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Lieutenant General Nicolae Ciucă, Chief of the Romanian Armed Forces General Staff, and US General Philip Breedlove, Commander, Supreme Allied Command, Europe during General Philip Breedlove's visit at the Ministry of National Defence, 31 March 2015.
Photo: Valentin Ciobîrcă, http://www.mapn.ro/fotodb/20150331_1/IMG_0697

Solidarity and Responsibility

Finding itself in a difficult equation, perhaps the most complex one after the end of the so-called *Cold War*, in the late '90s of the past century, Europe looks anxiously towards its eastern border, where a new type of war, although undeclared as such, seems to have been started between a rule-of-law state and separatist forces that claim an alleged territorial autonomy and, therefore, other options regarding foreign policy. It is a context of insecurity and tension, a game of mutual accusations and eschewals, generated and sustained, as it is more and more suspected, by actors interested in generating a state of instability and, why not, in testing NATO's ability to respond to presumptive enemies.

The existence of a visible or just presumed threat to the territorial integrity of the states in the region calls for effective deterrent measures. Any aggressive actions or security situations that may pose problems to the eastern flank of the Alliance must generate an appropriate political retaliation in which the main role will certainly belong to the diplomatic dialogue, as the only rational way to defuse the current situation and to ensure compliance with the territorial integrity of democratic and sovereign states. Should they be respected by all parties to the conflict, the recent talks in Minsk will put an end to the armed confrontation that has already resulted, unfortunately, in thousands of casualties, combatants or civilians not involved militarily, but will also make over one million people leave their homes and seek refuge.

Romania is interested in strengthening its own status in the Euro-Atlantic structures, by enhancing its credibility as a state generating security and stability in the area. As a member of NATO and the EU, it is part of the 2014 Wales Summit provisions decision-making and implementation process. Starting the procedures regarding the installation of NATO command and control elements on Romanian territory is, therefore, a first response of our conduct, which is in agreement with the stance of these international bodies, in a joint effort to find solutions to the security situation in the Black Sea region. The military land and naval exercises,

the NATO aircraft flights over the territory of the member states in the region are also clear indications/declarations of the interest shown by the Alliance in bolstering the security of these states.

The support shown by the policymakers for the gradual increase in the budget earmarked for the armed forces in order to provide military structures with equipment and weaponry needed for the fulfilment of the assumed operational capabilities will prove their political maturity and responsibility towards the country's future.

As some political-military analysts state, the change in the strategic balance at the Black Sea occurred when Crimea was occupied, in March last year, and was aggravated by the outbreak of hostilities in eastern Ukraine. Given that this type of conflict, with uncertain stakes and prospects for tensioning/compromising the regional security environment, can start in any other place in Eastern Europe, the members of the international community must be united in making choices and decisions. Otherwise, although we do not like to accept the possibility of such scenarios, the inflammation, through mere *sympathy*, of other areas can cause uncontrollable explosions in this tense geostrategic area, with major consequences for regional and even global security. History has shown us so many times that such consequences have not been faced only by those led by their own hegemonic impulses, but quite the contrary, by millions of innocents. And this should never happen again in a normal world, in which the supreme value is human life.

 *Colonel Dr Mircea TĂNASE*

English version by

Iulia SINGER



Solidarité et responsabilité



est l'Europe que, située dans une équation difficile, peut-être la plus complexe de l'achèvement, à la fin des années 90 du siècle passé, de la soi-disant *guerre froide*, regarde inquiétant vers sa frontière orientale, où il y a une guerre de nouveau type, bien que non déclarée, semble avoir été déclenchée entre un Etat du droit et des forces séparatistes, qui affirme la revendication de son autonomie territoriale et, par conséquent, d'autres options de politique étrangère. Un contexte d'insécurité et de tension, un jeu d'accusations et des mouvements de s'esquiver mutuellement de ses responsabilités, généré et soutenu, comme il est soupçonné de plus en plus, par des acteurs intéressés de créer un état d'instabilité et, pourquoi pas, de tester la capacité de réponse des adversaires présumés.

L'existence d'une menace, visible ou tout simplement déduite, à l'adresse de l'intégrité territoriale des Etats dans la région nécessite des mesures efficaces de dissuasion. Toutes les actions agressives ou des situations de sécurité qui peuvent créer des problèmes au flanc oriental de l'Alliance doivent générer une riposte politique appropriée, où, bien sûr, le rôle principal sera d'avoir un dialogue diplomatique, vu comme la seule façon rationnelle de désamorcer la situation actuelle et d'assurer le respect de l'intégrité territoriale des Etats démocratiques et souverains. Les récents pourparlers à Minsk, s'ils vont respecter par toutes les parties du conflit, pourraient finir la confrontation armée qui a abouti déjà, malheureusement, avec la perte de milliers de vies, combattants ou civils non impliqués du point de vue militaire, et ils conduiraient à quitter leurs maisons et à fuir à plus de million de personnes.

La Roumanie est intéressée à renforcer sa propre position dans les structures euro-atlantiques en augmentant sa crédibilité en tant qu'un Etat qui génère de la sécurité et de la stabilité dans la région. En tant que membre de l'OTAN et de l'UE, elle fait partie du processus de prise des décisions et de mise en œuvre les dispositions du Sommet au Pays de Galles, en 2014. À partir des procédures d'installation sur le territoire roumain d'éléments de commandement et de contrôle de l'OTAN, voici, c'est une première réponse de notre conduite solidaire avec la position

de ces organismes internationaux, dans l'effort de trouver ensemble des solutions pour la situation de la sécurité dans la région de la Mer Noire. Les exercices militaires terrestres et navales, les vols d'avions de l'OTAN au-dessus du territoire des États membres dans la région sont également des preuves/des déclarations claires d'intérêts de sécurité de l'Alliance de réassurer la sécurité de ces États-là.

Le soutien, par les décideurs politiques, de l'augmentation progressive dans le budget de l'armée pour équiper les structures militaires avec d'équipements et d'armes nécessaires pour réaliser les capacités opérationnelles assumées va prouver leur maturité politique et leur responsabilité envers l'avenir du pays.

Certains analystes politique-militaires affirment que le changement d'équilibre stratégique dans la Mer Noire est produit alors quand la Crimée a été occupée, depuis le mois de Mars, l'année dernière, et a été aggravé par le déclenchement des hostilités dans l'est de l'Ukraine. Dans les conditions que ce type de conflit, avec d'enjeux incertaines et perspectives de tension/compromission de l'environnement de sécurité régionale, peut être lancé dans tout autre lieu dans l'est de l'Europe, les membres de la communauté internationale doivent être solidaires dans leurs options et leurs décisions. Sinon, même si nous n'aimons pas à accepter la possibilité de tels scénarios, l'inflammation, par *la sympathie*, aussi d'autres domaines peuvent causer des explosions incontrôlables dans ce périmètre géostratégique rempli de tension, avec des conséquences majeures pour la sécurité régionale et même mondiale. Et l'histoire nous a montré tant de fois que ces conséquences n'ont pas seulement supportées seulement par ceux qui ont été amenés par leurs impulsions hégémoniques, mais plutôt des millions d'innocents. Ce qui, dans un monde normal, dans lequel la valeur suprême c'est la vie humaine, il devrait de n'être répété.

*Version française par
Alina PAPOI*

BETWEEN THE EPICENTRE AND THE SHOCKWAVE OF THE UKRAINIAN CRISIS

*Brigadier General Dr Florinel DAMIAN
Major Ștefan OLARU*

The current political and military situation in Ukraine may be interpreted as the beginning of a new type of war, “the multidimensional war”. Many analysts consider that the “hybrid war” waged by Russia troubles the Eastern Europe and tests the coherency of both NATO and the European Union in acting together to protect their own rights and/or that of a partner state. Deeply rooted in history, with a controversial leader and relying on a reformed military system, Russia seems to redefine its position and question the Western policy towards Ukraine, where a significant Russian population lives.

The annexation of Crimea and the concern for consequences have determined NATO and the European Union to react based on different strategies. Situated in the immediate vicinity of the conflict area, Romania, as a NATO and EU member, is still exposed to several risks that need to be wisely dealt with.

Keywords: *procurement; space technology; China; troops management*

Russia and the others

100 years after the start of the First World War, 75 years after the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, 70 years after the allied forces landing in Normandy and 25 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the world is undergoing new political and social convulsions that generate regional insecurity, with negative influence at global level. With over 60 ongoing conflicts, many of them being major scale crisis, the humankind seems to reach a new crossroads, where ethnic and religious dominos and territorial puzzles, based on a certain “clemency” of the international organisations, tend to become a characteristic of a time of apocalyptic nuances, if we consider the dynamism of their repetition, their consequences and, sometimes, the cruel means used (e.g. Islamic State – ISIS).

The incertitude in Afghanistan, the restart of the conflict in Iraq – determined especially by the ethnic and jihadist character, the bloody confrontations on the African continent, doubled by the Ebola epidemic, the increased

Brigadier General Dr Florinel Damian – Director of Management – JFC HQ Naples, Italy.
Major Ștefan Olaru – Lessons Learned Staff Officer – JALLC, Lisbon.

Palestinian-Israeli conflict, as well as the evolutions in the Gaza Strip, Libya, Syria and Central Africa are only a few examples of serious problems with impact on world security.

The separatist movements in some states and the autonomist approaches, based on ethnic criteria, in some European states, complete the picture of a tumultuous period, with a continuation that is difficult to foresee.

But more than everything, the crisis in Ukraine reminds us that the world's powers are changing and that we are at the beginning of a new "*critical epoch*", as described by Danish philosopher Soren Kierkegaard in his "*existentialism*".

It is obvious that we cannot understand the Ukrainian crisis without a detailed and impartial analysis of what happened between 1917-1854 and 1989-1991 in Central and Eastern Europe, the globalisation's effects, as well as the Russian Federation's perspective on the new world order.

What has determined this new attitude of Russia? Is it a reaction against the United States of America? Is it a reaction against the European Union or NATO? Is it a reaction against all three?

Concerning the evolution of the relation with USA, an important analysis element is the conflict in Georgia and the military reform launched by Russia in 2008. The results of these two events with strategic impact led the USA to estimate that Russia did not pose a direct threat against USA or Europe anymore. Moreover, Obama administration initiated in 2009 a "*reset*" of the relations with Russia, continued with the *National Security Strategy* from May 2010, where it was mentioned the need for developing a stable, substantial and multidimensional relation with Russia, to the benefit of both parties, simultaneously with guaranteeing the integrity and sovereignty of Russia's neighbouring countries¹.

Even though, in the development of the *US National Security Strategy*, from military perspective, a closer relation with Russia was encouraged, consisting of cooperation in the fight against the terrorism and weapons proliferation, space and cyber technology, ballistic missiles as well as cooperation for preservation of peace and stability in Asia², there were voices calling for another perspective on Russia³. James Clapper highlighted that Russia redefined its national strategy starting from the premise that the USA and NATO were its "*biggest threat*".

¹ More details are available in *The White House. National Security Strategy*, May 2010.

² US Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America: Redefining America's Military Leadership*, 8 February 2011.

³ James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, Declaration in front of the Congress, 10 February 2011, quoted by Jim Nichol in the analysis *Russian Military Reform and Defense Policy*, prepared by the Congressional Research Service for Members and Committees of Congress, 24 August 2011.

Additionally, Russia's nuclear capabilities and its potential in causing and managing regional crisis were considered a direct danger, which, combined with China's similar capabilities, would almost surely be to the detriment of the USA.

As far as the 20-year-NATO-Russia relation is concerned, it was often said that it was not considered a real source of inspiration. The political dialogue consisted only of rituals while the military cooperation was limited to interminable projects, declarations and attempts to carry out common activities. Some analysts consider that the accusations made against Russia for lack of transparency did not mean that NATO was an easy partner for Russia⁴. If we were to sum up the observations of these analysts, the conclusions would be the following⁵:

- The NATO-Russia Council is largely defined by malfunctioning.
- The evolution of the relations lacked consistency.
- The collaboration in the ballistic missiles domain was ceased.
- The relation with NATO was limited to initiatives coming only from Brussels or to the interest of cooperating with some NATO member states, but as individual entities, not as Alliance members.
- The lack of NATO strategy regarding strategic partners.
- NATO's military bureaucracy generates delayed reactions compared to the political decisions, which was a positive fact, resulting in the continuity of military relations (logistic support, counter-piracy etc.), despite the political tensions.

We should not omit the fact that Russia permanently condemned NATO's "*broken promise*" not to expand beyond the borders of a reunified Germany. Real or not, this promise was raised up even by President Putin in front of the Russian Parliament, on 18 April 2014, reiterating the fact that his country saw a direct threat in NATO's enlargement up to Russian borders and in Georgia and Ukraine's exaggerated pro-Western course. The installation of the missile defence system in Romania and Poland is considered another "*indirect aggression*" against Russia. Some authors consider that, at least under the current circumstances, there are three urgent actions that should be taken for the NATO-Russia relation⁶:

- The repositioning of NATO forces in the geographical area of the Alliance, tacking into account that the countries on the Eastern flank of NATO

⁴ Heidi Reisinger, Research Advisor at NATO Defense College, *Does Russia Matter? Purely Political Relations Are Not Enough in Operational Times*, 31 January 2014.

⁵ *Ibid*, p. 4.

⁶ More details about NATO's eastward enlargement and Russia's perception of this enlargement are presented by Michael Ruhle, Head of Energy Security Section, in NATO Emerging Security Challenges Division, *NATO Enlargement and Russia-Die-Hard Myths and Real Dilemmas*, NATO Defense College Research Division, 15 May 2014.

are radically looking at approaching the Ukraine crisis from the perspective of “*collective defence*” while the countries in the Centre and the Western flank of the Alliance tend to choose a “*crisis management*” approach.

- The clarification of NATO enlargement policy.
- The development of cooperation with Russia based on the principle of “*reciprocal benefit*”.

In addition, an old topic was reopened for discussion⁸ concerning the lessons the Alliance must learn regarding *STRATCOM* and *Public Diplomacy*, subjects still unclear after Operation *Unified Protector* in Libya.

Last, but not least, the relation of Russia with the European Union must be analysed. In fact, maybe it is from this perspective that we need to understand the “*drop that spilled the cup*”. Ukraine’s close relation with NATO has been seen as a military threat while advancing in the relation with the EU was a direct economic threat, in the context in which the economic and commercial relations between Russia and the EU clearly favoured Russia, which was aware of the “*persuasion potential*” of Russian natural gas resources. On the other hand, Russia does not forget and does not forgive events as the one that happened in 2006 when the gas transit through Ukraine was affected and, consequently, a *déjà-vu* was created for a future problem of limiting the available resources for European states. Moreover, the bilateral relations with the important EU member states have always prevailed over the relation with EU as a whole. Therefore, the national agenda has been primordial in building EU relations with Russia.

During that time, Russia understood the fragility and slowness of NATO and EU decisions, as well as the opportunities it could benefit from by playing the “*Asia card*”⁹. Russia’s trade with countries from this region to which it belongs, geographically speaking, almost exploded. The income from oil and gas reached high limits and the trade with weapons and raw materials significantly increased. However, Russia cannot show up with globally competitive products. The intention to play a more active role inside BRIC¹⁰ (Brazil, Russia, India, China) sometimes had negative consequences in terms of image, as it happened when China did not recognise, as expected, the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Additionally, a possible “*junior*” position in relation with China would never be agreed

⁷ The analysis belongs to Julian Lindley-French and is presented in *NATO’s Post 2014 Strategic Narrative*, NATO Defense College, July 2014.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁹ Heidi Reisinger, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

¹⁰ About BRIC’s role in and impact on the current economic and political environment, we also wrote, with the appropriate bibliography, in “*Challenges for the Field Artillery System for the Years 2030-2040*”, in *Gândirea militară românească*, no. 2/2014, p. 160.

by Russia, even if, in May 2014, in Beijing, it was signed the contract for delivering Russian gas to China, not forgetting that the negotiations had started 10 years before.

On the other hand, it is estimated that this politic and economic construction (BRIC) would reconfigure the power poles in the next following years.

Vladimir Putin – foreign policy and internal resource

Russia's commitment to all these courses of action was the result of political decisions, some of them surprising, others already foreseen, taking into account the rotation of the leaders at the highest political level and Vladimir Putin's "in force" approach. The Russian President has been the subject of multiple analyses, which have tried to explain his decisions from the psychological point of view and to anticipate the next ones¹¹. It is thus presumed the possibility of understanding Putin the "man" and, consequently, through the nature of his political position, of understanding the concept of the Russian state. Being accused that he came to power supported only by the Russian oligarchs, this support was also identified as a significant vulnerability of the Kremlin leader. His solutions for all types of dangerous scenarios led to building significant financial reserves, which directly affected the Russian economy. In Putin's version, the "market economy" is dependent on manipulation and blackmail and of political clientele, which block the complete liberalisation of the market, the same authors have said. They also see Putin, who came to power only by a formal vote, as a leader who was not prepared to lead the country forward, but only to remain faithful to its large electorate, eager to redefine the Russian Federation as a world power pole with the same it has had throughout history. The actions preceding the current strategic decisions have kept Putin limited in processing his public image, and now, once the "mechanism for rehabilitation" is set in motion, he is trying to get the maximum benefit, even if less than 30% of the population agrees with the actions taken against Georgia and Ukraine. However, it can be also argued that Putin is the victim of his own success, because, when the resources and "external calm" made it possible, he facilitated the creation of a "so-called" new middle class of the Russian society. Yet, this class wants more, including Western-style political rights, which, in a way, is contrary to the idea of the state as understood by Putin. This is the truth discovered by Putin's supporters when street movements gained momentum in Moscow and other Russian important cities.

¹¹ One analysis, containing similar information, including details from this paragraph, is presented by *Foreign Policy* and available online at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/02/15/putin_personality_disorder

Putin's dilemma is whether to rebuild a strong Russia in the long term or to have immediate results, such as gaining "*initiative*" in everything that means the crisis in Ukraine. In either case, Putin needs popular support and human capital. A part of this human capital has already joined the opposition, another source of concern, which, ironically, comes right from the inside! In addition, the adhesion of the rural population, whose loyalty is best ensured through state subsidies, has its price, which determined the Russian President not to trust the support of the masses anymore.

Moreover, it seems that he no longer trusts his loyal people, replacing various close persons from key positions, during the last weeks, most likely fearing a plot. The same phenomenon also occurs in relation with the oligarchs who have supported him from the beginning in his efforts, but are now seriously affected by trade and financial sanctions imposed by the USA and the EU and demand more rights, financial flexibility and influence in the Russian society.

Therefore, the source of Vladimir Putin's foreign policy was based not only on internal material resources but also on the human support and his ability to manipulate the international political and economic context – in general, and the economies dependent on Russian gas – in particular.

In addition, Vladimir Putin was assimilated to a leader who sought revenge and wanted to show the others, especially the West, that Russia did not forget and did not forgive and that the superpower was neither more nor less than a "*Phoenix bird*" in other sizes. Of course, the comparisons with another world leader who linked his rise, perhaps as much as his fall, to a railway wagon in the Compiègne Forest on 22 June 1940 did not miss.

However, Putin's policy was supported by several success factors, the most important being the military reform and the new security strategy, implemented at the beginning of 2008.

Russia's military reform and security strategy

For the past 20 years, Russia has made significant efforts to modernise its armed forces, inherited from the former Soviet Union. The foundation was gangrened, with significant corruption at all levels, bad management of resources, failures and tragedies like the sinking of the *Kursk* submarine and with a conscription policy, leading to a soldierly life, often more with educational role and homogenisation than with significant results in terms of training. These issues would be more highlighted after August 2008, when the weaknesses were also demonstrated at operational level, during the conflict in Georgia. In this context, the Kremlin leadership understood the need to reform the defence system.

The reform was initiated, in 2008, by the Minister of Defence, Anatoliy Serdyukov, known until then as head of the Federal Taxation Service. This reform firstly involved the reduction of the troops number from 1,2 million in 2008 to less than 1 million¹². It primarily aimed at reducing the number of officers from 355 000 to 220 000, the reorganisation and modernisation of NCOs training and the change of the command and control system from one of four levels (military districts, armies, divisions and regiments) to one of two levels (strategic commands and brigades/battalions which, in turn, depending on the mission's specifics, could be transformed into mixed combat brigades/battle groups). In addition, a solid military police structure was created in order to ensure appropriate order and discipline in the barracks.

At the same time, a 10-year-arming programme was launched and the defence budget was substantially increased yearly¹³. The priorities of this programme were buying new nuclear missiles and platforms for strategic deterrence, aircraft, helicopters, ships, missiles, submarines, space and cyber technology.

Russia's National Security Strategy, the military doctrine and the features of the military reform reflect Russia's perception that the USA and NATO remain at least concerns, if not threats, to Russia¹⁴, as well as the fact that they have a "*certain lack of coherency*" because of the complexity of financial-economic interests and the cumbersome political decision-making process. It was noted that special emphasis was placed on developing anti-terrorist capabilities, humanitarian assistance and certain lines of defence on the borders with China.

To sum up, Serdyukov said that the reform was aimed at having mobile and equipped armed forces, capable of performance, able to participate in at least three regional and local conflicts.

Compared with previous reform attempts, this went much further, up to changing the force structure. However, some analysts questioned Russia's ability to provide the demographic resource required for the selection of members of the armed forces in order to meet the set standards and the budget necessary for weapons modernisation programme¹⁵.

¹² The details in the paragraph are from Jim Nichol's analysis, *Russian Military Reform and Defence Policy*, made by the Congressional Research Service for Members and Committees of Congress, 24 August 2011.

¹³ Russia allocates each year between 4% and 5% for defence, being the third, after the USA and China, as far as defence expenditure is concerned. The tendency is to increase the percentage earmarked for defence. A comparative analysis on countries and years can be found on the website of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database/milex_database

¹⁴ Jim Nichol, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

¹⁵ *Ibid*, p. 12.

However, recent events have shown that Russian military personnel know very well the international reality and, based on this, they have done their “homework” properly and have consistently applied the transformation plan proposed within the reform. In addition to changes in the force structure and the arming and procurement programme, we are dealing with a fundamental change in the modus operandi of the forces – strategic and operational planning, doctrine, techniques, tactics and procedures. These were named changes regarding the “character of the armed conflict” and here is their comparative summary, in table I¹⁶.

Traditional Military Methods	Modern Military Methods
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Military action starts after strategic deployment (declaration of war). • Frontal clashes between large units consisting mostly of ground units. • Defeating of manpower, firepower, taking control of regions and borders to gain territorial control <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Destruction of economic power and territorial annexation. • Combat operations on land, air and sea. • Management of troops by rigid hierarchy and governance. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Military action starts by groups of troops during peacetime (war is not declared at all). <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Non-contact clashes between highly manoeuvrable interspecific fighting groups. • Annihilation of the enemy’s military and economic power by precise shorttime strikes in strategic military and civilian infrastructure. • Massive use of high-precision weapons and special operations, robotics, and weapons that use new physical principles (direct-energy weapons – lasers, shortwave radiation etc). <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Use of armed civilians (4 civilians to 1 military). • Simultaneous strike on the enemy’s units and facilities in on all of the territory. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Simultaneous battle on land, air, sea and in the information space. • Use of asymmetric and indirect methods. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Management of troops in a unified information sphere.

Based on these changes, some analysts¹⁷ have summarised the development of Russia’s military capabilities for 2020 as follows:

- from direct destruction to direct influence;
- from direct annihilation of the opponent to its inner decay;
- from a war with weapons and technology to a culture war;
- from a war with conventional forces to specially prepared forces and commercial irregular groupings;

¹⁶ The details are presented in Janis Berzins, *Russia’s New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defence Policy*, National Defence Academy of Latvia, April 2014. The author quotes a study from 2013 of General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of Defence of Russia Armed Forces.

¹⁷ Peter Mattsson, *The Russian Armed Forces Adapted to New Operational Concepts in a Multipolar World?*, Riga, 19 February 2014, text adapted by Janis Berzins, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

- from the traditional (3D) battleground to information/psychological warfare and war of perceptions;
- from direct clash to contactless war;
- from a superficial and compartmented war to a total war, including the enemy's internal side and base;
- from war in the physical environment to a war in the human consciousness and in cyberspace;
- from symmetric to asymmetric warfare by a combination of political, economic, information, technological, and ecological campaigns;
- from war in a defined period of time to a state of permanent war as the natural condition in national life.

Crimea or “it can be worse”

It can be said that this new approach to war was applied and validated, at least partially, in Ukraine. Yet, how did it all begin?

Russia considers Ukraine (and Belarus) as part of itself, something that it lost with the collapse of the former Soviet Union. It was argued that, to Russia, Ukraine could never be just a “foreign country”¹⁸. Russia's history began with what was called “Kievan-Russ”, from where the Slavic culture was inherited and developed as well as the Slavic Orthodox Christianity, which is even currently canonically led by Moscow. A significant part of Ukraine (especially its Eastern part) was part of Russia for centuries, their history intertwined so many times while some of the most important battles for Russia liberty and independence happened on Ukraine's territory¹⁹. The Russian Black Sea Fleet is located in Sevastopol, in the Crimean peninsula, starting from 1783, with only a few “gaps”, either based on the conquest of the territory, following regional wars, or due to successive treaties and agreements with Ukraine (after the collapse of the USSR), in order to become Black Sea riparian country and, thus, gain access to the Mediterranean Sea.

In this context, Russia could not accept NATO's enlargement up to its borders, especially that the Western countries promised that the former Soviet and satellites republics would remain in a buffer zone. True or not, the fact is that nowadays NATO's border is approximately 160 km from Saint Petersburg, instead of 1 600 km during the period of the former Soviet Union. With Ukraine as a NATO member, the common border can cause too much offence for Moscow.

¹⁸ Henry A. Kissinger, *To Settle the Ukraine Crisis, Start at the End*, in *The Washington Post*, 5 March 2014.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, p. 18. The author mentions the battle of Potlava in 1709.

While Russia wanted to make Ukraine its special and subordinated partner or, in the worst case, a neutral one, the United States and the European Union involvement in the Ukrainian internal affairs was seen as a direct confrontation with Russia's regional interests.

Attracting the Ukraine in the Western sphere of influence was thus more than an attempt to Russia's "*natural right*" over the region.

Therefore, the premises were set up for a crisis that follows the traits of a strategic shock²⁰. In November 2013, former Ukrainian President, Viktor Yanukovych, surprisingly refused to sign the Association Agreement with the EU, negotiated since 2007, and re-oriented his country towards Russia. This decision sparked ample protests in all country confirming to Russia, based on Russian specialists' analyses, the fact that the West was financially involved in destabilising Yanukovych's government²¹. The follow-on negotiations, led by the EU, were aimed at stopping the protests, revalidating the previous Constitution, as well as other additional points, such as new elections with external monitoring²². Even though this was not at all an excellent solution for Russia, Moscow preferred to wait than to see instability expanding, hoping in the election of a pro-Russian president in the upcoming elections. In addition, the Russian leaders forgot the provisions of the Treaty signed with USA and the EU in Budapest, in 1994, regarding Ukraine's independence and integrity. However, the Ukrainian opposition continued to ask for Yanukovych's resignation, threatening with a military coup d'état. Therefore, the police forces withdrew and a new Coalition was created in the Ukraine Parliament.

During this time, on the streets of Kiev, unknown snipers were firing both at protesters and at police officers, creating confusion and letting the parties support their own theories. Thus, Russia claimed that the West was behind the snipers, who acted in order to provoke the masses, while the West claimed that Russia was behind the snipers in order to create the framework for a radical intervention of the President's loyal forces. The truth was that the support for the opposition increased, the divide of Ukrainian society became more visible, and the anticipated revenge pushed Yanukovych and other governmental officials to seek refugee to Russia.

This was the spark that led to the annexation of Crimea²³. First of all, Russia considered that the overthrow of Yanukovych was illegal; therefore the new government was illegitimate. According to the Ukrainian Constitution,

²⁰ As far as the "*strategic shock*" is concerned, we also wrote about it in *Challenges for the Field Artillery System for the Years 2030-2040*, art. cit., p. 157.

²¹ A detailed chronology of the Ukraine events, completed with significant statements for each moment, is available at Center for Strategic and International Studies – <http://csis.org/ukraine/index.htm>.

²² See also *Agreement on the Settlement of Crisis in Ukraine*, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/671348/publicationFile/190025/140221-UKR_Erklaerung.pdf.

²³ The conclusions and details from this paragraph are from Janis Berzins, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

the procedure for overthrowing the President started when he/she was formally charged with violating the law, the Constitutional Court confirmed the accusations and the Parliament decided the impeachment by a three-fourth majority vote. Secondly, Russia considered that the new government was formed by extremists who jeopardized not only Russia's security but also Ukraine's. Therefore, Russia argued that it had a moral mission to protect Russians minorities in Ukraine if their security and fundamental rights were violated. Thirdly, Russia was convinced that the West betrayed the agreement signed on 21 February.

Therefore, Russia reacted to preserve its interests. First, its military interests, because an anti-Russian government could review the agreement regarding Russian military bases at the Black Sea, in Crimea. Second, Crimea became part of Ukraine in 1954, "by a mistake" made by the leader at that time of the former Soviet Union, Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev (born in Kalinovka, Ukraine), the peninsula being originally a land of the Thracian-Cimmerians tribes, with Scythians intrusions (the 6th-12th centuries) and with a subsequent historical development in which Romanians played an important role, especially as a stable Christian population, until the Ottoman oppression (the 13th century – the last part of the 16th century) and the massive deportations of the old locals to Siberia and/or Caucasus Mountains started by the Russians (after 1783) and continued by Stalin (especially after 1940).

Third, to give a clear message to the West that Ukraine is a "red line" and it should remain under the Russian sphere of influence.

Fourth, in order to redefine the hierarchies and to show that the Russian Federation is to be respected and considered of a similar stature to the United States of America.

Fifth, it was a good opportunity to divert public attention from Russia's domestic social and economic issues, even if it was effective only in the short term.

Finally, the West had to understand that what happened with the Soviet Union in the past could not happen with the Russian Federation.

The Russian Strategy with regard to the annexation of Ukraine should be seen on three interrelated levels²⁴.

First, the doctrinal unilateralism or the idea that the successful use of force would be legitimate. The weak/lack of response from the US and the EU, together with the "inactivity" of Ukrainian military units in that area, showed that the Russian strategy was correctly evaluated by Russian specialists.

Second, the Russian President had to prove that all actions taken were lawful. Without discussing the legality of Russian actions, we cannot avoid the facts: Putin asked the Russian Parliament to authorise the use of military forces in Ukraine, if needed, and the Parliament approved. This approval, together with the lack of use

²⁴ *Ibid*, p. 23.

of military forces in the Crimea, recognised according with the international law of war, was a pretext to justify the Russian peaceful intentions.

Third, the compliance with the agreements in force. Even if the number of Russian troops in Crimea increased, it remained within the limits stipulated by the agreement between the two countries, and their actions, together with those of the local population, were defined as “*self-defence*”.

Russia directly supported the referendum held by the pro-Russian political forces, living on the peninsula, in order to justify the annexation of Crimea to Russia. While the West considered it as illegal, as well as its subsequent actions, the Russian leaders reminded everybody that a similar thing happened in Kosovo and the principles accepted could not be different. Additionally, as a general view, the things were quite the same, in terms of the “*modus operandi*” for declaring the independence and the character of a forced puzzle in building Ukraine, as it was the case for the former Yugoslavia²⁵.

The Crimean campaign was an impressive strategic communication show, with many similarities to the intervention in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as well as with many differences, consisting in the new approach to the war, presented by General Gerasimov. The best measure of reality is that in just three weeks and without firing a single bullet, the Ukrainian troops were disarmed and demoralised, and the 190 bases were surrounded and surrendered. In return for the use of an impressive number of tanks and artillery, the Crimea campaign was based on under 10 000 troops, many of them already stationed on Crimean territory, with a reserve of a few paratrooper battalions/battle groups and *Spetsnaz* commando troops, while Ukrainian forces consisted in over 16 000 soldiers, most of them having a “*hesitant*” attitude in front of the pro-Russian forces. After blocking the Ukrainian troops in their bases, the Russians began the second phase of the operation, which consisted of psychological operations, intimidation, bribery and media and Internet propaganda, in order to undermine any resistance and to avoid the use of firepower. Another feature of the operation was the extraordinary discipline of (pro-)Russian forces fitted with new, modern equipment, body armour and light armoured vehicles²⁶. Certainly, the presence of “*little green men*”²⁷ will continue

²⁵ For a better understanding of the situation in Kosovo before and immediately after the declaration of independence, see Ștefan Olaru, *Kosovo văzut din umbra steagului albastru*, Editura Arhip Art, Sibiu, 2008.

²⁶ These elements related to the deterrence of the enemy can also be found in the NATO doctrine for Information Operations, Art. 122, defined as *Presence, Posture and Profile*. The doctrine may be accessed online at <https://info.publicintelligence.net/NATO-IO.pdf>

²⁷ More details are available at http://www.publika.md/nato-se-arata-ingrijorata-ca-rusia-ar-putea-trimite-omuleti-verzi-in-tari-din-vecinatatea-sa_2053021.html and its subsequent links.

to be, for a long time, a subject in the analyses of the military strategies applied during the Ukraine Crisis, at international level.

Thus, Russia placed the idea of “*influence*” in the centre of operational planning and used all means to achieve it (effective internal communication, deterrent operations, PSYOPS, media operations, effective external communication and coordination of information on the Internet, diplomatic and political statements, discrete and effective reactions).

The target audience was very well defined: Crimea’s Russian-speaking population, Ukraine’s Russophobe government and the international community, especially NATO and the EU. The results were a demonstration that the old Soviet method of “*reflexive control*” was still applied successfully²⁸.

Russia did not remain only with the taste of victory, because, even if a little bit late, the international response was a powerful one – economic infringements, suspension of military procurement programmes, flights banning for certain political leaders and oligarchs and threat of isolation. However, some Western countries were reluctant to apply/extend the sanctions, primarily because winter was near and dependence on Russian gas was high, and secondly, because others (or, in fact, the same...) had already been paid, by the Russian Federation, in advance, significant amounts (1 to 1,5 billion Euros) for clear commitments to deliver complex military equipment.

Meanwhile, the pro-Russian rebels expanded their actions, controlling more than one third of Ukraine, with a new country project, in an already identified area – New Russia²⁹, comprising the southern flank of Ukraine, from the Ukrainian-Russian border to the border with Romania and the Republic of Moldova, including Transnistria (Moldova’s breakaway province).

After recovering from the initial shock, the Ukrainian Army launched a major counteroffensive operation, using armoured and motorised units, airborne troops and special operations forces. However, they did not expect such a strong reaction from the “*rebels*”, who were much better armed than originally assessed, very frequently managing to shot down transport aircraft, fighter jets and attack helicopters of the Ukrainian Army (even a civilian transport aircraft following a widely recognised route set by international authorities in the domain, including the Russian Federation).

²⁸ The subject is developed in Major General Andrew Mackay, Commander Steve Tatham, Dr Lee Rowland, *Crimea: Russian Reflexive Control?*, a summary being available at <http://behavioural-conflict.tumblr.com/post/80898348308/crimea-russian-reflexive-control>

²⁹ This concept is presented at <http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-05-05/why-putins-ukrainian-new-russia-could-be-an-ungovernable-mess> and http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/04/18/putin-novorossiya-ukraine_n_5173559.html with additional links

In these circumstances, Crimea became a forgotten subject, with which the world was already reconciled, understanding that Russia could do much more – from the federalisation of Ukraine and annexation of Russian-speaking regions to the commencement of a new *Cold War*.

The clash up to “*all or nothing*”, in which the Ukrainian forces changed tactics, passing from field and air defence artillery attacks and fighter aviation while the rebels began to lose control of certain areas, was marked by the tragedy of the *Malaysian Airlines* plane, shot down by a ground-air missile from the area controlled by the rebels³⁰. At this moment (of writing the article), the investigation’s results are not available, the parties accusing each other of targeting the plane with 298 passengers on board.

Meanwhile, NATO increased its presence in Romania, Poland and the Baltic countries with more fighter/reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft, battle groups and reconnaissance (ISR) and war ships, both in the Black Sea and in the Baltic Sea. The already planned exercises were conducted with scenarios tailored and reshaped to the current situation.

Another milestone in the development of this crisis was represented by the humanitarian convoys prepared and sent by Russia in the regions affected by conflict. Ukraine and the West perceived this as an invasion without the participation of the Red Cross, while Russia presented it as an aid to the people affected by conflict and that could no longer wait for border formalities delayed by the Ukrainian customs officers. After “*forcing the border*”, under international pressure, a convoy returned to Russia, Ukraine accusing Moscow that it was just an excuse to extract certain leaders from the conflict area and some weapon systems related to the destroyed airliner.

The international media did not lack information and images, either official ones or directly from Facebook, where several images posted were subject to confirmation or information of identity or participation in certain activities of those who uploaded them.

Therefore, some analysts believe that exposing the hidden reality that was defining the majority pro-Russian Crimea is less dangerous than a federation of Ukraine, in which some regions can later join Russia by referendum.

The risks for Romania

It is obvious that a crisis at Romania’s borders cannot remain without effect and not generate any risks for our country. As in the case of Poland and the Baltic countries, Romania was considered by many analysts as a vital pillar in the geopolitics

³⁰ The chronology of the events is available at <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-28354787>

of the area, significance confirmed by the visits of senior officials and the commitments of NATO/Americans after the crisis³¹.

Romania, a NATO and EU member, with a stable economic situation and an exemplary integration of minorities (although some try to push the Hungarian minority to unrealistic and social tension generating goals) has a border of over 600 km with Ukraine and the risks identified by specialists may be multiple, everything depending on the way in which the Romanian state, with appropriate financial, military and political support, will know how to manage them.

The first risk identified is of territorial nature, through the annexation of Crimea to the Russian Federation. Thus, the discussion will be around the succession of states to the Treaties and the way in which Russia will respect the decision of the International Court of Justice on maritime delimitation in the Black Sea³². As neither Romania nor Russia are states parties to the Vienna Convention from 1978, the positions of the two countries may be different, especially since Russia can argue that this decision does not apply to it. In addition, any matter that reaches the UN Security Council would *a priori* be affected by Russia's veto right³³.

The second risk for Romania is energy related. Romania imports gas from Russia (around 20%), but a possible crisis would not excessively affect our country, as long as it has the internal resources (providing 80% of the necessary energy) and the technology required in order to develop our capabilities through strategic partnerships with specialised companies to extract oil and gas from the Black Sea and exploit the shale gas (an issue provoking a pretty harsh reaction from the civil society). This would give us energy independence and, moreover, under certain conditions, Romania could become an exporter in the EU, limiting some countries' dependence on Russian gas³⁴. In this case, it is considered³⁵ that Russia would not accept the situation and could invoke the Treaty on Friendly Relations and Cooperation between Romania and the Russian Federation³⁶, entered into force on 27 August 2004. In accordance with Article no. 8, the parties will work together

³¹ See George Friedman, *Borderlands: The View Beyond Ukraine*, <http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/borderlands-view-beyond-ukraine#axzz3BIwnmo7w>

³² The decision and the prior trial are available at <http://www.mae.ro/node/2168>

³³ A detailed analysis of this issue, conducted by Radu Dudău and Laurențiu Panchiu, is available online at http://adevarul.ro/international/foreign-policy/cu-rusia-locul-ucrainei-marea-neagra-ramane-exploatarea-resurselor-romaniei-1_53a82bfa0d133766a8d47196/index.html

³⁴ Current estimated level of Romania's natural resources is detailed at <http://www.gandul.info/financiar/harta-resurselor-romaniei-in-cati-ani-se-vor-termina-rezervele-de-gaze-naturale-petrol-si-carbune-11748644>

³⁵ *Ibid*, p. 33.

³⁶ The Treaty provisions can be consulted at <http://www.dri.gov.ro/lege-nr-242004-pentru-ratificarea-tratatului-privind-relatiile-prietenesti-si-de-cooperare-dintre-romania-si-federatia-rusa-semnat-la-moscova-la-4-iulie-2003/>

to protect the nature in the Black Sea, which could cause Russia to consider the oil exploitation in Black Sea by Romania as environmentally harmful. On the other hand, Russia started an “*offensive*” in this field, Gazprom and its subsidiary already possessing several distribution terminals and having big plans for the future³⁷. These things seem to be in line with the points of view expressed³⁸, according to which Russia will try, by all means possible, to influence the policy related to Romania’s energy security and, as a consequence, to influence the political spectrum financially.

The third risk is the economic impact. For now, this impact is not assessed as very serious, the Governor of the National Bank of Romania saying that “*it seems to be manageable*”³⁹. In his opinion, the Romanian exports to Russia and Ukraine are only 4,7% of total exports, so a decrease by 10% in such exchanges would reduce by 0,16% the rate of the GDP growth. The Russian investors have a significant presence in Romania, either directly or through holdings registered in other EU countries, but none of the Russian-owned companies has a “*systemic importance*”, the governor said, referring to the steel industry (Russian group TMK), metallurgy (Alro Slatina and Alor Oradea) and refining sector (Lukoil, which owns the refinery Petrotel-Ploiești). The Romanian banking sector has no direct links with Russia and Ukraine. The banks in Romania do not have Russian or Ukrainian shareholders, and the Romanian banks’ exposures on entities from the two countries are “*negligible*”, the governor said. On the other hand, in Romania there are banks from Austria and France with significant exposure in Ukraine and Russia, and any shock suffered by them can be transmitted in Romania. However, the comfortable solvency and liquidity of the Romanian banking system should cover such risks. In terms of trade relations, out of the total Romanian exports to Russia, 59% are agricultural and transport equipment, 17% processed goods and 13% chemicals. Romania’s imports from Russia almost entirely consist of oil, gas and energy products and various natural resources⁴⁰. Even if the capital market tensions were moderate, we can mention the risk regarding the image of the area, with potential to deter investors, at least in the short, if not the medium term, which may have a significant impact on Romania. In addition, on the one hand, the tourism in Romania, at least

³⁷ An estimation of the future presence in Romania is available at <http://www.agerpres.ro/economie/2013/11/12/interviu-seful-pentru-romania-al-nis-petrol-gazprom-n-a-venit-in-romania-sa-si-risipeasca-banii-12-03-53>

³⁸ See George Friedman, *Borderlands: First Moves in Romania*, <http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/borderlands-first-moves-romaniaaaxzz3BIwnmo7w>

³⁹ Mugur Isărescu, *Romania: Recent Macroeconomic & Banking System Developments*, presentation delivered to the Group of Asian countries ambassadors and available at <http://www.gandul.info/stiri/isarescu-despre-conflictul-rusia-ucraina-romania-nu-este-expusa-la-riscuri-economice-semnificative-12517235>

⁴⁰ *Ibid*, p. 39.

at the Black Sea, can be negatively affected by this crisis, but, on the other hand, the tourists intending to visit Russia and Ukraine can turn to Romania instead.

The fourth risk refers to the Romanian minority in Ukraine. In full conflict, the Kiev authorities expanded the recruitment to the young people without military experience (however, without involving the teenagers of the Ukrainian officials), which triggered protests from the Romanians ethnics consisting in blocking roads, especially after the first two Romanian nationality victims in this conflict were announced. Yet, the dissatisfaction of the Romanian minority in Ukraine, which consists in about 400 000 people, is not new. The Romanian minority supported Viktor Yanukovich⁴¹ in the elections in exchange of a promise that the Romanian language would become an official language, which even happened until 2012, when the law was abolished by the Ukrainian Parliament. Russia, through different NGOs in Ukraine, always supported the Russian-speaking minority rights but also advocated for the rights of other minorities⁴², whilst the general attitude of Ukrainian leaders resulted in the abolition of the law of languages in Ukraine. Romania has a complex issue here and must take a clever position between the two sides, especially because the Romanian minority interests prevail and, like the linguistic rights of the other minorities, they will be subject to a domestic law implementation package at the request and under the coordination of EU experts⁴³.

The fifth risk is related to aspects specific to any crisis with humanitarian consequences. It is very likely that Romania, along with other neighbouring countries of Ukraine, will deal with a wave of refugees from Ukraine, their management being important both for ensuring the necessary living conditions and for setting up a mechanism to allow the return to their home localities after the situation is stable.

The sixth risk is directly related to the influence of the Ukrainian Crisis on the Republic of Moldova and its impact on the status of Transnistria. The territorial integrity of Moldova, a state that has recently signed the Association Agreement with the EU, which is a partner of NATO, would ensure the advancement of Moldova's transformation in its European becoming. Romania has a special relationship with this state and this troubled period has generated different scenarios. There are plenty of visible elements that allow some analysts⁴⁴ to believe that Transnistria will follow the path of Crimea and Moldova the path of Ukraine.

⁴¹ See the comments at <http://www.romaniailibera.ro/actualitate/international/ianukovici-promite-statut-de-limba-regionala-pentru-minoritati-inclusiv-pentru-cea-romana-174462>

⁴² More details in the article at <http://rt.com/news/minority-language-law-ukraine-035/>

⁴³ See more details online at http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/education/minlang/default_en.asp

⁴⁴ A related analysis is available at <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ukraine-crisis-moldova-on-high-alert-as-fighting-intensifies-9325108.html>

References are made to the economic sanctions imposed by Russia to Moldova, the Russian investments in Moldova and the ethnic composition of the population in some regions. Romania will not be comfortable with a new “frozen situation” at its borders, so it needs a proper policy that ensures a favourable development of relations in this area⁴⁵. The relationship between Romania and the Republic of Moldova is seen as a fundamental one, as long as, with Moldova integrated with Romania in the European Union, indirectly, the NATO border would be at about 100 km from Odessa, while Russia, anchored in Transnistria and having access to the Prut River, would remain only a “plain” away from București⁴⁶.

The seventh risk is of military nature. There have not been expressed any opinions that would reflect any direct military threat to Romania, although, a possible expansion of the Russian influence to the Romanian border would definitely determine a different approach to our national security strategy as well as another dimension of our national defence budget. The prevailing opinion is that any military threat will not be perceived as only against Romania, but against the Euro-Atlantic organisation⁴⁷. A response, in this regard, can be considered the Strategic Partnerships between Romania and the United States of America, on the one hand, and between Romania and Canada, on the other hand, and, as a result, the temporary but strong presence in the Romanian military bases/national areas of many supporting elements, such as 6 Canadian F-18 HORNET, NATO ISR aircrafts, NATO ISR/missile carrier ships in the Black Sea, as well as the US steadfast support and its determination to limit the crisis in Ukraine and its effects. On the other hand, located at the confluence of so many “routes”, Romania can become a transit country for the illegal trade in conventional and unconventional weapons, something that, combined with “external” support, would favour the appearance of armed factions, which could attempt to destabilise Romania on ethnic grounds. Moreover, the export of “terrorism” in Romania may be another long-term threat, taking into account, in particular, the long-term ideals expressed by the “Islamic State (SI) – the jihad”.

Obviously there are many more issues to address here, the subject of this article being a vast and dynamic one, but, in a future analysis, some useful considerations can be highlighted from all the above-mentioned ideas:

1. All current aspects of the Ukrainian crisis, combined with the lessons learned from the tumultuous history of the Carpathian-Danubian-Pontic area,

⁴⁵ See also Corina Crețu, *Cât de periculoase sunt efectele crizei din Ucraina asupra României*, <http://www.ziare.com/economie/analiza-economica/cat-de-periculoase-sunt-efectele-crizei-din-ucraina-pentru-romania-1284697>

⁴⁶ George Friedman, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

⁴⁷ Teodor Meleșcanu, interview available at http://adevarul.ro/news/eveniment/adevarul-live-ora-1100-directorul-sie-teodormelescanu-despre-pericolul-unui-razboi-granitele-romaniei-sireimpartirea-sferelor-influenta-europa-est-1_53e0788e0d133766a80546bc/index.html

highlight many visible risks whose effects can be directly identified. However, there may be a variety of other risks in the foreign policy area, which can be difficult to define because of the lack of access to information.

2. The conflict in question has brought to the forefront a new face of the “*Cold War*”, whose principles began to be written after Ukraine lost its “*nuclear power*” status and the seeds of a **multidimensional war/hybrid war** grew in the globalised world. This type of antagonist social phenomenon is a total one, developed more or less discretely, but as hard as a classic one, generating all the conditions for the emergence of the new “*crippled generations*” or “*mentally destroyed populations*”.

3. At the same time, this war will lead to “*further complications*” in addition to the existing ones, because of the global economic interdependency, the diminishing resources available to humanity and, last but not least, the extended financial crisis still affecting most world economies. An example in this respect could be “*porting a geostrategic element in the international financial system*”.

4. At world level, the emergence of a new world power (BRIC) is more than obvious, which begins to gravitate around the China-Russia binomial. The things seem to be clear: China will be the economic engine of the “*new alliance*”, while Russia will be the military pole. However, in the medium and long term, the question arises whether the other emerging countries, parties of this organisation, will approve of this liberalism at macro-state level (placing the community before the individual), based on the freedom and preservation of the multitude of social organisations or will continue be more integrated in the “*Western-type liberalism*”.

Although the international reality is in a continuous motion, sometimes a Brownian-like one, Romania is a solid member of NATO and the EU, with a coherent position, which can be affected in some way, in the current geopolitical and geostrategic context, but still not critically, by the Ukrainian crisis, its profile and its potential developments.



THE APPLICABILITY OF SYSTEMIC ANALYSIS TO SECURITY STUDIES

Brigadier General Dr Andrei-Marius DIAMESCU

The article is dedicated to a critical analysis of the relationship between intelligence and social scientific research. Moreover, the article focuses on the applicability of systemic theory in intelligence analysis, identifying its main avenues of development and the areas of interest for intelligence services, to maximise results and establish a theoretical framework for evaluating security organisations/structures.

The conclusion is that intelligence activities are essentially similar to sociological research and thus strongly influenced/determined by the main theories validated by social and behavioural sciences.

Keywords: *intelligence; sociology; analysis; theory; epistemology; praxeology*

Introduction

Security studies, in general, and intelligence studies, in particular, are part of what is known as *knowledge*. They mainly operate with terms such as adversaries, enemies, hostile groups, organised crime groups, terrorist groups etc. These entities can be defined as social and, as such, are likely objects of research for socio-human and behavioural sciences, for sociology in general.

Intelligence investigations, just like social sciences investigations, focus on discovering the truth and not on producing proof that would justify certain preconceived opinions.

The intelligence activity is not concerned with producing normative judgments, but with collecting, processing and producing information about certain activities. The intelligence

activities and products are mainly practical and applicative, despite the fact that intelligence analysis maintains a theoretical side as it strives to identify

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constants that are similar to the laws of social sciences and to reveal the deeper relations between various variables.

It should not be forgotten that intelligence, just like any other sociological research activity, has its own style of presenting results. Sociological research and intelligence reports do not resemble each other and have nothing in common with any literary genre that entertains esthetic ideas.

1. Intelligence and Social Research

My approach to the relationship between intelligence and sociology is based on the following social research features described by Gary King, Robert Keohane and Sidney Verba in *Designing Social Inquiry (Fundamentele cercetării sociologice)*¹:

1. The goal of research is formulating inferences or, to put it differently, “drawing general conclusions regarding things that are not observable, based on the collected data”.

From this point of view, we can easily trace the similarity between sociological research and intelligence. Moreover, the above-mentioned authors say that scientific research contains two types of inferences: *descriptive inferences* that move from studied cases to similar cases and *causal inferences* that identify the laws behind the observed phenomena, based on the collected information. Both types lend themselves easily to intelligence analysis.

2. Conclusions are uncertain. The above-mentioned authors say, when discussing this feature, which also applies perfectly to intelligence, that although nobody is immune to uncertainty, it is less likely for a quantitative researcher to formulate bad generalisations because he or she works with a high number of cases and must use statistical representativeness. The qualitative researcher, however, is more certain of his or her inferences when observing the behaviour of a person or group of persons with whom he or she had interacted for a long time. Nuances aside, G. King, R. Keohane and S. Verba concluded that any type of social research must estimate the results’ degree of certainty, something that intelligence also does.

3. It is the method, not the material/object of study that makes research scientific. The method or, better yet, methodical thinking “*assures adequatio intellectus ad intellecti* (internal logical coherence) *and adequatio intellectus ad rei* (the concordance between our mental image and objective reality)”, and represents, according to the *Philosophy Dictionary*, “*the most active theoretical aspect of science, the one that defines the path to obtaining new knowledge*”.

¹ Gary King, Robert Keohane, Sidney Verba, *Fundamentele cercetării sociologice*, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2000, pp. 21-23.

² Septimiu Chelcea, *Metodologia cercetării sociologice. Metode cantitative și calitative*, Editura Economică, București, 2001, p. 60.

The method is obviously the element that makes research scientific and sets the results apart from common knowledge, regardless of the object of study, including those social elements that are part of the intelligence sphere, such as the adversary, hostile organisations/groups, organised crime or terrorist groups, spies and espionage agencies etc.

4. The last feature identified by G. King, R. Keohane and S. Verba is the one marking the difference between sociological and intelligence research: public procedures.

To put it differently, since sociology is public, sociological research must be transparent. Otherwise, *“the scientific community has no way of checking the results’ validity”*³.

It is a well-established fact that the methods, techniques and procedures used in intelligence activities and their products are not public. However, this does not preclude them from being highly scientific.

Laymen may find it surprising that the private/secret character of intelligence activities arises not from their methods and procedures, but from the object of study. To put it in a more accessible manner, intelligence methods and procedures are secret in order to give the object of study (hostile persons/organisations, organised crime, terrorist organisations, adversaries/enemies etc.) as few chances as possible of countering the investigation and concealing their activities.

Moreover, the difference between intelligence activities and sociological research is not as clear-cut as it might seem.

Social research results are validated by the scientific community, while intelligence products are validated in two ways: first, through an epistemic evaluation of the results by the intelligence community and, second, by the decision-making community for which the final product is made and which offers praxeological validation.

The critical relationship between socio-human research and intelligence, on the one side, and the four features described by King, Keohane and Verba, on the other, underscores the similarity between the two fields and also the objective need for a scientific approach to intelligence as a prerequisite to maximising both the support it provides to decision-makers and the efficient use of resources.

The scientific approach is currently the most relevant way of knowing the individual and group behaviours, social phenomena and actions of adversaries/enemies. The scientific method ensures the desubjectivisation of knowledge, combines the preoccupation for applying the method of understanding with rigorous

³ Gary King, Robert Keohane, Sidney Verba, *op.cit.*, p. 22.

observation of phenomena and helps achieve the correct view of the surrounding reality, one with less interference from the individual's perception at the senses level.

In order to reach these goals, it is necessary to gain a correct understanding of the influence that theories recognised/validated as true by the community of socio-human researchers have on the scientific knowledge of social processes and individual and group behaviours. By theory (gr. *theoria*, the act of observing; figurative sense: intellectual speculation) "*we understand an act of intellectual creation by which several laws are tied to a principle from which they can be rigorously deduced. In a narrow sense, theory is a group of true statements about relationships between phenomena*"⁴.

Social research benefits from a multi-level theoretical structure that includes, according to Septimiu Chelcea, *major theories*, such as determinism, interactionism, structuralism, functionalism, phenomenology etc., *medium-level theories*, such as social mobility, and *theories with a minimal level of generality*, such as empirical statements that are true "*here and now*".

Each of these theories is useful in the field of intelligence because they can define avenues of research and adding scientific value to products. I consider the following theories to be relevant for increasing the scientific level of intelligence services from both the chronological point of view of their development and their applicability to intelligence activities:

- deterministic theory;
- interactionist theory;
- systemic theory, which can be essentially seen as a combination of structuralism and functionalism that suits the current realities.

The growing complexity and the accelerated dynamics of the security environment underscore the importance of the systems theory in understanding and countering the various risks and threats to the national and international security.

2. Applicability of Systemic Theory in Intelligence Analysis

Security, seen here as a state of balance and optimal functioning of a system (individual, community, society), generated by the absence of factors (sources) that produce dysfunctions, seems to lend itself well as a field of study to the systemic point of view. This method has already been chosen by most of Romania's post-1990 analysts, who defined security as "*an ensemble of actions and their results designed*

⁴ Septimiu Chelcea, *Inițiere în cercetarea sociologică*, Editura Comunicare.ro/cursuri universitare, București, 2004, pp. 20-21.

to keep a national entity functioning within certain parameters that do not endanger its state, nor its position relative to other structures⁵.

The method was influenced by the existence of organisations and the development of local capacities to relate to it. The systemic method does not focus on identifying laws, but on creating models of the studied objects, which are seen as organisations, in order to obtain a unified interpretation of these organisations and their specific traits.

In the past decade, systemic analysis became the most popular tool in security investigations.

In a repeat of the systemic analysis's own crystallisation process, the first step for security researchers was to create models of structures, producing what became known generally as *structural analysis*. Later, experts developed ways of modelling the mechanisms that allow organisations to function. This method is known as *functional analysis*.

The creation of theoretical models for several types of systems started from the differences between the internal and international security organisations.

Today, we are several stages into the development of model construction concepts, while theorists distinguish between several generations of explanatory models. These models are used to:

- explain possible changes in internal and international security organisations;
- estimate possible developments in case of pressure or in the case of generated or involuntary changes of the internal or international environment;
- estimating possible solutions in order to overcome unwanted internal or external situations.

A distinction must be made between two major approaches to systemic analysis:

- one that focuses on linear analysis and which assumes that the modelled object is subject to causal interpretation relations (deterministic);
- another that focuses on analyses based on organisations whose properties are not limited to their components' properties. These organisations are more than the sum of their parts.

It should be noted that systemic analyses conducted in the field of security, and not just security, should be considered separately from models, the latter not being exclusively system-based. Given the two major types of approaches, it is quite clear that terms such as models, modelling and simulations are also used in the case of causal interpretations.

However, the field of security has produced complex models, such as those used in *The Day After* exercises, which require participants to get involved and to make

⁵ Simion Boncu, *Securitatea europeană în schimbare, Provocări și soluții*, Editura Amco-Press, București, 1995, p. 21.

decisions in order to control situations and preserve states deemed desirable or favourable by decision-makers.

Returning to the classification of approaches mentioned above, one should not forget that Raymond Boudon had warned about the most tenacious and entrenched of all the prejudices about change, namely the impulse to explain the state of a system at a “*t*” moment based exclusively on the system’s state at “*t-1*”. Ion Aluș and Traian Rotaru, in their preface to “*Raymond Boudon – Texte sociologice alese*”, synthesise Boudon’s arguments thus: “*first, the future state of a system cannot always be foreseen because the process in which the system is involved may sometime include open situations (...)*”.

Second, the determinist-mechanistic solution regarding change is rejected on grounds that many social changes are the result of innovations that, once again, cannot always be predicted.

The third objection to narrow determinism is, in the case of social sciences, what he calls the Cournot Effect, meaning that type of hazard that occurs when two or more causal series meet. Even if each sequence’s phenomena can be predicted, the meeting of sequences at a random moment in time will generate an unpredictable phenomenon”⁶.

I think the influence the 11 September terrorist attack against the USA had on the current shape of the international security system is a relevant application of Boudon’s argument.

And even though the French sociologist was a fierce critic of determinism, he still made a very lucid evaluation of the current and foreseeable possibilities of investigating the social aspect in general and expected this activity to retain in the future its empirical-descriptive character, which focused on explaining processes instead of postulating a course a priori. For this reason, it is crucially important to perfect and coordinate the methodological procedures and investigative techniques of organisational-institutional structures – for all aspects of social life, including the military.

The high diversity of organisations and their aspects has led to the development of many types of systemic analyses based on practical components. These analyses focused on concepts such as complexity, systems, structures, functional relationships, dysfunctional relationships, regulatory mechanisms, types of regulations, system statuses, system entries/exits, status networks, role networks etc.

It is the range of concepts used by systemic analysis that underscores its suitability to organisations, regardless of their fields of action. This type of analysis is recommended for studying national and international security institutions

⁶ Raymond Boudon, *Texte sociologice alese*, Editura Humanitas, București, 2000, pp. 159, 165.

and organisations. However, given the fact that almost all these organisations belong to a macrosocial field (national or international), the systemic paradigm becomes useful in investigating the sources of security/insecurity.

When rigorously applied, this paradigm allows the construction of security environment evolution analyses. The supposed connections between the security organisations and institutions, between the social life aspects that impact the nation's fundamental interests and between the international actors demand the creation of models that take into account every part of the paradigm and can provide relevant explanations only when taken as a whole.

Using the concepts of *system entries and exits*, we can model the relationships between several variables and their security consequences.

If the current organisation of the *National Security System* is coherent, unified and designed to satisfy the Romanian people's need for security, as a social necessity, it must be shown that the systemic analysis must consider at least two types of structures:

1. The structure of statuses and roles networks which the organisation uses to act in order to satisfy the nation's internal and external security needs. This structure can explain the organisation's *raison d'être* and its effectiveness in relation to the stated purposes. It can include:

- national security analysis components, which define the organisation's specialisation;
- solution design components for performing its national security duties;
- project evaluation and optimal implementation methods components;
- solutions implementation components.

Depending on the security environment's complexity at a given moment and on the existence of priorities, other components may emerge within these structures with the purpose of optimising decision-making flows or focusing the organisation's efforts toward certain targets.

2. The structure of statuses and roles networks which the organisation uses to manage itself (this structure could be called logistics). It includes:

- material components that ensure the functioning of both structures;
- personnel management components;
- information resources management components;
- financial resources management components;
- components for managing relations with other organisations;
- other components required for the effective functioning of the two structures⁷.

⁷This version is an adaptation to the field of security of the theoretical model proposed by Lucian Culda in *Dimensiunea epistemologică a interogării existenței sociale a oamenilor*, Editura Licorna, București, pp. 261-262.

I think that this framework, used as a theoretical guideline, could offer enough information for security studies to include explanatory, critical and constructive parts. A good argument supporting this statement is the adopting by many experts (mostly from the field of international relations) of the term security architecture. This term naturally requires a systemic-based view of the object of study.

A brief analysis of the aspects revealed by the theoretical framework, aspects that could prove relevant for evaluating a security organisation, results in the following definitions:

- clarifying the national (military) and security interests that the organisation aims to satisfy;
- the organisation's capacity to identify and define the security needs of its chosen field (military);
- the state of the first structure's components and features by means of which the organisation aims to satisfy the security needs;
- the effectiveness of strategic decisions designed to make the organisation functional and efficient, thus making sure that it can perform the job it was created for;
- the features and functioning state of the logistic structure that ensures organisational vitality;
- the types of dysfunctional manifestations and their consequences for organisations.

In the case of systemic-based investigations, the critical component of an intelligence product is used to improve the understanding of dysfunctions in the organisation under scrutiny. However, systemic analysis is not limited to identifying dysfunctions. The final part of every study is, or at least should be, the constructive component because it alone can justify the previous components, give them a practical value and prove the praxeological value of the systemic theory. In fact, it is this very aspect that gives the highest relevance to the use of systemic theory in intelligence and counterintelligence.

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RUSSIA AND THE PIVOT TO ASIA (I)

Silviu PETRE

Under the catchphrase “pivot to Asia”, the Obama Administration signalled not necessarily an original philosophy but a renewed commitment to channelling American resources from Europe and the Middle East towards Asia. What is far less taken into consideration is Russia’s pivot to Asia, crafted especially during President Putin’s past decade under the grand strategy of rebuilding former Soviet sphere of influence. Contrary to the common view that the Kremlin lacks the soft power dimension and only resorts to threats and energy blackmail, Asian countries prove such assertion wrong as they are more and more courted by Russian diplomacy and investments.

In recent years, Russia has made its presence felt in Kabul, Ulan Bator, Islamabad, Dhaka, and Naypyidaw. The article analyses Moscow’s approach to such actors in the region.

Keywords: *Russia; Vladimir Putin; pivot to Asia; Afghanistan; Mongolia; Pakistan; Vietnam*

Introduction

The “*pivot to Asia*”, a phrase launched by US President Barack Obama, has highlighted one of the prerequisites for geostrategic success in the 21st century, namely the presence in Asia. The change in the focus and priorities of diplomacy at the White House has generated a mimetic process for other important actors in the region, Russia included. Following the post-Soviet decades when the Kremlin focused its attention on traditional interlocutors, be they friends, foes or clients, for several years it has tried to complete the puzzle with *rimland* actors, namely those on the Indian Ocean Coast. Such actors, be they Pakistan, Bangladesh, Vietnam, Myanmar or even Sri Lanka, have come to the fore in a game in which politics tries to be coextensive with geography.

In June 2013, at the *Sankt Petersburg International Economic Forum*, President Vladimir Putin exposed his own version of the pivot to Asia, stressing the imperative to focus attention on the Asia-Pacific

region to benefit from the financial opportunities deriving from the situation¹. Moreover, the discourse of the President of Russia sought to distance from what was considered the Western analysts obsessive idea, namely the rivalry

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¹ For further details on the Russian *ostpolitik* in the Asia-Pacific area see also Alexander Panov, *Integration of Russia into the Asia-Pacific Region (2013-2020 outlook)*, Russian International Affairs Council, 2 April 2013.

between Moscow and Beijing, the above-mentioned official stating that: “*We are not frightened. China does not worry us... Russia and China cooperate on many questions*”². However, besides bravado, the Russian people collective psychology establishes its azimuths based on an inventory of fears. Therefore, ever since its birth, it has felt the pressure of the huge space bounded by the West and the Pacific, space that it has been forced to gradually absorb to resolve the threats to its security; the saga of conquering own fears has become one of glory justified, many times, in mystical, pravoslavnik terms³. However, if expansion seems to have been the *longue durée* pattern of the former Tsarist Empire, resumed after 1917/1921 under the mantle of communist missionary activities, in the short and medium term, Russia has been rather forced to choose between the two above-suggested civilisational poles: the West and the steppe (the Tatar heritage). The fabric clothes, tailored following the minimalist fashion of the 19th century, or the sable fur, with all the invoked imaginary⁴. That being said, the immediate or better to say

² Fiona Hill and Bobo Lo, *Putin's Pivot. Why Russia Is Looking East*, in *Foreign Affairs*, 31 July 2013.

³ Marlene Laruelle, *Russia's National Identity and Foreign Policy toward the Asia-Pacific*, in *The ASAN Forum*, 25 January 2014.

⁴ Analyst Sergei Medvedev from Higher School of Economics, Moscow, considers that the oscillation between the West and the East is but a consequence of the existence of two cultures in the Russian *psyche*: Culture I and Culture II, both having as variable the huge area of the country. According to Medvedev, Culture I is equalising, non-hierarchical, looks to the future and desires the breach with the past, the rejection of tradition, sometimes in violent forms. Peter the Great reforms, Gorbachev's Perestroika or Boris Yeltsin's pro-Western orientation are all included here. Culture II is, on the contrary, hierarchical, authoritarian, centralising, exalting fixity and population homogeneity, all under the idea of eternity, the end and religion. It alternates with the first, trying to correct the former abuses. In the modern period, it is expressed in rejecting the Western way, clinging to nationalism and promoting orthodoxy. Why is a Meiji reform package impossible in Russia? Medvedev asks rhetorically. His answer is related to the vast area that imparts lack of measure to elites and induces irresponsibility. Sergei Medvedev, *Power, Space, and Russian Foreign Policy* in Ted Hopf (ed.), *Understandings of Russian Foreign Policy*, The Pennsylvania State University, 1999, pp. 15-57, esp. 30-32, 49-54.

Not in a complete different manner, Andrei Tsygankov focuses on the continuity in Russian diplomacy during the Soviet period up to the troubled decade of the '90s. Tsygankov divides the Russian national identity in three states of aggregation/modalities, each having a different azimuth. *In the first group* there are the Westerners, a current personified by characters such as Peter I, Alexander I, Gorbachev or Yeltsin, believing in the European vocation of Moscow. *In the second category* there are the pragmatists and statists, who propose a rather conservative vision of the status quo, among them being the Soviet leaders during the *Cold War*. *The third group* is represented by the representatives of civilisationism. In their opinion, Russia is an entity separate from the West and it should behave accordingly. They embrace a type of messianic, often radical, diplomacy. Among them, Lev Trotsky and Eurasianists such as Alexei Dughin can be mentioned. As Medvedev, quoted above, Tsygankov believes that, in the post-Soviet period, the Westerners were glorious between 1991 and 1993. Then, the disappointment related to NATO enlargement and the nationalist parties revival has brought to the fore the representatives of pragmatism and civilisationism, Andrei P. Tsygankov, *Russia's Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity*, Third Edition, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2013, 1-8, 40-50 and *passim*.

not too far vicinity has been largely neglected in post-Soviet years. Since 2010 things have changed and the Russian envoys are present in office in Islamabad, Colombo, Naypyidaw or Hanoi.

The present article will focus on these small and medium actors rather than on the great powers with extra-regional potential (China, India, Japan).

Russia in Afghanistan

Nothing can better illustrate the relativity of the phrase *great power* than the ungovernable regions, the true black holes of geopolitics, which absorb huge resources from the international community. Like Vietnam, which limited the US direct military involvement in the world and contributed, by ricochet, to the fall of the Bretton Woods system, Afghanistan accelerated the collapse of the Soviet sphere. Today, 25 years after Russia withdrew from Afghanistan, it is forced to drive the haunting memento away to consider the rules of engagement in the post-ISAF future.

The Afghan nemesis is related not only to terrorism (which, for many countries, is not a real threat) but also to heroin trafficking all over the world:



Source: *International Heroin Trafficking Flows*, Office of National Drug Control Policy, apud Drug Enforcement Administration – DEA, see <https://www.ncjrs.gov/ondcnpubs/publications/policy/99ndcs/figihtf.html>

In numbers, the Afghan opium production means 36% of the country's licit GDP, i.e. 2.6-2.7 billion \$. The area cultivated increased from 29 000 hectares (1986) to 104 000 hectares in 2005, says a World Bank study⁵. The peak was reached

⁵ Edouard Martin and Steven Symansky, *Macroeconomic Impact of the Drug Economy and Counter-narcotics Efforts, Afghanistan: Drug Industry and Counter-narcotics Policy*, World Bank Report, see <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/0,contentMDK:21133060~pagePK:146736~piPK:146830~theSitePK:223547,00.html>

in 2007 when the acreage became 25 times higher than in 2001! Russia itself felt shock waves, absorbing 25% of the Afghan heroin and 15% of the Afghan opium channelled through the northern route. What is worse is the transition of Russia from a transit to a consumer point!⁶

Immediately after September 11, among the first heads of state who called George W. Bush to offer aid was his counterpart, Vladimir Putin⁷. For the next decade, Russia proved to be an available partner in collaborating on the complicated issues in Central Asia. Its airspace was used to transport more than 379 000 people, military personnel included, and more than 45 000 containers in more than 2 200 flights, according to the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs of the US Department of State, 2012⁸.

However, the US withdrawal, far from being regarded with joy from Moscow, as those who are interested in the crisis in Ukraine might expect, has a negative connotation. From now on, Russia and its protective cordon formed by the Central-Asian republics might turn to the situation in the '90s, when the collision between the Chechen terrorists and al-Qaeda maintained a climate of instability. Moreover, the military caste around Putin regime has no inclination to deploy contingents in Kabul and Helmand to continue the work left unfinished by *ISAF*, writes Mihail Rostovsky for *Moskovsky Komsomolets*⁹. All that can be hoped is that the new Abdullah Abdullah Administration will have more legitimacy than that of Hamid Karzai and will succeed in standing on own feet with minimal help from the international community¹⁰.

Russia in Pakistan

The relations between Moscow and the state established by Mohammed Ali Jinnah have never been extraordinary. On the *Cold War* chessboard, the Indo-Soviet friendship pushed Pakistan towards China and the United States. The bilateralism between Moscow and Islamabad reached its nadir following 1980, when the latter became the second front and the logistic warehouse of the Mujahideen that fought against the Spetsnaz troops¹¹ in the arid Afghan climate. After the collapse

⁶ Ekaterina Stepanova, *Afghanistan after 2014: The Way Forward for Russia*, IFRI, May 2013.

⁷ Fiona Hill, *Putin and Bush in Common Cause? Russia's View of the Terrorist Threat after September 11*, Brookings Institute, Summer, 2002.

⁸ *US–Russia Cooperation on Afghanistan*, US Department of State, 18 June 2012.

⁹ Judy Dempsey, *Russia's Concern for Afghanistan after NATO*, Carnegie, 5 March 2013. Dmitri Trenin, *Russia and post-American Afghanistan: Focus on Drugs and Central Asia*, Carnegie, 21 October 2013.

¹⁰ 28 July 2014.

¹¹ Ardeshir Cowasjee, *A Recap of Soviet-Pakistan Relations*, *Dawn*, 12 March 2011.

of the USSR, Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif tried a diplomatic thaw, but with limited success. Another moment that provided the opportunity of *rapprochement* was represented by the nuclear tension between India and Pakistan (1998-2001). In May 1998, both South-Asian nations conducted nuclear tests, which was a cause for the international community concern. In the next year, Pakistan attacked India on the Tiger Hill, Kargil, offensive countered by the latter numerically superior troops. For almost a year, the common border (*Line of Control*, in established terminology) was crowded with the troops of both nations, stuck in a clash no less dangerous than the Cuban missile crisis (October 1962). President Putin rallied to the multilateral conciliation effort. He tried, by meetings with President Musharaff and Prime Minister Vajpaae, to distil the conditions of a consensus, without any significant progress.

If the relationship with India continued at a privileged temperature, as before, the one with Pakistan returned to the common coldness. A second moment of relaxation loomed in 2007 when Pakistan denounced terrorism, and Russian Prime Minister, Mikhail Fradkov, paid a three-day visit to Islamabad, the first visit of any Russian official in the last 38 years. The departure of Musharraf and the arrival of the couple Asif Ali Zardari – Yousef Raza Gilani, President and Prime Minister, marked the upward course of the relations with Moscow. Putin regime has been very careful so that the good offices cannot spoil the relationship with India, as *Ria Novosti* mentions in 2010. The scruples of this kind have not seemed to be a priority lately: the importance of Pakistan for post-2014 Afghanistan rewrites the geopolitical combinatorics in the region and the great powers are ready to work with the actors in the area to ensure stability in the Hindu Kush Mountains.

Therefore, in May 2011, Russian General-Colonel Alexander Postnikov visited Pakistan and his gesture was replicated by the Chief of the Great General Staff (at that time), General Asfaq Parvez Kayani, event largely discussed in the international media¹². Also in 2012, the first *Russian-Urdu Dictionary* appeared, a sign of cultural intimacy, at least in elitist circles¹³.

Lately, the most recent gesture is related to the decision of Russia to lift the embargo on arms supplies to Pakistan. According to Sergei Chemezov, Director of *Rostec*, the country plans to sell M-35 helicopters to Pakistan. Analysts have different opinions on the topic. While some of them warn about the possibility of irritating India, others think that fear is not justified, especially since both Islamabad and New Delhi buy American weapons without qualms of conscience. The Russians

¹² Baqir Sajjad Syed, *Kayani to Visit Russia from Oct 3*, *Dawn*, 29 September 2012.

¹³ Qaiser Zulfiqar, *Bridging Cultural Borders: First-ever Urdu-Russian Dictionary Launched*, *The Express Tribune*, 2 August 2012.

movement in this case is twofold: 1) to compete with the Chinese equipment, which has a near monopoly on the Pakistani market in the field; 2) to equip the Pakistani troops to fight against the Taliban guerrilla¹⁴.

Russia in Mongolia

The interaction between the Russian and Mongolian people has largely defined the Eurasian physiognomy in the past millennium. *À la longue durée*, the combination of the two is a memento of empires waving: if, at a definite time in the past, Genghis Khan regime coagulated the largest dominion known in history, its rapid decline favoured Russia to revenge and expand. In modern Tsarist era, Mongolia, the state that formerly had global ambitions, was controlled by Sankt Petersburg. At the end of the First World War, when China organised a foray outside its northern borders, the Soviet Union intervened and thus the Mongolian People's Republic was established in 1921. From that point on, the relations have remained cordial overall and have survived Socialism.

The resumption of dialogue was achieved in stages: first, it was President Putin visit to Mongolia, in November 2000, then the Mongolian President Nambaryn Enkhbayer visit to Russia. The first resulted in the *Ulan Bator Declaration*, and the second in the *Moscow Declaration*, in December 2006. Three years later, there were already regular meetings between presidents and prime ministers. In late August 2009, President Dmitry Medvedev signed a strategic partnership document with his southern counterpart.

Shaking hands were followed by military exercises and cooperation in defence matters. The first joint actions took place in 2002 and they were repeated for a decade. Between 3 and 10 September 2011, *Selenga 2011* was conducted, which involved 500 troops on both sides and 200 artillery pieces¹⁵.

Selenga 2014 took place between 15 and 29 August at the Munkh Khet range in Dornod Aimag region and involved more than 1 000 troops, a double number compared to the just-mentioned exercise.

As the tensions between Russia and NATO have escalated, following the Ukraine crisis, the *Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)* conducted, in August, the largest military exercise in its history, reuniting 7 000 troops from China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The show of force, called *Peace Mission 2014*, took place before the SCO Summit in September, in Dushanbe,

¹⁴ Zachary Keck, *Russia Ends Arms Embargo against Pakistan*, *The Diplomat*, 4 June 2014. Saurav Jha, *Russia's Strategic Pakistan Play*, *The Diplomat*, 31 July 2014.

¹⁵ Roger McDermott, *Russian-Mongolian Defense Cooperation and Selenga 2011*, in *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, Volume: 8, Issue: 172, 20 September 2011.

when it was speculated that Mongolia could join the organisation. The elite in Ulan Bator considered the offer with reservation for at least two reasons: 1) SCO is regarded as a dictators club, and Mongolia has proved to be a functional democracy since 1991 and 2) once caught in such multilateral arrangement, Mongolia cannot preserve the present freedom of action in foreign policy¹⁶.

Finally, the focus of the SCO Summit between 11 and 12 September was the issue of security, the Russian and Chinese representatives stating that Afghanistan should become a stable and “*self-reliant*” country that does not depend on NATO/ISAF presence. Moreover, the participants attacked NATO missile defence system. As far as enlargement is concerned, India, Iran and Pakistan will join the organisation in 2015¹⁷.

Following 1991, Mongolia has shaped a dual profile on the Asian scene: 1) developing country ready to exploit its generous mineral resources and 2) peace broker, available in the settlement of international disputes.

In the past decade, Mongolia has had one of the highest GDP growth rates in the world: 18-20% annually! However, as it often happens, the benefits of prosperity are not evenly distributed, but depend on some urban centres, in this case the capital. Many people from the countryside come to Ulan Bator hoping for a better life. Statistics confirm it: if, in 1989, 26.8% of the population lived in the capital, in 2006, the percentage was over 38% to reach 45% in 2010¹⁸.

The economic development is due, to a significant extent, to mining, an activity on which international companies are more than ready to capitalise (hence, perhaps, the nickname of *Minegolia*). Coal, oil, molybdenum are only a few of the substances that ensure a place on the entrepreneurship map.

The country’s uranium deposits are of particular interest in this context. They are found especially in the northern and south-eastern parts of the country, in four regions: Mongol-Priargun, Gobi-Tamsag, Khentei-Daur and Northern Mongolia, and the exact points are: Dornod, Gurvanbulag, Nemer, Mardaingol, Ulaan, Kharaat, Khairkhan, Nars, Dulaan Ul, Ulzit, Gurvansaikhan, Zoovch Ovoo, totalling 135 000 tons in 2013, according to the information from the Ministry of Mining¹⁹. The richest drilling wells are: Dornod: 28 868 t; Gurvanbulag: 16 073 t


¹⁶ Joshua Kucera, *Russia and the SCO Military Exercises*, in *The Diplomat*, 28 August 2014.

¹⁷ Shannon Tiezzi, *The New, Improved Shanghai Cooperation Organization*, in *The Diplomat*, 13 September 2014.

¹⁸ Ariunaa Norovsambuu and Tirza Theunissen, *Mongolia’s Economic Boom*, in *The Diplomat*, 30 January 2013.

¹⁹ There are still debates on the quantum of reserves. However, the official cited below (see note 20) indicates 135 000 tons, Oxford Business Group mentions 80 000 tons, while the Russians identify a quantity between 120 000 and 150 000 tons. *Nuclear Plans: Uranium Deposits Have Opened up New Opportunities*, The Report: Mongolia 2012, Oxford Business Group.

and Zoovch Ovoo: 54 639 t. The Mongolian legislation considers uranium as a strategic reserve and does not allow the foreign participation in a percentage of more than 34%²⁰.



Source: Jonathan Watts, *Gobi mega-mine puts Mongolia on brink of world's greatest resource boom*, in *The Guardian*, 7 November 2011

The first mining prospecting was conducted in the '50s and the '60s, with Soviet help. In 1956, the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research in Dubna, near Moscow, started to train Mongolian engineers²¹.

Since 1995, the Mongolian Government has concluded several agreements with different states or international economic agents to develop the particular sector. In 2009, *Monatom*, a state company, was established, and the *Law on Nuclear Energy* was promulgated. Among the first names in uranium mining sector is *Areva*, which came to Mongolia in 2006 and received 28 exploitation licences on an area of 14 100 square kilometres. The Mongolian party signed two treaties with the Russians, in 2009 and 2010, and a year later, the joint initiative *Dornod*

²⁰ Baatarsogt Baldorj, Ministry of Mining, Uranium Resources and Reserves Mongolia, Interregional IAEA-CYTED-UNECE Workshop on United Nations Framework Classification for Fossil Energy and Mineral Reserves and Resources – 2009 (UNFC-2009), Applications in Uranium and Thorium Resources: Focus on Comprehensive Extraction, Santiago, Chile, 9-12 July 2013 (pdf presentation).

²¹ Uranium in Mongolia (Updated August 2014), World Nuclear Association.

Uranium was established. 49% of the shares are owned by the Russian company *Atomredmetzoloto*, the remaining shares being owned by *Monatom*²².

In the Soviet period, the Mongolian economy was not more than the Soviet/Russian economy appendage. Overall, the Soviets completed 720 projects, including the power plants in Darkhan and Erdenet, the mines in Baganuur, Aduunchuluun and Sharyn Gol, as well as 1 000 kilometres of roads.

Once Vladimir Putin Administration was in office, the links between Moscow and Ulan Bator were revitalised. In 2000, the new Russian head of state visited the southern neighbour and, two years later, in March 2002, Prime Minister Mihail Kasyanov became the first Chief of the Cabinet who visited Ulan Bator after 1971. During the third meeting, in June 2003, Putin reaffirmed his country interest in the Central-Asian state, in the talks with Prime Minister Nambaryn Enkhbayar. Several months later, in December, the Kremlin removed almost the entire debt of 11.4 billion rubles owed by the Mongolian partner²³.

Russia's task to keep Ulan Bator as a *hinterland* could be neither easy nor successful in the short and medium term. Always caught between the giant neighbours, the country of former khans seems ready to capitalise on the opportunities provided by globalisation to overcome geographical fatality. The *third neighbour policy*, as it is called by analyst Dmitri Trenin²⁴ describes President Elbegdorj diplomacy as being driven by links with external actors, from the United States & Canada to North Korea, as well as by the availability to mediate some conflicts or to deploy troops in UN-led peacekeeping operations²⁵.

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In the second part of the paper, the author will present aspects regarding the geostrategic importance of some countries such as Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Vietnam.

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²² The Report: Mongolia 2012, Oxford Business Group, *op. cit.*

²³ Sergei Blagov, *Mongolia Drifts away from Russia toward China*, The Jamestown Foundation.

²⁴ Dmitri Trenin, *Mongolia's Third Neighbor*, Carnegie, 4 October 2013.

²⁵ Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj, President of Mongolia, to the Diplomatic Corps on the Occasion of the Presentation of New Year's Greeting, The Office of the President of Mongolia, Public Relations & Communications Division, 15 January 2014.

Considering only peacekeeping troops, Mongolia has deployed 8 000 troops since 2002, being the 26th-largest number of troops globally and the 2nd-largest number of troops from Asia, an important effort, taking into account its population of 2.6 million people. Mongolian troops have taken part in UN-led missions, OSCE exercises, or joint exercises with the USA. Christopher Pultz, *The Role of Peacekeeping in Mongolia's Military Strategy: A New Paradigm for Security*, The National Bureau of Asian Research, Asia Policy 17 (January 2014). J. Berkshire Miller, *Mongolia: More than just a Courtesy Call*, *The Diplomat*, 4 April 2014.

WE ARE CONTINUALLY AT WAR BUT WE WISH TO BE AT PERPETUAL PEACE

General (r.) Dr Mihail ORZEAȚĂ

Fight for more power and influence in international relations is the most frequent cause for violent conflicts and crises among states and communities.

The world faces more and more violent conflicts and crises, although most political leaders consider negotiation is the best way for solving disputes among states and communities.

There are more and more crises that are not really settled, thus becoming frozen or dormant conflicts that last for decades.

Ethnic and religious intolerance has reached the level in the Middle Ages or the Nazi period, summary executions, torture, ethnic and religious cleansing being some of the methods employed by different groups.

Keywords: *crises; conflicts; international security; use of force; New Cold War.*

1. The Armed Peace

The world we live in is the scene of the fight for power and influence in all the areas of human activity. This way of living has been a constant of human existence and it is likely to remain so as long as humankind exists because human beings want to impose their will on their human fellows not only in individual but also in intercommunity relations.

In the first years after the end of the *Cold War* the fight for power and influence in the international community was mainly subversive as bipolarity was replaced with unipolarity, namely the hegemony of the USA¹, which became the sole superpower in the world.

The global economic-financial crisis, started in 2008, and the US economic decline were among the most important causes that favoured the initiation

of the process of transition from unipolarity, plastically described by former US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, by the expression: *“We are the indispensable nation. We are great”*² to multipolarity, suggestively characterised by another former

General (r.) Professor Dr Mihail Orzeată, former Deputy Chief of the Romanian Armed Forces General Staff.

¹ William Pfaff, *The Question of Hegemony*, in *Foreign Affairs*, January-February 2001, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/56654/william-pfaff/the-question-of-hegemony>, retrieved on 19.12.2014.

² Franz Nuscheler, *Multilateralism vs. Unilateralism, Policy Paper 16 of the Development and Peace Foundation*, Bonn, January 2001, p. 4, http://inef.uni-due.de/page/documents/pp_16_en.pdf, retrieved on 04.01.2015.

US Secretary of State – Hilary Clinton – using the expression: “*It’s true that America can’t solve every problem, but I don’t know any major problem in the world that can be solved without us*”³. However, this process is, as Joseph Nye, Professor at Harvard Kennedy School, states, one whose duration cannot be predicted. In this regard, he mentions the Roman Empire, which continued to influence the world for three centuries after its apogee, as well as the British Empire, which continued to be one of the important powers in the world even after it lost the American colonies. Moreover, the distinguished Professor states that, in the current world of information, cyber insecurity and power diffusion between state and non-state actors, transition could be different from that imagined by the other states that compete for power in international arena⁴.

Great powers, through their global interests, “*feel compelled*” to get involved – politically, diplomatically, financially, economically and militarily – in almost all the crises in any region of the world, be they internal or between states. They want to permanently expand their influence or at least to maintain the influence they have on other states of the world. While trying to meet this goal their interests clash and those who suffer most are the states and communities that are the subject of dispute.

The security interests of states are specific and relatively constant, but it is not the same with their allies (friends), fact that guides actions in relation to other states. To support their interests, in the medium and long term, states employ flexible foreign policies (which are considered double standard⁵ by some experts), namely they initiate and denounce treaties and alliances to meet the set objectives.

It is alarming that there are more and more crises and they are not really settled by using force, but they become frozen or dormant conflicts or insurgencies

³ Paul Lewis, *Hillary Clinton Backs ‘Smart Power’ to Assert US Influence around World*, in *The Guardian*, 13.01.2009, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jan/13/hillary-clinton-confirmation-hearing-senate>, retrieved on 29.12.2014.

⁴ Joseph Nye, *Commentary: American Power in 21st Century*, Harvard Kennedy School, <http://www.hks.harvard.edu/news-events/news/news-archive/american-power-21st-century>, retrieved on 29.12.2014.

⁵ Hans-Christof von Sponeck, *The Dangerous Double Standard*; article published in *Current Concerns*, no. 1/2007, Zürich, Switzerland, see <http://www.currentconcerns.ch/index.php?id=2012>, retrieved on 01.09.2014 (Only if we have common interests we can eliminate double standard in international relations, states Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary-General); see also Owen Bowcott, *US Accused of Double Standard at UN*, article published in *The Guardian* on 12.09.2002, retrieved on 19.08.2014; see also Judy Dempsey, *Judy Asks: Should America Spy on Its Allies?*, the article, published in *The Christian Science MONITOR*, 16.07.2014, available at <http://carnegieeurope.eu/2014/07/16/judy-asks-should-america-spy-on-its-allies/>, retrieved on 19.08.2014; see also Susan Ratcliffe – editor, *Oxford Essential Quotations, Lord Palmerston – Speech, House of Commons, 1 March 1848*, Oxford, 2012, ISBN 9780191735240, available at <http://www.oxfordreference.com/q-oro-ooo1818130/> (Lord Palmerston, former UK Prime Minister, appreciates that states do not have permanent friends, they have only permanent interests), retrieved on 24.08.2014.

that last for decades, as it happens between the Indians and the Pakistanis since 1947, between the Israelis and the Palestinians since 1948, between the Turks and the Greeks in Cyprus since 1974, in Afghanistan since 2001, in Iraq since 2003 etc.

Another concern is the relevance of the UN. Officially, the world organisation has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security through the Security Council. In reality, the activity of this UN body is disrupted by the disagreements between states⁶, especially between the great powers that exercise their veto when they consider their interests are affected, action through which they are above the world organisation and, implicitly, disregard international community⁷.

The increase in the number and area of the regions affected by violent clashes has prompted the international community to organise different missions such as military observers, peace-keeping, peace-enforcement or reconstruction ones. Following the international community involvement in resolving crises and conflicts, peace is maintained using weapons by contingents of troops under UN, OSCE, EU etc. mandate. From the Balkans to Southeast Asia, the map of the world looks like a mosaic made up of areas of relative peace, frozen (dormant, latent) conflicts and areas where guns speak and the international community ... is silent or hardly effective.

In the era of globalisation, information, important scientific progress as far as macro- and microcosmos are concerned, an era when there are a lot of organisations whose main mission is to ensure global security (UN) or regional security (NATO, OSCE, CSTO – Collective Security Treaty Organisation, Arab League, African Union, ANZUS – Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty, ASEAN etc.), more and more communities choose to employ violence to settle their disputes. Ethnic and religious intolerance has reached the level in the Middle Ages or the Nazi period. Summary executions, mass murder, prisoners torturing and killing, rapes, destruction of localities, forced removal of ethnic (ethnic cleansing) or religious (religious cleansing) groups from a given territory have been the methods employed by the fighting groups in the Balkans⁸, Chechnya⁹, Georgia (Abkhazia

⁶ Madeleine Albright, *Who Broke the UN?*, in *Foreign Policy*, 13.08.2012, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/08/13/who-broke-the-u-n/>, retrieved on 19.12.2014.

⁷ George Friedman, *Russia and the United States Negotiate the Future of Ukraine*, the article, published by *Geopolitical Weekly* on 01.04.2014, available at <http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/russia-and-the-united-states-negotiate-the-future-of-ukraine/>, retrieved on 02.12.2014 (In the *Cold War* period, the foreign ministers of the USA and the USSR used to meet and negotiate the result of crises and even the fate of some countries.).

⁸ Jeffrey D. McCausland, *Rebuilding Security and Confidence in the Balkan Region*, București, 2000, p. 25.

⁹ Peter Boukaert, *War Crimes in Chechnya and the Response of the West*, *Human Rights Watch*, 01.03.2000, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2000/02/29/war-crimes-chechnya-and-response-west>, retrieved

and South Ossetia), Ukraine¹⁰, as well as by the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)¹¹, to defeat their opponents.

2. What Does the Future Hold in Store for Us

Will reason take precedence over emotion in international relations? Will the political leaders of the great powers in the world understand that a civil crisis should be resolved employing non-military means? Why do they employ military means to resolve non-military crises (political, social, economic etc.)?¹² Aren't there enough lessons of history to teach us that the reason of force will generate frozen conflicts while the force of reason will, very probably, lead to negotiations and peaceful resolution of crises and conflicts? Could the financial interests of armament manufacturers be more powerful than the interest of the communities to live in peace and stability?

It seems that some political leaders fear of losing their social position exceeds the ordinary people power of understanding. It seems that we, ordinary people, are not aware of the fact that power corrupts¹³ and that is why we want political leaders to answer our questions. Unfortunately, the provided answers are less than the asked questions and they are not convincing.

What will happen? Will violence diminish in international relations? Will a new *Cold War* or even a new World War break out? How much and in what way is the public interest important for political leaders? How much and in what way are ordinary people – their needs, desires and expectations – important for political decision-makers?

on 16.12.2014; see also John Sweeney, *Revealed: Russia's Worst War Crime in Chechnya*, in *The Guardian/The Observer*, 05.03.2000, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/mar/05/russia.chechnya>, retrieved on 16.12.2014.

¹⁰ Damien Sharkov, *Ukrainian Nationalist Volunteers Committed 'ISIS-Style' War Crimes*, *Newsweek*, 10.10.2014, <http://www.newsweek.com/evidence-war-crimes-committed-ukrainian-nationalist-volunteers-grows-269604>, retrieved on 16.12.2014.

¹¹ Ralph Ellis, *UN Panel Details ISIS Abuses in Syria, Says They Amount to War Crimes*, *CNN*, 14.11.2014, <http://edition.cnn.com/2014/11/14/world/meast/isis-war-crimes/>, retrieved on 16.12.2014.

¹² Benaisha Daruwalla, *The Wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and US Use of Military Force*, E-International Relations, February 2012, <http://www.e-ir.info/2012/02/18/what-impact-have-the-wars-in-afghanistan-and-iraq-had-on-the-willingness-to-utilise-military-force-to-advance-us-foreign-policy-objectives/>, (*"In 2003, Time Magazine asked the readers all over the world to answer the question 'What is really the greatest threat to global peace in 2003? Iraq, North Korea or the USA?'. There were 7% votes for North Korea, 8% for Iraq, and 84% votes for the USA"*), retrieved on 30.12.2014.

¹³ *Power Corrupts*, *The Phrase Finder*, <http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/absolute-power-corrupts-absolutely.html>, retrieved on 29.12.2014; see also John Antonakis, *Does Power Lead to Corruption?*, in *The Guardian*, 17.12.2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2014/dec/17/does-power-lead-to-corruption-research-testosterone>, retrieved on 29.12.2014.

Although the experts in international relations and security warn about the danger of a new *Cold War* breaking out, the US President Barack Obama¹⁴ has contested such a prediction. Initially, the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, also disapproved of the hypothesis of a new *Iron Curtain*¹⁵, but, after the G20 Summit in Brisbane/Australia, when he was asked to withdraw the support for Ukrainian separatists, he declared that the West was provoking Russia into a new *Cold War*¹⁶.

All these considered, we wonder how we can understand the new provision in the new military doctrine of Russia through which NATO is considered the main threat to the Russian Federation?¹⁷ What about the economic and political sanctions imposed on Moscow by NATO, the EU and other US allies? What about the plan to isolate Russia?¹⁸ Isn't it a variant of the containment policy adopted by the USA in its relations with the USSR in the *Cold War*, during 1947-1991?¹⁹

Quo vadis, Domine?

English version by
✍️ *Diana Cristiana LUPU*

¹⁴ Megan Fitzpatrick, *Russia – Us Relations Are Chilly, But Is This Another Cold War?*, article, published by *CBC News* on 31 July 2014, available at <http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/russia-u-s-relations-sre-chilly-but-is-this-another-cold-war-1.2723056/> (Obama: *Russia is not the leader of any coalition/alliance and it does not have a global ideology to promote, as the Soviet Union did in the Cold War.*), retrieved on 11.08.2014.

¹⁵ Konstantin Fets, *Russia Has No Intention of Building a New Iron Curtain, Says Putin, Russia beyond the Headlines*, 24.11.2014, http://rbth.co.uk/politics/2014/11/24/russia_has_no_intention_of_building_a_new_iron_curtain_says_putin_41637.html, retrieved on 03.02.2015.

¹⁶ Simon Tisdall, *The New Cold War: Are We Going Back To Bad Old Days?*, in *The Guardian*, 19.11.2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/19/new-cold-war-back-to-bad-old-days-russia-west-putin-ukraine>, retrieved on 30.12.2014.

¹⁷ Maria Tsvetkova, *Russia's New Military Doctrine Names NATO as Key Risk*, *Reuters*, 26.12.2014, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/26/us-russia-crisis-military-doctrine-idUSKBN0K40Q120141226>, retrieved on 27.12.2014.

¹⁸ Roberta Rampton, *Biden warns Russia will be isolated if Ukraine crisis not resolved: US official*, *Reuters*, 3 March 2014, <http://news.yahoo.com/biden-warns-russia-isolated-ukraine-crisis-not-resolved-174333462.html>, retrieved on 03.01.2015; see also Timothy Heritage and Vladimir Soldatkin, *Putin Looks to Asia as West Threatens to Isolate Russia*, *Reuters*, 21.03.2014, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/21/us-ukraine-crisis-russia-insight-idUSBREA2K07S20140321>, retrieved on 03.01.2015.

¹⁹ *MILESTONES: 1945-1952, Keenan and Containment, 1947, US Department of State, Office of the Historian*, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/kennan>, retrieved on 04.01.2015.

ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY THREATS TODAY AND IN THE MEDIUM TERM

Colonel Dr Gheorghe BĂJAN

Motto: *“The world will not be destroyed
by those who do evil, but by those who watch
them without doing anything”.*

Albert Einstein

The article focuses on the global strategic trends today and in the medium term as well as on their effects and implications in relation to the security environment. The trends are mainly associated with demographics, environment, globalisation and the new world order, technological development, terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, resources and energy security. Their effects on the civil system, economic system, security environment, maritime environment and military environment are analysed. In conclusion, it is shown that the response to security threats, including the provisions relating to the use of force, should be adapted to the new realities.

Keywords: *security threats; global strategic trends; areas of instability; cyber security; climate change*

General overview

The threats to the security environment in the early decades of the 21st century are related, globally, to various uncertainties, be they regional, religious, ethnic, economic or social, to which are added terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, drug trafficking, globalisation, global warming, natural or man-made disasters and others, leading to new policies addressing defence by moving the effort from territorial to non-territorial defence.

The deterrence and defence missions planned at national or allied level have lost much of their significance. The operations in Iraq (1991), Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo or the most recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan marked the beginning of such trends. Moreover, threats also include uncertainty and instability within and nearby the Euro-Atlantic areas and, unless actions

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to counter or prevent their effects are taken, they could evolve rapidly and generate regional crises at the periphery of NATO or the European Union member states. There are countries that face not only serious economic, social and political problems but also ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, negative results of inadequate efforts in reform processes, human rights abuses. Failure or delay in their settlement may result in state dissolutions, which, from local level, could generate instability at regional level or even lead to armed conflicts.

Therefore, we consider that security policy should be understood flexibly, allowing for a vast array of possibilities to militarily or non-militarily settle the differences and, in the worst case, the consequences of security violations caused by organised crime, disruption of vital resources supplies, or uncontrolled exodus of a large number of people, which have become more serious after the events on 11 September 2001.

The traditional face to face confrontation between armed forces has been replaced with complex combinations of actions, law enforcement and peacekeeping activities, and military and economic measures. New types of technology, including bio-technology, which have been adopted or are to be adopted by some armed forces wishing to develop their capabilities to respond to the changes related to conducting a future conflict, will also directly influence the ways of action of a potential hostile force.

Since the end of the *Cold War*, the types of performed operations have changed and adapted to meet the tasks related to humanitarian and rescue, peacekeeping, crisis management, stabilisation and reconstruction missions. In parallel with the changes in the security environment, there has been a fundamental shift in the understanding of humanitarian intervention by international public opinion. Moreover, the greater emphasis placed on human values and human rights has contributed to the new concept of *humanitarian intervention*, relying on the assumption that the international community has an interest to act as a whole, for reasons that have nothing to do with supporting the status quo or maintaining security. Humanitarian intervention is now seen as an appropriate response of the international community to serious human rights abuses and injustices it cannot afford to ignore.

The marked contrast with the *Cold War* period, when there was a single threat and the response forms were more or less identical, requires a common understanding of security threats. Cooperation, at the level of international, governmental and non-governmental bodies and organisations, will be one of the biggest challenges in the coming years. The need to respond differently will be one of the factors that should not impede the progress of any alliance, and the results should provide

each member with unequivocal security advantage. To develop such capabilities investment is necessary, not only financially but also politically, to deal with risks other than those associated with the “*monolithic threat of the Cold War*”.

Strategic trends in approaching developments

Starting from the intelligence community assessment, according to which it is impossible to achieve an estimate based on “*intelligence*” beyond the time horizon of 10 years, and from some military analysts assessments completed in collaboration with academic representatives and other structures capable of relevant contributions (political, economic, banking etc.), we can identify a set of trends in the evolution of the elements that will have a direct impact on the continuation of life as well as their implications for security.

They concern the evolution of global factors, they are not exhaustive, and they are elements that stimulate the debates on the future and the possible solutions to the problems they may generate.

The trends are associated with issues related to demographics, environment, globalisation and the new world order, technological development, terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, resources and energy security. Furthermore, they will have effects on and implications for the security environment through a series of influences on some states and areas such as: environment, urbanisation, metropolises failure, recruitment, security of natural resources, media monitoring, information operations, unconventional actions, clash of civilisations and transnational terrorism, technologies without human operators, nuclear proliferation, imposing the will of the great powers etc. Briefly, the essence of each strategic trend and the associated implications are discussed in the following trinomials:

a. Birth rate – young population exodus – recruitment

It is estimated that 90% of population growth will have its origin in the very high birth rate in poor and developing countries, and the young generation, over-numeric, in a context of high unemployment and lack of an effective education system will be forced to emigrate to areas, regions or countries that can provide minimum living standards. This “*artificial demographic explosion*” in connection with “*active population aging*” and “*increasing imbalance between labour force and pensioners*” will have direct implications for social, economic and even military activities, especially at regional level. The armed forces of countries facing a small young population will have difficulty in recruiting both numerically and qualitatively. The conditions under which young people (especially local ones) study will determine not only entering the increasingly competitive labour market at a later age but also using military technologies on a larger scale, in parallel with recourse

to *recruiting* immigrants, foreign military personnel, or employing private military companies. The challenges of recruiting may lead to the need to reassess the role of conscription.

b. Environment – limited natural resources – energy security

The consequences of climate change will be more dramatically perceived in developing countries, both in urban and rural areas, being estimated that, by 2030, 2/3 of the world population will live in areas facing water shortages. The effects of natural disasters, compounded by those caused by uncontrolled exploitation of forests, inappropriate technologies for extracting energy resources, industrial pollution and other human activities, will increasingly influence living conditions.

Given that fossil energy sources together with alternative ones will be able to cover anticipated increases in energy consumption, we can say that the 21st century will witness a new revolution in energy. Professor Jeremy Rifkin considers that *“hydrogen will be the new inexhaustible source of energy and hydrogen-based economy will be the great technological revolution of the century, with multiple effects, not only in terms of sustainable development and democratic relations in society strengthening but also in military equipment development”*.

Key natural resources such as oil, gas and mineral deposits of strategic value will continue to be operated in areas marked by instability. To maintain access to them, to secure areas at risk and to avoid the situations of instability expansion will become key requirements of the planning process, regardless of the nature or scope. They will be accompanied by measures meant to development and stabilisation, and when natural resources are located in areas where the security situation is uncertain, military intervention may be necessary to protect the integrity of infrastructure and investment.

The increasing complexity of the environment in which future conflicts will be conducted will require a quasi-total presence of the media and the rapid exchange of information through Internet services. Moreover, the simultaneous approach at different levels to multidimensional missions will be a challenge for the armed forces required to operate under these conditions, thus imposing the adoption of new tactics and specialised equipment, up to the highest levels of decision. Military personnel, at all hierarchical levels, will need to know the legal implications of their actions and to be trained on the basis of well defined objective and authoritative doctrines. The variety and changing nature of the environment in which they operate may require intense training and the existence of special qualities in order to have well trained military forces capable of victory in these circumstances.

c. Globalisation – world order – imposition of will

The process of globalisation will continue to generate advantages and disadvantages. The imbalance between the income in developed and poor countries maintains, while developed countries and their economies will become increasingly interconnected. In the not too distant future we may witness the phenomenon of absorption of policy by economy as a result of promoting the interests of certain nations or corporations at the expense of others. Moreover, losing control of key economic or social decisions will reduce the sovereignty of the state and the alleged business and market ethics will be nothing but a scam. Trade will be free only for the rich, the only ones able to enjoy unrestricted freedom of movement. The rich are global and poverty will occur locally. As a result, the hungry desire to go to areas where the existence of decent living conditions is not a problem is natural, acknowledged, but not unconditionally accepted by those who do not fall into this category. Can thus freedom of movement be considered the most important achievement of globalisation and the guarantee of prosperity?

We will witness increasing global interdependence, growing complexity of relations between states, and the effects, beneficial or otherwise, of changing the global strategic balance by countries like India and China. Under these conditions, the provisions of international laws on the use of force should be adapted to these new realities.

Imposing the will of the great powers or “*soft power*”¹ will increasingly influence the achievement of some tasks by using the access to target audience, by projecting a certain culture, investment, types of education or other non-coercive means. It could be an alternative to employing military as an instrument of power, which will be easily accessible to non-governmental actors or civilian power structures to meet their political, economic or ideological goals or ambitions.

d. Technological development – network development – robotisation

Access to technology will tend to globalise, reducing (but not eliminating) the existing differences between societies. Thus, dual-use technologies (civilian and military) will benefit less technologically developed societies, especially by being able to produce low-cost and innovative applications. Globalisation of markets and information actually encourages reduced state sovereignty, territorial division and identity segregation, and the use of technology will mean for the rich² more opportunities to make more money.

¹ ACT, *Multiple Futures Project*, Second Report to Military Committee, May 2008.

² The 350 richest people in the world have as much wealth as the 2.3 billion poorest.

Technologies without human operators will contribute to reducing the risks soldiers are exposed to, ensuring, at the same time, a wide array of capabilities and increasing the range of them, even in hazardous or extreme environment. They will also ensure the capacity for permanent monitoring of remote or hostile areas. Under these circumstances, it is possible that, at some point, the problem of legal consequences and ethical implications can arise when deciding to use automated systems, particularly robots, to respond to threats. The 21st century is expected to be marked by new dynamics in terms of progress, no less spectacular than in the 20th century in terms of scientific discovery and technological innovation, which can also provide means to counteract the negative effects of the processes meant to promote the sustainable development of the global economy and the society as a whole. Biotechnologies³ and nanotechnologies⁴ will also be domains that will highly impact technological progress and living and health conditions improvement, and new developments in information technology will facilitate access to education, knowledge, and sources of information for the purpose of democratisation and raising standards in the young generation education and training.

e. Terrorism – religious extremism – nuclear proliferation

Terrorism, especially transnational one, will continue to be nurtured, to find justification in political motivation, inequity and different types of frustrations, and it will extend beyond the borders of poor countries or instability areas.

Actions of extreme violence, staged and executed by elements with a radical ideology will continue to persist. They will use complicated networks and exploit international media to maximise the impact on the population, seeking political destabilisation. This type of actions will be concentrated in developing countries, where they can take advantage of weak political regimes and become popular among disadvantaged population with high social needs.

The increase in the number of countries with access to nuclear weapons, some of which being recognised as “*hosts (Havens)*” of terrorist groups or organisations will affect the ability of global military powers to undertake interventions. Security operations against personal or authoritarian regimes will entail specific risks, which can be considered, to some extent, in the case of the states that have chemical, bacteriological and radiological capabilities.

³ The use of living cells, bacteria etc. to make useful products for agriculture, food industry and pharmaceutical industry.

⁴ Manipulation of matter on an atomic and molecular scale.

f. Urbanisation – migration – metropolis

It is likely that by 2015, more than half of the world population will live in the city, and the number of metropolises with over 10 million inhabitants will reach 23, 15 of them located in developing countries. Water shortage, insufficient means of subsistence and health care will be greatly aggravated by population migration, forced to leave their places of origin from a variety of causes that have been mentioned above. The necessary services to be provided, lack of jobs, inefficient education system, correctional system and, last but not least, the population security will be priorities that, if not met by local authorities, will generate as many types of threats that, initially, will have effects at regional and state level. Urban population density and complexity limit and even reduce the degree of mobility and of effectiveness of precision weapons, communications systems and elements of surveillance, data collection from open or human sources and their transmission. Sophisticated capabilities will be needed to identify the regions on cultural bases, to ensure utilities and public services simultaneously with conducting precise combat actions against insurgent groups.

g. Media monitoring – information actions – unconventional operations

The expansion of the media, in all its forms (audio, television, internet, print) will not only have an impact on all aspects of life but will be influenced by the innovative use of personal devices that will further complicate the way perceptions, expectations and opinions take shape. Thus, in hostile or conflict environments it will not be possible to exploit traditional media techniques, which will enable unfiltered news to play a significant role in influencing opinion, the truth becoming increasingly subjective. Under these circumstances, governments, political parties and administrative structures will be subject to ongoing monitoring and challenged. There will also prevail the capabilities that will allow information and cultural operations and will exploit the qualities offered by digital information (versatility and ability to disseminate) in order to enjoy political or commercial advantages.

Additionally, the threat of unauthorised access to networks and information manipulation will be more frequent and intense as criminal elements will enter new markets. Military communications systems should include robust and generalised protection measures, options to lower the speed of traffic to ensure communications under jitter in networking conditions and unrestricted access to space dedicated platforms. By expanding information globally, the known, traditional, geographic environment will be replaced with cyberspace. Its main feature is the lack of space dimension as well as the unique temporality (the instantaneous transmission) and, therefore, by interconnecting computers worldwide, the relationship here/there cannot be seen in opposition. The fact that technology shortens spatiotemporal distance

has led to the human condition polarisation and, thus, the new elite will have greater mobility and freedom of movement, and, financially, power becomes really extraterritorial.

In the absence of open conflicts, such as state against state, from a military perspective, unconventional activities will prevail and will be mostly related to crime, terrorism, public disorder, insurgency, all fuelled by current or generic frustration, shortcomings, resentments or reactions to other factors. There will also appear actions of groups sponsored by states that, in order to impose some interests or preserve some advantages, will use intermediaries exploiting the weaknesses of the international system without directly exposing to the risks of an open conflict, state against state. Armed criminal elements, terrorist or insurgent groups trained and experienced in different global conflicts, knowing no other reason to exist than fight, will cover most of the global landscape, requiring their identification and effective countering.

Current sources and areas of instability

A regional analysis, in terms of the way the imbalances and national or group interests may increase and tend to cause instability, is presented below.

Southeast Europe will remain a potential source of instability that threatens Europe, specifically in the Western Balkans, with two centres of gravity, namely Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. Despite a period of 12 years of monitoring, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the effects of political and economic reforms are still expected and Kosovo remains a haven for drug trafficking and organised crime, despite the declaration of independence and the transformation from a failed state in a European welfare state, an EU protectorate.

Eastern Europe will remain a potential source of instability that threatens Europe, specifically in Ukraine, with the two centres of gravity, namely Crimea and the two declared autonomous republics. Moreover, there are the problems between the two republics, Moldova and Transnistria.

South Caucasus will have a vital strategic importance to NATO and the EU, as the main supplier of gas and oil to Europe, on the east-west axis. The region also serves to force projection in Central Asia and to transport support to Afghanistan.

Central Asia is strategically interesting for three main reasons: *first*, for its significant reserves of oil and gas; *second*, the fact that new oil products transport projects will significantly change the flow of energy resources, which will affect the regional balance; *third*, the fact that the existence of an ideological vacuum in terms of jihad could create a breeding and refuge ground for Islamist terrorists. It is estimated that Germany and the USA, along with several other Alliance

member states, have the most favourable position to engage the region, NATO being already involved by *PfP* programme.

South Asia can be considered a strategically important region for several reasons. One is that it supports NATO operations in Afghanistan. The activity in Pakistan has a direct impact on the *ISAF* mission. Moreover, the relations between the two nuclear states, Pakistan and India, remain tense and their observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation Council will remain important. Maghreb is strategically interesting because of its geographical proximity (14 km from the Strait of Gibraltar), population migration, and the fact that it represents a potential area of terrorism development.

Sub-Saharan Africa, although not significantly strategically interesting for the Alliance, is involved in the logistic support of the African Union operations in Darfur. The African continent in general is an area of economic interest to many developed countries in Europe that continue the exploitation of resources, as an extension of the traditional relations in the colonial period. On the other hand, a large number of countries are in an area of instability and, against a background of poverty, the state power institutions are not in control or they have a fragile control. According to some less optimistic analysts, there are premises for Africa to become a failed continent in the future. Therefore, we can say that this region represents a priority interest for the European Union. A supporting argument is the large number of military and civilian missions under the aegis of the EU, in Guinea Bissau, Chad, Congo, Sudan, Somalia etc.

Gulf region will continue to be an area of strategic interest as a major source of oil and a platform of cultural, political and economic specific elements that can be capitalised on to conclude agreements in order to avoid conflicts.

Far East is important as a trade partner but, currently, there is little hope to achieve consensus in NATO in this respect. For the moment, engagement in the Far East is left to member states, particularly the US and EU multinational bodies.

Latin America is of less interest for NATO. That is because, currently, it does not represent any threat. One cannot exclude the possibility that Latin America could become a breeding ground for future terrorist organisations. Now, here are engaged, through bilateral agreements (in varying degrees), the United States, Canada, the UK, Spain, Portugal and France.

Terrorism

The failure to provide a single definition of terrorism has led to confusion and division of views within the Alliance. Some states consider that combating terrorism is a police mission, while others consider it a major risk that requires military countermeasures. No other organisation can provide a clear definition

of terrorism. That is why, it is often referred to as “*Islamist-fundamentalist or fanatical threat*” and “*actions of terrorist groups*”, terrorism thus being considered a generic threat.

Terrorism, as the main threat affecting the security environment at strategic level, should be examined considering the nature, value (individual, group or network) and motivation of participants. As a result, defining terrorism should be the first step towards addressing the threat in a coherent and coordinated manner. Currently, there is no universally accepted interpretation of terrorism at the UN level either. Terrorism is manifested by the deliberate use of force or threat of force against civil society and other non-combat objectives to produce a psychological effect (fear, intimidation, insecurity) in order to influence the attitudes and behaviour of a wider target audience, to achieve political or ideological goals. Once a common definition of terrorism is accepted, the next step is to classify the types of terrorist groups in order to assess the threat and develop the right approach.

Energy security

Modern society is increasingly dependent on energy in almost all human activities. That is why energy security is so important. By 2030, energy consumption will be provided at a rate of 33.8% by oil, 27.3% by natural gas, 15.5% by solid fuels, 12.2% by renewable sources, and 11.1% by nuclear sources.

Europe will continue to be largely dependent on external supplies to meet its energy needs. Overall, the EU relies on Russia to import 30% of its necessary oil and 50% of natural gas. Seven Eastern European countries assure 90% of their necessary oil from Russia, and six EU member states are totally dependent on Russia for natural gas.

It is more than likely that, in the future, Russia will follow a strategy to increase Europe’s dependence on Russian energy resources in order to achieve economic and political benefits.

Given the dependence on imported energy, it is clear that the restricted access to energy resources represents a threat to the continent’s security.

Defining energy security is a crucial first step to meet the challenge. The first oil crisis in the post-1973 period, after the Arab-Israeli war, put energy security and, above all, supply security at the centre of energy policy agenda in most industrialised nations. Since then, policy makers and analysts have tried to provide a definition of the concept of *energy security* and its implications. The European Commission defines energy security as “*the ability to ensure that future essential energy needs can be met, both by means of adequate domestic*

worked under economically acceptable conditions or maintained as strategic reserves, and by calling upon accessible and stable external sources supplemented where appropriate by strategic stocks⁵. Thus it refers to maintaining reliable energy supply at reasonable prices, and it is an international problem that necessarily involves an increase in interdependence between main producers and consumers. No country or region can ensure energy security independently. Therefore, addressing security energy should include partnerships. In this respect, the relations with Russia and the countries bordering the Caspian Sea are important, but they should not exclude relations with the Middle East or Norway. Given the huge geological reserves, the Middle East will remain an important player in energy policy in the future. The decrease in demand and the diversification of both types and sources of energy are at the heart of energy security.

NATO should get involved in ensuring the security of critical energy infrastructure through the conclusion of firm agreements with the states in the Gulf, particularly under the auspices of the *Istanbul Cooperation Initiative*, the *PfP* and partnerships. It is also necessary to develop and maintain military capabilities to ensure the “key” infrastructure security, namely the pipes and strategic transport routes (especially in the Mediterranean, the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, the Strait of Hormuz and the Arabian Gulf).

Cyber security

Many attacks on NATO or the Allies information systems demonstrate unequivocally that states and/or non-state adversaries try to exploit the Alliance growing dependence on information systems. One of the reasons why they try to use strategies of this kind is to counter NATO’s superiority in traditional weapons. It is no secret that modern warfare is increasingly dependent on high-performance computers and interconnected networks, and the Alliance and the armed forces of member nations rely more and more on the digital age for information superiority.

The operations in cyberspace, which involve the use of computer networks, their exploitation and protection, represent a new challenge for allied security, even if the first manifestations of this type of threat emerged in the last decades of the 20th century. It is estimated that cyber war has existed since the ’90s but, considering the threat of terrorism and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it has increased in intensity after the events on 11 September 2001. “*Cyber attacks get manifest by actions such as cyber terror, hacking, cracking, cyber spy, which can grow in scale and size becoming cyber war*”⁶. The attacks on the financial sector in Estonia (October 2007),

⁵ *European Security Strategy*, December 2003.

⁶ Tom Young, *Cyber War Moves up NATO Agenda Increasing Coordinated Assaults Are Alarming Defence Ministers*, Computing, 1 November 2007.

when the two main banks (representing two thirds of the industry) could not provide their *online* services for nearly 24 hours, led James Lewis, Director of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies to declare that “*cyber attacks will be an essential part of conflicts in the future and, therefore, the potential use of computers as a weapon should not be ignored..., and, currently, there are about 20 nations that are developing the abilities that allow for gaining military advantage*”. Given this context, it is clear that cyber attacks are a critical element of the new strategic environment.

The computer system that dominates our times requires redefining the term “*armed attack*”. Thus, so that a cyber attack can be interpreted as a declaration of war involving armed intervention, Thomas C. Wingfield presents the argument of “*considering the amount of resulting damages following the attack*”⁷. To exemplify, he points to the effects of using a “*2 000 pound*” bomb and those of introducing a “*virus*” in a network that is essential to the functioning of a state. As other arguments that should be considered the following are mentioned the “*action severity*” or, more specifically, the number of people killed and the “*violation of sovereignty*”.

The European Journal of International Law suggests that “*a cyber attack that intentionally compromises the control system of a chemical or biological plant, and, as a result, causes the release of toxic gases over large population centres, is more likely to be considered the legal equivalent of an armed attack*”. Moreover, it is mentioned that “*a one-time computer attack against the financial markets of Wall Street, causing a crash, or the penetration and theft of classified top-secret information from defence department databases, might by itself be sufficient to constitute an armed attack*”. “*Perseverance*” can be considered an armed attack in the case of low-intensity attacks against a state’s financial markets that produce intermittent interruptions or cause the theft of sensitive (albeit not top-secret) information. Despite these arguments, cyber attacks cannot be interpreted, at NATO level, within the scope of art. 5, as there are several networks even from within the member states that “*attack*” in various forms. As a counter-argument to describing a cyber attack as an armed one is the fact that it is almost impossible to determine the identity or affiliation of the attacker. It is true that identifying the attacker is difficult but not impossible. In fact, the challenge should lead NATO to develop effective techniques to determine the source of attacks.

Cyber operations are attractive to many countries or different actors, including terrorist organisations, as they may be conducted with low cost, low risks and high effectiveness. They may ensure the attacker’s “*success*” and “*anonymity*”

⁷ See the *United Nations Organisation Charter*.

by routing the operations to the final target, through compromised servers in the Internet network. “Malicious source code” may launch viruses, block networks, alter data, access information, spread false information and interfere with information that is vital to military operations (e.g. those in C3, navigation and logistics). Connecting to network may also mean vulnerability. *The tens of thousands of attacks that are annually launched against the allies lead to the idea that the 21st century begins with a cyber war.*

In conclusion, the only way to counter cyber attacks is to secure systems. Securing systems should be permanently “updated” so that it cannot be penetrated. In this regard, there are two accepted approaches: first, the more solid the system of each nation is, the more protected the Alliance will be; second, a solid system can be obtained only by the cooperation of international organisations and specialised institutions to jointly develop an effective protection system.

Space security

The military approach to the threats to the space dimension in the area of interest should start from international laws⁸, from the fact that, currently, about 19 000 man-made flying objects⁹ are launched into space, and from the existing military space technology¹⁰. Given that over 500 satellites are used for military purposes to cover domains such as navigation, surveillance, imaging, as well as communications and meteorology, it is no doubt that space is a key element of the strategic environment. In general, these activities are considered beneficial and non-aggressive. In fact, these systems are critical to the civil sector, especially for airspace management, maritime navigation, road transportation and for tracking shipping as well as for weather forecasting.

To address threats in space, they should be first defined. Subsequently, specific protection capabilities as well as countermeasures should be identified. Moreover, it is necessary to reconsider some areas of interest that directly address the reduced capacity for cooperation and coordination of the allied effort in space and the lack of coordination during the negotiation of the services that are provided by civil society.

⁸ *Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space* (1967), *Rescue Agreement* (1968), *Convention on the International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects* (1972), *Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space* (1975), *Moon Agreement*, forbidding the use of civil space equipment for military purposes (1972).

⁹ More than 12 000 are inoperable and only 2 000 can be controlled.

¹⁰ In the field of satellite communications/SATCOM (Italy, France, Luxemburg, the UK, the USA) and commercial (INMARSAT); in the field of intelligence/MAJIIC (France, the UK, the USA); in the field of meteorology, oceanography and navigation (GPS); in the field of ballistic missile defence (France, the UK, the USA); in the field of force warning/FFT; in the field of warning (ACCS/ALTMBD Programme, NBCR Programme).

A strategic approach to outer space should include national and multinational programmes to allow further development of the European satellite system “Galileo”, the sensor-based space surveillance and, last but not least, the further development of the communications by satellites to meet NATO requirements.

Climate change¹¹

Temperature records since 1850 show that the last 12 years were the “hottest” and the last 50 were abnormally hot, being also registered as the “hottest” in the last 1 300 years. Global warming will produce severe weather changes, will lead to sea level rise at an unprecedented rate in the last 3 000 years, temperatures will increase by 2-5 degrees Celsius, which will cause major heat waves, floods, prolonged droughts etc.

The main reason underlying global warming is the atmosphere pollution because of greenhouse gases. According to studies, the level of these gases today is higher than the total emissions over the last 650 000 years (approximately 1 000 tonnes of CO₂/second are emitted into the atmosphere). The latest studies have shown that the United States emits the largest quantities of greenhouse gases and estimated that in the near future, China will surpass the US in the field. One of the most disastrous effects of global warming is the polar ice cap melting.

Following the calculations made by some scientists it is expected that, by 2020, the polar ice cap will disappear during the summer, which will allow the deployment of maritime traffic in the area. The effects of the polar ice cap melting will cause the sea level rise by 10-20 cm per year, which, in time, will affect the systems and environments that ensure the functioning of society, in general, as well as the domains that manage security, in particular. The disappearance of the Arctic Sea ice raises serious security and sovereignty problems for the five nations around the Arctic ring and for the indigenous people seeking the right to a share in the Arctic territories.

Nations are in constant competition not only to have access to new maritime trade lines and vast energy reserves, but also to control the waters of Northern Canada, which can also serve as space for illegal activities (trafficking in human beings, weapons, drugs or terrorist activities). Canada, Russia and the US are the major powers seeking to seize some of the new areas in the Arctic Sea resulting from the ice disappearance. Thus, these nations invest in geological research, in surveillance and combat equipment, and adapt their ways of managing

¹¹ *The Age of Consequences: The Foreign Policy and National Security Implications of Global Climate Changes*, 2007.

operations, introducing more exercises, flights, and exploration missions in the Arctic area, using capabilities that are specific to this area.

A classification of climate change effects is related to a variety of areas and aspects that can be associated to the civil system, the economic system, the security environment, the marine environment and the military environment, which are briefly examined as follows:

❖ **Effects on the civil system**

Annually, 300 million people are victims of floods (Bangladesh and the East Coast of India could be completely flooded). Polar bear as well as polar fauna will disappear with the disappearance of the polar ice cap. It is well known that it reflects 80% of the solar energy that penetrates the atmosphere and, therefore, its disappearance will accelerate climate change and the sea level rise. Each day when snow melts the ice reduces by 5 centimetres, which affects polar flora and fauna. As Arctic coastlines disappear the life of the communities living in the area is endangered. Mankind will face a water crisis and an energy one, and millions of people will be forced to migrate to survive as huge territories will become simply uninhabitable. There will be extreme temperatures day and night, winter and summer, strong winds and abnormal weather phenomena, prolonged droughts, floods, devastating storms and record temperatures (with their adverse consequences: fires, frosts). Springs will start earlier and autumns will arrive later, disorder that increases by 2 the number of weeks when snow melts. It is estimated that, by 2020, about 40% of the world population will live in countries that will face acute water shortage problems.

❖ **Effects on the economic system**

The displacement of huge pieces of ice will be a real threat to navigation and offshore drilling platforms. Crops will be increasingly affected when the planet is already overpopulated. The danger of geopolitical conflicts on resources and emerging territories is imminent. Sea salinity will decrease, which will affect not only ecosystems but also a large part of food resources and thus means of livelihood. The sea level rise will also affect agriculture in the coastal region, reducing arable land. Drought will lead to the lack of water for irrigation, which, together, will reduce strategic stocks of food etc.

❖ **Effects on the security environment**

Climate change may lead to new threats that could affect national and international security environment. They can manifest as natural and man-made disasters of a higher intensity than current ones and can lead to increased political instability, not only in the regions where social problems are beyond the government capability

to solve but also in those that are stable. Stability and security should be maintained where they exist and implemented where they are not.

Climate change, environmental security and energy dependence are closely related representing global challenges for all countries. Climate changes will result in changes in the consumer society, increasing poverty, migration, unemployment and lack of drinking water and food, situations that will create favourable conditions for the development of extremist and terrorist actions.

❖ **Effects on the maritime environment**

Marine environment as well as coastline is directly related to climate. Oceans, via marine currents, are important distributors of heat from the Equator to the poles. This movement of marine currents will be affected by the massive melting of the polar ice cap and will have dramatic effects on marine flora and fauna, salinity, ecological balance etc. The process of erosion of coastlines will intensify and they will partially or totally disappear in some estuaries, fjords or isles so that coastline economic activities (transport, fishing, tourism etc.) can be affected.

❖ **Effects on the military environment**

Nations should engage in seeking the solutions that are needed to reduce the effects of global warming in order to prevent and avoid global security and stability alteration. Many military objectives are located in coastal areas and may be affected by the sea level rise or the storms caused by atmospheric changes.

Military operations will become increasingly difficult and the military personnel from the military bases to be affected should be evacuated and moved to other places that should be identified or designed. In order not to affect the response time of the military forces and capabilities, plans should be developed and the optimal modes of action should be identified so that these military objectives can be stronger. Last but not least, it should be considered the fact that the use of military equipment under extreme atmospheric conditions requires considerable cost for adaptation and maintenance. The foreseeable consequences of climate change on national security should be also considered and incorporated into national security and defence strategies.

The possible failure and/or instability of governments to manage the tense situations caused by vital resources scarcity can generate local or regional conflicts. For the successful conduct of such operations are necessary scenarios, training, exercises, resources and military capabilities appropriate for such interventions.

Strategically important natural resources, especially oil and gas, will continue to be sources of conflict, and the access to these areas will increase the importance of the activities that play a role in the development in the region.

The exploitation of resources in certain Arctic areas, according to Norwegian analysts, can generate security issues, military intervention being necessary to protect the investments made in these areas.

The powers in the Arctic area are responsible for the new opportunities and challenges in the region. That is why their civil and military influence in the region should be extended. Therefore, the intensification of the military activity in this area may result in territorial disputes and military conflicts.

A possible scenario for an “*arctic conflict*”, probably a diplomatic one, may be represented by the dispute between Canada and the USA on the international legal status of the Northwest Passage, which will become an important navigation route, as it will be an alternative to the Panama Canal, and it will shorten the distance between Asia and Europe by about 7 000 kilometres. This passage contains a number of straits and channels (still covered by ice), representing maritime lines going across the top of Canada and connecting the Atlantic and the Pacific. While Canada claims that they are part of its internal waters, the USA maintains its position that they are part of international waters and should be open to everyone. This scenario has not been considered (discussed) for decades, but it becomes an important topic with the opportunities that are foreseen as a result of ice melting. It is estimated that the Northwest Passage will be navigable during the summer starting in 2050.

Another possible scenario for an “*arctic conflict*”, probably not only diplomatic but also potentially explosive, may be represented by the dispute between Russia and the other states in the region on the legal status of international waters and the exploitation of oil reserves under the ice cap.

In conclusion, the analysis of the implications on the above-mentioned domains leads to the following strategic considerations:

➤ Oil and mineral reserves, estimated at 25% of world reserves, will considerably increase the importance of the Arctic nations. Countries like Canada, USA, Russia, Norway, Denmark (Greenland), Iceland, Sweden and Finland will start fighting for a piece of the so-called “*polar pie*”. Mention should be made that Denmark and Canada have already argued over an area of 1.3 km² of land resulting from the polar ice cap melting.

➤ China and India, considered among the largest energy consumers, will be interested in having access to the oil and gas resources available with the disappearance of the polar ice cap.

➤ The emergence of new maritime lines, the right to fish in the area, and the national security issues in the Arctic states (new measurements relating to territorial waters, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone etc.) may cause conflicts between different states.

➤ The effects of the polar ice cap melting will get materialised by chaos, anarchy, migration, disease and famine. A study conducted by the US Department of Defence shows that *“soon, the battle for resources, food and water will become a matter of life and death..., many states will try to develop nuclear arsenals to protect resources..., millions of people will be killed in wars and natural disasters ..., and the consequences of the polar ice cap melting are difficult to assess”*. The Pentagon report on the subject warns that *“a large part of Europe will be engulfed by water, the high areas of the old continent will enter a new ice age with Siberian temperatures..., and other regions of the world will turn into desert. It is also estimated that these effects are not expected in the distant future, most likely in 2020”*.

➤ Volcanic and seismic activity will increase and cause numerous natural disasters with serious consequences not only on human existence and activity but also on the environment.

➤ Freshwater reserves will be affected. The lack of water for drinking and irrigation will result in new tensions. Most countries in the Middle East, except Turkey, Egypt and Iran, depend on water resources outside their national borders. The access to vital resources, especially food and water, may also cause conflicts similar to those in Africa today.

➤ About two thirds of the world population live near coastal areas where are located most critical facilities and infrastructure such as ports, power plants, transport routes etc. The sea level rise will cause the disappearance of land, affecting not only these facilities but also the population living in these areas. The population will have to settle elsewhere, and its migration will affect even the strong alliances between neighbouring states as a result of the problems that arise at the borders.



THE CHALLENGING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS AND POLICYMAKERS

Dr Ruxandra BULUC

The present article investigates the reasons why tensions and dysfunctions appear in the relationship between analysts and policymakers, the misunderstandings that cause intelligence reports to be either inadequate or discarded, the nature of the analysts and policymakers' individual and respective jobs and the possible sources of incongruence. The aim of the article is to provide a better understanding of what each community could do to fluidise the process of analysis and decision-making, what responsibilities policymakers should assume and what characteristics intelligence reports should exhibit to be more useful and timely.

Keywords: *analysts; intelligence reports; policymakers; cognitive biases*

the cooperation between the two communities such as adjusting the policymakers' expectations, drafting effective reports, educating the analysts and policymakers' respective communities so that they may become better acquainted with the role and functions each performs.

The relationship between the analysts' community and the policymakers is often tense for several reasons: inadequate expectations on either side, a misunderstanding of the role that the analysts can play in the decision-making process, intelligence products that either do not correspond to the policymakers' requirements or are not timely, a lack of proper communication between the analytic and the decision-making levels. The first objective of this article is to analyse the types of tensions, misunderstandings and communication barriers that exist between analysts and policymakers, such as unrealistic demands, the politicisation of intelligence and the ambiguity of intelligence reports. The second objective is to propose a series of solutions to improve and facilitate

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The first step is to investigate the reasons that lead to dysfunctions in the relationship between analysts and policymakers. A better understanding of these reasons might in turn lead to a clearer image of what measures would be most appropriate to reform this relationship.

1. Causes of dysfunctions in the analyst-policymaker relationship

The dysfunctions that might arise between the intelligence community and that of policymakers are mostly caused by the intrinsic differences in the nature of the two practices. The analysts' profession is based on reflection, reasoning, comprehension, not on action. From this point of view, analysts are quite similar to professors. Analysts need time to investigate their areas of interest, to develop a paradigm of knowledge so that using it they can build inferences and put forth hypotheses. Time constraints impede these processes and affect the development of their paradigms, which is, by definition, a long-term activity. Analysts focus on certain areas of interest, collect data regarding the events and the actors that are in play there, estimate possible future courses of action, try to visualise the area using the corresponding cultural lens, meaning the elements related to that culture that have implications for the understanding of a particular situation.

Policymakers do not require all these processes. Regardless of how useful they may prove to be in the long run, they are not of interest in the short run. Policymakers operate mostly in the "now", with current situations and less with evolution trends and world views. They are not so much interested in the ways in which governments act in certain parts of the world, as they are in the ways in which those governments' actions could affect their own country. Their temporal horizon is more restricted and their interest in intelligence reports is conditioned by the degree to which these reports can come to support their domestic policies. Moreover, policymakers cannot afford to say that they do not know how to act in a certain situation.

The interaction between these two perspectives results in conflicts. Policymakers want intelligence on which to base their actions, while analysts want information which is truthful, correct and as accurate as possible and they request more time to refine their analyses, to draw a clear and accurate picture of the ongoing events in their areas of interest¹. Policymakers interact with the people who elected

¹ G. Treverton, *Intelligence Analysis: Between "Politicization" and Irrelevance*, in R. Z. George, & J. B. Bruce (eds.), *Analyzing Intelligence. Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations*, Georgetown University Press, Washington DC, 2008, pp. 91-104.

them, feel responsible for their policies and this is why they need to act. Analysts work with data, with organisational behavioural patterns on whose basis they strive to make predictions and posit inferences. Consequently, policymakers often accuse analysts of being cut off from the real world, sequestered in an ivory tower and unwilling to provide them with analyses that could support their policies and actions.

Jervis² suggests that the ways in which policymakers judge whether or not their policies are based on accurate intelligence should mirror the ways in which analysts try to discern which data could vouch for the accuracy of their hypotheses. However, this self-interrogation and self-evaluation is challenging as it generates uncertainty and often contributes to increased political and psychological pressure, thus impeding action. The analysts' main goal is to investigate and estimate accurately the possible implications of various courses of action, while the policymakers' main objective is to make effective and timely decisions. To meet this goal, policymakers can develop a reluctance to interact with analysts³. Apart from this reluctance, policymakers may also generate pressures on analysts with a view to obtaining the answers, solutions, hypotheses that they need in order to confirm that the decisions they plan on making are the best ones.

Firstly, policymakers want to minimise not only the compromises they make, but also their personal perception of these compromises. At least at a declarative level, they are used to making tough decisions, but the cognitive impulse is to make easy decisions, with a lower level of risk, reason for which they regard intelligence analysis as a confirmation source for the validity of their reasoning and choices, as a means of support for their policies. Therefore, they may argue that their policies are superior to the alternatives, that they are more financially effective, that they accomplish more goals.

Secondly, the same political and psychological factors that act in the case of compromises also determine policymakers to be reluctant to develop an alternative plan of action, a so-called plan B, for their policies⁴. This reluctance has a cognitive component: once a policy is implemented, it is very difficult for its proponents to detach themselves from it and to estimate whether it is lacking in any aspects. This unwillingness to reevaluate along the way is caused by the human mind's need for consistency. Moreover, we would argue that there is also a perception-related reason: if there is a plan B, then plan A may be seen as fallible and may consequently

² R. Jervis, *Why Intelligence Fails. Lessons from the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War*, Cornell University Press, New York, 2010, p. 160.

³ *Ibid*, p. 160.

⁴ *Ibid*, p. 163.

receive less support. Treverton⁵ and Jervis⁶ explain that drafting an alternative plan also entails accepting that the first policy may fail and, in this context, the tensions between analysts and policymakers become more severe. Leaders want to pursue their first option until the end because they invested time and funds into it, and, as a result, analysts who present data that may contest that option's validity are seen as naysayers and sceptics. This approach determines analysts to be reluctant in their interactions with policymakers and the communication lines may break easily, with disadvantages on both sides.

However, one must not deduce from this that policymakers are unaware of the risks they assume when pursuing a policy that shows signs of weakness, but cognitive closure may prevent them from accepting alternatives and it is difficult to estimate the precise moment when a policy is no longer viable and needs replacing. As McLaughlin⁷ explains, policymakers do not ignore obstacles but their first instinct is to push forward and attempt to overcome them. They are aware that, at a given moment, a change in policy or course of action may be called for, but they value consistency and meeting final objectives more. These are the situations that lead to political failure which are not all based on intelligence failures. The game of doubt is not one that policymakers can afford to entertain, and once a decision is made, doubts are generally put aside.

In this respect, Jervis⁸, Treverton⁹, McLaughlin¹⁰ emphasise the fact that policymakers should trust that the decisions they have made and implemented are the most suitable. This faith is necessary both from a cognitive and from a psychological point of view, but it can have undesired side effects. As Steinberg¹¹ explains, policymakers establish direct contacts with foreign partners, they build a rapport that analysts do not have access to and that might encourage policymakers to consider that they understand and could anticipate the foreign parties' actions. In these interactions, policymakers form their own mindsets that have a cultural component which stems from their own personal background and are resistant to change as they seem to be based on accurate first-hand information and on years of experience in the field. For this reason, policymakers may reject intelligence

⁵ G. Treverton, *Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information* (2nd ed.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004, p. 181.

⁶ R. Jervis, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

⁷ J. McLaughlin, *Serving the National Policymaker*, p. 72, in R. Z. George, & J. B. Bruce (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 72-81.

⁸ R. Jervis, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

⁹ G. Treverton, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

¹⁰ J. McLaughlin, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

¹¹ J. Steinberg, *The Policymaker's Perspective: Transparency and Partnership*, p. 84 in R. Z. George, & J. B. Bruce (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 82-90.

products because they seem to contradict the images they have formed of the people they come into contact with, of their motivations, assumptions and even ideologies. Thus, analysts end up in the difficult situation of having to explain not only the foreign partners' policies, but also to identify and evaluate the accuracy of the beliefs that policymakers have formed and all this without direct experience with the situation or the persons involved. This separation may be viewed as a drawback by policymakers and as an advantage by analysts because the latter gain a greater degree of detachment and a lower degree of subjectivity.

Policymakers' optimism seems exaggerated to analysts who are used to taking into account all variables and not accepting anything as certain. However, the former need the drive that optimism generates in order to be able to make tough decisions and live with their consequences. This optimism is yet another source of tensions between analysts and policymakers because, since when leaders are not ready to make a change and are confident they are on the right path, they will refuse intelligence reports that may contradict their policies and will claim that analysts are uncooperative, superficial or, in extreme cases, even disloyal.

These accusations which for analysts are severe and unfounded derive from a range of expectations that policymakers have with respect to the role and function of intelligence reports. In reality, analysts can only describe and explain certain situations or make estimates with respect to the consequences that a certain policy may entail or predictions with respect to the ways in which events in a certain part of the world may evolve. The role of intelligence analysis is to produce and provide information, not to prescribe actions or courses of action, but policymakers expect in many cases that intelligence reports support their policies and decisions. This process is called the *politicisation of intelligence*.

In some authors' opinion, the politicisation of intelligence is the "*wilful distortion of an analysis in order to suit the policymakers' requirements*"¹². Firstly, in order to understand the extent to which this process may affect intelligence analysis, one must understand the ways in which it can come about. According to Treverton¹³, politicisation of intelligence may take several forms which overlap to a certain extent: (1) *direct pressure* from a senior to reach certain conclusions which are in accordance with current policies; (2) a "*house line*" regarding a certain issue and how it must be tackled, what constraints need to be obeyed; (3) "*cherry picking*" used by senior officials to choose whichever policy best suits their immediate goals; (4) question- *asking* in which case the questions either indicate the required

¹² J. Gannon, *Managing Analysis in the Information Age*, p. 214 in R. Z. George, & J. B. Bruce (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 213-225.

¹³ G. Treverton, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

answer or already contain it; (5) a *shared mindset* by means of which analysts and policymakers share the same beliefs which negatively influence their analyses and policies respectively.

Jervis¹⁴ also examines the various types of politicisation from the explicit one – when the analyst is told directly what conclusions to reach – to the less obvious: *demotion* or *reassignment* for analysts who do not produce the desired results, *resource cutbacks* or *self-censure* on the part of the analysts who fear the consequences of not producing the desired conclusions on their careers. The most evasive form of politicisation has been termed “*politicisation by omission*”¹⁵ and it presupposes ignoring certain situations because the results would not be agreed by superiors.

All these forms of politicisation can only complicate the already tense relationship between analysts and policymakers. There are, in our opinion, certain ways in which the cooperation between the two levels can be encouraged: (1) by adjusting the policymakers’ expectations to the capabilities of the analysts’ community and (2) by producing intelligence reports that are useful and timely for policymakers. We shall look at them in turn.

2. Policymakers’ expectations

In order to make good use of intelligence reports, policymakers must be aware of their own cognitive biases, as Jervis¹⁶ explains. Firstly, policymakers need to comprehend the fact that no interpretation they produce with respect to the intelligence they receive, the ongoing events or the persons they come into contact with is wholly objective. What seems obvious and self-explanatory is only apparently so because of the confirmation bias which presupposes that already-formed assumptions on a situation will be upheld. These assumptions should not only be made apparent, but also shared among analysts so they could be verified or disconfirmed.

Along the same lines, policymakers should understand that their availability to evaluate an event or a situation from several perspectives and to take into account those contexts in which their decisions could become unpopular, but adequate to the respective event or situation, is the best way to detect the best course of action or to make the best policy. The process is difficult from a psychological as well as from a political point of view, but policymakers should include contradictory positions in the decision-making process, to use the “*devil’s advocate*” technique

¹⁴ R. Jervis, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

¹⁵ *Ibid*, p. 172.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, pp. 462-464.

to uncover as many weak points of potential measures before they are put into practice and become much more difficult to control or reverse.

McLaughlin¹⁷ states the fact the policymakers who really know how to use intelligence reports have a realistic view of what they can and cannot accomplish, they understand the fact that analysis is more useful in detecting the evolution trends in international relations, than in predicting certain events and, consequently, know what questions to ask analysts to discriminate between that they truly know and what they only assume. Moreover, these policymakers are not intimidated by analyses that are not in agreement with their policies, but regard them as a good starting point to identify the weaknesses of these policies, to adjust and improve them. In other words, policymakers who understand and appreciate intelligence analyses accept the fact that analysts see events from the perspective of what they could mean and not from the perspective of what actions need to be undertaken.

Steinberg¹⁸ adds the fact that policymakers need to understand that there is a difference between a puzzle¹⁹ and a mystery²⁰ and that if the former can be solved, the latter will remain shrouded in uncertainty which, no matter how hard they may try, analysts cannot overcome it.

In order for the relationship with analysts to flow more efficiently, policymakers should assume a series of obligations²¹. They should communicate clearly to the analysts' community what their aims, priorities and necessities are. Analysts have limited resources at their disposal and if they know what the priorities are, they can use them productively. Policymakers' priorities are not, of course, the only avenues of investigation for analysts, but knowing what they are would help improve and consolidate the relationship between the two communities. Policymakers would thus have the support of the analysts' community and they could be more open when the analysts would present potentially risky situations that were not previously on the leaders' agenda.

Policymakers themselves can be considered sources of information due to the direct connections they establish with the members of governments, foreign groups and organisations, and this is a role they should assume and they should share the information and conclusions they reach with the analysts. In our opinion,

¹⁷ J. McLaughlin, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

¹⁸ J. Steinberg, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

¹⁹ Treverton (*op. cit.*, p. 4) defines the puzzle as being those situations which can be solved, in principle, if there is access to information. They are more concrete and they rely on contexts, statistics, quantities of armament, etc. as they are at present, not on human decisions.

²⁰ Mysteries are defined by Treverton (*op. cit.*, p. 4) as those abstract, future-oriented situations which refer to political and social issues and which evolve in accordance with certain human decisions and which cannot be easily deduced from gathered concrete information alone.

²¹ J. Steinberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 87-88.

this type of communication could compensate for the fact that the analysts are separated from the on-the-ground situation, but it would also help to identify the policymakers' cognitive biases in those situations and to prevent possible negative reactions to future analyses regarding those areas or persons of interest.

Another measure that policymakers could take to improve the relationship with analysts is to include them in discussions of policies and courses of action. Analysts could become familiar with policymakers' interests and could share the knowledge they have with respect to that particular situation directly in the debates, offer policymakers alternative perspectives and aid them in identifying the implicit assumptions that may affect their evaluations. This inclusion of analysts in discussions is not similar to the politicisation of intelligence analysis as long as their opinions are heard, but policymakers do not try to change them to suit their purposes. However, this involvement can represent a risk for analysts, namely they might lose objectivity because they might react, even unconsciously, to peer pressure and, as a consequence, they could exclude or ignore certain information that might jeopardize the decision or contradict an already-made decision. The balance between the advantages and the risks is delicate and hard to maintain, but the benefits of involving analysts in the decision-making process cannot be denied.

Treverton²² identifies certain stages of the decision-making process and implementation of a certain policy or course of action in which policymakers are interested in intelligence reports. From Treverton's comments, we will retain only the aspects concerning the means in which intelligence analysis can prove its worth. In the beginning, when a problem appears, policymakers want to know if it is important, how it can be approached and what implications it may have. The second moment is when policymakers analyse the alternatives to solve the respective problem and they intend to make a decision that combines national and international interests. The third moment is after the decision is made, when leaders need analyses to see if the taken measures were the most suitable and the results are the desired ones, or, if they are not, how they could be adjusted.

It is important for analysts to be aware of these stages and to take them into account so that intelligence reports may be given to policymakers in due time and the relationship between the two levels could function.

3. The characteristics of intelligence reports

In order for the policymakers' expectations to be met, intelligence reports need to exhibit a series of desirable characteristics. The main goal of intelligence analysis is not to prescribe courses of action, but to provide useful and necessary

²² G. Treverton, *op. cit.*, pp. 183-185.

information to set courses of action. For this reason, analysts focus mostly on examining evolution trends for different events and situations in various parts of the world, which could become important, although they may not be urgent at present. Following these trends, analysts could spot when and where a crisis might occur with an increased degree of accuracy. However, more often than not, policymakers do not have the necessary time to get better acquainted with situations that might, at one point, deteriorate into full-blown crises. However, these long-term analyses are important for policymakers and can aid in the formation of a paradigm of knowledge for members of the decision-making bodies, even if they do not reach the top levels of the hierarchy. A well-informed leadership structure can support the decision-making process when a crisis does occur.

Most policymakers in key positions are confronted with extremely chaotic information about the world and are pressed for time to comprehend as fast as possible and as accurately as possible what exactly is happening, why and what the consequences may be for their own state. They do not have the luxury of postponing a decision until they can be sure of making the right one. This is why McLaughlin²³ claims that the intelligence reports that the analysts' community puts forth should respect a series of analytical standards. Reports should be *epistemologically accurate*, meaning that they should present what is definitely known separately from what is intuited or inferred. They should be *clear*, more precisely, they should explicitly present the degree of reliability of each piece of information presented. Reports should also be *timely*, that is, they should be delivered within the often very narrow window of opportunity between the moment when a crisis presents itself and the moment a decision must be made. The judgments that reports present should be *revised* every time new information presents itself that may require revisiting the initial conclusions. *Alternative conclusions* can and should be included in reports to prove that other avenues of investigation have been taken into account, and the conclusion is backed by the elimination of other alternatives.

If all these aspects are taken into account, reports need only one other ingredient to reach their goals: they should be *persuasive*. Persuasion is necessary so that policymakers take into account the analysis even if it is counter to their implicit and/or initial estimations and views or to the policies they have implemented. Persuasion presupposes transparency with respect to sources, possible interpretations, reasons for which some interpretations have been excluded, the degree to which the conclusions are drawn from certain data or from personal reasoning processes.

²³ J. McLaughlin, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-78.

Steinberg²⁴ approaches two other aspects that should be included in reports so that they may aid policymakers. The first is represented by the *indicators* that would allow them to evaluate the validity of a judgment if they were to implement it. More precisely, if the judgment is accurate, the report should suggest what evolutions may come to be or what future developments could undermine the validity of a judgment and promote another one instead. Thus, policymakers could avoid falling prey to choosing the judgment that best suits their mindsets. A second aspect refers to the analysts' community who might assist policymakers by providing them with so-called *peripheral vision* and a *temporal perspective* that place their decisions in a larger international context. Moreover, by virtue of these two aspects, the community of analysts may and can answer the question "*what are the wider, long-term consequences of this decision?*" This is a task for which policymakers do not have enough time and for which analysts are trained, some of them being specialised in problems in other areas than the ones directly involved in the current crisis. To help policymakers from this perspective, analysts should constantly ask themselves what changes occur in their areas of responsibility, to focus on the incremental alterations that might turn into evolution trends and that might become elements of surprise when they reach critical mass.

If they are prepared and written in accordance with the above-mentioned criteria, intelligence reports will be able to combine two important objectives: to inform policymakers about possible future crises in a timely manner and to assist them in the decision-making process to find the best policy or course of action. However, this is a bilateral process in which the lines of communication between analysts and policymakers should remain open and they should apprise each other of any changes that might occur within their areas of responsibility and expertise.

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* *

Examining the incongruence between the expectations of the analysts' and the policymakers' respective communities has revealed the fact that they stem from the intrinsic characteristics of their respective missions, meaning that analysts are inclined to investigate, while policymakers are prone to act. Analysts examine, try to ascertain the truth or to identify the events that are most likely to take place, the evolution trends in various situations around the globe. Their role is not to prescribe policies or courses of action or to make decisions. These fall into the policymakers' area of responsibility, and they have to confront compromises dictated by combining

²⁴ J. Steinberg, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

policies with the evolution of events in various areas. In principle, it would be easier for policymakers if intelligence reports were justifications for their decisions. The policymakers' jobs are based on perseverance in their decisions, not on oscillations between various measures, on their experience with foreign partners or other actors involved in the events in certain parts of the world and all these could affect their impartiality and might determine them to preserve some courses of action that lose their validity. A danger that must be avoided by policymakers is the attempt to politicise intelligence analysis to ease their decision-making process. Policymakers' expectations should be grounded on a realistic vision of the benefits that an accurate intelligence analysis could provide as well as on a clear view of its intrinsic biases, of which the most important is its impossibility to anticipate with a maximum degree of certainty how exactly events will unfold. Moreover, policymakers should assume a series of responsibilities in their relationship with the analysts' community to facilitate and improve communication. More precisely, they should become themselves sources of intelligence because of their direct connections with various actors in different countries and regions and they might include analysts in the process of examining situations and making decisions, without pressing them to come up with the conclusions that are expected, but accepting their input. Analysts themselves, if directly involved in the decision-making process, should try not to lose their objectivity and let themselves be influenced by group pressures.

With respect to the characteristics of intelligence reports, we have identified several that reports should exhibit: accuracy, clarity, timeliness, revision of judgments, alternative judgments, persuasion. By adapting their style to the policymakers' requests, analysts could obtain reports that are more useful in the decision-making process and that cannot be overlooked by policymakers.

All these measures, implemented simultaneously, could contribute to the fluidisation of the analysis and decision-making that could maintain national and international security.



ASPECTS REGARDING THE ACTIONS OF INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURES IN THE CURRENT SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Dr Ion CĂLIN

The current international security environment consists of elements of continuity as well as of elements of discontinuity compared to the Cold War period. Even so, the events that have taken place in the international arena in recent years and the forces and trends that are currently in action seem to accentuate the changes and to gradually diminish the elements of continuity. In this context, the author points out, the new threats to international security require the concerted efforts of all democratic states to prevent and counter them. Therefore, some effective mechanisms for the collective management and assessment of information should be established.

Keywords: *risks and threats; intelligence; international security; democracy; transnational organisations*

The recent international developments in the field of security show the dynamic, complex and fluid character of risks and threats with direct impact on the way the state institutions with responsibilities in the field of national security function. The classical military conflicts persistence in certain areas and the regional ambitions of some states, the emergence of some new power vectors in Asia or the Middle East overlap with the transfer at non-state level of international relations on the coordinates of the development of the role of transnational organisations, terrorist or extremist groups with global orientation or even individual actors. Thus, the relations between states and non-state actors have become important coordinates to decipher the security dynamics at both national and international levels.

Foreign policy is increasingly influenced by the internal power evolutions in a state, which are also affected by a certain loss of sovereignty in the circumstances of some global phenomena impact over the internal security environment.

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In the current security environment, the enlargement of cooperation between national intelligence services has been already known as a major imperative. Given that the new threats to international security have determined all democratic states concerted efforts to prevent and counter them, it is more and more necessary to establish some effective mechanisms to collectively manage and assess information. These evolutions have been reflected in successive and substantiated reforms of the intelligence services in states as the US, the UK or France. A brief history of the international evolutions effects over the activity of intelligence services, in particular, and over the intelligence field of a state, in general, can focus on few basic transformations.

NATO essence as an alliance whose main goal is to provide collective defence for its members, as it is stipulated in its constitutional act, contributes to increasing trust among the intelligence services of the member states and to boosting constant exchange of data that are useful to document and counter global threats as premises of the articulation of an adequate response having pronounced anticipatory character.

Cooperation in the field of intelligence requires a new phase of special services co-working: the movement of the centre of gravity from the general information exchange to the cooperation for punctual cases and actions as means to optimally capitalise on the potential offered by the involved partners.

The limits of cooperation in the field of intelligence are related to the objective reason of special services activities sharing and secrecy, on the one hand, and to the fact that the world of secret services is characterised by competition rather than cohesion, on the other hand, the great “*producers*” dominating “*the network*” and the small actors being pushed to periphery.

Moreover, the logic of approaching the cooperation issues in the field of intelligence must follow the simple-complex relation, which requires the coordination of special services activities at internal, regional and international level.

At operational level, the intelligence services in NATO member states keep in contact on matters of interest but there is no effective coordination between these structures and those of the International Military Staff and the International Staff. So far, in NATO, there has not been established any effective mechanism to coordinate the analytical product resulted from the intelligence activity so that political-military and military decision-makers can be provided with an identical final product to allow for coherent decisions. Therefore, the greatest differences in the field of intelligence appear between the military and civilian structures.

Most of the decisions taken in the North Atlantic Council are based on the information provided to the member states representatives by the national intelligence services. In order to meet the necessity to respond to the new requirements related to the informational support for the Alliance’s decision-making structures,

the *Allied Command for Transformation (ACT)* developed a NATO transformation plan in the field of intelligence. The plan stipulates the development of some documents to provide *ACT* with the command and control means for the transformation process.

In NATO, the responsibility for the overall orientation of intelligence activity is the attribute of the North Atlantic Council. The orientation of the intelligence activity at the political-military level is assured by the *NATO Military Committee* supported by the *NATO Intelligence Board (NIB)*. The chiefs of intelligence services in the Alliance member states participate in it. Along with *NIB* work a series of workgroups and committees on issues specific to military intelligence. The military intelligence activity in NATO is regulated by a series of policies and procedures such as *Guidance for Intelligence Support to NATO*.

Considering the ongoing coalition-type operations led by NATO, in which non-NATO member states also participate, these regulations should be adapted in order to allow the exchange of information between all the coalition partners. In this regard, there have been some initiatives in the theatres of operations but the existing restrictions hamper the political-military and military decision-making process¹.

Unlike other organisations, the EU applies and coordinates a wide range of security policy instruments. They are employed, almost exclusively, on the basis of different national security agencies contribution, which are still reserved to exchange information in multilateral format. Moreover, mention should be made that the EU does not have executive responsibilities to allow for countering any of the threats both inside and outside the community territory.

Beyond this slight inertia, the EU has developed its own structure tasked in a first phase with organising the cooperation in matters of intelligence. Currently, there can be identified four EU bodies that together form a would-be intelligence structure or even an intelligence agency: the *EU Joint Situation Centre (SITCEN)* the *EU Military Staff's Intelligence Division (INTDIV)*, the *European Union Satellite Centre (EUSC)* and the *European Police Office (Europol)*.

Related to the four structures, most European countries consider that, currently, the EU does not need an intelligence agency in the classical meaning of the term, advocating for strengthening the existing mechanisms and their transformation into veritable “*informative support apparatuses*” at the community level.

At the Spring 2004 European Council, the European leaders committed to intensifying cooperation in the fight against terrorism by the efficient use of existing instruments and the adoption of new measures to allow closer cooperation in the field. Moreover, it was introduced the solidarity clause stating

¹Tiberiu Tănase, *Considerații privind perspectivele intelligence-ului din cadrul NATO, Dinamica mediului de securitate european*, București, 2007.

that in the event of a terrorist attack against any member state, the other member countries will act jointly in a spirit of solidarity. All available means will be mobilised, the military ones included, to prevent terrorist threats, to protect the democratic institutions and the civilian population as well as to give assistance to the victim-state at the request of the particular authorities. It is also stated that member states can choose the concrete mode of action.

Another initiative meant to provide better cooperation in this field is represented by the establishment of the position of Counter-Terrorism Coordinator at the EU level. The EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator tasks are rather general – “*coordination of all EU efforts to combat terrorism*” – and consist of:

- improving the activity in the field of terrorism combating at the EU level;
- taking some measures to improve the information flow for the EU interior ministers in order to enhance the decision-making process related to the antiterrorist activity.

The reconsideration of the “*enemy*” from the state actor, reasonable and constrained by certain international rules, to the non-state actor, irrational, unconstrained and part of informal networks as far as actions are concerned, has generated a redefinition of the mode of action in the field of intelligence. Under these circumstances, services should be more adaptable, more dynamic, and able to prevent and respond to some threats whose “*classification*” level can be easily modified. The connections between organised crime and corruption, between terrorism and money laundering activities, between espionage and traffic of influence, “*mercenary*” actions are not necessarily new phenomena but the interdependence between these risks and the extremely strong dynamics of their manifestation needs a new approach to the field.

The *national intelligence and security doctrine* approaches two concepts that lie at the basis of the Romanian security system, namely the *national system of security* and the *national security system*.

The *national system of security* is defined as the ensemble of legislative, executive and judicial bodies, institutions, economic bodies, nongovernmental organisations and citizens that, in conformity with the law or freely consented, assume obligations or manifest preoccupations and civic initiatives related to the achievement, protection or affirmation of security interests and values.

On the other hand, the ensemble of public authorities with autonomous statute as well as other institutions legally assigned to perform intelligence, counterintelligence and security activities compose the *national security system*. Its components hereinafter called *intelligence structures* are:

- external and internal intelligence services – *Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE)* and *Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI)*;

- security services – *Protection and Guard Service (SPP)*, *Special Telecommunications Service (STS)*;
- departmental intelligence and protection services within certain ministries: as the service within the Ministry of National Defence – *Defence Intelligence General Directorate*; within the Ministry of Internal Affairs – *General Directorate for Intelligence and Internal Protection*.

Along the services and structures in the Romanian security system, an important role is played by the institutions with responsibilities in the field of national security problems monitoring: *the National Registry Office for Classified Information (ORNISS)*; *the National Agency for Export Control (ANCEX)*; *the National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control (CNCAN)*; *the Romanian Food Safety Agency (ARSA)*; *the National Radioactive Waste Management Agency (ANDR)*; *the National Office for the Prevention and Control of Money Laundering (ONPCSB)*.

The components of the national security system are organised and function in conformity with the organic laws, being unitarily coordinated by the Supreme Council of National Defence, subject to the parliamentary control by specialised commissions and financed from the state budget. They act in an integrated manner to provide the national security.

The state intelligence services fulfil the national security policy of the state. The goal of the policy is to identify, acknowledge, prevent, counteract and eliminate the threats to national security or the facts susceptible to transform in such threats as well as to timely develop strategies to achieve this goal.

Although they were established and functioned in exceptional conditions in the first years of existence, the intelligence structures have strived to perform their activity in normal conditions, proper to any similar institution in countries with tradition in democracy, namely legality, equidistance, transparency.

In order to exercise the legal responsibilities, the intelligence structures are authorised to use methods, to establish and use adequate means to get, verify, assess, capitalise on and store data referring to national security. These structures organise and perform qualified intelligence activities for collecting information, use, in conformity with the law and the internal norms, the available means in specific facilities, places and environments, employing specific methods.

The personnel of intelligence structures perform their activity openly or under cover depending on the needs related to providing national security. The intelligence structures activity is classified as state secret and organised in conformity with the law, preventing data and information leakage. The created documents are kept in the internal archive and can be consulted with hierarchical approval and in conformity with the law.

Following the comparative analysis of the Romanian intelligence community and the intelligence communities legally established in other states, it results:

- the elements of compatibility with the intelligence structures in other states;
- the trend to harmonise the organisation, competencies and responsibilities of the national intelligence system with the main elements that characterise the intelligence structures in the countries signatory to the Statute of the Council of Europe;
- some gaps in the legislative framework as the juridical regulations in other states are more complete regarding the integrated functioning of intelligence communities components, specialised coordination structures being also established.

Without neglecting the political and academic discourse, the concepts briefly presented and analysed can remain/become national values in the official documents of power factors only if they are acknowledged and correctly used, and permanently updated. Their inclusion as compulsory scientific disciplines in the framework of Romanian military educational institutions will give proper substance to the dynamics of our realities and perspectives in terms of national security interests.

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MISSION COMMAND: A HUMAN RESPONSE TO THE REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS

Dr Marius Valeriu PĂUNESCU

A recent American publication on mission command philosophy states that “mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations”. In the light of NATO understanding of mission command, the American definition seems to be more restrictive in terms of decentralisation for effective mission accomplishment, by using “disciplined initiative”, which may not provide enough room for improvisation in the unforeseen circumstances of the current operating environment. This article analyses the understanding of mission command philosophy and manoeuvrist approach to operations from three perspectives: NATO, the UK and the US.

Keywords: *Revolution in Military Affairs; technology; mission command; leadership; manoeuvrist approach*

Introduction

Many analysts addressing the Revolution in Military Affairs have argued on the hypothesis that “*information age*” technology, if combined with appropriate doctrine and training, might allow a small but advanced military organisation to protect the state interests with unprecedented efficiency. The debate on (r)evolution in military technology has concluded that “*a revolution in military affairs dramatically increases combat effectiveness by four types of simultaneous and mutually supportive change: technological change; systems development; operational innovation; and organisational adaptation. The relative priority among these elements varies from revolution to revolution. The current revolution, for instance, is heavily shaped by technology*”².

Although militaries consider the extraordinary evolution of military technology and its practicalities in the contemporary operating environment,

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¹ *Mission Command (ADP 6-0)*, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, DC, March 2014, p. 1.

² Steven Metz, James Kievit, *Strategy and the Revolution in Military Affairs: From Theory to Policy*, Strategic Studies Institute, 1995, pp. 3-4.

they need soldiers, non-commissioned officers and officers with not only the technical skills to operate with these high-tech systems of weapons, communications and information, but also with competencies which encourage initiative, innovation, and efficiency in the execution of responsibilities. Because the current security operating environment is fluid, ambiguous, dynamic, ever-changing, multi-faced and overlaps with the civil areas, in most conflicts today, the faculties to plan, order and control are not sufficient to secure the chances for successful operations. Two of today required military abilities are more than necessary: communicating in order to sustain the moral and cohesion of the organisation and empowering for the benefit of developing initiative and confidence in action. The first one operates for creating an interactive communication which encourages the information flow horizontally and generates a permissive working environment. The second competency operates for “*igniting the latent talent, ingenuity and creativity in the people to accomplish the mission*”³. In practice, both competencies have become essential in applying mission command philosophy that promotes “*the conduct of military operations through decentralised execution based on mission orders for effective mission accomplishment*”⁴.

If the notion of military revolutions had its origins in the Soviet writings, particularly of Marshal N.V. Ogarkov, the American Armed Forces have managed to experience the thoughts. The combat effectiveness in the Gulf War (1990-1991), Iraq intervention (2003), Yugoslavia operation (1999), Afghanistan operation (2001) emphasised that “*the US military could strike anywhere with force, precision and relative safety its enemies*”⁵, achieving success through an advanced technology that operates properly in all domains: air, maritime, land, space and cyberspace. Consequently, the trend in the western countries and their partners has been to invest more in military technology, systems development, operational innovation and organisational adaptation to secure the supremacy of war fighting power. On the other side, the states and actors that cannot afford to keep the pace have tried to adopt alternative measures that allow them to remain reliable in the long term. Within this framework of competitive technology, on the one side, and the lack of it, on the other side, the mission command philosophy and its applicative ways have preserved the thoughtful stage for better applicability in any kind of war.

³ Don M. Snider, Lloyd Matthews, *The Future of the Army Profession*, US Military Academy, 2005, p. 608.

⁴ *Command and Control of Allied Land Forces (ATP-3.2.2) – STANAG 2199*, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Standardization Agency, 2009, p. 1-9.

⁵ Steven Metz, James Kievit, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

Principles of war, mission command and manoeuvrist approach – the tenets of military doctrine

The primary objective of armies is to fight and win wars. Because the war is chaotic in nature, the army must be a disciplined organisation capable of achieving political objectives in support of re-establishing peace and order within an area of operation (theatre of operations). Although armies are usually characterised by “*centralised command, hierarchy, discipline, intercommunication, esprit de corps and a corresponding isolation and self-sufficiency*”⁶, in practice, they have learned to apply philosophies that promote flexibility, agility and convergence using principles of war, mission command approach and manoeuvrist approach to operations approach.

Along the principles of war, these two philosophies constitute the tenets of the doctrinal package of every armed force. If the principles of war guide soldiers at all levels in the planning and conduct of warfare, and the manoeuvrist approach represents an indirect approach philosophy in which the shattering of the enemy’s overall cohesion and will to fight is paramount, the mission command imparts understanding to subordinates about the intentions of higher echelons and their role within the echelons’ plan, enabling them to fulfil achievable missions with the maximum freedom of action and suitable resources.

During the history, the principles of war have been key elements of any armed forces doctrine and, as a consequence, they have been adapted to the particularities of every age. Although there are slight differences in the way to define the common principles of war at the strategic level, in the “*Information Age*”, the most important principles of war are: *objective* (identify and pursue clearly defined and attainable goals whose achievement best furthers the national interests)⁷; *maintenance of the morale* (“*morale is a positive state of mind derived from inspired political and military leadership, a shared sense of purpose and values, well-being, perceptions of worth and group cohesion*”⁸); *initiative*⁹ or *offensive action*¹⁰

⁶ Samuel E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback. The Role of the Military in Politics*, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick (USA) and London (UK), third printing 2004 (originally published in 1962), p. 7.

⁷ William T. Johnsen, Douglas V. Johnson II, James O. Kievit, Douglas C. Lovelace Jr., Steven Metz, *The Principles of War in the 21st Century: Strategic Considerations*, Strategic Studies institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, 1995, p. iv.

⁸ *Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01* (fourth edition), UK Defence Doctrine, UK Ministry of Defence, Shrivenham, November 2011, p. 2-4.

⁹ William T. Johnsen, Douglas V. Johnson II, James O. Kievit, Douglas C. Lovelace Jr., Steven Metz, *op. cit.*, p. iv.

¹⁰ *Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01, op. cit.*, p. 2-4.

(the practical way in which someone seeks to seize advantage, retain momentum and exploit the initiative); *mass*¹¹ or *concentration of force*¹² (the concentration of superior fighting power in time and space for achieving intended effects); *economy of effort*¹³ (allocate judiciously minimum essential resources to the achievement of established objectives); *security*¹⁴ (to minimise the vulnerabilities of friendly forces plan concomitantly with the assurance of sufficient freedom of action to achieve objectives); *surprise*¹⁵ (to act when and where the adversary is not prepared to respond); *flexibility*¹⁶ (the ability to change and adapt rapidly to meet the new circumstances); *sustainability*¹⁷ (to generate the means by which the friendly forces fighting power and freedom of action are maintained).

In accordance with the UK perspective, the manoeuvrist approach to operations applies strengths against identified vulnerabilities, involving predominantly indirect ways and means of targeting the intellectual and moral component of an opponent's fighting power¹⁸. It calls for an attitude of mind, in which doing the unexpected, using initiative and seeking originality are combined with a ruthless determination to succeed. In fact, the manoeuvrist approach is an indirect approach that emphasises the action against the enemy's moral component of fighting power rather than the physical component.

The US describes the manoeuvrist approach to operations in terms of two fundamental strategies that may be applied separately or in combination. The first approach is the strategy of annihilation or attrition, which has the goal to break the adversary's resistance, by applying direct actions against his physical military capabilities. The second approach is the strategy of erosion, whose goal is to convince the adversary through indirect means "*using military force to erode the enemy leadership's or the enemy society's political will*"¹⁹.

According to NATO's view, the manoeuvrist approach to operations is an indirect approach that focuses on "*shattering the adversary's overall cohesion*

¹¹ *Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 25 March 2013, p. I-3.

¹² *Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01, op. cit.*, p. 2-4.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 2-4.

¹⁴ *Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, op. cit.*, p. I-3.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. I-3.

¹⁶ *Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01, op. cit.*, p. 2-4.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 2-4.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 5-9.

¹⁹ *Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, op. cit.*, p. I-4.

*and will to fight rather than his materiel*²⁰. This approach involves a combination of lethal and non-lethal means to create effects that operate against adversary's understanding, undermine his will and shatter his cohesion. It emphasises disruption and defeat rather than the destroying of the adversary by concentrating the actions against the defeat of the adversary's will and commitment to continue the fight.

Mission command is a philosophy that describes how commanders, supported by their staffs, combine the command and control art and science for mission accomplishment, using delegation of authority to act in support of the higher echelon's intentions. Within a concept of operation at strategic, operational or tactical level, the mission command philosophy generates the freedom of action through the elaboration of commander's intent and the unified command through the designation of the main effort. Mission command underpins the manoeuvrist approach by commanders giving orders in a manner in which the subordinates understand what effects are to achieve and for what reason. Subordinates then decide how these effects must be achieved in line with their commander's intent. As a consequence, mission command is a philosophy that tells what to do, not how to do.

The characteristics of command and control that encompass the ability *"to identify and react to changes in the situation, to provide a continuous, interactive process of reciprocal influence among the commander, staff, and available forces, and to reduce chaos or lessen uncertainty"*²¹ establish a style of mission command focused on decentralised command, freedom of action, speed of action and initiative.

If the UK considers that mission command has four enduring tenets – *"timely decision-making; subordinates are told what effect they are to achieve and why; subordinates are allocated sufficient resources to carry out their missions; the commander's determination to take the plan through to a successful conclusion"*²² – the US explain it through six principles – *"build cohesive teams through mutual trust; create shared understanding; provide a clear commander's intent; exercise disciplined initiative; use mission orders; accept prudent risk"*²³.

²⁰ *Allied Joint Doctrine AJP-01(D)*, Non-classified NATO publication, NATO Standardization Agency (NSA), 21 December 2010, p. 6-3.

²¹ *Command and Control of Allied Land Forces (ATP-3.2.2)*, *op. cit.*, p. 1-2.

²² *Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01*, *op. cit.*, p. 5-4.

²³ *Mission Command (ADP 6-0)*, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

Decentralisation, freedom of action and initiative come together when mutual understanding and trust are built up. Mutual understanding creates an invisible link between the commander and subordinates that enable not only timely and effective decisions but also creative actions. Mutual understanding rests in familiar experiences and common application of doctrine and training. Trust is shared confidence among commanders and subordinates, which builds moral cohesion within the organisation. Commanders build trust by exercising leadership, which means to conduct voluntary actions to influence people by providing “*purpose, direction, and motivation while operating to accomplish the mission and improving the organisation*”²⁴. Earning trust is a day-to-day activity and requires a strong commitment to apply military ethics. Mutual trust needs time to be earned and can be very easily lost. In essence, mutual understanding and trust provide the foundation of cooperation for the successful planning and execution of joint and multinational operations.

Applying disciplined initiative through the lens of mission command and centralised command

The unprecedented development of military technology and communication and information systems allows commanders to practice both mission command and centralised command philosophies. If the attributes of command are taken into consideration – *decision-making, leadership and control*²⁵ – we may observe that leadership is one worth element that influences the approach to command. A democratic style of leadership is likely to follow the principles of mission command. An authoritarian style of command is expected to choose the centralised command approach. Both styles of command are effective, but if we consider them in the loop of the employment of *task-orientation* and *relationship-orientation*, there are studies that have concluded that:

1. *in a democratically-led group, the climate is positive, the members are productive and the work continues with good spirit while the leader is away;*
2. *in an authoritarian-led group, the climate is poor but the productivity is high, even though, when the leader is away, the productivity declines*²⁶.

²⁴ *Command and Control of Allied Land Forces (ATP-3.2.2)*, *op. cit.*, p. 1-4.

²⁵ *Ibid*, p. 1-2.

²⁶ Dan A. Marmorstein, *Leadership and Education. A Textbook*, Defence Command Denmark, Copenhagen, 2008, p. 378.

Applying disciplined initiative in the view of mission command means acting “in the absence of orders, when existing orders no longer fit the situation, or when unforeseen opportunities or threats arise”²⁷. Applying disciplined initiative in the view of centralised command means to act within the framework of specified tasks received through orders, exploit opportunities by asking approval from higher commanders, rely more on the initiative of higher echelons and carry out the missions in the higher echelon’s ways. In the mission command, commanders use disciplined initiative with the purpose of encouraging *initiative* in creating opportunities. In the centralised command, commanders use disciplined initiative with the purpose of encouraging *discipline* in resolving opportunities.

In terms of freedom of action that allow subordinates room for improvisation in unforeseen circumstances, the mission command approach defines the limits within which subordinates may act in *commander’s intent*, and the centralised approach defines the limits in *commander’s mission*. Both styles of command use mission orders that clearly explain the mission’s purpose, key task and desired end-state, but the mission command approach emphasises the importance of intent, which has a direct link to the desired end-state, unlike the centralised command approach, which concentrates the effort on achieving the specified tasks of the established mission statement.

Military organisations that apply mission command approach in operations in the way of decentralisation, freedom and speed of action and initiative can perform centralised command if it is necessary. The vice versa is more difficult to achieve. The element that makes the difference is the flexibility that waves from mission command philosophy and rigidity from centralised command. A military organisation trained to plan, prepare, execute and assess operations in a flexible manner is able to practice centralised command if necessary. Also, being flexible means to have the skills of acting in a rigid manner when the circumstances of the operating environment ask for it. Creatively applying disciplined initiative represents the thoughtful skill of any subordinate and, normally, these skills are not very frequent. On the other side, being disciplined in executing activities in accordance with procedures and techniques is a basic requirement for every subordinate performance and, because it is exercised regularly, this behaviour is found ordinary.

²⁷ *Mission Command (ADP 6-0)*, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

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Nowadays, with the help of the “*Information Age*” technology, the possibilities of commanders to exercise their authorities have increased dramatically. With the means of a communication and information system, a commander can promote an efficient style of command using mission command approach if he wishes to encourage decentralisation, freedom and speed of action and initiative or he can promote a style of command using the centralisation approach, which restricts the freedom of action and initiative, encourages directing activities and enforces control.

Mission command is a philosophy that relies on leader-follower relation, encourages communication and empowerment within the limits of commander’s intent, which gives subordinates the confidence to apply their ways to do things in unforeseen and unpredictable situations, because they understand the purpose of the received mission, the key tasks and the desired end-state. Because mission command makes the relation between commanders and subordinates powerful through the leadership attribute of command, this philosophy can be put in practice not only by the armies which are technologically developed, but also by the armed forces that do not manage to keep pace with the (r)evolution in military technology. Leadership is a concept linked more on the art to work with people than on the science. Being effective today means to manage scientifically the technology for a focused objective. However, this can be performed only in concert with the development and involvement of people to the benefit of the overall goal – to achieve the mission and improve the organisation. In the light of the Revolution in Military Affairs, the mission command philosophy represents a modern way of the conduct of warfare, which is better and more efficient than the centralised (tutorial) command approach.



PERSPECTIVES ON PROMOTING SECURITY CULTURE

Dr Veronica PĂSTAE

This article approaches the security culture phenomenon and expands on the importance of making it better known to the general public. Firstly, we shall examine the conceptual dimensions of security culture by surveying its definitions and clarifying the present-day scope of the concept. Secondly, we shall go into detail about the social benefits of promoting security culture and raising people's awareness with regard to this issue. Thirdly, we shall look into a variety of strategies and methods that could be employed in the process. Thus, we shall argue that academia must be viewed as one of the most important actors in this undertaking because it represents the field of free debates and exchange of ideas, fostering new approaches to a multitude of domains. Finally, we shall comment on the particularities of source, message, channel and receiver in the context of public campaigns for promoting security culture.

Keywords: *security culture; source; message; channel; receiver; Internet; virtual environment*

Introduction

A significant example of wordplay – “*security is not everything, but everything is nothing without security*”¹ – illustrates the importance of security in human existence, as a fundamental need in surviving and making progress. It is therefore unsurprising that studies on this issue have flourished and developed along various lines of research, focusing on different aspects, such as military action, politics, economy, environment etc.

Predictably, the concept of security has evolved, widening and deepening, lately encompassing a lot more than the military or political sectors. As a result, other factors have come into play, among which cultural aspects, so the next step forward in the dynamics of security studies has been to launch the concept of *security culture* and to explore its nature and utility.

Consequently, our intention is to address this complex concept and to investigate its implications for the security arena.

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¹ M. Anton, *Valorile și securitatea națională în contextul euro-atlantic actual – teză de doctorat, “Carol I” National Defence University, 2006, p. 190.*

1. What is security culture?

Although security needs are specific to all human beings, it can be easily noticed that there are pronounced differences in the way individuals and societies perceive and relate to this phenomenon. At international level, dissimilarities and sometimes stark contrasts in security approaches arise from each state's geographical position, economic power, historical past, religion etc. Therefore, scholars have coined the concept of *security culture* in order to address the interdependence between security strategies and cultural influences.

Security culture is a relatively new concept and one which poses many problems in being accurately defined. As one can see from the very components of the expression, this concept builds on two complex phenomena: *security* and *culture*, themselves difficult to capture in synthetic definitions.

Generally speaking, "*security is pursuit of freedom from threats*", whereas culture accommodates "*collectively held semi-conscious or unconscious images, assumptions, codes and scripts which define the external environment*", consisting of "*shared assumptions and decision rules that impose a degree of order on individual and group conceptions of their relationship to their social, organisational or political environment*"².

Therefore, *security culture* is to be found at the crossroads between these two concepts. Chronologically speaking, the first notable association between security and culture appeared in 1970s, in one of Jack Snyder's studies dealing with Soviet and US approaches to nuclear strategy. At that time, the researcher spoke about *strategic culture* defining it as "*the sum of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of a national strategic community have acquired...with regard to nuclear strategy*"³. Decades later, Heiko Biehl *et al* highlighted the importance of Snyder's remarks because this type of approach focusing on culture "*was intended to challenge the dominant theories of that time, which largely rested on the assumption that actors behave rational and act in pursuit of preferences largely determined by material factors*"⁴. These scholars further underlined the subtle interplay between cultural aspects and the decision-making process: "*Cultural approaches emphasise that national preferences and interests are not always objectively determined, but are created in a multifaceted way and complex environment.*"

² B. Buzan, *People, States and Fear (An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era)*, Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York, 1991, p. 18.

³ A. I. Johnston, *Thinking about Strategic Culture*, in *International Security* 19(4), 1995, pp. 44-45.

⁴ J. Snyder, *The Soviet Strategic Culture (Implications for Limited Nuclear Options)*, R-2154-AF, RAND, Santa Monica, 1977, p. 8.

⁵ H. Biehl, B. Giegerich, A. Jonas (eds.), *Strategic Cultures in Europe (Security and Defence Policies Across the Continent)*, Springer VS, 2013, p. 10.

*The sensitivity a cultural approach brings to historical experiences of societies and the ability of strategic culture research to connect domestic and international politics are important advantages for analysing security and defence policies*⁶.

Such observations are highly relevant to the discussion of the security culture concept, but as one can easily notice, these authors employ the term *strategic culture* to call attention to what other researchers would label *security culture*. According to Krause⁷, the distinction between strategic and security culture is that the former is more concerned with power and war (*cf.* experiences of war and peace, role of armed forces, threat perceptions, enemy images etc., as constituents of strategic culture), while the latter builds upon beliefs, traditions, attitudes etc.

Therefore, security culture is more inclusive a term, encompassing both values (with respect to security and peace) and the ways these values are perceived, articulated and advanced.

Nonetheless, there have occurred many overlaps between these two concepts in the literature, but it is beyond the scope of the present paper to go into details about the fine distinctions setting them apart⁸.

What we intend to do, in turn, is to analyse several definitions of security culture as given by some scholars and to focus on the way security culture could become better known to the general public.

Surveying the definitions offered by various authors, it is obvious that stress is laid on values, beliefs, habits, common practice etc., in short, on a collective mindset that determines the manner in which a society regards the security phenomenon and designs its approach and response to threats.

To begin with, C. Gray argues that *security culture* “refers to the socially transmitted habits of mind, traditions and preferred methods of operations that are more or less specific to a particular geographically based security community”⁹. Thus, the researcher emphasises the operational value of security culture viewing it as a framework that determines courses of action.

According to A. Latham, *security culture* involves “a set of widely resonating ideas that have evolved out of a long historical experience and that are deeply rooted in the shared consciousness or common sense”¹⁰. It follows that security culture

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁷ K.R. Krause (ed.), *Culture and Security (Multilateralism, Arms Control and Security Building)*, Frank Cass Publishers, London, 1999, p. 15.

⁸ For further details on the distinctions among *diplomatic culture*, *political culture*, *strategic culture* and *security culture*, see K.R. Krause, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-18.

⁹ C. S. Gray, *War, Peace and Victory (Strategy and Statecraft for the Next Century)*, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1990, p. 45.

¹⁰ A. Latham, *Constructing National Security (Culture and Identity in Indian Arms Control and Disarmament Practice)*, in *Contemporary Security Policy*, 19 April 1998, pp. 132.

is inherently linked to national narratives and myths, and it is not just a “*product of history and socialisation, but of political and social choice*”¹¹.

To K.R. Krause, *security culture* is also connected with ways of action since it consists of those “*enduring and widely-shared beliefs, traditions, attitudes, and symbols that inform the ways in which a state’s/society’s interests and values with respect to security, stability and peace are perceived, articulated and advanced*”¹².

Another researcher, Nicole Gnesotto, addressed the security policies in the European Union and defined security culture as “*the aim and the means to incite common thinking, compatible reactions, coherent analysis – in short, a strategic culture that is increasingly European, one that transcends the different national security cultures and interests*”¹³.

Given these definitions, a multitude of questions spring up: are people aware of the influence culture exerts on their behaviour? Are leaders alert to the accord between their decisions and the cultural norms where those decisions are implemented? What can be done in order to raise public awareness regarding security matters?

Starting from these rhetorical questions, we shall approach hereupon the issue of promoting security culture, offering some considerations on the utility of such an undertaking and addressing the manner in which it could be carried out.

2. Promoting security culture

When dealing with the issue of promoting security culture, the first point of discussion should be whether security awareness is beneficial to the general public or not.

In our opinion, the answer is affirmative, since the entire security landscape has dramatically changed over the last decades. If, not long ago, the security domain was viewed as pertaining exclusively to the military and political sectors, nowadays, security has become a part of citizens’ daily life, especially after the chain of infamous terrorist attacks which started with 11 September 2001 in the USA and culminated with the recent attack at the headquarters of *Charlie Hebdo*, a satirical weekly magazine in France. On 7 January 2015, twelve people were killed by a group of gunmen in response to some controversial religious-oriented cartoons they had published.

This is further proof that the terrorist phenomenon has ceased to be a myth affecting only the military and has become reality for common people to face every day. Consequently, a question such as “*Terrorists know about you. What do YOU know about them?*”¹⁴ can make the difference between life and death even for civilians

¹¹ *Ibid*, p. 133, 154.

¹² K.R. Krause, *op. cit.*, p.15.

¹³ N. Gnesotto, *For a Common European Security Culture*, in *WEU-ISS Newsletter*, 31 October 2000.

¹⁴ *Profil* (publication of the Romanian Intelligence Service), year 2, no. 5, June 2004, p. 13.

walking in the street. It is therefore critical for people to find out more about threats and to respond in a better-planned manner to these types of dangers.

On that account, many researchers have underlined the importance of outlining and promoting security culture and there were some noteworthy contributions to the issue in Romania, as well.

For instance, in June 2004, Ionel Marin, back then deputy director of the Romanian Intelligence Service, argued in *Profil* magazine that the dynamics of national and international relations required a new approach on behalf of the institutions responsible for security issues, which meant that they should seek to promote dialogue with public actors and validate the social mission of these institutional actors¹⁵.

Another article published in the same magazine emphasises the role educational institutions should play in the process of promoting security culture: *“Educational programmes, a better coordination between educational projects, local communities and various segments of the population, an increased mass-media involvement in promoting Euro-Atlantic values, all these represent a great opportunity of extending the influence in the public sphere and among young people...”*¹⁶.

Additionally, Romanian researcher and professor Ioan Deac¹⁷ called attention, in a recent article published in *Observatorul Militar*, to the fact that security studies did not yet have a proper representation in the public opinion, since the domain actually lacked a specific *culture*. Referring to the Romanian National Defence Strategy 2010, p. 29, the researcher emphasised the importance of security culture as one of the fundamental pillars supporting national security.

His conclusion, to which we adhere, was the fact that in the process of promoting security culture, the military higher education system should play a major part since it could endow graduates with proper professional expertise.

However, we think that another crucial actor in the process of promoting security culture should be mass media due to its high penetration power into public conscience. Through responsible mass-media action, citizens can be encouraged to pay more attention to individual security, as well as to community or state security. Launching a major publicity campaign for security would enhance the level of civilian security culture, would sensitise, teach and activate common people with regard to threats. Advertisements, news coverage, the virtual environment (Web pages, forums etc.) are all means of putting forward security

¹⁵ Ionel Marin, *Nu există realitate fără comunicare*, in *Profil*, year 2, no. 5, June 2004, p. 3.

¹⁶ *Profil*, year 2, no. 5, June 2004, p. 21.

¹⁷ Ioan Deac, *Cultura de securitate și universitatea*, in *Observatorul Militar*, no. 12, 26 March - 1 April 2014, p. 1.

issues in order to mould public opinion and influence people's attitudes and behaviours.

In an article dealing with campaign design and management, R.D. Smith¹⁸ makes an inventory of communication options that can be used in public campaigns, and which we consider to be useful in a campaign promoting security culture, as well. The author distinguishes four categories as follows:

- (1) face-to-face communication and opportunities for personal involvement, using venues such as speeches, seminars, demonstrations, and special events;
- (2) organisational media involving communication vehicles such as brochures, newsletters, direct mail, Web sites, CDs and DVDs, and other media through which the message content, packaging, and dissemination are controlled;
- (3) news media such as newspapers, magazines, news services, radio, television and online news outlets, through which the campaign planners/supervisors could work with journalists and media gatekeepers to present the message; and
- (4) advertising and promotional media, another form of controlled media, involving outlets such as print and broadcast advertising, Web-based promotion and out-of-home advertising and organisation-directed promotional items such as clothing, consumer items and accessories.

Of course, not all these tools are necessarily appropriate in a public campaign promoting security culture, but surely some of them, if well-orchestrated, are effective in raising civic engagement in security issues.

R.H. Gass and J.S. Seiter¹⁹ make further interesting points in an article concerned with the way people's attitudes are formed and changed. Starting from the actuality that changing someone's attitude will trigger modifications in his/her behaviour, the two researchers survey several manners in which human attitudes could be influenced.

We think that some of the observations they make could be useful in the process of raising public awareness towards security matters, too.

There are some key components in the persuasion practice, as identified by Berlo²⁰: *the source, the message, the channel* and *the receiver*, on which Gass and Seiter expand as follows:

The *source* must be credible, therefore, in our case, state institutions and universities should get involved in promoting security culture, given their credibility. If spokespersons were selected, they must be credible and charismatic.

¹⁸ R.D. Smith, *Campaign Design and Management*, in W.F. Eadie, *21st Century Communication (A Reference Handbook)*, vol. 2, SAGE Publications Inc., 2009, pp. 736.

¹⁹ R.H. Gass, J.S. Seiter, *Persuasion and Compliance Gaining*, in W.F. Eadie, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, pp. 156-164.

²⁰ D. K. Berlo, *The Process of Communication (An Introduction to Theory and Practice)*, New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1960.

As far as the *message* is concerned, it can comprise two components: *narrative evidence*, which is “*anecdotal evidence, told in narrative form, presented as a case study, or related as personal accounts*” and *statistical evidence*, which “*consists of averages, percentages, and other numerical proof*”²¹. We consider that both types of evidence can be effective in promoting security culture, though some researchers claim that statistical proof has slightly more persuasive power than narrative proof²². Thus, the public can be told narratives about security issues (*i.e.* event reports, accounts from the lives of real people etc.), and can be offered figures and statistics related to security matters. R.H. Gass and J.S. Seiter argue that sometimes “*a well crafted narrative can be quite compelling and numbers do not always speak for themselves*”, therefore, the best advice they can offer is “*to combine the two. Begin with a narrative example, then use statistics to demonstrate that the example is not an isolated case*”²³.

In discussing the effectiveness of a message, the two researchers also touch upon motivational appeals, which they define as “*external inducements, often of an emotional nature, that are designed to increase an individual’s drive to undertake some course of action*”²⁴.

As stated by Gass and Seiter, motivational appeals can fall into several categories: fear appeals, guilt appeals, humorous appeals, patriotic appeals, pity ploys and sex appeals²⁵.

Our assessment is that a public campaign designed to sensitise the public opinion with regard to security problems could rely on fear appeals (*i.e.* perceived vulnerability), patriotic appeals (*i.e.* the sense of belonging to a certain group and set of norms) and humorous appeals (*i.e.* witty slogans, images and clips).

The *channel*, on the other hand, is also important, representing the means by which a message is conveyed; it can be spoken, printed, televised or online, all categories including advantages and disadvantages. Gass and Seiter²⁶ recommend considering the major influence of computer and Internet access upon users in designing a public campaign. In this respect, they mention the growing impact of blogging and social networking sites like MySpace and Facebook, as well as

²¹ R.H. Gass, J.S. Seiter, *op. cit.*, p.160.

²² R.W. Preiss, M. Allen, *Performing Counter-attitudinal Advocacy (The Persuasive Impact of Incentives)*, in M. Allen & R. W. Preiss (eds.), *Persuasion: Advances through Meta-analysis*, Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, 1998, pp. 231-239.

²³ R.H. Gass, J.S. Seiter, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

²⁴ Idem, *Persuasion, Social Influence and Compliance Gaining* (3rd ed.), Allyn & Bacon/Pearson, Boston 2007, p. 271.

²⁵ Idem, *Persuasion and Compliance Gaining*, in W.F. Eadie, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

²⁶ *Ibid*, p. 163.

the increasing reliance of people on cell phones, which could also be exploited through voice texting and images.

As regards the *receiver*, or the audience, Gass and Seiter²⁷ draw attention to the fact that factors such as age, gender, educational level or size of the audience should be considered in the process of persuasion. Cultural background is another key factor: *“Cultural differences play a major role in the way people respond to influence attempts. Some cultures are individualistic, valuing independence and the goals of the individual over those of the group, while others are collectivistic, valuing harmony, conformity, and concern for others. As such, messages that appeal to personal benefits and success tend to be more effective in individualistic cultures, while those that emphasise family and group goals tend to be more effective in collectivistic cultures”*²⁸. Consequently, public campaigns must take into account these societal traits when addressing audiences.

However, the final goal of public campaigns for security is not to make a profit; therefore, in our view, the starting point of such campaigns should be informing the public that the final benefit of having a more solid security culture means improving citizens’ quality of life.

*
* *

All things taken into account, it becomes obvious that promoting security culture is a current concern among democratic states. In this respect, we considered it useful to survey some definitions of the concept since many people, civilians in particular, have only the faintest idea what security culture is about.

Questioning the ways in which security culture could be promoted, we have addressed significant aspects involved in conducting public campaigns, insisting on the importance of correctly evaluating the source, the message, the channel and the audience in order to make the campaign as effective as possible.

In our opinion, academia, mass media and the virtual environment should become public arenas for security culture issues to be put forward and to gain prominence.

As we have argued, raising public awareness towards this matter is actually a means of strengthening collective security.

²⁷ *Ibid*, p. 161.

²⁸ S. Han, S. Shavitt, *Persuasion and Culture: Advertising Appeals in Individualistic and Collectivistic Societies*, in *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 30, 1994, pp. 326-350 apud R.H. Gass, J.S. Seiter, *Persuasion and Compliance Gaining*, in W.F. Eadie, *op. cit.*, p. 161.

NEOCLASSICAL REALISM AND THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

Dr Mihai ZODIAN

For a long period of time, the allocation of resources for defence has been mostly explained by the balance of power theory.

The various interpretations of this idea have called it into question lately due to many intellectual problems posed and because events seem to contradict it.

A new school of thought – neoclassical realism – hopes to maintain the main traits of this conceptualisation, while adapting to the post-Cold War security tendencies.

This article is dedicated to an evaluation of this new school of thought, with the goal of pointing out some ambiguities and debates caused by its principles.

Keywords: *resources; power; state; security; balance; neoclassical realism*

The domain of security studies originated and developed during the *Cold War* due to at least two main reasons. First, the practical requirement of having a better understanding regarding the issues related to the use of force, in the new circumstances created by the bipolarity competition and the nuclear built-up. Secondly, these subjects arouse a lot of interest in the public opinion, which contributed to the extensions of the discipline beyond the traditional specialists¹.

In this context, classical realism, especially Hans Morgenthau's work, has gained a lot of standing². According to him, politics and security are seen as a struggle for power, influenced by various normative and institutional contexts, which is caused, in the end, by the enduring traits of human nature³. Strategies should aim towards keeping the international position, while controlling the potential conflict implied by this goal⁴.

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¹Barry Buzan, Lene Hansen, *The Evolution of International Security Studies*, Cambridge University Press, f. l., 2009, pp. 10-13.

²Hans Morgenthau, *Politica între națiuni*, Polirom, Iași, 2007.

³*Ibid.*

⁴Raymond Aron, *Penser la guerre: Clausewitz*, Gallimard, 1976, vol. 2.

Essential for both peace and survival, maintaining a stable distribution of power means, among other things, that no actor can become the dominating force, at least for the proponents of this opinion⁵. This policy has opened the possibility for developing a more stable security environment, which can allow for the negotiating and solving of conflicts, for realists. The balance of power theory has put a premium on great powers, military force and flexible diplomacy.

The detente and the development of transnational relations have posed some questions regarding the viability of classical realism⁶, but under the influence of positivistic epistemology, inspired by the model of natural sciences, the neorealism promoted by Kenneth Waltz has offered a systemic or holistic explanation for the security domain⁷. States and other groups interact on the international arena under conditions of anarchy, in the absence of a common sovereign, a situation that forces them to look for their own security or pay the price⁸. The international system induces a tendency for an automatic balancing, which does not depend on actor's intentions; thus, we can understand arms races and alliances as tools for survival⁹.

Waltz argues that bipolarity, the situation in which there are only two great powers, under the condition of mutually assured destruction, was the most stable configuration of the international security environment, due to its predictability¹⁰. The end of the *Cold War* and the various critics directed against positivism, due either to philosophic reasons or to the ambiguities of the predictions made in the social sciences, aroused, among other things, a new wave of questions regarding neorealism. The opponents stressed the importance of international institutions, globalizations, ideas and the possibilities of change, including here new kind of actors, the common theme being a new conceptualisation of state's function as the main unit in the international system.

Neoliberalism and especially constructivism grew in popularity in the international relations and security studies disciplines. Subjects like identity, integration, supranationalism have drawn the researcher's attention, as compared to traditional issues of force, resource allocation, nuclear weapons etc. In this context, a new form of realism emerged, the neoclassical one, which tried to mix classical realism and neorealism.

⁵ Martin Wight, *Politica de putere*, Arc, Chişinău, 2000, pp. 176-193.

⁶ Robert O. Keohane, Joseph Nye jr., *Putere și interdependență*, Polirom, Iași, 2009.

⁷ Stephano Guzzini, *Realism și relații internaționale*, Institutul European, Iași, 2000, pp. 242-244.

⁸ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Teoria politicii internaționale*, Polirom, Iași, 2006, pp. 133-134, 153.

⁹ *Ibid*, pp. 165-172; Colin Elman, "Introducere: Evaluarea teoriei balanței de putere", in John A. Vasquez, Colin Elman, *Realismul și balanța de putere*, Polirom, Iași, 2012, p. 33.

¹⁰ Kenneth Waltz, *op. cit.*, pp. 224-232.

1. Neoclassical realism and the process of capabilities generation

Neoclassical realism wants to keep the research focus in the security studies on power politics, but it adds explanation taken from the domestic side of the states, adding more flesh to the structuralist theories like the one conceived by Waltz. Contrary to neorealism, here we have a school that still tries to find its identity and to define the main variables and correlations. Even so, the legitimacy of this enterprise is intensively contested, while its future is still uncertain.

It all started from Waltz's statements regarding the need to combine the systemic and unit level based explanations in order to understand concrete phenomena on the international relations stage, even if the structure enjoys a special status. In the article that launched the term of neoclassical realism, Gideon Rose points out that neorealist generally underestimates the actual policies pursued by actors, being more interested in general results like balance of power, war or conflict¹¹. Some structuralists are also pessimist about the possibility of creating more integrated explanations¹².

Thus, according to Rose, neoclassical realism combines system and unit in order to understand specific foreign and security policies, while accepting the conclusions reached by their predecessors. Additional factors like the domestic order play only a secondary explanatory function by comparison with the international distribution of capabilities, a structure that indicates the limits of action for the various players¹³. That means we are dealing not with a challenge to neorealism, but more with an adaptation, at least according to their representative's intentions¹⁴.

Now, since the international power position is considered insufficient, Rose points out three other variables, which are intermediary in a causal chain between the structure and the policies pursued by actors: the decision makers' representations, state's internal autonomy and incertitude, while opting for an epistemology that stresses theory-laden case studies and counterfactual reasoning¹⁵. The author identifies some predictions made by neoclassical realists like the external expansion's dependency on power and the ambiguity of this linkage, but those conclusions are not very different compared to other versions of realism¹⁶.

¹¹ Gideon Rose, *Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy*, in *World Politics*, October 1998, pp. 144-172.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 154.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Kenneth Waltz, *Omul, statul și războiul*, Institutul European, Iași, 2001. Rose, *op. cit.*, p. 145.

¹⁵ Gideon Rose, *op. cit.*, pp. 160-167.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 167.

This trend should make necessary a theory regarding the units and their relationship with the international system, a domain where neoclassical realism still has deficiencies.

This school of thought contains some degree of variety. Barry Posen can be seen as one of the precursors, especially with his important book on military thinking, where he tests alternatively balance of power and organisation theories, in order to explain the content of doctrines and strategies¹⁷. The specific traits are grouped under the headings of offensive, defensive or deterrent nature, political-military integration and degree of innovation¹⁸. The predictions involved by the two groups of theories are contradictory, which has allowed testing by case studies.

Posen has investigated the security policies pursued by France, Germany and Great Britain in the interwar period, arguing that the balance of power theory explains the behaviour of those three great powers better¹⁹. In general, for him, the emergence of a new thread induces the establishment of rational policies, while a calm era allows the development of administrative inertia. Even so, he underestimates the role of elites, decision-makers and culture and fails to offer a convincing explanation for appeasement. Especially for France, according to realist theories, after the rise of Nazism, one should have been expecting a strategy of confrontation not of negotiation. Put it otherwise, Posen simplifies too much and overstates the role played by institutional factors. His theoretical significance resides, paradoxically, in offering alternatives to balance of power theories, as the one represented by buck-passing.

The most important neoclassical realist, Randall Schweller offers a nuanced interpretation of the actor's goals, without initially approaching directly the domain of domestic politics, because of his interest in modifying the balance of power theory. Thus, according to him, the states may well be interested in gaining security, but they can also seek power²⁰. The decision-makers can choose, taking into account the goals and costs of change, to support or to contest a certain international order or an aspect of it. At global level, it matters not only the distribution

¹⁷ Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine, France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1984.

¹⁸ *Ibid*, p. 84.

¹⁹ A subject developed in a review dedicated to Posen's book in Mihai Zodian, "Rațiunea, puterea și organizațiile", *Colocviu strategic*, no. 12, December 2013.

²⁰ Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In", in *International Security*, summer 1994, pp. 74-75 and *Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest*, Columbia University Press, 1998.

of capabilities taken as such, but also the presence or the absence of equilibrium between the *status-quo* and revisionist powers²¹.

One of the consequences, according to Schweller, is that bandwagoning, siding with the challenger, can sometimes be more efficient than balancing, thus directly distancing from the ideas shared by the main body of neorealist researchers²². The states may oppose, align or pass the buck; unipolarity can last for a while, due to power imbalances²³. It follows that systemic tendencies are not reproducing directly in state's behaviour, which, as such, is not that different from Waltz's ideas.

From Schweller's ideas, it follows that capability generation depends on certain factors, such as the type of goals and the power position on the international arena. Revisionist great powers will tend to build significant armed forces in order to satisfy their expansive interests, drawing the smaller dissatisfied powers with them. The uncertainty is bigger regarding *status quo* powers, which may invest in security, if they perceive the threat, or in other domains, while minor ones will tend to pass the buck. The international stability will depend on the distribution of capabilities between defenders and contenders. But if we must take into account the power resources and the perceptions/interests, we should conclude that the international system is composed of not one, but two structures, one of power and another one of representations/ideas, since the division in *status-quo* and revisionist states is the result of ideologies and political regimes²⁴. The road is open towards rethinking the third level of analysis.

The essence of the argument relies on the attitude adopted by those great powers, which are interested in maintaining a certain world order, but they play an ambiguous role in the balance of interest theory's initial formulation, because they should oppose radical change, but sometimes, this does not happen, or the reaction comes very late being thus inefficient. As a consequence, Randall Schweller creates a second theory regarding decision-making, which aims at understanding why elites can try to avoid pursuing balancing strategies, even when it is reasonable to do so. He identified four variables: *elite cohesion* (the agreement regarding the presence, nature, gravity and the response needed to address a threat), *government's vulnerability*, *social cohesion* and *elite coherence* (the presence or absence of cleavages)²⁵. With a similar

²¹ Andrei Miroiu, Simona Soare, *Alianțele militare*, in Andrei Miroiu, Radu Ungureanu (coord.), *Manual de relații internaționale*, Polirom, Iași, 2006, p. 218.

²² Randall L. Schweller, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 103-104.

²⁴ Andrei Miroiu, Simona Soare, *op. cit.*, pp. 216-219.

²⁵ Randall L. Schweller, *Unanswered Threats, Political Constraints on the Balance of Power*, Princeton University Press, 2006, pp. 47-55.

reasoning, even if he is not a neoclassical realist, Barry Buzan distinguishes between strong and weak powers, measured by capabilities, and strong and weak states, according to the domestic support and legitimacy²⁶.

One of the implications is that, besides the type of interests and power positions, we must assume that the states have to be thought accordingly to the rational-actor model. Schweller's variables seem to be reducible one to the other and are suggesting that, for an effective behaviour, the elites and societies must be coherent, which is almost a tautology. Like Buzan's concept, it is too much centred on the state as an institution and either underestimates or looks ambiguously at society.

Alongside Schweller, two other authors need to be mentioned, since they aim at developing a neoclassical realist explanation, but this time, taking into account the unipolar structure of power and the United States strategies on the world stage. These approaches differ in terms of the implicit premises regarding the state's role, seen either as just a domestic power relation's reflection or as an autonomous factor. Thus, Christopher Layne tries to explain US foreign policy using just two variables: the systemic distribution of power, which offers opportunities and constraints and the elite's characteristics²⁷. The latter is interested, economically and ideologically, in creating and maintaining a world open to the business and ideas originated in the US, and, as a consequence, it promotes the consolidation of unipolarity and the prevention of a regional hegemony in Eurasia²⁸. Fareed Zakaria explains Washington's policies using both the distribution of power and some internal variables: social power, which, beside state's capabilities, is directed towards the state-society relationship; the extraction capacity and the degree of centralisation²⁹.

Besides the fact that they rely on a single case study, when the number of international actors is greater, both approaches are raising some issues. Christopher Layne adapts a typical elitist theory, which does not explain why the policies and actions undertaken by decision-makers are accepted by the public, and it is pretty simplified, apparently being the result of an *ad hoc* selection. Zakaria assumes that the stronger a state is by comparison with the society, the more influential it is on the international scene, but the most important actor now is a democracy. Both seem to underestimate the fact that the discussions

²⁶ Barry Buzan, *Popoarele, statele și teama*, Cartier, Chișinău, 2000, pp. 104-115.

²⁷ Christopher Layne, *Pacea iluziilor, Marea strategie americană din 1940 până în prezent*, Polirom, Iași, 2011, pp. 61, 87.

²⁸ *Ibid*, pp. 88-90.

²⁹ Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power. The Unusual Origins of America's World Role*, Princeton University Press, 1998, pp. 35-39.

regarding the role played by the state are already an established “*industry*” inside sociology and political sciences, that the subject is a key element for the discussions regarding the phenomena of globalisation, and that there is a need for at least a schematic treatment of it, since this subject is not ignored, not even in classical realism³⁰.

The oscillation between various conceptions regarding the states and elites, the critiques directed against the first formulations of neoclassical realism have stimulated this school of thought to give more attention to explaining domestic politics. Taliaferro, Lobell and Ripsman try to define, in a collective work, a clear vision regarding this very important issue³¹. The state is seen as the main actor in international and security domains, and defined in a Weberian sense, as claiming the monopoly of legitimate force inside its borders³². At the same time, his attributes are defined from the outside-in, which has led to the primacy of the executive, which still needs resources to pursue its policies or lacks autonomy, thus being forced to resort to various domestic actors for the production and distribution of capabilities³³. The authors treat almost all groups that are active in the international relations as states and are evoking the significance of elite’s consensus.

There are at least two issues with this new formula. The mix between the monopoly of legitimate force and the primacy of executive cannot be applied to all the actors which Taliaferro, Lobell and Ripsman view as states. Examples, ancient polis or medieval kingdoms, and the European Union, which is not very clear where we should put it. Thus, we have a contradiction between the intention to bring more context into explanation and an anhistoric conception of the state, contradicting even one of classic realism’s principles, one of their guiding lights³⁴. Also, legitimacy is not well understood, being reduced to a version of social consensus, and the oscillations between an etatist and an elitist conception of politics still remain. Ironically, like Hobson notices, the state which appears so strong seen from the inside is theorised as a mere toy of faith in the international relations³⁵.

³⁰ Hans Morgenthau, *op. cit.*, pp. 332-362.

³¹ Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, Steven E. Lobell, Norrin M. Ripsman, *Introduction: Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy*, in Steven E. Lobell, Norrin Ripsman, Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, *Neoclassical Realism, the State and Foreign Policy*, Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 24-28; George Vişan, *Un suflu nou pentru o teorie fundamentală*, in *Sfera Politicii*, no. 169.

³² *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ Morgenthau, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-51.

³⁵ John Hobson, *The State and International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Since we need to understand how resource allocation for defence works, including budgeting, theories that are taking into consideration matters such as state's autonomy, organisational models, elites intentions or social cohesion are insufficient. During an economic crisis, the pressures put on the political system intensify, the requirements of various policies enter into competition more than usually, various groups are becoming rivals for resources, elites act under constraint and contestation etc. It is sufficient to observe the recent political struggles related to budgetary decisions in the US, which lead to "sequestration" and "shutdown", or the controversies linked to issues like debt and deficits inside the EU³⁶. All states are influenced by these tendencies, never mind how autonomously they look.

2. Neoclassical realism's reception

One of the issues raised when interpreting this new version of realism is its reception as an intellectual feint during a conflict of theories pursued after 1989, more than being analysed on its own terms. This argument is related to the various critics directed against Waltz's neorealism, previously discussed, controversies which have not led to a clear result, while consolidating the intellectual distance between international relations schools of thought. The disciplines related to the study of peace and conflict now present the image of divergent interpretations, with few common elements, except issues like conflict or justice.

Two topics are involved. First, from a conceptual point of view, the research principles of positivism, inspired by the model of natural sciences and by philosophy of science like the theories of Popper and Lakatos, is increasingly put under questioning. Secondly, parallel developments from other humanistic disciplines express doubts regarding the adequacy of structuralism, which is increasingly seen as a materialistic simplification, lacking the objectivity claimed by its supporters.

The most outspoken critic of neoclassical realism, John Vasquez, argues that we are dealing with an erroneous intellectual attempt to justify neorealism's flaws, especially balancing theory, by proposing improvised explanations, aiming at protecting structuralism from its predictive errors³⁷. Ironically, he is inspired by the Lakatos neopositivist philosophy of science, in which theories contain a hard core, protected by additional statements, a conceptual form that makes them difficult to reject only by experiments and testing³⁸. The only effective criterion

³⁶ Simona R. Soare, *Sub povara a 90 000 de tone de diplomație? Statele Unite ale Americii, strategia hegemonică și declinul relativ de putere*, Editura Militară, București, 2013.

³⁷ John A. Vasquez, "Paradigma realistă și programele de cercetare", in Vasquez, Elman, *op. cit.*, pp. 44-65.

³⁸ Imre Lakatos, *Introduction: Science and Pseudoscience*, in Imre Lakatos, John Worrall, Gregory Currie, *The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes*, Cambridge University Press, 1978, pp. 1-7.

is the discovery of new facts, which can distinguish between progressive and regressive research programs³⁹.

Obviously, realists from various intellectual orientations have fought back and these controversies have resulted in many articles and collective books. Some argue that Vasquez misunderstands Lakatos, other bring into attention rival philosophies of science, while few of them find common grounds with the contestation⁴⁰. All things considered, the consequence of this debate is, first and foremost, the consolidation of theoretical camps, and only secondly, better concepts and research methods.

3. Evaluating the debates

The controversies have unfolded between researchers sharing the same model of knowledge, the one inspired by natural sciences, and we can argue that it is exactly this ideal of investigation that has been affected the most. If even positivists do not know very well what science is, then it is difficult to hope that their epistemological rivals will clear out the meaning of this approach in their stead. Especially the view of science as being preoccupied by generalisations, measurement and empirical testing of hypothesis, with the goal of discovering social laws similar to natural ones was at risk.

The stake is not only a philosophical one, but has a political dimension too, with a certain impact on strategies. On this occasion, there have been put under question not only the validity of some concepts and correlations, but also the legitimacy of the entire research traditions, and even subjects like financing, compositions of departments, issues which testify for the intensity of the dispute. Thus, one of the consequences has been that non-communicative pluralism mentioned above, even if some armistice proposals have been made.

From the perspective of the policy's argumentation, a problem occurs when the arguments in favour of a preferred strategy are very controversial or vague. In the end, as Robert Keohane reminds us, we all act starting from some representation, even if we are not fully aware of its characteristics and logical consequences⁴¹. This is true also when we discuss the alternative to some policy or a social setting, for which even experience is not always a good guide, since the next event may well be very different from the last.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ Kenneth Waltz, *Evaluarea teoriilor*, Stephen M. Walt, *Puterea progresivă a realismului*, Randall Schweller, *Noile cercetări realiste asupra alianțelor*, Colin Elman, Miriam Fendius Elman, *Lakatos și neorealismul: o replică lui Vasquez*, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, *Logica și evidențele neorealismului: când este o teorie falsificată?*, in Vasquez, Elman, *op. cit.*

⁴¹ Robert O. Keohane, *Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics*, in Robert O. Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and its Critics*, Columbia University Press, 1986, pp. 3-4.

Nevertheless, neoclassical realism is not without virtue. Its main advantage is that this school of thought has drawn attention to the contextual elements that influence the policies and strategies pursued by the international actors, including on resource allocation for defence. For example, in all economically advanced societies, we can find a strong state's presence in the economy, but the goals, means, social coalitions that stimulate and support them vary⁴². Meanwhile, the connection between defence and welfare expenditures is one of the main themes that have inspired the recent debates in both the US and the EU. Vasquez's critique is exaggerated, because neoclassical realism is a new school of thought, which cannot answer to all the philosophical and research problems left unsolved for almost three hundred years since the humanistic disciplines try to imitate natural sciences.

Neoclassical realism can be included into a broader movement inside the international relations, strategic and security studies domains, which draw attention to the need for investigating individuals, groups, institutional traits or culture as fundamental factors in understanding the social life. Thus, its representative's intentions and some of the arguments are useful, even if they require further elaboration. First, the relationship between system and actors should be clarified, more precisely, what John Hobson calls "*state's acting capability*", the unit's ability to change, under some circumstances, the structure⁴³. Secondly, more research is welcome on the subject of the relationships between power factors and other types of social structures, which explain why people aim at some goals and act to realise them, and not only what they can do, in abstract terms.



⁴² Gosta Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, Princeton University Press, f.1, 1990.

⁴³ John Hobson, *op. cit.*, pp. 205-205.

PARTICULARITIES OF MANAGING THE FINANCIAL RESOURCES REQUIRED FOR THE PERSONNEL ENGAGED IN CONTEMPORARY MILITARY AFFAIRS CONTINUING TRAINING

Brigadier General Dr Florin JIANU

Financial resource management, as part of the military affairs resource management, represents a constant challenge to political and military leaders. The support for military affairs shows a state ability to provide both national and regional security.

To ensure the financial resources that are necessary to continually train the personnel in defence area as well as to provide the military with high-performance equipment represents a goal for all states, be they members of an alliance or not.

Therefore, the financial strategy to support military affairs should consider the state important options, given the security environment, the regional situation and the alliance the particular state is part of.

Keywords: *management; modern military affairs; defence; financial resources; personnel training*

Introduction

The fast-paced development of a society requires the particular state administration to continually adapt defence systems, organisation and management, defence policies, and forms of material support, especially the financial one. Any activity in military affairs requires not only human resources but also significant financial resources.

It is often considered that the ability to manage financial resources represents the basis of managerial power as this activity entails the political and military leaders capability to allocate money, time, equipment, labour force and space, based on a defence strategy. The need to modernise and develop defence systems and, implicitly, to provide the necessary financial resources arises from the pace and dynamics of social development.

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Financial resource management specific to military affairs

Management is one of the key factors that explain why a military structure is trained or untrained and able or unable to meet the security challenges. Command refers to a network of political and military decision-makers working together to achieve the goals and objectives set by each military structure, so that each of them can organise and conduct their own training activities.

Broadly defined, financial resource management is a segment of the military general management that fulfils the following functions: financial estimation, financial organisation, financial allocation, financial communication and financial control. They are also applicable to the financial component of military affairs with the main aim of maximising the value of military structures considering the relation security provider – security risk.

The financial resource management in military affairs undergoes continuous change being part of the defence management transformation process, *“because of the need to meet the legal and financial-accounting requirements regarding financial resource utilisation and public property administration”*¹.

The financial resource management in the field of military affairs aims at providing and managing the specific resources and flows, all subjected to rigorous internal control procedures. Military affairs financing mechanisms should be established in a proper, coherent and stable manner, so that they can allow the participation of those responsible for the budgets planning, appropriation and monitoring.

Against this background, the equipment modernisation is a component of military affairs, which requires the allocation of financial resources to procure cutting-edge equipment and technologies, and to train the personnel engaged in military affairs.

The financial resource management in military affairs is based on the general courses of action highlighted by the National Defence Strategy, representative being *“the generalisation of resource management based on multiannual programmes and priorities by the institutions responsible for security and defence”* and *“increasing transparency regarding the use of public funds and the responsibility to the taxpayer”*².

¹ *Strategia de transformare a Armatei României*, București, 2007, p. 9, see http://www.mapn.ro/despre_mapn/informatii_generale, retrieved on 18.01.2015.

² *Strategia Națională de Apărare*, București, 2010, p.28, see <http://www.presidency.ro/static/ordine/SNAp/SNAp.pdf>, retrieved on 18.01.2015.

All these aspects should contribute to substantiating the decisions in the field of training the personnel engaged in military affairs. It is clear that, since 2004, Romania, as a NATO member state, has embarked on a path of collective defence.

Romania participates in “*NATO joint budgets (civil, military, infrastructure) as well as in the NATO Security Investment Programme*” and “*takes the full responsibility for funding the participation in the activities under the Individual Partnership Programme as well as for the necessary expenses to support the Romanian personnel that work within NATO integrated political and military structures*”³.

The budget constraints in recent years have highlighted the problem of allocating the necessary financial resources to develop military affairs, to train the personnel engaged in operating modern equipment included. Therefore, the state has a significant economic role in providing the necessary financial resources to support its military affairs to meet the standards required by the Alliance in order to eliminate the security risks to the nation.

Financial resource management specific to personnel training

Managing the financial resources that are necessary to train the personnel engaged in military affairs is an essential activity for national security. Providing the personnel engaged in military affairs with continuing training is the political-military leaders duty and social responsibility to meet the national security and defence objectives in full compliance with NATO military objectives.

One of the main courses of action related to the military transformation is “*to enhance the personnel training*”⁴, which entails providing the necessary financial resources to train the personnel engaged in military affairs.

The financial resource management specific to the personnel engaged in military affairs training entails, in addition to financing instruments, the existence of some military command structures, training programmes and exercises, military capabilities, processes and institutions to develop the personnel necessary skills to conduct military operations.

Considering the specific issues and functions, managing the financial resources that are necessary to train the human resources in the field requires

³ *Ibidem*, p. 28.

⁴ *Strategia Națională de Apărare*, București, 2010, p.18, see <http://www.presidency.ro/static/ordine/SNAp/SNAp.pdf>, retrieved on 18.01.2015.

a specific mechanism that entails processes and stages: planning; training and coordination; control and evaluation of resources.

Planning involves the budget development for training the personnel engaged in military affairs, according to stage requirements and meeting efficiency criteria.

The coordination of financial resources entails actions and responsibilities related to personnel training as well as the military conscious and responsible participation in all the stages of specialised training.

The control and assessment of the financial resources necessary to train the personnel engaged in military affairs should be conducted by comparing performance to meeting the training plan objectives.

The presented management functions will contribute to the financial resources proper and efficient planning, their controlled allocation in time, as well as to monitoring and assessing the results and costs.

The personnel engaged in military affairs training is mainly funded using the resources allocated for this purpose in the defence budget as well as funds and revenues resulted from the necessity to participate in alliances, partnerships or international cooperation missions. This type of cooperation enjoys *“the great advantage of saving financial and material resources, ensuring the national efforts high efficiency”*⁵.

The financial resource management specific to the personnel engaged in military affairs training should be based on a viable project related to the force training programme. This project should systematically analyse several variables, namely: programme objectives; training content; methods and assets used during training; criteria for assessing the results; lessons learned.

The personnel training design should have a pragmatic character to avoid extremes, namely a superficial or too detailed project. Therefore, all the intermediary elements necessary to financially support the force training should be considered. A *“budget for failure”* should be also considered to fund alternatives and several courses of action if the training objectives cannot be met.

Financial resource management supports the personnel training programmes that should be flexible, allowing the use of funds to meet the planned objectives, achievable and measurable. The personnel engaged in military affairs should be trained to deal with both new and classical threats.

⁵ *Strategia Națională de Apărare*, București, 2010, p. 4, see <http://www.presidency.ro/static/ordine/SNAp/SNAp.pdf>, retrieved on 18.01.2015.

Conclusions

The managerial success in military affairs is closely connected to the way defence strategies are developed as well as to the possibility to financially support it focusing on the personnel training.

The financial resource management in the field of training the personnel engaged in military affairs should establish the processes employed in budget allocation and ensure that the allocated funds are used to meet the force objectives. The strategy to financially support military affairs should establish the state important options considering the security environment, the regional situation, the alliances and the available resources.

To continually train the personnel engaged in contemporary military affairs departments the necessary financial resources should be allocated, considering the personnel participation in current and future operations and the possibility to support them. Indecision as far as budget allocation is concerned, given that training and equipment in the field of military affairs are underfunded as well as that the regional security risks are likely to get manifest, can highlight serious difficulties regarding the state of security and the national defence in the long run.

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INFLUENCE OF ENVIRONMENT ON NATIONAL SECURITY

Dr Irina TĂTARU

The opinions expressed in this paper are related to the environmental and social issues concerning national security, marking the latest developments in the field. It is shown that environmental issues should be a cause for concern for both experts in the field and ordinary people as they directly affect human existence.

As far as Romania is concerned, the existing legal framework gives due weight to environmental security issues. In this regard, the National Sustainable Development Strategy appeared in 2008, aiming to connect Romania to a new philosophy of development adopted by the EU and other states in the world, namely that of sustainable development.

Keywords: *national security; environment; economic development; sustainable development strategy*

Introduction

Nature has been always seen as a generator of resources and an ideal place for waste disposal. Natural resources have become the focus of resource security. The development of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear ones, increasingly raises questions about the nature and survival of the human species in general if such significant means are used in an armed conflict in the future. Moreover, the development of various polluting industries has had negative effects on the natural environment. At the same time, man-made environmental changes in order to meet people's needs for food, water, shelter have added to those negative effects resulting in sometimes irreversible damage.

Environmental security

People begin to realise that nature protection is equivalent to maintaining the conditions necessary for existence. In this regard, more and more states and nongovernmental organisations adopt and impose appropriate measures to protect

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natural environment. Somehow, we can speak of environmental security. By this concept, “... we understand both biosecurity, namely security of all that is alive, and the inorganic world security, which generates resources and hosts the world bios, (...) environmental security is the most general concept in the sphere of security, being a counterproductive limitation if reduced to environmental protection and ecological security. Environmental security, from the perspective of recent EU documents, becomes the fundamental premise of sustainable development”¹.

In our opinion, this is the correct approach, which leads to new perspectives in building national security as a coherent set of components: social, economic, political, military, cultural, human and environmental. In fact, these components are interdependent, each acting continuously and with different intensities on the other. We consider that the effects of their interaction are cumulative over time. If we summarise the influence of environment on national security we find that the existence and manifestation of other ingredients have, in one way or another, a solid support in the natural environment. Therefore, the economic component is based on items that come directly from nature, being produced by the land (agriculture), extracted from the subsoil resources of the planet (various minerals, hydrocarbons) or, indirectly, by the fact that all human activities are performed in the environment transformed according to human needs.

Economy and environment

In recent decades, as a mega real being, “*mother nature*” has reacted to the irresponsible actions of human beings and sometimes it cannot be any the less understood and managed by mankind². To provide solutions in order to globally repair the evil done in decades, other decades are necessary. Unfortunately, some processes are irreversible and nature’s arsenal is practically unimaginable and sometimes impossible to counteract. Man, part of the bios and part of the global ecosystem, is the only component that can slow the dynamic confrontation with the environment. Natural balance should dethrone the desire for profit. The purpose of this process is to achieve again the balance between ecosystem components.

To this end, adequate measures are required at national and European level. In fact, the European Union, by creating a legal framework and adapting it to each EU member state, makes the first step in a long process that is important and necessary but not sufficient. Europe is a mosaic of organisational cultures and states having particularities that should be taken into account. Romania, for example, was for more that half a century under the culture of the totalitarian

¹ Dr Francisc Tobă, *Securitatea națională*, see http://www.securitatenationala.ro/e107_plugins/content/content.php?content.29, p. 19.

² *Ibidem*, pp. 3-5.

regime that was characterised by excessive centralism, ruling out any initiative and thus assuming responsibility for community leadership.

To this are added the negative effects of the current economic and financial crisis that has swept the world since 2008. The crisis has drastically reduced the financial resources allocated to environmental protection and development of environmentally friendly agricultural and industrial activities.

On the other hand, the crisis has made some “profitable” activities grow significantly. Thus, in Romania, one of the factors affecting environmental security is the abuse of property, especially in the area of deforestation. The National Sustainable Development Strategy in Romania stipulates the development and implementation of a National Programme for Sustainable Forest Management that establishes the measures to be taken for the responsible management of the national forest fund. The legislation limiting the use of property, especially when having a negative impact on communities, is not sufficiently clear. Therefore the owners abuses can be justified by the fact that they exercise unlimited right over their property. More often than not benefits are private and environmental insecurity is public.

Awareness of the need for environmental protection in national security

The current general legal framework in Romania gives due weight to environmental security issues. The National Security Strategy of Romania (2006) states that national security could be jeopardised by a number of serious events, geophysical, weather-related or associated, incorporating environment or reflecting its degradation, including as a result human dangerous, harmful or irresponsible activities. Serious events mean, among other aspects, industrial or environmental disasters that cause a large number of victims, serious environmental pollution in the national territory or in adjacent regions.

Moreover, the Sustainable Development Strategy stipulates that “*The priority lines of action of Romania’s foreign policy are aimed at upholding and promoting the national interests, which are permanent and non-partisan, while continuously adjusting to the ongoing changes in the system of international relations, gradually shaping the international profile of Romania and dealing with the consequences of its particular geographical position at the eastern border of the EU and NATO*”³.

In addition, in Law 137/1995, the law on the environmental protection, supplemented and amended, it is noted that: “*The object of the present law is to regulate environmental protection, an objective of major public interest, on the basis of the principles and strategic elements which lead to the sustainable development of society*”⁴. Therefore,

³ See <http://strategia.ncsd.ro/docs/sndd-final-en.pdf>, p. 135.

⁴ Law 137/1995, art 1.

we can say that environmental issues are well regulated and that all rules can be implemented and the problems of environmental degradation can be understood by the entire population.

Conclusions

We stand today on the threshold of a new industrial revolution, a fundamental structural change in the global economy. The traditional model of economic development – the GDP growth parallels the energy consumption and carbon emissions growing – is no longer viable. It is unsustainable in terms of energy and climate security. The excessive amounts of carbon dioxide pumped into the atmosphere contribute to accelerating the climate change.

This is not an environmental problem that would concern only the experts in the field. Climate change is related to human existence itself. Its consequences such as floods, hunger and diseases lead to migration, widespread in areas where there are already tensions. In turn, drought and changes in agricultural crops generate more competition for food, water and energy in regions where resources are already low. Economic destabilisation, as predicted, may reach a level that has not been seen since the Second World War.

Unfortunately, we all can see the effects of climate change in Romania, the floods and droughts in recent years. We should establish a new economic model, one that uses energy more efficiently and decouple economic growth from carbon emissions, on the one hand, using more energy sources, on the other hand.

The implications of the “*profit rush*” have disastrous consequences on the environment. All these aspects have repercussions on security from individual and national to global level. The disasters that occur in some areas causing crises/ conflicts and lack of vital resources can lead to regional or global conflicts.

Therefore, we can say that environmental issues have a strong impact on national and global security and the current economic and financial crisis amplifies especially their negative dimension.

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SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN (1979 – 1989) – Objectives and Combat Tactics –

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The article discusses the objectives pursued and the combat tactics employed by the belligerent forces during the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (1979-1989). In this regard, it is shown that the fulfilment of the political and military objectives was undermined by the contradictory reality of the political situation in Afghanistan, the illegitimate nature of the government in Kabul, and the lack of popular support for the communist regime backed by the USSR. The situation called for a permanent change of the Soviet ground combat tactics, limiting the ability of the Soviet commanders to use their resources efficiently. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, as agreed by the Geneva Accords in 1988, ended on 15 February 1989, but, unfortunately, it was not followed by the pacification of the country.

Keywords: *Afghanistan; Soviet 40th Army; limited contingent; combat tactics; operational capability*

The nature of the Afghan conflict has known over the years several definitions and interpretations aimed to internationally legitimate the actions of its main protagonists.

The “*fraternal aid*” was granted by the USSR to the Afghan people – precisely to the communist government in Kabul – by virtue of the “*Soviet-style internationalism*”, in order to create optimal conditions for the socio-economic development of the country and to prevent other actors from undertaking hostile actions. Soon after the beginning of the intervention, the Soviet military actions started to be opposed with an increasingly stronger force by the Mujahideen resistance.

Discreet in the early stages of the campaign, the support provided to the Mujahideen resistance by the democratic powers of the bipolar world order became later an open secret. It proved to be a turning point for transforming the Afghan conflict

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into a hot manifestation of the Cold War, not without significant reshaping effects on the international relations system.

In retrospect, the almost ten years of the Soviet military presence on the Afghan soil were years of fire for the Red Army soldiers, who, ultimately, had to pay the death toll¹ of one of the undeclared wars of the 20th century. The intervention became a “*black hole*” for the Soviet economy, severely affected by the increasing costs of that ideologically camouflaged military campaign. Its large-scale consequences would discredit the Soviet system internally and externally, accelerating the processes of democratisation, which led to the fall of Central and South-East European communist regimes and, ultimately, to the collapse and dissolution of the Soviet Union by the end of 1991.

Soviet Intervention Objectives

Regardless of its ideological justifications or geopolitical determinations, the Soviet military intervention initiated on 27 December 1979 in support of the Afghan communist government caused the Soviet leadership to define the main political and military objectives, the configuration of the intervention forces, as well as the most appropriate tactics in order to achieve the desired end state.

The analysis of the circumstances in which the Red Army entered Afghanistan shows that both Soviet and Afghan policymakers were convinced that the main objectives of the intervention could be fulfilled in a relatively short period of time, in the worst case scenario the presence of the Soviet military on the Afghan soil being estimated at maximum three years.

In this respect, immediately after the invasion, Babrak Karmal² said that he expected the Soviet forces to remain in Afghanistan for only six months. This optimistic assessment was shared at the time by the Soviet political leadership, but not without the comments of the top-level Red Army commanders.

The fulfilment of the political and military objectives of the strategic concept that was the basis of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan was undermined by the contradictory reality of the political situation in Afghanistan, the illegitimate nature of the government in Kabul, and the lack of popular support for the communist

¹ 15 051 killed in action (belonging to the Red Army, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and KGB), 311 missing in action, and 35 478 wounded in action, according to *Pravda* on 15 February 2011. A commission nominated by the Russian Armed Forces General Staff considered the number of the military killed in action being approx. 26 000, including also the soldiers who passed away in hospitals due to the combat wounds. See Doru-Claudian Frunzulică, *Marea Ecuatie: Afganistan*, p. 103.

² Afghan Communist leader, Babrak Karmal, became chairman of the Revolutionary Council and chairman of the Council of Ministers on 27 December 1979.

regime backed by the USSR. The situation called for a permanent change of the Soviet ground combat tactics, limiting the ability of the Soviet commanders to use their resources efficiently. Because of the lack of popularity of the Red Army presence on Afghan soil, any success in achieving the military objectives by the Soviet military forces had immediate negative effects on the political objectives of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, causing reduced public support and bringing delegitimisation and discredit on the communist government in Kabul as well as on its Soviet supporters.

❖ **Political Objectives**

The engagement of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan had as a main political objective the revitalisation of the Afghan communist regime in Kabul, which was incapable to exercise any authority because of the lack of credibility and public support. In this regard the discussions in early 1980 between Yuri Andropov³, the head of the Soviet Union's KGB, Babrak Karmal and other representatives of the communist government in Kabul are relevant. On 7 February 1980, Andropov reported to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party that Afghanistan stabilisation required urgent measures *“to restore the unity of the Afghan Communist Party, to increase the operational capability of the Afghan armed forces, and to strengthen the ties between the Party, the government and the masses, normalising economic life in the country and taking active Afghan foreign policy, appropriate to the situation”*⁴.

The objective of strengthening the relations between *“the Party, the government and the masses”* was compromised from the very beginning by the Soviet military intervention itself, whose immediate results were the transformation of the communist government in Kabul in a puppet government, denying Babrak Karmal's legitimacy and capacity to exercise effective leadership, and emphasising the Afghan economic, financial and military dependency on the USSR.

Another political objective of the intervention consisted in blocking any possible attempts of repositioning Afghanistan outside the Soviet sphere of influence, considered very probable should the Afghan communist government fall.

The role of the Soviet forces was clearly defined three months after the beginning of the intervention, on 7 April 1980, in a report addressed to Politburo

³ Yuri Andropov, head of KGB between 1967 and 1982, supported the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. On 12 November 1982 he was elected Secretary General of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union, a position he held until his death on 9 February 1984.

⁴ William Maley, *The Afghanistan Wars*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2002, p. 43.

by Andrei Gromyko⁵, Yuri Andropov, Dmitriy Ustinov⁶ and Vadim Zagladin⁷. The report defined the Soviet forces mission as being in Afghanistan for “*defending the revolutionary regime and the country from external threats, guarding the country’s borders together with Afghan forces, providing urban centres security and freedom of movement along the main lines of communication, rebuilding and strengthening the combat capability of the Afghan armed forces*”⁸. The report also stated that “... *only when the internal situation is stabilised, and the security situation around the country is improved, at the request of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, we may consider the question of the possible withdrawal of our troops from Afghanistan*”⁹.

Despite the statements of good intentions repeatedly made by the Soviet leadership, the subsequent political and military developments showed that the issues of legitimacy and credibility of the Communist regime in Kabul were even more aggravated by the USSR military intervention, which affected the motivation and morale of the Afghan military personnel and reduced the combat capability of the Afghan armed forces.

❖ **Military Objectives**

The main military objectives of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan were defined as follows: taking control of the main road communications, major cities, air bases, economic and logistical points of interest; reducing losses among Soviet troops; developing minimum necessary relationships between the Soviet forces and the local population; training and increasing the combat capability of the Afghan forces (armed forces, police, secret service) to be able to carry out independent operations against insurgent groups; providing necessary support (logistical and combat – intelligence, air, artillery, communications) as required by the Afghan forces engaged in operations against insurgent groups; building up the operational capability of the Afghan forces so that the Soviet forces could be withdrawn from Afghanistan as soon as the resistance was defeated.

⁵ Andrei Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1957 and 1985 and Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR between 1985 and 1988, had an important role in defining the conduct of Soviet foreign policy on Afghanistan.

⁶ Dmitriy Ustinov, Minister of Defence in the period 1976 - 1984, as well as Yuri Andropov, was one of the main supporters of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan.

⁷ Vadim Zagladin, one of the main theorists of *perestroika* and *glasnost* reformist current was Leonid Brezhnev’s and Mikhail Gorbachev’s close advisor and collaborator.

⁸ Maley, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 44.

Taking control and providing security in the main urban centres (Kabul, Herat, Kandahar, Mazar-e-Sharif, Jalalabad) were military priorities established at the very beginning of the intervention, being well-known the previous incidents caused by the riots of the population in which were killed also Soviet citizens (e.g. Herat, March 1979). The existence of airports in the above-mentioned cities did not exclude the necessity of keeping control not only over the land lines of communication between them but also over the other major roads to link with Pakistan, from Jalalabad through Khyber Pass to Peshawar and from Kandahar through Spin Boldak up to Quetta. Ensuring freedom of movement and security of transport by the road communication network in Afghanistan proved to be a major military objective whose achievement required numerous resources, thus blocking the possibilities of using them to extend control in areas dominated by the Mujahideen resistance.

The unreliability of the Afghan forces led the Soviets to assume a comprehensive training programme for increasing the combat capability of the Afghan military units, so that they could fight in the front line against the Mujahideen insurgency.

Manning and training, providing the necessary weapons, ammunition and military equipment for building up the operational capability of the Afghan forces to enable them to fight independently against the Mujahideen resistance proved to be a very complex task too. For this purpose, a lot of efforts were constantly undertaken to ensure sufficient weapons, ammunition and military equipment for the Afghan forces. However, the problems of certifying the Afghan forces combat readiness, of motivating and maintaining the morale of the Afghan military personnel often proved to be unsolvable. The official figures related to manning the Afghan military units were often falsified, due to the fact that they were severely affected by the large number of desertions and by the fighting between tribal factions, a situation that caused many officers to give up their military career.

Over the years, the operational capability of the Afghan forces increased, although it never reached the combat readiness level desired by Soviet planners. It was best seen after the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Afghanistan, when the Afghan forces were able to contradict all the political and military forecasts that the fall of the Communist regime was imminent! Due to the Afghan forces, who demonstrated that they could fight much better without the Soviet guardianship, the communist government in Kabul survived the Soviet Union (whose death was officially registered on 8 December 1991), remaining in power until 28 April 1992! Perhaps it would have lasted longer if it had continued to receive financial support, weapons, ammunition, military equipment and fuel from the Russian Federation.

Limited Contingent

The superficial assessment of the security situation in Afghanistan as well as of the capacity and willingness of other states to support the Mujahideen resistance is revealed by the analysis of the structure of the Soviet intervention force, which was called the *40th Army*. It was composed of a mixture of airborne troops, motorised infantry and armoured units, the initial number of about 85 000 troops being supplemented by about 20 000 troops.

In an attempt to propagandistically accredit the idea of a low-level intervention, the official Soviet sources, political and military leaders, as well as the media defined the *40th Army* as a “*limited contingent*” (*ogranicenûi contingent*). Its missions were obviously “*limited*” to supporting the Afghan communist government for combating the Mujahideen resistance!

The *40th Army*, as an intervention task force, was not specifically structured to deal with the particular situation in Afghanistan. Subsequently, the Soviet military leadership took the necessary steps to adapt the *40th Army* structure, carefully considering the combat tactics used by the Mujahideen resistance, and the country’s characteristics – economic, demographic, ethnic and linguistic, political, historical, and, last but not least, geographical, paying due attention to predominantly mountainous terrain, large areas of desert, frequent sandstorms, hydrography, lack of rainfall and undeveloped road network.

The *40th Army* four divisions, five brigades, three independent regiments and their support units were extensively employed in ensuring the security of 29 provincial centres and several industrial, economic and military objectives of strategic importance. At the same time they were required to allocate forces to secure thousands of villages, hundreds of miles of road communication and to control many dominant points spread throughout Afghanistan, in areas of tactical interest.

The initial structure of the *40th Army* showed that it was established by quickly assembling everything that was considered to be necessary and sufficient to accomplish the immediate military objectives of the intervention, namely to secure Kabul and the major cities, airports, military bases and the main inland lines of communication, without taking into account the possibility of a lengthy confrontation with the Mujahideen resistance movement organised with external support. These objectives – which obviously should have been proper to only short-term stages of intervention – became main objectives, around which it was shaped and reshaped the whole Soviet conception concerning the use of the *40th Army*. The defensive nature of the concept of operations resulted in increased dependence on holding some key positions considered to be of strategic importance.

Further analyses revealed that the defensive approach was counterproductive, as it led to the situation in which the Mujahideen resistance seized the initiative and the government forces lost their control over the entire territory of Afghanistan.

As far as the combat actions of the Soviet forces are concerned, their conduct proved to be the most relevant piece of evidence of the rationality in the organisation, the exploitation of the possibilities offered by their weaponry and equipment, the training for combat, the planning and management capacity of the commanders of the *40th Army*.

Combat Tactics

The combat tactics used by the *40th Army* and the Mujahideen resistance evolved during different phases of the conflict, according to military and political priorities, available resources and the hitting power of the new weapon systems in the inventory of the belligerent parts.

Rapidly learning the lessons of guerrilla warfare, in order to combat the Mujahideen resistance, the Soviet military leadership began to understand the necessity of quitting conventional tactics and conventional formations in favour of using small special forces sub-units or task-tailored units, supported and supplied by aerial means.

The Afghan insurgency's way of fighting also adapted to the Soviet combat tactics and operating procedures with the aim of multiplying as much as possible the Mujahideen fighters' chances of survival on a battlefield dominated by the Soviet superior firepower and advanced military technology.

❖ Soviet Combat Tactics

According to the initial concept of operations, which was mainly aimed at the occupation of air bases, garrisons, government centres and points of strategic importance, Soviet military planners intended to use their aircraft, helicopter-gunships, armoured vehicles and artillery to keep open the roads between major cities, providing firepower backup for the Afghan government forces only on request.

To accomplish the ordered missions, the *40th Army* large units and units prepared and carried out numerous joint operations in order to destroy insurgent groups and take control over the districts dominated by them, to defend objectives of economic and military interest, to ensure the freedom of movement and the security of the roads, to insert or withdraw Soviet units from Afghanistan.

Depending on the structure and membership of the units engaged, the operations were carried out independently or jointly, and in terms of quantity of forces and assets, the operations were of a military or special level. Independent operations

were more frequent in the late part of the war, with the exclusive employment of the *40th Army's* forces, under the plans and guidance of the Soviet command. Overall, throughout the period in which the *40th Army* was in Afghanistan, there were about 220 independent operations conducted. The gradual increase in the operational capability of the Afghan government forces allowed the planning and conduct of joint operations. The plans were developed by the Soviet command and they were implemented by both Soviet and Afghan forces. Until the withdrawal of the *40th Army* from Afghanistan, in February 1989, there were more than 400 joint operations conducted together with the Afghan forces.

The force structure as well as the allocation of the necessary support to conduct each operation was based on the situation, the level and character of the insurgent actions, the peculiarities of the area of operations, and the means chosen to destroy the insurgent groups. The experience of the first combat actions led to the decision that, in order to destroy the insurgent groups that acted in the mountains, it was necessary to allocate more forces and assets than those required to fulfil similar missions under normal combat field conditions. Specifically, the successful fulfilment of the tasks carried out in the mountains was conditioned by the allocation of four to five more forces and assets designated to participate in the joint operations against insurgent groups. The Soviet forces also carried out several special operations, although reduced in scope and number of participants, with well defined objectives such as to capture insurgent leaders or to take control over key positions, special objectives or supply routes used by insurgent groups. To conduct such special operations, the forces and resources were allocated from one or more units, backed by combat support units/subunits. During the operations carried out by the Soviet forces, regardless of their size, they widely used the opportunities offered by the air force, the air assets available depending on the prioritisation of the enemy targets, the insurgent groups anti-aircraft capabilities, season, weather conditions, day or night time.

The Soviet large units and units frequently carried out combat actions in the areas of responsibility assigned. When insurgent forces were identified in large areas, having numerous detachments of little value, occupying inhabited places, villages, gorges and passes in the mountains, and it was impossible to encircle them, the whole district was divided into areas of responsibility assigned to units authorised to act independently. As planned, during the military operations, the aviation units were prepared to assist the units that requested help, depending on the emerging priorities, ensuring at the same time the blockage of the entire district in which the anti-insurgency operation had to take place. Relevant to this mode of action is the operation carried out in January 1983

in the provinces of Kabul, Logar and Wardak, against insurgent groups consisting of more than 20 detachments, totalling about 2 000 fighters. The operation was conducted by troops belonging to an air assault division, an independent air assault brigade, and several specialised units in the land forces. Because of the size of the district, the operation area was divided into several areas of responsibility assigned to operational and tactical units. This mode of action allowed the simultaneous engagement of all insurgent groups in multiple locations and hotbeds, by splitting the forces manoeuvre and assets to engage and destroy the enemy by parts.

Another combat tactic, particularly effective for destroying insurgent groups, consisted of simultaneous actions of Soviet large units and units on several directions, with the support of combat aviation and air insertion. This form of combat was used when the insurgent groups were located on different directions and at different depths, Soviet planners trying to act so that they could achieve simultaneous destruction. For this purpose, air assault troops were inserted behind insurgent groups to block their withdrawal, the Soviet tactical squads occupying dominant heights and defending them with all their might, performing the role of so-called “*anvil*”. The entire area of operations was under the control of the military aviation, which, at the request of the commanders of the units engaged in the tactical field, could carry out selective or massive air strikes within the area of operations and on the access roads to it. The units that had the mission to advance employed the method of searching and clearing, moving from one alignment to another. Depending on the size of the areas of responsibility, the nature of the combat field, and the insurgent groups effectiveness, the conduct of such operations could take from 8 to 10 days.

The Soviet forces did not usually operate at night outside their military bases, garrisons or security zones and the Mujahideen fighters used this opportunity to act during night hours to intimidate the civilian population, to lay mines, to destroy bridges and culverts in sectors of strategic roads or to prepare dawn ambushes against Soviet patrols and convoys.

Confronted with security requirements in many urban centres, airports and strategic objectives, to ensure the freedom of movement and the security of transport on the roads, the *40th Army* had to quickly adapt its doctrines, operational procedures and combat tactics to increase its action flexibility and rapidity and to protect own military personnel and equipment. When needed, Soviet military planners used their heavy firepower to attack insurgent positions by bombing and using rockets and machine-gun fire from helicopter-gunships to rid Afghan localities of Mujahideen forces.

Among the operational tactics and procedures that were often employed by the units of the *40th Army* the following can be mentioned: intelligence collection, tracking, blocking and destroying insurgent groups, adapting the assets and forces engaged in offensive actions to the characteristics of the area of operations (e.g. populated areas, mountainous terrain) to limit both own losses and those among civilians, tactical air support and air insertions, ensuring the security and defence of isolated objectives and forward bases, organising ambushes and raids, using armoured groups and artillery barrages, escorting convoys and strengthening the control over communication lines, blocking the supply routes used by insurgent groups, finding and defusing mines.

The increased mobility, superior firepower and higher accuracy of the lethal weapons used by the Soviet forces allowed the 40th Army to dominate the battlefield. Soviet military planners noted the need for resources in order to develop new concepts for conducting warfare in a non-linear way and establishing security zones (urban areas, strategic corridors, objectives of strategic importance). The non-linear approach to the battlefield, decentralised command of combat operations and development of new concepts on establishing and expanding security zones gradually determined a limited use of the combat tactics and military formations specific to classic war.

At the same time, it was necessary to redefine the traditional concepts relating to staging and to reorganise the military units to optimally exploit the advantages of flexibility and manoeuvrability. Moreover, it was an increase in combat capability, responsiveness and resilience in situations of military engagement. In this context, in order to enhance manoeuvrability, flexibility and logistic support, the Soviets tested the advantages and disadvantages of new configurations of task forces, tailored to accomplish specific missions, such as the air echelon, joint forces brigade and battalion, armoured group and air assault detachment, which were used extensively in Afghanistan.

Depending on operational necessities, the task-tailored forces were assembled from available regiments and units at a particular moment and for specific missions. Once the missions were completed, the units were returned to the formations they belonged to. This approach provided the Soviet forces with greater flexibility, being avoided the logistic burden of deploying whole regiments or brigades just for a limited operation. The units included in the task force used the necessary weapons, ammunition and equipment, leaving behind their current tasks, which had to be performed by other formations.

Despite the Soviet intervention failure in meeting the political and military objectives, the operational art, tactics and procedures employed by the *40th Army*

were continuously developed by capitalising on the experience gained during the combat actions carried out against the Mujahideen insurgency.

The advanced technology and superior firepower, the ability to concentrate and the increased capacity to localise and hit targets, the higher mobility and rapidity in action failed to guarantee the decisive Soviet victory against the anti-communist Afghan insurgency.

❖ **Mujahideen Combat Tactics**

The Mujahideen combat tactics were characterised by the discontinuity of actions, avoiding the direct engagement of the superior Soviet forces, secretly preparing attacks in order to achieve surprise when hitting targets, followed by the rapid withdrawal and hiding of the fighters.

The comparative analysis of the tactics used by the Mujahideen resistance reveals that the limitations due to the decentralised command of combat actions, reduced mobility and difficulties in supplying the troops with weapons and ammunition were balanced by capitalising on the knowledge of the terrain and of the Soviet combat tactics and operational procedures.

The lack of cohesion of the insurgent groups that were operating in Afghanistan with the support of various sponsors and intermediaries was also reflected in the tactics used by the Mujahideen resistance, non-standard ones, tailored to the battlefield, the possibilities of withdrawal and hiding, the structure of the forces, the available weapons, ammunition and equipment. Although insurgent detachments acted in a decentralised manner, often at the tactical level, there were situations when they conducted larger-scale actions at operational level. In fact, the lack of centralised command of the Mujahideen insurgency proved to be an advantage, as the actions taken against the Soviet and Afghan government forces could continue in spite of capturing or killing insurgent commanders.

The Mujahideen raids, ambushes and counter-ambushes, projectile and bomb attacks against Soviet bases and Afghan government targets, the extensive use of mines and improvised explosive devices, the blockage of communication lines by destroying bridges and tunnels, and even the siege of strategic targets, urban warfare and fighting in encirclement, countering Soviet raids and air attacks, defending their bases and hide-outs during the Soviet clearing operations were also real tests of combat, resilience and survival capabilities for the insurgent groups.

In spite of the superior Soviet firepower, the Mujahideen fighters frequently ambushed the Soviet and Afghan government convoys, optimally exploiting the advantages provided by the terrain, given the narrow defiles through which the passage was unavoidable.

The superiority of the Soviet forces in terms of firepower, air supremacy, available resources, capability, mobility and swift action was reversed by insurgent fighters by avoiding decisive engagements that would expose them to artillery barrages, air strikes, encirclement, capture and destruction. The action scheme common to all insurgent groups was to hit the enemy by surprise, hide quickly and survive to resume fighting in other favourable conditions.

To exemplify, after organising ambushes or conducting surprise night attacks on air bases with 107mm and 122mm rockets and RPG-7s aimed to destroy the Soviet aircraft and helicopters, the tactical withdrawal to well-protected hide-outs was the first condition of preserving the combat capability of Mujahideen groups, in order to reappear for new attacks when the circumstances were opportune. Therefore, the leadership of Mujahideen insurgent groups preferred rapid withdrawal in order to return later to the same positions or to hit vulnerable enemy targets in other areas of operations.

In the first phase of the conflict, the extensive use of helicopters by the Soviet forces led insurgent groups to act at night, when the Soviet air superiority was encumbered by the much reduced effectiveness of the helicopters to hit ground targets. Beginning in 1987, the use of *Stinger* anti-aircraft missiles by the insurgent groups made the Soviets lose their complete air supremacy in Afghanistan and subsequently caused the Soviet military planners to change their air tactics in support of own troops.

It is worth mentioning the fact that insurgent groups perfected their ways of gathering intelligence and carrying out reconnaissance missions in areas controlled by the Soviet and the Afghan government forces, being able to find in time where and when the Soviets were planning the next attacks, to prepare shelters and hide-outs, to conduct ambushes, including anti-aircraft, on the routes of access or exit from the area of operations.

Insurgent groups, due to the adaptation of the combat tactics to the peculiarities of the theatre of operations in Afghanistan, managed to act along the lines of communication and often block the supply transports carried out by the Soviet and Afghan forces, which resulted in reducing their mobility and combat capability. Moreover, insurgent groups managed to keep control over certain areas of the territory and benefited from the effective support of the population, all these being prerequisites for the victory against the Soviet intervention forces that supported the Afghan communist regime.

Conclusions

The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, as agreed by the Geneva Accords in 1988, ended on 15 February 1989, but, unfortunately, it was not followed by the pacification of the country. The civil war continued undisturbed until the fall of the communist regime, in April 1992, and also afterwards. During the Mujahideen regime between 1992 and 1996, Afghanistan remained an area of armed confrontation between rival groups supported from abroad on the basis of political, ethnic and religious motivations. With varying degrees of intensity, the civil war also continued during the Taliban regime until its removal in 2001, as a result of the American intervention (Operation *Enduring Freedom*), followed by NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), based on the mandate given by the UN Security Council.

Illegal even from the perspective of the USSR Constitution, the Soviet military adventure greatly challenged the Soviet economy and seriously affected the internal and external credibility of the Soviet regime. The consequences of the undeclared war waged by the Red Army on the territory of Afghanistan against the Mujahideen resistance contributed to the collapse of the communist regimes in Central and South-East European countries and their exit from the Soviet influence, leading to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and even to the disbandment of the Soviet Union.

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SURGICAL MANAGEMENT OF PNET/EWING SARCOMA IN MILITARY PERSONNEL

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Ewing's sarcoma is a malignant tumour related to peripheral primitive neuroectodermal tumours. They share the same genetic alteration and response to chemotherapy. The standard treatment for Ewing's sarcoma is multimodal and it consists of surgery for the local control of the disease, multi-agent chemotherapy and radiotherapy. This type of management has proved its efficacy and improved the five-year survival rate of patients with Ewing's sarcoma and peripheral primitive neuroectodermal tumours in military personnel.

Keywords: *Ewing's sarcoma; peripheral primitive neuroectodermal tumours (PNET); treatment.*

Introduction

Ewing's sarcoma (ES) is a malignant tumour composed of small round cells. It is related to peripheral primitive neuroectodermal tumours (PNET) having the same genetic alteration and response to chemotherapy. These tumours present a specific 11;22 translocation that can be used to establish the correct diagnosis. PNETs have multimodal treatment: surgery for the resection of the tumour, chemotherapy and radiotherapy for the control of systemic disease. This type of approach has improved the survival rate for the patients with PNET.

Material and Methods

The paper presents theoretical and practical aspects of Ewing's sarcoma/PNET and appropriate treatment. Because of the rarity of this disease, there are few scientific papers on this topic.

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Ewing's sarcoma is part of a group of tumours called "small round cell tumour of childhood" along with neuroblastoma, lymphoblastic lymphoma, rhabdomyosarcoma. The tumours belonging to this group have multiple histological and immunohistochemical similarities and it is quite difficult to differentiate one from another. Every tumour has its own immunohistochemical pattern that must be searched and identified in order to establish the correct, definitive diagnosis. For example, lymphoblastic lymphoma has high immunoreactivity to CD99 and to leukocyte common antigen (LCA) (CD45), while ES/PNET has no/low immunoreactivity to LCA; both lymphoblastic lymphoma and ES/PNET have the same membrane pattern. Neuroblastoma is immunoreactive to NSE, S-100 and neurofilament protein, while ES/PNET is not. Rhabdomyosarcoma is immunoreactive to CD99 like the ES/PNET, but the staining is usually focal, weak, and cytoplasmic; Rhabdomyosarcoma is also immunoreactive to desmin and actin and weakly positive to NSE like neuroblastoma, but negative to LCA (CD45) like ES/PNET¹.

Ewing's sarcoma typically occurs in children and adolescents. It can very rarely be found in adult individuals. There have been described two types of Ewing's sarcoma: skeletal and extraskeletal, having similar histological, immunohistochemical, molecular and genetic features². The most frequent site of appearance is the long bones of the limbs and the pelvis. The development of Ewing's sarcoma in the head and neck area is rare, about 2-3%, the mandible and maxilla being




Figure 1: Ewing's sarcoma of the nose with extension in the maxillary sinus and ethmoidal cells

¹ Masaki Kawabata, Kosuke Yoshifuku, Yukari Sagara, and Yuichi Kurono, *Ewing's Sarcoma/Primitive Neuroectodermal Tumour Occurring in the Maxillary Sinus*, *Rhinology*, 2008, p. 46.

² Berna Uslu Coskun, Ugur Cinar, Hayati Savk, Tulay Basak, Burhan Dadas, *Isolated Maxillary Sinus Ewing's Sarcoma*, *Rhinology*, 43, 2005, pp. 225-228.

the most common location. ES/PNET rarely occurs in the nasal cavity and paranasal sinuses; in the English literature were reported only 12 cases until 2007, most of them described in the nasal cavity and maxillary sinus³.

Epistaxis, nasal obstruction and discharge, facial pain, swelling of the face with asymmetry are the most encountered symptoms of the ES/PNET in the rhinological area. The unilaterality of the symptoms is characteristic for these tumours.




Figure 2: Ewing's sarcoma of the nose with extension in the pterygopalatine region

The imagistic investigation (CT/MRI) establishes the tumour true dimension, its relationships with the surrounding structures (soft tissue invasion, bone erosion) and offers the surgeon a key for the complete resection of the tumour.

The correct, complete and definitive diagnosis is based on tissue biopsy after histological, immunohistochemical and molecular genetic investigations. The histological findings consist of small, round cells with round or oval nuclei and scant cytoplasm. The presence of CD99 (MIC-2) in immunohistochemical investigations is characteristic of Ewing's sarcoma, as well as the identification of 11;22 translocation in the genetic analysis. This translocation – t(11;22)(q24;q12) – can be identified in 85% of ES/PNET cases by PCR molecular analysis. In 30% of the cases can be observed trisomies 8 and/or 12 along with the specific translocation⁴.

The treatment of ES/PNET is multimodal: surgical approach for complete resection of the tumour, when possible in association with systemic radiotherapy and chemotherapy. The five-year survival rate has increased with the multimodal strategy of treatment by 70% compared to single or dual therapy, according

³ Masaki Kawabata, Kosuke Yoshifuku, Yukari Sagara, and Yuichi Kurono, *op. cit.* pp. 75-78.

⁴ *Ibidem.*




Figure 3: Coronal CT image-naso-sinusal tumour




Figure 4: Axial CT image-naso-sinusal tumour

to some authors⁵. The longest disease free interval reported after multimodal treatment for ES is 59 months⁶. An important role in choosing the treatment strategy for head and neck ES/PNET is played by the localisation of the tumour, dimension of the tumour, age of the patient, and general clinical status of the patient⁷. Multi-agent systemic induction chemotherapy can be administered preoperatively in order to improve the result of the surgery to obtain complete resection of the tumour and maintenance chemotherapy can be applied after surgery. Chemotherapy uses a combination of the following drugs: vincristine, doxorubicin, cyclophosphamide, adriamycin, etoposide, actinomycin D and ifosamide⁸. Radiotherapy is used to control subclinical micrometastases and can be associated with polichemotherapy. The dose of radiotherapy used for the treatment of ES/PNET is 40-45 Gy for postoperative radiotherapy and 45-60 Gy for definitive radiotherapy in order to achieve the best outcome⁹. For children, radiotherapy can be avoided if the local control of the tumour is achieved with surgery, due to the long term effects of this treatment. Radiotherapy is related to growth defects, late toxicity, risk of malignancies (leukemia or solid malignant tumour), and it is eluded every time the complete removal of the tumour with free resection margins can be accomplished¹⁰. Aggressive surgery with complete removal of the tumour and tumour free resection margins is essential for a good long-term outcome of the patient, especially when treating children with ES/PNET¹¹, but the multimodal approach to these “*small round cell tumours*” is the golden standard of treatment.

The follow up of the patients with ES/PNET must be thoroughly planned and it consists of CT or MRI for entire body (chest, abdomen, brain, bones)

⁵ See J. Thariat, A. Italiano, F. Peyrade, I. Birtwisle-Peyrottes, L. Gastaud, O. Dassonville, and A. Thyss, Case Report. *Very Late Local Relapse of Ewing's Sarcoma of the Head and Neck Treated with Aggressive Multimodal Therapy*, Sarcoma Volume, 2008, Article ID 854141, 4 pages doi:10.1155/2008/854141, and H. Jürgens, A. Ranft, U. Dirksen, et al., *Risks of Recurrence and Survival after Relapse in Patients with Ewing Tumour*, Journal of Clinical Oncology, vol. 25, no. 18S, supplement, 2007, 10012.

⁶ I. Alobid, M. Bernal-Sprekelsen, L. Alós L, P. Benítez, J. Traserra, J. Mullol, *Peripheral Primitive Neuroectodermal Tumour of the Left Maxillary Sinus*, Acta Otolaryngol, 2003, Aug;123(6):776-8.

⁷ J. Thariat, A. Italiano, F. Peyrade, I. Birtwisle-Peyrottes, L. Gastaud, O. Dassonville, and A. Thyss, *op. cit.*

⁸ See Masaki Kawabata, Kosuke Yoshifuku, Yukari Sagara, and Yuichi Kurono, *op. cit.*, J. Thariat, A. Italiano, F. Peyrade, I. Birtwisle-Peyrottes, L. Gastaud, O. Dassonville, and A. Thyss, *op. cit.*, I. Alobid, M. Bernal-Sprekelsen, L. Alós L, P. Benítez, J. Traserra, J. Mullol, *op. cit.*

⁹ J. Dunst, S. Ahrens, M. Paulussen, et al., *Second Malignancies after Treatment for Ewing's Sarcoma: A Report of the CESS-studies*, International Journal of Radiation Oncology Biology Physics, vol. 42, no. 2, 1998, pp. 379-384.

¹⁰ *Ibidem.*

¹¹ N. C. Daw, H. H. Mahmoud, W. H. Meyer, et al., *Bone Sarcomas of the Head and Neck in Children: the St. Jude Children's Research Hospital Experience*, Cancer, vol. 88, no. 9, 2000, pp. 2172-2180.

to search for second tumours, complete blood tests and periodic endoscopic examination (for the ES/PNET in the head and neck region).

In the literature are described two types of metastatic relapses: early (within the first three years from the first diagnostic tumour) and late (after five years from the diagnosis of primary tumour). The early metastases are proven to have a poorer prognosis and there are authors who claim that 85% of the metastases occur in the first three years¹². In case of late relapse, curative treatment can be performed – surgery for the complete removal of the metastatic tumour, multi-agent chemotherapy and radiotherapy (if the patient was not irradiated for the primary tumour)¹³.

Conclusions

The treatment of choice for the ES/PNET is multimodal: surgery for local control of the tumour associated with multi-agent chemotherapy and radiotherapy. This type of management has proved its efficacy by increasing long-term survival rates in military personnel. An important element in the therapy of ES/PNET is the “*aggressive*” follow up (periodic CT/MRI of chest, abdomen, brain, bones; periodic endoscopic examination, complete blood counts) for early detection of the metastatic relapses.



¹² See A. M. McTiernan, A. M. Cassoni, D. Driver, M. P. Michelagnoli, A. M. Kilby, and J. S. Whelan, *Improving Outcomes after Relapse in Ewing's Sarcoma: Analysis of 114 Patients from a Single Institution*, *Sarcoma*, vol. 2006, Article ID 83548, 8 pages, 2006, and P. Leavey, L. Mascarenhas, N. Marina, et al., *Prognostic Factors for Patients with Ewing Sarcoma (EWS) at First Recurrence*, *Journal of Clinical Oncology*, vol. 25, no. 18S, supplement, 10011, 2007.

¹³ J. Thariat, A. Italiano, F. Peyrade, I. Birtwisle-Peyrottes, L. Gastaud, O. Dassonville, and A. Thyss, *op. cit.*



The Secretary General's

Annual Report 2014

Jens Stoltenberg

Source: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_116854.htm, 30 January 2015.

FOREWORD

Keeping NATO strong



2014 was a black year for European security. And as we enter 2015, the terrorist attacks in Paris were a stark reminder of the threats and challenges we face. But we also saw millions standing up for our values and our open societies.

Our security environment has changed fundamentally. To the South, violent extremism is at our borders, spreading turmoil across Iraq and Syria and bringing terror to our streets. To the East, Russia has used military force to annex Crimea, destabilise eastern Ukraine, and intimidate its neighbours.

These threats challenge the international order we have built since the fall of the Berlin Wall – an order that embodies our democratic values and is vital for our way of life.

So, from my first day in office, my priorities have been to keep NATO strong, to work with partners to help keep our neighbourhood stable, and to keep the bond between Europe and North America rock-solid.

At our Summit in Wales in September, NATO showed that the transatlantic community is rising to the challenge. We agreed the *“Readiness Action Plan”*. This is the most significant strengthening of our collective defence in decades, to assure all Allies, improve the responsiveness and effectiveness of our forces, and deter threats from wherever they may come. We are working hard to implement the plan in full and on time.

To do this, it is vital that we invest in our defence. We must spend more and we must spend better. At Wales, NATO Heads of State and Government pledged

to stop the cuts in defence spending, to aim to spend 2% of Gross Domestic Product on defence within a decade, and to spend that money more efficiently. I will continue to work with Allies to keep that pledge.

2014 was the final year of our combat operation in Afghanistan, the largest in Alliance history. We did what we set out to do: to deny safe haven to international terrorists, to make Afghanistan stronger, and to make our own nations safer.

Today, the security of Afghanistan is fully in Afghan hands. While many challenges remain, we are determined to support Afghanistan to build on the gains that we have made with great effort and sacrifice. That is why we have launched a new mission, Resolute Support, to train, advise and assist the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces. We will also continue to provide financial assistance for those forces, and intensify our political dialogue and our practical cooperation with Afghanistan.

A key lesson from our missions and operations over the last 20 years, from Afghanistan to Kosovo, is the need to work with other nations and organisations. We are also reaching out to partners to enable them to better meet security challenges in their own regions. This includes countries like Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia, which share our values and have chosen a European path, as well as Jordan, a key security player in the Middle East – because if our neighbours are more stable, we are more secure.

We are also stepping up our cooperation with the European Union. We share the same values and the same challenges, so we must continue to complement and reinforce each other.

Last year, the very foundations of the Euro-Atlantic order came under threat. But as this Annual Report makes clear, NATO's response has been, and will remain, firm. NATO is adapting to the new security environment, as it has done throughout its history. We will always protect our values and keep our nations safe.



Jens Stoltenberg
NATO Secretary General

In 2014, major changes in the security environment increased the threats faced by all NATO members. In Europe, Russia illegally annexed Crimea, fuelled crisis and conflict in Ukraine and spurred tension along NATO's eastern border. In North Africa and the Middle East, extremist violence and instability spread. Across the world, cyber crime increased in volume and sophistication.

On 4-5 September, Heads of State and Government from the 28 NATO member countries as well as partners from over 30 countries and leaders of international organisations gathered for a summit in Newport, Wales. The decisions made at the Summit will guide the work to keep NATO strong and able to deter and defend against any threat, with the right equipment and skills, and with stronger partnerships.

CHAPTER I

NATO on duty

Nearly one billion people live in the 28 NATO member countries. Every day, NATO is actively engaged to provide for their collective defence and to manage crises in Europe and beyond.

Aggressive actions in the East

In 2014, Russia and Russian-backed separatists began a campaign of violence aimed at destabilising Ukraine as a sovereign state. Russia's aggressive actions disregard international law and violate security arrangements and commitments that Russia has made, including the Helsinki Final Act. Russia's recent actions have fundamentally challenged the vision of a Europe whole, free and at peace and are a threat to security and stability in Europe and beyond.

On 2 March 2014, the North Atlantic Council agreed that *“military action against Ukraine by forces of the Russian Federation is a breach of international law and contravenes the principles of the NATO-Russia Council and the Partnership for Peace”*. One month later, NATO Foreign Ministers agreed to suspend all practical civilian and military cooperation with Russia but to maintain political contacts at and above the level of Ambassador to enable NATO and Russia to exchange views. Two meetings of the NATO-Russia Council about events in and around Ukraine took place at the ambassadorial level following this decision.


For over 20 years, NATO has worked with Russia to build a strong and mutually beneficial partnership, including through the mechanism of the NATO-Russia Council, based on the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Rome Declaration. Prior to the suspension of practical cooperation, NATO and Russia had been working together on a range of activities including counter-terrorism, counter-piracy and civil emergency response, among others. But as NATO leaders confirmed in Wales, the conditions for a cooperative, constructive relationship do not currently exist. NATO's relationship with Russia will be contingent on a clear, constructive change in Russia's behaviour that demonstrates compliance with international law and its international obligations and responsibilities.

The impact of the violence and insecurity caused by Russia and Russian-backed separatists has not been limited to Ukraine. This violence can undermine the safety, stability and well-being of people around the world, as demonstrated by the tragic downing of Malaysia Airlines passenger flight MH17 in July. NATO supports the sanctions imposed by the European Union (EU), the G7 and others as part of an international effort to address Russia's destabilising behaviour. Instability and unpredictability to the East and the South also prompted NATO to enhance its collective defence to deter potential threats.

Assurance measures

While NATO does not have a permanent military presence in the eastern part of the Alliance, Allies have, since April 2014, taken action to demonstrate NATO's resolve to deter and defend against threats and to provide assurance for the eastern Allies. All 28 NATO members are contributing to these measures, which provide continuous air, land and maritime presence and military activity on a rotational basis. These deployments are limited in scale, designed to reinforce defence, and are in line with NATO's international commitments.

NATO's Baltic Air Policing mission began 10 years ago to protect the safety and integrity of Allied airspace over Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Allies participate in this mission on a rotational basis, and since the start of the mission 14 Allies had deployed 34 contingents to protect the integrity of NATO airspace over the Baltics. Given the increased instability in the region, this deployment was significantly enhanced during 2014. This includes more aircraft policing the airspace of the Baltic States and Poland, additional aircraft based in Romania, and AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) surveillance flights over Poland and Romania.



Protecting NATO airspace: Allied aircraft patrol over the Baltics and Poland.

To provide assurance at sea, NATO deployed a number of multinational maritime forces. A Standing NATO Mine Counter-Measures Group began patrolling the Baltic Sea in April 2014 with seven ships from six countries. In the Eastern Mediterranean, an enlarged Standing NATO Maritime Group began conducting maritime assurance measures in addition to counter-terrorism patrols in May 2014, with five ships from as many countries.



Working better together: military exercises, here led by US troops.

Military exercises provide important opportunities to improve the ability of Allies and partners to work together and are a valuable demonstration of NATO's readiness to respond to potential threats. As part of NATO's efforts to assure eastern Allies and to adapt to changing environments, the number of exercises undertaken in 2014 significantly increased. With 162 events under the Military Training and Exercise Programme – double the initially planned number – and 40 national exercises in the context of the assurance measures, one exercise started every two days within the area of responsibility of NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe. These exercises took place on land, at sea and in the air over Alliance territory.

Violent instability in the South

Fighting in Iraq and Syria cost thousands of lives in 2014 and fuelled humanitarian and security challenges for the region and the world. The so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) poses a grave threat to the region and serious challenges for NATO's members and partners. The Assad regime has contributed to the emergence of ISIL in Syria and its expansion beyond. NATO has condemned the violent and cowardly acts of ISIL. At the NATO Summit in Wales leaders expressed their collective outrage at the barbaric attacks against all civilian populations. They also affirmed that NATO would not hesitate to take all necessary steps to ensure the collective defence of every Ally, wherever and whatever the threat.

Since early 2013, NATO has deployed Patriot missiles to augment Turkey's air defences against any missile threat from Syria. The Alliance is working to enhance cooperation in exchanging information on residents from NATO countries who travel to Iraq and Syria to fight alongside ISIL. NATO is also working with partners in the region to help build defence and security capacity. This enhanced cooperation has begun in Jordan. At the end of 2014, Iraq requested assistance to build its defence capacity.

Readiness Action Plan

At the Wales Summit, NATO agreed a plan to ensure that the Alliance is ready to respond swiftly and firmly to new security challenges. This Readiness Action Plan (RAP) is the most significant reinforcement of NATO's collective defence since the end of the Cold War. Through a range of assurance measures and adaptation measures, the RAP addresses risks and threats from the East

and the South and provides the building blocks with which NATO can respond to any challenge, current or future.

The assurance measures in the RAP include the continuous air, land and maritime presence that began in April 2014. At their meeting in December, NATO Foreign Ministers welcomed plans for continuing this presence throughout 2015. Every NATO member is contributing to these measures, in a spirit of solidarity summed up as “28 for 28”. This baseline for assurance and deterrence is flexible and can be adjusted in response to the evolving security situation.



Faster response: elements of the NATO Response Force training in the Mediterranean.

The RAP introduced a number of measures to adapt NATO’s strategic military posture. The NATO Response Force – a multinational force with land, air, maritime and Special Operations Forces components – will be enhanced, including by establishing a spearhead force that will be able to deploy within days, particularly at the periphery of NATO’s territory. This Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) will include elements of all military services and Special Operations Forces, and will be tested through short-notice exercises. In addition, the RAP calls for a number of logistics enhancements, including the prepositioning of equipment and supplies, to enhance NATO’s readiness to respond to any challenge to Allied security.

The plan affirms the continued need for a robust and agile NATO Command Structure and the importance of regional expertise and cooperation. It also prescribes enhanced training and exercise programmes that will focus on collective defence, and on practising comprehensive responses to complex civil-military scenarios from the strategic to the tactical level, including so-called “*hybrid*” threats.

The implementation of the RAP is a long-term effort that began upon its agreement in September 2014. NATO Defence Ministers oversee this process and will decide further details of the implementation at their meeting in February 2015.

Operation Active Endeavour

Under Operation Active Endeavour, Allied ships are patrolling the Mediterranean Sea, monitoring shipping to help deter, defend, disrupt and protect against terrorist activity. The operation evolved out of NATO’s immediate response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the United States and has continued to adapt to meet evolving security risks.

The experience that NATO has accrued in Active Endeavour has given the Alliance unparalleled expertise in the deterrence of maritime terrorist activity in the Mediterranean Sea. This expertise is relevant to wider international efforts to combat terrorism and, in particular, the proliferation and smuggling of weapons of mass destruction, as well as enhanced cooperation with non-NATO countries and civilian agencies.

Afghanistan

2014 marked the final year of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, the largest operation in the history of the Alliance. The aim of ISAF was consistent throughout the operation: to ensure that Afghanistan is never again a safe haven for international terrorists. The ISAF mission has concluded, and NATO remains committed to supporting Afghanistan in making further progress towards becoming a stable, sovereign, democratic and united country.

Afghanistan in the lead

Since June 2013, the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have been in the lead for combat operations throughout the country. The ANSF have demonstrated that they are an effective force, providing security for and sustaining the confidence

of the people of Afghanistan. With the end of ISAF on 31 December 2014, Afghan forces now hold full responsibility for security in Afghanistan.

Many challenges remain, but throughout 2014, the Afghans proved their readiness to provide security across the country. For example, during June and July, the ANSF led over 84 000 unilateral conventional operations, over seven times as many as in 2012. More Afghan personnel are now training their own recruits. And initiatives to improve the living conditions and career opportunities in the Afghan army and police forces are showing tangible results, including those fostering opportunities for the participation of women, who number over 2 800 in the ANSF.

In a land-locked country the size of Afghanistan, air power is essential in order to provide security efficiently and effectively. Efforts to rebuild the Afghan Air Force (AAF) began in 2007 and will continue through 2017. During 2014, the Air Force planned and executed air operations including emergency extraction, emergency casualty evacuation, air reconnaissance and troop transport airlift with limited ISAF support. In May, Mi-17 helicopters and C-130 transport aircraft from the AAF provided critical humanitarian aid and disaster-relief supplies to victims of a landslide in Badakhshan province within hours of the disaster.

The ANSF protected the Afghan population during political and cultural events across the country. During the presidential and provincial council elections, the ANSF planned and provided security throughout all 34 provinces with limited ISAF support. Both in April for the first round of elections and again in June for the run-off, the ANSF helped create the conditions that enabled over seven million voters to cast ballots at more than 6 100 polling centres.

Despite delays in the process, the country's presidential elections were a success, sending a clear signal from the people of Afghanistan about the course of their country's future. This was the first peaceful transfer of authority in Afghanistan's modern history and shows how far the country has come.

Concluding ISAF

In 2014, NATO's role in Afghanistan continued to evolve as the ISAF operation came to a close. Over the course of the year, 73 bases were closed or transferred to the Afghan forces. Over 36 000 troops from 39 troop-contributing nations were redeployed. More than 25 000 pieces of equipment were donated to the Afghan authorities. In September, the NATO Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) fleet returned to Geilenkirchen, Germany. While in Afghanistan,

the fleet conducted air surveillance, tactical air support and other valuable roles through more than 1 200 missions and 12 000 flight hours.

With over 50 countries having participated, ISAF was the largest international coalition in recent history. Through the experience, all involved improved their ability to act and operate together. This effort demonstrated political solidarity among NATO Allies and partners throughout the years of the operation.

A new chapter

With the completion of ISAF at the end of 2014, the nature and scope of NATO's engagement with Afghanistan is changing. At the NATO Summit in Wales, leaders affirmed three parallel and mutually reinforcing strands of activity that will comprise NATO's relationship with Afghanistan in the years to come.

These include:

- the train, advise and assist mission, Resolute Support;
- financial assistance to the Afghan forces; and
- an enduring partnership built on political consultations and practical cooperation.

In September 2014, NATO and Afghanistan signed a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which was later ratified by the Afghan Parliament. The SOFA provides the legal basis for the presence of NATO forces in Afghanistan to train, advise and assist the Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) after 2014 through the new NATO-led mission, Resolute Support. The mission is also endorsed by the international community at large, as reflected in United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 2189, unanimously adopted on 12 December 2014.

Resolute Support will include approximately 12 000 personnel from Allied and partner countries. It will operate with one hub in Kabul and four spokes in Mazar-e Sharif, Herat, Kandahar and Laghman. At each of the Train, Advise and Assist Commands (TAACs), a framework nation will play a coordinating role. Other Allies and partners will contribute with personnel and equipment.

While Resolute Support is not a combat mission, it is not without risk. Afghan forces are providing security in the country and are successfully responding




Afghan national unity: NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg greets Afghan President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani (left) and Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah (right) on their first visit to NATO HQ.

to attacks with bravery and professionalism. Yet insurgent efforts to disrupt Afghanistan's progress and change the course for which the citizens of the country voted are likely to continue. Areas of rural Afghanistan remain contested and fighting is expected to persist in 2015. In this environment it is important that the servicemen and women of the ANDSF continue to receive the support of the international community, including through the training, advice and assistance of Resolute Support, as well as through financial assistance.

NATO Allies and ISAF partners have provided support to the Afghan forces on the understanding that the Afghan government will make an increasing financial contribution. At the Wales Summit, contributors renewed their financial commitment to support the sustainment of the Afghan security forces. NATO's existing Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust Fund has been adapted to serve as one of the funding streams helping to sustain the ANDSF after 2014 and to ensure that the money can be disbursed and accounted for in accordance with donors' requirements. NATO will continue to work with Afghan authorities to review the force structure and capabilities of the ANDSF to achieve a sufficient and sustainable force. As agreed at the 2012 NATO Summit in Chicago, Afghanistan should assume full financial responsibility for its forces no later than 2024.

Afghanistan: Resolute Support Mission



Produced by NATO HQ, SITCEN – Geospatial Section
December 2014

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Kosovo

2014 marked the 15th year of the NATO-led force (Kosovo Force or KFOR) that was deployed to contribute to a safe and secure environment and freedom of movement in Kosovo, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1244. NATO's role in Kosovo has evolved over this period to include assisting in the return and relocation of displaced persons and refugees, providing medical assistance, protecting patrimonial sites, suppressing cross-border weapons smuggling, and helping stand down the wartime security corps and establish the Kosovo Security Forces, along with structures to provide civilian oversight.


NATO's mission in Kosovo is carried out in close cooperation with other international actors including the UN, the EU, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). Together, these organisations have helped to foster the environment needed to build a durable peace and a prosperous future for a multi-ethnic Kosovo. NATO continues to support the EU-facilitated dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade that led to a landmark agreement in April 2013. While political challenges remain, progress is palpable. The general election held in Kosovo in June 2014 was one demonstration of improvements, with Kosovo's security forces providing for orderly, secure proceedings, avoiding the violence that had disrupted previous elections.

This progress is on track to continue, and NATO remains committed to fostering peace and stability in Kosovo. To this end, the Alliance will continue to adapt to the conditions on the ground and will make any changes to its force posture in Kosovo on the basis of those conditions, in accordance with the UN mandate.

Counter-piracy

In 2014, the international efforts to counter piracy off the Horn of Africa and in the Gulf of Aden yielded continued success. The number of piracy incidents off the coast of Somalia reached its lowest in recent years; no ships have been seized since May 2012, and there were fewer than five incidents in 2014. In 2010 and 2011, there were over 120 attacks per year. NATO's Operation Ocean Shield, in close cooperation with the US-led Combined Maritime Forces, the EU Naval Forces and independent contributors to these efforts, has effectively and dramatically reduced pirate activity in the region.

Piracy incidents 2009-2014



Figures for piracy incidents involve vessels greater than 300 tons engaged on international voyages as defined in Regulation 19 Chapter V of the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention of the International Maritime Organization. Statistics provided by Allied Maritime Command Headquarters, Northwood, United Kingdom.

This reduction in piracy incidents is important for the global economy as well as for regional security. Yet while the successes are clear, Somalia-based piracy has not yet been eradicated. A continued international naval presence off the coast of Somalia will be needed to give time and space for long-term efforts addressing the root causes of piracy to yield results.

At the Summit in Wales, Heads of State and Government agreed to continue Operation Ocean Shield until the end of 2016. The EU has extended its Operation Atalanta for the same period, and NATO and the EU will continue to ensure the complementarity of these efforts.

While the focus of NATO's efforts off the Horn of Africa continues to be at-sea counter-piracy operations, the Alliance is also working with regional actors to build capacity so that they can better address the root causes of piracy. While not the lead actor in this realm, NATO capacity-building programmes include training, education courses, participation in military exercises and advice on security sector reform.

CHAPTER 2

Investing in defence

At the NATO Summit in Wales, Allies agreed the Readiness Action Plan to strengthen NATO's collective defence and a defence investment pledge to strengthen Allies' ability to fund sustained defence efforts. They also approved a defence planning package and set priorities related to training, equipment and technology to ensure that NATO forces are properly prepared and equipped for whatever challenge may come.

Defence investment pledge

In Wales, NATO leaders pledged to stop the cuts to defence budgets, to increase investment as economies recover, to make the most effective use of available funds, and to strive for a more balanced sharing of the costs and responsibilities of their common defence. This is the first time NATO Heads of State and Government have made this kind of commitment.


In 2006, Allies agreed voluntary targets for defence spending: 2% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) should be allocated to defence expenditures, while 20% of those expenditures should be dedicated to research, development and acquisition of major defence equipment¹. In the defence investment pledge, Allies affirmed that those countries already meeting these targets would continue to do so and that those below would halt any decline, aim to increase defence expenditure in real terms as GDP grows, and aim to move towards the 2% and 20% targets within a decade.

The pledge was needed because the amount of resources dedicated by Allies to defence has been on a steady decline since the end of the Cold War. In 1990, the 14 European Allies spent USD 314 billion on defence in real terms². By 2010,


¹ For all the graphs in this chapter of the report, it should be noted that Albania and Croatia joined the Alliance in 2009 and that Iceland has no armed forces.

² Figures in constant 2010 US Dollars.

Alliance major equipment expenditures as a percentage of defence expenditures 2007 and 2014



Alliance defence expenditures as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product 2007 and 2014




Source: NATO Defence Planning Capability Review 2013-14. Based on 2010 prices. Estimates for 2014 except Spain 2013 figure.

Source: NATO Defence Planning Capability Review 2013-14. Based on 2010 prices. Estimates for 2014.


Note: In September 2014, the European Union's statistics office implemented a new accounting standard as part of the worldwide System of National Accounts, resulting in an increase in GDP figures for most member countries. The United States implemented the accounting standards in 2013. While the changes in how GDP is calculated have no direct impact on real defence expenditures, the result is a relative decrease in defence expenditures as a percentage of GDP.

**Defence expenditures as a percentage of GDP
versus major equipment expenditures as a percentage of defence expenditures**



Source: NATO Defence Planning Capability Review 2013-14. Based on 2010 prices. Estimates for 2014 except Spain 2013 figure for major equipment. The United States is not included.
 Note: In September 2014, the European Union's statistics office implemented a new accounting standard as part of the worldwide System of National Accounts, resulting in an increase in GDP figures for most member countries. While the changes in how GDP is calculated have no direct impact on real defence expenditures, the result is a relative decrease in defence expenditures as a percentage of GDP.

defence spending in NATO Europe had dropped to USD 275 billion, despite 12 additional European countries having joined the Alliance. In 2014, it is estimated that European members of NATO spent USD 250 billion on defence.



Source: NATO Defence Planning Capability Reviews. Based on 2010 prices and exchange rates. Estimates for 2014.

The cuts to defence expenditures, deepened by the financial crisis, diminish the options available to the Alliance and reduce the extent to which Allies equitably share responsibilities. The defence investment pledge is an important signal that Allies are committed to addressing the mismatch between challenges faced and resources available. Progress on this pledge will be reviewed annually, starting in June 2015.

Developing the right capabilities

Spending targets can provide useful indicators for progress, but absolute figures for defence investment are only as meaningful as the military capabilities they produce. The investment by Allies in defence includes procuring the right equipment, ensuring that the men and women who serve are properly trained, and providing the right frameworks through which troops and equipment are deployed.

In Wales, Allies agreed on priorities that include enhancing and reinforcing training and exercises, improving command and control structures, Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, ballistic missile defence, and cyber defence.

They emphasised the importance of multinational cooperation, which allows for significant operational and cost benefits. They also affirmed the importance of inclusive, sustainable, innovative and globally competitive defence industries on both sides of the Atlantic.

NATO Forces 2020

As agreed at the 2012 Chicago Summit, NATO Forces 2020 establishes the goal of developing modern, tightly connected forces that are equipped, trained, exercised and commanded to operate together and with partners in any environment. Smart Defence and the Connected Forces Initiative contribute to meeting this goal, and the newly adopted Readiness Action Plan complements and reinforces these initiatives by improving overall readiness and responsiveness.

Smart Defence is an initiative to help Allies generate defence capabilities by harmonising requirements and pooling resources. It facilitates specialisation and multinational collaboration among Allies and provides an important tool for meeting priority targets. Since its launch in 2011, 33 Smart Defence projects have been developed. While most of these are longer-term endeavours, six projects have already been completed and are delivering important assets for the Alliance, four of these in 2014. Also in 2014, two additional Smart Defence projects were launched to tackle the cyber threat and build capacity in that field. This brings the total to three Smart Defence projects on cyber defence, including the Malware Information Sharing Platform, the Smart Defence Multinational Cyber Defence Capability Development project, and the Multinational Cyber Defence Education and Training project. And at the Wales Summit, further projects were agreed, including a project to procure air-to-ground precision-guided munitions cooperatively.

European Allies play a leading role in Smart Defence, actively participating in or heading all 27 current projects. Another way in which European Allies are leading to contribute to NATO's common security is through groupings under the leadership of framework nations, whereby Allies work on a multinational basis to develop forces and capabilities required by the Alliance. The **Framework Nation Concept** is based on NATO's experience in Afghanistan and was endorsed by Heads of State and Government in Wales. Ten Allies, facilitated by Germany, committed to focus on creating coherent sets of capabilities in a range of areas. Another group of seven Allies, facilitated by the United Kingdom, established a Joint Expeditionary Force that will be rapidly deployable and capable of conducting the full spectrum of operations, including high-intensity operations. Italy is leading

a group of six Allies on the basis of regional ties to promote stabilisation and reconstruction, the provision of enablers, the usability of land formations, and command and control.

The **Connected Forces Initiative (CFI)** focuses on the ability of NATO's forces to work together and with partners in complex operations across a variety of environments. The initiative was launched to ensure that the Alliance was building on the lessons learned over 20 years of intense operational experience. Through education, training and exercises, Allies develop the skills and understanding needed to be effective in multinational operations.

One element of CFI is a deployable command and control capability for Special Operations. In a dynamic and uncertain security environment Special Operations Forces are essential, complementing air, land and maritime forces. The Special Operations Component Command Core (SOCC Core) includes approximately 70 personnel on very high readiness and provides a scalable, deployable command and control option that can support NATO operations. The SOCC Core was declared to have full operational capability at the Wales Summit in September.

Taking full advantage of available technology is also part of CFI, and **Federated Mission Networking (FMN)** is a prime example of NATO applying lessons from recent experience to provide a more integrated structure from which to operate. Through the experience of ISAF in Afghanistan, the value of a coalition-wide network was made clear: greater situational awareness facilitates more effective decision making. Rather than building a network only after a mission is established, FMN provides a ready mechanism that can support any training, exercise or operation that NATO might undertake in the future.

NATO Air Command and Control System

NATO's systems for air command and control, along with national systems within NATO European territory, track all civilian and military aircraft in NATO airspace over continental Europe, providing 24-hour surveillance of the skies. NATO is upgrading a variety of NATO and national systems with the NATO Air Command and Control System (ACCS). By integrating air mission control, air traffic control, airspace surveillance, airspace management and force management functions, this system will provide a Recognised Air Picture. This will enable NATO and its members to manage all types of air operations over NATO European territory and during deployments beyond NATO's territory.

A further advantage of ACCS is its deployable capability, which was successfully used during an exercise in 2014 to provide live aircraft control. This deployable air command and control capability, including its radar, is due to reach initial operational capability in early 2015. This new system underwent a series of tests in 2014 that will enable the operational use of the system to increase throughout the next three years, achieving full operational capability in 2017.

Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

2014 was an important year in advancing NATO's Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR) capabilities. In an operation, informed decision making requires a consolidated view of NATO and national air, ground, sea, and space assets. JISR brings together a combination of processes, systems and people to enable the production of fused reports.



Better intelligence: surveillance drones tested during a major trial in Norway.

In May, the Alliance held the largest JISR trial in its history, “*Unified Vision 14*”. The trial, which took place in Norway, tested NATO's ability to gather information and synthesise intelligence from multiple sources at different stages of a crisis. With satellites, aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, naval vessels, ground sensors and human intelligence from 18 Allies, the trial demonstrated significant progress and provided important feedback that will bring NATO closer to achieving its target of initial operational capability at the end of 2016.

As part of the trial, a US Air Force RQ-4 Global Hawk conducted several flights, demonstrating the safe operation of high-altitude unmanned systems in European airspace. NATO is acquiring the Global Hawk to provide a NATO-owned and operated Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) capability. The first NATO AGS personnel arrived at the main operating base in Sigonella, Italy in 2014, where they are coordinating infrastructure work to support the timely integration of the AGS capability.

Ballistic missile defence

As part of NATO's commitment to collective defence, Allies agreed in 2010 to extend NATO's ballistic missile defence (BMD) capability to provide coverage and protection of all NATO European populations, territory and forces. Since then, work has been underway to acquire and develop the equipment and infrastructure needed to make this capacity fully operational. In 2014, NATO's BMD was made more robust through additional national voluntary contributions as well as further refined command and control arrangements and procedures. During 2014, two US BMD-capable Aegis vessels arrived at their new home port in Rota, Spain, and two more vessels will arrive in 2015. These ships have advanced sensor capabilities and interceptor missiles that can detect and shoot down ballistic missiles. Deployment of the land-based version of these capabilities, Aegis Ashore, in Deveselu, Romania is on track for completion in 2015. A second Aegis Ashore site will be established in Poland in 2018.

Cyber security

As the Alliance looks to the future, cyber threats and attacks will continue to become more common, sophisticated and potentially damaging. Responding to the evolving challenges in the cyber domain, NATO leaders endorsed an Enhanced NATO Policy on Cyber Defence and a Cyber Defence Action Plan at the Summit in Wales in September. Building on the accomplishments of previous NATO cyber defence policies, the 2014 policy reflects the evolution of the threat landscape, technological environment, and broader international approach to the issue. The policy establishes that cyber defence is part of the Alliance's core task of collective defence, confirms that international law applies in cyberspace, and intensifies NATO's cooperation with industry.

In 2014, NATO systems registered over 3 000 cyber security events. The top priority of NATO cyber defence is the protection of the communications systems

owned and operated by NATO. To this end, NATO has invested in its NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC). In May 2014, NCIRC reached full operational capability, expanding the protection of NATO networks to 52 locations.

NATO continued, in 2014, to integrate cyber defence components in its exercises, training and education. In November 2014, the Alliance held its largest cyber exercise to date using the NATO Cyber Range – a platform for testing and evaluating software-enabled solutions to security problems.

Countering terrorism

NATO's efforts to counter terrorism include projects to develop and enhance capabilities that fill critical shortfalls and meet NATO's priorities. At the Joint Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Defence Centre of Excellence in Vyskov (Czech Republic), NATO's first CBRN Reach-Back Centre has been established. This is an operations room from which key stakeholders can connect with scientific and technical CBRN experts, providing subject-matter expertise wherever and whenever required.



Safer route clearance: robots counter improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

New standards were introduced for armoured vehicle protection and the testing of jammers against radio-controlled improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Through a voluntary national contribution fund, NATO members supported activities related to future detection technologies, a prototype database to support countermeasure development against radio-controlled IEDs, and training for counter-IED operators. NATO also adopted a new doctrine of route clearance, incorporating lessons learned by NATO countries in different theatres, including Afghanistan, and adapting surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities to new technologies.

Other aspects of technological advancement to counter terrorism include work to better protect large aircraft through infra-red counter-measures, as well as a planning tool to support harbour protection called “*Safe Port*”.

Reforming NATO’s structures

NATO’s work to reform its structures and improve its efficiency is an ongoing effort. Implementation of the NATO Command Structure that was agreed in 2011 is approaching its final milestones. In 2014, Combined Air Operations Centre Torrejon and Allied Land Command Izmir achieved full operational capability. The new NATO Command Structure is due to be fully operational in December 2015. The reform of NATO Agencies also continued in 2014, yielding a better governance structure, more efficient services and cost savings. NATO has reduced and consolidated its Agencies from fourteen in 2011 to three in 2014. And to improve NATO’s ability



New Headquarters: efficient, flexible and sustainable.

to recruit and retain qualified talent, Allies are examining a NATO-wide human resources strategy that would align the administration of international civilian personnel in accordance with common objectives and priorities.

The construction of NATO's new headquarters in Brussels, Belgium is on track for completion, with the move scheduled for 2016. The building will house NATO's International Staff, International Military Staff, NATO Agencies and the delegations of all NATO members. The new headquarters provides a catalyst for the transformation and revitalisation of how the Organization functions. The building will also enable NATO to reduce its headquarters' environmental impact and optimise energy consumption.

CHAPTER 3

Cooperation

Twenty years ago, NATO began to formalise the mechanisms through which it could advance both practical and political cooperation with partners, establishing the Partnership for Peace and the Mediterranean Dialogue in 1994. Today, working with partners is one of the Alliance’s core tasks. International events in 2014 demonstrated, once again, the value of NATO’s partnerships and the need to continue strengthening relations with partner countries and international organisations.

Reinforcing the ability to work together

NATO is well-equipped to lead multinational operations and is more effective with the support of its partners. Many partner countries are steady contributors to NATO-led operations, providing troops, equipment or substantial financial aid to efforts in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and the fight against piracy. The experience and know-how gained through this active

cooperation is the impetus for the Partnership for Peace Initiative. The initiative was launched at the 2014 NATO Summit in order to maintain the experience and bolster NATO’s operational tempo was at its highest.

To stay connected and interoperable, a particular and renewed focus is placed on ensuring that the partnership is used effectively and that exercises, education



and training adequately support the interoperability objectives. One of the key innovations of the Partnership Interoperability Initiative is the creation of the Interoperability Platform, which provides a framework for Allies and 24 partners to pursue cooperation and dialogue on interoperability.

Partner countries have also been offered the opportunity to craft detailed, tailor-made relationships with NATO. So far, enhanced opportunities within the initiative have been formally offered to Australia, Finland, Georgia, Jordan and Sweden in view of the significant contributions these countries have made to NATO-led operations and, more generally, to deepening their relations with NATO.

Work on interoperability goes beyond practical cooperation in the field, whether through operations or military exercises. Staying connected involves education and training. NATO's Defence Education Enhancement Programme (DEEP) focuses on increasing intellectual interoperability between members and partners. In 2014, 12 countries continued their participation in this programme (Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Mauritania, the Republic of Moldova, Mongolia, Serbia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan). The Republic of Moldova, for example, is pursuing a four-year officers' programme, which will be fully operational from summer 2015. In Ukraine, which has the most extensive engagement with DEEP, 40 events were conducted in 2014, involving more than 30 NATO experts and 150 Ukrainian faculty members. NATO also appointed a special advisor for military education reforms who will lead the experts responsible for advising the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence on state-of-the-art military education systems.

Strengthening engagement and coordination with international and regional organisations is also a priority for NATO – not least because the complex challenges to international security demand a comprehensive approach. At the NATO Summit in Wales, NATO Foreign Ministers held a meeting with the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office and the Secretary General of the Council of Europe to discuss closer cooperation and issues of common concern. This was the first time such a meeting took place.

Defence and Related Security Capacity Building

NATO is bolstering its existing partnership tools with the creation of the Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative. This initiative, agreed at the NATO Summit in Wales, seeks to reinforce cooperation in two broad areas of activity. The first area involves advice on defence reform and institution building, including

national security architecture, policy and defence planning. The second involves defence capabilities and the development of local forces, usually focused on education and training over an extended period of time.

This initiative differs from other partnership tools because it focuses primarily on short-term stability efforts. NATO has extended invitations to Georgia, Jordan and the Republic of Moldova and is ready to consider requests from other interested countries – partner or non-partner – and organisations. In December, Iraq requested consideration as part of this new initiative. And when conditions permit, NATO is also ready to provide defence and related security capacity advisory support for Libya. To help carry the initiative forward, NATO’s Deputy Secretary General has been appointed as Special Coordinator for Defence Capacity Building, and a military hub has been established within the NATO Command Structure to support related issues.

Supporting Ukraine

Throughout the recent crisis in the East, NATO has shown strong political support for Ukraine and its freedom to decide its own future. At the Wales Summit in September, NATO Heads of State and Government met Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, sending a strong political message of NATO’s unwavering support for Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity



Support for Ukraine: Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko at the Wales Summit.

and for the rules-based Euro-Atlantic security order. Allies are also reinforcing their advisory presence at the NATO offices in Kyiv and will continue to promote the development of greater interoperability between Ukrainian and NATO forces.

Within the framework of the Distinctive Partnership with Ukraine that was agreed in 1997, NATO has increased its practical support to the country as the crisis developed. Measures include a number of immediate and short-term actions to help Ukraine cope with the current crisis, as well as longer-term measures geared towards capacity building, capability development, and reform of the armed forces and the security sector.

In this context, Allies launched five new trust funds to support command, control, communications and computers (C4), logistics and standardization, cyber defence, military career transition and the rehabilitation of injured military personnel. These trust funds add to NATO's support for existing programmes on defence education, professional development, security sector governance and security-related scientific cooperation. In 2014, Ukraine was the number one beneficiary of the Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme, with 15 new projects and an estimated Euro 10 million budget for the 2014-2017 period.

Open door

Four partner countries aspire to NATO membership: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Montenegro and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia³.

At the Summit in Wales, NATO leaders agreed to launch a period of "*intensified and focused talks*" with Montenegro to address the remaining issues with regard to the country's membership aspirations. Montenegro's progress will be assessed no later than the end of 2015 with a view to deciding whether to invite the country to join the Alliance.

NATO leaders also agreed to develop a substantial package of measures with Georgia to help the country prepare for future NATO membership. The measures aim to strengthen the country's capabilities through defence capacity building, training, exercises and enhanced interoperability opportunities.

An invitation to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will be extended after a mutually acceptable solution to the issue over the country's name is reached within the framework of the United Nations.

³Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name.

NATO will continue working with Bosnia and Herzegovina to pursue the reforms needed to meet NATO standards. This principally involves registering immovable defence properties as state property in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

A wide network of partnerships around the globe

NATO's cooperation with partners spans the globe, with countries volunteering expertise and know-how from different continents in a joint effort to resolve common security concerns.



Closer cooperation: counter-piracy is one area where NATO works with partners.

In the Asia-Pacific in 2014, Japan became the fifth partner in the region to sign an Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme (IPCP) after Mongolia, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea and Australia. The IPCP, which was signed by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in May 2014, focuses on areas including disaster relief, cyber defence, counter-piracy, and interoperability. Australia, Mongolia and New Zealand were recognised as contributors to the Resolute Support Mission, through which NATO will provide training, advice and assistance in Afghanistan.

NATO pursued outreach with other countries in the region, such as China, to discuss issues of common interest including Afghanistan and counter-piracy. The Alliance also remained engaged in informal regional meetings on security including the Shangri-La Dialogue, the Jakarta Defence Dialogue and the Seoul Defence Dialogue.

NATO established a partnership with Iraq in 2012 to help the country build more effective security forces. The partnership includes cooperation in the areas of political dialogue, education and training, response to terrorism, defence institution building and border security, among others. With the Iraqi government's request at the end of 2014, the Alliance is considering additional cooperation and support within the framework of the new Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative.

NATO and its partners continued work to remove barriers to women's active and meaningful participation in conflict prevention, management and resolution as well as in peace-building and post-conflict cooperation initiatives. Work also continued to reduce the risk of conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence, with military guidelines in this area currently being developed. In 2014, a revised policy and a two-year Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security were developed with and endorsed by partners in the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), as well as Afghanistan, Australia, Japan, Jordan, New Zealand and the United Arab Emirates. These policy documents set ambitious targets and objectives for NATO to further mainstream UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and related resolutions in its activities in order to make this agenda an integral part of everyday business in both civilian and military structures.



Empowering women: an Afghan officer trains with an Australian mentor in Kabul.

A unique aspect of NATO's 2014 efforts in this area included a consultation conference with representatives from civil society, who were invited to provide recommendations that directly influenced the development of the Action Plan. The interactions between NATO members and partners as well as other international organisations and civil society groups have proven to be valuable for mobilising political commitment and facilitating practical cooperation.

Projects on UN Security Council Resolution 1325 implementation have been developed and funded by NATO's SPS Programme as well as through a trust fund. The NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives brings together Allies and partners to discuss best practices in integrating gender perspectives in operations and regarding the recruitment and retention of women in the armed forces.

A further milestone in advancing the Women, Peace and Security agenda within NATO was achieved with the decision to make the NATO Special Representative for Women, Peace and Security a permanent position within the International Staff at NATO Headquarters.



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DETECTING HYBRID WARFARE: A CHANCE FOR NATO AND THE EU TO WORK TOGETHER?

Peter PINDJÁK

In the author's opinion, NATO has a wide range of instruments at its disposal. The Alliance has expended a great deal of effort in recent years to stay abreast of new threats, especially in cyberspace. Nevertheless, NATO, as a military alliance, will never embrace the full spectrum of challenges embodied in hybrid warfare.

He adds that NATO should consider a more flexible policy and strive to deter prospective adversaries with a wide range of instruments. By partnering with the EU and expanding its set of instruments, the Alliance will be able to tackle the threat from multiple angles. What is more, it may be even able to prevent it.

To conclude, he mentions that the Alliance will need to expand its capabilities and strengthen its cooperation with the EU. Through a comprehensive approach, NATO and the EU will be able to employ an entire palette of instruments to an emerging conflict.

Keywords: *hybrid warfare; SSR; irregular threats; UNSC*

In response to the conflict in Ukraine, NATO has decided to take on an ambitious task: developing a set of tools to deter and defend against adversaries waging hybrid warfare.



As the conflict in Ukraine illustrates, hybrid conflicts involve multilayered efforts designed to destabilise a functioning state and polarise its society. Unlike conventional warfare, the “*centre of gravity*” in hybrid warfare is a target population. The adversary tries to influence influential policymakers and key decision-makers by combining kinetic operations with subversive efforts.

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The views expressed in the article are solely those of the author and do not represent official position of the Slovak Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs.

The aggressor often resorts to clandestine actions, to avoid attribution or retribution. Without a credible smoking gun, NATO will find it difficult to agree on an intervention.

Undoubtedly, prevailing in hybrid warfare presents NATO with an institutional challenge. To effectively counter irregular threats, the Alliance will need to strengthen cooperation with international organisations, particularly with the EU.

NATO has a wide range of instruments at its disposal. The Alliance has expended a great deal of effort in recent years to stay abreast of new threats, especially in cyberspace. Nevertheless, NATO, as a military alliance, will never embrace the full spectrum of challenges embodied in hybrid warfare.

Why two is better than one

The current NATO deterrence policy for hybrid warfare is based on a rapid military response. This policy has three potential weaknesses. First, member states may find it difficult to agree on the source of a conflict, creating a significant barrier to prompt collective action. Second, to counter irregular threats, hard power alone is insufficient. Regardless of how rapid a response may be, deploying military force to an area swept by hybrid warfare will turn out as *“too little too late”*. Too often, the conflict evolves under the radar. Finally, a deterrent built upon military force alone will not be credible. To deal with irregular threats, NATO cannot simply revive the strategy of massive retaliation, or rely exclusively on one course of action.



NATO should consider a more flexible policy and strive to deter prospective adversaries with a wide range of instruments. By partnering with the EU and expanding its set of instruments, the Alliance will be able to tackle the threat from multiple angles. What is more, it may be even able to prevent it.

The EU seems the organisation best suited to complement NATO's crisis management efforts, as it offers a diversity of instruments that can be employed

in hybrid warfare. NATO and the EU could create an effective institutional tandem that has a wide range of both political and military instruments at its disposal. The NATO Summit in Wales acknowledged the EU as a strategic partner of the Alliance. And the common threat of hybrid warfare within the Euro-Atlantic area presents a solid opportunity to develop this partnership even further.

NATO and the EU should intensify consultations and engage in joint planning, especially in implementing the EU Council decisions on security in December 2013. The inter-institutional cooperation should become more systematic and pragmatic.

Events in Ukraine have changed the threat perception in Europe. Recent pledges to reverse declining defence budgets confirm this. NATO and the EU should take advantage of this momentum. Through close coordination in defence planning, both organisations can avoid duplication and achieve greater convergence. The European Council meeting in June 2015 will offer a good opportunity to review and possibly adjust the future course of cooperation. NATO's Secretary General should not miss the opportunities this meeting will bring.

The importance of security sector reform

Prevention represents the best possible means of countering hybrid warfare. Irregular threats are far more difficult to manage once they become an overt attempt at destabilisation. Rolling armour columns and exchanges of open fire, as witnessed in Ukraine, signify that a hybrid conflict had entered its later stages. Skirmishes such as these may easily evolve into an insurgency with no foreseeable political or military solution. As appears likely in Ukraine, the result may be a *"frozen conflict"*.

States that appear vulnerable to destabilisation can adopt measures to increase the resilience of their security sectors in advance. The concept of *Security*



Sector Reform (SSR), embedded in *UNSC (United Nations Security Council) Resolution 2151*, offers an indispensable tool to tackle the challenges of hybrid warfare. SSR aims to strengthen a state's ability to provide public safety and secure the rule of law, while embracing transparency and accountability. The transatlantic community should call upon the countries prone to destabilisation to take on the SSR initiative. These measures will not only better prepare the country to counter external threats, but will also help pave its way to sustainable development and prosperity.

The EU has incorporated SSR into its Common Security and Defence Policy operations. It's now concluding its first successful mission of this kind in the Democratic Republic of Congo and has recently launched a SSR mission in Ukraine. A strong security sector and well-developed soft power serves as the best measure to secure peace and stability in European neighbourhood, particularly against the subversive threats witnessed in Ukraine.

An opportunity not to be missed

To effectively defend against hybrid warfare, I believe the Alliance will need to expand its capabilities and strengthen its cooperation with the EU.



Through a comprehensive approach, NATO and the EU will be able to employ an entire palette of instruments to an emerging conflict. By embracing the concept of SSR, NATO and the EU can focus their efforts on the most vulnerable states and help them to become more resilient against destabilising threats. The two organisations should not miss out on this chance to advance their partnership to a new level. By more closely coordinating their efforts, NATO and the EU could not only avert irregular threats, but could help secure peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area for the foreseeable future.

EUROPE NEEDS LESS SOLDIERS – But More European Ones –

Stefan SOESANTO

The author writes that the continuous drawdown of US military forces from Europe has created substantial political fragmentation on the continent, which is negatively affecting Alliance cohesion and strategic decision-making.

Therefore, he mentions that the 26 European members must adopt a holistic approach towards territorial defence rather than merely trying to compensate for the defensive weaknesses of its peripheral members in the context of possible Russian aggression, while affirming that NATO needs to enhance national diversity among the armies of its member states and increase military dependencies to pivot away from a strategy based on defending its parts, towards a strategy of defending the whole.

He concludes by pointing out that creating European soldiers is the tactical way forward to build sustainable structures of cooperation, strengthen the foundations of the Alliance and interweave European security interests across the entire continent.

Keywords: *RAP; VJTF; holistic approach; integrated operational cooperation; Alliance cohesion*

Let us start with the good news first. Last year's NATO summit in Newport, Wales was a positive milestone in the evolution of Europe's defence posture. To recap, the crisis-hit European states recommitted themselves to reverse the trend of declining defence budgets within the next decade, by raising their military expenditures to 2% of GDP with 20% dedicated to *Research and Development – R&D* and major equipment acquisition.

The Alliance also adopted a *Readiness Action Plan (RAP)* to safeguard its Eastern flank with the increase of military exercises and deployment of additional rotational NATO forces to Eastern and Central Europe. And consensus was reached on the creation of a 4 000-5 000 strong *Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF)*, capable of deploying within a few days' notice by early 2015.

The disappointing part of the Wales Summit outcome is that larger defence budgets, closer military cooperation, and increased force readiness are not going to fix the Alliance's underlying problem of financially inefficient, politically fragmented and strategically incoherent European allies.

The article was featured in the *NATO Review*, 12.02.2015, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2015/Also-in-2015/europe-defense-budget-military-soldiers/EN/index.htm>

Stefan Soesanto – A non-residential James A. Kelly Fellow at Pacific Forum CSIS who currently works at RAND Europe.



First, the continuous drawdown of US military forces from Europe, from a high of 440 000 in 1957 to an all-time low of around 67 000 in 2015, has created substantial political fragmentation on the continent. This is negatively affecting Alliance cohesion and strategic decision-making to the point of mere status quo maintenance.

As a result, Moscow's clear violation of the *1997 Helsinki Final Act*, which forbids the "demand for, or act of, seizure and usurpation of part or all of the territory of any participating state", has not prompted a drastic turnaround in Europe's position towards the *NATO-Russia Founding Act*. Instead, the Alliance merely chose to reinforce its restrained security commitments towards its Eastern members, despite the dramatic changes in the continent's overall security environment.

Second, in the absence of permanently stationed forces across NATO's Eastern flank, the Alliance's collective self-defence posture and long-term quest for force interoperability is being increasingly defined in political terms rather than sound deterrence strategy. True, NATO has put forward suggested increased military exercises, additional rotational forces and the formation of a rapid response battalion. These temporarily circumvent the notion of inadequate territorial defence of NATO's Eastern members, but do little to address the widening shortfalls of Alliance solidarity, defence commitments and military cohesion within NATO itself.

If the dictum of "*Vigilia Pretium Libertatis*" ought to apply to the Alliance in the 21st century, the 26 European members must adopt a holistic approach towards territorial defence rather than merely trying to compensate for the defensive weaknesses of its peripheral members in the context of possible Russian aggression.



A holistic approach to reform the Alliance would entail first and foremost the reconfiguration of NATO's deployment strategy within Europe itself. In the same manner as the right to free movement and residence has strengthened European citizenry and the Union's political integration, NATO needs to enhance national diversity among the armies of its member states and increase military dependencies to pivot away from a strategy based on defending its parts, towards a strategy of defending the whole.

The numbers speak for themselves. Some 25 per cent of NATO members do not have an air force, 30 per cent have no naval force or maintain a navy with less than 600 sailors, and 50 per cent are fielding an active army of less than 20 000 soldiers. NATO is an Alliance of unequals, but it does not have to be.

The first step to solve NATO's underlying problem is to recognise that the continuous failure to create and deploy *NATO's Response Forces (NRF)* and the *EU Battlegroups* is political in nature. Both rapid-response forces and the current *Framework Nations Concept* advocated by Berlin struggle with the uneven distribution of political risks, due to their internal rotational setup, unequal financial burden-sharing and the issue of reacting to a military crisis rather than preventing one in the first place.

To achieve permanent political change within multilateral institutions, in which national interests reign supreme, it is prudent to use existing structures rather than creating new ones. What Europe needs are not new forces on permanent operational stand-by, as envisioned by the North Atlantic Council and the EU



Commission. What the Alliance needs is to pick up where the European Union and the nation states have seemingly failed.

Creating European soldiers, and in the long-run hopefully full-fledged European citizens, is the tactical way forward to build sustainable structures of cooperation, strengthen the foundations of the Alliance and interweave European security interests across the entire continent. Only when the European allies are heavily invested in each other's territorial defence, while maintaining national sovereignty and budget authority, will their parliaments and citizens be inclined to live up to NATO security commitments and the continuous pursuit of Alliance cohesion.

The Netherlands has so far been the only NATO country that has embraced the idea to fully integrate elements of its military into the force structure of another



state. It signed the *Dutch-German Declaration of Intent (DoI)* in May 2013. While this DoI is not based on reciprocity nor includes changes in basing venue for the troops concerned, it does present a basic blueprint on how to foster integrated operational cooperation, while counter-intuitively expanding national sovereignty at the same time.

If reciprocity and a change in basing venues were to apply in the Dutch-German DoI case, the Dutch would have “*lost*” a brigade and “*gained*” a German one in return. Troop levels within the Netherlands and Germany would have roughly remained the same, while national sovereignty would have visibly expanded on both sides due to their brigades abroad and unchanged troop levels at home.

Yet, instead of lingering in their barracks on Dutch soil, as the current DoI stipulates, the 11th Airmobile Brigade would have enhanced “*interoperability and common planning, preparations and pre-deployment training*” in Germany. It would serve as a permanent national contact point for overall military cooperation between Den Haag and Berlin and would be used as a trip-wire force to defend its neighbour to the East.

If such a DoI were to be implemented by all the European members within NATO, to the extent that 10-25 per cent of the armed forces were to comprise soldiers from other NATO members, the continent could turn itself into the proverbial fortress of Europe and be able to naturally create the building blocks for multinational divisions, brigades and battalions, to emerge under NATO command.



While this strategy of “*trip-wiring*” Europe may be interpreted by some as a violation of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, it would not necessarily prompt Moscow to embark on a troop buildup across NATO’s Eastern flank. Under the strategy outlined, troop levels in the Baltic States would remain the same. Their national composition, however, would significantly change – and with it their power to deter.

However, for the strategy of “*trip-wiring*” to translate into a workable concept, the continent has to re-learn the basic lessons of strategic decision-making. None of the European NATO members is a superpower. Few, if any, can singlehandedly embark on a global mission to tackle threats as diffuse as international terrorism or as comprehensive as stabilising failed states. And none of them can solely focus on defending its national borders while free-riding on Article 5.

NATO cannot be solely held together by the ink in the Washington treaty. It must be backed up by the military force necessary to visibly underscore Europe’s unwavering security commitments. In the absence of a coherent strategic culture on the continent, as exemplified by the cacophony of European defence papers and work-around initiatives such as the pooling and sharing concept, it is necessary for the Alliance to return to its basics again.





NATO Chiefs of Defence discuss the Readiness Action Plan, the Resolute Support Mission and Partnerships

• 21 Jan. 2015 - 22 Jan. 2015

Over the course of the two day session, the Chiefs of Defence provided clear military advice ahead of next month's Defence Ministers meeting. They discussed the Readiness Action Plan and the future of the Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan. They also discussed continued and strengthened cooperation with partners and Strategic Military guidance for 2015.

Speaking about challenges linked to increasing instability on the Eastern and Southern flanks of the Alliance's borders, the Chairman of the Military Committee, General Knud Bartels said that *"the threats we face call for both military and political diplomatic actions"*.

During the meeting, representatives from the Mediterranean Dialogue partner countries (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia) provided Allies with invaluable insights on the regional security challenges, paving the way for strengthened military to military cooperation.

In the first day's afternoon session, Chiefs of Defence discussed the new Resolute Support mission in Afghanistan that was launched on 1 January 2015 to train, advise and assist the Afghan security forces. The Chiefs of Defence received

Source: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_116739.htm



both operational and political briefings and it was agreed that the Commander of the Resolute Support mission, General John F. Campbell, should be given as much flexibility as possible in the early stages of the mission.

There was also a discussion about the Readiness Action Plan and the Very High Readiness Task Force (VJTF) with its interim solution. The Chiefs of Defence agreed and endorsed a number of measures to be reviewed by Defence Ministers at their meeting in February. The Chairman said during his press conference: *“I am confident after discussions held yesterday and today that we will be able to meet to the political ambitions and requirements”*.

Defence Ministers agree to strengthen NATO’s defences, establish Spearhead Force

- 05 Feb. 2015

NATO Defence Ministers took important decisions on Thursday (5 February 2015) to strengthen the Alliance’s collective defence. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said the decisions would *“ensure that we have the right forces, in the right place, at the right time”*.

Ministers approved plans in the light of the changing security environment to the east and south of the Alliance’s borders. The NATO Response Force will be

Source: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_117188.htm



enhanced. The Defence Ministers agreed on the size and scope of a new very high readiness force or Spearhead Force. *“We decided that this very high readiness force will consist of a land brigade of around 5 000 troops. These will be supported by air, sea and special forces,”* said Mr Stoltenberg. He said the Spearhead Force would be backed up by two more brigades *“as a rapid reinforcement capability in case of a major crisis. Altogether, the enhanced NATO Response Force will count up to around 30 000 troops”*.

Defence Ministers also decided to immediately establish six command and control units in Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania. *“If a crisis arises, they will ensure that national and NATO forces from across the Alliance are able to act as one from the start. They will make rapid deployment easier. Support planning for collective defence. And help coordinate training and exercises”*, said the Secretary General.

Ministers also held a meeting of the NATO-Georgia Commission and reaffirmed their support for the country’s attempts to further modernise its security forces. *“NATO is committed to help Georgia make its defence more modern, and thereby enable Georgia to move closer to NATO membership”*, said Mr. Stoltenberg. The Alliance is deploying a team of experts to advise the Georgian authorities on defence reforms, and a Joint NATO-Georgia Training Centre is being set up in Tbilisi.

The day began with a regular meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group which, around once a year, considers key issues related to the Alliance’s nuclear deterrence policy.

This is the official statement issued on 5 February 2015:

Statement by the NATO Defence Ministers on the Readiness Action Plan

1. We, the Allied Defence Ministers, met today to review progress and direct further work on the implementation of the NATO Readiness Action Plan. At the summit in Wales, our leaders set out the response of the Alliance to the substantial changes in the security environment on NATO's borders and beyond. As we progress towards the Warsaw Summit in 2016, our meeting today is an important stepping stone towards adapting the Alliance's military strategic posture. We are working to ensure that our Allied forces maintain the high levels of readiness and coherence needed to conduct NATO's full range of missions, including deterring aggression against NATO Allies and demonstrating preparedness to defend NATO territory.

2. The Readiness Action Plan, approved by Heads of State and Government, provides a coherent and comprehensive package of necessary measures to respond to the challenges posed by Russia and their strategic implications, as well as to the risks and threats emanating from our southern neighbourhood, the Middle East and North Africa. The Plan strengthens NATO's collective defence and also its crisis management capability. Defensive in nature, the measures will contribute to ensuring that NATO remains a ready, robust and responsive Alliance capable of meeting current and future challenges from wherever they may arise, and that NATO has the right forces in the right place at the right time.

3. The implementation of the Plan is well underway, and we have achieved considerable progress since the Wales Summit. The Alliance has increased the presence of land, maritime and air forces in the eastern part of its territory. These Assurance Measures initiated in May last year are continuing through 2015, as planned. They demonstrate Alliance resolve and solidarity. All Allies are contributing to this effort – 28 for 28.

4. We have also made progress on Adaptation Measures to bolster NATO's readiness and responsiveness. Today, we agreed to enhance the NATO Response Force, which will become a division size joint force with significantly increased readiness and highly capable and flexible multinational forces. These will be trained and organised to rapidly respond to a variety of contingencies. In addition to air and maritime components and Special Operations Forces, its flagship element

Source: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_117222.htm?selectedLocale=en

will be a new Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), centred on a multinational brigade with up to five manoeuvre battalions with some elements ready to move within 2 to 3 days. We welcome the declaration of France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom to assume the role of a framework nation for rotations of this force in the coming years. We also welcome the availability of the Interim VJTF capability for 2015 led by Germany, the Netherlands and Norway, with some other Allies participating, which has already started training and exercising. We also welcome the efforts of other Allies contributing to enhancing the NRF by raising the readiness of their forces. Furthermore, initial work has already commenced on adaptation with regard to the south.

5. In addition, we decided on the immediate establishment of the first six multinational command and control elements – the NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUs) – on the territories of Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Romania initially, which constitute a visible and persistent NATO presence in these countries. They will facilitate the rapid deployment of Allied forces to the region; support collective defence planning; and assist in the coordination of multinational training and exercises.

6. We welcome the work of Denmark, Germany and Poland to develop the Headquarters Multinational Corps Northeast to provide an additional high readiness capability to command forces deployed to the Baltic states and Poland, if so required, and to enhance its role as a hub for regional cooperation. We also welcome Romania's intention to make available a new deployable Multinational Divisional Headquarters as Multinational Division Southeast.

7. Today, we reiterate the commitment of our nations to Alliance solidarity and the security and protection of our populations and territories. We will continue reviewing the implementation of the Readiness Action Plan and take further decisions at our coming meetings, in line with the decisions taken at the Wales Summit.

NATO Support and Procurement Agency – new name and expanded capabilities

• **01 April 2015**

Effective 1 April 2015, the *NATO Support Agency (NSPA)* will become the NATO Support and Procurement Agency. This change marks the expansion of Agency capabilities to include all aspects of systems procurement from initial acquisition throughout sustainment.

Source: <http://www.nspa.nato.int/en/news/news-20150401-9.htm>



The mission of the *NATO Support and Procurement Organisation* is to provide responsive, effective and cost-efficient acquisition, including armaments procurement; logistics; operational and systems support and services to the allies, NATO Military Authorities and partner nations, individually and collectively, in time of peace, crisis and war, in order to maximise the ability and flexibility of their armed forces, contingents, and other relevant organisations, within the guidance provided by the NAC, to execute their core missions.

The *NATO Support and Procurement Agency* brings the full spectrum of 21st century logistics and acquisition capabilities under one organisation to ensure NATO allies and partners can maximise the effectiveness of their defence and logistics efforts. From acquisition and through-life support to system disposal and operational logistics support, *NSPA* capabilities, products and services offer integrated procurement and logistic solutions to support current and future national requirements to allies and partners.

NSPA is now even more effectively positioned to offer the full range of design, acquisition, logistics and procurement support services for complete weapon systems across five distinct capability areas:

- *Systems Procurement and Life Cycle Management,*
- *Support to Operations and Exercises,*
- *Strategic Transport and Storage,*
- *Logistics Services and Project Management,*
- *Fuel Management.*



Reorganising the support activity to match these new capability areas will occur over the course of the coming months and the Agency stands ready for new acquisition programmes to join.



FOR THE ATTENTION OF THOSE INTERESTED IN SUBMITTING ARTICLES TO “RMT”

Manuscripts submitted to the editorial staff should be sent by mail or email, edited in *Microsoft Word*, *Times New Roman*, size 14, justify, and they should have no more than 8 pages. The **graphic illustration** – schemes, figures, tables should be designed using *CorelDraw*, and maps and images – in *JPEG* format.

Manuscripts should be written in accordance with the academic standards and adopting the norms in the Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, available at www.ldoceonline.com. Abbreviations and acronyms should be either avoided or explained.

To optimise our collaboration, submissions should be accompanied by the following: name, phone/fax number, email, address of the institution and other relevant information.

RMT Editorial Staff reserves the right to make editorial changes regarding the style, grammar and length of the manuscripts. Authors will be consulted, in case the changes could affect the form or the content of the manuscript.

We expect You, with interest and hope, to submit your articles for publication, mentioning that manuscripts and relating materials are not given back to authors. Thank you for your understanding!

The Editorial Staff

The editorial and layout process
was completed on 23 April 2015.



Cover 1: Mountain troops in action. Photo: Major Florentin LAZĂR.

Cover 3: President of Romania visits NATO. Bilateral meeting with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and President Klaus Iohannis of Romania, 16 January 2015.

Photo: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/nato/hq/photos_116576.htm

Cover 4: Fighter from Special Operations Forces. Photo: Valentin CIOBĂRCĂ.



<http://www.smg.mapn.ro/gmr>