Romanian Armed Forces for being capable of a proper response to potential aggressors, individually or within alliances/coalitions. If we analyse it from the perspective of the synchronisation with the European military phenomenon, the process has had different characteristics and has gone through different phases, in accordance with the evolution of the military thinking and the geopolitical situation of the Romanian state.

Between 1859 and 1916, the Armed Forces and the officers and NCOs corps were organised, equipped and trained following the model of that part of staff officers who had graduated from prestigious military institutions in the West-European states.

This process was intensified while the *reorganisation of the Romanian Armed Forces during the First World War* (November 1916-June 1917), through the procurement of French modern military equipment and the adoption of France's military structural model and combat tactics and procedures, specific for this traditional ally of Romania. The memorable victories won in the 1917 summer campaign and those that followed until the acknowledgement of the Romanian unitary national state creation, in peace treaties signed at the end of the war, demonstrated the skills of the Romanian military command, as well as the importance of adopting the standards of modern armed forces of that time.

Between the two World Wars and during the Second World War, the General Staff conducted successive reorganising, equipping and training activities, and focussed on traditions and national economy potential capitalisation, as well as on keeping in line with the evolution of the armed forces in Europe. The conceptual and organisational acquisitions from that time made it possible for Romania and its armed forces to be positioned beside partners/allies of strategic importance in the Eastern campaign, as well as in the anti-Nazi coalition, during the second part of the war.

Going under the Soviet Union influence, *after the end of the war* and joining the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, under the pressure of the same state, caused a separation from the traditional allies and consequently led to the adoption of military norms, thinking and action principles that were totally different from those previously promoted.

Partially and gradually resumed, while separating from Moscow leadership (remarkable from the national security viewpoint, especially after 1968), the activity of developing doctrinal elements and laws for the implementation and direct coordination of transformation, equipment and training process, in line with the traditions in the Romanian Armed Forces, did not succeed to surpass the ideological

barriers and the conceptual model imposed by the political military leader of the Warsaw Treaty.

These were the circumstances in which the Romanian Armed Forces and implicitly the Great General Staff¹ found themselves in 1989, a year of spectacular, and, at the same time, inevitable political changes in Eastern Europe.

The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the termination of the Warsaw Treaty, events that marked the end of the *Cold War*, faced NATO with the decision to self-dissolve or to adopt a strategic concept in keeping with the new realities.

Considering that the engagement of the founding states², as well as the fact that the treaty does not state explicitly that is aimed against a state or non-state actor but against “*an armed attack against one or more of them (the parties in the treaty – N/A), in Europe or in the United States of America ...*”³, the participants in the North Atlantic Council reunion on 7-8 November 1991 in Rome agreed that the treaty was still in force and decided on the adoption of a new NATO *strategic concept*.

All these events, as well as those following during the last decade of the 20th century made it possible for the Alliance to enlarge in the Eastern European area and therefore for Romania’s accession in April 2004 to take place, becoming a full-fledged member of the North Atlantic Alliance.

The above-mentioned evolutions, as well as the progress of the national economy could not lead but to Romania regaining its place, on 1 January 2007, in the European economic and security construction. This new phase, that of the *Romanian Armed Forces accession and integration in the Euro-Atlantic structures* has been one of the greatest challenges the General Staff had to face.

Approaches and Results

The Romanian Armed Forces relationship with NATO has been established gradually, depending on the evolution of the integration process and the participation in common actions, the responsibility of planning and coordinating this process belonging to the structures existing in different stages of the General Staff restructuring process.

¹ Name of the General Staff at that time.

² According to Art. 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the states will “*contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being*”, *NATO Handbook*, 2001 edition, p. 437.

³ *Ibid*, Art. 5.

The adoption of modular J-type structures (G, N, A, S⁴) for the services staffs, including the General Staff, in the context of Romania's firm engagement regarding NATO integration and even of more robust negotiations in this direction, more clearly defined the responsibilities concerning the coordination of national forces planning with the integration process and the increase in the interoperability level between the military forces of NATO and Romania. In this respect, starting with 20 April 1997, in the framework of the new General Staff organisational structure, the *Strategic Planning and Arms Control Directorate (J5)* began its activity. It had the responsibility of drawing up framework or normative documents for the military activity, of substantiating the decisions of military and political-military authorities, as well as of implementing programmes and projects assumed at national and international level, in military actions, in peacetime, in crisis situations and/or at war.

In order to develop a unitary coordination of the NATO accession process, in 2000, the *Reform Coordination and NATO Integration Section* was established as a core structure for the Reform Coordination and NATO Integration Sub-Committee. This was a structure especially established at the level of the Ministry of National Defence, working in sessions planned similar to the Alliance ones. From the very beginning, the Strategic Planning Directorate was in charge of the coordination of *Reform Coordination and NATO Integration Section* activity.

Following the Prague NATO Summit in November 2002, when Romania was invited to join the Alliance as a full-fledged member, we started the accession specific activities in order to reach the objectives already assumed by *Romania's Calendar of Reform* (issued prior to the moment of accession). At the General Staff level, the coordination of this process was the main responsibility of the Transition and NATO Integration Section, established through the transformation of the former Reform Coordination and NATO Integration Section.

After the accession to the North Atlantic Alliance (2 April 2004) the great endeavours specific to the NATO integration phase were initiated. This time, the coordination of all these endeavours fell under the full responsibility of the Strategic Planning Directorate⁵.

One of the first activities carried under the direct coordination of the Strategic Planning Directorate after Romania joined NATO, took place at the end of August 2004, when, in accordance with the Alliance procedures, the Romanian Armed Forces developed and submitted to NATO authorities their first answer

⁴ J – joint, G – ground, N – naval, A – air, S – section.

⁵ The Transition and NATO Integration Section was transformed in the Force Planning Section and was integrated in the Strategic Planning Directorate.

to *NATO Defence Planning Questionnaire – DPQ 04*⁶, a reference document that included major aspects of strategic planning mainly focusing on national forces and capabilities assigned to NATO.

Our participation in the multilateral meeting of NATO Defence Review Committee concluded the first cycle of defence planning within the Alliance context, thus establishing one of the highly important domains managed by the Strategic Planning Directorate and setting up an active operational interplay between the Romanian General Staff and the Alliance.

The newly established rules and regulations⁷ regarding this particular domain have created a favourable framework and provided the Strategic Planning Directorate with the appropriate tools and means required for further participating in the next cycles of defence planning⁸, unitarily coordinating and monitoring our commitments implementation process. Therefore, the Romanian Armed Forces are now contributing a consistent force package to NATO defence capabilities, which proves our determination to fully contribute to the collective defence and implicitly be perceived as a reliable partner.

The lessons learned and the outstanding experience resulted from our interplay with the North Atlantic Alliance have facilitated our activities relative to this domain with the European Union, as the requirements are similar, in principle. In 2006, the Strategic Planning Directorate coordinated the process of formulating the national response to the *HGQ 06 Questionnaire*⁹, through which we submitted to the EU, prior to the accession, accurate information on the Romanian Armed Forces contributions to the *EU Global Objective (High Level Group 2010)*. In accordance with the political decisions commonly agreed upon within the *Clarification Dialogue*¹⁰ in March 2009, the same contribution as to NATO was communicated to the EU. Thereby, the Romanian Armed Forces currently participate with unitary force package to both the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union.

⁶ On 18-20 October 2003, Romania started the integration in the NATO force planning, through the participation in negotiations consultations with representatives of NATO (IS, IMS, ACT) Authorities of force proposals 04, which concluded with the acceptance of 75 forces proposals. Following their analysis in the Defence Review Committee, in the spring of 2004, they became the *force goals 04*.

⁷ P1/08.02.2008 – *Joint Order on Developing Plans to Implement the Requirements of Force Goals 2008 Assumed by Romania for the Period 2008-2018* and P2/21.05.2008 – *Joint Order regarding the responsibilities of MoD Structures to Complete DPQ and Participate in Defence Analysis Activities*.

⁸ Subsequent cycles of NATO defence planning: *Force Goals '06* and *'08*, respectively the *Defence Review Committee DRC '07* and *'09* (based on NATO's Defence Planning Questionnaire '04, '06 and '08).

⁹ *Head Line Goal Questionnaire* – a questionnaire similar to the NATO DPQ, which gathers information regarding defence planning and contribution of member states.

¹⁰ A step in the EU planning cycle.

Another crucial domain of topical interest within our operational interrelation with the Euro-Atlantic security bodies is that of standardisation. Just as within NATO, standardisation is approached by the Romanian Armed Forces as the main tool and way for achieving interoperability with the other NATO member states armed forces.

Since March 2004, the Strategic Planning Directorate has been directly and constantly involved in this domain and has succeeded in imposing a new tempo to the defence planning process. Its involvement has become more sustainable with the approval of specific regulations and related standards¹¹, which have brought about a new conceptual, structural and procedural approach to standardisation and interoperability, both guided by a coherent and regular framework, harmonised with the NATO one.

Based on these new rules and regulations, 910 STANAGs have been accepted so far and 135 STANAGs have already been implemented, their provisions being included in more than 186 normative documents, doctrines and handbooks currently employed throughout the training and education process.

Special attention should be paid to NATO doctrines as basic elements for achieving operational interoperability. Hereby we have to mention that all key domain doctrines (personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics etc.), also known as the “*Keystone/Capstone Doctrine*” (AJP 1-9) and the *Allied Joint Doctrine* (AJP-01) series, are currently implemented in the Romanian Armed Forces. The Strategic Planning Directorate has had under its responsibility two of these doctrines, AJP-01 and AJP-5 respectively, whose provisions and “*philosophy*” are encompassed within the *Romanian Armed Forces Doctrine* and the *Romanian Armed Forces Operational Planning Doctrine*. Albeit the Strategic Planning Directorate experts have not had the development of other major doctrines under their direct responsibility, they have participated and actively contributed to the doctrinal process.

Although the European Union has not yet developed its own standardisation system, usually using NATO standards, we may consider that when this happens, the Strategic Planning Directorate will be able to avail of its own expertise and knowledge gained following the relation with the Alliance.

¹¹ *Instructions on the standardisation activity in the Romanian Armed Forces* and other orders, such as the *Statute of the Organisation and Functioning of the Council of Standardisation and interoperability*, the *Guide of the Person in Charge of the Domain and the National Delegate to the NATO Working Group in the Field of Standardisation* and procedures for accepting and implementing the NATO Standardisation Agreements (PLStd-1, PLStd-2).

The right extent of the cooperation relationships and interoperability with the Euro-Atlantic security bodies is better illustrated by the Romanian military effective involvement in common missions and operations. The Romanian Armed Forces participation in missions abroad and their remarkable outcomes in NATO-led operations or coalition-type missions clearly demonstrate not only that Romania has proved to be a reliable partner and efficient contributor to collective security but also that it has a level of operational interoperability similar to the NATO member countries one. We may say that such good results have been constantly backed up by an accurate planning well developed by the Strategic Planning Directorate. Based on specific rules and regulations¹², the force planning for missions abroad is meant to create a clear picture on our forces employment in missions abroad and, once approved by the Supreme Council of National Defence, it becomes the landmark for the reprioritisation of our defence resources.

If in the paragraphs above we have mainly focused on the operational side of our relation with international security bodies, we will further like to refer to the institutional-functional side of strategic planning process and domain.

The Strategic Planning Directorate was the coordinating structure for developing *The Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy*¹³ and our planners fully contributed to establishing the adequate implementation measures. *The Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy* is a programmatic document, crucial for guiding and coordinating all the related activities aimed at achieving its scope and purpose, that of “*promoting and protecting our national interests against the current, developing and future risks and threats, accomplishing the security and defence commitments Romania has assumed as a NATO and EU member or in relation with other international security bodies*”. Through this, a multi-phased integration¹⁴ into NATO and the EU is pursued, as well as the achievement of a modern, modular, professional force structure, which is well equipped, ready to be deployed and interoperable, self-sustainable, capable of multidimensional force protection, timely, flexible, and able to make rapid decisions based on the accurate and timely information and data provided.

¹² *Law 42/2004 regarding the Participation of Forces in Missions outside the Romanian State* and the *Strategy of the Use of the Romanian Armed Forces in Missions outside the Romanian State*.

¹³ Developed in 2006 and revised in 2007. It was approved by the Supreme Council of National Defence through the Decision no. 38 on 29.03.2007.

¹⁴ The Phase of the completion of basic restructuring (2005-2007), the Phase of the operational integration into NATO and the European Union (2008-2015) and the Phase of the full integration into NATO and the European Union (2016-2025).

In the conditions of the exchange of experience with NATO similar structures on strategic scenarios issues, particular rules and regulations¹⁵ have been developed to bolster up the “*philosophy*” of collective defence and to lie at the basis of further operational plans and scenarios to be implemented according to the Alliance procedures.

In one way or another, the overall activity of the Strategic Planning Directorate depends on well-established interrelations with international security organisations, as our NATO full member status and our participation in the ESDP/EU military dimension have major implications on a large majority of planning activities under the direct responsibility of the Strategic Planning Directorate. From this perspective, the management of this domain has become a distinct field of responsibility for the Strategic Planning Directorate.

Concomitantly with issuing guidelines for the drawing up of mandates¹⁶, a review of NATO working groups’ major themes and priorities has been made taking into account the interest and the importance they have for Romania; there have also been identified all other structures and even individuals with responsibilities in the field and particular tasks have accordingly been established for each of them. These endeavours have materialised in a documentary consisting of general and specific mandates¹⁷, which represents a fundamental basis for our Military Permanent Representatives to NATO and the EU.

The coordination of the participation in the NATO Working Groups constitutes another distinct domain within our institutional-functional interrelationship. This activity is getting more coherence and accuracy once instructions¹⁸ were developed and implemented in order to establish the manner of participation and pre-training of national delegates attending NATO Working Groups sessions.

The Strategic Planning Directorate activity has also materialised in the preparation of the Romanian Chief of the General Staff’s participation in Military Committees Meetings, Ministerial Meetings, processing after action reports, coordinating participation in different committees and working groups’ activities as well as

¹⁵ “*Conception of the Development of Strategic Scenarios in the Romanian Armed Forces*” and “*Methodology of Drawing up Strategic Scenarios*”, no. M. 210/23.11.2007, “*Instruction on the Development, Coordination and Execution of Operational Plans for the Use of Forces*”.

¹⁶ “*Instructions on the Procedures for Drafting and Approving the Mandates for the Representative Structures of the Ministry of National Defence to NATO, EU, UN and OSCE*”, approved by order MS-49/05.05.2009.

¹⁷ It is still in process of being approved. The General Staff drafted the final form, which was sent to the Department for Defence Policy for endorsement.

¹⁸ SMG 8/30.01.2009 – Order regarding the coordination of the activity of the delegates of the General Staff and its subordinate structures to NATO and EU working groups reunions, committees and subcommittees.

in several initiatives and projects of the European Defence Agency (EDA), preparing documentaries for attending the Agency's Steering Board Meeting at the level of Capabilities Directors, initiating the steps required for participating in EDA different project teams activities depending on the objectives previously established for this purpose.

The connection to the current evolutions of concepts, including their definition and appropriate application by the Romanian Armed Forces in a context defined so that it could avoid possible confusions and inappropriate perceptions, has been achieved through the *Order referring to the development, validation and/or implementation of transformation concepts*¹⁹.

At the same time, the process of developing the Romanian Armed Forces military capabilities is now harmonised with NATO and EU ongoing processes through a specific regulation²⁰ and we are confident that the outcomes will soon be visible.

A substantial contribution to enhancing the expertise level of the Strategic Planning Directorate's interrelations with international security bodies was made when our officers manning different positions in the international military structure concluded their tours of duty and shared their gained personal and professional experience. This constantly facilitates the active participation of the Strategic Planning Directorate and the proactive approach towards identification and negotiation of key posts within NATO (NATO Strategic Commands, intelligence, operations etc.) structures, thus increasing Romania's visibility in accordance with our force contribution to NATO operations.

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The relation with both NATO and the EU is far from being a finished process, and is not a simple one, conducted in accordance with a "*successful model*" that, once applied, guarantees the accomplishment of the objective. Therefore bearing in mind the necessity of continuing to adapt to future evolutions, through the diversity of resources involved, through the consequences generated in all fields of activity, providing a true interface with the two organisations is a lasting, complex and continuous process.

The core goals and challenges of the Strategic Planning Directorate lie at the basis of these assertions. Certainly, the new developments in this directorate will be analysed and synchronised for obtaining and maintaining a strong

¹⁹ Disposition of the Chief of the General Staff no. S59/2009.

²⁰ SMG 18/2009 – *Disposition of the Chief of General Staff regarding the relationship between the General Staff and its subordinate structures, and EDA and ACT.*

and continuous relation with both organisations, as part of the defence planning process, and for developing and employing national military capabilities.

The provision of permanent organisational conditions is necessary in this respect, meaning at least the maintenance, if not even the development, of specialised structures within the Strategic Planning Directorate and continuously providing specialised and well-trained personnel.

The Strategic Planning Directorate is already perceived as an innovative entity of the General Staff, due to the obtained results, more specifically its specific “products”. Permanently placed in the outposts of knowledge, the Strategic Planning Directorate is permanently ready to provide the high rank military decision-makers with specific courses of action for each strategic planning issue. Following the creation and preservation of a performance-based and rigorous working climate, in which all members can capitalise on their knowledge, competence and expertise level, using a coherent and efficient conceptual mechanism, it is obvious that the outcomes are at the highest level of quality. In fact, that means a quite evident conclusion: this directorate “*is able to fully manage its specific field*”, has both the resources and the required capabilities, and is permanently in contact with the evolutions and the current and future trends of the military phenomenon, being ready for new and exciting challenges.



THE MANAGEMENT OF THE ACTIVITIES FOR IMPLEMENTING THE CIS CAPABILITIES IN THE ROMANIAN ARMED FORCES

Captain Cristea CUCOȘEL
Colonel Dr Mihai BURLACU

The Communications and IT Directorate has been actively involved in issuing up the ministerial directives regarding defence planning. Thus, after giving up “The Communications and IT Programme”, which is a separate programme of formation, training and modernisation of the forces of the Ministry of National Defence, the coordination of the resources allocated to other programmes, in order to implement the requirements of the force goals assumed by our country in the field of communications and information systems (CIS) was ensured for: providing extended strategic and tactical communications to the forces involved in NATO operations; upgrading electronic message systems, ground-air-ground radio services (UHF); providing information support to the stationary or deployed headquarters; providing information security within the CIS; providing a response capability to computer systems incidents; providing communications for civil decision-making authorities, in peacetime, to exercise sovereignty in the national airspace.

Keywords: *information and communications technology; extension of general capabilities; test platforms; CAI interoperability; working groups*

The Communications and Information Systems Directorate (J6) was established on 30 April 1997, as a result of the first structural reorganisation of the General Staff¹ that, among other objectives, was aimed at developing organisational entities similar to the Western ones, which were supposed to be adopted in order to implement the main principles of military planning in a new fashion, reflecting the joint operational command structure at strategic level articulated on different functional areas (J1-J6/8).

Having in view the area of competence and the responsibility of planning, structuring and implementing the general strategy of the Communications and Information System (CIS) development within the Romanian Armed Forces, its various components and their functional responsibilities have been taken over, derived and integrated from the Signal IT and Electronics Command that has been also successively transformed becoming the Communications and IT Command.

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Colonel Dr Mihai Burlacu – the Communications and Information Systems Directorate within the General Staff.

¹ Emergency Ordinance no. 14/2001 regarding the new organisation and functioning of the Ministry of National Defence, subsequent to the Romanian Government Decision no. 1217/2001 regarding the organisational structure and personnel of the Ministry of National Defence, the Minister of National Defence Order no. M.S. 12/2001, and the Chief of Staff Directive no. S/S.M.G. 24/1997.

The initial core of the CIS Directorate has developed and has grown, over the past 10 years, in proficiency and experience, as well as in assuming new tasks and functional responsibilities. An example which best illustrates this assumptions is the incorporation of the basic elements of the Network Security and Cipher Section² (INFOSEC), at the beginning of 2003. Furthermore, it is worth mentioning the establishment of the Military Radio Frequency Management Agency on 25 July 2001, as well as of the Military Information Systems and Services Agency on 17 April 2004, both under the specialised coordination of the CIS Directorate.

Since November 2006, the Directorate is organised and operates in accordance with Law no. 346 on 21 July 2006 regarding the organisation and responsibilities of the Ministry of Defence and the Government Decision no. S 1550 on 7 November 2006 regarding the approval of the organisational chart of the central structures in the Ministry of Defence and of the total number of positions, established through the Minister of Defence Order no. MS 177 on 20 November 2006.

The CIS Directorate has been involved, as an integrated part of the General Staff, in planning, directing, and evaluating all the major objectives that have aimed at the military reform, capability development, participation in operations and exercises, command structure transformation, as well as in the overall modernisation of the military organisation.

Taking into account the speed and dynamics of change in the IT&C field expressed in the vision, strategy, political and functional plans that have been materialised into projects and special developments, we must notice the role the CIS Directorate plays in the general management of the *communications and information (CIS)* planning process, in all its stages from the initiation, identification and determination of the operational requirements for information exchange, through the concept definitions, planning, programming, to implementation, in-service operation and maintenance of the CIS capabilities for their entire life cycle.

Among the major achievements which have been noticed involving essential contributions from the directorate's personnel, it would be worth mentioning the Romanian Armed Forces Transmission System (STAR), renamed RMNC, to capture its role of National Defence Network as part of the NATO General Communication System (NGCS), which has undergone different development and technological modernisation stages, representing the framework of the transport and networking services for voice, data, and video-conference users; moreover, the implementation of the Minister of Defence's TETRA – DIMETRA IP subsystem as a component of the single national infrastructure of mobile digital radio-communications in TETRA standard; the development of the wide area data networks within INTRAMAN project, to support various information systems

or applications as part of SIIMAN – the Integrated MoD Information Systems, implementation of the digital voice and data terminal with cryptographic and radio modules (DELTA – 01M), crypto-routers NX 2070 for the video-conference system, the cryptographic system “TS 2000MA” for the military cipher structures and other INFOSEC similar products and systems; the upgrade of the communication’s infrastructure with US assistance in the most important sites, implementing an optical fibre infrastructure for the distribution level and network core; last but not least, the modernisation of radio systems using integrated services that was bound to ensure the extension of RMNC services through static radio narrow band single channel systems (RRONS), towards tactical mobile environment in the context of increasing the digital implementations for the entire battlefield.

Furthermore, it is worth mentioning the primary and decisive role of the Directorate in the process of experimentation, testing and validation of CIS capabilities, including the management of the Romanian participation in interoperability testing infrastructure provided by the international environment, within the framework of various interoperability events, exercises or demonstrations, facing as much as possible the right set of realistic scenarios and spotting the relevant technical details for the interfaces analysed at the level of the programming lines of certain applications on the testing platforms or in the lab. Without going for an exhaustive review, it can be recalled, in the same context, the involvement of our personnel on different planning levels in support of special exercises with valuable results. There has been, therefore, provided the CIS support for exercises covering an extensive range of objectives such as the ones in the spirit of PfP or related to regional cooperation initiatives, civil emergency crisis, crisis management, CJTF, Special Forces training, supporting certification and affirmation of forces intended for NATO operations. Moreover, specific exercises have been attended for testing C4I interoperability. They have taken place annually since 1995, as follows: the *COMBINED ENDEAVOR* series, for evaluating radio systems interoperability; *HERALD HERMES*, for evaluating C2 systems within *COOPERATIVE AUTOMATION* 1999, 2001 or for the validation of systems’ future requirements and resources; *CWID* 2006-2009. We cannot leave out, of course, the recent involvement in CIS testing exercises for *NRF* components, *STEADFAST CATHODE*, starting in 2006. Since 2004, the *CETATEA CIS* exercise has represented a national response to the testing requirements in interoperability exercises regarding the CIS units abilities within the Romanian Armed Forces to accomplish missions in cooperation with similar government entities, assuring the services and platforms needed

² Organised and activated by the Minister of Defence approval no. SC 2/15.01.2003 and the Chief of Staff Directive no. B5/S-401 on 21.02.2003.

for an integrated exchange of information that tries to gradually materialise the principles of *network-enabled capabilities* concepts.

The common denominator has always been the provision of the required CIS services for command and control at strategic, operational, and tactical levels, in order to establish C4ISR systems by implementing a data management capability between sensors, decision level and adequate response systems generating the estimated effects, assuring the adequate situational awareness and, in the future, a suitable common operational picture at all command levels, as a source of assuring information and decision superiority based on the management of relevant information and providing a common understanding of the battle space. Of course, the support of corporate planning processes intensively developed within the military organisation, but also during daily activities, implies a new supporting IT approach to processes on a wide scale and modern service delivery, new applications, and data modelling strategy implementation.

As a follow-up to the developing of new NATO compatible force structures of the Romanian Armed Forces as well as to reach a suitable maturity level of interoperability, the CIS Directorate issued: *"The doctrine for command, control, communications and information support (C4I) in joint operations"*, *"The methodology for the development, implementation, and the activation of military information systems"*, *"The C4I2SR Concept in the Romanian Armed Forces"*, *"The C4I2SR Strategy in the Romanian Armed Forces"* and *"The concept regarding the development of software defined radios for the Romanian Armed Forces"*. There were also issued some policies and directives as: *"Guidance for the activation of MoD TETRA mobile radio-communications system"*, *"Guidance for the development of Mode 4 and 5 identification friend and foe system in Romanian Armed Forces"*, *"Cryptographic protection of state classified information exchanged between military units through communications and information systems"*. Minister of Defence orders have been also issued to direct and provide appropriate guidance in supporting the management of the services required by the MoD, and other policies and instructions have been issued to settle a framework for the operation and utilisation of CIS services. It is also worthwhile mentioning the relevant directives for the activation of *Document Management System in electronic format (SGDFE)* and *Military Messaging System (SMM)* within the Defence Staff, Services, headquarters and units, and also the common *Directive of Chief of Defence and the General Defence Intelligence Director regarding the activation of TS 2000 MA cryptographic system"*. Among the recent achievements there can be mentioned: the C4I2SR system architecture at the brigade level, the communications and information system architecture for NBC Monitoring and Warning System, the policy regarding IP address allocation

within the INTRAMAN network, and a new concept concerning information and communication systems maintenance, the theatres of operations included.

An important role in the training and education of the IT&C decision-makers has been played by the conferences organised annually by the chief of the CIS Directorate, having topics which have consolidated the roadmaps and general guidance, based on the exchange of experience regarding ways and perspectives in the development of CIS at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

CIS Directorate has actively participated in the process of drafting the Defence Ministerial Directives, and after the closure of the “*CIS Programme*”, as a distinct programme of activating, preparing and modernising the forces within the MoD, it has been assured the process of coordinating the involvement of allocated resources in other programmes for implementing the CIS requirements of the force goals adopted by our country to support: the provision of strategic and tactical communication extensions at the level of forces committed to NATO operations; the modernisation of electronic messaging systems, ground-air-ground radio services (UHF); information system support for both static and deployed headquarters; information security within CIS; an incident response capability within information systems; communications for civilian decision-making authorities in peacetime, to support air national sovereignty and for implementing an identification friend and foe including NATO Mode 5 capability.

An important set of actions coordinated by the CIS Directorate, during this period, has been the installation, operational testing, and security accreditation of the NATO communications and information systems in Romania and its services in the most important command centres, including the Bi-SC Automated Information System (BI-SC AIS) basic capabilities within the NATO SECRET Wide Area Network, activated on 17 April 2006, supported and operated in our national sites by the Military Information Systems and Services Agency.

During the same period, very fertile in reconsiderations and programming changes, the CIS Directorate has participated with good results in the conferences and workshops carried on at expert and staff levels within the framework of NATO C3, at NATO C3 Board level as well as in subcommittee and working group substructures, assuring in this way the harmonisation of policies and own plans in the areas of responsibility, setting and assuming objectives and priorities for CIS area, establishing common orientations and directives for capability development. There have always been approached new coordinating instructions regarding the development of specific capabilities within the EU by the development of the relationship with the European Defence Agency and the European Union Military Staff.

An intense activity has been aimed at the negotiation and decision to establish a NATO Deployable CIS Module in Romania under the Supreme Allied Command Europe operational control.

A priority of the external relations has been the establishment of bilateral CIS technical agreements with the neighbour states, covering also the cooperation in the frame of frequency spectrum management.

The participation in NATO operations has always been seen as a decisive test of our capability to provide the required CIS support for deployed forces, which constantly depends on results based on a complex interaction as well as a complete set of planning and cooperative monitoring measures in a multilateral framework to which all services are to participate, involving also the Joint Operational Command and of course the CIS Command.

To end this summary report of a fruitful period, rich in achievements and successful enterprises, both major and less important ones, we appreciate that the CIS Directorate represents a major pillar of the General Staff, able to exercise its duties and essential role in the strategic coordination of the relevant development and employment processes of CIS capabilities currently and in the future, being an important actor in the transformation of the Romanian Armed Forces and in the implementation of network-enabled capabilities.



THE TRAINING AND DOCTRINE DIRECTORATE – Historical Milestones and Contemporary Redefinitions –

Brigadier General Dr Mihai CHIRIȚĂ

Training modernisation and streamlining are aimed at increasing the level of preparedness of units and large units for carrying out the assigned tasks. In this respect, the author points out that peacetime training must meet the requirements of the missions in crisis situations or at war.

It is essential that the training process should be focused on performance. It is only in this way that the units and subunits will be able to perform the specific tasks effectively during military actions.

Increased interoperability with the armed forces of NATO member states can only be achieved by adopting, adapting and implementing the Alliance standards in the field of training as well. The standardisation of training makes it possible for the level of performance of both individual and collective training tasks for each mission requirements to be correctly assessed.

Keywords: *military handbooks; training process; areas of responsibility; lessons learned; military culture*

The Training and Doctrine Directorate, as it is named and organised currently, has a rather recent history. We say “rather” because we believe that the statement according to which there cannot be armed forces without training, military doctrines and regulations, traditions and specialised education does not need to be demonstrated anymore. One can therefore state that the objective of such a directorate has existed in the Romanian Armed Forces for a long time, and it has been achieved through various structures whose name or subordination have often been changed, depending on the historical period and the reform process of the military body.

The historical milestones of our directorate, as a component structure of the General Staff, begin with the establishment of the *Doctrines, Studies and Syntheses Section* on 01 July 1997. A series of reorganisations and restructurings follow in 1997, 2000, 2001, the structure being temporarily dissolved in the last one, the training component being separated from the one responsible for the coordination of the military

Brigadier General Dr Mihai Chiriță – Chief of the Training and Doctrine Directorate within the General Staff.

doctrines and regulations drawing up process, then, after only three years, in March 2004, it is recreated as a structure in the organisation of the General Staff, under the name of the *Doctrine and Training Directorate*.

Going further on the directions for the reorganisation, in 2006, the directorate reassesses its structure, reorganises in keeping with the new responsibilities and is renamed the *Force Readiness, Generation and Evaluation Directorate*. After the last reorganisation of the Ministry, in 2009, the directorate is once again reorganised, certain structures transform, it is subjected to personnel cut and renamed the *Training and Doctrine Directorate*.

The successive reorganisations and restructurings completed by our directorate have required for “*on the fly*” rethinking of the functionality of component structures, a particularly thorough examination of the areas of responsibility, functions and way to fulfil them, given the complex conditions generated by the large fluctuations of the staff.

Throughout the development of the mentioned process, there have been multiple reorganisations on structures and functions, system inputs and outputs, changes in the area of activity, promotions, as well as some individual drawbacks, some circumstantial in nature or determined by the fact that some people could not quickly readjust to the new requirements and have not achieved the performance necessary to execute the functions they have been assigned.

Currently, the *Training and Doctrine Directorate* is the specialised structure of the General Staff that is responsible for the coordination, management and assessment of the training process, operationalisation of forces, development of specific normative acts, military doctrines and manuals, general military regulations, expertise in the process of issuing military publications and in commanding the *lessons learned* process and system, traditions and military culture, coordination of military education, as well as physical education and sports activities.

Training, as a process by which human, material and financial resources are transformed into operational capacity, being under the responsibility of the *Training Service*, holds a central place in the structure of any armed forces able to meet the military and security needs of the state. Military might depends on the amount of its forces, but especially on their quality, which is achieved mainly through the training process.

Modernising and streamlining training are primarily aimed at increasing the level of preparation of units and large units for carrying out the assigned tasks.

Training that takes place in peacetime must meet the requirements of the missions that are to be fulfilled in crisis situations or at war. We appreciate that this axiom must guide the planning, execution and evaluation of the training process.

The training process should be focused on performance. The units and subunits will be able to perform the specific tasks at a high level during military actions only if their execution is practiced throughout the training process.

Increased interoperability with the armed forces of the NATO member states can only be achieved by adopting, adapting and implementing the Alliance standards in the field of training. The training standardisation makes it possible for the level of performance of the individual and collective training tasks established for each mission requirement to be correctly assessed.

Through the introduction of *Missions Training Programmes/MTP*, specific to each units/subunits, training standardisation acquires a higher dimension. Applying this concept is a qualitative leap, a step forward in the overall effort of transformation and modernisation of forces.

As their name suggests, these programmes enable the possibility to easily determine which training activities should be conducted by a military structure to be able to fulfil the assigned mission. They are also a real help for the commanders who directly conduct the training, because they contain already adopted documents for developing and assessing training.

Missions Training Programmes, which address the training of commands and forces, must be supplemented by *Individual Training Programmes/ITP*, which provide training standardisation at the individual level.

The training standardisation by introducing *MTP* and *ITP* must be related to the change in the current format of the preparation documents in the military system. It should be considered that, depending on the changes taking place in the operational environment, the documents for conducting and assessing training will have to be updated, yet, without affecting the principles that lie at the basis of their development.

The modernisation of the training process requires the use of advanced computer assisted simulation technologies, which provide the training of command structures and of forces in conditions similar to the current battlefield realities. The main role of modelling and simulation is to reproduce as realistically as possible the battlefield conditions, with as low as possible costs.

An important part in developing training through simulation activities will belong to the simulation centres established in the Romanian Armed Forces, whose mission is to ensure the planning, preparation and execution of exercises.

NATO is currently undergoing a new and comprehensive transformation process that is aimed at increasing forces mobility, deployment capacity and support in theatres of operations, while increasing the response capacity of military structures, and all this process is conducted under the imperative of the principle of “*permanent change*”.

Adapting to the tendencies of the evolution of the integrated battlespace means the continuous change of the data based on which there are developed training concepts, plans and programmes and, implicitly, the need to partially or fully resume the analysis and planning process. In other words, in the “fluid” environment in which we operate, “*the only constant is change*”.

To conclude, the characteristics of the changes in the training conception may be translated in “*individualisation of training through standardisation*”.

The substantial changes in the Romanian Armed Forces are found in what we call the process of “*standardisation-interoperability*” with the military structures of NATO member states.

This is a complex process, which requires a large amount of investments, especially financial ones. The difficulty is amplified when the logical and objective requirements are not met, namely the ones of full compatibility between the proposed goals and the needed resources, given the situation in which, as far as resources are concerned, we add a new conception as a first class element, which is appropriate to the way of thinking and acting. We understand that this means investment and effort in changing mentality and in achieving “*intellectual interoperability*” in the military alliance to which we belong.

In this respect, the conception of using, training and educating our armed forces has suffered major changes, resulting from the analysis of the development of the security environment, of the new physiognomy of conducting military actions and of the participation with troops in military coalition actions in theatres of operations and, at the same time, it has been a major objective in the activity of the Directorate.

The lessons learned from the participation in the above-mentioned missions, as well as in various other international exercises and missions facilitate the process of rethinking in a modern spirit the training procedures and methods, the content of military publications, being a good opportunity for conceptual clarification and achievement of “*intellectual compatibility*” of military personnel, a mission in which our Directorate is deeply involved through the structure of *lessons learned*.

In fact, the organisation and implementation of a uniform system of *lessons learned* in the Romanian Armed Forces, defined as a priority of our Directorate, will enable, among other things, the streamlining of future military activities, the collection of information in databases specific to the domain and their dissemination towards the beneficiaries, the processing of a large number of reports, as well as the possibility to adapt and update the already developed doctrines, manuals, regulations and normative acts.

The coordination of the development process of “important” military publications in the specific areas of the General Staff, as well as the structures under its supervision, the precise application of the NATO hierarchy in the doctrinal field, as well as the coordination of the committees specialised in specific normative acts, doctrines and military manuals in the Romanian Armed Forces, specific to the *Doctrine Service* through its specialised structure, the *Doctrine Section* respectively, have required a sustained team effort, a serious documentation in areas that are often restrictive or little exploited, to which other structures with responsibilities in the development of specific normative acts have contributed, in the spirit of the institutionalised collaboration in the military.

In the field of doctrines, regulations, instructions, manuals, the adaptation of new military capabilities to be able to act in the current conflict framework requires the implementation of a system of norms, procedures, rules and standards derived both from personal experience and from the military actions carried out under NATO mandate or within certain missions.

The current concept – the doctrines, regulations –, although provide us with the premises for a common approach with the one of the Alliance, is continuously adapted and improved in the armed forces services, with the purpose of conducting rapid and effective operations and combat actions in a joint and multinational framework.

The new operational concepts stipulated in the developed military doctrines or assessed by our directorate are oriented towards developing the mentality of a winner for the fighters, who must rapidly adapt to the real conditions of operational situations, to act independently in the national and multinational structures, inside the country or abroad, depending on the specific and particularities of missions.

The application of the new doctrinal concepts will significantly change the structure and functionality of the military body as a whole, as well as in its components, will provide the full effectiveness of command and the synergy of military action, as well as the optimisation of the capabilities specific to the Romanian Armed Forces.

Through the harmonisation of military documents with the Alliance requirements, we will determine the unitary use of the same operational concepts and, therefore, the same method of reasoning at the tactical, operational and strategic level as our partners. In this regard, both Romanian military theory and practice will be harmonised with the Western ones to effectively address the problems imposed by the nature of current conflicts, by the quality standards in the preparation of the Romanian Armed Forces for the participation in such conflicts, regardless of the theatre of operations, its conditions (excessive climate,

degree of culture and civilisation etc.) and the methods and rules of engagement with a view to achieving success.

The doctrinal structure should be based on the modern conflict theory generated by the evolution of the psychological and media, technical, special, psycho-moral, visible and invisible, conventional and unconventional dimensions, and must meet the requirements related to the modern battlefield physiognomy, whose essential attributes are: multidimensionality, transparency, dynamism, discontinuity, multi-directionality, automation and, last but not least, digitisation.

The continuous effort in the field of the harmonisation of military documents within the Directorate has been focused on modernity and efficiency, selective introduction of the new and total exclusion of formalism and routine, thus contributing to changing the mentality of the armed forces staff and refocusing its most part towards the study and adoption of what is truly valuable.

NATO joint doctrines lie at the basis of developing similar national doctrines, which represent, in turn, the reference element in the development of other documents that are specific to this field.

In this regard, there is a close relationship between the NATO joint doctrines (AJP) and the national doctrines developed in the General Staff and at the level of its services, exemplified by the fact that “*capstone*” and “*keystone*” NATO publications represent the reference field for level 1 national publications and determine the content of the ones located at the lower hierarchy levels – manuals, regulations, techniques, tactics and standard operating procedures.

There is a functional communication and information system between the General Staff, through its specialised structure, and the *NATO Standardisation Agency*, resulted in the permanent exchange of information in the field of doctrine, the annual participation in the meetings of the *Allied Joint Operations Doctrine Working Group – AJOD WG* and the timely transmission of specialised issues for analysis and harmonisation of point of views.

Romania’s participation as a member of the NATO working group on issues of joint doctrine has stimulated the process of harmonisation of joint-type national doctrines with the allied doctrines, the instruments necessary for all commanders of the expeditionary forces that our country has made available to coalitions in the theatres of operations in which it has taken part and has deepened the integration process into the Alliance as a credible partner to work within NATO.

We consider that the implementation of the new doctrinal and full compatibility concepts in the field in keeping with Alliance requirements will be a long and continuous process, conducted in all the structures of the Romanian Armed Forces.

A structure specialised in the field of education management at the level of the Ministry of National Defence, the *Traditions and Military Culture Section* subordinated to our Directorate is assigned with developing, in keeping with the competences, the specific normative framework in the field of military traditions of civic education, the cultural and educational strategy of military activity, with coordinating, evaluating and proposing the necessary corrective measures for an effective management of the spiritual life, with providing specialised assistance to the compartments and personnel responsible for the activity of the Romanian Armed Forces military traditions.

Since 1996, through a Provision of the Chief of the General Staff, the traditions and military culture activity is defined as a category of training, and civic education – a component of the national education system, as well as of the educational process.

In this context, the specialised structure, following various re-subordinations, has redefined its tasks and objectives and acted especially for:

- fostering the loyalty towards the nation, country and military, the camaraderie and team spirit, the responsibility of personnel categories for faithfully fulfilling the obligations and missions incumbent on them on the Romanian territory and in theatres of operations;
- providing the material and spiritual conditions specific to traditions and culture, as a dimension of the military preparation for the staff training and education programmes capitalising on the existing cultural potential of the military;
- professionalising the institutionalised system of the armed forces cultural institutions, corresponding to the standards and requirements of modern cultural management;
- protecting, preserving, restoring and capitalising on the military-historical heritage, fostering authentic, perennial values, thus creating higher grounds and motivations regarding the Romanian and universal military culture values;
- developing the process of the integration of the Romanian armed forces in the country's cultural and spiritual life, the intercultural learning within NATO and maintaining the high level of public confidence and respect;
- resuming and expanding the cultural cooperation connections with the armed forces of the neighbouring and NATO member countries, especially to honour the memory of the soldiers fallen in the Second World War and, more recently, in theatres of operations.

The strategy of the education system management in the field of military traditions is aimed at creating, within the categories of military personnel, the conditions for gaining access to equal opportunities and in conditions of social

protection to the heritage and cultural values of the armed forces, the continuity of cultural approaches, the neutrality of the cultural activity towards any political party ideology, its dogmas and doctrines, the critical assumption of the cultural experience of the civil institutions of this profile and of the armed forces of other countries, the diversification of cultural offers and their differences depending on the category of personnel they are addressed to, the formation of a behaviour that is adequate to the information process and to the accumulation of additional knowledge in order to become responsible citizens, attached to the fundamental ethical, moral-religious and military values, with a positive attitude towards the rule of law and the military institution, with a strong sense of duty and military discipline, capable of prolonged effort, resistant to hostile psychological and ideological pressures.

The activities of military traditions and civic education, to which the religious assistance ones add and which are held under the patronage of the specialised structure and in cooperation with the National Office for Heroes Memory, National Association of War Veterans, Association of Heroes Cult, the National Union of Military Forces in Retirement and Reserve, the Religious Assistance Section, through the specific forms of expression, have set up and developed a new conceptual, structural and functional framework of the Romanian military culture, which is flexible, coherent and adaptable to the Romanian society, to the impact and status of Romania as a NATO and the European Union member country.

The priority courses of action in the field of traditions and civic education are complemented by: improving the legal framework for the Commission of Heraldry and Designation of the Ministry of National Defence, advising on the proposals of military structures in relation to granting battle flags, adopting heraldic symbols and granting honorary designations, adopting identification flags, coordinating the work for the distribution of demilitarised artillery weapons for decorating historical monuments, organising ceremonies for national and/or military events, coordinating the work of museums, traditions halls, military circles and libraries, organising and improving the training of the personnel specialised in military traditions, participating in international agreements signed by Romania on the regime of war graves and commemorative war works, working with local government authorities on taking care of burial sites, commemorative war works and memorials of the Romanian soldiers in the country.

Military Education, which falls under the *Education Section*, considered as a form of basic preparation, together with training and practicing the attributions of the functions (gaining experience), is one of the three pillars on which the training system architecture is based and this is the way we have approached it in the "*Romanian Armed Forces Training Doctrine*".

The areas of responsibility of the Education Section consist in conducting and coordinating the undergraduate, graduate and specialist/advanced military education process, in developing and implementing the specific normative framework as well as in establishing specific performance indicators.

The same structure is responsible for the relationship of the military education system with the national education system, the military education systems of NATO and EU member states and the states with which cooperation agreements are signed in this field.

In full agreement with them, the Education Section works to achieve a pragmatic and efficient education system, vector of the transformation process that is meant for the formation of educated and trained fighters, possessing a high managerial culture, able to operate in a joint multinational environment, to take risks, to identify critical points or areas and to implement change.

It is also aimed at building a modern military education, which is prospective, flexible and open, adequate to the process of transformation and modernisation of the Romanian Armed Forces, the requirements of market economy and the individual choices of self-assertion of pupils, students and learners.

Another course of action is to continuously improve the quality of education with a view to being in line with the level of the existing good practice at the national and international level, to link the educational process with the objectives and imperatives of the operationalisation of the Romanian Armed forces units.

Starting from the responsibility of conducting the education process in the Romanian Armed Forces, the Education Section, in cooperation with the specialised structures in the Human Resource Management Directorate and the Ministry of Education, Research and Youth, develops and implements strategies, policies and regulations regarding the selection and training of military personnel, ensures the interface between the military education and the national education, as well as with the military education of other states, coordinates the process of the development of the “*Graduate Model*” and the educational curriculum documents at the level of military education, in line with the *National/European Qualifications Framework*.

Through the agency of the Section, the verification, endorsement and approval of education plans, of documents and policy proposals aimed at institutional development of educational establishments are achieved. It also coordinates the self-evaluation activity of the military education institutions, controls and evaluates the military education institutions in keeping with the standards of the *ARACIP (Romanian Agency for Quality Assurance in the Pre-University Education)* and *ARACIS (Romanian Agency for Quality Assurance in Higher Education)*, promotes the educational offer of military educational institutions, conducts and coordinates

the programmes for foreign language learning by the military and civilian personnel of the Romanian Armed Forces, coordinates scientific research in military education institutions.

The main characteristic of the activity in the field of military education has been the continuation of its structural and content reform process, concomitantly with fulfilling the plan of development, training and specialisation of active and reserve military personnel.

The military education reform process has been conducted at the conceptual level, to meet the current training requirements, in line with the evolution of structures and the requirements of the positions the graduates will fill. The curricula have a rich content, a modern and differentiated one, in accordance with the military needs, the forms of personnel preparation and training and the levels of their education and development.

The education programmes of the National Defence University, the academies of the armed forces services and application schools are being reviewed in order to reflect NATO strategies, doctrines, procedures and standards and to improve the preparation of the military and civilian personnel. In this process, we particularly focus on including all NATO standards accepted and implemented through specific national publications.

Military physical education, under the responsibility of the *Physical Education Office*, was and should remain, according to our conception, an essential component of the training process, which capitalises on all the forms of collective or individual activity that takes place with a view to forming, developing and maintaining the motor skills, helping, at the same time, through the provided methods, to the improvement of the physical and mental health of the military personnel.

Given the complexity of the field concerned and the implications it has in the performance of the functional duties of each military man, the specialised structure of the Directorate, either a section or office, has channelled its efforts in order to carry out its work on five main directions, respectively: developing the specific normative framework, the physical education of the military personnel, the activity “*Sports for All*”, the professional sport activity and within the International Council of Military Sports.

We will further present briefly the specific activities undertaken within each course of action. Thus, military physical education was required as compulsory, provided in the training and education plans, in accordance with *Law of physical education and sport no. 69/2000*, taking place systematically and continuously, throughout the entire week, the entire training and education process. The Physical Education Office within the General Staff is the specialised conception structure

that coordinates, directs, controls and evaluates the activity of physical education and sports in the Ministry of Defence.

Currently, the normative framework of this particularly important activity for the training of the military personnel, resulted in the set of documents regulating the activity of physical education and sport in the Romanian Armed Forces, is established: the *Conception of physical education and sports in the Romanian Armed Forces*, *Instructions regarding the management of sports activity in the Romanian Armed Forces* and the *Rules of military physical education*.

As far as the physical education of the personnel employed in military structures is concerned, the activity is organised and conducted in all the units, subunits and military education institutions, in keeping with the specific training plans and programmes, their content being determined by the general requirements of the education and training process, the specific of each military branch and speciality. Moreover, physical education can contribute with effective means to the physical recovery and mental preparation for combat of military personnel, the physical activity being really necessary and useful.

The management of military physical education, consisting in the full range of the forms of organisation and operation is mostly ensured by specialists and specialised structures.

At the level of the General Staff, steps have been taken to improve the physical effort capacity of the Romanian Armed Forces soldiers, including those of the General Staff and, to be an example for the entire armed forces, this activity has begun with the personnel of the General Staff. Absolutely all the soldiers of this structure began to be assessed, from the first half of 2007, as far as the level of their physical training was concerned. Those who did not correspond to the tests were recommended special training programmes meant to make them ready to meet the required military regulations in force.

The activity "*Sports for All*" has been systematically and continuously performed to strengthen and maintain the health, development and improvement of the motor and moral skills of the military men, as well as to attract the entire personnel of units to practice sports in an organised manner, within local and national sports competitions, encouraging, at the same time, those with special physical skills for performance in sports. This activity has included sports competitions and application-military tests in close connection with the specific of the branch, as well as related to the activities in the training programme.

A number of military men participating in these activities were selected to be part of the teams of the Ministry and represent the Romanian Armed Forces

in international military competitions, organised under the patronage of the International Council of Military Sports. The professional sport activity has been organised and carried out in the Armed Forces Sports Club “*Steaua*” of Bucharest and the Applicative-Military Sports Club “*Bucegi*” in Predeal, with notable results at national level, consisting of numerous titles of Romania’s champions, as well as internationally, by obtaining five Olympic medals at the most recent Summer Olympics edition, held in 2008 in China.

The field of military sports is governed by the International Council of Military Sports. Our armed forces, member of that body since 1992, is represented by a head of delegation and three members, the activity being coordinated by the Physical Education Office from the Training and Doctrine Directorate.

The command structures of the International Council of Military Sports (ICMS) have considered the Romanian military presence in the international military sports landscape as an active one, and the Romanian Armed Forces as a serious partner in this body. The Council’s main objectives are: the implementation of physical education and sport in the armed forces of member countries, the strengthening of the team spirit and friendship of the soldiers from all continents and the active involvement in the common efforts to maintain world peace by participating in activities, including in areas of conflict and post-conflict. These objectives are summarised by the motto of the organisation: “*Friendship through Sport*” and the recognition by the UN of the ICMS as a partner in maintaining peace and stability in high-risk areas of conflict.

Another important issue that has shown the progress of military athletes in their preparation is that many of them have participated in the international missions in which the Romanian Armed Forces are involved (Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq). We believe that the development of the skills specific to practicing a sport or applicative-military discipline has allowed them to fulfil the specific missions at a higher quality level.

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The achievements presented, based on professionalism, dedication, commitment and team spirit, represent us both as a structure within the General Staff and as a team fully aware that any successful action is based on work and responsibility.

We equally assume the success and failure, the latter being, for each member of the staff, a subject of consideration and, why not, a “*lesson learned*” for the future. In this respect, we address the future missions of the Directorate and we are determined to add a further substantial quality to our work, our courses of action being:

- implementing a professionalised system of training through covering at least four defining stages, represented by: the design of the training

doctrinal framework; its differentiation on levels, structures and forms of training; the theoretical implementation and practical realisation of the system; training evaluation;

- modernising military education;
- implementing a military doctrinal system adequate to the current restructuring phase of the military body, with particular emphasis on the acceptance of NATO standards, the adoption of new concepts in the field of conceptual, structural and operational interoperability of forces, the modernisation of the system and process of the development of military publications.

We reckon that the future of individual and collective training is connected, to a large extent, to the development of *distance distributed education*. In this regard, we intend to act more effectively for the use of a distributed system at an as widely as possible level.

For us, it is also very important that the new concepts that lie at the basis of the transformation of the North Atlantic Alliance could be integrated into the future training of joint forces.

We are concerned, at the same time, with refocusing the attention of the staff on the set of traditional military norms and values, team spirit, heroes cult and tradition in the Romanian Armed Forces.

We have presented only some of the historical and operational benchmarks of the *Training and Doctrine Directorate*, which have essentially marked the specific commitment of our structure in the operational organisation of the General Staff.

We are convinced that the facts mentioned above are only the source, the essence of what has been achieved in our team, and the engagement in affirming the novelty, the competence, the foresight and the innovative thinking, based on the scientific study and interpretation of phenomena and processes specific to the military field, are only some of the features of the character of the personnel who have “*inspired*” the Directorate throughout its short, but fruitful history.

English version by
✍️ *Iulia NĂSTASIE*

THE ARMED FORCES HISTORICAL SERVICE - Promoter of the National Military Historiography -

Captain Dr Marian MOȘNEAGU

The archives preserved over the years and managed with responsibility by the Armed Forces Historical Service represent, in the author's opinion, a true source of documentation for military and civilian researchers, who have enriched the national military historiography with works of real scientific value.

During the Second World War, in the structure of the Service there was the information office, which sought to record important data about radical movements, about their weight and influence in the Romanian society, about the risks to which the archive deposits and the patrimony of the National Military Museum were exposed. This office made an almost complete description of the destruction of the archives located in two railway carriages, bombed at Turnu Severin on the night of 15/16 April 1944.

Keywords: *scientific research; administrative issues; war preparation; documentary source; mobilisation and military training*

The Evolution of the *Armed Forces Historical Service* merges with the very development of the General Staff.

Throughout the 142 years of existence, it has had different names: 2nd Section Historical works (1867; 1870-1893), 3rd Historical Office (1893-1896; 1897-1904), 1st Office (1896-1897), 4th Office (1904-1906), 3rd Historical Office (1906-1907; 1918-1920), 6th Information Office (1907-1918), 4th Historical Section (1 April 1920-1922), 8th Historical Section (1922-1927), 7th Historical Section (1927-30 January 1928), Historical Service (30 January 1928-1949), Military Archives Section (1949-1 March 1998), Romanian Military Archives (1 March 1998-1 December 2000), Military Archive Service (1 December 2000-1 April 2002), Military Archives and Documentation Service (1 April 2002-1 May 2006) and the Armed Forces Historical Service (1 May 2006-onwards).

The need for a specialised structure within the General Staff occurred once it was created. Thus, in "*Monitorul Oastei*" (the "*Army Gazette*"), vol. II/1864, the following *Publication* was issued,

Captain Dr Marian Moșneagu – Head of the Armed Forces Historical Service.

signed by the Minister of War, General Alexander Iacovache: “Given the benefit that the country and the armed forces derive from spreading training in the army; considering how beneficial is to put books to read in the hands of soldiers, to remind them of glorious memoirs and noble examples, and to be at the same time in relation to their tastes and positions; given the army’s lack of a Romanian military history; considering the establishment of schools within regiments, we have decided to hold a competition in order to adopt two works meant for the regimental schools of the corps”.

The first work will include **an array of the most important feats of bravery, generosity, humanity, patriotism, unselfishness and heroism** through which the Romanian soldiers have distinguished throughout all the ages of our history.

The authors should try hard to seek all that can instil the noblest sentiments in soldiers. We must bear in mind that the book they will make is intended for soldiers, out of whom most part have little training and many no training at all.

Therefore, it must be written in a comprehensive manner and, consequently, a simple style is greatly needed. As a model, the contestants can be familiarised with the historical episode of **Sobieschi și plăieșii români (Sobieschi and the Romanian Border Guards)**, described by C. Negruzzi and the Circular of 1 November 1860 given by Mister M. Kogălniceanu, the then Minister of the Interior, to the villagers.

This work will need to have at least one volume [...], printed with **Cicero** and 150 pages.

The second work will be **Romania’s military history**. This history will include in detail all the military events of our history. The authors will particularly insist on the ages of Stephen the Great and Michael the Brave, as well as on those during which regular armies were established for the first time.

Furthermore, the authors will describe, in addition to the history of the wars of the Principalities, all that is necessary to know from the general history of the countries. The contestants must bear in mind that this book is especially aimed at non-commissioned officers training; therefore, the deeds must be well specified, only the ones with real importance in our annals being mentioned and political digressions must be avoided, as they are not related whatsoever with the purpose of this work.

For both works, printed works and manuscripts will be allowed to participate in the contest. All of them must be submitted to the Ministry of War (1st Directorate, 1st Division), before 31 December 1864¹.

Through the High Decree no. 380 on 17 March 1867, within the Central Administration of the Ministry of War, under its direct authority, the *War General Stock* was established, as independent directorate. It consisted of the 1st Section

¹ “Monitorul Oastei”, vol. II, 1864, pp. 44-46.

the Romania Map – Interior Topographic Work and 2nd Section – Historical Works. Military Statistics and Regimental Papers. The heads of the department were appointed by the Prince, the other officers being appointed by the Minister of War². This structure was transient, being abolished by the High Decree no. 1163 on 11 August 1867.

Through the High Decree no. 181 on 3 February 1870, Carol I approved the “*Regulation regarding the service of staff officers*”, which stipulated the re-establishment of the *War General Stock*. Under Article 68, the 2nd Section Historical Works and Military Statistics had the following attributions: “*classification and preservation of archives regarding war operations. The drafting of any military operations. The history of regiments since their establishment and, in general, all the historical work. The gathering of all the necessary documents for Romania’s military history and the foreign powers’ history. Papers and works published abroad. The conservation of the library and archive of the Stock. The examination of military papers and works published in Romania and abroad*”³. A further regulation would set out in detail all matters that regulated the activity of the Stock⁴.

Through the High Decree no. 158 on 17 January 1884, the “*Regulation of the staff service*” was approved, which maintained the distribution of the General Staff in the three sections, a distinct attribution of the 1st Division being “*the journal and history in times of peace and war*”⁵.

In the organisation chart of the Great General Staff from 1893, in which it became a superior directorate in the structure of the Ministry of War, in keeping with the new “*Regulation of the staff service*”, approved by the High Decree no. 1170 on 13 April 1891, the 3rd Office within the 1st Section was responsible, among others, of the “*statistical issues and the history*”⁶. In 1896, the General Staff Historical Service was part of the 1st Office of the 1st Army Organisation, Mobilisation and Training Section and, in 1897, within the 3rd Office⁷.

In 1899, it became the “*History of army campaigns and major operations*”⁸.

In 1904, the historical issue became the responsibility of Sub-office B, 4th Office of the 2nd Section, under the name “*Stages. Military mail facilities and related regulations. Campaigns history*”⁹.

² Serviciul Istoric al Armatei, Registrul Istoric al Marelui Stat Major, f. 24.

³ Serviciul Istoric al Armatei, Microfilme, roll P.S.E.M. 1208, c. 130.

⁴ Serviciul Istoric al Armatei, Registrul Istoric al Marelui Stat Major, f. 30.

⁵ *Ibidem*, f. 73.

⁶ *Ibidem*, f. 99.

⁷ *Ibidem*, f. 116.

⁸ *Ibidem*, f. 124.

⁹ *Ibidem*, f. 137.

From 5 July 1904, the 4th Office of the 2nd Section had the following responsibilities: *“Historical, geographical and statistical studies. Library. “Military Romania” (România militară, in Romanian – A/N) Editorial staff*¹⁰.

In 1905, the *“The History of the Russian-Japanese War”*¹¹ was written within the General Staff.

In 1906, the Campaigns History is found among the responsibilities of the 3rd Office of the 1st Section¹², an office that, from 1907, will be named History and Library, with the departments of Historical Studies and Statistics, Historical Papers. Library, *“Military Romania”* Library Bookkeeping and Quartermaster’s Office¹³.

From 25 May 1907, the attributions of the 6th Information Office of the 2nd Section included the General military historical service. Studies of modern campaigns; National military history; History of the Romanian army organisation, History of manoeuvres and training camps, History of exercises and manoeuvres regulations of the three services¹⁴. Towards the end of 1909, 6th Office Information prominently included the Historical Service of the General Staff¹⁵.

After the army adopted its peacetime organisation, based on the High Decree no. 3179 on 28 October 1918, two offices could be found within the 2nd Historical Service and Milestones Section – 3rd Historical Service Office, headed by Lieutenant Colonel Dumitru Motaş and 4th Stages and Great General Staff Library Office¹⁶.

On 11 March 1919, the head of the Historical Office, Lieutenant Colonel Dumitru Motaş, required the creation of the Historical Section of the Great General Staff. The main reason was that given the fact that the Historical Office, having to prepare a paper work completely independent of the ones of the other sections, the officer considered that *“its integration in one of the sections would not be advantageous, but it rather has the disadvantage of the fact that the archives and correspondence of this office are recorded in a section with which there are no collaboration relations”*. In addition, the officer argued that *“In order to continue the preparatory work of a historical summary of the campaign, staff are needed for the time being for: classifying the war archive, in charge of this operation being at least one officer for each army corps and one for various military services;*

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, f. 139.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, f. 145.

¹² *Ibidem*, f. 151.

¹³ *Ibidem*, f. 157.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, f. 166.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, f. 185.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, f. 272.

centralising the historical summaries coming from the Divisions and their coordination in time and space; studying the various complaints regarding the operations; drawing the historical summary of operations”.

To this end, the officer called for an urgent expansion of the Historical Office, which, at that time, did not even have the personnel required for the classification of campaign archives, which could be done only by officers who possess sufficient military knowledge (graduates from the Superior War School or officers who served in corps headquarters, divisions or brigades). The solution was to create a Historical Section within the General Staff, led by a Colonel, organised in three offices: 1st Historical Office, 2nd Archive Office and 3rd Registry Office¹⁷.

Consequently, based on Order of the Day no. 51 on 14 May 1919, the 2nd Historical Section turned into the 3rd Instruction, Regulations and Historical Section, with three offices¹⁸. Among these was the 3rd Historical Office, with three sub-offices, which had the following responsibilities: “1. *Gathering, classifying and coordinating data and operational documents of all major army units and drafting this history. Drawing up the history of the 1916-1919 campaign.* 2. *The works of the Monograph Commission and similar commissions. The lessons learned from the history of campaigns regarding organisation, training and command.* 3. *Supervising the particular work with older historical character of the Romanian Army. Historical monuments, treatment of prisoners and related works. Historical archive*”¹⁹.

In the order of battle of the Great General Staff on 1 November 1920, we can see the 6th Historical Section within the 2nd Division, established on 1 April 1920, based on the Report no. 224 on 28 March 1920, being organised in two offices – the 1st Romanian Army Historical Office and the 2nd Historical Office of Foreign Armies²⁰.

In 1921, the 6th Section of the 2nd Division was reorganised in three offices: the 1st Office History of the Neutrality and of the Campaign 1916 until 1 January 1917, the 2nd Office History of the Campaign 1 January 1917 until 1 April 1921 and the 3rd Office Old Campaigns and Archive²¹.

From 1 April 1922, we find the 8th Historical Section of the 3rd Division, with two offices, 1st Office Period of Neutrality and Operations until 1 January 1917 and 2nd Office Operations from 1 January 1917 until the army was reorganised for peacetime²².

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, P II 1 524, c. 355-356.

¹⁸ Serviciul Istoric al Armatei, Registrul Istoric al Marelui Stat Major, f. 273.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, f. 283.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, f. 293.

²¹ *Ibidem*, f. 299-300.

²² *Ibidem*, f. 318.

In 1923, the 8th Section Campaign History had two offices – 1st Office Archives, Research, Military Museum and 2nd Office Campaigns Study²³. During this period, the 8th Section completed with documents from war archives the history of the second part of the campaign 1 January 1917 – 1 August 1918, the reorganisation of the Romanian Army in the winter between 1916 and 1917, the events and operations between 27 November 1916 and 1 January 1917 and the 2nd Army offensive in Mărăști. It also drafted a series of historical works, such as the Romanian cavalry action in the 1916-1918 campaign (the Charge at Robănești, the Prunari Action, the Action of the 1st and 2nd Cavalry Division in the second part of the campaign) and the Summary of the Romanian Army operations in Transilvania (November 1918-May 1919) for the Foreign Ministry²⁴.

From 1 October 1927, the 8th Historical Section turned into the 7th Historical Section, within the 1st Division, with the 1st Office Historical Research, the 2nd Office Archives, the 3rd Historical Office and the National Military Museum²⁵.

On 30 January 1928, the 7th Historical Section, with the National Military Museum and the Central Archives of the Ministry of National Defence in its subordination, turned into the Historical Service²⁶.

The interwar period was particularly prolific for the specialists of the Historical Service, who created many works, studies and documentation. Among them, the monograph *“Romania in the World War 1916-1919”*, the most ambitious editorial project of the Historical Service, involved a thorough activity of documentation. The first volume (672 pages and 42 appendices), with Chapters I-VIII, appeared in 1934, the second volume (886 pages and 13 appendices) – Chapters IX-XIX, in 1936, the third volume III, part I (1 032 pages and 20 appendices) – Chapters XX-XXIV, in 1940, and part II (866 pages and 10 appendices), in 1941, all published by the *Official Gazette and State Printing House* (in Romanian, *Editura Monitorul Oficial și Imprimeriile Statului*) and the National Printing House Bucharest (Imprimeria Națională București).

The work was completed with four volumes of Documents – Appendices, first volume, 1934 with 510 documents, totalling 738 pages, second volume, 1936, 343 documents and 328 pages, third volume, part I, 1940, 609 documents and 498 pages and third volume, part II, 1941, 1 155 documents and 476 pages.

²³ *Ibidem*, f. 322.

²⁴ *Ibidem*, f. 349.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, f. 624.

²⁶ Luminița Giurgiu, Lucian Drăghici, Manuel Stănescu, Cornel Țucă, *În slujba Muzei Clio. O istorie a Serviciului Istoric al Marelui Stat Major. 1920-1945*, Editura Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, București, 2006, p. VII.

To this monumental work, performed under the coordination of General Grigore Constandache, Head of the Historical Service between 28 January 1928 and 31 October 1936, and subsequently, technical adviser and that of Colonel Constantin Drăgănescu, Head of the Historical Service between 1 November 1938 and 10 February 1942, paid their contributions the Colonels Epaminonda Arghiropol, Ioanichie Philemon, Ioan P. Georgescu, Marin Manafu and Victor Renescu, Lieutenants Colonels Paul Alexiu, Petre Andreescu, Ioan Cristescu, Constantin Drăgănescu, Romulus Dumitrescu, Carol Franc, Alexander Ioanițiu, Scarlat Momiceanu, Ioan Muțiu, Isaia Popa and Emil Procopiescu, Nicolae Stătescu and Nicolae Tretinescu, Captain-Commander Preda Fundățeanu, Majors Alexandru Dumitrescu, George A. Ionescu and Vasile P. Nicolau and Captains Ioan Constantinov, Vasile Garaiac, Traian Lărgeanu and Vasile Nicolau.

During the Second World War, the Historical Service continued writing the fourth volume The History of the 1916 Campaign, which included the operations between 10 November and 31 December 1916: The Crossing of the Danube and the Olt by the Enemy. Operations in Wallachia 10-12 November 1916, Battle on the Argeș and Neajlov; Operations on 12-15 November 1916, Operations in Dobrudja 10-20 November 1916, and the Withdrawal; Situation on the evening of 20 November 1916 and Operations on 21-27 November 1916, concomitantly with gathering the archives and documentary material for the History of the events from 15 March 1939 to 21 June 1941 and the Campaign against the Soviet Russia.

Until 1 February 1943, a Summarised History was made regarding the historical relations between the Romanians and Russians for school youth, and another one, for military schools, and *“the bases were laid for making the plan of a history of war preparation of our army under all circumstances, from 1921 – when the army was organised for peacetime – until 1941, the beginning of the current war”*.

By the order of the Military Office of the Leader of the State the paper *“The value of the contribution made by Romanian forces in the Battle of Odessa, in the ensemble of the allied disposition at the South wing of the Eastern front”*²⁷ was drafted.

The archives funds preserved over the years and managed with responsibility by the Armed Forces Historical Service have constituted a true source of documentation for military and civilian researchers, who have enriched the national military historiography with works of real scientific value²⁸, to which

²⁷ Serviciul Istoric al Armatei, Marele Stat Major. Serviciul Istoric, file no. 852/1942, f. 2-5.

²⁸ *Istoria Statului Major General Român. Documente. 1859-1947*, Editura Militară, București, 1994; *Șefii Marelui Stat Major Român. Destine la răscruce. 1941-1945*, Editura Militară, București, 1995; *Istoria Statului Major General, 1859-2004. Istorie și transformare*, Editura Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, București, 2004; *Armata Română și Răscoala din 1907*, Editura Militară, București, 2008; *Armata Română și Unitatea Națională*, Editura Pământul, Pitești, 2008; *Înzestrarea Armatei Române, vol. I, 1919-1930*, Editura Academiei Tehnice Militare, București, 2000, *vol. II 1931-1935*, Editura Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, București, 2008.

there are added, on the occasion of a century and a half since the establishment of the General Staff, the volume *The General Staff in the architecture of the Romanian military body*²⁹, the first *Encyclopaedia of the Romanian Armed Forces* and the Romanian Armed Forces Album 1859-2009.

During the Second World War, the Service comprised an Information Office, which sought to record important data about radical movements, their weight and influence in the Romanian society, about the risks to which there were exposed the archive and the inventory of the National Military Museum. This office made an almost complete description of the destruction of the archives located in two railway carriages, bombed at Turnu Severin on the night of 15/16 April 1944. Many valuable pieces of information at the Historical Service refer to the archives handed over to the Soviet commands after 12 September 1944 and at the initiative of the officers of the Service to copy the operation logs of units before the Soviets took them over. The ordeal endured by the officers of the Service, who were in contact with the Soviets, is understandable given that they were threatened as they did not cooperate to find the Russian military archives, which remained in Romania after the First World War.

Changes in the Romanian Armed Forces after 1945, inspired by new allied present, including with troops, in Romania led to changes in the structure and functions of the Historical Service. In these circumstances, it was only after 1960 that research was resumed, with infinite precautions, regarding some topics of interest for the military history, but without the vigour, polemic spirit and scope of the period before the war. The Service focused on solving mainly the administrative, archives management problems as well as some meant to explain the events on 23 August 1944, the anti-Hitler campaign and the Romanian-Soviet "brotherhood of arms".

Faced with the challenges generated by the fundamental change caused by the events between December 1989 and January 1990, the researchers and the archivists of the Armed Forces Historical Service, together with specialists from the Centre for the Study and Preservation of Historical Military Archives have fulfilled missions of great responsibility with a view to taking over and preserving an impressive volume of archive material from various military units and institutions abolished as a consequence of the reorganisation and modernisation of the Romanian military body. In this context, through the decision of the General Staff, there were created three intermediate archives at the level of the Land Forces Staff, Naval Forces Staff, and Air Force Staff and one technical archive.

²⁹ Editura Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, București, 2009.

Since 2008, along with the other activities specific to the military archive system, the Armed Forces Historical Service implemented, for the first time, a computer system meant to ensure the integrated management of military archives and to create an electronic archive of the funds and to facilitate scientific research in the archives of the Romanian Armed Forces.

At the same time, The service has managed the activity meant to resolve a huge volume of requests from Romanian and foreign citizens with a view to issuing certificates necessary for establishing the quality of war veteran, resistance combatant, political persecuted persons or people sent in work camps, employees of the Ministry of National Defence. From 1991 until now, over 1 800 000 applications have been considered and resolved and over 1 250 000 certificates have been issued.

Returning, on 1 May 2006, to the name of the Armed Forces Historical Service, proper to all similar institutions in the armed forces of NATO member countries, was a necessary reparation, meant to recover an honourable tradition, as well as a restoration of the area of responsibility in accordance with the requirements of the conservation, research and exploitation of the archive treasure and the military traditions of the Romanian Armed Forces.

In this context, the members of the Scientific Council of the Armed Forces Historical Service issue quarterly, since 1998, the review *“Document – Bulletin of the Romanian Military Archives”* (*Document – Buletinul Arhivelor Militare Române*), which can be accessed online as well at the website address of the institution.

The research of military archives is open to all Romanian and foreign researchers at the offices of the Armed Forces Historical Service in Bucharest and the Centre for the Study and Preservation of Historical Military Archives in Pitești, the funds available for research being also available on the website of the institution, at www.defense.ro/sia/index.htm.

English version by
 **Iulia NĂSTASIE**

THE PROJECTION AND MODERNISATION OF MILITARY STRUCTURES – Domain of Responsibility of the Structures and Armament Planning Directorate –

Major General Dr Nicolae N. ROMAN

The Structures and Armament Planning Directorate is the specialised structure of the General Staff that plans and monitors the activities meant to implement the establishment, reorganisation and modernisation programmes of the Romanian Armed Forces structures, depending on priorities and allocated resources, with the purpose of achieving a force structure that is modern, reduced, professionalised, properly equipped, deployable, interoperable, has a multidimensional self-sustainment and protection capability, a flexible command and, based on optimal information and data, is capable of making decisions in a short time, of acting jointly and of being engaged in a range of missions in keeping with the commitments to NATO and the EU.

The reform in the military domain, in general, as well as the redesign of the command and control architecture, in particular, is a continuous process, the Alliance undergoing itself a transformation process to meet the new challenges.

Keywords: *human resource management; military equipment; strategic command; defence resources; areas of responsibility*

The activities related to the reorganisation and modernisation of the Romanian Armed Forces that have fallen under the responsibility of the entities with attributions in the human and material resource management, since 1990 up to now, have sought to harmonise the new structures with the ones already existing in the NATO member states, to procure state-of-the-art equipment and assets and to streamline the military expenditure, mainly the one regarding personnel and operational procedures.

In this context, the Romanian Armed Forces transformation process has taken place as a natural necessity, which has derived from the new strategic and transformation orientations of the Alliance. These have enabled the enlargement of the range of objectives and processes, to include the structuring and preparation of the forces with a view to participating in collective defence, improving capabilities for the entire range of crisis management operations as well as the ones for multinational operations meant to counter terrorism.

Major General Dr Nicolae N. Roman – Chief of the Structures and Armament Planning Directorate within the General Staff.

The Romanian Armed Forces transformation has been conceived in correlation with the Alliance transformation process itself. Given the circumstances of the transformation of forces, concepts and capabilities, the *Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy* represents the middle and long-term vision regarding the dimensioning, preparation and procurement of the armed forces so that they could take part in future operations. This makes available to the decision-making factors an enhanced military vision regarding the future configuration of the forces structure and capabilities that are necessary for the fulfilment of the missions by the Romanian Armed Forces. The adopted and projected concepts and capabilities are translated into requirements and plans, through the agency of the defence planning process and in keeping with NATO standards.

Consequently, the reorganisation and modernisation process has been aimed at dissolving, transforming or merging some structures that did not play a part in the organisation of the Romanian Armed Forces in peacetime anymore, the process being associated with a matching cut in the number of positions (functions) and the lay-off of the redundant personnel.

The role of the analyses of the restructuring activities has been that of guiding the decision-making factors to make the required changes in the structure of personnel (on categories of military, ranks, military branches and specialities etc.). The analyses have been mainly focused on increasing the professionalisation degree of the structures, the way of training and using the personnel etc.

At the same time, the funding necessary for personnel expenditure, the lay offs and the military pensions have been agreed upon so that they could meet the possibilities offered by the annual budgetary allocation established through the state budget.

In the field of acquisitions, the modernisation of the technique, the procurement of new systems and equipment have been sought, as well as the need for tailoring in keeping with the Alliance standards in order to meet the objectives regarding the interoperability with the technique of the NATO member countries armed forces, in accordance with the *Force Goals* and the Romanian Armed Forces procurement conception.

The transformation in the field of leadership, command and control has been aimed at re-projecting the structure of leadership, command and control with the purpose of optimising the decision-making and operational act. In this respect, the projected command and control structure of the Romanian Armed Forces would have to ensure an efficient leadership in peacetime, the easy adjustment of the leadership system in crisis situations, at war or to conduct missions in case of civil emergencies, which could be applied to command forces in national defence

missions, in a limited period of time, as well as to connect with an allied command on the national territory or abroad, to plan, organise, fulfil and control a mission in an integrated, logic and coherent system.

The *Strategic and Armament Planning Directorate* is the specialised structure of the General Staff that plans and monitors the activities meant to implement the programmes related to the creation, reorganisation and modernisation of the structures of the Romanian Armed Forces, depending on the priorities and the allocated resources, with the purpose of achieving a modern, reduced, professionalised, properly equipped, deployable, interoperable force, which is capable of self-sustainment and multidimensional protection, has a flexible leadership and which, based on the optimal information and data, is capable of making decisions in a short time and of acting jointly and being engaged in a range of missions in line with the commitments to NATO and the EU.

We will further present some of the most important stages in the evolution of the Directorate, starting with 1834, when the first “*central military structures and bodies*” were established in the two principalities. In the “*Ștabul Oștirii*” (the General Staff), the functional attributions regarding the “*army*” *organisation and procurement* were fulfilled by “*cancelarii*” (offices) manned with adjutants¹.

Since 1882, within the Great General Staff, certain structures with attributions in the field of organisation and procurement were established, as presented in *figure 1*.

Starting with 1990, as a consequence of the evolution of the regional and international political situation, at the same time with the political and social transformations, it was necessary for a profound change to be made in dimensioning and structuring the forces, as well as in planning the defence resources. These conditions have required the establishment of a specialised structure within the Great General Staff (later the General Staff) intended to propose, analyse and evaluate, with the staffs of military services and the other central directorates, the organisational structures of the Armed Forces and plan, depending on priorities, the material and financial resources meant for defence.

Thus, within about 20 years, the central structures of the Ministry and its subordinate main echelons have undergone extensive reorganisation. At the same time, the structures that over the years have fulfilled duties similar to the current ones of the directorate have undergone the transformation process, the most significant moments being listed below.

¹ http://dspi.m100.man/scurt_istoric/index_files/page620.htm

THE FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE

“Achieving the necessary capacity for the Romanian Armed Forces to promote and protect national interests in the circumstances of the current, developing or future risks and threats, fulfilling the commitments in terms of security and defence made by Romania within NATO and the EU, as well as to other international bodies”².

Therefore, the *first half of 1990* was the period in which the peacetime organisation of the Ministry of National Defence was established, which would represent, *in early 1990*, the cornerstone from which ample measures were initiated immediately after the events in December in order to restructure the Romanian Armed Forces, in general, and the central structures of the Ministry, in particular. Many changes were made in this period, most of the newly created structures representing the initial components for taking the next steps in the structural evolution of the Ministry.

At that time, in the General Staff there were the *Organisation, Mobilisation and Procurement Planning Directorate (OMPPD)* and the *Personnel Section*, and, directly subordinated to the Minister of National Defence, there was

THE ORGANISATION OF THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF - ON 11.12.1882 -
Section 1 – Organisation, Mobilisation, Operations Section 2 – Intelligence, Logistics Section 3 – Geography, Topography
- ON 10.09.1939 -
Section 1 – Organisation, Mobilisation Section 2 – Intelligence, Counterintelligence Section 3 – Operations Section 4 – Procurement Section 5 – Training, Education, Regulations Section 6 – Transportation
- ON 01.04.1940 -
Section 1 – Organisation, Mobilisation Section 2 – Intelligence, Counterintelligence Section 3 – Operations Section 4 – Procurement, Services Section 5 – Training Section 6 – Transportation, Communications Section 7 – Higher Military Education
- ON 01.04.1947 -
Section 1 – Organisation, Mobilisation Section 2 – Intelligence, Counterintelligence Section 3 – Operations Section 4 – Procurement, Services Section 5 – Training, Schools Section 6 – Transportation, Communications
- ON 15.05.1980 -
– The Organisation, Mobilisation and Armament Planning Directorate – The Operations Directorate – The Troops Command Mechanisation and Automation Directorate – Various sections (Aviation, Marine, Units Services, S.12 etc.)

Figure 1

² *Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy*, approved by the Decision of the Supreme Council of National Defence no. 38/2007, p. 6.

the *Cadres and Education Directorate*. Starting on 15 May 1990, the *Personnel Directorate* was established under the subordination of the Minister of Defence through the transformation of the former *Cadres and Education Directorate*, a structure that would coordinate the training and management of the Romanian Armed Forces personnel, in keeping with the new conditions created in the civil society.

Between 1993 and 1997, the structures of the Ministry of Defence responsible for human and material resource management underwent major transformation, as shown in *figure 2*³.

Year	Level	
	Great General Staff/ General Staff	Minister of National Defence
1993	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Organisation, Mobilisation and Procurement Planning Directorate was reorganised into the Organisation and Mobilisation Directorate and the Planning Directorate/30.10. - The Personnel Section was transformed into the Personnel Directorate/30.10. 	- Personnel Directorate
1994	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The Great General Staff was transformed into the General Staff/25.11. - The Organisation and Mobilisation Directorate - The Planning Directorate - The Personnel Directorate was transformed into the Personnel Inspectorate. 	- Personnel Directorate
1995	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The Organisation and Mobilisation Directorate - The Planning Directorate - The Personnel Inspectorate was transformed into the Personnel Directorate. 	- Personnel Directorate
1997	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The General Staff was reorganised based on modules, on "J"-type structures/30.04. - J.1 – The Personnel and Human Resource Records Directorate - J.8 – The Structures and Resource Planning Directorate. 	- Personnel Directorate changed into Human Resource Management Directorate/01.11.

Figure 2

In the context of the '97s, a priority direction of the transformation process of the military institution was the establishment of quantitatively reduced structures, which were effective, efficient, flexible and interoperable with the NATO member states armed forces and capable of providing the complete fulfilment of the basic missions of the Romanian Armed Forces, as well as of those assumed by treaties and military engagements.

³The data and information come from the organisation charts of the central structures of the Ministry of National Defence (the archive).

In this respect, Romania's status at that time towards the North Atlantic Alliance favoured the development of this reform process and even the compulsory assimilation or adaptation of its tendencies of evolution, knowing that the Alliance and, with it, most member states completed a comprehensive transformation process.

In the current terms, the General Staff (the command) is the properly organised element of the military structure, at strategic level, through which the Chief of the General Staff fulfils the command of the force structure and which is invested by laws with specific expertise in the military actions. The General Staff should provide leadership for all the activities and military operations that are prepared and conducted by the forces structure through a rigorous staff work, done in a uniform manner and with the participation of all its structures.

This context required the projection and operationalisation of a command and control structure, at the strategic level, which was smooth and flexible, able to plan and conduct independent or joint military actions, interoperable and compatible with NATO command structures. On *14 April 1997*, the Romanian Government Decision no. 110 on the organisation of the Ministry of National Defence came into force, which revoked the provisions of Government Decision no. 0828/1994. This moment marked the Ministry's transparency towards the civil society, its structure being made public for the first time in Romania's *Official Gazette* (in Romanian, *Monitorul Oficial*).

It was an important step, especially for the General Staff, because this echelon adopted, starting with *30 April 1997*, as a new element, *the "J" organisational structure*, specific to similar echelons of the NATO member states armed forces.

Thus, in the structure of the General Staff, there were established: *J.1 – Personnel and Human Resources Records Directorate* and *J.8 – Structures and Resources Planning Directorate* and, at the level of the Minister of National Defence, the *Personnel Directorate* turned into the *Human Resource Management Directorate*.

Given the above-mentioned data, it can be concluded that the reorganisation of the Ministry of National Defence and its subordinated structures, as central structures, made from the application of the provisions of the Romanian Government Decision no. 110/1997, *was one of the largest, at that time, perhaps the most important of the last 10 years*, representing the nucleus around which gravitated the other structural changes that occurred afterwards.

In 1998, the *Structures and Resources Planning Directorate* developed the first framework-plan on the progress of the reorganisation and modernisation of the Romanian Armed Forces, for 1998, approved by the Supreme Council of National Defence. Moreover, the Emergency Ordinance no. 7/1998 on the social protection of the staff made redundant following the reorganisation of the Armed Forces was promoted and approved.

Later on, after some research and documentation regarding the need for structural adjustments in the central bodies of the Ministry of National Defence, an “*experiment*” was made through which, with the transformation of the *Personnel and Human Resources Records Directorate* into the *Personnel, Human Resources Staffing and Mobilisation*, the *Organisation Section* – a unique structure in the central structures of the Ministry of National Defence, which was at that time (1 July 1999) part of J.1, was re-subordinated and integrated in the *Human Resource Management Directorate*. This “*experiment*” ended on 1 January 2000, when the *Organisation Section* returned in the structure of the General Staff in J.8 – *The Structures and Resources Directorate*.

All these provisions were stipulated in the Romanian Government Ordinance no. 41 regarding the organisation and functioning of the Ministry of National Defence, which came into force on *15 September 1999* and revoked Law no. 41 on 18.12.1990, on the organisation and functioning of the Ministry of National Defence.

On *15 June 2000*, the Romanian Government issued the Emergency Ordinance no. 74 on the organisation and functioning of the Ministry of National Defence, which stated that the institution is organised on central structures, whose establishment was approved by Government Decision. This Emergency Ordinance revoked the Government Ordinance no. 41/1999.

Under Article 107 of the Constitution of Romania and the provisions of Emergency Ordinance no. 74/2000, according to which the “*organisation of the central structures of the Ministry of National Defence was approved by Government Decision*”, the Romanian Government issued the Decision no. 489 on the organisation of the central structures of the Ministry of National Defence, the entry into force being on 30 June 2000.

The implementation of these laws determined the following changes in the structures with functions that were similar to the current Structures and Armament Planning Directorate/the General Staff, as follows: J.1 – the *Mobilisation and Personnel Directorate* changed into the *Organisation, Personnel and Mobilisation Directorate*, J.8 – the *Structures and Resources Directorate* was abolished and the *Programme Development, Coordination and Monitoring Section* was established, as a structure responsible for implementing the *Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Evaluation System*. These structures responsible for human and material resource management at the General Staff functioned with this organisation until 2006.

Starting with *01 November 2006*, by the Order of the Minister of National Defence no. B.5/1777, the *Structures and Armament Planning Directorate* was established – J.8, as a specialised structure within the General Staff.

Subsequently, through the *Order of the Chief of the General Staff* no. G.2/S-81 on 20 February 2007, the entry into force of the new organisation chart of the General Staff was approved, with the following structural changes: the *Organisation, Personnel and Mobilisation Directorate* was reorganised in the *Personnel and Mobilisation Directorate*, and the *Structures Service/J.1* and the *Programmes Development, Coordination and Monitoring Section/General Staff* were reorganised and integrated in the *Structures and Armament Planning Directorate*.

By the end of 2008, there were completed the normative framework governing the leadership, command and control in the Romanian Armed Forces, the organisation and functioning of the command structure at the strategic level, the organisation of the integrated control posts for the disposition of strategic leadership elements, as well as the organisation and functioning of the Joint Operational Command.

Based on the above-mentioned information, we can say that the General Staff has worked under that name, but with different structural organisation for 15 years, from 1994 to 2009.

THE CURRENT SITUATION:

The Structures and Armament Planning Directorate consists of 3 services, as follows:

- *The Structures Service;*
- *The Armament Planning Service;*
- *The Programmes Coordination and Evaluation Service.*

During 2009-2015⁴, the transformation process will aim to achieve the final operational capability for the command structure at the strategic level, both in peacetime and during crisis situations and at war.

To ensure the “*chain of command*” compatibility and continuity, the vertical

hierarchical relations, in these fields, at the level of the General Staff, the categories of military forces, the branches commands, the joint operational one and the subordinate structures, the following specialised structures function, as presented in *figure 3*.

The *Structures and Armament Planning Directorate*⁵ is the specialised structure of the General Staff, of the Ministry respectively, which has responsibilities in the following fields:

- a. the structural design and organisation dimensioning of the Romanian Armed Forces;

⁴To implement the provisions of the Government Decision no. S-113 on 18.02.2009 and the Government Decision no. S-37 on 22/01/2009 to amend the Government Decision no. S-1550/2006 regarding the approval of the organisation chart of the central structures of the Ministry of National Defence and the total number of required positions, on 30.03.2009, the new organisation chart of the General Staff enters into force, whose structure also comprises the Structures and Armament Planning Directorate.

⁵In accordance with the areas of activity of the General Staff, under the *Rules of Organisation and Functioning of the Ministry of National Defence*, approved through the Order of the Minister of National Defence no. M.S.118 on 19.06.2007.

Echelon	The Name of the Structure	Areas of Activity
The General Staff	The Structures and Armament Planning Directorate	- structures (structures projection and evolution, organisation charts development and organisation) - armament planning - programmes coordination and evaluation
The Land Forces Staff	The Structures and Armament Planning Service	- structures (structures projection and evolution, organisation charts development and organisation) - procurement - planning, programming and evaluation of major programmes - costs budgeting and assessment
The Air Force Staff	The Structures and Armament Planning Service	
The Naval Forces Staff	The Structures and Armament Planning Service	
The Joint Logistic Command	The Structures and Armament Planning Service	
The Communications and IT Command	The Budget Planning and Financing Office and the Mobilisation Office (in charge of the Organisation charts as well)	- organisation chart records - budget planning and execution
1 st Infantry Division	Organisation Charts and Staffing Office	- organisation chart records
4 th Infantry Division	Mobilisation and Organisation Charts Record Office and the Budget Coordination, Monitoring and Analysis Office	- organisation chart records - budget coordination, monitoring and analysis

Figure 3

- b. the development and management of the documents that are specific to structures organisation;
- c. armament planning with military technique and equipment;
- d. coordination of activities for issuing operational requirements and for developing procurement norms;
- e. unitary coordination of major programmes of the military services and the Joint Logistics Command;
- f. the development and conduct of the General Staff Major Programme/strategic command;
- g. cost estimates required for the military structures and capabilities.

The current status of Romania, of NATO and EU member, requires the development of a continuous process of assimilation or adaptation to their tendencies of evolution, being well known that most armed forces of the member states undergo a comprehensive transformation process.

In this context, it is required the development of a command and control structure, at the strategic level, which is flexible, able to plan and conduct independent or joint military actions, interoperable and compatible with NATO structures.

Creatively using our own experience, our military tradition, as well as the one of other countries in addressing this issue was and still is beneficial, which allows us to use some of the information available in some situations interpreted, regarding the similar structures existing at the moment in some NATO members armed forces.

To carry out their tasks, these structures are generally organised modularly, usually known as “NATO-type” structures, which also enables the exercise of special inter-branch competences (at strategic level).

In general, to ensure compatibility with the other commands of the NATO member states armed forces that have similar modular structures, the central structures of the General Staffs (or similar) in the armed forces of the NATO and EU member states are sized in accordance with the attributions they fulfil and the traditions of each country. They are numbered from J.1 to J.9, as in *figure 4*.

Operations
J. 2 – Intelligence
J. 3 – Operations
J. 5 – Planning (plans and scenarios)
J. 9 – CIMIC
Other structures
(Resources) Operations Support
J. 1 – Personnel (and Mobilisation)
J. 4 – Logistics
J. 6 – Communications
J. 7 – • Doctrine, Training, Education and Lessons Learned or • Operational Plans and Interoperability
J. 8 – • Budgetary Resources or • Force Structure, Resources and Evaluation or • Defence Resources Planning and Programming
Other structures

Figure 4

Lately, one can observe a tendency to standardise their organisation on “J”-type structures. However, except for the first (J1, J2, J3, J4 – which represent the same structures in all the NATO member states armed forces), the other ones (J5, J6, J7, J8) do not have the same areas of activity or name.

It is estimated that this type of structure – “J” meets the needs for facilitating the exercise of command and operational control, the management and monitoring of military actions and the troops participating in military operations, at military-strategic level and for ensuring interoperability with the staffs of NATO as well as of the NATO member states armed forces. Moreover, such a structure matches the reduction in the number of command structures in favour of the force structure, as well as the “shortening the chain of command” in order to achieve consistency between planned resources available through Romania’s state budget, the engagements assumed towards the Alliance and the missions set for the Romanian Armed Forces.

The Structures and Armament Planning Directorate of the General Staff is a central structure of conception, analysis, synthesis and structures evaluation, of planning and programming of the resources meant for providing the functioning of the armed forces, the procurement of military assets and materials, as well as a structure of the armed forces modernisation.

The Directorate, with its current structure, has proved effective, being a specialised integrative structure, which, together with the other structures of the General Staff and with the specialised ones belonging to the staffs of the military services, as well as those from the central structures of the Ministry of National Defence, provide

the decision-makers with propositions for solving the major problems facing the Romanian Armed Forces, now and in the medium and long term, and substantiate the identified versions for the settlement of problems, based on the armed forces needs and available resources.

Some of the major actions and activities planned and carried out so far, following the implementation of measures regarding the reorganisation and modernisation process of the Romanian Armed Forces, in which the Directorate has been directly involved, are the following:

“For almost twenty years we had all of the time and almost none of the money; today we have all of the money and no time”.



General George C. Marshall
14th Chief of Staff, U.S. Army,
1 September 1939-18 November 1945

- the fulfilment of modular structures of the headquarters and staffs of the military services and branches and joint operational commands;
- the distribution of forces with a view to meeting the requirements of not more than 90 000 troops, on military services, branches and joint operational commands, as well as on command structures;
- the projection of basic military structures (battalion, brigade and similar), for all the services and the assessment of the necessary costs;
- the development and submission of reports and documentations regarding the stage of the development of the reorganisation and modernisation process in the armed forces, as well as its perspective;
- the implementation of defence resource management on objectives and programmes.

Through these details, we have tried to present some of the steps taken by the General Staff, in the context of the general political and military process of adapting the command structures to the requirements of the ones in the Euro-Atlantic structures.

We share the idea that the military reform, in general, and the redesign of the architecture of command and control, in particular, is a continuous process, the Alliance itself undergoing a process of transformation and adaptation to the new challenges identified and, consequently, the process of reform and modernisation of the Romanian Armed Forces must be fully harmonised with the developments within NATO and the European Union.

As Admiral N.J. Cebrowski stated in an article, *“although the business world is different from the military domain, the lessons learned from the business world can be applied in the military”*⁶.

Therefore, *“the general staff, as a subsystem, must be flexible, it must be a throbbing organisation and the flexibility must penetrate its very structure. It must dilate and contract to a regular rate, depending on the specific needs. It must be organised on functional microstructures that can develop, combine or separate, depending on the mission needs in times of crisis or at war”*⁷.

*

These have been the most significant moments in the evolution of the *Structures and Armament Planning Directorate*, regarding organisation and subordination, as well as the specific missions corresponding to the areas of responsibility it has managed. The aspects approached in this article may represent an important milestone in the proper understanding of the place and role of a structure that had notable achievements in the past years and that has particularly important missions for those to come.

English version by
 **Iulia NĂSTASIE**

⁶ Amiral N. J. Cebrowski, *Obiectivul bazat pe rețea – o abordare militară diferită*, în *Gândirea Militară Românească*, no. 6/2003, p. 103.

⁷ General de brigadă dr. Nicolae N. Roman, *Statul major într-un comandament întrunit național – considerații preliminare*, în *Gândirea Militară Românească*, no. 3/2005, p. 58.

THE MILITARY REPRESENTATION TO NATO AND THE EU – Anniversary Introspection –

Lieutenant General Dr Sorin IOAN

The priority objectives of the Military Representation have been subsumed under the specific and punctual interests of Romania and, directly, under the those of the Ministry of National Defence, in relation to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. In this context, the author mentions a few of the most significant purposes of the Representation: to participate in developing Romania's strategic profile within NATO; to precisely establish the interests that can be supported within the Alliance, and to define, based on this, some real political-military objectives and to provide the connections that ensure the support necessary for the achievement of these objectives; to develop cooperation and consultation relations with the similar structures of the member nations and with the military structures at the NATO Headquarters and the EU Military Staff in order to consistently, timely and coherently promote the political-military interests within NATO.

Keywords: *Cold War; insurgent groups; crisis situation; military operations; security environment; civil-military cooperation*

The thought and the sight deeply focused on the anniversary moment that has complex implications for the General Staff have led to a personalised analysis of the *National Military Representation*. How does this structure contribute to the multiple responsibilities of the military leadership to meet the unconditioned requirements of the national defence and to credibly participate in the collective defence within the Alliance and the European Union? Which is the stage of the projects meant to promote the national interests and the measurable evaluation of the contribution to the General Staff affirmation, as the Armed Forces conception and command body? Which is, in fact, the ratio between the objectives and achievements?

At the same time, it is proper to evoke the evolution of the structure, from the initial form, attached to the Alliance, up to the current, integrated one, mentioning briefly the intermediary stages that have marked an important dimension of the armed forces transformation in the latest 16 years, from the perspective of the national security strategy.

Lieutenant General Dr Sorin Ioan – the Romanian Military Representative to NATO and the EU.

The activity of the Representation is circumscribed by the current preoccupations of the international collective defence institutions to respond to the current risks and threats in an environment characterised by solidarity and consensus to which our country adheres, in the spirit of the national interests that are connected to the regional context.

Reviewing the main NATO and EU priorities, we will actually mark the activities of the Representation personnel that are day by day connected to the General Staff specialised structures.

NATO – at Present

NATO is an intergovernmental collective organisation that has dedicated for 60 years to the solidarity of the member states so that they could collectively protect the state of security, thus being a defensive alliance, not one having an offensive character. NATO also represents an alliance of values that has adapted with flexibility, diplomacy and through credible solutions in each stage of its evolution. After a long history marked by bloody conflicts, NATO actively contributes, with determination and in a common “*voice*”, to consolidate and keep peace in Europe, being the binder of a continent that has been divided after the end of the *Cold War*. Moreover, the threat of international terrorism that has no frontiers led to the decision to launch, for the first time, six years ago, an operation outside the borders of Europe, after the unprecedented attack on 11 September 2001 determined the internal democratic environment, deeply affected by it, to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty for the first time in NATO six-decade history. Thus, the Alliance operation in Afghanistan, as part of the sum of the international community great efforts, mandated by the UN, has sought to eradicate the attempts of al Qaeda, a centre of gravity for terrorist organisations, to launch new attacks wherever in the world. The main objectives, concentrated in two stages, have been firstly to topple the Taliban regime that sheltered and supported terrorist structures, and secondly to support the new government to a new road map, without turn for the Afghan people, as well as to help the country to reconstruct in a stable and secure environment. The importance and difficulty of the mission are also confirmed by the fact that, after a long period of time, marked by human sacrifices and significant investment made by NATO member countries and the contributing ones (currently, there are 42 participant nations), the Alliance is still looking for solutions to assure the success of this complex operation. The tribute paid through the supreme sacrifice of over 1 000 military men, not only during the Operation *Enduring Freedom* but also during NATO-led *ISAF*, as well as the great number of the injured should not be forgotten, and the courage of the military nurtures the energy of the multinational force to continue the mission.

NATO mission in Afghanistan has proved to be more complex than it was initially estimated, requiring for the definition of some new concepts out of which we mention “*insurgency*” and the “*comprehensive approach*” to stability and reconstruction operations.

➤ *Insurgency* cannot be exclusively defined as being under the leadership of the “*Taliban movement*”. It is actually related to some neighbour states, too, comprising different insurgent groups that operate within the framework of autonomy that varies according to the regional and historical particularities. The cooperation between them is manifest at the tactical and circumstantial level rather than at the strategic one. For example, in the southern region, insurgency is led by the members of the former Taliban regime and consists in a large number of fighters organised following rigorous hierarchical principles. In the eastern region, there are factions that operate in small groups. In many situations, the insurgent collaborators’ actions are grounded in personal, opportunistic reasons rather than in ideological principles.

On the other hand, the farmers that own narcotics crops financially support insurgency, especially to counter the efforts made to eradicate the illegal crops and to protect drug trafficking. Insurgent groups support each other, exchanging equipment, training bases, and explosive ordnance, but not without having interests in it. The local traditions and tribal rules nurture the process of recruiting fighters against the external, international forces.

In order to successfully counter insurgency, its vulnerabilities should be identified, based on the aspects that divide the insurgents, especially those having an ethnic nature and the ones related to the deficit in armament and equipment.

The main pillar that has to be consolidated is represented by gaining the trust and support of the local population that does not take part in the insurgency but is many times terrorised by the “*remains*” of the former Taliban regime.

Briefly, we may affirm that the success of the operation is not to be assessed through the number of the eliminated opposition militants but through the effectiveness of the measures taken to consolidate the population trust in the international forces, which will thus represent a shield meant to discourage the insurgents and to diminish their number and actions.

It is therefore evident that success cannot be achieved by the military component of the mission only, but by it in cooperation with the civilian component, through the efforts of other international governmental and non-governmental organisations, through the coordination of the reconstruction efforts for the direct benefit of the population and local, regional and central administrative authorities.

Coordination may be achieved through the common will of the involved external and internal actors to subordinate to a coherent and comprehensive approach.

➤ *Comprehensive approach* is a relatively new concept, determined by the difficulties related to the effectiveness of the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, which has already been theoretically outlined through a series of doctrinal concepts, but has proved difficult in practice.

Reality adds to the viability of the definition given by W. Freeman, Jr., which can be found in the 1995 edition of the *Diplomat's Dictionary* and says that "*War and diplomacy are different but intimately related aspects of national policy. Diplomats and warriors who recall this will therefore act as brothers in a potentially lethal common endeavour ... They will consider together when to fight and when to talk and when to press and when to stop*"¹.

Although the syntagm "*comprehensive approach*" has been frequently used by the UN, NATO and the EU, a common official definition has not been agreed upon yet. In general, it refers to the synchronisation and harmonisation of all the elements of power, both national and international, and the elements of power, that are not officially defined either, refer to the aggregate of the diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial and other resources that are engaged in this endeavour.

To detail these two concepts, we will add only a generic enumeration of the issues of interest in NATO debates as follows: ongoing operations (Afghanistan, Kosovo, counter-piracy off the coast of Somalia, the training mission in Iraq), anti-missile defence system, energy security, cyber defence, development of the command, control and leadership system, the Alliance strategic partnerships. All these justify the North Atlantic Council preoccupation with reformulating the current Alliance's Strategic Concept that was adopted in 1999. The action will be coordinated by the new NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, and has to be finalised up to the summit in 2010 that takes place in Lisbon, Portugal. At the same time, sequentially, the mentioned issues represent domains managed by the Military Representation personnel in the debates within the working groups or at the level of the Military Committee. The national military interests are supported through the mandates given by the General Staff, and they are approached through open and flexible talks until consensus is reached.

¹ Quoted by Kurt Amend at <http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/75-amend.pdf> and by Cristopher M. Schnaubelt in "*Operationalizing a Comprehensive Approach in Semi-permissive Environments*", NATO Defence College, Research Division, Rome, June, 2009.

The European Union – Internal Coordinates and Current State

The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), whose operational civilian and military support is represented by the *European Defence and Security Policy (ESDP)*, is today a dynamic action through its projects themselves. Since 2003, *ESDP* has decided the development of 23 operations, out of which 6 military operations, including the most recent one, in progress in the territorial waters of Somalia, engaged to counter piracy, or the one concluded this year, in Chad and the Central African Republic, in support of a civilian UN operation, as well as 17 civilian operations that have contributed to the resolution of some crisis situations, through assisting in disarming programmes, imposing control by administrative structures and the rule of law, supporting the security structures reform, and assisting police and justice reform. The latter mission is the one in Kosovo that was carried out and that reached its operational capability in 2008.

As it is known and has materialised in the reality of the security environment, the European Union has progressively distinguished as a major actor on the international scene, having a systematic strategic vision transparently presented through the *European Security Strategy*, with effective instruments for crisis management, at the diplomatic, civilian and military level, which complement other involvement measures in the field of economy, trade, humanitarian aid, and in support of the development of some disfavoured regions.

At the same time, it is evident that the EU has got involved not only within the borders of the European continent (the Western Balkans or the South Caucasus) but also outside it, in Africa, the Middle East or Asia.

The political and economic evolutions have resulted in radical changes such as the organisation capacity to promote its values related to peace and security outside the continental borders.

The *EU Military Committee* was established following the Council Decision on 22 January 2001, and the decision to transfer the functions and capabilities from the Western European Union to the European Union (Marseille, 13 November 2000). It represents the highest military body within the Council of the European Union. The Military Committee provides the *EU Political and Security Committee (PSC)* with advice and recommendations with regard to the military aspects of the *European Security and Defence Policy*, being supported by the *European Union Military Staff (EUMS)* and having, at the same time, an important role in military operations planning and organisation. Documents are prepared and courses of action are decided upon within the *European Union Military Committee Working Group (EUMCWG)*, composed by the deputy military

representatives of the member states. This brief structural presentation reminds of the role and a part of the activity of not only the members of the National Military Representation but also of the one of the officers, warrant officers and NCOs that fill command and execution positions within the *EU Military Staff*.

As it is an important issue, we will try to focus on an *ESDP* relevant domain, the one represented by crisis management, in which the EU adopted, not long ago, procedures, means and methods that facilitate an effective coordination of the different actors involved, as well as of their available instruments. We will thus briefly mention the crisis phases as far as procedure is concerned, sequentially sub-divided, in which the civil-military coordination is assured as follows:

- *routine phase* in which the EU carries out monitoring, advance-planning and early-warning functions;
- *formulation of a crisis management concept (CMC)* – after a crisis situation is detected, and following the *Political and Security Committee* decision, which considers that the EU action is appropriate, under its leadership, a *CMC* is drawn up, describing the EU's political interests, the aims and final objective, together with the major strategic options;
- *approval of the concept of crisis management and development of the strategic options* by the Council – in the event a military operation is also required, the *Political and Security Committee* tasks the EU Military Committee with drawing up strategic military options. Strategic options may also be required for a civil operation (police and the rule of law enforcement). In this case, the *PSC* tasks the *Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management – CIVCOM* with strategic civilian options;
- *formal decision to act and the development of planning documents* – the official decision may give the *PSC* delegated powers from the Council of Ministers to provide the political command and strategic direction of the operation (article 25 of the TEU). It validates the chosen strategic military and civilian options, and in particular the chain of command. An *EU Special Representative (EUSR)* may also be appointed at this stage. In the event of a military operation, the location of the *Operation Headquarters (OHQ)* is also approved. It is responsible for drawing up the *Concept of Operation (CONOPS)* and *Operational Plan (OPLAN)*. These documents, after being validated within the Military Committee, are submitted for approval to the *PSC*;
- *implementation of the approved measures* – under the authority of the Council, the *Political and Security Committee* exercises the political control and coordinates the strategic directions of the operation; *EUSR* and the *Operation Commander (OC)* report periodically;

- *refocusing the EU action and ending the operation* – the Political and Security Committee assesses any adjustments to be made in the course of the operation and, when conditions are met, declares the operation completed. Once the operation has been completed, a process to identify the lessons learned takes place so that they could be capitalised on in the future.

Out of this statement, besides the image of institutional functionality, it may be deduced the specific activity of the members of the EU member states national representations, who, in each phase, sustain the national political and military mandate as far as the content of the concepts, plans or decision documents are concerned.

Besides military operations, among the priorities approached by the Military Committee the following may be mentioned: the development of operational capabilities, the completion and update of some concepts in specific domains, the collaboration with the *European Defence Agency (EDA)*, priorities established by each member state for the period it exercises the EU Presidency following the rotation principle, at every six months, standardisation and interoperability and others.

In case the Treaty of Lisbon is adopted by all the member nations, its putting into practice will result in significant structural and functional changes.

In a paper dedicated to an anniversary moment, we consider appropriate to also present a brief history of the Military Representation:

- in *February 1993*, Romania, through the voice of President Iliescu, formally applied for NATO membership;
- in view of Romania's military representation within *EAPC* and of the activities specific to the *Partnership for Peace (PfP)* developed at NATO HQ, Brussels, in *September 1993*, Brigadier General Paul Șarpe was appointed Romania's military representative to NATO, having as subordinates a small group of officers within a Representation Office. They were assigned to represent Romania's military interests within the activities carried out by NATO, and the main mission/task was to support the process of preparing the national conceptual, operational and technical capabilities to actually work with the armed structures and forces of NATO member states, as well as to develop cooperation programmes and common actions within the PfP;
- in *January 1994*, Romania was the first post-communist country that responded to the invitation launched by NATO to join the Partnership for Peace, a programme aimed at the Euro-Atlantic cooperation in the field of security, playing a major role in the process of including new members in NATO;
- in *May 1995*, Romania signed the *Individual Partnership Action Plan (IAPAP)*;

- in *October 1995*, Romania signed the *Status of Forces Agreement between the NATO members and the participants to PFP*;
- on *16 June 1996*, Major General Gheorghe Rotaru was appointed Romania's military representative to NATO, his mission being to continue to support the activities meant for the country accession to the Euro-Atlantic structures;
- in *April 1999*, NATO launched the *Membership Action Plan – MAP*. The mission of the military representative structure was to support the *Annual National Plan of Preparation for NATO Membership* that established the objectives, measures and deadlines with a view to guiding, supporting and assessing the efforts made to prepare for the accession to the Alliance;
- on *1 August 1999*, Lieutenant General Ioan-Gavril Ghițaș was appointed the Chief of the military representation to NATO, having as main mission to support the Annual National Plan of Preparation for NATO Membership;
- at the *Prague NATO Summit* (21-22 November 2002), the heads of state and government of NATO member countries decided to invite Romania, together with other six states – Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, to start the North Atlantic Alliance accession talks;
- on *26 March 2003*, the ambassadors of NATO member states signed *NATO Accession Protocols* for Romania and the other six states invited to join NATO, within a ceremony in Brussels;
- on *8 May 2003*, the Accession Protocols were ratified by the US Congress;
- *Romania's Military Representation to NATO and the EU* was established in 2003 through the *Government Decision no. 172/13 February 2003 regarding the institutional changes made in the context of Romania's accession to NATO, including the organisational structure and functioning of Romania's Representation to NATO-HQ and to the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe – SHAPE*;
- on *1 August 2003*, General Lieutenant Constantin Gheorghe was appointed Chief of the Military Representation;
- on *29 March 2004*, Romania (Prime Minister Adrian Năstase) deposited the instruments of accession to NATO, being one of the seven states that were part of the Alliance fifth enlargement wave;
- on *1 December 2004*, Lieutenant General Cornel Paraniac was appointed Romania's Representative to NATO and the EU.

The year 2004 marked Romania's transition to the status of a NATO full-fledged member, with all the subsequent opportunities and obligations, including the participation in the decision-making process and the involvement, without exception, in all the Alliance's activities.

The priority objectives of Romania's Military Representation have been subsumed under the specific and punctual interests of Romania and of the Ministry of National Defence in relation to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation as follows:

- to take part in consolidating the process of building up Romania's strategic profile within NATO, which allows, once the full-fledged membership is achieved, for the effective promotion of the Romanian military interests at the Alliance level;
- to formulate and precisely establish the interests that may be supported within NATO, to define, on this basis, some concrete political-military projects, and to establish the connections and harmonisation that provide their achievement with the necessary support;
- to develop the cooperation and consultancy relations with the similar structures of NATO member states as well as with the military structures at NATO HQ and the EU Military Staff, to consistently, timely and coherently promote the political-military interests within NATO;
- to initiate and develop the capacity for dialogue and persuasion and the use of military active diplomacy to enhance the capacity of influencing and persuading with a view to supporting and promoting the national military interests at the level of NATO and EU military structures;
- to actively participate in the committees, sub-committees and working groups in order to formulate proposals and viable solutions that are necessary for making just decisions regarding the Romanian military body reform and modernisation process;
- to develop and enhance the contribution to the national mechanism related to drawing up the national positions that are necessary for the dialogue within NATO decision-making process;
- to provide Romania's ambassadors to NATO and the EU with expert advice in military matters;
- to draw up proposals regarding the implementation of NATO priorities in the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff action plans;
- to consolidate a flexible, efficient and pragmatic relation with the structures appointed by the Ministry of Defence to take part in promoting the national security interests;
- to formulate points of view and draw up the necessary documents for the agendas and participation in ministerial meetings, the meetings of the chiefs of staff, and especially in the Istanbul Summit;
- to intensify contacts with the experts of the EU Military Committee and those of the European Union member states military representations;

- to amplify the meetings and talks with military experts within *EUMS* to initiate the Military Representation into the issue of consultancy and decision-making mechanisms related to the national engagement in the *ESDP* process.

The Representation activity also materialised in actions meant to identify the priority domains, responsibilities, approaches and deadlines to conclude agreements, laws, memoranda and other documents that had to be signed and ratified by Romania in the NATO accession and integration period. Moreover, it supported national authorities through formulating some points of view or providing information related to the experience of the states that joined NATO in the previous enlargement wave.

In April 2005, the *Treaty of Accession to the EU* was signed, and Romania was given the observer status. As far as the relationship with the European Union, the year 2005 represented an important stage in the general process of Romania's accession to the EU and of the acceleration of the process of connecting the Romanian military system to the *European Security and Defence Policy* through:

- pursuing, deepening and promoting the objectives of the General Staff, of the Ministry of Defence within *ESDP* and *CFSP*;
- pursuing and promoting the interests of the Romanian Armed Forces during the *EUMC* meetings, the *Military Committee/EUMCWG*, the project groups that conduct their activity within the *European Capability Action Plan/ECAP/PGs*;
- conducting analyses and studies to document the national representatives that participate in the meetings of the European institutions with responsibilities in the field of *ESDP*;
- preparing and taking part in the European Union military missions that are complementary to those of NATO, an edifying example in this respect being the Romanian engagement in the EU-led mission "*Althea*", in Bosnia and Herzegovina;
- intensifying the approaches to identify and assess the ways of implementing the policies in the field of developing military capabilities drawn up by the *European Defence Policy*, in the mid and long-term strategies meant for the military system equipment and modernisation, in close connection with the long-term programmes meant for the Romanian Armed Forces modernisation;
- on 16 December 2007, Lieutenant General Dr Sorin Ioan was appointed Chief of the Military Representation.

During the period of the invitee status, the Military Representative took part in the Military Committee meetings having the observer status, thus having access to only certain documents and information, without the right to express national positions, until April 2004, when accession got materialised. Mention should be made that, in October 2004, our country hosted the first Informal Meeting of Defence Ministers in NATO member countries, in Poiana Braşov. The Military Representation in Brussels significantly contributed to the preparation of the meeting. Since 1 January 2007, the attributions of the Representation have been extended over the European Union military domain.

The aspects that have been briefly mentioned above do not shadow or diminish the constant, effective and efficient activity conducted by all the officers, warrant officers and NCOs that have manned the Representation in different stages of its evolution and that, many times, have played a pioneering role in the armed forces of our country.

For all and each of them this structure has been a “*school*” that has prepared them to adapt to the continually changing procedures and, not less relevant, a school of military diplomacy exercised in a large, multinational environment. In this context, the constant preoccupation of the personal structure within the General Staff with the career path management is laudable, as well as the value added through capitalising on the personnel experience and providing them with adequate positions when they come back to the country, for the benefit of the institution.

We cannot conclude without mentioning the role, work and outstanding results of the other national military representations within NATO strategic command or other components of the structure, as well as of the ones that have filled staff positions in a large array of domains.

English version by
 *Diana Cristiana LUPU*

THE AREAS OF COMPETENCE AND THE ATTRIBUTIONS OF THE GENERAL STAFF REPRESENTATION TO SHAPE

Major General Fănică CÂRNU

The constant and coherent effort to promote the national military interests on the part of the Military Representation has primarily consisted in obtaining favourable conditions for the participation of Romanian forces in NATO operations, in keeping with the current national possibilities. In support of the decision, the author points out that the personnel of the Representation draw up primary analyses of NATO requests for contributions to NATO forces in different theatres of operations, analyses that contribute to the substantiation of effective decisions at the level of the national military authorities.

In order to clarify some issues of interest to the structures within the General Staff and the categories of forces, the Representation requires support from SHAPE military experts. In essence, the issues addressed concern force and operational planning at the strategic level, the definition of the national level of ambition, the affiliation and generation of forces, the conduct of the national integration process, the evaluation of the forces meant for NATO or the provision of support for carrying out high-visibility events.

Keywords: *information exchange; NATO structures; national military authority; force planning; force generation*

The Romanian General Staff Representation to the *Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe* – *SHAPE* is the specialised structure of the Ministry of National Defence that is designed to provide the link between the Romanian General Staff and services, and the NATO structures that are located in the military base at SHAPE.

Allied Command Operations – Generator of Transformation within the North Atlantic Alliance

SHAPE is, among the allied military, the well-known acronym of the *Supreme Headquarters of Allied Powers Europe*.

This NATO strategic command has been in the current location since April 1967, when it was redeployed from France to Belgium, together with other political and military bodies of the Alliance. SHAPE was installed, mainly for security reasons, in the Casteau area, near Mons, at 50 km southwest of the capital of Belgium.

Following the changes occurred since 2003 in the NATO Command Structure, the *Allied*

Major General Fănică Cârnu – the Romanian General Staff Representative to the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE).

Command Operations (ACO) has taken over the main components and missions of SHAPE, becoming the body responsible for planning and conducting the Alliance's operations, as well as for providing expertise at the highest level in the operational area. ACO is one of the Alliance's two strategic level commands. It is led by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), a four-star US General. His deputy (DSACEUR) is a European four-star General, who is in charge of the operational command of the military component of the European Union operations.

Currently, the Allied Command Operations is playing its strategic role in the military operations conducted by NATO in Afghanistan, the Balkans, Iraq and Africa.

Given that NATO transformation is mainly determined by the dynamics of the contemporary security environment and the experience gained in the theatres of operations, the Allied Command Operations represents an important transformation engine in NATO.

All NATO member states delegate one military representative – *National Military Representative/NMR* to this Command, supported by a designated staff. The Representations are responsible for achieving the permanent and direct access of nations to the Alliance's military planning process and the effective collaboration in support of NATO-led operations.

Some members of the Partnership for Peace, Mediterranean Dialogue, Istanbul Cooperation Initiative or part of the Contact Group countries have assigned teams or liaison officers at the Military Cooperation Division of SHAPE.

The first Romanian representative and liaison team to SHAPE was established in 1995, immediately after Romania's accession to the Partnership for Peace Programme. That team's effort was focused on preparing Romania's accession to the North Atlantic Alliance, supporting the implementation of the partnership goals and the participation in the exercises organised by NATO with partner states.

The Romanian General Staff Representation to SHAPE was established in the summer of 2003, based on the previous structure of the team representing Romania to the former Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC).

The relations of the Romanian General Staff Representation with other NATO structures located at SHAPE, and with other National Military Representations accredited to SHAPE are set up in accordance with national regulations and harmonised with NATO ones.

Role, Areas of Expertise and Tasks of the Romanian General Staff Representation to SHAPE

The Romanian General Staff Representation to SHAPE permanently interacts with all Allied Command Operations component bodies and other National Military Representations to SHAPE in order to achieve the goals, objectives and tasks set by the Romanian Ministry of National Defence.

The personnel of the Romanian General Staff Representation to SHAPE consist of commanding officers, staff officers and support staff. The commanding officers are the Romanian National Representation Chief, with the rank of two-star General, his deputy and the chief of staff.

The staff officers are specialised in the fields of operations, intelligence, logistics, personnel, air force and naval forces. They provide a functional link between the Romanian General Staff and services, and SHAPE bodies participating in NATO and EU working groups dealing with operations.

The administrative staff is composed of two non-commissioned officers manning the *National Support Element* located in Mons. Their main role is to provide financial and administrative support to the entire Romanian military personnel in Mons location.

The primary role of the *Romanian National Military Representative to SHAPE (ROU NMR)* is to provide direct links between the Chief of the Romanian General Staff and the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, for all the matters concerning the Romanian Armed Forces, especially regarding the participation in NATO-led operations.

The Romanian General Staff Representation to SHAPE ensures the exchange of information in areas of interest for the Romanian Armed Forces and coordinates the preparation of cooperative activities between the Romanian General Staff and services, and the Allied Command Operations.

Among the main responsibilities of the Representation, it is worth noting the following:

- participates in preparing national bids for NATO manning conferences and backs up the mandates consigned by the National Military Authorities on that purpose;
- provides expertise to underlie the national decision to commit forces and capabilities to NATO-led operations;
- contributes to preparing the participation in the Alliance force generation conferences and backs up the national mandates regarding Romania's offer for each request of the Alliance, ensuring the agreement of national interest with the Allied Command Operations requirements;

- ensures the participation in conferences and workshops related to its areas of responsibility;
- draws up reports, briefings, assessments and points of view in order to underline the national decisions while participating in the ongoing NATO-led operations.

ROU NMR exerts its national military authority in relation to the Romanian personnel appointed in national and international posts in Mons location.

In order to be able to fulfil the above-mentioned attributions, the personnel of the Representation develop collaborative and advisory relations with similar structures belonging to NATO members participating in the *NMR Echelon* and with partner representatives accredited to the Military Cooperation Division. Mention should be made regarding our intensive and fruitful cooperation with the USA Military Representation in order to obtain and maintain the US support for the Romanian troops deployed in theatres.

The Romanian General Staff Representation to SHAPE collaborates with the bodies of the Romanian Permanent Delegation to NATO and the EU, in order to continuously inform each other about the elements of common interest and the documents issued at the level of both SHAPE and NATO HQ.

Milestones of the Activity of the Romanian General Staff Representation to SHAPE

The Representation's constant and coherent effort to promote the national military interests has been materialised into obtaining favourable conditions regarding the Romanian participation with forces into NATO-led operations, taking into consideration our current capacity.

In support of the national decisions, the personnel of the Representation draw up initial assessments and analyses of NATO requests regarding the potential contributions with forces and capabilities to different theatres of operations, thus contributing to the substantiation of the National Military Authorities decisions.

Sometimes, in order to clarify some aspects of interest for the Romanian General Staff or services, the Representation asks for support from SHAPE military experts. Such areas of interest are force planning, planning for operations at strategic level, national level of ambition, affiliation, force generation, integration process, certification of NATO assigned forces, NATO's support for High Visibility Events (i.e. NATO Summit in Bucharest), and so on.

The Representation's staff officers draw up reports after the force generation conferences on the ongoing operations and missions (*ISAF, KFOR, OAE, NTM-I,*

Air Policing, OCEAN SHIELD, ALTHEA) and NATO Response Force, in order to support the national planning process.

During the force generation and manning conferences, the Representation upholds its mandates and negotiates with other nations in order to get contributions and jobs that offer visibility to Romania's efforts in NATO.

The Representation synthesises the specific data related to the stage of drawing up/implementation of different strategies, concepts, plans or doctrines before sending them to Romania.

In 2008, ROU NMR contributed to initialising the preparation of the participation in 79 multinational exercises and training events together with other NATO and PfP countries by providing the planning and organising documents for the interested structures in the country and drawing recommendations regarding the participation and setting up the functional links. An important event to which the Romanian General Staff Representation to SHAPE substantially contributed was the preparation of the Bucharest NATO Summit by providing the needed information and proceeding to get the air support for the security operation.

The Representation became involved in the preparation and development of the theatre strategic airlift activities, its effort being focused on the harmonisation and coordination of the detailed transportation plans at the level of the Allied Movement Coordination Centre in SHAPE.

An important component of the Representation activity is the provision of legal arrangements for the logistic support of the Romanian troops committed to NRF. The main priorities in this area are the continuous information exchange and analysis of the technical agreements and memoranda of understanding providing the legal basis for the participation in NATO-led operations. The negotiation process of the mentioned documents has been concluded with the support of the Romanian General Staff Representation to SHAPE.

The right coordination of activities and the effective information exchange between the Romanian General Staff and NATO Training and Equipment Coordination Group (NTECG) have led to a successful donation to the Iraqi Ministry of Interior.

The Representation has developed documents providing detailed information about the logistic support for the forces in NATO-led operations, the stocks planning in NATO, organisation and responsibilities of the Allied Command Operations budget structure and about planning, programming and budgeting activities.

The newly issued allied publications, which have an impact on the conceptual regulations in the fields of intelligence, operations, logistics and personnel, together

with the final outcomes from conferences, working groups or committees are analysed and transmitted, ensuring a prompt access of the General Staff structures to any relevant information.

All the actions taken by the Romanian General Staff Representation to SHAPE ensure a balanced Romanian contribution to the allied operations.

Another important goal for the Romanian General Staff Representation to the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe is to develop cooperative relations with all NATO structures and National Military Representations, in order to promote the national military interests.

Another main target of the Representation is to promote an adequate image of the Romanian Armed Forces by contributing to all social and protocol events and activities organised in Mons.

Finally, all the efforts of the Representation, its involvement in the specific activities of representation and development of a positive image of the Armed Forces have contributed to the perception among the NATO community that Romania is a reliable ally.



THE RELIGIOUS ASSISTANCE SECTION – Spiritual Component of the Military Body –

*Military Chaplain Constantin ȚANU
Military Chaplain Ion ILINCA*

After December 1989, the armed forces, just as all the other state institutions, underwent a profound restructuring and reform process, which was aimed at not only establishing new structures but also reorganising some structures that impeded on the natural development of the activity.

The authors mention that the dominant concern for the military system was Romania's security, more precisely, redefining and dimensioning it as part of the European security. Consequently, the political and military leadership drew up and elaborated on the strategy for gaining NATO membership. Every effort was made in support of this idea, for almost fourteen years, the political consensus and the support on the part of the population leading to the achievement of this desideratum in 2004. The rebirth of the Religious Assistance in the Armed Forces was part of this process, which paid its contribution to the acknowledgement of the Romanian Armed Forces as an apolitical institution, able to really serve the legitimate interests of both the country and the people.

Keywords: *missionary work; religious service; national interest; Christian values; religious organisation; spirit of sacrifice*

The long history of the Romanian people settled “*at the crossroads to all the evils*”, as chronicler Miron Costin said, reveals the permanent connection between the cross and the sword, symbol of the blend between the sacred and transient things, as a guarantee of the fact that we have lived here since ancient times. As it is proved by the historical and archaeological documents, the Romanian people were born Christian. The Church has always played an important part in the conscience of those who have fought so that the people could live on this land that inspires lyricism. The Church and the Army have always manifested as fundamental institutions of the rule of law.

The beginnings of the Christian faith on the territory that was to be the cradle of the genesis of the Romanian people date back in history, in the period of time when a part of Dacia was conquered by the Romans. This fact is attested by a series of archaeological discoveries having a Christian character, such as the vessel on which a fish is engraved, discovered in the centre of the Roman Camp in Copăceni, Vâlcea County, dated

Military Chaplain Constantin Țanu – Chief of the Religious Assistance Section within the General Staff.
Military Chaplain Ion Ilinca – the Religious Assistance Section within the General Staff.

the second half of the 3rd century (currently exhibited at the National Military Museum), or the gems and vessels decorated with Christian symbols, discovered in the Roman Camps in Romula, Olt County; Cumidava-Râșnov, Brașov County; Slăveni, Olt County; Buciumi, Sălaj County; Micia, Hunedoara County; Racovița, Vâlcea County and others. To them, the remains of the oldest basilicas discovered in Sucidava-Celei, Olt County; Isaccea, Tulcea County; Tropaeum-Adamclissi, Constanța County etc. are added. All these provide evidence of the existence in the area of some communities or persons who practiced the Christian cult.

Eusebius from Caesarea states that Apostle Andrew would have been the one who christened Scythia (a Roman province that included Dobrudja). In the Synaxarium, the Church honours Saint Andrew calling him: *“Holly Saint glorified and fully praised Andrew, the First-Called of the Apostles”*.

Saint Apostle Andrew was part of the group of the first five disciples of Messiah who formed the nucleus of the unity and cohesion related to keeping holy teaching. Apostles, obeying the commandments of Jesus the Messiah, directly contributed, through their missionary work, to the birth of the Christian World. Saint Andrew’s mission was, as we have mentioned before, to christen the people in Scythia, where he seemed to have a lot of proselytes. Eusebius from Caesarea mentions an edict issued by Emperor Diocletian in 303, based on which a large number of military men were discharged from the army on the grounds that they did not renounce Christian faith. Numerous martyrs existed among the Roman troops at the Danube, too. In this context, it is relevant the *martyrdom* discovered in Niculițel, Tulcea County.

Based on the documents, archaeological proofs and tradition, it can be stated that the Romanian people was born Christian, its genesis and its Dacian-Roman synthesis being concomitant with the process of Christianisation. These are the reasons why the Romanians are the only people in the area that, unlike its neighbours, does not have a date – a year – that marks the beginning of this spiritual development. The numerous inscriptions, reliquaries, engolpions etc. containing Latin characters that were discovered in different areas of the territory inhabited by the Romanians attest to not only the wide spread of the Orthodox Christian religion but also the continuity of the same population in the Carpathian-Danubian-Pontic area, in the period of time between the 4th and the 13th century, despite all the hardships generated by the invasions of the migratory populations.

The organisation of the Church and the continuous practice of the Christian cult, and the courage and firmness proved in defending the homeland are defining factors for the maintenance of the nation spirit and faith. Since their emergence on the stage of history, the Romanians have proved to be people for whom

the love for their nation and the affection for Jesus Christ have been permanently in an indestructible connection. It has been the binder that has enforced the firmness the inhabitants of this corner of the world have resisted in front of the foreign invasions and the greedy impulses of some neighbour nations.

Under these circumstances, it appeared and completed the indestructible link between *“the sword and the cross”* in the fight to defend the territory inherited from our forefathers and the national being. Through the presence of the priest, religious assistance has been provided for a long time to the ones that defend their possessions, national being, independence and sovereignty on the native land. Throughout time, priests, those *“shepherds”* of the human soul, have concretely contributed to the moral preparedness of our military men, inspiring them with the spirit of sacrifice and devotion for the fundamental values of the human and spiritual life, in accordance with the Christian moral precepts.

The Orthodox Church, traditional in this geographical area, has permanently involved, through its servants, not only in the life of local communities but also in the spiritual guidance of the defenders of the country, in blessing the flag and military men before fight or in comforting and burying those fallen on the battlefield. In modest churches, in the countryside, or in monumental ones, built by the rulers, their names are mentioned and they are prayed for, the cult of heroes playing an important part in the service ritual of the Romanian Orthodox Church.

As the great historian Nicolae Iorga stated: *“In churches and monasteries, the memory of our praiseworthy past, be it good or bad, marked by disasters or by short moments of happiness, is preserved through the letters engraved in gold and silver, through the written gravestones, through the lists of dead people engraved in altar stones, through the written stones above the doors”*.

There are parts of the soul that can be touched only by appealing to religion and the military man needs to know that the priest, confessor and spiritual teacher is close to him. That is why, not only in peacetime but especially at war, the clergy have been among the military and, many times, they sacrificed themselves on the battlefield.

The fortified churches or monasteries have often been not only centres of spirituality and religious faith but also places that provide security and refuge in case of danger. It made possible for our forefathers to acknowledge and assert themselves as real soldiers of Christ in this part of Europe, real defenders of Christian values on the way of pagan invasions.

Relevant in this context seems to be the letter sent by the Moldavian ruler Saint Stephen the Great to the rulers of the European states after the victory won by him in the Battle of Podul Înalt, on 10 January 1475: *“To the Hungarian Crown*

and to all the countries this letter is addressed to, may they be happy. We, Stephen Voievod, ruler of Moldavia by the mercy of God, bow to all of you in friendship, we wish you the best and we tell Your Highnesses that the pagan emperor of the Turks has spelt the death of the whole Christianity, as he every day thinks of ways to subject and destroy all Christianity. That is why we inform Your Highnesses that, on the Twelfth Day last year, the above-mentioned Turk sent a great army, 120 000 military men, to our country and against us. The Captain of the Army was Soliman Pasha, the Beglerbeg; together with him, there were all the courtiers of the above-mentioned Turk, and all the peoples in Romania (name used for the South of the Balkan Peninsula – A/N) and the ruler of Wallachia with his army, as well as Assan Beg, Ali Beg, Schender Beg, Grana Beg, Oshu Beg, Valtival Beg, Serefaga Beg, the ruler in Sofia, Cusenra Beg, Piri Beg, the son of Isac Pasha, with all his army of janissaries. The above-mentioned ones were the great captains with their armies.

Hearing and seeing all these facts, we took the sword and, helped by Our Almighty God, fought against the enemies of Christianity and defeated them, and had them trodden, and put them to the sword; for it we praise Our God. Hearing about it, the pagan emperor of the Turks decided to take revenge and to come in person and with his army in May to subject our country that is the gate of Christianity and that has been protected by God so far. However, if the gate represented by our country is destroyed – God forbid it – then all Christianity will be in danger. That is why, we would kindly ask Your Highnesses to send your captains to help us against the enemies of Christianity until it is not too late, as the Turk has many enemies now, and has to fight with his sword against them, no matter where they might be. As for us, We promise and We swear on our faith that we will fight to the death for our Christian law, on our own. So you have to do, at sea or on land, after we, helped by Almighty God, have cut the right hand. Therefore, be prepared to do it without delay.

Suceava, Saint Paul's Day, 2 June, AD 1475”.

As it is attested by the letter presented above, as well as by other documents and a series of Orthodox churches built by not only Stephen the Great but also by his successors, among whom we mention Constantin Brâncoveanu, the outstanding rulers and fighters were examples of Christian virtue, publicly admitting the trust in the traditional Church values and in the role played by it for keeping the sense of belonging to the nation and the country alive. The Army and the Church have proved to defend the national interests and the prosperity of the nation with devotion throughout the history of the Romanian people.

The close connection between the two fundamental institutions of Romania as a state got manifest not only in the Middle Ages, a period marked by the fight to secure the territory, during the Revolutions in 1821 or 1848-1849, when the teachers

into faith were found next to those they preached to, but especially after the establishment of the permanent Romanian Armed Forces, when the “*national militia*” was established in the Principalities, in 1830.

On 2 May 1850, the Great Spatharus Nicolae Ghica, the Chief of the Army in Wallachia, requested the Holy Mitropoly in Bucharest to find a solution so that a priest could be appointed to each “*polc*” (regiment) in the garrisons of Bucharest, Craiova and Brăila. Following this request and the answer of Mitropolit Nifon, the Ruler Barbu Dimitrie Știrbei issued, on 10 July 1850, the decree in which three priests and six sextons were appointed to the Army. The first church in Bucharest designated for garrison religious services was Saint John Church in Zlătari. Soon, the services were moved to Saint Mihai Vodă Church and then to Saint George Church in Malmaison that was near the barracks.

Mention should be made that, during this period marked by the effervescence of the military body, period in which the General Staff was established, the following were issued: “*Responsibilities of military chaplains*” (October 1850), in which the tasks of the clergy inside the Romanian Armed Forces were established, including the uniform they were to wear, namely: “*culioane (hats) made of civil cloth, having a dark colour and a black ribbon on the edge, two fingers in width, uniform that could be worn only as long as they worked for the armed forces*”, instructions that remained valid up to the year 1870, when, on 6 April 1870, King Carol I promulgated Decree 603 through which the “*Regulation for the clergy in the permanent Armed Forces*” entered into force. According to it, it was possible for each regiment to have its own chaplain. In 1876, another decree stipulated that all troops and units in the territory could have their own chaplains, and in 1877, the unit chaplains were replaced by garrison chaplains who assured the religious service for all the military units in the garrison.

It is the moment when there were laid the foundations of some military structures in which the religious assistance, the brotherhood between the “*sword and the cross*”, started to have a special place in the political-strategic conception of the Romanian state and whose special importance was to get manifest in alleviating the suffering and encouraging the military men who fought for the independence of Romania.

The period of time between 1870 and 1948 is characterised, as far as the religious assistance in the Romanian Armed Forces is concerned, by a grandiose beginning and a temporary return at the end, as it was disbanded, in an abusive and barbarous way, by the communist regime that tried, through the forced indoctrination of the cadres and the soldiers, to separate the Armed Forces from the Church.

As it has been proved by the entire evolution of our people, the undeniable unity between Tradition and Holy Tradition did not only lie at the foundation of our nation and the country but it was also the essential condition of our development in a history forged under the influence of the word of Jesus Christ the Messiah. It strongly asserted itself in this period characterised by important and ample military confrontations (such as the War of Independence, the War for Reunification, the Crusade against Bolshevism or the participation in the War against Hitler), with a defining impact on the Romanian state destiny and the establishment of its role and place in the political concert of the European nations.

During the War of Independence (1877-1878), ten chaplains in the garrisons of București, Craiova, Galați, Brăila and Iași accompanied the combat units in the theatre of operations in the South of the Danube, providing the injured and the dead with specialised assistance. To them more than 150 monks and nuns from different monasteries added, who were engaged in activities on the front, as stretcher bearers or nurses, as well as behind the front and in the campaign hospitals, taking care of the injured and contributing this way to strengthening the connection between the two fundamental institutions of the state: the Armed Forces and the Church.

After the end of the war, once some measures to modernise the armed forces were taken, the establishment of a permanent religious service was taken into consideration, so that the spiritual needs of the military could be met. In this context, mention should be made that, in 1905, through a royal decree, a special medal called the *“Răsplata Muncii pentru Biserică”* (*Reward for the Work to the Benefit of the Church*) was introduced.

The campaign in the summer of 1913, in Bulgaria, and the start of the First World War, in 1914, represented a new opportunity for the assertion of the necessity to develop and expand the religious assistance in the Armed Forces because: *“the sound of the bell of the holly prayer gets united with the sound of the courageous trumpet of the military men of the country”*. Some Romanian Orthodox priests in Transilvania, Banat and Bucovina were conscripted in the Austrian-Hungarian Armed Forces, accompanying the Romanian regiments on the battlefields in Galicia and Italy, while the Romanian priests in Bessarabia were conscripted as military chaplains in the Russian Armed Forces. Among them, we mention the military chaplain and the poet Alexei Mateevici (1888-1917), the author of the well-known poem *“Our Language”*.

In Romania, the meeting of the Holy Synod on 16 May 1915, following the suggestions of the Mitropolit Pimen Georgescu of Moldavia, decided to appoint priest Constantin Nazarie, who was also Professor of religious moral at the Faculty

of Theology in Bucharest, as archpriest of the military chaplains. The Synod also recommended that the archbishops and mitropolitans in all dioceses should have nominated priests that “*graduated from Theology and had aptitudes for military assistance*”, aged between 30 and 45, who, in the event of the Romanian Armed Forces mobilisation, could have been appointed military chaplains and assimilated into the Officers’ Corps.

In the summer of the same year, Constantin Nazarie got the approval of the Great General Staff to draw up the regulation related to military clergy, called “*Directions for the chaplains in the Armed Forces in times of war*”, in which all the activities that were to be carried out by the military chaplains in case of an armed conflict, including their official campaign uniform, were regulated.

Throughout the First World War, the 3rd Echelon, Religious Service, was functional within the Great Headquarters of the Romanian Armed Forces. It consisted of 253 mobilised priests at the beginning of the campaign. On 9 March 1917, it was issued the Order no. 19001 that officially regulated the assimilation of military chaplains into the lieutenant category and stipulated the possibility that they could be promoted to the rank of captain for special achievements.

The main task of military chaplains was to provide religious assistance (to have the military confessing and receiving the Eucharist, to bless the military when they left the garrison, to carry out liturgical services, to pray for the dead, to bury those who died in the fights, to pray for them etc.), as well as to give first aid for the injured and to supervise the way in which the food for the troops but especially for those in ill health was made. Military chaplains accompanied the military on the battlefield and, many times, they sacrificed their lives or were taken prisoners. For their courageous deeds, 68 military chaplains were awarded Romanian decorations such as: “*Avântul țării*”, “*Serviciul Credincios*”, “*Răsplata Muncii pentru Biserică*”, “*Meritul Sanitar*”, “*Coroana României*”. In this context, it is eloquent the example of Justin Șerbănescu, the confessor of the 21st Infantry Regiment, Ilfov (whose building houses the National Military Museum nowadays), who was awarded the highest Romanian military distinction, Order “*Mihai Viteazul*” 3rd Class, in conformity with I. D. 1561 on 25 June 1918, for: “*the competence, courage and love for the country he proved on the battlefield in 1916 when, seeing that the Feldioara Regiment lost almost all the officers and the commander who had been injured at Clăbucetul Taurului, took the command of the regiment and, fighting for one day and one night, succeeded in forcing the enemy to retire on Mount Susai, thus preventing it from occupying Azuga. In the fights on Mount Diham, he commanded a battalion of exempts, and on 17 November 1916, being wounded for the second time on Mount Sorica, refused to be evacuated to remain with his courageous soldiers*”.

The laborious activity of military chaplains was synthesised by the archpriest Constantin Nazarie in the *“Report on the activity of the military priests in the campaign 1916-1918”*, handed in to the Holy Synod on 25 December 1918, in which he insisted upon having permanent religious assistance among the military men and suggested that an Armed Forces Episcopate should have been established. Following these actions, it was drawn up and promulgated, through the Royal Decree no. 3378 on 20 July 1921: the *“Law regarding the organisation of military clergy”*.

The law stipulated that: *“active military chaplains, no matter their rite, are allowed in the Armed Forces to meet the requirements related to confession and the development of the religious feelings”*. The Armed Forces Episcopate was established, based in Alba Iulia, the Coronation Cathedral, led by a bishop who had the rank of a Brigadier General. Under the guidance of three bishops – Iustinian Teculescu (1923-1924), Dr Ion Stroia (1925-1937) and Dr Partenie Ciopron (1937-1948), the Armed Forces Episcopate functioned without interruptions for 27 years, up to 22 August 1948, when the communist authorities brutally disbanded it, through the Order no. 946426 on 22 August 1948, issued by Cluj Military Region.

The military chaplains had tasks related to the organisation of the religious service for the echelons they served, the pastoral activity during campaigns (mobilisation, military operations, marches), as well as for the prison camps. Special attention was paid to the cult of national heroes because, as the first Patriarch of the Romanian Orthodox Church Miron Cristea highlighted: *“The deeds of an epic grandeur of our heroes, who contributed supreme sacrifice to the achievement of the greatest event in the history of the Romanian people, has to be an irresistible incentive for each Romanian to always make little or big sacrifices to the benefit of the entire people, otherwise we would not be worthy of them”*.

In the interwar period, military chaplains accomplished their spiritual mission in the units they were assigned to. A new element appeared in addition to what was stipulated in the decree issued in 1870, namely the *celebration of the patron saint of the particular military unit*. Their activity was regulated through more legislative acts, among which we mention the following: *“Regulation regarding the application of the Law regarding military clergy”* (1924), *“Provisional directions regarding the religious service in peacetime and during campaigns”* (1931) and the *“Law regarding the organisation of military clergy”* (1937).

In conformity with the legal provisions, representatives of all the officially recognised cults were admitted as military confessors; that is why, besides Orthodox confessors, Roman-Catholic, Greek-Catholic, Lutheran, Reformed, Muslim and Mosaic ones could carry out their activity in the Armed Forces.

In general, the military chaplain belonged to the same rite as the majority of the military, and for the religious minorities, a minister, rabbi or imam was appointed to the garrison, depending on the spiritual requirements of the troops.

At the beginning of the Second World War, there were 108 chaplains in the active military clergy. To them, more than 200 mobilised priests were added during the campaign, without being included in the permanent structure of the Armed Forces.

As it happened during the first world conflagration, chaplains accompanied our military from the Prut to the Caucasus or Cotul Donului and then, westwards, to the Tatra and on the banks of the Hron and Moravia, being not only the spiritual shepherds but also the spiritual teachers of the brave Romanian military. This fact made the Armed Forces Bishop, Brigadier General Dr Partenie Ciopron, state that: *“the Church, through the military chaplains, is in the front lines. We have military chaplains that died on the front, while others became invalid or were taken prisoners by the enemy ... We will suffer and we will be happy with the nation led by the Church”*.

After the end of the war, once the communist regime came to power, the deliberate action meant to destroy the military elite and the military clergy started. On 2 October 1945, the Superior Directorate of Culture, Education and Propaganda, established on 8 May 1945, was transformed into the Armed Forces General Inspectorate for Education, Culture and Propaganda, within which the Liaison-Clergy Office functioned, having the mission to coordinate the work of the military chaplains with the one of the educators appointed to military units. Military chaplains were required to become propagandists of *“democratic ideals”*, to become *“precious collaborators of the democratic government”*. All these culminated in 1948, when the Armed Forces Episcopate and the Military Clergy Inspectorate were disbanded, and the military chaplains were put in reserve, the way for the military atheist education being open. However, the holy ties that had existed between the Army and the Church for a long time could not be broken. The Romanian Orthodox Church gave a wise response to these abusive measures, including in its regulations the possibility of providing the military men with religious assistance individually, which was put in practice with great discretion, caution and which was risky, but proved, at another crucial moment in our history, that the Romanian Armed Forces never ceased to be Christian.

In all this holy work, the Orthodox Church followed the evangelic principle of the Messiah: *“Heaven and Earth shall pass away but my words shall not”* (Mathew 24, 35-Luca 21, 33).

The suppression of the Religious Assistance structures in the Armed Forces proved, in time, a barbarous measure supported by the communist government through draconic administrative measures that did not yield a concrete result.

What the persecutors did not know or did not want to know was that the Church – from the Orthodox standpoint – is a divine-human, synodal establishment, in which its two aspects, seen and unseen, secretly merge, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit.

The Church and its sons in uniform continued to obey and keep the spiritual laws of their forefathers, even though they did it in secret or deceiving the vigilance of the political police.

The Church remained the foundation on which the most secret interpersonal spiritual connections were built, the other dimensions being either annulled, distorted or conventionally affirmed.

Communism represented an impressive force meant to destroy and annihilate people, a barbarous one whose destructive valence was especially aimed at the spiritual component of the individual, as through communism, the demons of history and civilisation became visible. It was an attempt to get deep down in the individual spirit to destroy the yearning for divine and to model monsters with human faces (*“the new man”*).

Communism gave a chronic ideological consistence extracted from atheism to the religious suppression, atheism becoming the main weapon to drive God away from the human soul. Fighting against God, atheist communism fought, in fact, not for the benefit of humanity but against the human-like characteristics. For this reason, too, communism proved to be a *“creation”* that was contrary to the Romanians nature and spirit. We do not consider ourselves different from other peoples in the world, but a people that have a true Christian calling.

For some people, Romania means its administration, for others, its land, but for Christians it is a sort of destiny, a way of coming into being, living and dying in the silence and peace derived from holy faith.

Throughout this period, defying the official atheist ideological interdictions, there were different manifestations that kept alive the light of Orthodoxy in this area. It was this lamp that enlightened the sons of the country that wore the military uniform, too. So it was possible, in December 1989, moment that was to mark the beginning of a new era in the development of this people who experienced a lot of hardships, for the Church and the Armed Forces to be together; in the sound of the bells of the churches everywhere in the country, the military understood the urge to accomplish their mission in a way that differed from what they were required to do, through ideological formulas that were strange to their

nature. They accomplished their mission with dignity and faith, and they prevented the dream of becoming a free and democratic nation again from being swamped in blood.

It was the fate of the two institutions, arbitrarily separated, to meet and get united again, in those days when the hate against communism burst out, amazing the world.

After December 1989, the Armed Forces, as all the institutions of the state, have undertaken a profound process of restructuring and reform, aimed at not only building new structures but also disbanding others that prevented normal activity.

For the military system, the dominant preoccupation was Romania's security, more precisely its definition and dimensioning as a part of Europe's security. Consequently, the political and military leadership drafted and elaborated on the strategy for accession to NATO; considerable efforts were made to support this idea for about 14 years, this objective being achieved in 2004, following the political consensus and the support provided by the entire population of the country.

The rebirth of the Religious Assistance in the Armed Forces was subsumed under this process, as well as the contribution it made to the acknowledgement of the Romanian Armed Forces as an apolitical institution, able to serve the legitimate interests of the country and its people.

The reference moment of resuming the religious assistance in the armed forces is marked by the signature of the Protocol regarding the organisation and conduct of religious assistance in the Romanian Armed Forces, concluded on 11 October 1995 between the Romanian Orthodox Church and the Ministry of National Defence.

The document stipulated the fact that resuming the religious assistance activity with a permanent character was meant to meet the *“religious, moral and spiritual requirements of the military men and to contribute to their religious, civic and ethical education”*.

The Protocol established the fact that the religious assistance activity had to be conducted in all the components of the military life, being the legal framework in force until the adoption of the Law regarding the military clergy.

The Protocol reopened a path, not easy at all, providing the religious assistance in the armed forces with own identity, which resulted in a lot of responsibilities. However, its way has permanently been lit by the belief that, being in the service of Jesus Christ and the Church, it has been able to meet an essential need of the military.

The Protocol, the decisions of the Holy Synod, as well as the orders issued by the Ministry of Defence generated the next steps, the objectives and the ways

through which the requirements of the military life can meet the ones of the Christian life.

One of the essential provisions of the Protocol was that related to the establishment of the *Religious Assistance Section* within the Ministry of National Defence. The main mission of this structure was to provide the framework for drawing up some projects and normative acts until a methodology for conducting the religious service in different situations was developed.

In the structure of the Religious Assistance Section entered Orthodox priests, staff officers, representatives of the Roman-Catholic Church and of the Evangelic Alliance, thus seeking to provide solutions to all the aspects presupposed by the reintroduction of the religious assistance in the Armed Forces.

An important moment in the activity of the Religious Assistance Section was marked by the selection and training of the chaplains that filled positions in large units and military educational institutions.

In the first stage, 24 chaplains were selected (proposed by dioceses and admitted following an exam). Thus, at the beginning, some commands, large units, units and military educational institutions belonging to all military services were staffed.

This first series of graduates (military chaplains) that was called "*Bishop Brigadier General (r.) Dr Partenie Ciopron*" tried very hard and succeeded in meeting the recommendations of Patriarch Teoctist: "*the Romanian Armed Forces will have their own chaplains again, Jesus Christ envoys, the envoys of the saints of our traditional Orthodox Church. From now on, it will be known that there, in the middle of the military men, there are Jesus Christ envoys working ...*

You are therefore called to mark on the tally of your hearts, as a great honour as well as a great responsibility, the thought that the Armed Forces of the country, which have experienced so many hardships, have given heroes and have preserved the integrity of our nation, are now waiting for the presence of the divine grace among the military".

The chaplains belonging to this series of graduates were handed in the certificates of graduation from the course at the Academy of Higher Military Studies by the Minister of Defence. They were also handed in the military chaplain insignia on which "*In hoc signo vinces*" was inscribed, and the Patriarch offered each military chaplain a copy of the Holy Scripture, advising them not to forget the spur: "*Take thy share in suffering as a good soldier of Jesus Christ*" (I Timothy, II, 2, 3).

On 23 April 1996, on the Feast of the Holy Great Martyr George the Trophy-Bearer, the priests belonging to the first series of graduates took their positions with a religious and military ceremonial. It was a feeble spring that became

a river of faith in the middle of the armed forces. To those pathfinders, other chaplains have been added each year, so that there are about 80 military chaplains in the armed forces structures now. A characteristic of the activity of these worthy servants of the Church is their abnegation and self-sacrifice in serving Jesus Christ while integrated in the military communities.

Military chaplains have been supported by the commanders and personnel of the units they were appointed to, which explains why, in only a few years, the restoration, reconstruction or construction of some churches have been made possible, in spite of numerous difficulties, especially financial ones.

For the zeal they proved in assuring the religious assistance, numerous military personnel were awarded "*Crucea patriarhală pentru mireni*", the most important distinction awarded to the laics, while some chaplains were awarded the title "*Iconom Stavrofor*", the most important distinction awarded to parish priests.

Chaplain Nicolae Constantin was the first who led the Religious Assistance Section, in other words, who continued the work of Bishop Partenie Ciopron. He struggled and succeeded, with the help of God and the support of the Romanian Orthodox Church in laying the foundations of the religious assistance in the Armed Forces. He was helped and supported by chaplains such as Ștefan Buchiu (who was the interim until the chief of the section was appointed), Dumitru Stoleru, as well as generals and officers belonging to the Ministry of National Defence leading structures.

A brief list of the founders of the Religious Assistance in the Armed Forces would consist of ecclesiastical personalities such as: Patriarch Teoctist, Teodosie Petrescu, Teofan Savu, Nifon Mihăiță, Vicențiu Grifoni, Constantin Pârvu, Augustin Rusu, to mention only a few of them.

On behalf of the Ministry of National Defence, the following involved decisively in this endeavour: Gheorghe Tinca (the Minister of Defence at that time), General Dumitru Cioflină (the Chief of the General Staff at that time), General Mircea Mureșan, Brigadier General Ioan Roman, Brigadier General Marin Mirea and all the commanders of the military structures to which military chaplains were appointed.

As a direct consequence of the Protocol and of the establishment of the Religious Assistance Section, the "*Law regarding the establishment and organisation of military clergy*" was adopted by the Parliament as Law 195/2000.

The law defines the status and the role of the military chaplain, as well as the way in which the religious service is conducted as follows: "*Art. 2 – The military chaplain is the servant of a church or of a cult recognised by the law who fills a position in the structures of the Armed Forces and is invested with the right to perform cult activities and to transmit the inherited teaching to the Christians he preaches to ...* ”.

The Religious Assistance Section has also been involved in the military-political action meant for Romania's integration into NATO. Thus, the principles and concrete ways to ensure interoperability with the religious assistance structures in the armed forces of NATO member countries have been identified. A representative participation in the international reunions and the other manifestations organised by the military chaplaincies within this body was assured.

This way, the Religious Assistance has contributed to a better and rapid acknowledgement of the Romanian Armed Forces and to propel our country to the path of integration into the Alliance.

Invited to participate in different reunions, conferences and international events, the Religious Assistance Section has popularised the spiritual component of the Romanian Armed Forces and has also attracted the sympathy, respect and support of the leading religious and military authorities in the North Atlantic Alliance, thus essentially contributing to the international acknowledgement of their Christian and European vocation.

The participation in the peacekeeping missions and in combating international terrorism in Europe, Africa, Afghanistan and Iraq has been appreciated not only by the direct beneficiaries but also by the authorised representatives of the allied forces with whom the missions have been carried out.

The faith in God and the desire to serve a noble cause represent, without doubt, the support of an effective collaboration to the benefit of the humanity supreme ideals.

The respect enjoyed by the Religious Assistance Section is illustrated not only through the great number of the manifestations and activities in which it has participated but also through the viability of the solutions it has provided in relation to the organisation and functioning of the religious assistance in the armed forces in conformity with the traditions of our Church and with the requirements of full compatibility with the similar structures in the political-military North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

English version by
 *Diana Cristiana LUPU*

THE LAND FORCES

– Evolution and Structural Transformation –

Major General Dr Dan GHICA-RADU

Colonel Dr Adrian TONEA

Lieutenant Colonel Marius FAUR

The modern foundations of the establishment and development of the Land Forces can be placed in the second half of the 19th century, following the revolutionary process in 1848, the creation of the modern Romanian state through the Union of 1859 and the fulfilment of the military policy of Alexandru Ioan Cuza.

The evolution of the Land Forces is closely related to the evolution of the Romanian society throughout time, to the transformations occurred within the Romanian Armed Forces in various stages of its existence.

The Land Forces command has been exerted by structures that have different names: command, directorate or staff. The need for transformation has led to major developments in this field. In the mid-90s, the Tanks and Infantry Command was reorganised in the Land Forces Command, with subordinated directorates and weapon inspectorates.

***Keywords;** human resource; area of responsibility; theatre of operations; military structures; operational capability*

The historical dimension of the *Land Forces* and of their achievements dates back from immemorial times, as it started with the anonymous infantry fighters. The history of the Army represents a summing up of the history of the branches and specialties they have always consisted of: infantry, mountain corps, artillery, engineer troops, NBC defence etc.

Whether designated as such or not, the *Land Forces* have always been for the Romanians not only the most numerous component of the Armed Forces, but also the only service capable of engaging, carrying out and bringing to an end fights, battles and operations, accomplishing extremely difficult missions, and being able to make extraordinarily important human sacrifice.

The modern foundations of the constitution and acknowledgment of the *Land Forces* date back from the second half of the 19th century, following the revolutionary process in 1848, the establishment

Major General Dr Dan Ghica-Radu – Chief of the Land Forces Staff.

Colonel Dr Adrian Tonea – the Land Forces Staff.

Lieutenant Colonel Marius Faur – the Land Forces Staff.

of the modern Romanian state through the Unification in 1859, and the military policy promoted by Alexandru Ioan Cuza.

The evolution of the *Land Forces* is closely connected to the evolution of the Romanian society throughout time and to the transformations the Romanian Armed Forces have undergone in different stages of their evolution.

The command of the *Land Forces* has been exercised by structures that, as it is shown by the history of this service, have had different names – command, directorate or staff. The need for transformation has brought about important changes in this field, too. In the mid-'90s, in accordance with the Order of the Minister of National Defence, the Infantry and Tanks Command was reorganised as the Army Command, directly subordinating directorates and branch inspectorates. The evolution continued, being imposed by the operational requirements, which caused the transformation of the Army Command into the Army Staff, directly subordinating the army-type structures, educational institutions, and other branch formations.

Starting on 11 April 2000, in accordance with the Decision of the Supreme Council of National Defence, the Army Staff was reorganised and transformed into the *Land Forces Staff*.

The leadership, command and control in the Land Forces are executed at both operational and administrative level, through the structures in their organisation.

In relation to the current requirements, the structure of the Land Forces Staff allows for the successful command of the large units, units and subordinate structures in peace, crisis and war time, as well as for the commands training, the military education and training, the efficient management of the human, material and financial resources that are allocated in order to achieve and maintain the level of readiness necessary to meet the requirements of the missions assigned to each structures.

Starting in 1991, the efforts of the military in the Land Forces have been focused on meeting the requirements related to Romania's accession to NATO and the EU, and they are currently oriented towards meeting the commitments of our country as a member of these organisations.

Romania's official openness towards the Euro-Atlantic institutions with responsibilities in the field of security was initiated in July 1990, when the Prime Minister of Romania at that time invited NATO's Secretary General to visit Romania. The formal diplomatic relations with NATO were initiated in Brussels. In February 1993, Romania's official desire to integrate into the Euro-Atlantic structures was reaffirmed. In January 1994, Romania joined the Partnership for Peace Programme. In April 2004, after more than ten years, Romania became a full-fledged member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

As for Romania's accession to the EU, it was initiated in 1993, when Europe Agreement establishing an association between the European Communities and their Member States and Romania was signed. The path towards accession continued with our country application for accession to the European Union, in June 1995, and with the beginning of negotiations, in February 2000. Romania became a full-fledged member of the European Union in January 2007, more than ten years after it applied for accession.

This brief chronological analysis shows that the road map of Romania's accession to the European and North Atlantic structures was a long process accompanied by achievements as well as by frustrations and sacrifices.

Today, NATO is an intergovernmental political-military alliance, consisting in member states that belong to both Europe and North America, states that are determined to meet the objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty signed in April 1949. The observance of the objectives and principles in the UN Charter, and the safeguard of the freedom and the common inheritance and civilisation of the Alliance member states, the democratic principles, individual freedom and the rule of law, the stability and welfare in the Euro-Atlantic area, the collective defence in support of peace and security, the economic cooperation – represent the fundamental values that lie at the basis of the Alliance¹.

After a period of exploration generated by the disappearance of the traditional adversary, NATO Strategic Concept was updated in 1999 and highlighted the necessity for the Alliance members to focus their peace and stability efforts on an enlarged Euro-Atlantic area, aiming at key elements such as:

- A broader approach to the security concept that should include political, economic, social and environmental factors, as well as the dimension of the Alliance defence.
- The maintenance of the Alliance military capabilities to ensure the military operations effectiveness.
- The firm engagement towards transatlantic relationships.
- The development of the European capabilities within the Alliance.

The evolution of the Land Forces military structures participation in NATO, EU or UN-led missions outside the national territory, be they already concluded or ongoing ones, is mentioned below:

Stage I – previous to the Partnership for Peace, started in 1991 and lasted until January 1994, Romania being the first country to sign the Partnership for Peace Programme.

¹ *The Reader's Guide to the NATO Summit in Washington*, 1999, p. 48.

Stage II covers the participation in the Partnership for Peace until the beginning of 2000.

Stage III, also called NATO pre-accession period covers the years 2000-2004, up to Romania's NATO accession.

Stage IV started the moment Romania joined NATO and is still ongoing.

The current presence in the theatre of operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina with a military police platoon within the operation *ALTHEA/EUFOR* represents the continuation of the participation in NATO missions – *IFOR* and *SFOR*. NATO handed *SFOR* mission over to the EU, in 2004.

In accordance with the Decision of the Romanian Parliament no. 25 in 1996 and the Government Decision no. 73 on 8 March 1996, the Romanian Land Forces took part in the *Implementation Force Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina – IFOR*, between 8 March and 1 November 1996, with an engineer battalion. The participation in the mission was based on the provisions of the Dayton Peace Agreement (Ohio, SUA), its basic mission being that of ensuring the international military force freedom of movement in the theatre of operations.

The Stabilisation Force Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina – SFOR was a mission meant for peace stabilisation (consolidation), decided by the UN Security Council on 12 December 1996 to succeed *IFOR*. In agreement with the Government Decision no. 9 on 9 June 1997, Romania, which was not a NATO member at that time, participated in the mission with an engineer battalion, a fuel and lubricants transportation detachment (starting 1 November 1996), staff officers in the Force Headquarters, a military police platoon (starting 24 August 1998).

The continuity of the presence within the Stabilisation Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina was assured by two detachments having different names. The National Detachment "*BOSNIA*" consisted of engineer troops and a military police platoon that was directly subordinated to the Multinational Specialised Unit (MSU), in conformity with the provisions of the Technical Agreement concluded between the General Command of the Italian Carabinieri and the Romanian General Staff.

The Romanian Detachment "*OLANDA*", as its name says, was under the Dutch operational control (within the Dutch contingent), executing logistics mission.

In Kosovo, the military police platoon, the first Land Forces structure deployed in this theatre of operation, acted, between April 2001 and August 2003, during five rotation cycles. On 23.04.2001, the military police platoon was firstly deployed in Thessaloniki, Greece. After a period of intensive training for the newcomers in the theatre, on 9 May 2001, the platoon was deployed in the location Djeneral Janckovici, on the frontier between Kosovo and *FYROM*, being in the composition of the 34th Company Traffic Control/34th Brigade Mc. (GR), belonging to *KFOR*, having the mission of assuring the freedom of movement on the main procurement routes.

According to the Romanian Parliament Decision no. 22 on 11 September 2001, Romania augmented its participation in *KFOR* with infantry subunits. On 22 November 2001, an infantry company belonging to the 812th Infantry Battalion was introduced in the theatre of operations under the Belgian control, initially in the BELUROKOS (Belgium – Luxemburg – Romania) Battle Group, and then in the BELUKROKOS (Belgium – Luxemburg – Ukraine – Romania) Battle Group. In July 2003, the mission within this Battle Group was concluded.

On 1 March 2002, this subunit was followed by an infantry company belonging to the 26th Infantry Battalion “*Neagoe Basarab*”, but in another location, under the Italian operational control. The *Romanian Force National Detachment – ROFND* Mission is still ongoing, the structure participating in the 19th rotation cycle.

The Decision of the Romanian Parliament no. 38 on 21 December 2001 approved the Romanian participation in the *International Security and Assistance Force – ISAF in Afghanistan*. The Land Forces have been engaged in the theatre of operations in Afghanistan since 2002, not only in the Operation *Enduring Freedom* but also in *ISAF* that is currently the centre of gravity of the Romanian participation in this theatre of operations. The first subunit deployed in January 2002 was a military police platoon that took part in the Operation “*Fingal*” within *ISAF*. It was soon followed by an infantry battalion.

During the seven-year presence in Afghanistan, in the context of the diversification of the missions and the increase in the importance of the multinational forces, the number of the Romanian military has been significantly augmented to ensure the military capabilities necessary for effectively carrying out the activities in the area of responsibility.

Counterinsurgency strategy suggests that for 1 000 residents there should be 20-25 counterinsurgents. Currently, the number of the troops in Afghanistan, including the Afghan forces, represents one third of this necessary. The only alternatives are either to supplement forces or to change the mission².

According to the provisions of the Decisions of the Supreme Council of National Defence and Law no. 42 /2004 regarding the participation of the Armed Forces in missions abroad, in the years that followed, the Land Forces continued to participate with personnel and fighting assets in the theatres of operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Balkans. At the beginning, an NBC company took part in the Operation “*Iraqi Freedom*”, followed by an infantry battalion subordinated to an Italian Brigade. In the same brigade, in parallel with the infantry battalion, a military police company was deployed, which distinguished itself through

² *Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, article published in *Foreign Policy*, January-February, 2009.

the way in which the military succeeded in training the Iraqi Police so that the Coalition could hand over specific tasks to them.

The Engineer Detachment was deployed in Al Hillah and Ad Diwaniyah, in the Multinational Division Centre-South, under the Polish command. The Centre-South Division restructuring resulted in the revision of the Engineer Detachment organisational chart and the gradual reduction in the personnel. Considered at that moment a new contribution, an infantry company/UNAMI was introduced in the theatre of operations. It was deployed in Basra and acted within the UN Force Protection Mission in Iraq. The main tasks of this company were to guard, protect and escort the United Nations personnel.

When the UN representatives left Basra, on 3 April 2007, the Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations, General David Veness, the Chief of the Safety and Security Department, conveyed his sincere appreciation and words of thanks to the Romanian Armed Forces for the efforts made by the military personnel engaged in protecting the UN representatives. The fact that no member of the UN Staff in Basra fell victim to the violence in the area represents the proof of the mission success.

It is evident that the participation in operations outside the national territory has led to significant evolutions on different levels, such as doctrine, human resources, training, equipment and assets, armament, materials: *“It’s important to recognise the most important overarching doctrinal concept that our Army, in particular, has adopted – the concept of full spectrum operations. This concept holds that all military operations are some mix of offensive, defensive, and stability and support operations. In other words, you’ve always got to be thinking not just about the conventional forms of combat – offensive and defensive operations – but also about the stability and support component. Otherwise, successes in conventional combat may be undermined by unpreparedness for the operations often required in their wake”*, stated General David H. Petraeus³.

The participation with forces and assets in this type of operations has evolved, according to the well-known Gauss curve, and it has been directly proportional to the level of security and the intensity of the operation in the area of responsibility. Therefore, in 2001, as it has already been shown, the Land Forces were present in Kosovo, at the beginning with a military police platoon (traffic control), then with two more infantry companies, and currently there is only one company deployed in the area. The reduction in the effectives has been gradual, depending on the evolution of the state of security in the particular area.

³ In an interview for *Foreign Policy*, January-February, 2009.

“The main problems regarding security in Kosovo, following the independence declaration, mainly pertain to economy, crime and great corruption, and not to interracial violence”, stated Admiral Mark Fitzgerald, Commander of the Allied Joint Force Command in Naples, on 17 June 2009. The Commander appreciated that only a few incidents in Kosovo require a military reaction, the majority of them being within the competence of the authorities in Pristina. Fitzgerald also said that the situation on the ground allowed for the reduction in the KFOR troops (NATO Force in Kosovo) from 13 800 to 10 000 military men until January 2010, as it has recently been decided by the Foreign Ministers of the member states. *“However, Kosovo will have available forces, not only in the country but also abroad, capable of coping with the threats that would endanger a secure environment”*, added Admiral Fitzgerald.

The exemplification may continue with the theatre of operations in Iraq where an NBC company was introduced at first, followed by an infantry battalion, an infantry company (UNAMI), a military police company and an engineer detachment. Gradually, they were withdrawn from the theatre of operations and, once the Iraqi Forces were handed over the responsibilities regarding ensuring security and the Memorandum concluded between Romania and Iraq expired, the participation in this mission ended.

If in the Balkans and in Iraq we can speak about the descendant slope of the curve, the situation in Afghanistan is different, as the state of security does not allow for a reduction in the force but, on the contrary, there is a need for forces to be supplemented. In this case, we appreciate that we are still on the ascendant slope.

With some exceptions, the military currently involved in theatres of operations are not at their first mission. Moreover, they have gained experience in more than one theatre of operations. The military structures have been rotated in the theatres of operations, according to the plan, taking into account the graduality and diversification principle, with a view to capitalising on the experience gained, and to eliminating routine. The skills acquired during the training for the mission have been improved in the theatre of operations, and other new skills have been acquired in conformity with the specific operation procedures. The transfer of knowledge and experience has allowed for easily and efficiently adapting to the specific conditions of the theatre of operations. The training forms and methods have become preponderantly practical and modern. The goals and objectives are aimed at meeting the operational requirements of the mission. During the training period, modern simulation equipment is used. It copies the conditions in the theatre of operations very well, and a part of the military men that are to take part in missions in Afghanistan attend training courses in common with the Coalition partners in the Land Forces Training Centre or in NATO bases.

The evolution has not been reflected in quantity only, but also in quality, as far as both the missions' logistics and the human resources are concerned. For example, in the inventory of the military police platoon in Kosovo or Afghanistan there used to be *ARO* vehicles. Currently, the infantry company in Kosovo has *VAMTAC* vehicles in inventory. The infantry battalion in Afghanistan had *ARO* vehicles and *TABs*, and now the Romanian military men execute their missions with *HUMVEE* vehicles and *PIRANHA* vehicles. The information and communications means available to the Romanian military men assure the more effective exercise of command and control. Connections are not established using old generation radio stations or radiotelephones, but recent generation radio stations. *STAR* modules ensure the permanent connection with the country, not only from the military but also from the social perspective.

In addition to the important participation in the Alliance operations and associated efforts, in the national context, the Land Forces represent an active factor for the *ESDP* implementation, through the logistics and human resources they have already engaged, separately or within two European Battle Groups meant to accomplish Petersberg-type missions, having in view the fact that the military personnel available to the EU have to be different from those available to the Alliance.

Following the accession to NATO and the EU, our country has become an important regional actor, integrated in the decision-making process at the European and NATO level, a member in a confederation that is very powerful as far as the international relations are concerned, a beneficiary and provider of security, and a part of the most effective political-economic system known in the history of humanity.

After years of sedimentation and clarification, the specific aspects related to the modernisation of defence were considered and detailed in the *Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy* in 2007. This strategy is very important as it covers the full spectrum of domains related to the Armed Forces transformation – considered as being the process of adaptation necessary to support the strategic interests –, starting from the fundamental premise according to which this process has to be based on continuity, innovation and modernisation. Naturally, the concepts and capabilities adopted and projected in this strategy are in compliance with NATO standards, and take into account the process of the Alliance transformation as well.

The fundamental goal of transformation consists in providing the Romanian Armed Forces with the necessary capabilities to promote and protect the national interests against the identified risks and threats, as well as to meet the commitments made by our country as a member of NATO, the EU, and other international bodies.

In this context, the military transformation is a continuous development process and presupposes changes at the level of doctrines, forces organisation and structure, capabilities, intelligence activities, training, education and procurement, personnel management, and planning on programme bases, which thus become the main domains for the application of the transformation effort.

In the current stage, the Land Forces represent an important component of the national security, through the relevance of their missions for the country security needs that are directly linked to their intrinsic capacity to take action across the full spectrum of military operations. The maintenance of the operational capacity of this service, currently and in the future, simultaneously with its transformation into a military force for the 21st century, requires a cumulative long-term effort, as far as time and resources are concerned. In this context, the Land Forces will continue to face the challenge of permanently keeping the balance between requirements and resources.

Therefore, the goal of the transformation of the Land Forces, as well as of the Romanian Armed Forces on the whole is represented by the achievement of a structure of forces that should be modern, reduced, professional, properly equipped, deployable, interoperable, self-sustainable, able to provide multi-dimensional protection, and that should have a flexible leadership that can make decisions in a short time based on the optimal information and data⁴.

English version by
 *Diana Cristiana LUPU*

⁴ *Strategia de transformare a Armatei României*, Ministerul Apărării Naționale, 2007, pp. 3-7.

THE ROMANIAN AIR FORCE - Tradition and Contemporaneity -

*Major General Dr Ion-Aurel STANCIU
Lieutenant Colonel Vasile TOADER*

The experience of air fighters has been confirmed by the accomplished tasks, by the victories obtained during the two world wars, as well as by the isolated, local conflicts in which they have been involved. The air victories, as well as the defeats have provided many lessons and conclusions on the concepts and structure of air operations, the ways for cooperation between the air force branches or between them and the other categories of armed forces and on the organisation, procedures and methods of action in combat of the Romanian aircraft in modern warfare.

Today, as the authors consider, Romania has succeeded, through sustained and consistent efforts, in achieving two fundamental goals – to accede to NATO and the EU. From this position, the Romanian Air Forces should develop in keeping with both the risks and threats to national security and with the assumed objectives and the requirements of full integration into Euro-Atlantic security structures, namely the European ones.

Keywords: *deployable forces; theatre of operations; operations planning; information flow; battlespace picture*

The military phenomenon, Romania's geostrategic position, as well as the socio-economic and political changes in the Romanian society have all generated, throughout time, transformations in the military realm, which are reflected in an extensive process of re-evaluating, rescaling and redesigning the command and combat structures.

One of the most significant moments in the history of the national military institution of the last two centuries was the establishment of the *General Staff*, on the 12/24 November 1859, through the High Order of Prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza. The foundation of the General Staff brought about intense changes in the Romanian military system, from the establishment of the Romanian modern state and up to date.

A Respectable Past, a Credible Present, and a More Certain Future

The General Staff, the Armed Forces highest strategy and command body, has undergone a permanent evolution, influenced by the objectives and orientations of the national military policy,

Major General Dr Ion-Aurel Stanciu – Chief of the Air Force Staff.
Lieutenant Colonel Vasile Toader – the Air Force Staff.

by the necessity of the Romanian Armed Forces reconstruction, as well as by the Romanian Armed Forces participation in the significant confrontations of the last half of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century, which caused changes in the universal military theory and practice.

Although fairly small at the beginning of its existence, the General Staff structure has been in a constant transformation in accordance with the times which it has transited, being attached to the military traditions of the Romanian people and its national values, learning from the experience of the other armed forces and permanently evaluating its own strategies and military actions.

One of the major events in the history of the General Staff at the beginning of the 20th century was the recognition of the *Air Force* as a standalone service, in the summer of 1910, when the aviation engineer Aurel Vlaicu performed, within the manoeuvres in Slatina-Piatra Olt area, reconnaissance, observation and liaison flights. Later, on the 1 April 1913, the *Law regarding the organisation of the Romanian aeronautics* was adopted. In the summer of the same year, the Romanian Air Force participated in its first armed conflict, the Second Balkan War, this campaign being the first assessment of the combat capability of the Romanian Armed Forces after more than three decades. This is how the aircraft proved their capacity and began to play a very important role as combat assets, and the air war became a reality. The military Air Force started its history of military conflict engagements.

The Romanian political-military environment, foreseeing the aviation potential, whose abilities were worldwide recognised, showed a high interest in its development, by legal, economic and administrative means and this is how it was placed, for some decades, in the international avant-garde of the military aeronautics development endeavours.

The experience of the air fighters was proved by the missions accomplished, by the victories recorded during the two world wars and the local conflicts in which they were involved. From the air victories and defeats, numerous lessons have been learned and conclusions have been drawn regarding the air operations concepts and structure, the ways of cooperation between the specialties of the air force or between these and other services of the Armed Forces, as well as regarding the organisation, procedures and methods for combat engagement of the Romanian aeronautics in modern wars.

Today, Romania takes pride in two fundamental accomplishments – the accession to NATO and the EU. From this perspective, the Romanian Air Force must develop its strategy in accordance with the risks and threats to the national security, as well as with the objectives and standards assumed for the full integration in the Euro-Atlantic and European security structures.

Experience Gained by the Air Force in Theatres of Operations in NATO and EU-led Missions outside the Romanian Territory

The decisions that Romania has made since September 2001 as a *de facto* NATO member have extensively contributed to increasing Romania's image and credibility abroad. Romania's participation with troops in operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo, as well as in NATO and EU operations certifies that Romania is an active member of the international community. The Air Force has decisively contributed to the deployment of Romanian contingents assigned to perform missions within these theatres of operations.

The experience gained from these tasks forms a helpful basis for the future decision-making process. The C-130 aircraft has proved its efficiency in the theatres of operations and it has also certified that our aircrews meet the proper training level to jointly operate with allied members. The modernisation of the existing C-130 aircraft and the acquisition of a new version are decisions we have supported as a result of the *lessons learned*. Given the new challenges the Air Force should face, we have examined the issue and set up appropriate medium- and long-term courses of action and steps to be done. It refers, mainly, to diversifying the force offer and changing the focus on deployable forces.

Besides the missions of the national contingents, a significant number of Air Force military personnel has been involved in peacekeeping missions as ONU/OSCE observers in Congo, Ethiopia, Burundi, Sudan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo.

Within the EU-led operation *ALTHEA* (in Bosnia and Herzegovina), the Romanian (4 IAR-330 SOCAT helicopters and 44 personnel) detachment's activity illustrated the individual and team feats of strength and skill and provided a unique experience that enabled amendments of the special training manuals, particularly those provisions on night helicopter training operations and the use of night vision goggles.

The knowledge and experience gained in the various missions within the area of operation, the development of English language communication skills, and especially the human relations built during the tour made this mission a genuine success.

During the mission "*Romania – Lead Nation KAIA*", the Romanian Air Force Detachment took over the management of Kabul International Airport, coordinating daily air operations, processing meteorological data to ensure flight safety, maintaining and improving communications, providing supplies and logistic support for passenger and cargo processing operations on the terminal.

The mission, guided by the motto “*flight safety above all*”, provided ground operation personnel with outstanding experience in organising and managing the activity on an in-theatre airfield terminal, where the operational intensity tests the physical and mental capacities of the military personnel, and where adequate training, teamwork and information exchange proved their contribution for success.

Air Policing over the Baltic States (BALTICA-07), a NATO-led mission, was performed as an integral part of collective air defence to maintain the sovereignty of the designated air space and represented a beneficial experience for the Romanian Air Force, an opportunity and a challenge as well, designed to test their training, deployment and employment on another NATO nation’s airbase.

The experience acquired by *BALTICA-07* detachment (4 MiG-21 Lancer and 67 personnel) revealed particularities that significantly contributed to the improvement of deployable force training. The emphasis was mainly placed on the importance of continuing training under NATO command and control, significantly increasing aircrew practice, including air interceptions with live ammunition on board, flying formation adjustments to engage low altitude and low speed targets. Moreover, solutions to adjust the equipment and materiel inventory required for such missions were identified, including the improvement of detachment performance under limited host-nation support (HNS) on the airfield.

Four years after the accession to NATO, Romania hosted, in 2008, the largest summit in the Alliance’s history. The *Security operation for NATO Summit in Bucharest* was the first live operation of this type jointly conducted by Romania and NATO, enabling it to prove the level of procedural, operational and technical interoperability of the Romanian part, which demonstrated a remarkable teamwork.

The concept of operations proved to be appropriate, meeting the mission requirements. We have learned that flexibility is an incredibly important element of planning for a *High Visibility Event (HVE)*. Working to adapt to airspace changes, for working with an ever evolving VIP aircraft bed-down plan, and accepting very late notification were added to numerous other challenges.

Joint exercises have been part of the air force training, mainly aiming at the certification and affirmation of deployable forces made available for NATO operations. During these exercises, we have understood our capability limitations, especially regarding the in-service equipment and expeditionary logistic support. As a consequence, programmes for modern equipment acquisition have been developed to remove these limitations.

The preparation and training of the deployable force still remain a challenge for the Romanian Air Force. Connection to in-theatre information flow, logistics and force protection on airbases with minimum HNS are still open issues.

To find the appropriate solutions, it is necessary to continue our participation in common exercises and training events, to thoroughly analyse their results, and to constantly improve the information exchange with our allies.

Air Power Significance and its Future Evolution

Given the existing geopolitical and geostrategic context, analysts and policy-makers are constantly concerned with observing the direction of the military phenomenon's evolution and, therefore, with "*building*" the most viable and efficient national and collective security defence systems.

The future conflicts will probably be characterised by the selection of confrontation spaces and objectives, no massive combat actions, high intensity and short duration, increased force mobility and diversification of combat procedures, massive use of new generation of "*intelligent weapons*", electronic systems for surveillance, reconnaissance and strike of C4I systems and the whole specific actions.

The historical evolution of conflicts requires for a review of the armed forces' role within the critical change of the military tool usage objective. The interest in occupying a territory has been replaced by the interest in influencing and controlling the course of events. The need for presence in the area has cleared the space for the pressing need to control in order to be able to influence and, possibly, to intervene anywhere in the world while trying to avoid fight, thus switching from the concept of causing the enemy massive damages to high precision surge operations and active force protection measures to achieve the objective and avoid collateral damages mainly of civil population (effects-based operations, network-centric warfare, information warfare, psychological warfare).

Given this background, the Air Force will continue to play an important role in managing the crises at any level of the conflict through gaining temporary air superiority and control over the airspace of strategic interest, causing significant damages to key elements of the enemy military potential and combat zone, and providing the proper conditions for the other military services to be able to accomplish their missions. Consequently, before being concurrent with Air Force operations, the Army and Navy actions will be normally preceded by the employment of the Air Force.

The various possibilities of employing air assets allow for the national or multinational military leadership to deter and prevent aggression, to properly adjust the scope and intensity of the air operations conducted so as to solve crisis and conflict according to the political requirements. Air superiority, precision engagement, information superiority, effects-based operations and mobility

are critical elements of the strategic perspective on the Air Force employment in any type of armed conflict, whether it is traditional, asymmetric or irregular. Besides these, the Air Force provides specific expertise and support to Special Operation Forces.

Air superiority has to make inefficient the adversary's air defence and limit the risks of its air attacks. To this end, there are requested not only capabilities to annihilate the adversary's air defence to ensure the freedom of action of own forces but also the efficiency and persistence of air operations beyond the spatial possibilities of the adversary's air defence in difficult weather conditions.

Through the direct and indirect effects of the air operations, the possibility of *joint employment of the armed forces* is created. The indirect effects of the air operations determine the isolation and preparation of the battle space where surface forces will conduct operations while the direct ones enhance their combat capabilities.

By offensive engagement, proper targets designation and weapons efficiency, the Air Force is able to decisively influence the intention of a possible aggressor. Doing so, the Air Force becomes the key element to dominate a political conflict and deter the enemy.

Precision engagement increases the number of struck targets within a single aircraft sortie and the achievement of specific effects, eliminating the risk of fratricide and those related to collateral damage, and not the least, achieving significant effects both militarily and psychologically.

Information superiority is based on: integration of manned, unmanned and space/cosmic reconnaissance systems; battle space picture, which includes real-time recognised air picture; early warning; efficient use of intelligence to ensure the need for information and conduct of information operations; deny the adversary the use of its C4ISR.

Rapid mobility has grown in importance towards the point where it is necessary in every military action. This allows the establishment of an air bridge during air/joint operations and a military capacity of efficient and timely movement inside the area of operations, interest area adjacent to the theatre of operation, anywhere and in any conditions.

Agile combat support allows the conduct of sensitive, persistent and efficient operations in any conditions.

The employment features and the capabilities of the air assets make it almost impossible for any target to avoid striking. The resulted potential risk can be neutralised by similar types of assets only. Therefore, the airpower can be counterbalanced by airpower *only*. Alliances or isolated states may become subjects of intimidation unless they have a credible airpower.

As a conclusion, the airpower importance in preventing and solving crisis and conflicts emerges from its potential to accomplish a large spectrum of missions, precision attack on targets located throughout the theatre of operations, almost real time reaction and capability to discourage any threats. Through its potential to quickly respond and deter, the airpower importance will be maintained if not increased at a high level in the years to come, too.

Influence of the Current Security Environment in the Air Capabilities Establishment

In order to better understand the role of the Air Force, the missions that can be performed, and the required capabilities, let us have a glance at the features of the environment the Air Force may operate in. Basically, much of what could be seen now in Iraq and Afghanistan will be seen again in the future. It is still room for surprises and, definitely, there will be surprises, no matter how well the forces might be prepared.

The nature of future wars will not be too different from the one of the current wars. History teaches us that the *characteristics* of each individual war are always different and most certainly will change, but the enduring nature of war as a human endeavour will remain largely unchanged.

Just like today, future enemies will determine the forces to adapt as they adapt. They will attack the targets' vulnerabilities whenever and wherever they can. *The environment* is the one that influences the types of actions to be taken as well as the ability to conduct these actions.

Current warfare could come up as a "*natural reaction*" to globalisation and to the overwhelming political and military superiority. The future adversaries will exploit state boundaries and other political, economic, and tribal layers in order to seek sanctuary from conventional military capabilities, much complicating the operational planning. Operations conducted in these environments will either support or target state and non-state actors. Once the general environment is determined, it should be understood the context in the area or state of interest to develop a more comprehensive picture of the strategic problem. On many occasions, operating environments are typically influenced by external states that may have an interest in the conflict or in the area. In numerous cases, the adversaries will fight unevenly because they cannot succeed or even survive, in any other way.

In conclusion, when dimensioning the forces, it is absolutely necessary to balance our force to be able to fight the conventional, irregular, and hybrid threats of the future. Why ? Because now we think and speak about unconventional,

asymmetric, hybrid warfare, but how many people would have expected a “*classical military conflict*” such as the one in Georgia in 2008 ?!

The difference is given by the contrast between conventional operations that force an adversary to surrender in the traditional sense, and irregular warfare where defeat may not be a highly recognisable event, but rather when the adversary is “*defeated*” in the eyes of the populace and rendered ineffective or irrelevant (media warfare).

There is a great challenge to dimension the right and required capabilities to fight an unconventional warfare. The threats are no longer represented by massive conventional and nuclear forces. Nowadays, the threats are generated by adversaries who have learned they can threaten and harm nations in ways that fall below the traditional response threshold. They can destabilise neighbours and generate refugee flows. They can get engaged in narcoterrorism, or in low-level attacks inside and outside the territory of a state. They aim at WMD proliferation. They have learned to attract, employ suicide attackers, kidnap citizens etc. We briefly call all these the *threats of asymmetric/irregular warfare*.

To deter and defeat these threats there is a need for forces with new capabilities. There is a need for forces able to operate across the entire spectrum of conflict. We must be able to apply force – or threaten its application – rapidly, selectively, and decisively. The forces must be applied in a manner that deters aggressors and reassures allies and partners. Doing so requires a force structure that demonstrates speed, power, endurance, and interoperability. To be not only relevant but also decisive in the 21st century, the force has to be *tailored* to meet these new challenges.

In doing this, it has to be analysed from the very beginning what air power is expected to do in a possible conflict. First, it is expected to know what is going on – situation awareness and then, it is expected to conduct Air Defence/Air Policing/Air Sovereignty. In addition, it has to prove a rapid deployment capability and to project Air Superiority within AOR while conducting and sustaining air operations. It rises the following question: What are the Air Power ingredients to be used to achieve this ? They may be: *surveillance, reconnaissance, protection, mobility, range and precision*. But what remains as the most vexing problem, the greatest challenge ? What is missing is the ability to discover, identify and neutralise the targets that are *concealed*, not only in a traditional manner (forests, bunkers, etc.), but also in populated areas; *dispersed* not only in a certain area of operation but also in built-up areas with non-evacuated civilians; *mobile* and *fleeting*.

To overcome these “*new adverse tactics*”, the Air Force must have sensor persistence for *concealed* and *dispersed* targets and be able to respond and react

in time for *mobile* and *fleeting* targets. These two domains should be worked on, which means *information, range, precision and time*.

At the end, analysing what is expected from the Air Power in a potential conflict, it can be seen that in this equation emerges the *ability to predict the battle space* that becomes the most important capability in modern conflicts. In the future, what makes the difference in the Air Force capabilities will be the ability to get information that is timely and useful to a weapon system. Again, this means *information, range, precision and time*.

Air Power Impact over the Conceptual and Structural Domains

The particular significance of the air power on the military power scene and, implicitly, on the armed conflict denouement has determined a complex approach to the issue. In this context, in the latest years, the process of developing the Air Force's doctrine, manuals and procedures has been intensified, as a consequence of the requirement to develop a *conceptual component* that corresponds to modern armed conflicts and crisis management requirements and also to ensure conceptual compatibility with NATO, as a result of the requirements related to the integration in this political-military alliance.

Through their content, the new doctrines and standards make an attempt to direct the Air Force employment in collective defence and stability operations to obtain the desired control over the airspace. The doctrines also refer to the way of accomplishing missions in peacetime, such as Air Policing, participation in civil emergencies or disaster relief operations.

In addition, an efficient framework for the use of the lessons identified and learned has been validated. It has an important role in drawing attention to the principles that guide the employment of air power, the improvement of the effectiveness at command and execution levels, the upgrading of the Air Force specific structures and equipment.

Correlated with the challenges of today's strategic environment and the air power factors, the Air Force Doctrine has succeeded in defining the ways to strengthen and employ air forces in military operations by providing the general, free from restrictive rules, framework that provides the unity of concept and execution at all echelons, on the one hand, and the users' creative thinking, initiative and adaptability to quickly changing and difficult-to-predict situations, on the other hand.

In this context, the restructuring process of the Romanian Air Force has been conducted according to the following principles: *sizing* the Air Force by considering the missions requested and resources provided; *ensuring the efficiency of the Air Force*

by achieving its structural, functional and action identity in all situations; *providing the balance as far as the missions, personnel, concepts and equipment are concerned*, which will enable the structures of the Air Force to accomplish their assigned missions, to build a high response capability, to be flexible and to be able to perform long-lasting operations; *the dependence of the organising structure on the level of the armament and equipment development*, the armament and equipment systems requiring a certain number and specialisation of personnel; the achievement of interoperability with similar structures in the armed forces of NATO member states.

At the same time, in line with the Air Force missions that emerge from the operational doctrine and with the requirements to operate and maintain the new equipment, a planning strategy has been developed to enable the human resources management to meet the *Final Operational Capability (FOC)* standards. The reorganisation has not been an easy process so far and we do not expect it to become easier. On the contrary, it has been a particularly difficult one, as it is highly dependent on limited budgetary resources.

An essential reconfiguration of the Air Force is needed. Operational and logistic requirements for the new combat and associated maintenance equipment will influence the Air Force activities, and therefore, synchronised adjustments should be made in order to enable resource savings and smooth transition from old to new.

The restructuring stage is followed by modernisation, which brings all the Air Forces' structures to NATO standard level within a nearly ten-year period through capable equipment acquisitions that ensure a gradual elimination of the *"existing limitations"* and also the transition towards the next equipment generation.

It is essential to understand that there is no freedom of action for the land or naval forces without airspace control, and also that, lacking air transport and air-to-ground attack capability, the force mobility, including the Special Operation Forces' mobility, and concentrated efforts drop down to a level where they pose no threat to an enemy. Our future focus is quality with all its associated elements. The current orientation towards the multirol aircraft acquisition takes into account the operational requirements that have been defined by focusing on quality, thus enabling an option for a smaller number of fighters than the existing one. Besides this, we have considered creating capabilities for tactical airlift with fixed and rotary wing aircraft, where important shortfalls have been identified at NATO level.

Air Force Main Acquisition Efforts

Currently, in order to enable the Air Force to play its role and prove its competencies, an extensive complex and integrated reform process has been initiated as part of the Armed Forces reform covering all fields of activity. This process

has been based on the Air Force assessment from the perspective of its future role, effectiveness and interoperability requirements, as well as efficiency and capability criteria, closely connected to the resources available. The assessment has enabled the identification of restructuring and modernisation courses of action, the realistic distribution of resources and appropriate corrections during the process of reform.

Ways ahead for ongoing and near future acquisition programs aim at completing or improving the operational capabilities in areas such as: air surveillance, ground-based air defence, tactical airlift, support capabilities and infrastructure. All these programmes are closely connected to the Air Force goals and tasks within the transformation process undertaken by the Alliance to improve interoperability with forces from allied nations. Programmes are also prioritised by end-of-life cycles for various equipment categories.

Acquisition plans that encompass the air surveillance are correlated with air command and control system and aim at providing continuous contribution to *NATINADS*. At present, upgrading programmes are in progress for FPS-117 radars and the National Air Command and Control System. Near future plans include acquisition of low and medium-altitude surveillance radars.

Air defence capabilities will be significantly improved once the acquisition programmes of multirole aircraft, high-range surface-to-air missile (*HSAM*) and *SHORAD/VSHORAD* systems are finalised. Moreover, an upgrading programme of the existing *HAWK* missile systems has been initiated.

The multirole aircraft programme is vital for the Romanian Air Force. It is the one that will change our entire “*philosophy*”, will definitely release us from our “*Eastern inheritance*” and will launch the Romanian Air Force on new evolution coordinates, totally different from the past. This step is planned as a long-term strategy, up to the horizon of 2040-2050. Purchasing solutions have to be redesigned according to the new time horizon, taking firstly into account the required national defence capabilities. The crucial factors for decision-making will be: the gradual approach (with an interim solution for 2012-2025), capabilities, efficiency, benefit-cost ratio and the financial sustainability of the programme for which we have the full support of the leadership of the Ministry of National Defence and the General Staff.

The effort to improve the tactical airlift capability, both fixed-, and rotary-wing, will become visible once the *C-27J SPARTAN* aircraft acquisition and the *IAR-330* helicopters upgrading are completed. Both the air and the ground crews have started the training programme in order to be certified and able to use the airplane. This aircraft, together with *C-130* and *C-17*, commonly tasked within the *SAC (Strategic Airlift Capability)* program, will provide Romania with modern airlift capability, sufficient for the operational requirements of the Armed Forces.

Last but not least, in order to provide adequate operating and maintenance conditions for all of these systems, plans have been developed to achieve appropriate support capabilities and infrastructure. We take into consideration the establishment of a Logistic Base at the Air Force level. An important component aims at increasing personnel and equipment safety by implementing NATO standards of fire fighting measures and storage areas protection. These are to be achieved by both national and NATO/NSIP funds for the airbases where the multirol aircraft will be bedded down.

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As a conclusion, in its almost ten decades of activity, the Romanian Air Force has been undergoing essential and inherent changes, which will create the conditions to turn the existing forces into more flexible and agile ones, able to face the challenging security environment.

During this entire period of time, the General Staff has had a paramount role in coordinating the major transformation of the Romanian military body that has determined democratic changes in the Armed Forces and allowed Romania to promote its interests in the relations with all international actors.

It is certain that, in the near future, the Air Force missions will be more and more difficult, more complex, wide-ranging in time and space. The more the demands will emerge, the higher the motivation and professional satisfaction will become.

One thing will certainly remain unchanged in the future: the most valuable resource of the Air Force – the human resource.



THE ROMANIAN NAVAL FORCES

– History and Development in the Black Sea Security Environment Context –

Rear Admiral Dorin DĂNILĂ

To analyse the geopolitical features of the Black Sea region, the author believes that there must be identified the major obstacles with which the region confronts and the paradigms regarding the area, as well as the efforts of coastal states to become involved in a dynamic and systematic process meant to establish regional security.

In this respect, the impact of the era of the post-communist transition on the Black Sea states is an essential factor in understanding the current situation through which these states adapt to the new transatlantic security order. Last but not least, the analysis of geo-economic interests of some powers, mainly from the viewpoint of the energy competition, resources transit lines that connect the Mediterranean Sea, the Black Sea, the Caspian Sea and Central Asia, can determine the identification of the short- and medium-term geopolitical perspectives of the actors involved in this region.

Keywords: *waterways; enemy craft; military fleet; Romanian littoral defence; naval operations*

From the ancient times until the modern age, in the Black Sea waters and on the Danube have sailed one after another Phoenician ships, Hellenic triremes, Roman galleys, Byzantine dromons, Venetian and Genovese caravels, Moldavian sailboats and Wallachian skiffs, but the development of the Romanian Navy began to take shape together with the Romanian Principalities Unification, in 1859, which triggered the unification of the flotillas of the two sister countries on 22 October 1860, under the name of “*Flotilla Corps*”.

The History and Evolution of the Romanian Navy throughout Time

The Decree signed by Prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza established the definitive union of the flotillas on the entire course of the Danube, Colonel Nicolae Steriade being assigned as the first senior commander of the Flotilla Corps. The first command of the Romanian War Flotilla would be located in Ismail, the ships adopting

Rear Admiral Dorin Dănilă – Chief of the Naval Forces Staff.

a unique flag made by joining the colours and coats of arms of the Wallachian and Moldavian flags. The following year, the process of modernisation of the Flotilla's uniforms began, navy blue being introduced.

The Romanian Flotilla asserted itself during the Independence War, in which it participated along with the Russian river forces in many actions such as laying mine barriers, attacking enemy ships and providing artillery fire.

As a consequence of gaining the independence and, implicitly, the access to the sea, the Romanian Navy, and its first maritime ship – the gunboat *Grivița*, benefited, until the breakout of the First World War, from three acquisition programmes with ships and navigation assets. Consequently, Romania's combat potential increased significantly.

During the First World War, Romania integrated in the general war effort, during the three war campaigns, accomplishing missions such as defending the Turtucaia bridgehead, supporting the army's right flank, withdrawing the Romanian ships on the front line, destroying the enemy artillery near the city of Tulcea, transporting materials and eliminating the Russian ships resistance in the Danube Delta.

The union of all Romanian territories in a unique state, in 1918, enabled the development of the military fleet in the interwar period, new ships being procured: "M"-class destroyers – *Mărășești* and *Mărăști*, gunboats, torpedo boats, antisubmarine speedboats and monitors, Romania thus becoming the country with the most powerful river combat potential in Europe.

The '30s represented a very beneficial period for the Military Navy, which was equipped with "R"-class destroyers – *Regele Ferdinand* and *Regina Maria*, the submarines depot ship *Constanța*, the first Romanian submarine *Delfinul* and the second naval training ship *Mircea*.

In 1939, in Galați, the first military ship made in Romania, the minelayer *Amiral Murgescu* was commissioned, to which more new units, built or purchased after 1940, added, the most significant ones being the two submarines – *Rechinul* and *Marsuinul*, assembled in Galați shipyard.

At the beginning of the Second World War, the Romanian Royal Navy reached the top of its procurement and development, being a modern and balanced navy, able to face the threats in the Black Sea.

During the Second World War, one can notice the main sea actions such as defending the littoral and harbours by countering the attack and landing attempts of the enemy. In this respect, one can mention the action on 22 June 1941, when, in front of the city of Constanța, the artillery from the destroyers *Mărăști* and *Regina Maria* and the coastal batteries pushed back the raid of the Soviet ships.

The cruiser *Moskva* – the flotilla’s lead ship – was sunk and the destroyer *Harkov* was damaged. Another important action was the evacuation by sea of the Romanian and German troops from the Crimea peninsula, within the greatest naval operation conducted in the Black Sea, code-named Operation “60 000”.

The days of 23 August and 5 September 1944 had dramatic consequences for the Romanian Royal Navy because of the assault of both the German forces – enemy, at that time – and the allied Soviet forces, which started to disarm the Romanian warships. After those days, the Constanța harbour, along with the ships and war installations, remained exclusively under the control of the Soviet Naval Command.

After the Second World War, in the first post-war years, Romania was deprived of the maritime fleet and, to a great extent, of the river one, because the Soviet Union fleet took over the Romanian ships. After signing the Armistice Agreement and, afterwards, the Agreement for the retrocession of the Romanian merchant and military ships, the Soviet government gave a part of the ships back to Romania.

At the same time with the return of the monitors within the Navy, the *Danube Flotilla* was established, which, in 1959, was named the *River Brigade*.

At sea, as a consequence of the organisational changes between 1948 and 1949, the maritime ships group transformed into an independent unit that operated until May 1951 under the name the “*Maritime Forces Command*”.

In 1955, the squadrons containing maritime ships and maritime defences were subordinated to the Military Maritime Forces Command. In the same period, in the Romanian shipyards, it started the building of new types of ships, such as base minesweepers, basin minesweepers or river minesweeper speedboats. At the same time, a number of torpedo speedboats, submarine hunters and missile speedboats were purchased from the USSR.

In 1962, the 42th Maritime Division was setup, the successor of the Sea Division, a big unit that had been dissolved at the end of the Second World War.

At the end of the '70s and the beginning of the '80s, a series of military ships were built in the Romanian shipyards, such as the escort ships *Midia* and *Constanța* (in the Brăila Shipyard), the light cruiser *Muntenia*, transformed into a destroyer and subsequently into the frigate *Mărășești* or the “*Eustațiu Sebastian*”-class frigates (in the Mangalia shipyard).

After the events in December 1989, as a revival of the maritime-river defence tradition, the *Maritime Fleet Command* was set up, afterwards transformed into the *Naval Operational Command* and subsequently into the *Fleet Command* and the *Naval Operational Component*. At the river, the *Danube Flotilla Command* and the *Danube Flotilla* were set up, transformed into the *River Component* and subsequently into the *River Service*, subordinated to the *Fleet Command*.

Thus, in their modern history, of almost 100 years, the Romanian Naval Forces have served the national maritime and river interests and have participated in the water borders defence, up to the supreme sacrifice, fulfilling the role they have been assigned by the political-military leadership.

The Challenges to the Current Security Environment and the Perspectives of the Romanian Naval Forces

❖ The Black Sea Geostrategic Importance

From ancient times, the Black Sea has been a transit area of economic, political and strategic interests of both coastal states and great non-coastal powers. In support of this affirmation, one can mention the ancient caravans and maritime routes of the *Silk Road*, which was the connection between the oriental and occidental civilisations, as well as the frequent raids of the great powers of those times from South to North and vice versa for economic and political purposes.

Nowadays, the evolution of the geopolitical and security environment at the Black Sea, its geographical position, the risks and threats, as well as the advantages given by the political, economic and military cooperation have attracted the interest of the transatlantic and European organisations, the result being a more careful approach to the problems this area is faced with. One of the priorities of Romania's foreign policy is the Black Sea area, which is considered a "*maximum importance problem of national interest*".

❖ The Geopolitical Features of the Black Sea

In order to analyse the geopolitical features of the Black Sea region, it is necessary for the major obstacles and paradigms the region is faced with to be identified, as well as for the efforts of the coastal states to engage into a dynamic and systematic process meant to build regional security. In this respect, the impact of the post-communist transition era on the Black Sea states is an essential factor for understanding the current situation by means of which these states adapt to the new transatlantic security order. Last but not least, the analysis of the geo-economic interests of some powers, mainly in regard to the energy competition and the resources transit routes that connect the Mediterranean Sea, the Black Sea, the Caspian Sea and Central Asia, can lead to the identification of the geopolitical perspectives of the actors involved in this area in the short and medium term.

In the short and medium term, the Black Sea basin and the adjacent area will remain an active space from the political, economic and even military

perspective, which can influence the global and regional security. It is obvious that the degree of awareness of the Black Sea strategic importance will increase, becoming primordial for most of the political actors with interests in the area and this will soon lead to the definition and implementation of some specific policies for this area.

❖ *Specific Elements of the Black Sea*

From the official stances of the Black Sea coastal states, there are at least three characteristic elements for the region.

Firstly, all the states in the area are joined around the same interests and fundamental values that govern the international relations evolution for the time being, such as democracy, human rights, free market-based economy and fight against terrorism.

Secondly, all the states in the region are connected one way or another to the Euro-Atlantic security network. Regarding the stance on NATO, in the region there are Alliance member states, PfP member states and states developing special partnerships with NATO. From the European Union perspective, these states express more and more firmly their options regarding their relations with it, some of them signed the treaty of accession, others will start the negotiations or will develop an active and dynamic cooperation with the European Union.

Thirdly, the Black Sea area develops as a major connection between the Euro-Atlantic strategic area and the Middle East, the Caspian Sea and Central Asia.

❖ *Security Characteristics of the Black Sea Basin*

From the security situation's point of view, the Black Sea basin and the Caucasus area is very complex, characterised, on the one hand, by a process meant to reaffirm the regional security architecture, as part of the Euro-Atlantic one, and, on the other hand, by the existence of an important conflictual potential, caused by the recommencement of some inter- or intrastate frozen conflicts, as well as by the increase in the asymmetric threats, illegal drug and human trafficking, immigration and, last but not least, terrorism.

Moreover, the Black Sea area is located in the nodal point of two strategic major guiding lines: on the one hand, the hot field of the relation between the energy producer and consumer and, on the other hand, the flow between the security producer and consumer. The increase in the importance of the Black Sea area in the current geopolitical context is based on the need for acquiring strategic raw materials, the NATO and EU enlargement, the military and economic cooperation, especially with these ones, and the enhanced involvement of the

great powers or international structures in the general matters of the region.

Despite the efforts of developing new security organisations and partnerships at the Black Sea, Russia's diverging interests and the positions of force regarding the hydrocarbons flows and the status of the sensitive area between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea increase the level of tension in the area, which acquires a conflictual feature, despite the apparent cooperation.

Last but not least, the instability in the Danube Delta area, determined by the latest developments of the Bâstroe Canal, brings back to our attention the security problems at the mouths of the Danube.

The appearance of some new NATO actors, among which Romania and Georgia, and Ukraine's declared wish to become Alliance members, as well as the development of NATO's relationship with Russia theoretically create the premises of increasing the security in the area and transforming the Black Sea area in one of projection of the allied interests towards the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Orient. In fact, the regional interests of some Black Sea coastal states translate the collective security effort in regional cooperation organisations, which were impossible until a few years ago and even strongly diverging from the perspective of the interests of the regional actors. At another level, Romania's integration in the European Union puts the Union's borders at the Black Sea. This could be an approach meant for the economic, social and political stabilisation of the interests of the regional actors, but, at the same time, it could raise new questions regarding the European maritime borders security, when confronted with certain threats such as: the existence and activity of terrorist organisations, the extension of organised crime, drug trafficking, illegal fishing and violation of state border, illegal immigration, incidence of pollution risks and transport of hazardous materials.

In this context, the European Union has undoubtedly become the axis of the evolutions and transformations in the Black Sea neighbouring regions. It possesses a "*non-violent power*", which includes the promise of integration, the political dialogue, the assistance for reforms and the development of sectorial instruments. The enlargement of the European Union means export of stability, two of the fundamental concepts promoted by the European Union being:

- *democratic security*, based on the premise that the development of democracy at the national and international level excludes the war between the states that have adopted democracy as an organisation system;
- *security through development*, which means that the stability and security of these states increase in direct proportion to the economic growth level.

These extremely important evolutions and transformations, which have an increasing conflict potential require the necessity for a new Naval Forces

doctrine and the drawing up of a new naval strategy that can represent the instrument for the Romanian Navy modernisation and transformation in order to meet the new risks and threats at the Black Sea, the use of already existent security mechanisms, such as Operation *Black Sea Harmony (OBSH)*, the *BLACKSEAFOR* group (BSF) and the *Confidence and Security Building Measures* in the naval field at the Black Sea (*CSBM*), bodies that involve all the Black Sea coastal states.

Romania's role as a European Union and NATO border state requires, by means of the military cooperation instruments, the promotion and support to the big process of democratisation and contribution of the Wider Black Sea Region states to the Euro-Atlantic Security architecture. This approach means common efforts at national, regional and Euro-Atlantic level, by using a various range of instruments, such as attracting partners from the private sector or the civil society. Our projection firstly takes into account the principles of transparency, the involvement of all coastal states, the responsibilities assumed at regional level and the identification of certain reliable solutions for each of the parties involved in this process. From this perspective, we will keep on being attached to these regional cooperation forms whose goal is to provide security in the Black Sea area.

❖ *Romanian Naval Forces Participation
in Crisis Prevention in the Black Sea Region and Outside It*

The present and future activity of the Naval Forces is aimed at creating a structured and balanced force, able to respond to the risks and threats associated to the new security environment in the area, and interoperable with NATO maritime forces.

To meet the demands imposed in the area, the Romanian Naval Forces take decisive steps in order to have a fleet that is capable of accomplishing all the missions in which it will participate. Thus, in 2004 and 2005, our country purchased two frigates that considerably increased the Naval Forces operational capabilities and that have participated this year in the NATO Operation *Active Endeavour* in the Mediterranean Sea. The Black Sea is considered an extension to the north of this sea and an area in which dangers can be generated by the development of the dangers in the Mediterranean Sea as well.

In the latest years, Romania has participated in NATO operations or multinational exercises that aimed to enhance the cooperation, confidence and security between NATO and non-NATO naval forces. Thus, the Romanian Naval Forces have participated in multinational exercises such *Black Sea Partnership* or *Livex* type-ones. These exercises are already permanent, and within them there are executed mainly humanitarian and search and rescue missions. In this context, the corvettes and

minesweepers units have successfully participated in numerous multinational naval exercises both in the Black Sea and outside it. Moreover, the *Divers Centre* – the elite unit of the Naval Forces – has accomplished missions and participated in exercises in the Black Sea, the Mediterranean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean, proving the professionalism of its personnel. In 2008, the Marines participated in the *KFOR* mission in Kosovo with company-level forces, successfully developing peace support actions.

The future participation of the Romanian Naval Forces along with Turkey, the Russian Federation and Ukraine in the Operation *Black Sea Harmony*, whose main objective is to deter illegal activities at sea by monitoring the maritime communication routes, the identification and tracking of the suspect vessels in the waters under own territorial jurisdiction, opens a new important direction for cooperation in regard to the maritime security in the Black Sea.

The contribution of the Romanian Naval Forces to providing regional stability can be also evaluated through the document called “*Confidence and Security Building Measures in the Black Sea*”, resulted from the negotiations led by all six Black Sea states.

The monitoring of the regional naval situation, as part of the naval operations conducted in the Mediterranean Sea and in the Black Sea takes place by means of littoral or from the sea automatic systems, the data being sent to *CC MAR Naples* and to the *Virtual Regional Maritime Traffic Centre (VRMTC)* in Rome – which are still developing but tend for global coverage.

The Romanian Naval Forces can also provide assistance to national and foreign civil authorities. International humanitarian assistance is provided in support of peace or to reduce the consequences of natural or human provoked disasters. This kind of actions includes the elimination or reduction of the conditions that pose a threat to life and property. In case of disaster or crisis situations, the Romanian Naval Forces can provide civilians and non-combatants evacuation and assist in the medical and infrastructure reconstruction field.

Thus, Romania, through its Naval Forces, will continue to project its maritime and river interests in the Black Sea area and its wider one, having as main goal to remain a reliable partner within the Alliance, one that is able to respond to the threats to global and regional stability.

The need for taking firm measures for enhancing the safety of trading routes and pipelines in the area is very important and the Romanian Naval Forces become a basic component for reaching these goals.

❖ *Transforming and Adapting the Romanian Naval Forces*

Starting 1990, the Romanian Armed Forces have entered a big reforming process whose finality is the interoperability with the armed forces of NATO

member states. This process, a long-lasting and expensive one, has been conducted and supported by the General Staff and the Romanian government, so that the Romanian state could acquire armed forces that are able to respond to any threat to the security and national sovereignty.

In this general context, the Naval Forces have undergone a reform process that has led to the transformation of this service in a more flexible and powerful force, which currently is in full conceptual, structural and actional modernisation process.

The priority goal of the steps taken for the creation of a structure of forces that is able to respond to the risks and threats in the region, that is interoperable, at the same time, with the North-Atlantic maritime military structures is rethinking the concepts, laws, doctrines, regulations and handbooks in order to provide the legislative and normative framework for the accomplishment of missions, adaptation of the military actions planning and conducting system, implementation of standard procedures in common with allied naval forces and their partners, modernisation of ships and equipment, procurement of cutting-edge combat means, able to provide both the interoperability with NATO naval forces and the accomplishment of all missions with maximum effectiveness.

❖ *The Multi-role Naval Force and the Balanced Force
from the Perspective of the Naval Forces Evolution*

In order to face all the risks and threats to national security, the Naval Forces will undergo in the following years, along with the other services and under the command of the General Staff, a process of tailoring the structures and capabilities so that they could fulfil missions that are specific to high intensity conflicts, as well as missions other than war and non-violent ones, which determine the existence of certain reduced, flexible, fast deployable military structures, capable of self-sustaining in the action area.

For this purpose, the development of a multi-role naval force to correspond to the evolution of the military phenomenon is the essence of the Naval Forces modernisation and transformation process. The multi-role naval force will have an optimal structure and composition in order to successfully accomplish any type of missions within joint operations, having an important contribution to the defence of the national territory integrity. This will also be fully interoperable with NATO or non-NATO partners within the joint national and multinational operations.

An effective and economical force requires a developed logistic support system, made up from resources deployed in permanent bases and own re-supply means.

The collective, integrated and high quality training of crews for the accomplishment of various missions will represent the basis for the creation of the multi-role naval force.

The requirements that must be met by this naval force are the following: effective command and control, balanced force structure and appropriate interoperability and infrastructure. Command and control will provide the correlation of the naval forces command and control structures attributions with the Armed Forces leadership system, the improvement of the level of interoperability with Alliance partners and with the other categories of armed forces or with forces from other ministries, getting the Naval Forces, the General Staff and the Romanian Armed Forces closer to the requirements of the “*network-centric warfare*” at sea, at its coasts and in its depths.

The balanced structure of forces will be obtained by achieving force packages at different levels of the operational capacity, from the ships classes or the forces types necessary for accomplishing the missions, as well as through balancing the personnel.

Creating the infrastructure needed for the forces deployment, forces training and ships and equipment maintenance, in order to keep the costs of the force operation and maintenance at a low level, is another course of action for the Naval Forces transformation.

Starting from the current state of the Naval Forces, analysing the probability of the risks and threats manifestation in the area, carrying out such a procurement process of the multi-role naval force is possible to take place gradually, in the medium and long run, starting with 2010 until 2020-2025.

The creation of balanced naval forces is the key to fulfilling all national operative-strategic goals. Basically, the Naval Forces procurement of equipment and ships refers to: finalising the System of Integrated Observation, Surveillance and Control of the Black Sea Traffic – SCOMAR; completing the frigates modernisation programme and their procurement with modern helicopters and combat systems; replacing the corvettes with new, modern multifunctional corvettes; replacing minesweepers with modern mine hunters; reviving the submarine and purchasing, in the long term, two more modern submarines with classical propulsion; equipping the divers with improved equipment and competitive intervention ships; providing logistic capabilities to support the deployed forces in the theatre.

The multi-role naval force components will develop military actions or operations, both under national command and in the international environment, independently or within a joint task force. The missions foreseen for them are: naval traffic control with the purpose of preventing and fighting terrorist actions and illegal trade with hazardous products; protection of the harbours and important naval transports on the maritime and river lines of communication and of the economic

objectives in the area of responsibility; the provision of the facilities necessary for the forces and goods transfer via Romanian harbours; strategic naval transport of forces towards and from the theatres of operations outside the Black Sea; search and rescue at sea in case of naval and air accidents; actions for peace support and humanitarian assistance in case of disaster; collective and national territory defence operations against aggressions from the sea.

Fulfilling the procurement programme and the interoperability with NATO naval forces must be aimed at a more consistent participation of the Romanian Naval Forces in NRF and in NATO Naval Groups at the Mediterranean Sea – SNMG 2 and SNMCM –, as well as in the fight against piracy and terrorism.

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Defending and promoting Romania's maritime interests impose the provision of the safe development of activities on own maritime and river communication routes, as well as the provision of freedom of action on the seas and oceans of the world. The security of the maritime lines of communication is necessary and imposed in peacetime, yet, it becomes vital in crisis or conflict situations.

In order to successfully monitor crises and to prevent conflicts at sea, Romania should have the ability to provide the protection of its own legal and legitimate interests in the peaceful use of the sea.

As a Black Sea state, situated in the vicinity of the area of insecurity in the Balkans and at the entrance of the main river transport axis between the Middle East and Western Europe, Romania must have a credible and well-structured naval force, with a combative power corresponding to its responsibilities at sea and on the river – a flexible and balanced naval force, which is interoperable with the ones of NATO member states and with regional partners.

In the context of the evolution of the security environment, the maritime power of the country is a factor of vital importance and the Romanian Naval Forces are its main pillar.



THE JOINT OPERATIONAL COMMAND

– Exercise of Operational Command on the Structures Participating in Multinational Missions –

Brigadier General Dr Visarion NEAGOE

To exercise the command authority with which it has been invested, the Joint Operational Command carries out specific and implicit tasks, on which the author elaborates in this article, starting from the stage in which the mission is prepared, throughout its execution until the phase of the repatriation of the Romanian contingent and its transfer to the category of armed forces it is part of or the Joint Operational Command.

Through situation assessment, the staff of the Joint Operational Command seeks to fulfil the tasks in the order of mission, to follow the rules of engagement and national limitations, to abide by the assigned mandate, to identify the needs and send coordination instructions, fragmentary orders, to intervene at the superior echelon in order to change/expand the mission mandate or to meet the demands of the commanders of the contingents, when these are beyond the competences of the commander of the Joint Operational Command.

Keywords: *multinational operations; command-control structure; transfer of authority; rules of engagement; area of responsibility*

The fundamental element related to the complexity of the current international reality is the acceleration of the globalisation process. There are two tendencies as far as this process is concerned: either to understand and approve of it, as a real way to solve the regional and global problems, or to disapprove it. Both options are characterised by powerful transformations, by the change in the weight of state and non-state actors in the international arena, in competition for imposing their points of view or for achieving a new balance of power.

These changes are not and will not be linear and peaceful, but most times they generate vulnerabilities and risks which can be materialised in contradictions and instability. Instability may degenerate in crises and local conflicts with proliferation tendencies at regional, continental or even planetary level, imposing the involvement of the national and/or combined security structures.

Although the forecasts regarding the national security state lead to the conclusion that the risk of a regional armed conflict or a general one is

Brigadier General Dr Visarion Neagoe – Commander of the Joint Operational Command.

diminished, the possibility of a military conflict or actions involving Romania is not excluded. This, therefore, mainly due to the tasks and the rights assigned to Romania as a member of ONU, OSCE, the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union. Thus, the Romanian military contingents are in the situation to participate in various theatres of operations to perform military actions within collective/common defence, in allied or coalition context, based on the assigned tasks.

Romania's participation in multinational Coalition, NATO or EU type operations as well as the accession to NATO and the EU have required profound conceptual and doctrinal changes regarding the operations planning and conducting in multinational environment in order to organise and engage forces in operations, to exercise the authority to accomplish the mission. All of these have as a source the changes in the operational environment at the beginning of the 21st century, affecting the typology of conflicts and the ways to solve them.

Initiated by the end of the *Cold War* and accelerated by the terrorist attack on 11 September 2001, against some of fundamental institutions on the US, the profound transformations the Alliance has undergone were firstly aimed at the achievement of the capabilities to manage conflict situations outside the classic area of responsibility, namely the territory of the component states. One of the effects of these changes, particularly related to the projection of the military power in geographic areas far away from the territory of the component states, has been the launch of the transformation process for the armed forces of the member states.

One of the achievements of this process is the Romanian Armed Forces command and control structure remodelling, process that is in development, so that the structure can be compatible with that of the armed forces of the other Alliance member states and, especially, can ensure the exercise of the national command authority over the forces that carry out missions in the theatres of operations outside the national territory.

The Joint Operational Command is the structure directly subordinated to the General Staff that exercises *operational command (OPCOM)* over the national forces that participate in multinational missions outside the national territory. This mission is performed in peacetime, crisis situations or at war.

As it results from the name of the structure – operational command, the main competence and responsibility is to exercise the command authority assigned by a superior military or political authority, in our case, the chief of the General Staff, who exercises full command.

The future operations carried out by Romania, with its allies and partners, will have mainly a multinational character. Therefore, it is more than ever necessary to correctly and comprehensively understand the definitions of the command authority and of the practices related to its delegation.

Command and Control in Multinational Environment

As a subject, command authority is now one of the most debated concepts and, generally, one of the least understood of the contemporary military subjects, especially from the standpoint of the commander's requirements as determined by his mission, especially from the perspective of the commander of a multinational force.

While one of command principles is the "*unity of command*", which is also applicable to multinational operations, the systematic process meant to determine the specific command authority required for a particular mission assigned to the commander of the multinational force has lacked in the literature of security studies.

In NATO-agreed usage, there are four command and control authority levels. They are: *operational command*, *operational control*, *tactical command* and *tactical control*. There are also the administrative control, logistic control and the coordination authority. Besides them, which may be assigned/delegated to a multinational force commander, it is also a superior level that is the prerogative of the national command, at the armed forces level – *full command*.

National or full command is the military authority and responsibility of a superior officer to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and administration and exists only within national services. The term "*command*", as it is used in multinational environment, implies a lesser degree of authority than when it is used in a purely national sense. No NATO, EU or coalition commander has full command over the forces assigned to him since, in assigning forces to NATO, nations will delegate only operational command and operational control, depending on the situation.

Operational Command/OPCOM is the authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational or tactical control as deemed necessary. It does not include responsibility over administration or logistics.

In multinational environment, operational command represents the highest level of command authority that nations may assign to an allied commander.

He may assign missions/establish objectives, assign tasks, direct/engage forces, establish control measures of manoeuvres, deploy forces in the theatre of operations and assign separate employment of components of the concerned units. He also has the authority to delegate/retain the operational control and tactical control.

Operational Control/OPCON is the authority delegated to a commander to direct¹ forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks that are usually limited by function, time or location, to deploy concerned units, to establish control measures of manoeuvres and to deploy forces in the theatre of operations. Regarding the delegation of authority, the commander may assign operational control (only with approval) and assign/retain tactical control. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the concerned units. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control.

Tactical Command/TACOM is the authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by the higher authority. This level of command is specific to the tactical level, it is used in the actions area and it is similar to the old concept of operative command. The commander may assign tasks to concerned units and also control measures of manoeuvres, but they must contribute to accomplish the mission assigned by the superior echelon commander. Assigned with the tactical command, the commander may delegate only the tactical control.

Tactical Control/TACON comprises the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish the missions or tasks assigned. A force that is under a commander tactical control will carry out missions and tasks assigned by the superior echelon commander. The commander who exercises tactical control has responsibilities only to coordinate movements, manoeuvres and local force protection while the force is in his area of responsibility. So the unit which transits another unit area of responsibility is given under this unit's commander tactical control in order to direct the movements and manoeuvres.

As we can see, operational command provides a higher level of control for a commander concerning subordinated forces, while tactical control the lowest.

¹Direction converts the commander's decision into the forces effective action. Commanders generate the effective action through directing forces and synchronising the fighting functions. Commanders direct the operation results through: assigning missions, prioritising and allocating resources (forces or other types, made available by nations), evaluating and assuming risks, making decisions regarding when, where and how adjustments are made, engaging reserves, understanding the subordinates' needs, guiding and motivating the structure to accomplish the mission.

As a rule, within the Alliance, *OPCOM* is delegated to an allied commander only during Article 5 operations. For non-Article 5 operations, the highest level of command authority is *OPCON*.

Authorities that Exercise Command and Control

❖ *International authorities*

The political authorities that delegate a military force to carry out the operation and a commander to exercise the command are those international authorities (the UN, OSCE, the EU) with a consolidated legal status that enjoy prestige and unanimous recognition and that have assumed the role of resolving the crisis/conflict. Once the leader role assumed, the political organisation establishes the operation goal and objectives, the allocated resources and the end-state.

Based on the UN Security Council resolutions, after the establishment of the leader nation within the *multinational joint force* made up to perform an operation, the *memoranda of understanding* and the *technical agreements* between the troop contributing nations are drawn up and signed. These documents stipulate the engagements according to which the participants will set up the structure and accomplish the mission and establish the responsibilities, general principles and adequate procedures. For the local command, the organisation empowers a representative to manage the operation, who becomes the *High Representative* (political commander of the operation).

The international military authority is represented by the *multinational joint force* commander, to whom troop contributing nations subordinate forces, under different command levels (as a rule, *OPCON*).

The delivery of forces to the commander is made by drawing up and signing the *transfer of authority (TOA)* that constitutes the way in which it is assured the efficiency of the operation carried out by the *multinational joint force*, respecting the national sovereignty of troop contributing nations and the rules and principles of international law.

After signing the *transfer of authority*, the *multinational joint force* commander exercises the operational control over all subordinate forces, based on all his rights as a commander, which are given by the command level and limited only by the provisions of the transfer of authority.

The Romanian military contingents are directly subordinated to the structures in the *joint multinational force* (division, brigade, regiment), and its commanders are the superior level commanders of the Romanian contingents commanders.

❖ *National authorities*

The political authorities that make decisions regarding the participation in military missions outside the national territory of Romania are: the Parliament, the President of Romania, the Supreme Council of National Defence, the Government and the Ministry of National Defence.

The military command authority is represented by the Chief of the General Staff, who exercises the military command over the Romanian Armed Forces, in accordance with the political authorities decisions.

The Chief of the General Staff is the highest military authority and the main military adviser to the President and the Minister of National Defence and at the strategic level exercises the command over the Romanian military contingents that participate in missions outside the borders of the country.

The Chief of the General Staff is empowered to make the transfer of authority over Romanian forces to the *multinational joint force* commander.

At operative level the commander of Joint Operational Command exercises the *operational command* over all national contingents that participate in missions outside the borders of the Romanian state.

The Transfer of Command Authority

In close relation to the problems of command authority is that of the moment when forces are “*transferred*” (*transfer of authority – TOA*) from the national command structures to the multinational forces commander as far as operational aspects are concerned.

This important aspect – the decision regarding the moment when a national force is transferred to a multinational force commander – will have a major effect on the success of the mission. Therefore, by the official act of transfer of authority over the national forces (*ORBAT TOA MESSAGE*), the force and the time when it is put under the authority of the multinational force commander are specified. This is transferred after the ending of the reception process, stationing, movement to area of actions and integration in the multinational unit, so that the commander may use it in operation.

Thus, the Joint Operational Command commander, based on the *Act of operational command handover-takeover*, receives the structure from the service of the armed forces or from the Joint Logistics Command, under *operational command*, organising and performing successive specific activities regarding the evaluation, the conveyance of mission tasking, the organisation of introduction/extraction

in/from the theatre of operations, the continuous monitoring of conducted actions, the solutions for requests, the analysis of the way to accomplish the mission, the gathering, analysis and dissemination of the learned lessons etc.

The Joint Operational Command Role in Exercising the Operational Command over the Structures that Participate in Missions outside the National Territory

To exercise the assigned command authority, the Joint Operational Command accomplishes *specific and implicit tasks*, starting in the mission preparation stage, during the mission and ending with the repatriation of the Romanian contingent and its delivery to the armed force service to which it belongs or to the Joint Logistics Command.

During the forces training for mission, the main tasks are: the establishment of mission needs (essential requests) and operational requests, proposals for force sizing and organisation, participation in the conferences related to planning the contingents that are to be deployed in the theatres of operations, the issue of the mission order, the evaluation of the contingents operational level, the receiving process from the service, the planning and coordination of forces deployment, the development and promotion of mission reports and the drawing up, promotion and transmission of the documents that regulate the transfer of authority regarding the exercise of operational control over the Romanian contingents by NATO command, the coalition or the regional cooperation initiative/international organisation (the UN, the EU, OSCE), assigned to conduct the multinational mission.

During the mission the main tasks are: the awareness of the forces operational situation by continuous liaison with them, the reception and transmission of scheduled and on-demand reports, the organisation of video teleconferences with commanders.

Conducting the situation analysis (based on the reports or orders received by contingent commanders in theatres of operations), the Joint Operational Command Staff supervises the achievement of the tasks from the mission tasking, the observance of the *rules of engagement (ROE)* and national caveats, the assigned mandate, the identification of the needs and the transmission of coordination instructions, the fragmentary orders (FRAGO), the hierarchical intervention in the right upper echelon in order to change/extend the mission mandate or to solve the contingents commanders requests, when they exceed the Joint Operational Command competences.

An important aspect of the activities is represented by the maintenance of the fighting capacity through resupplying the task force with assets, materials, spare parts and ammo. To this end, transportation and supply plans are developed and they are submitted for approval to the Chief of the General Staff.

Moreover, through the specialised structure, it makes propositions for the decoration of the personnel that distinguished in missions, plans and executes the repatriation of the military that participated in missions in theatres of operations, plans and executes reconnaissance and control in the theatres of operations during rotations, depending on the situation, takes measures for organisational charts to be changed and for the Romanian contingents command and training to be enhanced.

At the end of the mission, after the task force has left the theatre of operations, a military ceremonial is organised and the task force is re-subordinated to the military service it belongs to.

For a better generation process, mission execution and forces regeneration, the *lessons learned* section gathers and analyses contingents' reports and identifies and recommends solutions to resolve the problems; the lessons learned are handed in to the specialised structure within the Training and Doctrine Directorate.

During these activities, the Joint Operational Command synchronises its actions and exchanges information with the operational component of the armed forces services, the Joint Logistics Command and the Communications and IT Command.

Romanian Participation in the Multinational Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq

Operation “*Enduring Freedom*” (*OEF*), a coalition type one, launched on 7 October 2001, under the US command, is part of the global war against terrorism.

Initially, Romania participated in this operation, starting July 2002, with an infantry battalion, a detachment of trainers for the new Afghan Army (*ANA Training*) as well as staff personnel.

To stabilise the situation, following the UN Security Council Resolution 1386, the *ISAF* mission was launched, in January 2002, and it was led by NATO since August 2003.

Romania has participated since the beginning of the mission (February 2002), contributing one C-130 B Hercules aircraft, one MP platoon, staff personnel,

and later, one intelligence detachment, an air traffic control team and military men in two Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRTs).

The MP platoon was involved in specific missions such as: reconnaissance, operative duties, traffic accidents investigations, escorts and traffic check points.

The battalion participation in OEF, starting July 2002, was executed under the command of the HQ from Kandahar, during six rotation cycles, till July 2006. The main tasks were to secure Kandahar Airfield Base and the *IRON* operation area, to patrol the area of responsibility and to execute reconnaissance missions.

Since 10 June 2003, “*ANA TRAINING*” detachment has participated in the process of the New Afghan Army development and readiness, as part of the Operation “*Enduring Freedom*”, in Kabul and other provinces. The main tasks have been to train the Afghan soldiers in different branches and specialties, as well as to participate in missions together with the Afghan battalions, to collect information and to contribute to the communications within the coalition. They still conduct such missions under the operational control of the *CJTF PHOENIX* – Kabul.

To provide the national logistic support in the theatre of operations in Afghanistan, starting January 2004, a *National Support Element (NSE)* has participated in each stage of the mission. It has conducted its activity in Kandahar Airfield Base, the main gate for the logistic transit for the Romanian detachments. Since 2008, the *NSE* has increased to enhance the capacity to manage the rising logistic support, once the forces were supplemented.

To ensure the Afghans’ secure access to voting polls, in 2005, the forces in the theatre in Afghanistan were supplemented. Thus, between 10 August 2005 and 10 November 2005, another Romanian infantry battalion was deployed in Kabul, under ISAF command. The battalion had missions like patrolling, quick reaction force, securing road transports and Kabul area.

In 2006, between April and August, 39 military men belonging to the Romanian Air Force were at the command of Kabul International Airport (KAIA). They were assigned to key administrative and command positions within ISAF, under NATO operational command.

Starting September 2006, the battalion that had executed missions in *OEF* was subordinated to the Regional Command South/ISAF and redeployed from Kandahar to Qalat. It subordinated an US Army infantry company and became Task Force Zabul.

In the province of Zabul, the tasks were executed within *ISAF* to support the Afghan Security Forces (*ANSF*), in cooperation with the Coalition forces

(“*Enduring Freedom*”), to assist the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in exercising and maintaining its authority.

A very important mission for the Romanian forces is to secure the A1 highway that links Kandahar and Kabul. The risk level is high as the 35 bridges on the highway are the insurgents’ preferred targets. The freedom of movement on the A1 highway is essential for ISAF.

Romania has been involved in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. It participated in the *PRT* project, in the province of Konduz, with:

- one logistic team formed by two officers and one NCO;
- one EOD team formed by two officers and one NCO;
- one doctor and two medical assistants.

The Romanian military were deployed in two *PRTs* in the North of Afghanistan. A *Mobile Observation Team – MOT* executed missions under the *OPCON* of the commander of the *PRT* North, in MAZAR-E-SHARIF. The main tasks were:

- to monitor the development of the provincial infrastructure;
- to identify the possible reconstruction and humanitarian projects;
- to monitor the progress of the security structures.

For specific missions, structures belonging to the special operations forces were deployed in the theatre of operations and they have acted in different provinces, according to their tasks.

Starting in October 2008, an *interim command and control team* was introduced in the theatre of operations in Afghanistan, assigned to conduct peace support operations under NATO command, in cooperation with the other *ISAF* forces, in the area of responsibility, coordinated by *RC-SOUTH* commander. The mission was aimed at supporting the Government of Afghanistan to maintain security and stability, to extend the authority, and to sustain the reconstruction and development effort.

In the same month, an *Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT-garrison type)* was introduced in the theatre in Afghanistan to mentor and train the military personnel belonging to an *ANA* garrison, within *ISAF*. In June 2009, an *OMLT* battalion was also introduced, to mentor and train the military personnel in an *ANA* battalion.

Against the background of the international terrorist attacks escalation, of banning the controls on the Iraqi territory, the US-led Coalition against terrorism launched Operation “*IRAQI FREEDOM*”, in March 2003.

The engagement of Romania to join the fight against terrorism was materialised in the participation in military operations in Iraq between April 2003 and July 2009. Over 8 400 soldiers accomplished a large variety of missions, such as: stabilisation

and peacekeeping missions, guard and protection, demining and building, surveillance and reconnaissance, controlling and monitoring road traffic, medical aid, significantly contributing to the promotion of stability, security and democratic values in the Iraqi community.

The most important military structure that carried out missions in the theatre of operations in Iraq was that of the infantry battalion type, starting in July 2003. The series started with the 811th Infantry Battalion that executed two missions, followed by the 26th Infantry Battalion (two missions), then the 812th Infantry Battalion, the 2nd Infantry Battalion, the 20th Infantry Battalion and the 280th Infantry Battalion. All these units were subordinated to the multinational brigade under Italian command, located in White Horse Camp, in An Nasiriyah, and since January 2005, in Mittica Camp, next to the Tallil Airfield. Starting in February 2007 the Romanian contingent was re-subordinated to the *Multinational Division (South-East)*, led by the UK (*MND SE/UK*). Starting February 2008, it was subordinated to the *Multinational Division (Centre)*, led by the USA (*MND C/USA*). Other five Romanian battalions were assigned: the 495th Infantry Battalion, the 32nd Infantry Battalion, the 151st Infantry Battalion, the 341st Infantry Battalion and the 26th Infantry Battalion, the latter as a training detachment, until 31 May 2009.

The Military Police Company was subordinated to the Italian task force located in An Nasiriyah and Mittica Camp in Tallil, between July 2003 and August 2006. The specific missions carried out by it consisted in securing the personnel and assets in Camp Mittica, reconnaissance and patrol, traffic control, and escort.

The engineer detachment was introduced in July 2003 and extracted in August 2006. It was subordinated to the *Multinational Division (Centre-South)*, led by Poland (*MND CS*), deployed in Camp Charlie (Al Hillah) and then, starting in January 2006, in Camp Echo (Ad Diwaniyah).

The detachment mission was that of ensuring engineer support to the multinational force, having not only a military component but also a civilian one. One of the most important tasks of this detachment was related to the organisation and extension of Camp Echo (Ad Diwaniyah), which resulted in the command of the Multinational Division Centre-South moving to that base a month earlier than it had been planned.

The infantry company assigned to protect the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq – UNAMI personnel acted between March 2005 and April 2007 under the *Multinational Force – Iraq (MNF I)*. Together with forces belonging to the US and UK, it escorted, guarded and secured the UN personnel from Basrah.

The medical detachment was introduced in July 2003 and extracted in June 2009 and it was subordinated to the *Medical Task Force* of *MNF I*. They gave medical assistance to the detainees and the civilian population in the area, under the guidance of the American partner.

The NBC defence company participated, between 12 April and 17 October 2003, in the military actions to monitor the nuclear (radiological) and chemical activity, to decontaminate the equipment that was to be repatriated, to survey and guard the installation, in the port of embarkation, as well as to extinguish the fire, in the event of an accident, at the heliport. It was subordinated to Cluster Brigade, in Kuwait.

To provide the logistics support for the national contingents the *national support element (NSE)* worked in Iraq between February 2004 and August 2007.

A significant participation in the operations was that of the Romanian military who were assigned to the multinational HQs, in intelligence, logistics, engineering and reconstruction. In December 2006, the institution of the *National Representative* was established. Through its activity, it brought more value to the image of the Romanian military effort within the Multinational Coalition, effort directed to the achievement of a democratic and secure Iraq.

The mission of the Romanian contingents in Iraq ended officially on 4 June 2009, moment marked by an end-of-mission ceremony in Tallil.

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Romania has participated with over 20 000 military in peacekeeping missions so far, with a large variety of forces, such as: infantry and engineer battalions, Special Forces detachments, intelligence detachments, field hospitals, military police, transportation capabilities, military observers and staff officers. The participation in multinational missions that involve a large array of military operations, from the humanitarian and reconstruction to the fighting ones has directly contributed to the enhancement of the armed forces training and interoperability, in accordance with the *lessons learned*.

Some defining aspects related to the Romanian Armed Forces participation in multinational missions have to be highlighted, as follows:

- involving all the military services in the common effort meant to train, evaluate, introduce and sustain troops in the theatre of operations, to redeploy them in the country, to recover them and to capitalise on the lessons learned;
- providing national strategic lift capabilities to the forces and assets, using the own air and naval forces means of transportation, a capability that just

a few of the contributing nations to the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq can be proud of;

- planning and achieving an excellent cooperation between the structures in the theatres of operation and the national intelligence structures, as well as between the latter and the allied intelligence structures;
- the achievement of important benefits, especially in the operational field, related to the expertise gained during the mission preparation and development, the experience of a real war, the use of new tactics, techniques and procedures, the unprecedented enhancement of the structural and operational interoperability with the allied structures, the improvement of the synchronisation and cooperation capacity during the actions carried out in common with the other forces in the theatre of operations.

As an active participant in this process, the Joint Operational Command is the spearhead of the Romanian Armed Forces, engaged in accomplishing the missions even in theatres of operations outside the national territory, in a multinational environment, thus capitalising on the experience sprung from the interaction with the multinational structures they have to cooperate and coordinate with to successfully accomplish the missions.

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THE COMMUNICATIONS AND IT COMMAND – Operational Requirements and Functional Responsibilities –

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The Command is deeply involved in the development and management of the main specific elements of communications and IT of the major “General Staff/strategic command” procurement programme, under the responsibility of the General Staff. Some of its components, on which the authors elaborate, refer to: expanding the CRONOS system, equipping strategic command posts with modern communication means, performing telecommunication work in fixed locations, procuring fibre and satellite flows, installing satellite terminals in different locations, developing video-teleconference systems in fixed locations and through the deployable (mobile) centres, providing secure workstation for computer networks, ensuring communications software for major IT applications in operation, providing DELTA-type encrypted voice terminals.

Keywords: *structures and capabilities; permanent signalling network; telecommunications services; commercial satellites*

If we all agree that the first historic step in the evolution of this branch is 14 July 1873 – when the first military telegraphy unit was established –, the second historic step is represented by 1 April 1932 when, through the High Decree no. 497/1923, the Signal Brigade and the 2nd and 3rd Signal Regiments were established in Bucharest, Câmpina, and Braşov respectively. The establishment of the two regiments was made possible through taking the signal personnel and technique out of the Signal Battalions that existed in the organisation of the 7 Pioneer regiments.

This reorganisation represents an important step in the separation of the two branches – Signal and Engineer. It is for the first time when the three Signal Regiments are subordinated to a large unit belonging to the same branch, although they also remain subordinated to the Superior Directorate and to the Engineer Command for a quite long period of time.

Colonel Ion Cerăceanu – Commander of the Communications and IT Command.

Colonel Dr Emil Tudose – Deputy Commander of the Communications and IT Command.

It naturally followed the third historic step in the evolution of the branch towards an independent one – the moment *1 July 1942* when, through the Order of the Great General Staff no. 85959 on 02.06.1942 and the Decree no. 3818 on 31.12.1942, the Signal Command and the Signal Training Centre, with the Signal NCOs School and the Signal Officers School are established.

Starting on *1 February 1949*, when, through the Order of the Great General Staff no. 45107/1949, the Signal Brigade changed into the Armed Forces Signal Command – whose mission was to command the “*signal education and training in all the units belonging to the Land Forces*” – the latter historic step is made regarding the separation from the Engineer Branch and the confirmation of the Signal Branch as a distinct one in the structure of our Armed Forces.

The Communications and IT Command has undergone numerous transformations to adapt to the realities of different times throughout its history.

The structure has been successively called: Signal Command (1942), Signal Directorate (1945), Signal Brigade (1946), Armed Forces Signal Command (1949), Signal Troops Command (1951), Signal Inspectorate (1990), Signal General Inspectorate (1991), Signal, IT and Electronics Command (1993), Signal Command (1997), Communications and IT Command (2006).

The *Communications and IT Command* is subordinated to the General Staff. Its mission is to achieve, exploit and maintain the communications and IT system at strategic level, necessary for the forces command, cooperation and warning in peacetime, in crisis situations and at war.

The transformation process, approached from the scientific perspective, is a concept and a doctrine on which the main effort of NATO member states to model the armed forces structure and capabilities is based today, so that they could adequately respond to the current risks and threats to their homeland security. From this standpoint, optimal solutions to meet the Command organisational and structural performance have been searched for (with reference to the latter two transformations out of the eleven ones it has undergone since its establishment) as follows:

- the transformation on 1 May 2006 that was essentially aimed at achieving the optimal balance between the structure of the Signal Command and the missions and commitments deriving from Romania’s status as a NATO member country;
- the transformation on 1 August 2008 that was aimed at adjusting the dimension of the Communications and IT Command in conformity with the general norms regarding the personnel, accepted in NATO member states – the ratio between the number of officers, NCOs, and the civilian

personnel, on the one hand, and the ratio between the ranks of the officers, warrant officers, and NCOs, on the other hand.

The continuous evolution of the achievements in the field of communications has marked the courses of action to be taken by the subordinate military units to fulfil their duties, as well as the concepts issued at the Command level.

Starting in 1997, once the Communications and Information Directorate was established within the General Staff, the competencies, tasks and responsibilities of the Communications and IT Command have undergone major transformations that have led to the role and place it currently plays, that of achieving, exploiting and ensuring the stability of the *National Defence Network (NDN)* at the level of the strategic leadership, efficiently using the effort of the subordinated units. The current Communications and IT Command forces and means are formed by the resources of the ten subordinated units, grouped according to their missions as follows:

- two regiment-level units, one of them equipped with semi-stationary means, and the other with mobile components to serve the communications and IT centres belonging to the strategic CPs in peace, crisis and war time;
- the Communications and IT Training Centre;
- a battalion-type unit equipped with mobile components to support communications and IT missions in the theatres of operations or on the national territory in peace, crisis and war time;
- four battalion-type units to exploit the communications centres having local, regional and national management in the composition of the permanent telecommunication network (PTN) in the area of responsibility and of the communications and IT centres of some CPs in peace, crisis and war time;
- a training Communications and IT Battalion;
- a maintenance and storage unit.

The concepts of *NCW (Network-Centric Warfare)* and *NNEC (NATO Network-Enabled Capability)* have posed a serious challenge to the Communications and IT Command with regard to the execution of some projects meant to gradually implement these modern warfare approaches. The achievement of C4I2SR systems in these circumstances presupposes, in fact, new systems, equipment and services provided by own forces or procured, to meet the often changing requirements, at the pace of progress in communications and information technology. For the Command, at this stage, the main goal is to continually develop the permanent telecommunication network in the NDN, so that the facilities and locations provided by it can permanently meet the operational requirements. In this context, we are

preoccupied with shifting the effort of the activities from “*providing systems and networks*” to providing integrated services, with a special focus on: clear communications and voice and data encrypted communications, encrypted multimedia-video communications, image transfer etc.

We are already strongly engaged in the implementation of the concepts based on modern technological solutions: tactical data links (DTDL, Link 22, MIDS/JTIDS etc.), sensor integration (ISTAR), the implementation of the Friendly Force Tracking (FFT) systems, new generation identification, navigation and synchronisation systems, for tactical platforms, as well as data fusion at the operational and strategic level.

The Command is deeply involved in the achievement and management of the main elements that are specific to the communications and IT domain of the major procurement programme “*The General Staff/strategic leadership*” under the responsibility of the General Staff. Some of its components that should be mentioned as being on the current agenda are the following: the extension of the CRONOS system, the equipment of the strategic command posts with modern communication means; the execution of telecommunication works in fixed locations, the procurement of satellite and optical fibre flows, the installation of satellite terminals in different locations, the modernisation of the PTN/NDN high, medium and low management centres, the installation of encryption devices in all the NDN locations, the development and upgrade of the *operative radio network at strategic level (ORNSL)*, the development of the video-teleconference system in fixed locations and through mobile centres, the assurance of securitised workstations for the PCs networks, the assurance of the communication software for the main ongoing IT applications (INTRAMAN, SCCAN, ASOC, CISANBC, SISAM etc.), the assurance of DELTA-type encrypted voice terminals, the assurance of MCID for the users in the services and the other commands, the implementation of the TETRA DIMETRA system and others.

To accomplish the missions, it is equally important to assure the infrastructure elements and some systems of communications and IT services belonging to the operators in the other military structures (Special Telecommunications Service, the Ministry of Administration and Interior, the Romanian Intelligence Service etc.), as well as the ones provided by civilian companies that are well-known in the field due to the long-lasting collaboration.

The equipment of the subordinate units with communications and IT assets and materials is a preoccupation that has undergone radical changes as far as both conception and achievement are concerned. A specific effort for the branch and the Armed Forces on the whole is that of introducing modern digital equipment

in the inventory, effort that has been ampler in the units subordinated to the Command, taking into account the missions they have to accomplish. We will mention some types of the new equipment that help us with currently executing our missions: PTN communications centres with local, regional and national management, radio-relay auto-stations, switching management stations, radio access and network services for transportable telecommunication network, frequency hopping radio stations PANTHER and HARRIS, different types and power output, SATCOM portable terminals, mobile and fixed, encrypted voice and data terminals, fixed and mobile VTC equipment, working stations and servers for INTRAMAN, with all information applications in function. To illustrate the great changes and achievements in this field, it is enough to mention that, currently, for the accomplishment of the missions, the Communications and IT Command and the subordinate units use only 10% of the old analogical technique, and the percentage is decreasing.

The Command COMSEC Department, through the current legislative framework, is responsible for managing the cryptographic systems and materials that are necessary for the connection of the General Staff internal and international structures.

The Command operations are organised for any type of action – planned or unexpected, from asymmetrical to classical forms, having in view the risk factors identified in NATO-type scenarios. The experienced officers in the field of operations, as part of a very well organised structure, can effectively manage different situations, drawing up the action plan and timely providing the subordinate military units with the action tasking.

The Communications and IT Command has actively participated in the most important national, multinational NATO/EU or bilateral exercises, such as: *“Combined Endeavor”*, *“Pontica”*, *“Technical Specialised Exercise (CISEX) Cetatea”*, *“Rousofex”*, *“Herald Hermes”*, *“Danube Guard”*, *“ROUEX”*, *“MILREX”*, *“DMX”*, *“SUMMEX”*, *“Getica”*, *“Jackal Stone”*, *“Steadfast Cathode”*, *“Bicaz”*, *“CMX”*, *“Sesim”*, *“Able Staff”* etc.

To support the forces in the theatres of operations outside the national territory, the Communications and IT Command has timely provided indispensable services and equipment as follows:

- Globalstar compatible satellite segment with 1 Mb/s capacity, for the PTN/NDN in locations in Iraq and in Afghanistan;
- telecommunication services using Globalstar, Inmarsat, Eutelsat satellite terminals, for the theatres of operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia and Kosovo;

- equipment and services to install ATM switches for extending NDN in the theatres of operations – Kandahar (Afghanistan);
- it has been developed the Ministry of National Defence encrypted VTC system and the Intranet to Romania's Military Representations to NATO and the EU (Brussels, Mons) and in other locations, at tactical level up to battalion level, as well as in the theatres of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan for all the national contingents, using deployable CIS modules and satellite segments with 1 Mb/s.

For the management of the PTN, a network in continuous development regarding not only its extension in new locations but also the provided facilities, the Command preoccupations focus on the application of technical solutions with last generation software versions, in parallel with the improvement of the competency level of the experts involved in this process.

The Communications and IT Command enables and coordinates the installation, modernisation and general management of PTN/NDN. 11 years after the first operational communications centres were established, the PTN/NDN structure is as follows:

- 19 Main Communication Nodal Points (MCNP);
- 24 Transit Communication Nodal Points (TCNP);
- 17 Access and Transit Communication Nodal Points (ATCNP);
- 6 Access Nodal Points Communication Centres (ANPCC);
- 131 Local Telecommunication Centres (LTC);
- 3 external extensions to Romania's Representations to NATO and the EU;
- 3 CIS modules to ensure the communication with the contingents deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq;
- 20 internal extensions of the communication centres using multiplexors and virtual switches.

The increase in the number and length of the leased digital flows has been determined by the permanent need for communication channels to support all the applications (INTRAMAN, SCCAN, ASOC, SISANBC, SISAM etc.), that use PTN/NDN.

The transportable communication centres installed on shelters (CCMSS1, CCMSS2, CRdRI and CSR available to the majority of the units under the Communications and IT Command) are provided with the same type of equipment as the stationary but rigidised centres. These centres are used to replace, at less capacity, some stationary centres that are destroyed or to achieve, urgently, communication in those areas that are not covered by the stationary PTN/NDN. At the same time, the transportable centres can be used to extend

PTN/NDN outside the borders of the country, using commercial or military SATCOM links.

The management of PTN/NDN, as the main component of the system, is ensured by the Communications and IT Command through 2 subordinate national management communication centres (main and rear), 10 regional management centres and 112 local management systems.

Currently, the management of PTN/NDN (NMS-3.0) is based on a SCO/UNIX platform and is structured on 3 hierarchical levels:

- *Upper Level Network Management – ULNM;*
- *High Level Network Management – HLN);*
- *Low Level Network Management – LLNM.*

Although we present PTN as a modern achievement that has changed the way of thinking of the military belonging to the Signal Corps, we can already speak about a short history of the network.

As it is known, PTN, as a NDN basic component, is a digital, mashed network that permanently ensures voice, data and multimedia connections (encrypted or not) in all the Ministry of Defence areas of interest. Starting in 1997, when a pilot mini-network with three centres in Bucharest and other five centres in the country was tested, PTN/NDN as a plesynchronous network based on circuits switching has continually developed. Packet switching is a more recently PTN/NDN functional component, and it is based on the implementation of *Asynchronous Transfer Mode – ATM* technology. This technology uses virtual digital circuits for the transport of data packets that have a fixed dimension (called cells), from the source to the destination, having speeds from 155 Mb/s and 622 Mb/s, up to speeds expressed in Gb/s.

Starting in 2006, ATM level backbones have been achieved, able to integrate voice, data and multimedia services (VTC etc.) through the implementation of the concept of Quality of Service – QoS and the dynamic management of the allocated bandwidth. Thus, to enhance the transportation capacity in PTN/NDN, under the coordination of the CIS Directorate, the Communications and IT Command coordinates and carries out the activities meant to prepare, install and enable the communication centres in the General Technical Project regarding the evolution of PTN/NDN. To ensure the voice, data and multimedia services, as well as to enhance the traffic capacity in a significant number of PTN communication centres, new pieces of equipment are about to be installed and configured, such as: multi-protocol switches MPS 115, MPS 145, MH-544, NCU (Network Control Unit). The necessity for the introduction of these new types of equipment in the PTN/NDN has determined the implementation of a new management system, as well as the PTN/NDN Upper Level Network Management restructuring.

Through the acquisition of the new management system (NMS-2K), the current system will migrate to an accredited LINUX/Windows platform, and the following new systems will add to the existent systems:

- LLNM: Element Management System (EMS);
- HLNM: Monitory Area System – Regional (MAS-R);
- ULNM: Monitory Area System – Network (MAS-N)
- Network Planning System (NPS).

The secretised or uncovered IT services and networks utilised in the Command and in subordinate units have also been developing.

As for the logistics of the Command, challenges are absolutely new – outsourcing of feeding, equipping, maintenance services, and turning to profit the equipment and assets in excess or the end-of-life ones being only some aspects. The procurement of assets and materials, products and services is another important aspect without which our current activity cannot be possible.

Special attention has been paid to assuring the maintenance of the military assets in the inventory either by own means or by outsourcing. Within the Command, logistics carries out all the maintenance work for the permanent telecommunication network and for the strategic level operative radio network in the Armed Forces.

Mention should be made that not only the equipment and services procurement but also the maintenance of the communications equipment carried out by the Communications and IT Command for the benefit of the services, commands and other structures in the Armed Forces represent more than 75% of the aggregate of the activities conducted in the field of logistics.

To support the forces in the theatres of operations outside the national territory, teams of experts belonging to the Communications and IT Command take part in carrying out the maintenance of the communication equipment periodically.

The logistics department has permanently and at a high quality level supported the other components of common logistics, in total conformity with the regulations and instructions in force.

We have in view the fact that, in the current transformation phase, logistics has to change its linear character and to become non-linear and unpredictable, similar to the features of the battlefield, fact that causes major changes in drawing up the logistic concept.

Here, training and specialisation courses in the field of communications and IT are organised, for all the categories of military personnel, public servants and civilians. The specialisation courses include all the categories of military and civilian personnel and are aimed at specific communications and IT domains such as: specialisation in the branch of the officers and NCOs belonging

to the branch, to other branches and military specialties, NATO communications centres, IT, radio-numerical equipment.

The course offer is attractive to the foreign partners, too, so their requests for courses have been more and more numerous lately.

The training process is also a domain that is in the attention of the commanders of all the subordinate units, coordinated by the Command specialised department.

Starting with the training year 2007, we have proposed to focus our efforts on the radical change in the mentality of the entire personnel in the Command and subordinate units regarding training, through adopting a unitary concept as far as the improvement in the training material base is concerned:

- fitting up some new specialised rooms, with the modern communications and IT equipment that has recently entered the inventory;
- fitting up some new specialised rooms for all the categories of training, personnel, military specialties and structures (drivers, NBC, ITAI, security and safety at work etc.);
- fitting up or modernising the obstacle runs necessary for the military physical education sessions, as well as the specialised practice grounds.

The efforts have been successful: in the above-mentioned interval, in each subordinate unit, 4-6 new and modern specialised rooms as well as an obstacle run that meets the current standards have been fitted up.

As for the financial aspect, we have a very well organised structure able to assure the use of the available credits in accordance with the laws in force. We also pay proper attention to keeping records of the inventory that always increases and diversifies.

The complexity of the activity and the great volume of work are determined by the structure of the budget approved for the Communications and IT Command as a user of credits, through which the expenditures associated to the communications and IT domain are made, in accordance with the regulations in force, included in seven major acquisition programmes funded by the budget of the Ministry of National Defence.

Last but not least, the responsibility domains without which the Command cannot accomplish its missions should be mentioned: secretarial work, medical and psychological assistance, the activity related to security and safety at work, environmental protection and, naturally, public relations.

The fundamental goal of the Communications and IT Command for the next period is to increase the capacity of command and execution, concomitantly with the continuation of the process meant to achieve structural readiness, modernisation and training of the subordinate units, the reinforcement of the cohesion of all

structures and the increase in the personnel professionalisation, so that they can organise, exploit and maintain the communications system that is necessary for the command of the joint military actions at strategic level, using NATO standards and operation procedures.

Special attention will be paid to the following directions:

- the achievement of the technical support for command, control and communications at strategic level;
- the continuation of the implementation of the assumed objectives and the achievement of the communications and IT systems interoperability with the ones of the armed forces of NATO member states;
- the continuation of the procurement effort, by own capabilities or by acquisitions, for the modernisation and achievement of the C4I2SR platform, within the limits of the allocated budget;
- the enhancement of the operational capability of the Communications and IT Command and of the subordinate military units so that they could accomplish the fundamental assigned mission, namely to provide the necessary technical support for the C4I2SR system, to gradually provide NATO network-enabled capabilities (NNEC) that are necessary to put in practice the concept of *network-centric warfare*.

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In conclusion, we consider that, currently, the Communications and IT Command, after the ups and downs experienced throughout its history, is today a reliable, dynamic, modern structure, whose personnel prove to be team players, a structure able to accomplish the complex assigned missions, in an environment in which the pace of progress in communications and information technology is so rapid that one could have hardly imagined.

English version by
 *Diana Cristiana LUPU*



PRESENT AND FUTURE IN THE ACTIVITY OF THE JOINT LOGISTICS COMMAND

Major General Dr Cătălin ZISU

As far as the current activities are concerned, the author points out that all the work of the Command is organised so that it could fulfil the annual and multi-annual objectives of the Defence Planning Council, through the logistic support programme, and to achieve consistency between resources and efficiency indicators.

In the area of supply, the Joint Logistics Command provides all the activities necessary for procuring material supplies to equip and support forces, at the operational and strategic level.

Through the specialised structures within the Command, there have been provided a new flow regarding the technical and material purchases for all categories of military forces, the products and services necessary for training/supporting forces in theatres of operations, outsourced services, assets maintenance at the level of the central structures and the military units subordinated to them.

Keywords: *logistic system remodelling; categories of forces; procedures and tactics; logistic capabilities; combat units*

The changes that occurred in the new security environment and geopolitical and geostrategic evolution at global

level have led to the appearance and extension of new risks and threats to peace and security at global level, with consequences over domains that were not related to the military actions some time ago.

Obligated to respond to these new challenges, the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation launched an ample transformation process that has had profound effects not only on our country but also on the other countries that are members of the two international security organisations, especially with regard to the general and specific changes in the military domain, at all the tree levels of military art.

For Romania, the transformation process at NATO and the EU level has been a special opportunity as it has resulted in numerous changes in the military institution, in all the areas of activity, the logistics included.

As for the military logistics organisation, the system remodelling has been, even from the beginning, a complex process aimed at ensuring compatibility with NATO and the EU principles, policies, concepts, doctrines, standards and procedures, not only jointly but also at the level of each armed forces service.

Major General Dr Cătălin Zisu – Commander of the Joint Logistics Command.

In conformity with *SMG/L1 – Doctrine for Joint Operations/2008* and *Romanian Armed Forces Logistics Concept*, the Joint Logistics Command is the General Staff execution structure meant to logistically support the joint military actions, to manage the operational and strategic stocks of military equipment and materials, to ensure the activity of representation and protocol at the level of the Ministry of National Defence, as well as the recovery of work capacity for the Armed Forces personnel.

The Joint Logistics Command restructuring and reorganisation, started in 2007, is a component of the process of transformation of the entire logistics system in the Romanian Armed Forces. This consistent approach is aimed at the effectiveness of the logistic support for the sustained structures, the implementation of quality standards that are similar to those in NATO similar structures, as well as at the assurance of some operational, flexible logistics structures, in conformity with the hierarchical level, and the nature, the value and the missions of the force for which the necessary support is planned.

The transformation concept at the level of the Joint Logistics Command has been consistent with the coordinates of the Romanian Armed Forces logistics system restructuring. The sustained effort in the latest years, especially following our country accession to NATO and the EU has been aimed at the achievement of the following objectives:

- to completely relieve the combat and support units of the logistic and administrative tasks, concomitantly with the acceleration in the rate of logistics standardisation;
- to ensure a great visibility of the logistic support activities, which allows for a closer and tighter relation with the logistics of each category of forces;
- to achieve a logistics system that should be operational, flexible and tailored to the dimension of the combat forces, an effective and efficient, proactive and predictive one;
- a new redistribution of the subordinate structures at national level, depending on the operational needs of each service;
- to reduce the subordinate units and subunits, as the reorganisation process develops, so that the principles, policies, procedures and tactics in the field of logistics may be applied accordingly;
- to establish some new integrated logistics capabilities, logistics base-type, able to provide the efficient control instruments and levers for the process as such and for the subordinate structures;
- to ensure the material resources and the essential services, at the level imposed by the accomplishment of the missions of the structures belonging to the services and by the funds allocated by them in the budget of the Joint Logistics Command, which acts as the user;

- to reduce the reaction time in carrying out the activities in the field of logistics;
- to improve the maintenance activity – the significant increase in the production capabilities, ensuring a rhythmical and continuous activity;
- to focus the logistic support on the sustainment of combat and support forces.

The Joint Logistics Command restructuring effort, started in 2007, as it has been mentioned above, has followed an innovative idea that is also integrative, as far as the organisation is concerned. Thus, the subordinate units, most of them warehouses meant to store the specific materials necessary for the Land, Air and Naval Forces, as well as the transportation and maintenance units have been reorganised and re-subordinated to the main entities subordinated to the Joint Logistics Command, the main coordination and storage centres, and the Transportation and Service Base respectively.

Another component of the Joint Logistics Command reorganisation has been aimed at the redistribution of the logistic support responsibilities according to the operation and geographical areas. Consequently, a part of the subordinate units were disbanded and, after the relocation of the inventory, transferred under the responsibility of the local authorities in the areas in which they used to carry out their activity. Other warehouses were redistributed among some armed forces services, in accordance with the new political-military realities of Romania and taking into account the objective needs of those structures. Mention should be made that this complex reorganisation process is still in progress, so, in the near future, new similar measures will be taken to make the logistic support activity more effective.

Following the repeated analyses made at the level of the Joint Logistics Command, it has resulted that the ongoing process is sustainable not only from the standpoint of the available resources but also from the one of the viability of the chosen solutions.

The Joint Logistics Command restructuring process is part of the Romanian Armed Forces transformation process and, for the moment, it takes place in the context of the world economic crisis but, even under these circumstances, we can say that the results of the hard work in the latest two years start to be visible and the Joint Logistics Command functioning is placed within the coordinates established at the decision-making level of the General Staff and of the Ministry of National Defence.

In our opinion, through belonging to a system of values that has been shaping, through the sense of sacrifice and the capacity to understand the problems the Romanian military system is confronted with, the personnel of the Joint Logistics

Command and the subordinate units have succeeded in overcoming most of the problems generated by the necessity for the Romanian military logistics system to align with NATO and EU standards, by the ongoing process of reorganising and reorienting an important part of the financial resources available to the Joint Logistics Command towards the logistic support for the Romanian forces within different multinational operations.

Which would be the results of the two years of transformation ? Through its new functional structure, the Joint Logistics Command provides the supported forces, including the ones that ensure the force generation and regeneration, with the necessary resources, according to the specific of the mission.

From the structural viewpoint, a series of large units, units and subunits specialised in acquisition, storage of all classes of materials, transportation, maintenance, infrastructure, campaign services, and, most recently, medical support are under the subordination of the Joint Logistics Command.

Through the stocks of materials that exist in the subordinate warehouses, the Joint Logistics Command maintains the logistic support for the operational forces at an appropriate level. The necessary conditions for putting in practice the Plan for the Romanian Armed Forces Integration into NATO Logistics are met. Therefore, at the Joint Logistics Command level, readiness has already been ensured or is going to be ensured for a series of military structures, which contribute to the completion of the framework for the modernisation and development of the military transportation capabilities.

Following the reorganisation, the Joint Logistics Command covers, through the missions and structure, all the logistics functional domains in peace, crisis or war time, not only on the national territory but also outside it.

Currently, through the new form of the project of the *Romanian Armed Forces Logistics Strategy*, within the Joint Logistics Command, the following aspects are aimed at: the reconfiguration, based on the new realities at NATO level, of the coordination and storage centres, their transformation into logistics units of a new type, more precisely into logistics bases that should have, as far as possible, the same structure, the same missions, and, the same capabilities, depending on the available resources. Of course, the specifics of the operation areas in which logistics bases carry out their activity will be taken into account.

By completing this process, the Command intends to provide the units and large units in the armed forces services with the necessary resources and capabilities so that they could accomplish the assigned missions.

From the organisational viewpoint, our main objective is that, at the completion of this reorganisation period, up to the end of 2012, we will be able to provide the combat forces and the military and civilian personnel in the armed forces

with a logistic system that should be flexible, proactive to requests and, last but not least, one meant to meet the military organisation requirements. As a very important component of the Romanian Armed Forces logistic system, the logistic sub-system supported by the Joint Logistics Command should ensure the link between the logistic systems of the three force service.

As for the current activities, the entire activity of the Command is organised and carried out to meet the annual and multi-annual objectives established by the Defence Planning Council, through the *Logistic Support Programme*, and to achieve balance between the allocated resources and the indexes of effectiveness.

As far as supply is concerned, the Joint Logistics Command ensures the development of the aggregate of activities meant to provide the forces with the materials that are necessary for their sustainment, at the operational and strategic level.

Through the specialised structures within the Command, a new supply flow has been ensured, with regard to the procurement of assets and materials that are common to all the armed forces services, others than the ones under the responsibility of the Armament Department, as well as the products and services necessary for the training/support of the forces in the theatres of operations, outsourced services, assets maintenance at the level of the central structures and their subordinate military units etc.

The Joint Logistics Command ensures, from this perspective, the planning, organisation and storing, in the system of subordinate warehouses, of the stocks of equipment and materials within the scope of logistics, for all the armed forces services, at the operational and strategic level, while the large units and units in the services have responsibilities only regarding the establishment and the management of the troops' stocks, at the tactical level.

Through the specialised transportation structures, the Command has ensured the delivery of equipment and materials from the operational and strategic stocks mostly generated by the development of the reorganisation process, as well as by the necessity to meet the needs of the services, upon their request, based on the own planning.

The Joint Logistics Command provides, through the Movement Coordination Centre, the integrated management of the Romanian and allied armed forces movement on the national territory, the deployment, support and redeployment of the national forces in missions outside the national territory, and the use of the movement and transportation capabilities on the national territory within the strategic deployment process, as well as the logistics associated to this process. Thus, the Command has ensured the necessary conditions for the national forces in all the theatres of operations in which we have deployed forces to be introduced, rotated or withdrawn.

Through the Movement Coordination Centre, an outcome of the collaboration of this structure with similar NATO ones, the Joint Logistics Command ensures the permanent cooperation with the Allied Movement Coordination Centre within ACO and with the Movement Coordination Centre within the EU. An example in this context is the assurance of the withdrawal of the assets and equipment from Iraq, by sea, when the mandate of our troops in this country ended. Moreover, the Movement Coordination Centre has ensured not only the transportation by rail but also by sea, the Danube and the interior rivers, based on the transportation contracts concluded between the Command and railway companies and ship-owners respectively.

As far as maintenance is concerned, at the level of maintenance centres that are subordinated to the Joint Logistics Command, the performed activities have been mainly aimed at the revitalisation of the assets designated to take part in multinational operations, as well as the test, recovery, evacuation, examination and medium complexity and high complexity repairs for the categories of equipment that are common to all the armed forces services.

In this field, the Joint Logistics Command organises the periodical movement of some mobile corrective intervention teams, specialised, tailored and equipped to execute the maintenance work that exceeds the competence of the maintenance teams deployed in the theatres of operations. After the introduction of the *NSE* in the theatre of operations in Afghanistan and our troops' withdrawal from Iraq, this type of technical assistance was ceased.

As for the ammunition in storage, used for firing exercises or in combat actions (in Afghanistan), the Joint Logistics Command organises, verifies and coordinates the entire activity meant to assess and monitor the evolution of the technical status of the ammunition that is common to all the armed forces services, as follows: infantry cartridge, hand grenades and the ammunition specific to the land forces: mortar ammunition, field and anti-aircraft artillery, field and anti-aircraft missiles, engineering ammunition, in all the military units.

For testing, the Joint Logistics Command subordinates the Armed Forces Artillery Laboratory, the Armed Forces Experiment Ground, and the depots where engineering ammunition is tested, which carry out their activity based on the approved plans for analyses and verifications. We would like to highlight the fact that, through the laborious activity of the experts subordinated to the Joint Logistics Command, the technical status of the ammunition in the Armed Forces inventory is under control and it even continually improves.

From the standpoint of the procurement of essential assets and equipment and their maintenance and readiness, this field is currently influenced by a series of factors, among which the most significant ones are the following: the technical resource exhaustion for most of the available assets; the maintenance of an important

number of quite old equipment in the inventory; the fact that an important part of the military equipment in the inventory, as well as the spare parts necessary for them to be functional are not produced any more; the fact that a significant part of the existent military assets have non-euro engines that consume a lot of fuel, polluting the environment over the admitted level etc.

Even under the circumstances of the budgetary constraints in the latest period of time, at the Joint Logistics Command level considerable efforts have been made to provide the subordinate large units and units and, last but not least, the structures that execute missions in the theatres of operations with the necessary assets and equipment. Thus, an important part of the allocated funds has been redirected towards the main coordination and storing centres, where a part of the assets that have been out of the use of the armed forces services was identified and capitalised on. Through the modernisation of the technological process and the efforts of the personnel in the maintenance centres, these assets have been revitalised and introduced in the inventory of the subordinate structures.

Turning assets to profit represents another extremely important activity within the Joint Logistics Command. Taking into consideration the growth in the pace of turning assets to profit in the latest years, at the Command level, the priority and rhythmical allocation of the funds necessary for carrying out this activity in good conditions has imposed as a necessity of the first rank. As for the pace of growth in the profit, it has increased exponentially between 2007 and 2008. In 2009, compared to the same period in 2008, there was a decrease in the payment received from turning the assets to profit *internally* and *externally*, excepting the one received out of turning to profit the ferrous and non-ferrous waste, which has an increasing trend up to the end of the year.

The pace in the execution of these activities is quite slow currently, taking into account the quantities in the inventory of the Ministry of Defence subordinate military units, which leads to a progressive accumulation of materials in the Joint Logistics Command warehouses and to the allocation of important funds for their preservation.

In our opinion, this fact leads to supplementary expenses for the manipulation and transportation of these commodities among the disbanded military units and those that are to be disbanded/transferred within the Joint Logistics Command, and more important, to the blockage of the investment based on the income from sale.

At the level of intention, the future actions performed by the Joint Logistics Command are aimed at all the logistic support functional domains. Thus, it is desired to resume the programmes meant to provide the armed forces with the Best-Available Technology assets, through issuing a Governmental Decision

to cover the deficit and to replace the assets having exhausted resources or those that are not safe when exploiting.

On another plane, a unitary concept regarding the establishment, supply, function and assignment of the units to the technical inspection stations is desired, thus harmonising the restrictions regarding the road traffic and the requirements generated by the budgetary restrictions and the equipment and assets belonging to the units in the Romanian Armed Forces. Therefore, our intention is to introduce in the organisation charts of the maintenance structures that are accredited by the Romanian Auto Registry – technical inspection stations –, the ones that will execute the periodical technical inspection in conformity with the territorial distribution structures that will perform the maintenance work to repair the acknowledged defects. As for some of the maintenance services outsourcing, we would like to initiate a collaboration protocol to be concluded between the Romanian Ministry of Defence and the Romanian Auto Registry, through which the isolated units should execute the periodical technical inspection at the authorised stations in their area of deployment.

In this context, we intend to draw up, in common with the experts of the Logistics Directorate, a new directive regarding the responsibilities and territorial subordination to the maintenance execution structures, related to the evacuation, and restore the assets in transit as well as those involved in accidents to be functional again.

As for resuming the production process of the aggregates, ensembles, sub-ensembles and spare parts, we intend to contribute to the establishment of a framework agreement aimed at the procurement of the necessary items for the equipment and assets that are common to all the force services, depending on the funds allotted by each programme director.

As far as movement and transportation are concerned, the preoccupations of the Joint Logistics Command are aimed at a close collaboration with the Military Police Section within the General Staff, with a view to drawing up a directive to establish the units subordination and responsibilities (through the military police units) to guard and protect the military convoys, especially those that transport dangerous commodities.

As far as multinational operations are concerned, based on the experience gained by the *National Support Module*, and now by the *NSE*, it is intended, at the level of the Joint Logistics Command, to increase the number of the personnel assigned to this structure, so that, having available supplementary military capabilities, it could perform more activities that are subordinated to the logistic support functional domains.

To support this measure, action is taken to introduce a logistic support unit for the theatre of operations subordinate to the Transportation and Service Base,

unit meant to coordinate the *ESN* activity in the future, so that it could generate and support, by own forces, the structure deployed in the mission area.

To provide solutions to some of the aspects that cause difficulties in the development of the process of turning the assets to profit, at the level of the Joint Logistics Command, a series of measures to unblock this particular process were initiated. Thus, through the establishment of the three main coordinating and storing centres, which have in their organisation chart specialised offices meant to coordinate and command the activities related to making profit at the level of the subordinate units, we intend to resolve the problems generated by the lack of personnel specialised in turning assets into profit.

Another measure is aimed at the revision of the provisions of the Order of the Minister of National Defence no. M 51/2006 and its improvement as far the possibility to sell externally is concerned, which will unblock the process and will result in an increase in the financial resources.

As for the other logistic support functional domains, we seek to ensure the following: to implement NATO codification system in the Romanian Armed Forces; to develop the *NSE* in the theatres of operations; to achieve, procure and introduce the individual food ration in the consumption norms, in conformity with NATO standards; to modernise the working and recovery conditions for the personnel in the Romanian Armed Forces; to continue to implement the Logistics Information System at the Command Level; to implement NATO information systems in the field of movement and transportation (ADAMS) etc.

In conclusion, we consider that, through all the aspects that have been mentioned, the Joint Logistics Command contributes to the increase in the pace of integrating the own logistic sub-system in the armed forces integrated logistic system, based on good and very good results. At the same time, through the preoccupation of its experts, the Joint Logistics Command seeks to contribute to the implementation of concepts such as network-based logistics, integrated logistic support, or combat forces integrated logistics in the Romanian Armed Forces, so that the forces sustainability in the theatres of operations can be ensured.

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English version by
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“CAROL I” NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY

– Continuous Development of the Quality of Education and Scientific Research –

Lieutenant General Dr Teodor FRUNZETI

This institution of higher military education, as the author reckons, has always been an obligatory point of passage towards the superior steps, functions and responsibilities in the Romanian Armed Forces. All unit or large unit commanders, officers with an important role to play in the staffs of higher echelons of the armed forces have attended various forms of training – education, improvement, continuous professional education etc. – in this institution.

All education programmes of the institution – regardless of the sometimes dramatic political and strategic characteristics of the situation in which it functioned, given the serious political circumstances, tensions and wars – are rigorous and substantial, respond promptly to the need for developing and implementing the military science, funding a world of military values, building an elegant, cult and consistent architecture of a body of officers with a high scientific and moral conduct.

Keywords: *education process; military art; the battle of Mărăști; big unit; war for the country's defence*

“Labor improbus omnia vincit” – Hard work conquers everything. It is the spirit and the slogan of “Carol I” National Defence University. Although this formula was placed on the frontispiece of this important institution of higher military education after 1989, it has lasted since 1889, namely for more than 120 years, since the *Superior War School* was established, among the first institutions of the kind in Europe. This institution has a rich, continuous and long history. It represents, in the Armed Forces philosophy, a reference point in the complex process of generating the systems of military values and their scientific support. It is like a clear and inexhaustible source of wisdom and right measure, with a quiet development and a moderate, sincere, modest, wonderful, respectable and laborious presence, with a silent and implicit heroism, and with a complex, long-term effect that is resonant, consonant and impressive in configuring its duration.

This military higher education institution has always represented – since its establishment and up to now – a compulsory transition point to the superior stages, positions and responsibilities

Lieutenant General Prof. Dr Teodor Frunzeti – Commander (Rector) of “Carol I” National Defence University.

in the Romanian Armed Forces. It is not any commander of a unit or large unit, any officer who fills an important position in the staff of the Armed Forces large echelons who has not passed through different forms of preparation – training, improvement, continuous professional development etc. – within this institution. In this context, the anniversary of the General Staff is an almost immanent event in the existence of “Carol I” National Defence University itself.

Consistency and Value

“Carol I” National Defence University is an institution of synthesis, having constructive and generative functions. It is, we could say, an institution that contributes to strategic synergy. Very powerful and very consistent. It has created, amplified, developed, generated and regenerated valuable officers that have manned, served and developed the command and control systems of the Romanian Armed Forces, the national and allied commands, the staff, as well as the commands of large units and units.

It is about the meticulous achievement, for more than twelve decades, of a valuable officer corps, of an elite command and staff corps, of 120 generations of staff officers, commanders of large units and units, well-trained, self-confident, responsible, courageous, respectable and, above all, people of great character.

Here, in this institution that is unique in its kind in the Romanian Armed Forces, there have been projected and achieved, due to the work of the armed forces command, of each professor and student, long-lasting supports for an enduring military culture, and especially for a strategic culture, a remarkable professional consistency and a generous ability to work for the staff, to draw up command documents, to command large units and units, to act with courage and in cold blood in difficult situations, to develop, train and use armed forces.

All the curricula of this institution – irrespective of the sometimes dramatic political and strategic characteristics of the circumstances under which the institution has functioned, given by the critical political conjuncture, tensions or wars – have been rigorous and substantial, promptly meeting the need for creating and implementing the military science, for substantiating a universe of military values, for creating an elegant, cultivated and consistent architecture for an officer corps that has adopted a code of superior scientific and moral conduct.

In 1939, when this prestigious institution reached the age of 50, Brigadier General Constantin Anastasiade, who belonged to the first series of graduates (1889-1891), wrote in the *Graduation Memory Book*: *“The Spirit of the School: to work restlessly to have us as useful as possible; to raise our souls to meet the most requiring responsibilities; to have us prepared for the great commands through the outcomes*

of our work; to protect from the temptations that could alter the moral value of the officers educated in this Institute of high military culture”.

The series of graduates in those years were not large at all, counting about 10-15 officers or even fewer. For example, the first series of graduates consisted of ten officers. However, they were selected from hundreds of officers and were preoccupied to prepare seriously not only for the admission but especially for the great responsibilities they were to take in those commands and structures in which the professional and moral present and future of the Romanian Armed Forces was decided. Out of the ten officers belonging to the first series of graduates, *“seven were commissioned as staff officers and appointed immediately to the Great General Staff and in the High Commands Staff. The other three were appointed to the corps as graduates of the School and highly eulogised. All these officers proved useful to the armed forces and reached the highest levels of military hierarchy”*¹.

The Armed Forces are a special institution. They are an institution associated with extreme risk that have to be always prepared to take action in difficult situations, so those who staff them, and especially those who command them, have to be special people. Even if it is said that anyone could be a soldier if needed, there are few people who are or can become really good soldiers. Even fewer can become, in time, good or very good commanders. It is not about physical and organisational qualities, courage and audacity only. Blind courage and extreme audacity are not useful at all in the fight. On the contrary, such qualities, when uncontrolled by reason, can lead to disasters. Besides these natural predispositions, information, knowledge, ability, wisdom, moderation, consideration, and especially self-confidence and steadfastness are also necessary.

These qualities are acquired firstly through education, in the school, and through systematic and continuous learning. A Superior War School – as our institution was when it was established, its name matching perfectly those times – had to provide the future staff officers and the future large units and units commanders with the science and art of war. Therefore, they should have had the systems of values that lie at the foundation of military philosophy implemented, namely the way of conceiving the war, not as a simple scuffle or massacre, but as the art of imposing a certain type of behaviour, as the art of surviving as a nation, state, independent entity, in a cruel and conflicting world.

War as an art, as a method to put a political decision in practice, through violent means, as it was defined by Karl von Clausewitz, has nothing in common

¹ *Cartea amintirilor absolvenților (1889-1995)*, Editura Academiei de Înalte Studii Militare, București, 1994, p. 14.

with the primitive scuffle, even though many of us still do not succeed in differentiating them. The War School – developed in a Romanian fashion, following the experience of the West, especially the model of the French and Italian schools – has generated a Romanian spirit of war, expressed in the officers’ inclination to study, to solid and well-made things, to knowing and understanding the important political-military and strategic commandments. Starting in November 1859, the Romanian Armed Forces had a General Staff and the General Staff needed staff officers educated in important institutions of higher education. Moreover, even since 23 July 1859, there has been a newspaper in the Armed Forces – “*Observatorul Militar*” (*Military Observer*) –, and later, a journal highly appreciated by officers, made and supported through their financial contribution, for dozens of years – “*România Militară*” (*Military Romania*) –, the predecessor of the today “*Gândirea Militară Românească*” (*Romanian Military Thinking*), which have generated debates on military issues, strategic thinking, superior military culture. The Superior War School met all these requirements. It had to create and systematically and rigorously implement, through the education process – the only one able to accomplish it –, that system of values the military institution needed so much. As it is well known, the Superior War School accomplished extremely well, with modesty, perseverance and a lot of responsibility its tasks and mission.

Moderation and Wisdom

To do, without making it public. To produce, without advertising it. To exist, to live and develop through what you are, what you do, and what you create, namely through the values you generate, launch, develop and honour. Moderation is often beyond what it is visible, in everything that resists under the sign of duration. Important things remain invisible to the eyes, writes Exupéry. Especially to the eyes that do not know, cannot or do not want to see. The Superior War School that was to become later the Military Academy, the Academy of Higher Military Studies in the first years after 1990, and “Carol I” National Defence University today has not been amazing. This special institution of higher military education does not proclaim its values and does not detach itself from the institution it serves – the Romanian Armed Forces –, it does not consider itself an elite of the elites, although it has every right to do so, does not complain, does not self-assess as a factotum and does not operate with distant, categorical or apodictic judgement. This institution of higher military education – which, in fact, has created the secular support for the Romanian strategic military culture –, is able to show moderation, to respect the spirit in which it was created, to behave like a generating spring and not like an impressive torrent, an alluvial deposit, a tempestuous

and devastating overflow. “Carol I” National Defence University, exactly like the Superior War School 120 years ago, is a profound and quiet institution, with high performance laboratories in which the military art and science are elaborated on, and the traditional source of generating the scientific and methodological support for our today and tomorrow military values is certified. Long time ago, on the anniversary of 50 years since its establishment, in 1939, only two years before the Romanian Armed Forces entered the war, Brigadier General Gheorghe Burghele, who belonged to the second series of graduates (1890-1892) stated: *“As we were a few officers (graduates, A/N), we were highly appreciated by the troops, especially as we were modest, not over-confident, talking about military matters without trying to show that we had the monopoly on military knowledge ...”*.

Valuable people do not proclaim their value themselves, they do not advertise themselves, they do not propagate themselves with emphasis, they do not boast of their success. They have and will continue to have the philosophy and physiognomy of springs. They come from the depths, they are clear, they accumulate other springs, and they generate and nurture life. Adjutant General Ștefan Fălcoianu, in his speech at the beginning of the course for the first series of graduates, stated *“we are positive that we will get the help of our most enlightened comrades and thus we hope that, together, we will have this institution bear the fruits expected by the Armed Forces”*².

This school of higher military education is practically found, through its spirit, through the steadfastness and seriousness it has educated and trained, throughout the 120 years of existence, command and staff officers, at all the levels of military art, from the tactical to the strategic one. Brigadier General Alexandru Cornățeanu, who belonged to the third series of graduates (1891-1893), asserted *“in the Armed Forces, there has to be only one belief: that educated officers, those who graduate from schools with good results, are a step ahead of the mediocre ones, of those who do not have a rich and serious culture in the military field ...”*, and Brigadier General Alexandru Referendaru, who belonged to the fourth series of graduates (1892-1894), remarked, expressing praise, that once *“our War School was established, the genuine Staff Corps in our Armed Forces started to come into being, as the officers that formed it were educated taking into consideration the same doctrine, a very judicious one, and received very good knowledge that left nothing in the military domain to be further explained or applied ...”*.

Hard work, perseverance and responsibility are the elements that best define the effort of the institutions, professors and students. It has always been so. The changes related to the political regimes, doctrines, conceptions and concepts, which have imposed certain rules or even political slogans, some of them dictatorial, others

² *Ibidem.*

irresponsible, have not altered the substance of this institutions. Since its establishment and up to now, it has stuck to its mission – that of educating and training command and staff officers able to serve modern and well-motivated armed forces – and has never made any concession to mediocrity, superficiality and quality. The support of the Romanian military heroism is represented by not only their ancestral and unconditioned devotion for the country, but also by the exceptional qualities of the command and staff corps educated in this institution of higher military education, the capacity and capability of this corps to train military that behaved heroically in two world wars and have made any sacrifice to defend the country.

In this institution, people have always worked tirelessly. Brigadier General Constantin Miltiade, who belonged to the 18th series of graduates (1906-1908), stated that, in the Superior War School, *“courses, in the two years of study, were taken in the morning and in the afternoon. Work in the classroom and at home. The dawn turned off the light on the desk”*.

We, the ones in the more recent series of graduates, passed through the same rigorous programme. We diligently did our homework, we learnt, we often transformed the night into day, we read almost all it had been written about military art, we elevated our soul, spirit and thought with the most important elements related to military art, we learnt how to work within the staff, to command a unit and a large unit, to provide solutions to difficult problems, to overcome hardships, to be men and to value men.

Rigour, Flexibility, Tenacity, Character

All the officers that are graduates of the Military Academy, the Academy of Higher Military Studies, the National Defence University I have worked with, whom I have known and valued, have a profound respect for this *Alma Mater*, for this bearer and creator of military science, culture and art.

It has been years since 1889, and the series of graduates that have filled positions in large units and units, staff, or other important positions in the Armed Forces have carried the spirit of this institution to the troops, in exercises, shooting grounds, in wars, in the theatres of operations of yesterday and today.

If the Armed Forces have always been successful in accomplishing the assigned missions – sometimes at the expense of human lives –, this is also due to the fact that the graduates of this institution have fulfilled their duties wherever they have been, as they learnt it when they were the students of this school.

Almost every series of command and staff officers that have graduated from this institution have had some of the members sacrificed on the battlefields,

in shooting grounds, in training grounds. Not only a lot of brave soldiers but also brave superior officers and generals who graduated from this institutions and who created and led the modern Romanian Armed Forces died heroes during the War for the Reunification of the country, the wars for the defence or for the survival of the country. On the monument in the courtyard of our institution, the names of some of the military in our institution who died in December 1989 are inscribed.

There are graduates of this institution of higher education, “Carol I” National Defence University today, who fill important positions in each unit in the Romanian Armed Forces. Periodically, all of them come back here, at the source, to refresh their knowledge, to integrate in the very complex and flexible dynamics of the development of the military institution today and tomorrow, to “charge their batteries”, to share their experience gained in the theatres of operations with the students and the professors. It has always been so.

The Army Corps General Gheorghe Mărdărescu, who belonged to the fourth series of graduates (1892-1894), highlighted that the “*Superior War School has done great service to the Armed Forces (...). It has the difficult responsibility to build the soldierly character of the elements that have been educated in the school, which is extremely important because, no matter what a commander’s knowledge capital might be, it is worth nothing unless it is doubled by the soldier’s bronze character ...*”.

This school has tracked its graduates, throughout the decades, it has encouraged them, it has helped them, it has asked them for advice, opinion, and even criticism. Because not everything has been triumphal and flawless. “Carol I” National Defence University of today, as well as its former formulas, is an institution of the well thought and made things, of genuine scientific dialogue, of education and forming vocation. It is capable of listening to its graduates, of welcoming them in its classes, amphitheatres and libraries, of keeping them informed about what is new in the field, of teaching them as well as of learning from them. Brigadier General (r.) Gheorghe A. Bottea, who belonged to the tenth series of graduates (1898-1900), stated, in 1939: “*I say in all sincerity that, when I graduated from the School, I realised the vastness of the military and general knowledge that were required and would always be for an officer that intended and strove to be useful to the Country, the Crown and the Nation, knowledge that could not be acquired anywhere else but in a school of higher education, in a genuine military academy as the Superior War School used to be and still is. (...) As for the moral qualities, I think it would have been – maybe – very useful, in those times, that a course to evince the moral qualities of commanders, in general, as well as the ways to develop those qualities through self-education or other methods, should have been taught in the School. In the Great War (1916-1919), I was bewildered*

and even sad to find out that none of these qualities: calm, tact, death defiance, sense of duty, solicitude, love, trust from the top to the bottom were too much considered, especially the latter three. Those who were more severe, distant, absurd, even towards the subordinates, were considered real chiefs ...”.

It is very difficult to overcome such practices. However, the well-trained generals and officers, those who were highly educated, and those who were confident in their knowledge and value did not resort to such practice. In the campaigns in the First World War, our Armed Forces were forced to fight on two fronts, without having the necessary means. Even under these circumstances, General Averescu conceived the manoeuvre in Flămânda, unique in its way in the history of military art, although somehow similar to the strategic manoeuvre of Decebal in Dobrudja, during the Roman invasions in 101-102 and 105-106. As it happened then, the manoeuvre in Flămânda was an ample offensive action, organised during strategic defence. Averescu used to be a teacher at the War School where he taught the Staff Course. In the offensive in Mărăști, the concepts the outstanding commander – General Averescu – thoroughly studied in the Superior War School were put in practice again.

During the Second World War, General Dăscălescu was very close to the soldiers, and the majority of the commanders and staff officers who commanded the General Headquarters, the units and large units during the Second World War proved to be modest, wise, intelligent, kind, courageous, dedicated and moderate. Moderation, wisdom, responsibility, devotion, expertise and hard work, courage and lucidity were always dominant. Not only in the campaign in the East but also in the one in the West, the Romanian military behaved properly towards the population, proved courage and heroism, and this was mainly due to the spirit in which the great commanders were educated and trained within this institution of higher education. Some of them became legends: Averescu, Eremia Grigorescu, Mociuschi, Dăscălescu, Dumitrescu ...

Brigadier General Artur Grigorescu, who belonged to the tenth series of graduates (1898-1900), stated: *“The great benefits the Staff officers brought to the institution, changing its aspect and transforming it in modern armed forces, were proved by the study of history for the period it was functional. The aspects of the campaigns in 1913, 1916-1918 were laudable ones. If, in many cases, they were not exactly executed was not because of their conception but of their execution. The errors did not occur because of the genuine staff officers but, many times, because of the fact that, at the command of the institution, people that exercised political influence were appointed, fact that could be easily seen, but it caused too much sorrow to mention. The consequences: defeat in the first part of the campaign 1916-1918, and glory when the things changed (...)”.*

The capacity, capability, and duty to see things as they really are, to learn from mistakes, to generate and regenerate this spirit of continuous responsibility, unconditioned perseverance, and generous and unlimited effort. In other words, *“Labor improbus omnia vincit”*.

Division General Ioan Prodan, who belonged to the 14th series of graduates (1902-1904), underlined that, in fact, what they learnt first was that the *“War School taught us how to read a book of Tactics and Strategy, and moulded our character”*.

We have mentioned the words of the officers that belonged to the first series of graduates to better and clearer highlight the continuity of the spirit of this institution, to reveal its resonance and consonance in time, its incontestable value, confirmed by the deeds of arms, the quality of command and staff, the adequate management, the formal behaviour, the character of the soldier, NCO, officer and general. The situations in which the graduates of this institution have not met the requirements of their mission are rare, accidental and insignificant. All the others – namely the vast majority – have accomplished their duties and have continued the valuable tradition of this institution, have legitimated and honoured it.

We, those who graduated from different forms of higher military education within this institution, are proud of having had the opportunity to attend it and we honour the school that educated us and gave us a boost in our careers. It is the reason why the implementation of the Bologna spirit, as a support for a new European reform of higher education, the higher military education included, did not pose special problems for “Carol I” National Defence University, due to its openness to all horizons.

Today, this institution maintains a War College that prepares commanders and staff officers who are highly competitive from the tactical, operational and strategic perspective, a Faculty of Command and Staff, management courses, advanced foreign languages courses, master and doctoral studies, and many specific forms of education meant for continuous professional development. It houses the National Defence College that prepares personalities in the field of security and national defence etc. Starting in 2003, the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies was added to “Carol I” National Defence University, a structure specialised in the fundamental research that may be applied in the field of defence, military strategy and security, which highly contributes to the development of advanced and professional scientific research, producing hundreds of interesting scientific papers that are very useful for the Romanian military thinking in the European and Euro-Atlantic context. The Regional Department of Defence Resources Management Studies in Braşov is also part of “Carol I” National Defence University. It is a new and modern structure

where courses that have a pronounced interdisciplinary character are taught, on themes related to defence resources management in the new geopolitical and geostrategic context.

We are NATO and the European Union members and we naturally benefit from the huge scientific laboratory, from the rich experience and the consistent and concrete expertise of our allies and partners, of the integrated allied structures. Never in its history has Romania been in a more consistent, powerful, elegant, elevated and efficient political-military and strategic company as the one in which it currently is. This is a very good and very important fact, although not sufficient. It is our duty of honour not only to capitalise in the most efficient way on the values and political-military, strategic, operational and tactical concepts of the Alliance, our allies and partners, but also to effectively participate, through our own effort, in the development of military culture and especially of the national and the Alliance strategic culture. Of course, “Carol I” National Defence University fully accomplishes this duty.

The present curricula and courses of our university are modernised and perfectly adapted to meet the requirements related to military personnel higher education, in the context of the revolution in military affairs, the requirements of the Romanian modern Armed Forces, technological progress and the characteristics of the new strategic and security environment. Thus, in conformity with the *Strategic Plan of “Carol I” National Defence University for the period of time between 01.10.2009-30.09.2014*, our institution organises university studies in the fundamental domain “Military Science and Intelligence”, study domains “Military Science and Intelligence” and “National Security”, in three cycles: 1st Cycle – academic studies with graduation diploma; 2nd Cycle – Master academic studies and 3rd Cycle – doctoral studies, as well as programmes meant for permanent education, having the following accredited specialisation: Joint Command – Land Forces, Joint Command – Air Force, Joint Command – Naval Forces, Logistic Command and Financial and Economic Management, and some specialisations authorised to function temporarily: Security and Defence, Military Command, Information Systems and Public and Intercultural Communication for National Security and Defence³. It is everything a modern educational institution having a beautiful and glorious past and a remarkable future could possibly desire.

The new mission of “Carol I” National Defence University is to provide initial education and continuous improvement to commanders, staff officers, military

³ *Strategic Plan of “Carol I” National Defence University for the period of time 1.10.2009-30.09.2014*, approved by the Senate of “Carol I” National Defence University, in the meeting on 21.07.2009, Bucharest, 2009, p. 4.

and civilian experts, selected to fulfil the duties related to command and expert positions in the field of national defence and security, to organise and conduct scientific studies and research that are necessary for the institutions, bodies and structures that have responsibilities in these fields, in an environment and following an education system that is as fully as possible integrated in the national, European and Euro-Atlantic environment.

The general objective that results from this noble mission is to *assure the continuous development of the quality of university scientific education and research, for all cycles and forms of education, as well as for permanent education, in agreement with the principles of the Bologna process, national legislation in the field and the Armed Forces Transformation Strategy.*


The current strategic plan is, in a way, the pinnacle of the 120 years of hard work, of the institution capacity to adapt to the modern requirements of continuous education and professional development, to our new development in the professional and moral environment, in the European and Euro-Atlantic context, as we would like to be and it is natural for us to be. It is, of course, everything our forerunners desired and achieved. It is because the spirit of the beginning is still alive and always present. The value of an institution – especially of an institution of higher military education – is mainly related to continuity, consistency, modesty, dignity, honour, respect, and especially effectiveness.

The Superior War School of 1889 would have all the reasons to be proud of “Carol I” National Defence University of today, which continues its philosophy, physiognomy, spirit, wisdom, importance, utility and value.

Maybe we should conclude by repeating what Army Corps General Ilie Șteflea, who belonged to the 27th series of graduates (1919-1921), wrote some time ago: *“The individuals that form a nation, those who want to live and remain free people, and not serfs, will have to be ready to fight and to make any sacrifice”*. It is a basic truth we should never forget.

This accomplishment can be possible, it is well known, only if the sources that generate the values that are so necessary for the duration and consistency of our today and tomorrow military institution – and one of these inestimable sources, generator of strategic culture is represented by “Carol I” National Defence University – are not let dry, flooded, polluted or overwhelmed by muddy waters, by all kinds of high flood, by seasonal weeds and temporary litter.

English version by
 **Diana Cristiana LUPU**



THE JOINT OPERATING ENVIRONMENT 2008

Challenges and Implications for the Future Joint Force

Part IV: The Implications for the Joint Force

Order or disorder depends on organization; courage or cowardice on circumstances; strength or weakness on dispositions... Thus, those skilled at making the enemy move do so by creating a situation to which he must conform; they entice him with something he is certain to take, and with lures of ostensible profit they await him in strength. Therefore a skilled commander seeks victory from the situation and does not demand it of his subordinates¹.

Sun Tzu

In an uncertain world, which will inevitably contain enemies who aim to either attack the United States directly or to undermine the political and economic stability on which America, its allies, and the world's economy depend, the nation's military forces will play a crucial role. Yet, war is an inherently uncertain and costly

endeavor. As the United States has discovered in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is no such thing as a rapid, decisive operation that does not generate unforeseen second and third order effects.

While the most important mission of the American military has been the ability to fight and win the nation's wars,

¹ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. and ed. by Samuel B. Griffith, Oxford, 1963, p. 93.

the ability of U.S. forces to deter conflict has risen to equal footing. Preventing war will prove as important as winning a war. In fact, the two missions are directly linked in a symbiotic relationship. The ability to deter a potential adversary depends on the capabilities and effectiveness of U.S. forces to act across the full range of military operations. Deterrence also depends on the belief on the part of the adversary that the United States will use its military power in defense of its national interests.

Since the fall of the *Iron Curtain*, the United States has planned for a global repositioning effort, removing forces from forward basing and garrisoning much of its military force structure at home. Instead, the *Joint Force* has found itself in near-constant conflict abroad, and now forces based at home find themselves in heavy rotation, projecting forward into the Middle East and elsewhere around the world. After protracted action in Afghanistan and Iraq, the force now faces a period of reconstitution and rebalancing which will require significant physical, intellectual, and moral effort that may take a decade to complete. During this time, our forces may be located significant distances from a future fight. Thus, the *Joint Force* will be challenged to maintain both a deterrent posture and the capacity and capability to be forward engaged around the world, showing the flag and displaying the ability to act in ways to both prevent and win wars.

A. War in the Twenty-First Century

As the discussion of trends and contexts above has suggested, the roles and missions of the *Joint Force* will include the protection of the homeland, the maintenance of the global commons, the deterrence of potential enemies, and, when necessary, fighting and winning conflicts that may occur around the world. Such challenges are by themselves daunting enough, but they will occur in a period characterized by radical technological, strategic, and economic change, all of which will add to the complexities of the international environment and the use of military force. America's position in the world, unprecedented in almost every respect, will continue to present immense challenges to its military forces.

Rapidly changing trends within the contexts described in the previous section will have profound implications for the character of war itself and the methods by which the *Joint Force* will wage it. Yet, the nature of war will remain closer to Agincourt than to Star Trek. At its heart, war will always involve a battle between two creative human forces. Our enemies are always learning and adapting. They will not approach conflicts with conceptions or understanding similar to ours. And they will surprise us. No amount of technology, conceptualization, or globalization will change those realities. Moreover, the employment of military force

will continue to be conditioned by politics – not only those of the United States and its allies, but by those of its opponents. Above all, joint force commanders, their staffs, and their subordinates must have a clear understanding of the strategic and political goals for which they conduct military operations. In almost every case, they will find themselves working closely with partners, a factor which will demand not only a thorough understanding of U.S. political goals, but coalition goals as well.

It is in this political-strategic environment that the greatest surprises for Americans may come. The United States has dominated the world economically since 1915 and militarily since 1943. Its dominance in both respects now faces challenges brought about by the rise of powerful states. Moreover, the rise of these great powers creates a strategic landscape and international system, which, despite continuing economic integration, will possess considerable instabilities. Lacking either a dominant power or an informal organizing framework, such a system will tend toward conflict. Where and how those instabilities will manifest themselves remains obscure and uncertain.

Between now and the 2030s, the military forces of the United States will almost certainly find themselves involved in combat. Such involvement could come in the form of a major regular conflict or in a series of wars against insurgencies. And as this document has suggested, they will certainly find

themselves engaged not only against terrorist organizations, but against those who sponsor them. One of the great problems that confronts American strategists and military planners is the conundrum of preparing for wars that remain uncertain as to their form, location, level of commitment, the contribution of potential allies, and the nature of the enemy. The only matter that is certain is that joint forces will find themselves committed to conflict against the enemies of the United States and its Allies, and in defense of its vital interests.

B. Preparing for War

There are two ominous scenarios that confront joint forces between now and the 2030s. The first and most devastating would be a major war with a powerful state or hostile alliance of states. Given the proliferation of nuclear weapons, there is the considerable potential for such a conflict to involve the use of such weapons. While major regular war is currently in a state of hibernation, one should not forget that in 1929 the British government adopted as its basic principle of defense planning the assumption that no major war would occur for the next ten years. Until the mid-1930s “*the ten year rule*” crippled British defense expenditures. The possibility of war remained inconceivable to British statesmen until March 1939.

The one approach that would deter a major conflict involving U.S. military

forces, including a conflict involving nuclear weapons, is the maintenance of capabilities that would allow the United States to wage and win any possible conflict. As the Romans so aptly commented, “*if you wish for peace, prepare for war*”. Preventing war will in most instances prove more important than waging it. In the long-term, the primary purpose of the military forces of the United States must be deterrence, for war in any form and in any context is an immensely expensive undertaking both in lives and in national treasure. When, however, deterrence fails, then, the military effectiveness of those forces will prove crucial. Here the efforts that have gone into preparing U.S. forces for conflict at their various training centers must continue to receive the same support and attention in the future that they have over the course of the past 30 years. As the Japanese warrior/commentator Miyamoto Musashi noted in the seventeenth century:

There is a rhythm in everything, but the rhythms of the art of war are especially difficult to master without practice ... In battle, the way to win is to know the opponent's rhythms while using unexpected rhythms yourself, producing formless rhythms from the rhythms of wisdom².

² Quoted in Thomas Cleary, *The Japanese Art of War, Understanding the Culture of Strategy*, Boston, 1992, p. 38.

The second ominous scenario that confronts the *Joint Force* is the failure to recognize and fully confront the irregular fight that we are in. The requirement to prepare to meet a wide range of threats is going to prove particularly difficult for American forces in the period between now and the 2030s. The difficulties involved in training to meet regular and nuclear threats must not push preparations to fight irregular war into the background, as occurred in the decades after the Vietnam War. Above all, Americans must not allow themselves to be deluded into believing their future opponents will prove as inept and incompetent as Saddam Hussein's regime was in 1991 and again in 2003. Having seen the capabilities of U.S. forces in both regular and irregular war, future opponents will understand “*the American way of war*” in a particularly detailed and thorough way.

In Iraq and Afghanistan our opponents have displayed considerable capacity to learn and adapt in both the political and tactical arenas. More sophisticated opponents of U.S. military forces will certainly attack American vulnerabilities. For instance, it is entirely possible that attacks on computers, space, and communications systems will severely degrade command and control of U.S. forces. Thus, those forces must possess the ability to operate effectively in degraded conditions.

In planning for future conflicts, joint force commanders and their planners must factor two important constraints into their calculations: logistics and access. The majority of America's military forces will find themselves largely based in North America. Thus, the first set of problems involved in the commitment of U.S. forces will be logistical. In the 1980s many defense pundits criticized the American military for its supposed over-emphasis on logistics, and praised the German Wehrmacht for its minimal "*tooth to tail*" ratio in the Second World War. What they missed was that the United States had to project its military forces across two great oceans, then fight massive battles of attrition in Europe and in East Asia. Ultimately, the logistical prowess of U.S. and Allied forces, translated into effective combat forces, defeated the Wehrmacht on the Western Front, crushed the Luftwaffe in the skies over Germany, and broke Imperial Japan's power.

The tyranny of distance will always influence the conduct of America's wars, and joint forces will confront the problems associated with moving forces over great distances and then supplying them with fuel, munitions, repair parts, and sustenance. In this regard, a measure of excess is always necessary, compared to "*just in time*" delivery. Failure to keep joint forces who are engaged in combat supplied could lead to disaster, not just unstocked shelves. Understanding that requirement represents only the first

step in planning, but it may well prove the most important.

The crucial enabler for America's ability to project its military power for the past six decades has been its almost complete control over the global commons. From the American standpoint, the Battle of the Atlantic that saw the defeat of the German U-boat menace in May 1943 was the most important victory of the Second World War. Any projection of military power in the future will require a similar enabling effort, and must recognize that the global commons have now expanded to include the domains of cyber and space. The *Joint Force* must have redundancy built in to each of these areas to ensure that access and logistics support are more than "*single-point safe*" and cannot be disrupted through a single enemy point of attack.

In America's two recent wars against Iraq, the enemy made no effort to deny U.S. forces entry into the theater. Future opponents, however, may not prove so accommodating. Hence, the second constraint confronting planners is that the United States may not have uncontested access to bases in the immediate area from which it can project military power. Even in the best case, allies will be essential to providing the base structure required for arriving U.S. forces. But there may be other cases where uncontested access to bases is not available for the projection of military forces. This may be because

the neighborhood is hostile, or because smaller friendly states have been intimidated. Hence, the ability to seize bases by force from the sea and air could prove the critical opening move of a campaign.

Given the proliferation of sophisticated weapons in the world's arms markets – potential enemies – even relatively small powers will be able to possess and deploy an array of longer-range and more precise weapons. Such capabilities in the hands of America's enemies will obviously threaten the projection of forces into a theater as well as attack the logistical flow on which U.S. forces will depend. Thus, the projection of military power could become hostage to the ability to counter long-range systems even as U.S. forces begin to move into a theater of operations and against an opponent. The battle for access may prove not only the most important, but the most difficult.

One of the major factors in America's success in deterring potential aggressors and projecting its military power over the past half century has been the presence of its naval forces off the coasts of far-off lands. Moreover, those forces have also proven of enormous value in relief missions when natural disasters have struck. They will continue to be a significant factor in the future. Yet, there is also the rising danger with the increase in precision and longer range missiles that presence forces could be the first target of an enemy's action in their exposed positions.

C. The Conduct of Military Operations in the Twenty-First Century

The forms of future war will each present peculiar and intractable challenges to joint forces. The U.S. will always seek to fight and operate with partners, leading where appropriate, and prepared to act alone when required to support our vital national interests. However, there is every likelihood that there will be few lines of delineation between one form of conflict and another. Even in a regular war, potential opponents, engaged in a life and death struggle with the United States, may engage U.S. forces across the spectrum of conflict. Thus, the *Joint Force* must expect attacks on its sustainment, its *intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR)* capabilities, and its command and control networks. The *Joint Force* can expect future opponents to launch both terrorist and unconventional attacks on the territory of the continental United States, while U.S. forces moving through the global commons could find themselves under persistent and effective attack. In this respect, the immediate past is not necessarily a guide to the future.

Deterrence of aggression and of certain forms of warfare will remain an important element of U.S. national security strategy, and the fundamentals of deterrence theory will apply in the future as they have for thousands

of years of human history. Deterrence operations will be profoundly affected by three aspects of the future joint operating environment.

First, U.S. deterrence strategy and operations will need to be tailored to address multiple potential adversaries. A “*one-size-fits-all*” deterrence strategy will not suffice in the future joint operating environment. Deterrence campaigns that are tailored to specific threats ensure that the unique decision calculus of individual adversaries is influenced.

Second, the increased role of transnational nonstate actors in the future joint operating environment will mean that U.S. deterrence operations will have to find innovative new approaches to “*waging*” deterrence against such adversaries. Non-state actors differ from state actors in several key ways from a deterrence perspective. It is often more difficult to determine precisely who makes the key decisions one seeks to influence through deterrence operations. Non-state actors also tend to have different value structures and vulnerabilities. They often possess few critical physical assets to hold at risk, and are sometimes motivated by ideologies or theologies that make deterrence more difficult (though usually not impossible). Non-state actors are often dependent on the active and tacit support of state actors to support their operations. Finally, our future deterrence operations against

non-state actors will likely suffer from a lack of well established means of communications that usually mark state-to-state relations.

Third, continued proliferation of weapons of mass destruction will make the U.S. increasingly the subject of the deterrence operations of others. As such, the U.S. may find itself in situations where its freedom of action is constrained unless it can checkmate the enemy’s deterrent logic.

U.S. nuclear forces will continue to play a critical role in deterring, and possibly countering, threats to our vital interests in the future joint operating environment. Additionally, U.S. security interests will be advanced to the degree that its nuclear forces are seen as supporting global order and security. To this end, the U.S. must remain committed to its moral obligations and the rule of law among nations. It must provide an example of a responsible and ethical nuclear power in a world where nuclear technology is available to a wide array of actors. Only then will the existence of powerful U.S. nuclear forces, in support of the global order, provide friends and allies with the confidence that they need not pursue their own nuclear capabilities in the face of growing proliferation challenges around the world.

Unfortunately, we must also think the unthinkable – attacks on U.S. vital interests by implacable adversaries who refuse to be deterred could involve

While we continue to bin the various modes of war into neat and convenient categories it should be recognized that future adversaries do not have the same lens or adhere to our Western conventions of war. In fact there is a great amount of granularity across the spectrum of conflict and a greater potential for “hybrid” types of war. This assessment acknowledges the blending of regular and irregular forms of warfare. It has also identified a convergence between some terrorist organizations and transnational crime. Some have postulated a further blurring of these various modes of conflict and challenges to governance as part of the future operating environment. To the historically minded in fact there is nothing new in such an approach. The Southern campaigns of the American Revolutionary War the advanced European weapons and tactics exploited by the Boers at the turn of the 20th century and General William Slim’s Burma campaign provide evidence regarding the results that can be obtained by combining the diffuse nature of irregular methods with modern weaponry. Wars of the twenty first century will similarly see no clear distinction between the methods used to achieve victory. Future opponents will exploit whatever methods tactics or technologies that they think will thwart us.

the use of nuclear weapons or other WMD. For both deterrence and defense purposes our future forces must be sufficiently diverse and operationally flexible to provide a wide range of options to respond. Our joint forces must also have the recognized capability to survive and fight in a WMD, including nuclear, environment. This capability is essential to both deterrence and effective combat operations in the future joint operating environment.

If there is reason for the joint force commander to consider the potential use of nuclear weapons by adversaries against U.S. forces, there is also the possibility that sometime in the future two other warring states might use nuclear weapons against each other. In the recent past, India and Pakistan have come close to armed conflict beyond the perennial skirmishing that occurs along their Kashmir frontier. Given India’s immense conventional superiority, there is considerable reason to believe such a conflict could lead

to nuclear exchanges. As would be true of any use of nuclear weapons, the result would be massive carnage, uncontrolled refugee flows, and social collapse – all in all, a horrific human catastrophe. Given 24/7 news coverage, the introduction of U.S. and other international forces to mitigate the suffering would seem to be almost inevitable.

Nuclear and major regular war may represent the most important conflicts the Joint Force could confront, but they remain the least likely. Irregular wars are more likely, and winning such conflicts will prove just as important to the protection of America’s vital interests and the maintenance of global stability.

A significant component of the future operating environment will be the presence of major actors which are not states. A number of transnational networked organizations have already emerged as threats to order across the globe. These parasitic networks exist because communications networks

around the world enable such groups to recruit, train, organize, and connect. A common desire to transcend the local regional, and international order or challenge the traditional power of states characterizes their culture and politics. As such, established laws and conventions provide no barrier to their actions and activities. These organizations are also becoming increasingly sophisticated, well-connected, and well-armed. As they better integrate global media sophistication, lethal weaponry, potentially greater cultural awareness and intelligence, they will pose a considerably greater threat than at present. Moreover, unburdened by bureaucratic processes, transnational groups are already showing themselves to be highly adaptive and agile.

Irregular adversaries will use the developed world's conventions and moral inhibitions against them. On one hand the *Joint Force* is obligated to respect and adhere to internationally accepted "laws of war" and legally binding treaties to which the United States is a signatory. On the other hand, America's enemies, particularly the non-state actors, will not find themselves so constrained. In fact, they will likely use law and conventions against the U.S. and its partners.

That said, in the end irregular war remains subject to the same fundamental dynamics of all wars: political aims, friction, human frailties, and human passion. Nevertheless, the context within

which they occur does contain substantial differences. As Mao suggested, the initial approach in irregular war must be a general unwillingness to engage the regular forces they confront. Rather, according to him, they should attack the enemy where he is weakest, and in most cases this involves striking his political and security structures. It is likely that the enemy will attack those individuals who represent the governing authority or who are important in the local economic structure: administrators; security officials; tribal leaders; school teachers; and business leaders among others, particularly those who are popular among the locals. If joint forces find themselves engaged in such situations, a deep understanding of the local culture and the political situation will be fundamental to success.



Source: The Intelligence & Terrorism Information Center

South Lebanon 2006: Hezbollah rockets Israel

What past irregular wars have suggested is that military organizations confronted by irregular enemies must understand the "other". Here, the issue is to understand not just of the nature of the conflict, but the "human sea", to use Mao's analogy, within which the enemy

swims. The great difficulty U.S. forces will confront in facing irregular warfare is that such conflicts require a thorough understanding of the cultural, religious, political, and historical context within which they are being fought, as well as a substantial commitment of “*boots on the ground*” for sustained periods of time. There are no “*rapid decisive operations*” in irregular warfare that can achieve swift victory. Instead of decisive campaigns, U.S. forces can only achieve victory by patient, long-term commitments to a consistent, coherent strategic and political approach.

This coherent approach must also take into account the capabilities of other elements of government. Often, interagency cooperation is difficult because of the relative imbalance of resources between the Department of Defense and other agencies. For this reason, the *Joint Force* can expect tension to exist between tasks that must be completed to accomplish the mission, and enabling the interagency community to engage effectively. Ultimately, war against irregular enemies can only in the end be won by local security forces. Moreover, the indices of success are counter intuitive: fewer engagements, not more; fewer arms captured, not more; fewer enemy dead, not more.

What is of critical importance in irregular war is the ability to provide security to the local population with the purpose of denying the enemy the ability to survive among the people,

allowing local police and military forces to build up sufficient strength to control their area of responsibility. Moreover, the *Joint Force* should contribute to the development of political legitimacy so that local police and military forces are acting with the support of the local population and not against it. The security side of the mission requires a deep understanding of local culture, politics, history, and language. In all cases the use of firepower will be a necessary feature, but balanced with non-lethal activities. Equally important will be the provision of high quality advisors to indigenous forces. Ultimately, U.S. forces can neither win a counterinsurgency, nor ensure that indigenous forces are regarded as the legitimate governing authority; only the locals can put in place the elements guaranteed to achieve lasting victory.

The current demographic trends and population shifts around the globe underline the increasing importance of cities. The urban landscape is steadily growing in complexity, while its streets and slums are filled with a youthful population that has few connections to their elders. The urban environment is subject to water scarcity, increasing pollution, soaring food and living costs, and labor markets, in which workers have little leverage or bargaining power. Such a mixture suggests a sure-fire recipe for trouble.

Thus, it is almost inevitable that joint forces will find themselves involved

in combat or relief operations in cities. Such areas will provide adversaries with environments that will allow them to hide, mass, and disperse, while using the cover of innocent civilians to mask their operations. They will also be able to exploit the interconnections of urban terrain to launch attacks on infrastructure nodes with cascading political effects. Urban geography will provide enemies with a landscape of dense buildings, an intense information environment, and a complexity all of which makes defensive operations that much easier to conduct. The battles of Leningrad, Stalingrad, Seoul, and Hue with their extraordinarily heavy casualties all offer dark testimony to the wisdom of Sun Tzu's warning: "*The worst policy is to attack cities. Attack cities only when there is no alternative*".³

If there is no alternative than to fight in urban terrain, joint force commanders must prepare their forces for the conduct of prolonged operations involving the full range of military missions. They should do so cognizant that any urban military operation will require a large number of troops and that actual urban combat could consume manpower at a startling rate. Moreover, operations in urban terrain will confront joint force commanders with a number of conundrums. The very density of building and population will inhibit the use of kinetic means, given the potential for collateral damage

³ Sun Tzu, *op.cit.*, p. 78.

as well as large numbers of civilian casualties. Such inhibitions could increase U.S. casualties. On the other hand, any collateral damage carries with it difficulties in winning the "*battle of the narrative*". How crucial the connection between collateral damage and disastrous political implications is suggested by the results of a remark an American officer made during the Tet offensive that American forces "*had to destroy a village to save it*". That comment reverberated throughout the United States and was one of the contributing factors to the erosion of political support for the war.

The ability of terrorists to learn from their predecessors and colleagues will not confront the hindrance of having to process adaptations and innovations through bureaucratic barriers. One must also note the growing convergence of terrorist organizations with criminal cartels like the drug trade to finance their activities. Such cooperative activities will only make terrorism and criminal cartels more dangerous and effective.

Operations against terrorists will keep Special Forces busy, with conventional forces increasingly active in supporting and complementary roles. If the Middle East continues on its troubled path, it is likely the war on terrorism will not continue on its current levels, but could actually worsen. Where an increase in terrorist activity intersects with energy supplies or weapons of mass destruction, joint force commanders will confront

the need for immediate action, which may require employment of significant conventional capabilities.



Source: The Intelligence & Terrorism Information Center

High Tech Guerrilla command post: Hezbollah position South Lebanon 2006 with off-the-shelf sensors

Finally, we should underline that persistent media coverage, coupled with changing Western attitudes about the use of force, will influence and be influenced by U.S. military operations. What will be of great importance in the situations where force is being employed will be the narrative that plays on the world's stage. The joint force commander must understand that he should place particular emphasis on creating and influencing that narrative. Moreover, he must be alert and ready to counter the efforts of the enemies of the United States to create and communicate their own narratives. The enemy's ability to operate within the local cultural and social fabric will complicate such efforts. This puts at a premium the ability of Americans to understand the perceptual lenses through which others view the world.

D. Professional Military Education: The Critical Key to the Future

The future Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the 2030s and the Service Chiefs of Staff are already on active duty in the rank of Captain or Lieutenant. The Combatant Commanders and all the future flag and general officers of the U.S. military in the 2030s are currently on active duty. The Command Sergeants Major and Command Master Chiefs of the Joint Force in 2030 are in uniform. In other words, preparation of the senior military leaders of the 2030s has already begun !

As Sir Michael Howard once commented, the military profession is not only the most demanding physically, but the most demanding intellectually. Moreover, it confronts a problem that no other profession possesses:

There are two great difficulties with which the professional soldier, sailor, or airman has to contend in equipping himself as commander. First, his profession is almost unique in that he may only have to exercise it once in his lifetime, if indeed that often. It is as if a surgeon had to practice throughout his life on dummies for one real operation; or a barrister only appeared once or twice in court towards the close of his career; or a professional swimmer had to spend his life practicing

on dry land for the Olympic Championship on which the fortunes of his entire nation depended. Secondly the complex problem of running a [military service] at all is liable to occupy his mind so completely that it is easy to forget what it is being run for⁴.

While the preparation of these young officers and NCO's must begin with their training as military professionals, it must also include their intellectual education to confront the challenges of war, change, and differing cultures. In the space of twenty-five years, they must master the extraordinarily difficult tasks of their military specialties as well as those required by joint warfare. But equally important, they must prepare themselves for the challenges presented by war and the projection of military force.

The recent experiences of Afghanistan and Iraq have made clear that in war, human beings matter more than any other factor. There are other dimensions, including technology, that are important, but rarely decisive. Above all, officers who hold the senior positions in the American military in the 2030s must develop a holistic grasp of their professional sphere and its relationship to strategy and policy. At this level of leadership, the skills for building trust

⁴ Sir Michael Howard, "The Uses and Abuses of Military History", in *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, no. 107, 1962, p. 6.

that will serve as the foundation for harmonious teams is as important as tactical or operational prowess – maybe more so. The future *Joint Force* must have leaders who can form and lead effective coalitions. Such a preparation will take a lifetime of intellectual preparation, because it demands an ability to understand the "other" in his terms, historically, politically, culturally, and psychologically.

The world of the 2030s will demand more than mastery of the technical and operational aspects of war. The nature of the decentralized operations required by many of the challenges described thus far will require that NCOs must also understand the fundamental nature of war as well as other cultures and peoples – as they will undoubtedly confront challenges equivalent to those faced by today's midgrade officer. Both officers and enlisted leaders will find themselves participating in coalitions, in which the United States may or may not be the leading actor, but in which partners will invariably play an important part. All military leaders must be equipped with the confidence to decide and act in ambiguous situations and under conditions where clear direction from above may be lacking or overcome by changing conditions.

This is the fundamental challenge the U.S. military will confront: providing the education so that future leaders can understand the political, strategic, historical, and cultural framework

of a more complex world, as well as having a thorough grounding in the nature of war, past, present, and future. Admiral Stansfield Turner, initiator of the intellectual revolution at the Naval War College in the early 1970s, best expressed the larger purpose of professional military education:

War colleges are places to educate the senior officer corps in the larger military and strategic issues that confront America... They should educate these officers by a demanding intellectual curriculum to think in wider terms than their busy operational careers have thus far demanded. Above all the war colleges should broaden the intellectual and military horizons of the officers who attend, so that they have a conception of the larger strategic and operational issues that confront our military and our nation.

The complexity of the future suggests that the education of senior officers must not remain limited to staff and war colleges, but should extend to the world's best graduate schools. Professional military education must impart the ability to think critically and creatively in both the conduct of military operations and acquisition and resource allocation. The services should draw from a breadth and depth of education in a range of relevant disciplines to include history, anthropology, economics, geopolitics, cultural studies, the "hard" sciences, law, and strategic communications. Their best officers should attend such programs. Officers cannot master all these disciplines, but they can and must become familiar with their implications. In other words, the educational development of America's future military leaders must not remain confined to the school house, but must involve self study and intellectual engagement by officers throughout their careers.

Part V: Some Leading Questions

Despite the uncertainties and ambiguities involved in the future security environment there are two specific areas where the U.S. military can better prepare its forces and its future leaders to meet the challenges that will come. As this study suggested at the beginning, perhaps the most important cultural attributes military organizations require are the ability to innovate in peacetime and adapt

in war to the actual realities of the battlefield. Unfortunately the present culture and bureaucratic structures of the Department of Defense place major hurdles in the path of future innovation and adaptation.

One can encapsulate those obstacles in simple words or phrases. What needs reform is obvious, but the actual execution, the important "how to", of any effective reform will require sustained

efforts against comfortable, deeply entrenched bureaucracies, sub-cultures within the military, and the demands of the present. Two areas that demand change are acquisition and the personnel systems.

A. Defense Economics and Acquisition Policies

The *Joint Operating Environment* has spoken thoroughly about the asymmetric application of power by potential enemies against U.S. military forces. There is also an asymmetry with respect to the “*defense spending*” of the United States and its potential opponents, particularly in irregular contexts. One only need to consider the enormous expenditures the United States has made to counter the threat posed by *improvised explosive devices (IED)*. The United States has spent literally billions to counter these crude, inexpensive, and extraordinarily effective devices. If one were to multiply this ratio against a global enemy, it becomes unexecutable. While this asymmetry is most dramatic against the low-end threat, it applies to more sophisticated threats as well. Current economics indicate that China likely spends far less than the United States for the same capability. For instance, because of its labor market, the cost of many of the raw materials, and the savings gained by reverse engineering technologies, the Chinese space program costs an order of magnitude less than that of the United States.

There have been justified calls for acquisition reform for decades, and while a number of groups have produced clear, forthright, and intelligent studies, little actual reform has taken place. This is no longer a bureaucratic issue – it is having strategic effects. Given the potential for disruptive technologies in the near future, the crucial issue will not be whether the United States possesses such technologies, but how affordably, how quickly, and how effectively joint forces can incorporate those technologies not only into their concepts, doctrine, and approach to war, but actually into the units and commands that will have to use those technologies on future battlefields.

Without a thorough and coherent reform of the acquisition processes, there is the considerable prospect an opponent could incorporate technological advances more affordably, quickly, and effectively – with serious implications for future joint forces.

B. The Personnel System

Perhaps the greatest difficulty confronting the Joint Force in preparing future leaders has to do with a personnel system that derives its philosophical and instrumental basis from reforms conducted between 1899 and 1904 and laws passed by Congress in 1947, 1954, and 1986. To a considerable degree, these reforms and laws still drive Service approaches to recruiting, training, promoting, and eventually retiring their personnel.

The current personnel and leader development system has its roots in long outdated mobilization systems for mass armies in world wars. And while the United States has had an all-volunteer force for 35 years, the bureaucracy still “thinks” and “acts” from an industrial-age, mobilization-based leader development paradigm. That approach continues to shape how the services approach training and education, often confusing

the two. That state of affairs must change.

If we expect to develop and sustain a military that operates at a higher level of strategic and operational understanding, then the time has come to address the recruiting, education, training, incentive, and promotion systems so that they are consistent with the intellectual requirements for the future joint force.

Part VI: Concluding Thoughts

Do make it clear that generalship, at least in my case, came of understanding, of hard study and brain-work and concentration. Had it come easy to me, I should not have done [command] so well. If your book could persuade some of our new soldiers to read and mark and learn things outside drill manuals and tactical diagrams, it would do a good work. I feel a fundamental crippling in curiosity about our officers. Too much body and too little head. The perfect general would know everything in heaven and earth.

So please, if you see me that way and agree with me, do use me as a text to preach for more study of books and history, a greater seriousness in military art. With two thousand years of example behind us, we have no excuse, when fighting, for not fighting well...⁵
T.E. Lawrence to B.H. Liddell Hart, 1933

The ability to innovate in peacetime and adapt during wars requires institutional and individual agility. This agility is the product of rigorous education, appropriate applications of technology and a rich understanding of the social and political context in which military operations are conducted.

But above all, innovation and adaptation require imagination and the ability to ask the right questions. They represent two of the most important aspects of military effectiveness. The former occurs during peace, when there is time available to think through critical issues. However, in peacetime, military organizations cannot replicate the actual conditions of combat, when a human opponent is trying his best to destroy

⁵ As quoted in Robert B. Asprey, *War in the Shadows, the Guerrilla in History*, vol. 1, Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1975, p. 270.

U.S. forces. Thus, there must be a premium on studying the military – from an evidence-based perspective, using history, current operations, wargames, and experiments – to better understand the present and future. There must be a connection between those in the schools and those involved in experimentation. Above all, there must be rigorous, honest red teaming and questioning of assumptions. “*All the objectives were met*” is a guarantee of intellectual dishonesty as well as a recipe for future military disaster.

Adaptation provides little time for reflection because of the immediate demands of combat. Here the patterns of thought developed in peacetime are crucial, because adaptation requires the questioning of the assumptions with which military organizations have entered the conflict. In the past, military organizations which have ruthlessly examined and honestly evaluated their assumptions in peacetime have done the same in war. Those which have not, have invariably paid a terrible price in lives. Those, whose commanders have listened and absorbed what their subordinates have had to say, were those which recognized what was actually happening in combat, because they had acculturated

themselves to learning from the experiences of others.

The defining element in military effectiveness in war lies in the ability to recognize when prewar visions and understanding of war are wrong and must change. Unfortunately in terms of what history suggests, most military and political leaders have attempted to impose their vision of future war on the realities of the conflict in which they find themselves engaged, rather than adapting to the actual conditions they confront. The fog and friction that characterize the battle space invariably make the task of seeing, much less understanding what has actually happened, extraordinarily difficult. Moreover, the lessons of today, no matter how accurately recorded and then learned, may no longer prove relevant tomorrow. The enemy is human and will consequently learn and adapt as well. The challenges of the future demand leaders who possess rigorous intellectual understanding. Providing such grounding for the generals and admirals, sergeants and chiefs of the 2030s will ensure that the United States is as prepared as possible to meet the threats and seize the opportunities of the future.

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Résumés

Le courage d'affronter le temps

Engagé dans la résolution de problèmes complexes du temps présente concrète, mais obligé, en même temps, d'affronter avec habilité et courage les défis d'un avenir imprédictible, l'Etat Major Général a eu le rôle primordial pour projeter, soutenir et réaliser la réforme structurelle de l'armée roumaine pour y imprimer le rythme de son marche vers la modernité. Une armée obligée, par sa raison d'être, de circonscrire son effort de renouvellement au processus de réforme et de reconstruction de la société roumaine, elle-même obligée et motivée, bien sûr, de maintenir son pas avec le monde civilisé. En accord avec la nécessité d'une réforme majeure de l'organisation militaire, étant un garant de la sécurité nationale dans le nouvel environnement politique international, l'Etat Major Général a assumé en même temps sa propre réforme institutionnelle, à la recherche de cette formule qui permettrait d'assurer la souplesse de la vitesse de réponse et l'efficacité de la mesure de la performance de contrôle.

L'Etat Major Général – l'architecte de la transformation de l'armée roumaine

À la déstructuration du monde bipolaire, les menaces directes à la sécurité des pays européens se sont diminuées, ce qui conduit à une certaine attention pour faire face aux menaces possibles de leur proximité. Ce fait a entraîné un nombre progressif de missions des forces européennes qui sont été déployées dans les zones de conflit comme le Moyen-Orient, en Asie, en Afrique et dans les Balkans occidentaux. L'auteur souligne que, si par la dernière décennie du XXème siècle, les menaces traditionnelles sont été essentiellement représentées par des différends territoriaux, des conflits ethniques et culturelles ou des concours de rejoindre les ressources, à l'heure actuelle, outre le fait que ces menaces n'ont pas perdu de sa pertinence, sont mis en évidence d'autres menaces comme le terrorisme, la prolifération des armes de destruction massive, l'émergence des non-acteurs de l'État ou les menaces asymétriques, la violation des droits de l'homme et les États défaillants.

La formation de l'Etat Major Général dans le contexte du développement de l'Etat national

La formation d'Etat Major Général a été un moment signifiant dans l'affirmation de la Roumanie comme une entité européenne. L'armée avait le rôle d'aider à faire avancer les pays membres du continent, en particulier dans la réalisation des espoirs de la nation et l'achèvement d'un changement dans le statut international de la Roumanie. L'auteur affirme que l'Etat Major Général a été l'un des facteurs en permettant d'assurer le succès de ces processus complexes. Pendant le règne d'Alexandre Ioan Cuza, puis au début de Carol I on peut parler d'un développement spectaculaire et du renforcement des forces armées de l'Etat national roumain. Il est reçu un plus grand nombre de régiments d'infanterie et l'accent a été mis sur l'arme de la cavalerie et de l'artillerie. Il a été créé aussi un régiment du génie. Moins de deux décennies, la guerre d'indépendance a confirmé le niveau qu'il a atteint l'armée roumaine.

L'Etat Major Général dans le système militaire de commandement

Depuis 1990, l'Etat Major Général a traversé plusieurs étapes de son organisation, les étapes de son évolution suivant la réforme militaire même, où il l'a gérée. Cette changement a particulièrement préoccupé, en premier lieu, la diminution et l'optimisation de la gestion de l'acte de commande à travers de toute armée, et d'autre part, l'interopérabilité avec les structures similaires des États membres de l'OTAN. En conséquence, l'auteur souligne que cette année a déclenché de vastes mesures pour restructurer l'armée roumaine, en général, et les structures centrales du Ministère, en particulier. Cette période a été consistante dans les modifications, dans la plupart de nouvelles structures créées en étant les premiers éléments pour la réalisation des étapes suivantes dans l'évolution structurelle de l'Etat Major Général.

**La structure du personnel
et de mobilisation de l'Etat Major Général
– les performances du management
de la ressource humaine**

La modernisation de la gestion des ressources humaines a commencé avec le développement du Concept sur la gestion des ressources humaines dans l'armée roumaine, dont l'objectif stratégique était de développer un système moderne de management, capable d'assurer le maintien de la compétitivité de l'institution militaire. La réalisation de cet objectif a impliqué, comment l'auteur exprime, la mise en œuvre d'un nouveau système militaire de gestion de la carrière, en introduisant un nouveau système d'évaluation des cadres militaires, ce qui produit le contexte et les outils d'organisation pour améliorer et rationaliser les activités de chaque militaire, et soutenir les processus d'analyse et de sélection pour les comités de sélection, le développement d'un ensemble de principes et de règles définissant les fonctions du personnel militaire professionnalisé de l'armée roumaine, dans lequel les nouvelles structures militaires ont été constituées et concrétisées.

**Les renseignements militaires
à 150 ans de la formation
de l'Etat Major Général**

Selon l'auteur, la direction du renseignement militaire est actuellement un service militaire de renseignement de niveau stratégique, capable de fournir des informations nécessaires à tous les niveaux de commandement militaire et politico-militaires. Le but de toutes les activités de renseignement, comme partie intrinsèque de la défense nationale, est d'assurer les conditions nécessaires pour exécuter avec succès les opérations militaires et les actions militaires ou non militaires de la Roumanie, en partenariat avec ses alliés. Aujourd'hui, plus que jamais, les préoccupations de cette structure sont liées à la modernisation et l'amélioration de l'activité des renseignements militaires comme une garantie pour assurer la sécurité et la défense nationale et de promouvoir les intérêts de l'Etat, en fonction des réalités actuelles et futures, où la menace militaire directe est remplacée par la technologie transnationale et informationnelle.

**La Direction des opérations
– un siècle et demi d'existence
dans la structure de l'Etat Major Général**

La participation de l'armée roumaine en temps de guerre, les succès et les échecs militaires ne peuvent être compris et appréciés, l'auteur souligne, sans une minime référence à l'activité de l'organisme supérieure de formation et de commandement – le Grand état-major, que le Grand quartier général. Ainsi, la structure

des opérations/département des opérations du Grand quartier général, par la qualité et l'opportunité des documents élaborés, les solutions originales et les mesures efficaces prises pour résoudre des situations stratégique-opératives difficiles et complexes, a été imposé pendant la Première guerre mondiale comme l'un des organes centraux d'élite de notre armée. Le département des opérations a directement influencé la manière dont notre armée a eu du succès, en mettant son empreinte indéniable sur la physionomie des moments les plus significatifs de l'ensemble de la guerre du peuple.

**La constitution des forces
pour les opérations spéciales
– une initiative sur l'impacte majeur
de l'armée roumaine**

En mettant en place la structure des forces d'opérations spéciales, les auteurs soulignent que les facteurs nationaux de la décision politico-militaire bénéficient d'un outil crédible, capable de produire les buts au niveau stratégique. La préparation et les équipements modernes font de ces forces un multiplicateur de pouvoir des forces conventionnelles en étant capable d'utiliser la force, non seulement sélective, mais par comparaison aux dimensions de la menace. En plus de réaliser des économies importantes d'énergie et des ressources les dommages quasi minimaux de garantie et les effets indésirables causés par des réponses classiques sont limités. A son tour, les opérations spéciales réussissent à assurer une coordination efficace de l'application des décisions politiques et militaires dans les structures de forces d'opérations spéciales de l'armée roumaine.

**La transformation de la logistique
de l'armée roumaine
– déterminations conceptuelles**

Les auteurs soulignent que toutes les armées modernes reconfigurent constamment leurs structures pour la lutte, tout en accordant une des priorités semblables pour les unités similaires de soutien logistique. Dans ce contexte, les auteurs considèrent que tous les facteurs politiques et militaires doivent être conscients que sans un soutien logistique approprié ils ne peuvent remplir leurs missions, n'importe qu'elles que soient. L'année 2009, avec tous les problèmes causés par la crise économique mondiale, se développe, au moins au niveau conceptuel, comme un repère important dans la transformation de la logistique de l'armée roumaine. Cette exigence de transformation a été attestée par le personnel spécialisé de la Direction de la logistique de l'Etat Major Général par la Stratégie logistique de l'armée roumaine. Ce texte inclut les plus récentes approches en ce domaine des États membres de l'OTAN

à la manière pratique dont l'économie nationale peut maintenir son armée.

La Direction de la planification stratégique – l'interface de l'Etat Major Général avec les organismes euro-atlantiques

La participation des Forces armées roumaines aux missions hors de l'État roumain, mais surtout ses résultats des missions de l'OTAN et dans le contexte des coalitions prouve, comment l'auteur décrit, en plus de l'image du membre de confiance et de contributeur réel pour la sécurité collective, et que, au moins en termes d'interopérabilité opérationnelle, nous sommes au même niveau avec les autres pays de l'OTAN. Cette participation n'aurait pas les résultats espérés sans l'appui d'une planification adéquate, qui est la prérogative de la direction de la planification stratégique. En accord avec les règlements spécifiques, la planification des forces pour les missions extérieures offre la perspective d'utiliser les forces en dehors de l'État roumain, qui, une fois agréé par le Conseil suprême de la défense nationale, est le repère dans ce domaine et d'orienter les autres efforts de défense.

La gestion des activités pour implémenter les capacités CIS dans l'armée roumaine

La Direction des communications et IT a activement participé à l'élaboration des directives ministérielles de planification de la défense. Ainsi, après le Programme «Les communications et les IT», qui est un programme distinct de la formation et la modernisation des forces du ministère de la Défense nationale, a été assurée la coordination des ressources allouées à l'emploi dans d'autres programmes à mettre en œuvre les objectifs généraux de la force du domaine des communications et des systèmes d'information (CIS) réalisés par la Roumanie pour: les communications stratégiques et tactiques qui s'étendent aux forces participant aux opérations de l'OTAN; l'amélioration des systèmes de messagerie électronique, des services de radio sol-air-sol; d'assurer la sécurité des informations dans le CIS, de fournir une capacité à réagir aux incidents des systèmes informatiques; d'assurer les communications pour les autorités civiles de décision, en temps de paix, d'exercer sa souveraineté dans l'espace aérien national.

La Direction instruction et doctrine – repères historiques et redéfinitions actuelles

La modernisation et l'efficacité de l'instruction visent à accroître le niveau de la préparation des unités pour accomplir les tâches confiées. À cet égard, l'auteur souligne que l'instruction qui se déroule pendant

la paix doit répondre aux exigences des missions qui doivent accomplir en temps de crise ou de guerre. Il est essentiel que le processus de formation soit axé sur la performance. Seulement de cette façon les unités et les sous-unités seront en mesure d'effectuer à un niveau élevé ses tâches spécifiques au cours de l'action militaire. Une interopérabilité accrue avec les armées des Etats membres de l'OTAN ne peut être réalisée que par l'adoption, adaptation et mise en œuvre des normes et d'instruction dans l'Alliance. La normalisation d'instruction permet à correctement évaluer le niveau de performance des tâches de formation individuelles et collectives pour chaque exigence de la mission.

Le Service historique de l'armée – le promoteur de l'historiographie militaire nationale

Les fonds d'archives conservés au fil des ans et gérés avec la maxime responsabilité par le Service historique de l'armée ont constitué et constitueront, l'auteur souligne, une véritable source de documentation pour les chercheurs militaires et civils, pour les historiens militaires qui ont enrichi l'historiographie militaire nationale par des travaux d'une certaine valeur scientifique.

Pendant la Seconde guerre mondiale, le service a été dans son structure un bureau d'informations, qui a cherché à enregistrer des données importantes au sujet des actions radicales, son influence dans la société roumaine, les risques auxquels ils ont été exposés les dépôts d'archives et le patrimoine du Musée militaire nationale. Ce bureau a réalisé une description assez complète sur la destruction des archives qui se trouvait dans deux wagons, bombardés à Turnu Severin, dans la nuit du 15/16 avril 1944.

Projeter et moderniser les structures militaires – domaines de responsabilité de la Direction des structures et de la planification de l'armement

La Direction des structures et de la planification de l'armement est la structure spécialisée de l'Etat Major Général qui planifie et conduit les activités de mise en œuvre des programmes de formation, de la réorganisation et la modernisation des structures de l'organisation de l'armée roumaine en fonction des priorités et des ressources allouées, pour réaliser une structure de forces moderne, réduite, professionnalisée, bien équipée, déployable, interopérable, avec sa propre capacité de soutien et de protection multidimensionnelle, avec une gestion souple, qui, fondée sur les meilleures informations et de données optimales, soit capable de prendre rapidement des décisions,

avec la capacité d'agir interarmées, et d'être engagée dans une série de missions, conformément aux engagements pris envers l'OTAN et l'UE. La réforme militaire, en général, et de remodeler l'architecture de commandement et de contrôle, en particulier, est un processus continu, et l'Alliance est en soi-même un processus de transformation et d'adaptation aux nouveaux défis.

La représentation militaire auprès l'OTAN et l'UE – une introspection à ce moment anniversaire

Les objectifs prioritaires de la représentation militaire sont été subsumés à l'intérêt spécifique et précis de la Roumanie et, directement, au ministère de la Défense nationale par rapport à l'Organisation de l'Atlantique Nord.

Dans ce contexte, l'auteur mentionne quelques-uns des buts le plus significatifs de la représentation: la participation à la construction du profil stratégique de la Roumanie à l'OTAN; formuler et déterminer précisément des intérêts qui peuvent être pris en charge au contexte de l'Alliance; la définition des projets politiques militaires spécifiques et la réalisation des jonctions pour le soutien nécessaire à assurer leur réalisation; le développement des relations de coopération et de consultation avec les structures similaires des nations membres et avec les structures militaires du siège de l'OTAN et de l'Etat Major Militaire de l'UE, pour promouvoir dans une manière cohérente, appropriée et cohérente les intérêts politiques et militaires de l'OTAN.

Les domaines de compétence et responsabilités de la représentation de l'Etat Major Général auprès SHAPE

L'effort constant et cohérent pour promouvoir l'intérêt de l'armée nationale, déposé à la représentation, a principalement consisté à obtenir des conditions favorables à la participation de la Roumanie avec des forces dans les opérations de l'OTAN par rapport aux possibilités nationales actuelles. À l'appui de l'acte décisionnel, l'auteur souligne que le personnel de la représentation élabore des analyses primaires des demandes de contributions aux forces de l'OTAN dans les différents théâtres d'opérations, analyses qui contribuent aussi à la fondation des décisions efficaces au contexte des autorités militaires nationales. Afin de relever certaines questions d'intérêt pour les structures d'Etat Major Général et des catégories des forces, la représentation exige l'appui des experts militaires du SHAPE. Au sujet, les questions traitées concernent la force et la planification opérationnelle au niveau stratégique, en définissant le niveau d'ambition nationale, l'affiliation et la formation des forces, de mener

le processus national d'intégration, d'évaluation ou d'assurer un appui pour les forces de l'OTAN à la réalisation d'événements de haute visibilité.

La Section assistance religieuse – la composant spirituel de l'organisme militaire

Après le décembre 1989, l'armée, comme toutes les institutions de l'Etat, a connu un processus large et profond de restructuration et de réforme, visant à non seulement la création de nouvelles structures, mais aussi de certaines déstructurations qui ont empêché le cours normal des affaires. Les auteurs indiquent que la préoccupation dominante pour un système militaire représente la sécurité de la Roumanie, qui est de redéfinir sa dimension dans le cadre de la sécurité européenne. Par conséquent, la stratégie politique et militaire a conçu et développé l'intégration dans l'OTAN. A ces idées se sont consacrés les efforts considérables pendant près de quatorze ans, et le consensus politique et le soutien pour toute la population du pays en faisant réalisables ces objectifs-là en 2004. Dans ce processus s'inscrit la renaissance de l'assistance religieuse dans l'armée, mais aussi la contribution qu'elle a apportée à la connaissance et la reconnaissance de l'armée roumaine comme une institution apolitique, capable de servir réellement les intérêts légitimes du pays et du peuple roumain.

Les Forces terrestres – évolution et développement structural

Les fondements modernes de la création des forces terrestres peuvent être placés dans la seconde moitié du XIXème siècle, à la suite du processus révolutionnaire de 1848, de construire l'Etat moderne roumain par l'Union de 1859 et de l'administration de la politique militaire d'Alexandre Ioan Cuza. L'évolution des forces terrestres est étroitement liée à l'évolution de la société roumaine au fil du temps, des transformations survenues dans l'armée roumaine à diverses étapes de son existence. Le commandement des forces terrestres a été exercé par des structures qui ont reçu différents noms: commandement, direction ou état-major. La nécessité d'une réelle transformation a conduit les développements responsables dans ce domaine. Dans la moitié des années '90, le Commandement d'infanterie et des chars a été transformé en commandement des forces terrestres, avec des directions subordonnées et des inspections d'armes.

Les Forces aériennes roumaines – tradition et contemporanéité

L'expérience des combattants de l'air a été démontrée par les missions effectuées, par les victoires obtenues au cours des deux conflits mondiaux et des conflits

locaux isolés. Comme conséquence des victoires et des défaites de l'air ont été reliés de nombreux enseignements et des conclusions sur les concepts et la structure des opérations aériennes, des arrangements de coopération entre les composants d'armes de la force aérienne ou entre eux et d'autres catégories de forces armées et sur l'organisation, les processus et les méthodes d'action dans la bataille d'avions roumains dans les guerres modernes. Aujourd'hui, la Roumanie, dites-ils les auteurs, a réussi, grâce à des efforts soutenus et systématiques, d'atteindre deux objectifs fondamentaux – à adhérer à l'OTAN et à l'UE. De cette position, les forces aériennes roumaines doivent évoluer en ligne avec les risques et les menaces à la sécurité nationale, les objectifs pris en charge et exigences d'une pleine intégration dans les structures euro-atlantiques.

Les Forces marines roumaines – histoire et transformation dans le contexte du milieu de sécurité de la Mer Noire

Pour examiner les caractéristiques géopolitiques de la région de la Mer Noire, l'auteur estime que les principaux obstacles identifiés et les paradigmes que connaissent cette région et les efforts pour les États côtiers à se joindre à un processus dynamique et systématique de construire la sécurité régionale. Dans cette remarque, l'impact de la post-transition de l'ère communiste des États riverains de la Mer Noire est essentiel pour comprendre la situation actuelle dans laquelle ces pays s'adaptent à la nouvelle politique de sécurité transatlantique. Enfin, l'analyse des intérêts géoéconomiques des pouvoirs, principalement en termes de concurrence, énergie, routes de transit des ressources pour relier la Mer Méditerranée, Mer Noire, Mer Caspienne et Asie Centrale, peut conduire à l'identification des perspectives géopolitiques à terme court et moyen des acteurs impliqués dans cette région.

Le Commandement opérationnel interarmées – l'exercice de la commande opérationnelle sur les structures qui participent aux missions multinationales

Pour réaliser son autorité de commandement, le Commandement opérationnel interarmées réalise des tâches spécifiques et implicites, sur lequel l'auteur présente dans cet article, depuis la préparation de la mission, au cours de son exécution jusqu'à ce que le retour du contingent roumain aux forces militaires à laquelle il appartient ou au Commandement opérationnel interarmées. En effectuant des analyses de la situation, le quartier général du commandement opérationnel interarmées vise l'ordre des tâches de mission, les règles d'engagement et les limites

nationales, l'identification des besoins et de coordonner la transmission d'instructions, les ordres de la fragmentation, l'intervention hiérarchique supérieure en droit de changer le mandat de la mission ou le règlement des demandes des commandants des contingents alors lorsqu'ils dépassent les possibilités de commandement opérationnel interarmées.

Le Commandement des communications et de l'informatique – exigences opérationnelles et responsabilités fonctionnelles

Le Commandement est profondément impliqué dans le développement et la gestion des principaux éléments spécifiques de la communication et technologies de l'information du programme major d'acquisitions "Etat Major Général/commandement stratégique", sous la responsabilité de l'Etat Major Général. Certaines de ses parties, sur lesquelles les auteurs retiennent, se réfèrent à: élargissement du système CRONOS, l'acquisition de moyens modernes de communication des points de commandement stratégique, la réalisation des travaux de télécommunications à des endroits fixes, l'acquisition des fluxes satellitaires et par fibre optique, l'installation des terminaux satellitaires dans des lieux différents, le développement du système de vidéo-téléconférence placé dans endroits fixes et par des centres déployables (mobiles), en fournissant des postes de travail sécurisés pour les réseaux informatiques, en assurant les programmes de communications pour les principales applications informatiques en fonctionnement.

Présent et future dans l'activité du Commandement logistique interarmées

Dans le plan des actuelles activités, l'auteur souligne que tous les travaux de Commandement sont organisés pour réaliser les objectifs annuels et multi annuels du Conseil de planification de défense, grâce au soutien logistique et d'assurer la cohérence entre les ressources et les indicateurs d'efficacité. Dans le domaine de l'approvisionnement, le Commandement logistique interarmées doit mener toutes les activités nécessaires à l'achat de matériel et de fournitures du matériel de soutien des forces, au niveau opérationnel et stratégique. Par les structures spécialisées du Commandement a été fourni un nouveau flux en termes d'achats techniques et matérielles dans toutes les catégories de forces militaires, les produits et les services de formation/soutien des forces sur des théâtres d'opérations, des services externalisés, le niveau de la maintenance technique aux structures centrales et aux unités militaires y sont subordonnées.

**L'Université nationale
de défense "Carol I" – le développement
continue de la qualité d'éducation
et de la recherche scientifique**

L'auteur souligne que l'Université nationale de défense, cette institution d'enseignement militaire supérieur, a toujours été un point obligé de passage pour les mesures, les fonctions et les responsabilités de l'armée roumaine. Chaque commandant d'unité, de grande unité, chaque officier qui a un rôle important aux échelons supérieurs de l'armée, est passé par diverses étapes de formation dans cette institution – la perfection, l'enseignement professionnel continu, etc. Tous les programmes d'enseignement – n'importe quelle que soit la situation stratégique, politique et parfois dramatiques dans lesquelles cette institution a fonctionné, étant donné les circonstances politiques graves, les tensions et les guerres – sont rigoureux et substantielles, répondent de développer rapidement et d'appliquer la science militaire, de fonder un monde de valeurs militaires, pour prendre une architecture élégante, culte et cohérente pour un corps d'officiers d'un haut niveau scientifique et moral.

**The Joint Operating Environment 2008
– Challenges and Implications
for the Future Joint Force (IV)**

L'étude relève les défis et les implications pour l'avenir commun de la Force, publié par United States Joint Forces Command pour décrire le futur environnement opérationnel, qui fournit une perspective sur les tendances futures, les chocs, les contextes et les implications pour l'avenir commun des commandants de force et d'autres dirigeants et de professionnels dans le domaine de la sécurité nationale. Ainsi, les auteurs décrivent le caractère durable de la guerre, les causes et les conséquences du changement et de surprises et aussi le rôle de la stratégie. Les auteurs abordent certaines questions sur la guerre et les opérations militaires au XXIème siècle, aussi sur la nécessité de l'enseignement militaire professionnel. Ils formulent certaines questions à l'égard de l'économie dans le domaine de défense, les politiques d'acquisitions et le système de personnel.

Version française par Alina PAPOI

2010

Military Celebrations

January

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February

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March

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September

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October

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November

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December

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- 1 February ~ Quartermaster Day
- 23 February ~ Military Hydrographer Day
- 28 February ~ Civil Defence Day
- 1 March ~ Military Motorists Day
- ~ Special Operations Forces Day
- 25 March ~ Psychological Operations Day
- 23 April ~ Land Forces Day
- 25 April ~ Military Justice Day
- 30 April ~ Infantry Day
- ~ Military Logistics Day
- 15 May ~ NBC Defence Troops Day
- ~ Military Police Day
- 20 May ~ Military Financier Day
- 31 May ~ Military Engineers Day
- 10 June ~ Paratroopers Day
- 17 June ~ Military Aviation Day
- 18 June ~ Military Constructors Day
- 1 July ~ Military Bands Day
- 13 July ~ "Electronic Warfare"
Military Speciality Day
- 14 July ~ Military Signal Operators Day
- 15 July ~ Military Submarine Day
- 20 July ~ Air Force Day
- 23 July ~ Military Press Day
- 25 July ~ Radiolocation Day
- 26 July ~ Military Archives Day
- 1 August ~ Tankmen Day
- 15 August ~ Naval Forces Day
- 21 August ~ Military Medicine Day
- 1 September ~ Military Computer Workers Day
- 4 September ~ Military Printers Day
- 19 September ~ Artillery and Anti-Aircraft
Missiles Day
- 1 October ~ Military Divers Day
- 9 October ~ Human Resource Day
- 25 October ~ Romanian Armed Forces Day
- 30 October ~ Military Public Relations Day
- 3 November ~ Mountain Corps Day
- 10 November ~ Artillery Day
- 12 November ~ General Staff Day
- ~ Military Geodesic Day
- ~ Military Scouts Day
- 16 November ~ Railway and Transportation
Troops Day
- 29 November ~ Romanian Infantry Day
- 14 December ~ Operations Directorate Day
- 27 December ~ Psychological Operations
Centre Day

REMCA

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