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# Romanian Military Thinking

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**ROMANIA - NATO**



**10 YEARS**

**1859**

*The General Staff*  
*155 years*  
*in the service of Romania*

**2014**

# Romanian Military Thinking

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*Issue dedicated  
to the anniversary  
of 10 years  
since Romania joined  
the North Atlantic Alliance*

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
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# THE ROMANIAN ARMED FORCES, 10 YEARS IN THE BIG FAMILY OF NATO

*Lieutenant General Dr Ștefan DĂNILĂ  
– Chief of the General Staff –*

Ten years ago, on 29 March 2004, Romania became a fully-fledged member of the North-Atlantic Alliance. Given the significance of this event for the society, it has been the greatest success of Romanian foreign policy since 1989. Gaining NATO membership was a lengthy process, whose constant feature was the broad support of the Romanian people for whom NATO membership equated to security and stability.

The national commitment to join NATO and the EU, and the wide support of the population and political parties were expressed by the referendum held in October 2003, when the amendments proposed to the Constitution of Romania were approved. The amendments enabled the completion of a process that had started over a decade before. It was established the concept of “*contribution to collective defence*”, as a mission of the Romanian Armed Forces, by changing Articles 117 and 118. Moreover, Article 149 stipulated that “*Romania’s accession to the North-Atlantic Treaty shall take place by means of a law adopted in the joint sitting of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, with a majority of two thirds of the number of deputies and senators*”<sup>1</sup>, thus defining the legal ground for adopting Law no. 22/2004 on Romania’s accession to the North-Atlantic Treaty.

Romania placed itself on the path to accession in 1993, when it applied for full NATO membership, followed, a year later, by the response to the invitation extended by the Alliance to participate in the Partnership for Peace. The programme,

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<sup>1</sup> Article 149, *Constitution of Romania*, republished in 2003.

aiming at achieving Euro-Atlantic security through cooperation, played an important part in the NATO enlargement process as well. The stage was beneficial in that it enabled integration in keeping with gathering experience and carrying out modernisation and reform programmes.

In April 1999, NATO launched the *Membership Action Plan – MAP* in order to help countries aspiring to join the Alliance. Romania submitted its own *Annual National Programme* under the *MAP*, which set the goals, measures and deadlines to be met for becoming a NATO member.

At the Prague Summit in November 2002, based on the evaluation of the progress made by candidate countries, NATO heads of state and government decided to invite Romania, together with other six countries – Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia – to begin NATO accession talks.

The accession protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty for Romania and the other six countries invited were signed during an official ceremony in Brussels, on 26 March 2003.

On 29 March 2004, Romania joined NATO by depositing the instruments of accession with the United States Government, the United States being the depository nation of the North-Atlantic Treaty. It is basically from then on that one may speak of integration and all that comes with it: harmonisation of the legal framework, broad process of transformation and modernisation of force structures, initiation of strategic procurement programmes, standardisation of procedures and training, participation in missions and operations abroad, as a NATO member country.

Started in 1991, 13 years before joining NATO, the Romanian Armed Forces participation in missions and operations abroad has steadily grown on three continents, under NATO command as well as with UN, EU and OSCE mandates.

The Romanian Armed Forces participation in missions and operations in an allied framework covers four stages: the first stage, before joining the Partnership for Peace programme, between 1991 and January 1994; the second stage, of the participation in the Partnership for Peace programme – until early 2000s; the third stage, of the NATO pre-membership status, between 2000 and 2004; and the fourth stage – since 2004, the year Romania has become a fully-fledged member of the North-Atlantic Alliance.

The most important contributions to NATO missions have been in Iraq, Afghanistan and Western Balkans. Between 2003 and 2009, Romania participated in *Iraqi Freedom* and *NATO Training Mission – Iraq*, with a maximum of 773 troops deployed in this area.

Within the Coalition of forces in Afghanistan, Romania has asserted its position regarding fighting the scourge of contemporary terrorism. At the same time,

its participation in the Coalition actions has been a confirmation of the trust placed by the Alliance in the professionalism of Romanian soldiers.

For instance, in Afghanistan, we have participated since 2002 in providing the security of A1 Highway in Zabul province, where we first deployed a battalion and then two manoeuvre battalions and staff personnel for the Regional Command South. At the same time, we have contributed advisory and liaison teams, staff personnel, trainers, special operations forces and military intelligence structures to building up and training the Afghan Armed Forces and the Afghan Security Forces, the Romanian presence between 2011-2013 being of almost 2 000 troops. To make sure the forces deployment and redeployment process is carried out in proper conditions, we have implemented a national support element for the first time in a multinational mission.

We took over the command of the Kabul International Airport, first, for four months, in 2006, and then for a year, in 2011-2012. Since the end of 2012, when the presence of forces in the Zabul province was decreased by a manoeuvre battalion, we have been responsible of providing the security of a part of the Kandahar airfield base.

More than 30 000 troops were deployed to these missions, coming from all the Land Forces infantry, mechanised or mountain battalions, on a rotation basis.

The transport of forces and equipment is mainly provided by own aircraft, the C-130, to which C-27 aircraft have been recently added. Moreover, we own a share of the C-17 Strategic Airlift Capability to which we contribute a crew. In fact, this was one of the first multinational approaches to delivering a vital capability to the Alliance, as part of what would later be known as the *Smart Defence* initiative.

The NATO- or EU-led operations in Western Balkans are of paramount importance for Romania, given that the security and stability in this area are prerequisites for maintaining a climate of peace in Europe as well as fostering the economic development of the region. We are fully committed to further developing participation in KFOR. It is our firm belief that this mission will assist local population in forging a brighter future.

Mention should be made that, ever since joining the Alliance, our country has been capable of performing, and has participated in Air Policing missions as part of the NATO Integrated Air Defence System. Furthermore, in 2007, we completed a three-month rotation in the air policing mission in Šiauliai, Lithuania, for the Baltic States. In the same vein, our frigates were present in the Mediterranean Sea, in NATO Operation *Active Endeavour* and in NATO Operation *Unified Protector* for imposing arms embargo on Libya, in 2011.

Romania's willingness to participate in such operations has made it possible for commands and units to be permanently connected to the political-military

developments in certain areas of the world, which has generated studies and analyses to facilitate better exercise planning and proper training programmes.

At the same time, we are also involved in addressing the security issues NATO faces at strategic, operational and tactical level. The NATO Summit held in București between 2 and 4 April 2008 is a convincing argument in this respect. The Summit, a high visibility political-military event, brought together delegates from all NATO member countries, 23 non-NATO member states participating in ISAF operations and representatives of certain international organisations. In this respect, we must also mention our involvement in *NATO's Parliamentary Assembly's 57<sup>th</sup> Annual Session*, in 2011, *Military Committee Conference*, in 2012, *Meeting of NATO Allied and Partner Special Operations Forces*, in 2014, and “*AFCEA Europe TechNet International and the NATO C4ISR Industry Conference 2014*”.

For the Romanian Armed Forces, joining the big family of NATO member states has resulted in making conceptual and functional adjustments, developing defence capabilities, actively engaging in Alliance missions, gathering experience and being involved in the NATO decision-making process. The Romanian Armed Forces transformation process entails the reform of the system in order to reach interoperability – the process started in 2007, with the approval of the Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy and the participation in the NATO reform process.

Today, 10 years after joining NATO, we can say that our modern armed forces are capable of fulfilling a wide range of missions and meeting the standards and engagements assumed.

We are fully-fledged members of the most important and strongest Alliance, but the integration process is not yet complete. There is a lot of work to be done and we are aware that the future holds new challenges, obligations and engagements in store for us. Considering the evolution of the international security environment and the latest events, we must emphasise the right decision made by our country back in the early '90s to embark on the European and Euro-Atlantic path.

**English version by**  
 **Iulia NĂSTASIE**

# *A Strong and Resolute Alliance*

**T**he North Atlantic Treaty, signed in Washington on 4 April 1949 by 14 European countries, the USA and Canada, as an alliance for collective defence, celebrates 65 years of existence. It is an age of full maturity, accumulation of considerable experience and undeniable authority, arising from the exercise, with determination and responsibility, of the mandate given by the signatory states.

The members of the most successful organisation in history in maintaining and inducing peace have committed to safeguarding the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, based on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

Throughout its existence, NATO has evolved as an organisation and has developed its military and political structures to keep pace with the changing context of international security. It has withstood the test of history and, being constantly concerned with a comprehensive approach to common security, where cooperation and dialogue play a predominant role, today it offers its members safety, certitude, confidence.

Romania's accession, on 29 March 2004, to the safest political-military alliance in the Euro-Atlantic area, followed a long series of negotiations and a pre-accession process that meant a sustained and unconditional commitment.

The road to NATO, a wise and courageous choice, based on the democratic vocation of the Romanian people, was strewn with many assessment points, when we had to demonstrate the transition from declarations to concrete engagements and to reconfirm the vote of confidence in the major project. Above the major or minor interests associated with internal political struggle, the national desideratum to safeguard and guarantee the country's security in a highly complex security space and environment was primarily considered,

being supported by the entire Romanian society, responsibly concerned with the future and security of the country.

The military institution, following the same natural path to the values of the Western world, has undergone a complex transformation and remodelling process, which has not always been easily accepted. Before becoming a constructive state of mind, the military body reform entailed a concerted effort to change mindsets and overcome a natural and often strong institutional inertia.

However, the benefit would be gradually seen on multiple planes. The adoption of NATO mentality, the concern to meet its standards, has meant being anchored in the transatlantic community and connected to its democratic values. Being connected to the pulse of the Alliance has also meant the considerable enrichment of Romanian military science and its international assertion.

The Romanian troops, praised for their professionalism and determination, by their allies on the antiterrorist front, have multiplied the experience gained by rotating contingents in the theatres of operations in *ISAF*, *KFOR*, *Active Endeavour* missions.

Participating in some major multinational projects – *Allied Ground Surveillance (AGS)*, *NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control (NAEW&C)*, *Air Command and Control System (ACCS)*, *Deployable Communications Module (DCME)*, *Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC)*, – Romania has distinguished itself, especially by its engagement in the development of the *Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD)* system. Its potential, revealed by the significant contribution to the Alliance goals and missions, was also confirmed by hosting, in București, NATO Summit in April 2008, and, in Sibiu, NATO Military Committee Conference in September 2012.

Along with the celebration of the 65<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the 25<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the fall of the *Berlin Wall* – the sad symbol of an arbitrary division of the world that we no longer want repeated – 2014 has multiple meanings for NATO: 20 years since the Partnership for Peace was launched, 15 years since the first enlargement after the end of the *Cold War* and since the Alliance first operational engagement, 10 years since the second – and the greatest – enlargement. It is an occasion for assessment and renewal of commitments, for the continuation of the contribution to the Alliance effort to define and express a response strategy to the great and serious security challenges on the current world political scene.

The General Staff has assumed consciously and responsibly the role of main vector of the Romanian Armed Forces integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures, while being concerned with own institutional reform, able to increase the entire operational capability to generate and command the forces in the theatres of operations, to promote and capitalise on the latest concepts in the field of military theory and practice. Its component structures have continued, through sustained effort, the work started after 1990 and validated in April 2004, when the flags of NATO and Romania were hoisted simultaneously in Brussels and București. It is a sign of hope and confidence in an Alliance that is strong and resolute in its response to the political-military crises that may generate threats to global and regional security.

 *Colonel Dr Mircea TĂNASE*

***English version by***  
*Diana Cristiana LUPU*



# *Une alliance forte et ferme*

**L**e Traité de l'Atlantique Nord, signé à Washington le 4 avril 1949 par 14 pays européens, Etats-Unis et Canada, comme une alliance de défense collective, célèbre 65 ans d'existence. Un âge de la maturité complète, de l'accumulation d'une expérience élevée et d'une autorité incontestable, résultant de l'exercice, avec détermination et responsabilité, du mandat des Etats signataires.

Les membres de plus réussie organisation dans le maintien de la paix et de son induction de l'histoire ont eu l'engagement à sauvegarder la liberté, l'héritage commun et la civilisation de ses peuples, fondées sur les principes de la démocratie, de la liberté individuelle et de la primauté du droit.

Tout au long de son existence, l'OTAN a évolué comme une organisation et a développé ses structures militaires et politiques pour suivre le rythme de l'évolution du contexte internationale de la sécurité. NATO a résisté à l'épreuve de l'histoire et, avec une préoccupation constante pour une approche plus large de la sécurité commune, où la coopération et le dialogue jouent un rôle prédominant, elle offre aujourd'hui aux ses membres de la sécurité, de la certitude, de la confiance.

L'adhésion de la Roumanie, le 29 mars 2004, à cette la plus sûre alliance politico-militaire de la région euro-atlantique, était due à une longue série de négociations et d'un processus de préadhésion qui signifiait un effort soutenu et un engagement sans condition.

La route vers l'OTAN, un choix sage et courageuse, fondée sur la vocation démocratique du peuple roumain, a eu nombreux points de contrôle où nous avons eu à faire la preuve de la transition entre l'espace déclarative et l'engagement concret et de reconfirmer le vote de confiance dans ce projet d'envergure. Au-delà des intérêts majeures ou mineurs de la lutte politique interne, le désir national, de l'assurance nationale et de garantir la sécurité du pays dans un espace et de l'environnement de sécurité très complexe, a été le but principal et a été soutenu

par l'ensemble de la société roumaine, préoccupée avec responsabilité de l'avenir et de la sécurité du pays.

L'institution militaire, naturellement enregistrée dans le même sens vers les valeurs du monde occidental, a été subie d'un processus complexe des transformations et des rénovations, pas toujours facile à accepter. Avant de devenir un état d'esprit constructif, la réforme de l'organisme militaire a été réalisée par un effort concerté pour changer les mentalités et de surmonter une naturelle, mais, assez souvent, forte inertie institutionnelle.

Mais le gain serait vu progressivement, au plusieurs plans. L'adoption de la mentalité de l'OTAN, la préoccupation d'accomplir ses conditions, ont signifiaient un ancrage à la communauté transatlantique et sa connexion aux ses valeurs démocratiques. La connexion à l'impulsion de l'Alliance a signifié aussi un enrichissement considérable de la science militaire roumaine et son affirmation dans l'espace international d'expression.

Les soldats roumains, appréciés pour leur professionnalisme et leur détermination par les camarades alliés du front antiterroriste, ont multiplié leur expérience par la rotation des contingents dans les théâtres d'opérations des missions *FIAS*, *KFOR*, *Active Endeavour*.

La Roumanie, participante à certains projets multinationaux importants – le *Système allié de surveillance terrestre (AGS)*, *Force aérienne de détection lointaine de l'OTAN et de contrôle (NAEW&C)*, le *Système de commandement et de contrôle aérien de l'OTAN (ACCS)*, le *Module de communication et informatique deployable de l'OTAN (DCME)*, la *Capacité de transport aérien stratégique (SAC)* –, a été distinguée notamment par son engagement dans la réalisation du *système de défense antimissile (BMD)*. Son potentiel, révélé par d'importantes contributions aux objectifs et missions de l'Alliance, a été confirmé par l'hébergement, à Bucarest, du sommet de l'OTAN en avril 2008 et à Sibiu, par la Conférence du Comité militaire de l'OTAN en septembre 2012.

L'année 2014, en même temps avec la célébration du 65<sup>ème</sup> anniversaire de la création de l'OTAN et le 25<sup>ème</sup> anniversaire de *la chute du mur de Berlin* – ce triste symbole d'une division arbitraire du monde, qui nous ne le voulons pas plus répété –, a pour l'OTAN des significations multiples: 20 années depuis le lancement du Partenariat pour la paix, 15 ans après la première extension post *la guerre froide* et de son premier engagement opérationnel, 10 ans après la deuxième extension – et la plus grande. C'est une occasion pour l'évaluation


et le renouvellement de ses engagements, de poursuivre la contribution au effort de l'Alliance pour définir et exprimer une grande stratégie de réponse aux grandes et graves problèmes de sécurité de l'actuelle scène politique mondiale.

L'état-major général a pris soi-même, dans une manière consciente et responsable, le rôle de principal vecteur de l'intégration de l'Armée Roumaine dans les structures euro-atlantiques et a concerné en même temps de sa propre réforme institutionnelle, en mesure d'étendre sa capacité opérationnelle de générer et de conduire des forces dans les théâtres d'opérations, de promouvoir et mettre en évidence les nouveaux concepts dans le domaine de la théorie et de la pratique militaire. Ses structures continuent, grâce à un effort soutenu, l'activité commencée après 1990 et validée en avril 2004, quand, tout à Bruxelles et à Bucarest, le drapeau de l'OTAN et celui de la Roumanie étaient arborés. Un signe d'espoir et de confiance dans une Alliance forte et ferme dans sa réponse aux crises politiques et militaires qui peuvent créer des menaces à la sécurité mondiale et régionale.

*Version française par  
Alina PAPOI*



## ***IN MEMORIAM***



***General (ret.) Dr Sorin IOAN***  
**1954-2014**

On Monday, 3 March 2014, I asked General (ret.) Sorin IOAN to write a *“testimony”* for the current issue of the journal dedicated to celebrating 10 years since Romania’s accession to NATO. I knew that, besides the important positions held at the top of the Romanian Armed Forces command structures, General Sorin IOAN was, between 1996 and 1997, the Commander of *“Saint George”* Tactical Detachment, deployed in Albania as part of *“ALBA”* Multinational Force, and in 2002, while he was the Chief of the Operations Directorate, he was the first Romanian military man who set foot on the Afghan soil, where Romania engaged to contribute forces to the Multinational Coalition. Subsequently, General Sorin IOAN coordinated several Romanian military missions within the Alliance in different theatres of operations. It is a great experience we would have liked to present in the pages of the journal in a larger editorial project.

General Sorin IOAN accepted the invitation without any reservation and promised that he would send the material in a few days. I knew that he had gone through a difficult period, having some health problems, but I found out that he had overcome the troublesome situation and he was getting better. I was glad to hear him lively and optimistic.

On Friday, 7 March, I received the article below via email. He responded promptly, militarily, to an *order* he had certainly given himself. Soon he called me to be sure that the material had reached its destination. I confirmed, I thanked

him, and I wished him good health again. I planned to give him a surprise gift, to personally offer him the journal whose sincere and reliable friend he had proved to be over time, supporting it not only by writing truly original and scientifically relevant materials but also by involving in its major projects.

In 2009, Romania's Military Representative to NATO and the EU, in the person of Lieutenant General Dr Sorin IOAN, was awarded the *Gândirea militară românească Journal Certificate of Excellence for the professionalism proved in promoting the national interests in the process of engaging the Romanian Armed Forces in carrying out NATO collective missions*. In 2011 and 2012, Lieutenant General Dr Sorin IOAN was the Chairman of the *Gândirea militară românească Journal Awards Selection, Evaluation, and Nomination Commission*. Those who attended the award ceremony in 2012 noted, once again, not only the elegant speech but also the fact that, to our surprise, the same self-possessed and erudite general presented the synthesis of the commission activity ... in verse.

The email containing the material was accompanied by a short text, apparently cold but premonitory: *"Unfortunately, the available time did not allow me to write an extensive material. I have attached it. Best regards"*.

Indeed, time had no patience with General Sorin IOAN. On Saturday, 15 March, he passed away. It was a week after he wrote this last article in which he expressed just a few words about the life lived to the full in the service of the country. He had so much to say ... We can only hope that, one day, we can read the book I heard he was working on.



*Gândirea militară românească* editorial staff pay pious homage to this remarkable General of the Romanian Armed Forces and will always remember him.

✍ *Colonel Dr Mircea TĂNASE*

# ASPECTS OF THE ROADMAP TO NATO

*General (ret.) Dr Sorin IOAN*

**I**n 1997, I was on a mission to Albania, having 404 soldiers under command. It was a country in chaos: the armed forces disbanded and left the barracks; there was no police or justice; mayors were deposed, and civilians, organised in gangs, devastated military units, taking over the armament and ammunition depots. And there were lots and everywhere. It was like in a country prepared for the whole people defence, having more armoured pillboxes, reinforced with semi-precious metals, than families. In each village, no matter how small, there were at least two rival gangs disputing authority and terrorising those who were not engaged. They attacked in the street and everywhere, together with those who escaped from prison during the riot, masked and drugged, robbing everything and everyone. Buses, the main means of transport to the capital, were favourite targets as there were many people in one place. If the driver did not stop, they opened fire, using machine guns, killing men, women and children. It happened in the south, our area of responsibility, which, at the Planning Conference, was refused by all nations, except Greece, which had interests in the area, being a neighbouring territory, but Turkey opposed it. Romania, the only participating country that was not a NATO member state, being the last one, did not have a choice. It was the first mission other than “*blue helmets*” we were engaged into. The reason is very clear: we wanted to win points up to the NATO summit, when the countries to be invited to join NATO in the first enlargement wave were announced.

Unfortunately, as we know, it was a missed opportunity, as only three countries were invited: the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary. The selection was made on political considerations. It is true that our armed forces were not modernised to meet NATO standards, but none of the other three countries was in a better condition. Immediately after the official announcement, I was called by many journalists and asked about my feelings and the way the situation affected the mission,

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General (ret.) Dr Sorin Ioan – former Romania’s Military Representative to NATO and the EU.



*Photo: Petrică Mihalache*

the military morale. Of course I had regrets, but the mission had to be completed according to the mandate. Regrets, because our mind had been long connected to the desire to integrate into the high-class military world, with solid security guarantees.

Up to 2000, we took small and hesitant steps to meet the Integration Plan: adoption of some general terms in NATO language and conventional signs, or insignificant measures to downsize the personnel and less the structures.

The main vector of transformation was the *Partnership for Peace (PfP)* that, starting in 1994, funded our officers and non-commissioned officers attendance at NATO and English language courses in their training centres. The importance of attending courses to accommodate to and to adopt the mentality of our colleagues in the Alliance was not realised from the beginning. In the early years, it seemed that the number of adapted military men in relation to our military strength was rather small. Being dissipated in units they did not stand out. However, the accumulation over time, by the multiplication of the number of trainees and especially by the invitation to participate in NATO joint exercises, including with subunits, resulted in significant changes.

The reform and integration programme strategy in the late '90s, stipulated, in the first phase, that the strength should be restructured and downsized, and, subsequently, the armed forces should be modernised. It was logical, given that downsizing required large financial resources: severance pay for those who left the system; relocation allowance for those who remained but changed the garrison;

transportation of remaining excess assets and materials to the newly established regional depots, and so on. The Air Force and then the Naval Forces completed the process first, having less structures and troops, while in the Land Forces the steps were shy and hesitant. Gradually cutting defence budget and renouncing the commitment of allocating 2,38% of GDP resulted in the fact that the 2<sup>nd</sup> stage, Modernisation Programmes Initiation, did not start.

The integration process has been significantly accelerated and more motivated since 2000, when we were actually monitored by a NATO evaluation committee and called regularly to Brussels to present the progress made according to the timelines agreed by both parties. Under the same pressure was launched the process of downsizing the Land Forces structures and troops, which peaked in 2004 and ended in 2005. During two years, on average, 90 structures (per year), of which eight brigades were downsized, and 5 000 officers were dismissed each year, meeting the objective of overturning the 3:1 ratio between officers and non-commissioned officers in favour of non-commissioned officers, thus aligning to the principles of the armed forces in NATO member states.

An important dimension of the integration process was the change in the fundamental concepts in NATO system and procedures. Only the *Operations and Training Directorate* (as it was called at that time) developed, approved, and adopted, on average, 11 concepts, guidelines and regulations per year, in compliance with NATO principles and, of course, adapted to our realities. No matter they referred to the system management, command and control, multinational operations management, the establishment, use and management of Special Forces, the transformation of training and education etc., the strategic documents were followed by detailed regulations and manuals at operational and tactical level. It was indeed a sustained effort in a short period of time, engaging all military structures as well as each member in an open and unconditional cooperation environment, which was also rewarding.

And that is because it was finally 2003, when invitations for seven new countries to join NATO were launched. This time, Romania was included but not without emotion until the last moment. Some “*senior*” countries considered the enlargement too broad and, especially, they were disappointed with some countries in the first wave that, following accession, showed less interest in the continuation of full integration programmes. I should mention that some armed forces, such those of Poland, began NATO system conceptual changes only after they became members. But one does not always get what one deserves when the decision is political. There are situations when one has to make greater efforts than others to convince.

In our case, I claim that a decisive role for the decision was played by the engagement, with substantial forces and important financial effort, in Afghanistan, starting in 2002, attracting, undeniably, the US support.

In 2004, when Romania became a full-fledged member, it had already hosted a NATO informal ministerial meeting, in Poiana Braşov, in October 2003, showing active, responsible and credible engagement in the life of the organisation.

For every military man who has been engaged in the construction of a new collective security system, coming from a totally opposed one, as the defence of the country by the whole people, it means accumulation of experience, requiring him to get thoroughly informed and open to major and profound mentality changes.

Personally, although I was pretty well informed, there were some issues I did not have access to such as: the command of the forces deployed in a member state under Article 5 in the Treaty. It is clear that no country would accept to transfer own forces under the command of the Allied Expeditionary Corps, if we take into account only the fact that in any area there would also be troops belonging to the Gendarmerie and to the Inspectorate for Emergency Situations the armed forces should cooperate with. Likewise, NATO would not accept to put its joint, multinational forces under the command of the national operational command. Which is the integration and cooperation system? I had the opportunity to clarify this as well as other issues during my tenure as National Military Representative to NATO.



*Photo: Colonel (r.) Gheorghiiă Teodorescu private collection*

The conclusion is that NATO, as any other national armed forces, undergoes a transformation and adaptation process, being flexible to the changes in the security environment.

*English version by*  
*Diana Cristiana LUPU*

# THE ROLE OF PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS IN THE EVOLUTION OF THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN

*Major General Dr Dumitru SCARLAT*

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*The concept of PRT, although relatively new and subject to criticism in the early stages of international military deployment in Afghanistan, has evolved and it is regarded as an extremely effective means to provide assistance to the Afghan Government to extend its influence in the provinces.*

*As joint teams composed of civilian and military personnel, varying in size and led by different countries, they are deployed in the capitals of certain provinces of Afghanistan providing, in the author's opinion, a viable alternative to international peacekeeping presence.*

*Current ISAF PRTs are led by Germany, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United States.*

**Keywords:** *international coalition; security implementation; ISAF; military culture*

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## **The concept of PRT\* . Short history**

The Bonn Agreement in December 2001 allowed for the deployment in Afghanistan of an *International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)* to gather the international coalition forces under the same command in the campaign against terrorism.

Given that Afghanistan lacked credible national armed forces or police forces, ISAF was considered essential to meet a security vacuum threatening especially rural areas. During the first years, ISAF had a mandate to act only in Kabul and on the outskirts of the capital, which did not fully meet the security needs in Afghanistan.

In April 2002, the President of the United States, G. W. Bush<sup>1</sup>, brought to attention the *Marshall Plan*, which was a real success in the reconstruction of Japan and Germany after the Second World War, talking about the necessity of a *Marshall Plan* for Afghanistan.

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Major General Dr Dumitru Scarlat – Deputy Chief of the General Staff, the Ministry of National Defence.

\* *Provincial Reconstruction Team*

<sup>1</sup> George W. Bush speech delivered to the nations engaged in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, 2002.

The concept of *PRT* was introduced by the US Government, consisting of military officers, diplomats, and reconstruction experts, to support reconstruction efforts in unstable states. The teams were largely new in structure, although elements of the *PRT* model were also present in other conflicts such as that in Vietnam. *PRTs* were first established in Afghanistan in early 2002, with the main aim of supporting local authorities to govern as effectively as possible. The programme was initially called “*Coalition Humanitarian Liaison Cells*”<sup>2</sup>. Subsequently, by including the security forces and the representatives of the US Government in the teams, it was called *PRT*.

ISAF expansion beyond the capital was authorised by *UN Resolution 1510* in October 2003. During the two years when *ISAF* expansion was blocked, other ways of establishing an international coalition forces presence in Afghanistan were sought. Thus, *PRTs* became the chosen solution. As an innovative approach in building peace and security, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan were largely a response to unpredicted circumstances.

Although relatively new and subject to criticism in the early stages of international military deployment in Afghanistan, the concept of *PRT*, in general, has evolved and it is regarded as an extremely effective means to provide assistance to the Afghan Government to extend its influence in the provinces. As joint teams composed of civilian and military, varying in size and led by different countries, they are deployed in the capitals of certain provinces of Afghanistan providing a viable alternative



<sup>2</sup> William J. Durch, *Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations*, US Institute of Peace Press, 2006.

to international peacekeeping presence that is neither an option for Afghanistan nor a part of the *ISAF* mandate. Current *ISAF PRTs* are led by Germany, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the United States. Other allies and partners make important contributions with civilian or military personnel.

## Evolution, role and missions

The first *PRT* was located in Gardez, in Paktia Province, co-located with US Special Forces since 2002. *PRT* became operational on 1 February 2003, so the reconstruction of schools and medical clinics in Paktia Province and in neighbouring provinces, Kwost and Ghazni began. The *PRT* initiative has been expanded throughout most of the provinces to develop reconstruction and reconciliation programmes in Afghanistan. *PRTs* have been part of the NATO-led *ISAF* mission since 5 October 2006.

27 Provincial Reconstruction Teams have worked within *ISAF*<sup>3</sup>. Each *PRT* consists of a variable number of members, between 50 and 500, both military and civilian personnel (civilians may be also part of government agencies or international organisations), being responsible for carrying out a very wide range of tasks, such as: to ensure international agencies security, to support the local government authorities reconstruction efforts, to support the efforts to disarm insurgents etc.

Based on their mandate, *PRTs* support *ISAF* Regional Commands to implement their objectives, cooperating very closely with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) the United Nations special mission established to support the democratic development of state institutions in Afghanistan and to manage the international agencies efforts in the field of reconstruction and humanitarian aid.

The main *PRT* tasks, as they were defined by the *PRT* Joint Executive Committee in Kabul, are as follows:

- to support the Afghan Government to extend its authority over the entire national territory to create the premises for ensuring a safe and secure environment;
- to actively participate in the reconstruction and development efforts made by central and local government authorities, international organisations, and non-governmental organisations.

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<sup>3</sup> In 2010.



To carry out these tasks, a *PRT* should develop the necessary capabilities to cover three major areas of action: *security implementation*, *government institutions effectiveness*, and *reconstruction*. Therefore, the main activities are related to initiating, planning, coordinating and implementing development and reconstruction programmes and projects to help revive or increase the institutional capacity of the host nation. Of course, it takes time and patience to achieve the related performance objectives, the main delay factor being the inability of the Afghan authorities to ensure sufficient administrative capabilities for the entire area of responsibility.

The idea that *PRTs* had the task of replacing *ISAF* as a source of security was always a difficult one but, over time, one thing has become increasingly clear – there is no single “*PRT experience*”<sup>4</sup>. In this context, it is mentioned the existence of a range of factors that shape what *PRTs* can achieve and in what ways.

The goal of *PRTs* is “*to enhance the popular legitimacy of the provincial Government by developing their capacity to conduct reconstruction and provide effective governance*”<sup>5</sup>. So that these Provincial Reconstruction Teams can be a success in making the civilian population feel secure and trust the provincial government and not the insurgents, *PRTs* should employ a large amount of public diplomacy to reach out to the civilians in these Afghan provinces and to instil trust in US COIN (counterinsurgency) operations<sup>6</sup>.

Firstly, *PRTs* vary according to location and the specific security and development needs in a certain area. Thus the experience of the New Zealand *PRT* in Bamian is very different from that of the Canadians in Kandahar<sup>7</sup>,

<sup>4</sup> William Maley, *Rescuing Afghanistan*, 2006 and *The Afghanistan Wars*, 2002.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>6</sup> The US concept of *PRT*.

<sup>7</sup> 40 Canadian *PRT* military men were killed in Kandahar.

given the losses suffered by Canadians and the lack in losses among the staff belonging to New Zealand's *PRT*.

Secondly, *PRTs* activity varies according to the practices and military cultures of contributing states. An important aspect is that of “*national caveats*”<sup>8</sup> on the ways to use forces, fact that has been a serious concern for the commanders in Afghanistan for a long time. These caveats manifest not only in the military organisational cultures but also in the views about the role *PRTs* should play. Part of the present nations prefer the dynamic use of forces to create a credible and robust presence while for other nations this aspect may reflect both a failure of imagination and a reluctance to use negotiation as a way of achieving concrete objectives.

Thirdly, *PRTs* vary according to their relationships with local population and leadership. The success of *PRTs* consists in achieving projects that are visible for local communities, bringing positive change in the life of the population. It is also important how the locals appreciate the effort of the teams in their area. That is why an important contribution to the evolution and interaction between *PRTs* and local communities is also made by fostering the personal relationships between the members of *PRTs* and local leaders. There are many situations when, only the fact that schools or public institutions are built or reconstructed by the military generates reluctance among the population, because the military and the uniformed personnel are associated with danger and not with help.

The nature and type of *PRTs* tasks generate even more troubles. Given *PRTs* deployment, they tend to mainly develop projects that are closer to provincial governments than to central authorities. The lack of the Afghan Government coordination can result in a lack of correlation between local and governmental objectives.

Another relevant aspect is *PRTs* interest in the priorities of their home governments than in those of the Afghan Government, thus developing “*Quick Impact Projects*” that may be successful in some cases, especially if carefully designed together with the local population. However, unfortunately, some of them can prove to be costly, lacking in feasibility, reflecting a lack of understanding of the complexities of diverse Afghan micro-societies.

The role of the Afghan state in all these projects should not be neglected as local authorities have to act in line with the Afghan Government's actions so that all these *PRT* efforts can have continuity.

*PRTs* activities and especially their visible results do not refer only to an area development project or package of projects. That is why specific strategies

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<sup>8</sup> Robert M. Perito, “*The US Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Lessons Identified*”, Special Report No. 152, *US Institute of Peace*, October 2005.

are necessary to support projects. It is also important to understand the way Afghan micro-societies and local tribal communities work. William Maley states that “the most successful PRTs have been those that are best attuned to recognising Afghans’ conceptions of Afghans’ needs. A good PRT leadership strategy is to spend as much time as possible listening, rather than talking”<sup>9</sup>. A relationship between PRTs and local communities representatives is necessary to convince them of the need to work to restore infrastructure and the rule of law institutions in the long run, always showing due respect for the local traditions and customs.

There are also difficulties in implementing PRTs projects determined by language barriers. Thus, those who work in the north have to deal with the Persian, a language more accessible than *Pastho* dialects, spoken in the south. This has led to tensions on the ground between some PRTs and experienced NGOs, which tend to approach reconstruction from a much more rigorously “developmental” perspective. Some NGOs take into account the fact that the locals will not have a clear picture on “humanitarian aid” and “development”, on the one hand, and the global “war on terror”, on the other hand. This is particularly the case when reconstruction is presented as a way to counteract political forces such as the *Taliban* and *al-Qaeda*.

Equally serious is the difficulty that the Afghans might have in making a difference between PRTs, on the one hand, and other international military forces, on the other hand. The fact that a part of uniformed personnel is engaged



<sup>9</sup> William Maley is Professor and Director, Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy, the Australian National University. He is the author of *Rescuing Afghanistan* (2006) and *The Afghanistan Wars* (2002). In May 2007, he was one of the coordinators of a NATO-supported workshop held in Waterloo, Canada on the experience of PRTs in Afghanistan.

in reconstruction and another part in the conduct of military type combat actions results in confusion among the local population. Moreover, the organisation of *PRTs* by military and civilian components can generate tensions between them, having a negative impact on the evolution and development of the team area of action.

In all these years of operation, *ISAF*-led *PRTs* have provided valuable support to the development of countless reconstruction projects, mediating between the parties in conflict, participating in the disarmament of Afghan groups, assisting the deployment of national police forces and the Afghan National Army, generally having an important role in improving the security environment through the contacts established with local authorities and population. *PRTs* have also proved an original way of making military and civilians work together to meet the complex task of ensuring external assistance to build the nation. Their composition is dictated by the logic that stabilisation and reconstruction are two sides of the same coin.

*PRTs* have been very useful tools in the management of COIN-type operations as they have well covered the specific domains of *ISAF* main missions, namely: *providing security assistance to the Afghan Government, supporting its reconstruction efforts, and providing the necessary organisational framework for imposing the rule of law across Afghanistan.*

The President of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, speaking in front of an audience consisted of foreign ministers and military experts attending the *Munich Security Conference* (February 2011), requested, for the first time, the participating governments to stop using private security companies, stating that they, together with civilian and reconstruction teams, hinder the governance of Afghanistan by the Central Government<sup>10</sup>.

In June 2011, contributing nations agreed a set of principles for the evolution and ultimate dissolution of their *PRTs*. *PRTs* evolved, shifting their efforts from direct involvement to providing technical assistance and building the capacity of provincial and district governments to provide essential service to the Afghan people. Over time, all *PRTs* will have handed over their functions to the Afghan Government, traditional development actors, NGOs and the private sector. Finally, they will be disbanded.

On 3 April 2013, the first *PRT* in Afghanistan, located in Gardez, was closed, after 10 years, in a ceremony with the participation of US Ambassador Stephen McFarland, and Provincial Governor of Paktya, being appreciated the *PRT's* contribution to the stabilisation of the area and to the reconstruction

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<sup>10</sup> The President of Afghanistan also stated it in front of Admiral James G. Stavridis, NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe.



of many important objectives in the province, by investing over 282 million dollars on 527 projects<sup>11</sup>.

In 2013, the following *PRTs* were working in Afghanistan: under *RC West*, Herat *PRT*, led by Italy, was active; under *RC Southwest*, Helmand *PRT* (the UK, the US, Denmark and Estonia) was working, which will be completely closed at the end of 2014, under *RC South*, *PRT Uruzgan* (the USA, Australia, and the Netherlands) was functional, and under *RC East* (Poland, the USA), *Ghazni PRT* was operational.

We can thus conclude that the *ISAF*-led *PRTs* have provided great help in many reconstruction projects, mediating between conflicting parties, participating in disarming the Afghan militias, assisting the deployment of the national police forces and the Afghan National Army, and facilitating the enhancement of the security environment in general, through the relationships with local authorities and population.

*PRTs* have also proved an original way to determine military and civilian actors to work together to meet the complex task of ensuring external assistance to build the nation.

***English version by***  
 ***Diana Cristiana LUPU***

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<sup>11</sup> kabul.usembassy.gov, press release, 2013.

# HUMAN RESOURCES IN THE ROMANIAN ARMED FORCES ON THE PATH TO INTEROPERABILITY WITH SIMILAR STRUCTURES IN THE ARMED FORCES OF NATO MEMBER STATES

*Colonel (AF) Dr Liviu Marilen LUNGULESCU  
Lieutenant Colonel BEng Alexandru ADOMNICĂI*

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*Romania's NATO membership entails new responsibilities and tasks that require an appropriate approach in all fields of the military system, the human resource one included. Considering the need for armed forces that are downsized, efficient, viable, flexible and interoperable with NATO structures, the General Staff has established its own configuration, implementing a structural reorganisation plan.*

*The period that followed Romania's accession to the Euro-Atlantic structures has been marked by extensive changes derived from the General Staff reorganisation, changes that have also affected the Personnel and Mobilisation Directorate. The authors review the main transformations the Directorate has undergone between 2004 and 2014.*

**Keywords:** *readiness; language training; military specialities; recruitment*

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Motto:

*"Personnel managers should be more and more concerned about the future".*

Albert F. Watters

Human resources, unlike other resources made available to the military by the society, have a great capacity to contribute to the progress of the military organisation.

Romania's joining NATO, ten years ago, exerted an important as well as systematically constant influence on the human resources in the armed forces. This fact was determined by the organisation requirements and the commitments made during the pre-accession process.

Under these circumstances, the *Personnel and Mobilisation Directorate* had to implement the measures set at the General Staff level by the "*Objective Force 2007 – fundamentally revised*",

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Lieutenant Colonel BEng Alexandru Adomnicăi – the Personnel and Mobilisation Directorate, the General Staff, the Ministry of National Defence.

which established the armed forces missions, the quality and quantity of forces assigned to missions, a special role being played by NATO assigned forces for collective defence. Thus, the personnel structure had to be reconsidered (military and civilian personnel) and downsized (with the social-related consequences). In fact, the whole system of military personnel recruitment, selection, training, professional development, promotion and retirement at the end of military career had to be reconsidered. However, it was necessary to maintain the existing personnel and especially the young people motivation for the military career.

Another major issue was the reconsideration of the military mobilisation system and the provision of the human and material resources necessary for the transition from peace to war, given the fact that conscription was abandoned (entailing the decrease in the number of reservists) and the new economic realities (the size of defence budget and the fundamental restructuring of defence industry).

All these implications were challenges that the *Personnel and Mobilisation Directorate* had to face, contributing, by meeting them, to achieving compatibility and interoperability with the human resources in the armed forces of the other NATO member states.

The activities that were carried out were intended to achieve the above-mentioned objective, entailing an important organisational, intellectual and actional effort to ensure a normal state of affairs and a favourable evolution of human resource management. Throughout this period, we were convinced that the new realities inside and outside the military entailed an attitude of permanent adaptation and transformation, as far as both concepts and actions were concerned.

The concrete way in which this process has developed will be further presented, focusing on the Directorate areas of responsibilities: personnel management, recruitment and selection, psychological assistance, the reserve training, and the Romanian Armed Forces mobilisation.

### ***Human resource evolution in the period between 2004 and 2014***

#### **❖ Personnel structures evolution**

Romania's NATO membership entails new responsibilities and tasks that require an appropriate approach in all fields of the military system, the human resource one included. Considering the need for armed forces that are downsized, efficient, viable, flexible and interoperable with NATO structures, the General Staff has established its own "*dimension*" and configuration, implementing a structural reorganisation and modernisation plan.

The period that followed Romania's accession to the Euro-Atlantic structures has been marked by extensive changes derived from the General Staff reorganisation. The *Personnel and Mobilisation Directorate* has also undergone changes. Thus, in February 2007, the *Organisation, Personnel and Mobilisation Directorate* became the *Personnel and Mobilisation Directorate*, as the Structures Service was re-subordinated to the *Structures and Armament Planning Directorate*. As for organisation, the *Personnel and Mobilisation Directorate* had two services (personnel and mobilisation), a technical secretariat and independent offices. Moreover, it coordinated the military centres and the regional selection and orientation centres. The organisation of the Directorate remained unchanged up to March 2008 when, following a new reorganisation, the Sociological Department was subordinated to the Human Resource Management Directorate and the Psychological Department was transformed into the Psychological Assistance Office and the Psychological Laboratory, the latter being coordinated by the Directorate. In fact, it is also the current structure of the Directorate.

The transition to professional armed forces, conscription being suspended in peacetime and replaced with the military service on a voluntary basis, required a new approach to the military personnel recruitment, selection and training system. To meet the set objectives a new recruitment and selection system was designed in 2007. Since then it has been functional as the single system for all military personnel: officers, warrant officers, non-commissioned officers, enlisted personnel, students of military colleges and volunteer reservists.

The changes in the regulatory acts were aimed at making the activity of human resource structures at all levels more effective, as well as at separating the policy and execution areas.

The *Personnel and Mobilisation Directorate*, through its structures, has acted mainly focusing on staffing within the personnel ceiling, maintaining/continuing manning the operationalised structures and those that are to become operational, depending on their operational level, on improving the language training of the personnel that are part of such structures, capitalising on the experience of the personnel who complete the term in office in the permanent posts abroad, as well as on harmonising the personnel-related regulatory provisions with the national, European and Alliance legislation.

It can be said that during the reference period, the *Personnel and Mobilisation Directorate*, according to its area of responsibility, has decisively contributed to the modernisation of human resource management, objective related to the general goal underlying the Romanian Armed Forces transformation.

❖ **Personnel management in the General Staff structures**

The professionalisation of the armed forces, started in the early '90s by raising the professional qualification level of the military personnel, creating a new personnel category, the military under contract, as well as by gradually reducing the military strength, was completed in late 2006.

Designed and implemented in response to the new organisational requirements, the *Status of Enlisted Personnel*, approved by *Law 384/2006*, clearly defined the rights and obligations of this personnel category as well as the functions, branches and military specialities, and resulted in designing, planning, organising and implementing a flexible internal and external recruitment and selection system.

Since Romania became a member of the Euro-Atlantic structures, the officers initial and continuing education and training have focused on implementing the Alliance standards to achieve interoperability with them to understand, participate and execute joint missions, under a single command.

It has thus become necessary for the personnel to attend courses abroad to deeply understand the courses of action in the Alliance member countries, to learn English, the language mainly used in the dialogue with the forces engaged by NATO in past, present or future theatres of operations. Moreover, in order to ensure interoperability, many students in the armed forces branches have been sent to study abroad so that, when returning in the Romanian Armed Forces branches, they can share the experience gained there and enable the resemblance between the course of action in the countries where they have studied and the one in our country.

Between 2007 and 2012, in order to fill the positions requiring specialities that could not be ensured following the direct path (psychologists, lawyers, doctors, journalists etc.) officers were educated and trained following the indirect path. For combat NCOs this procedure has been used since 2001 being driven by the need to ensure, in the short time and at low cost, a relatively large number of NCOs.

With the legislative changes in the personnel management between 2010 and 2014 other courses of action have been established as follows: mainly staffing the operational structures and those that are to become operational; providing positions for the personnel who complete the term in office in permanent positions abroad capitalising on their experience; increasing the quality of personnel education and training through participation in various forms of education and training.

The transition to modern, professionally competitive armed forces has generated some troubles in terms of adaptation. It is quite difficult for some stereotypes, rooted in the organisational realities proper to former armed forces, to disappear

overnight. Downsizing and personnel structural changes, resulting in decreasing the number of officers and increasing that of NCOs and enlisted personnel represent constant challenges. However, the process is irreversible and the armed forces transformation will implicitly lead to changing the personnel mindset.

#### ❖ **Personnel participating in missions outside the national territory management**

Romania's NATO membership entails respecting the commitments related to filling positions in international structures with personnel that meet multiple requirements in terms of training, experience, language and quick adaptation to working in a multinational environment. These requirements, following a brief analysis, seem to be very easy to meet.

The number of posts filled by Romania in NATO structures has evolved depending on the dynamics of the Alliance restructuring. Thus, if in 2004 there were 50 positions filled in NATO Command Structure (NCS), 10 years after Romania joined NATO, our country is allocated 145 posts in NCS and agencies, 17 posts in NATO Force Structure (NFS) and 18 posts in the Centres of Excellence.

As for the visibility of the assigned posts, in 2004 it was a single General position in the Partnership Coordination Cell, and currently there are allocated 4 General positions and a *Non Quota* General position in the International Military Staff (IMS).

The *Personnel and Mobilisation Directorate* has selected and managed approximately 500 military men, deployed to the commands in the Western Balkans during the missions *Implementation Force – IFOR*, *Joint Guardian*, led by the *Stabilisation Force – SFOR*, as well as *Kosovo Force – KFOR*.

A very important moment in the activity of the *Personnel and Mobilisation Directorate* is represented by the decision to participate in the ISAF mission in the theatre of operations in Afghanistan. Thus, in 10 years, about 1 000 troops in the Romanian Armed Forces have participated in missions in the headquarters established by NATO to conduct the operation in Afghanistan.

#### ❖ **Normative framework adaptation to NATO requirements**

In 2004, when Romania joined the Euro-Atlantic structures and its status changed from “*partner state*” to “*NATO member state*”, it became necessary to change/complete/adapt the legislative/regulatory framework existing at that time to one able to meet the new requirements related to the **military personnel career development and assessment, as well as the achievement of a transparent selection system** able to provide an opportunity to promote according to professional performance.

The *Personnel and Mobilisation Directorate*, aligning itself with the organisational and conceptual transformations undergone by the Romanian Armed Forces, has contributed, through the submitted suggestions, to promoting several normative acts that have resulted in the modernisation of human resource management and the implementation of individual career management.

Thus the *Personnel and Mobilisation Directorate* has contributed, as collaborator, to the development of the new *Military Career Guide* as well as of several personnel-related normative acts. Among them the following can be mentioned: the *Minister of National Defence Order no. M. 30/2006 for the approval of M.R.U-3/1, "Guidelines for the Military Personnel Assessment"*, the *Minister of National Defence Order no. M. 22/2010 for the approval of the "Norms regarding the Organisation and Functioning of the Selection and Ranking System for the Military Personnel in the Ministry of National Defence Career Development"*.

These documents regulate the assessment of the military personnel in view of their promotion, professional development, as well as filling positions according to their competence and professional performance. Moreover, they establish a new and unitary selection system that ensures transparency, equal opportunities for career advancement, and capitalisation on the military personnel performance and potential.

At the same time, the Directorate has been constantly concerned with the development of the regulatory framework for the participation of the personnel in missions outside the national territory as well as with the military personnel optimal management so that the main source of selection for filling the permanent posts in the international structures Romania is part of can be ensured. In this regard, the experts in the Directorate have developed the *Criteria and Methodology regarding the Personnel Selection in View of their Participation in Missions and Operations outside the Territory of the Romanian State*, approved by the *Minister of National Defence Order no. M. 101/2011*, and the *Chief of the General Staff Resolution for the approval of the Norms regarding the Creation of the Database for the Personnel in the General Staff Structures or Subordinate Structures Intended to Participate in the Selection for Filling the Permanent Posts in the National Representative Structures abroad and the Ones in the International Structures to which Romania is a Party*.

The changes in the Alliance's operations planning and especially the necessity to adapt the personnel support to the transformations in this field required, in 2011, the development of the *Doctrine for Personnel Support to Operations*, and, in 2013, of the *Personnel Support to Operations Handbook*. The handbook represents the "first document" that deals with issues specific to personnel support to operations, managing to ensure, through its content and applicability, the correlation

between personnel specific normative acts and those that are characteristic of the operation planning and management, representing a valuable guide for staff officers.

#### ❖ Personnel recruitment and selection

When the compulsory military service was suspended the specialised structures in the *Personnel and Mobilisation Directorate* took on the responsibilities regarding recruitment, and a single system to promote the military profession, and to recruit and select the military personnel was established, similar to that existing in NATO member states. In order to improve the regulatory and methodological framework for the recruitment and selection system operation, the experts in the Directorate have participated in developing the norms related to the activity of specialised structures, the recruitment criteria, and selection tests, according to the principles and rules of NATO member states professional armed forces. Moreover, special attention has been given to the selection and training of the personnel intended to fill positions in the territorial executive structures able to ensure, through their activities, the achievement of the objectives related to the military profession promotion to attract the young people that are motivated and military career-oriented.

#### ❖ Psychological assistance

For military psychologists, joining the Euro-Atlantic structures meant a challenge, not only in terms of practising their profession in the country and in the theatres of military operations but also from the standpoint of psychological assistance activity standardisation in terms of concepts, norms and actions.

The activity related to the design and development of the normative and methodological framework regarding the organisation and management of military psychologists work has been permanently aimed at the harmonisation with NATO procedures in the field, in conjunction with the related national legislation, having as main objective to ensure the functioning of psychological assistance structures in line with the requirements specific to the military institution, the theatres of operations and with the related requests made by military leaders.

Currently, the military psychologist, in mission in the theatre of operations outside the Romanian territory or in any of the military structures inside the national territory, enjoys the methodological framework and the professional competencies that enable him/her to perform the specialised actions to psychologically assess the human resources for their selection and entry into the military system and throughout their career as well as to psychologically assist the military personnel to restore and maintain the balance, to strengthen and optimise the military

personnel potential, and also to ensure psychological support for military leaders in military operations in terms of providing information and practical strategies to train the fighters mentally, to combat stress, and to increase the effectiveness of units in such operations.

Military psychologists professional concerns are identical with those of fellow professionals from other NATO member states armed forces, especially in terms of identifying the consequences of stressors during the deployment of military structures in districts or theatres of operations, capturing and managing the expectations of the military men and their families as far as the military institution is concerned, counselling military leaders to recognise the symptoms with psychological implications and the behavioural typologies, supporting them to adopt appropriate response strategies in the act of command, describing the benefits the military men can get from mental health professionals, highlighting the role and importance of rapid specialised intervention to restore psychic balance, and continuing personal professional development in order to maintain professional competence.

#### ❖ **Military centres – the liaison with public local authorities**

Romania's NATO membership has generated the adoption of a set of complex measures at the level of the Romanian society and the military body, the most important being those of organisational, material, normative and doctrinaire, and human nature. Among them the following are very important: downsizing; *all military personnel professionalisation*; change in the personnel recruitment, selection, training and career development system; military personnel reconversion following the armed forces restructuring.

Thus, by adopting relevant legislation and effectively implementing it, **military centres**, which represent an integral part of this process and the military liaison with the civil society, have permanently kept in touch and developed the relationship with local authorities, have campaigned for the enhancement of the perception of the armed forces, and for the increase in the citizens confidence in this institution.

#### ❖ **Evolution of the mobilisation system in the Romanian Armed Forces**

After Romania joined NATO, the following question naturally arose: *Is the armed forces mobilisation still necessary or not, given the security guarantees offered by Romania's NATO membership?* Finding a trenchant and well-argued response to this question was one of the main challenges for the experts in the *Personnel and Mobilisation Directorate* during the period preceding and immediately following the accession, and the arguments were soon provided by the Alliance itself.

Although the outbreak of a conventional regional or global war is regarded as less likely in the foreseeable future, the majority of NATO member states consider that this possibility **cannot be excluded**. Therefore, these states have not abandoned the approach of a war/armed conflict of high intensity and long duration in the national regulatory and doctrinaire framework. More precisely, they have set their own mechanisms (mobilisation systems) to augment and equip the military personnel, from the level established for the state of peace to the level required to fulfil the assigned missions in armed conflict situations, providing resources from outside the military system.

The main argument behind this approach is that no state can economically justify the necessity of financially supporting and equipping its armed forces over the level that is strictly necessary to ensure training and to carry out specific missions in peacetime.

Given this argument, it has become evident that Romania should adopt the same approach, the answer to the above-mentioned question being thus: yes, **the armed forces mobilisation is necessary**, as part of a unitary and coherent system – the national mobilisation system –, able to provide the resources that are necessary to fulfil their fundamental mission: the defence of the national interests, the prevention, deterrence and counter to any armed aggression against Romania and its allies.

Another important challenge has been the assessment of the consequences of the armed forces restructuring and modernisation on the mobilisation system. With the development of the military body organisation and the adaptation of the mission to the requirements derived from Romania's NATO membership, it has become clear that the mobilisation system based on the concepts and principles of the *Cold War* could not keep pace with the new force structure, the need to start and sustain the **process of the system modernisation** arising naturally.

The mobilisation system modernisation began with the suspension of conscription and the **transition to voluntary military service**. The efforts of the experts in the *Personnel and Mobilisation Directorate* have been focused on providing viable solutions to replace conscripts – the main source of human resources in the former mobilisation system – with other categories of personnel whose training is carried out exclusively on a voluntary basis.

These efforts have resulted in the introduction of the concept of **volunteer reservist** in the national regulatory framework, particularly in the regulation regarding carrying out the military service in this quality in the *Law regarding the Population Training for Defence*, and the *Law regarding the Status of Volunteer*

*Enlisted Personnel*<sup>1</sup>. Simultaneously, the mobilisation reserve structure and the alert system were reorganised.

An important step in the mobilisation system modernisation was the **integration of the mobilisation management system** in the *Concept of the Command and Control of the Force Structure in the Romanian Armed Forces* and the **simplification of the chain of command** by including the central group for mobilisation management in the National Military Command Centre, eliminating the structures of the Land Forces Staff meant to coordinate the territorial military bodies.

Other modernisation elements have been the **regulation of the state of mobilisation**, particularly the **establishment of the state institutions responsibilities** regarding mobilisation, materialised in the development of the *Law on the State of Partial or Total Mobilisation of the Armed Forces and the State of War*.

The transition to voluntary military service has also had some undesirable effects on the mobilisation system. Among them the following are the most important ones: reserve personnel training lowering and mobilisation reserve diminishing and aging. The solution identified for the reserve regeneration and the reserve personnel training enhancement is the **establishment of the volunteer reserve** within the operational reserve. In this regard, the project of the *Law on the Status of Volunteer Reservists* has been developed and important steps have been taken to approve it.

The mobilisation system modernisation process is a continuous concern of the experts in the *Personnel and Mobilisation Directorate*. Currently, their efforts focus on the development of a **unitary specific regulatory framework**, applicable to all the institutions responsible for national defence, public order and national security, which will result in a *mobilisation concept* and a *mobilisation regulation*.

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As a result of human resource management modernisation and development, in the period that preceded Romania's accession to NATO, it became necessary to implement the concept of *individual career management (ICM)*. Therefore, the effort of the *Personnel and Mobilisation Directorate* is channelled into achieving an individual career management system able to ensure:

- the correlation between individual needs and aspirations and organisational requirements and objectives;


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<sup>1</sup> By Law no. 23/2012, the title of this law was changed into *Law regarding the Status of Professional Enlisted Personnel*.

- the military personnel career management in accordance with the personnel specifications for the positions in the organisational charts of the military structures;
- the development of an integrated human resource management system;
- the motivation of the military personnel to ensure professional stability by providing professional development and attractive career opportunities;
- the promotion of competitive personnel.

The development of the concept of *individual career management* and its implementation represent the “*decisive step*” in the changes that are to occur throughout the military organisation modernisation process. This desideratum can become a reality only if we correctly and timely understand the specific issues and the theoretical principles that govern the human resource management system, and if the personnel policies are tailored to the needs of the military organisation.

*English version by*  
 *Diana Cristiana LUPU*



# ROMANIAN SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY – A Status Report –

*Colonel Dr Marius-Dumitru CRĂCIUN*

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*The purpose of the present paper is to present the evolution of the Romanian Special Operations Forces (ROUSOF), since their inception on 1 March 2003 to present day, the challenges they have met, as well as their contribution to national and international security.*

*In order to illustrate the evolution, the author uses examples from the ROUSOF missions in different theatres of operations, explaining how modern concepts and technologies such as Evidence-Based Operations are used. Moreover, the author highlights the fact that the human factor is more important than technical aspects, quality is more important than quantity, and SOF cannot be mass produced because they cannot be created in a short time and they regenerate slowly.*

**Keywords:** *SOF history; ISAF SOF; CSOTF 10; C4I; CAIS2R*

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**I**n the last 20 years the Romanian Armed Forces have undergone a solid transformation process and conducted difficult and complex missions in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Mediterranean Sea and Africa, under NATO, UN, EU, OSCE or different coalitions' flags, proving to be a vital institution of our state, flexible, dynamic, interoperable, capable to fulfil a broad spectrum of missions, both at home and abroad.

Among these large-scale transformational efforts, a significant phase was the establishment and modernisation of the *Romanian Special Operations Forces (ROUSOF)*. Nowadays, more than 100 *ROUSOF* operators are deployed abroad at any given time. It has been possible due to the transformation process the Romanian military have undergone, adopting NATO standards and developing capabilities and structures able to address the new security threats and challenges.

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Colonel Dr Marius-Dumitru Crăciun – the Special Operations Component Command, the General Staff, the Ministry of National Defence.

## History

Even before becoming a *de facto* NATO member state, based on the need to achieve military capabilities able to respond to the global emergent security threats, Romania started to develop principles, concepts, policies and, eventually, military capabilities able to integrate into the national and allied efforts to combat terrorism.

It was in December 2001 when the Romanian Parliament approved the *National Security Strategy*, where the commitment to improve the national democratic institutions and to enhance the reforms in order to become a NATO member state was clearly stated.

The idea to create a *SOF* unit was addressed in February 2002, during a meeting between the US Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chief of the Romanian General Staff and during the pre-membership discussions, when Romania affirmed its commitment to develop special operations forces as part of its force goals, as a niche capability, mostly available for NATO multinational operations. The military reform programme in support of the national security policy was subsequently generated, under the J3 Operations Directorate within the General Staff, with the creation of the Special Forces and the Counterterrorism offices.

The birthday of modern *ROU SOF* was *1 March 2003*, when the 1<sup>st</sup> Special Operations Battalion was established, although there were also structures in our Armed Forces tailored to conduct special operations before this date. The establishment of *ROU SOF* has been a very significant phase of the rapid, comprehensive transformation and modernisation process our Armed Forces have undergone in the last two decades, since Romania joined NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP).

In April 2003, the Supreme Council of National Defence endorsed the establishment of the Special Operations Battalion, and the Minister of National Defence approved the doctrine of *ROU SOF* training and operations.

The *ROU SOF* establishment process took into account, since its inception, the lessons learned by the Romanian troops that had already been deployed in the theatres of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as the experience of the strategic partnership with the United States.

The Special Operations Battalion, later named 1<sup>st</sup> Special Operations Battalion "*Vulturii*" (*The Eagles*), was created following the US model, where the operating basis of the force lies on the shoulders of Operational Detachments *Alpha*. The Romanian General Staff benefited from the help of the US European Command, through the great involvement of Lieutenant Colonel Ira C. Queen, who devoted a lot of energy into this project completion.

In July 2006, the President of Romania approved the handover of the combat flag for the 1<sup>st</sup> Special Operations Battalion.

Starting on 1 August 2006, a detachment from the 1<sup>st</sup> Battalion, Special Operations, was deployed to Afghanistan for specific missions, together with the United States Special Operations Forces (*Operation Enduring Freedom*)<sup>1</sup>.

The first *SOF* Battalion was designed to operate in out-of-area operations under NATO or coalition command, since counterterrorism inside Romania is a mission for domestic units belonging to other agencies (Anti-Terrorist Brigade, under the Romanian Intelligence Service – RIS).

As a niche capability mainly designed to operate in multinational forces or under allied command, interoperability was considered paramount from the very beginning. The Special Operations Forces were built as a joint capability easy to integrate in a multinational structure for two major reasons: to solve the interoperability issues and to take advantage of international support, especially provided by the US for further improvement of capabilities.

The legal framework was established in 2006, when the Romanian Parliament approved *Law no 346/2006 concerning the Organisation and Functioning of the Ministry of National Defence*, which stipulates: “*SOF constitute the specialised rapid-intervention component, consisting of elements from all military services, trained and equipped for specific missions like Special Reconnaissance, Direct Action and Military Assistance within Romania or in other theatres of operations, together with Special Forces belonging to the coalitions and alliances Romania is part of*”<sup>2</sup>.

The establishment of the *SOF* Battalion was followed by the establishment of the *SOF* Training Centre, in 2005, within the *SOF* Training School, with the main mission to select, qualify and train *SOF* personnel, as well as by the establishment of the Naval *SOF* Group – NSOFG, in 2006, and the Combat Search and Rescue Detachment of Air Force – CSRDAF, in 2008. Moreover, in 2008, within the General Staff Operations Directorate, the Special Operations Component Command – SOCC was established, a specialised structure designed to exercise operational command and control over the Special Operations Structures in the Armed Forces services.

In 2009, the 1<sup>st</sup> *SOF* Regiment was created, initially including the 1<sup>st</sup> Special Operations Battalion “*Vulturii*” (*Eagles*) and two paratrooper battalions, later on transformed into the 6<sup>th</sup> *SOF* Brigade.

From the very beginning, the cooperation, integration and interoperability of all *SOF*-type units have been considered of paramount importance in achieving

<sup>1</sup> *Point Paper on the Accomplishment of the Tasks of the Governance Programme between 2005 and first quarter of 2006*, 15 May 2006, published in *Ziua* newspaper.

<sup>2</sup> Chapter 5, art. 30, para d.

full operational capability. According to some specialists: *“The sooner the relationship between Army SOF, AFSOF and NAVSOF is developed, and they begin habitually to train together and support each other, the sooner the ROU SOF will be interoperable with the US and NATO forces. The establishment of the Helicopter Unit (AFSOF) is considered key for readiness and interoperability. A SEAL-type platoon and a small boat unit would be also necessary”*<sup>3</sup>.

The last 11 years were very challenging for Romanian SOF because they had to adjust, align and adopt commonly recognised Euro-Atlantic standards in Special Operation Forces areas. These are not only technical or technological standards but also cultural and doctrinaire ones. Moreover, new concepts, values and working procedures have been adopted.

Besides these structural changes, a lot of effort has been devoted into the human resource management, into selecting and training operators, into the procurement of adequate weapons and equipment, into modernising the training facilities, as well as into developing tailored doctrines, regulations and field manuals.

Romanian SOF have constantly participated in national and multinational exercises, both in Romania and abroad, together with partners from the USA, the UK, France, Turkey, Jordan, Israel, Poland etc. – countries with high expertise in the special operations area. ROU SOF structures are part of the pool of forces that Romania made available to NATO, and they were evaluated in 2007 (Army and Navy SOF), and in 2008 (Air SOF), according to NATO standards.

Interested in quality rather than quantity, the Romanian Armed Forces have succeeded in building up small but highly professional SOF structures, manned by elite soldiers, with developed warrior, operational, technical, and linguistic skills, in the last 11 years.

Most of these soldiers are trained as paratroopers, divers, and mountain troops, capable to deal with any situation and to conduct a wide range of missions such as: direct action, special reconnaissance, counterterrorism, combat search and rescue, intelligence gathering, hostage rescue operations, airborne insertion/extraction, close protection, foreign military assistance and so on.

All this coherent and rapid transformation process has made it possible for ROUSOF to be perceived as strategic capabilities employed to help achieve strategic and specified operational level objectives with small structures of tactical value.

Without being a substitute for conventional forces, SOF differ from other joint structures through their unique, agile and flexible capabilities, as well as through the high level of risk and employment, decided at strategic level.

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<sup>3</sup> Lieutenant Colonel Ira C. Queen, cited in Radu Tudor, *“Romania Creates New Special Operations Unit”*, in *Jane’s Intelligence Review*, 1 January 2005.

It is worth mentioning that Romania has been largely benefiting from the US support in developing its *SOF* structures. The USA has offered assistance, mentoring, training, as well as consistent logistic and financial support for weaponry and equipment procurement.

Since February 2011, the Romanian Special Operations Component Command and *SOF* structures have been under the command and control of the Military Intelligence Directorate, while each service (Army, Navy, and Air Force) retains the administrative control for their respective *SOF* elements.

### ***SOF personnel selection***

It is the men that give the value of *ROU SOF*. Identifying and employing the proper personnel is instrumental in building such a capability and we will further consider the selection and training process developed by the Romanian Armed Forces in order to provide *SOF* structures with qualified personnel.

The first condition to be selected for *SOF* is to volunteer, but of course, this is not enough. Besides the motivation and willingness to become an elite soldier, one has to pass through a very complex and tough selection process. The general selection criteria are the same for officers, non-commissioned officers (NCOs), warrant officers (WOs), and enlisted personnel as well, and they refer to professional, medical, psychological, physical, and linguistic standards, namely the ability to speak at least one foreign language.

Once selected, the respective personnel will go through a 7-week initial training and an 8-week specific basic training. The training programme, both at individual and subunit level, consists of all type of shooting, tailored Techniques, Tactics and Procedures (TTPs), special reconnaissance, survival exercises, resistance/escape in/from captivity and so on. In addition to this "*usual and routine training*", most of the personnel will be trained as paratrooper, diver, skier or mountain infantryman.

The selection process commenced in 2003, taking into account the long time tradition of the airborne and airborne reconnaissance forces the Romanian Armed Forces have had since the Second World War, as the particular missions and training of these units and their members possessed the closest profile to what was needed for *SOF* soldiers. The personnel belonging to such structures were familiar with part of the specific procedures, and possessed solid individual and collective skills to understand and master the principles of Direct Action (DA) and Special Reconnaissance (SR), and their previous selection and training indicated them as physically and mentally fit to move to an unconventional type of missions. It is to be noted that, in the Romanian military tradition, small long

range recon units were expected to conduct strikes well beyond enemy lines. Additionally, the former Paratrooper Brigades, about to be disbanded at that time, had in their task-organisation at least a Special Missions Battalion each, organised in small teams and trained for special insertion, DA-type missions behind enemy lines.

Romania extensively used *IMET (International Military Education and Training)* funds to further train these selected soldiers, mostly through mobile training teams to “train the trainer” as well as through sending officers and NCOs to attend courses in the US, like the US Army Ranger School and even the US Army Special Forces Qualification Course.

Internally, a selection and training programme had to be accomplished before and after a soldier was assigned to a combat element in the *SOF* Battalion. The selection and initial qualification course identified and stimulated native and obtained abilities and it had a success rate of around 8 percent.

Individual and team training (operational detachment) is conducted by the *SOF* Training Centre, through its organic assets, under a programme consisting of four phases, while Military Occupational Specialist’s (MOS) training for both primary and secondary functions in the team is coordinated with other schools and training centres. The overall process grants the newcomers access to a commission in a *SOF* unit according to their specific MOS.

Individual and team training conducted at the *SOF* Training Centre consists of four different phases:

- Phase I: Selection and Initial Training
- Phase II: Small Unit Tactics (Operational Detachment)
- Phase IV: Unconventional Actions Training
- Phase VI: Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape.

Candidates have to successfully complete every phase in order to move to the next.

MOS training trains candidates that successfully complete Phases I and II, and is generically known as Phase III – Specialist Phase; it is conducted in different schools and training facilities under the coordination of the *SOF* Training Centre.

In all the phases listed above, experienced operators freshly returned from deployments are temporary embedded in the cadre teams to ensure the correlation of training objectives with the beneficiary *SOF* units’ ones and to help shape a realistic and updated mission-focused training.

While all Romanian military train in English, Phase V – Language Training is a different approach. For *ROU SOF*, English is considered the *language of interoperability* rather than a foreign language, being regarded as a part

of Phase V, while the other part is focused on building language capabilities focused on the needs in the AOR. Language training is conducted in-country (in language centres) and abroad, but is also regarded as an individual responsibility.

Once all the qualification process successfully completed, the soldiers are assigned to their first positions where they start a new phase of their training, as junior members of their teams.

But this is not the end of training process. Then the specialised training follows, during which the *SOF* personnel, attending the required courses, will become experts in operations, INTELL, plans, logistics, CIS, PSYOPS, CIMIC, counterterrorism etc.

A simple calculation leads us to the conclusion that at least 5-6 years are necessary to “create” a *SOF* specialist. That is why, alongside this strict selection, training and education system, we have succeeded in developing an effective career management which allows us to put the right people in the right unit in the right position, as well as in promoting and retaining our soldiers within the system.

Only one year after the inception of our first *ROU SOF* structure, in 2004, a US Mobile Training Team arrived in Romania to give us valuable training support. The same happened in 2005, 2006, and 2007. Then, since 2008 we have conducted together with our American brothers in arms, each year, 3-5 bilateral *SOF* exercises within the framework of the *Partnership Development Programme (PDP)* and *Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET)*. Besides, Romanian *SOF* have constantly taken part in *JACKAL STONE* series of exercises since the first iteration in 2008, this being the most important multinational joint *SOF LIVEX in EUROPE*, led by *Special Operations Command Europe – SOCEUR*. The above mentioned exercises represented great training opportunities before the deployment of our units to Afghanistan.

In addition to these training events, *US SOF* generously offer us each year many slots for MOS training courses (INTELL, plans, medical, ranger), as well as academic training (master degree studies, mainly at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California). Currently, we are working to develop a better selection process for our operators we plan to send to *US SOF* schools in order to increase the retention rate.

In addition, within the framework of *Foreign Military Financing (FMF)* or *Foreign Military Sales (FMS)*, *US SOF* have offered consistent financial and logistic support consisting of armoured combat vehicles, weaponry, communication equipment, diving, paratroops equipment etc.

In its turn, Romania has offered a steady Host Nation Support (Army, Maritime and Air training facilities, logistic bases, firing ranges etc.) for *US SOF* taking part

in exercises in Romania, and most of all, by fighting together, shoulder to shoulder, as brothers in arms in Afghanistan.

Last but not least, we have adopted the already famous label for *SOF* operators as being “*quiet professionals*”!

### **Afghanistan – the reality test for ROU SOF**

In parallel with NATO evaluations, *ROU SOF* have also stood the test of real combat. In April 2006, the first Romanian *SOF* contingent started its mission in Afghanistan, within the US-led coalition operation “*Enduring Freedom*”. It was a very difficult mission, very far from Romania, geographically, in a totally different operational environment, with challenging risks, climate, culture, operational tempo and rules of engagement.

The NATO mission in Afghanistan is considered by both military and civilian specialists as a test of the Alliance’s political will and capabilities. The allies are seeking to create a “*new*” NATO, able to go beyond the European theatre and combat new threats such as *terrorism* and the *proliferation of weapons of mass destruction*. In this context, the operation in Afghanistan is NATO’s first combat type, out-of-area mission beyond Europe. The purpose of the mission is the stabilisation and reconstruction, and it is a difficult one because it must take place in the same time with the combat operations against Taliban insurgents.

In spite of all the above, the Romanian *SOF* contingents have proved their skills and knowledge, conducting counter-insurgency (COIN) operations through direct action, special reconnaissance, patrolling, combat search and rescue, as well as military assistance and training support for the Afghan National Security Forces.

The most eloquent illustration of *ROU SOF* adaptability is our presence in Afghanistan. In April 2006, the first Romanian *SOF* contingent started its mission there, within the US-led coalition, performing missions in many hot-spots in the Western part of Afghanistan. Since April 2008, the Romanian *SOF* have been conducting operations in Afghanistan under the ISAF flag.

As an international recognition of our contribution to the fight, in March 2008, Major General John F. Mulholland Jr., the current Deputy Commander, US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) stated: “*The major coalition SOF contributors in Afghanistan are the Romanian SOF contingent and the UAE*”.

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<sup>4</sup> Major General John F. Mulholland, in *Warrior Leader*, interview for *Special Operations Technology*, 19 March 2008, Volume 6, issue 2.

Then, since April 2008, *ROU SOF* have been conducting operations in Afghanistan under the ISAF flag, OPCON-ed to an US TF. The NATO-led ISAF, probably in its last year, faces some major obstacles: a weak government in Kabul, use of military capabilities of so many allies and partners in a distant country with a very difficult terrain, and rebuild a country devastated by war and illegal narcotics trade.

In both types of operations – coalition and allied ones –, the range of *SOF* missions includes everything from humanitarian to highly kinetic conventional and special operations. It is a fact that some nations have strong national restrictions with regard to the type of operations their forces are authorised to conduct in Afghanistan. Because of the caveats and restrictions, the command structure is complex and highly political.

The past and present situation of *SOF* in Afghanistan is a very good example of challenges and operational adjustment for modern leaders. In the immediate past, up to 2012, it was a parallel command structure for *SOF*, forcing commanders and their subordinate staffs, dealing with ISAF and OEF operations, not only to ensure transparency in their operational plans but to daily coordinate their operations, mostly kinetic. Up to now, great progress has been made, especially in establishing liaison officers to the important HQs and by putting both operations under the same *SOF* commander, Major General Austin S. Miller. The next logistic step would be to achieve operational interoperability within their C4IS2R<sup>5</sup> networks, going down the chain of command to operational detachment level.

From the national point of view, to achieve C4I<sup>6</sup> and C4IS2R capabilities to permit full interoperability with our NATO allies is a major challenge. Only by networking down to the ODA level the deployed *ROU SOF* are able to properly operate in this complex international environment.

In these 8 years of real combat operations, *ROU SOF* have demonstrated their skills and capabilities, the courage, cohesion, and maturity of the personnel from operational detachments. This statement is proved by the numerous medals and certificates awarded either nationally or internationally.

As the organic part of Combined Special Operations Task Force-10, *ROU SOF*, through the participation in the battlespace, alongside the *US SOF* partners, have paid their death toll to the fight for freedom. These warriors, US or Romanian, lost their lives in combat and we will never forget their sacrifice: SSG Patrick Kutschbach, Major (post-mortem) Tiberius Petre, CW2 Douglas Vose,

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<sup>5</sup> C4IS2R – Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Information, Surveillance, Reconnaissance.

<sup>6</sup> C4I – Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Information.

MSG Daniel Adams, 2LT (post-mortem) Claudiu POPA, 2LT (post-mortem) Adrian POSTELNICU, SSG Patrick H. Quinn!

Along the lost warriors list is another one I would like to mention, of the wounded in action. So far, the list has had more than 100 names on it...

All the facts mentioned above have led to a clear conclusion: the relationship between the *US* and *ROU SOF* can be best described as a quality one, mutually beneficial, long lasting, and multilateral. Thousands of combat missions successfully conducted together in one of the most dangerous parts of Afghanistan have proved that the *US* and *ROU SOF* are fully interoperable.

Our officers and NCOs have never had a serious interoperability problem, their versatility being widely recognised. The problem is again the technology gap and, judging by the actual MOD budget, the light at the end of the tunnel is still far away. In my opinion, some steps in the right direction have already been made, in order to get the military budget back to 2,1 % of the GDP.

Using again the *ROU SOF* experience in Afghanistan as a case study, my analysis got me to the conclusion that most of the time we need to get our operators up to speed using on the job military education and training offered in the theatre.

We are facing, in the last 3 years, a change in paradigm for Romanian *SOF*, because we have had to change our way of planning and conducting operations, in fact to decrease the number of Direct Action operations and increase the number of Evidence-Based Operations.

Up to 2011, most of the *SOF* operations were kinetic and the High Risk Arrests our operators performed had a demoralising outcome – most of the insurgents arrested were later on released by the *Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA)*. The motive was that they could not get properly convicted in a court of law! Although Afghanistan is a sovereign country with its own criminal justice system, the rule of law was and still is weak.

The conviction rate was very low because the way the arrest was done. So, *ISAF SOF* commanders decided to transit from law of war-based detentions to evidence-based criminal detentions by improving the evidence collection process on those arrests in order to get convictions.

To do so, *ROU SOF* operators had to enable and support the criminal justice system and properly learn legal and forensic procedures in a very short period of time. In short, the *SOF* operators had not only to do police type of work but also to teach the Afghans how to do it!

So training courses were put in place and *SOF* operators, acting as advisers for *Afghans National Security Forces (ANSF)*, were later on able to act as mentors in the process of collecting evidence and witness statements to be used in the Afghan Court of Law to prosecute and convict criminal suspects. One major caveat applied

here: to the greatest extent possible, evidence collection and case preparation had and still has to be performed by *ANSF*!

The results appeared in a short period of time, detainees suspected of committing criminal offenses being referred to the Afghan criminal justice system for pre-trial detention, prosecution, and serving of sentence for their crimes, based upon evidence collected and admitted in Afghan criminal courts.

Appropriate evidence collection, in most of the cases, resulted in admissible evidence being used in support of effective prosecutions. Although *US SOF* and *ISAF SOF* continue to have a need to exploit evidence for potential intelligence value, units are ultimately turning all gathered evidence, associated with a suspect or a group of suspects, over to Afghan authorities. The Afghan legal system does not specify a standard of proof similar to that found in most common law western legal systems, the Code of Criminal Procedure in Romania included. Instead, *SOF* units had to establish common standards, to coordinate everything with the relevant local, provincial, or national prosecutors and judges in order to determine the specific type and amount of evidence deemed credible.

Some prosecutors or judges yet require slightly different formats or types of evidence than those accepted by other authorities. Evidence collection practices and the type of evidence to be collected were, most of the time, coordinated with the prosecutors in order to fit local court requirements as necessary. In order to properly collect evidence, a high amount of specialised technical, forensic and even some basic legal training is required.

So, in the last three years, *ROU SOF*, along with our American partners, were able to advise the *ANSF* counterparts on how to collect forensic evidence, how to transfer a copy of the case file as well as all the evidence and statements about suspects and how to file them to the appropriate local, provincial, or national governmental authorities or to a national security court.

The conviction rate is still low but the *GIRoA* representatives have now the proof that the rule of law works. Because none of the *ROU SOF* operators involved in this process has had a legal or forensic university degree in their previous general studies, the concept “*train the trainer*” has been properly executed and provided results, and as in a lot more instances, *SOF* operators have been best suited for this mission.

Regarding the future, *ROU SOF* have earmarked an important number of instructors and trainers for *ANSF* to be part of the upcoming “*Resolute Support*” mission as a commitment to the Alliance’s long-term goal of a safe and secure Afghanistan.

## **ROU SOF participation in other missions**

In compliance with the commitments deriving from international treaties, agreements and memoranda Romania signed, contingents of different sizes from all services – Army, Air and Naval Forces – are part of multinational coalitions authorised to carry out peace support and humanitarian assistance operations in the framework of the UN, NATO, OSCE, and EU-led international missions.

The *ROU SOF* presence in Africa was brief, as participants in operation *Flintlock 2005*. After its conclusion, an article published in the US newspaper *Stars and Stripes* told the story of *Team Niger*. “...It helps to be able to speak French in a French-speaking nation... The Alabama-based 20<sup>th</sup> Special Forces Group, whose soldiers are trained in Spanish, brought to Niger two Romanian soldiers who are fluent in both French and English...”<sup>7</sup>.

Between 12 September and 12 December 2012, Romania contributed to EU-led operation “*Atalanta 12*” with frigate “*Regele Ferdinand*”. A crew consisting of 236 military personnel to include a GNFOS structure of 7 and a PUMA helicopter conducted the full spectrum of maritime operations in the Gulf of Aden, the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, with the purpose to deny and disrupt piracy along Somali Coast.

The GNFOS element was attached to F221 boarding team and performed *Vessel Boarding Search and Seizure (VBSS)*, *Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat (RHIBs)* infiltration, approaching, boarding and searching target vessels, *Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE)*, sniper over-watch and C2 operations. During “*Atalanta 12*” the operations results were as follows: several target vessels searched, force protection for convoys and 9 suspected pirates detained.

With this mission GNFOS demonstrated its ability to plan and conduct maritime and helicopter operations, unilateral and in support of conventional forces, provided advice for the F221 Commander to plan and execute specific *SOF* operations, and established common standard operating procedures for future operations increasing the visibility of GNFOS within the Naval Forces.

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The twenty-three years of involvement in missions abroad have required that the Romanian Armed Forces should maintain military forces, of variable sizes, integrated into the UN, OSCE, NATO and EU missions carried out in Africa and Asia, in the theatres of operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Western Balkans.

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<sup>7</sup> Charlie Coon: *Reporter's Notebook: Niger Training Wraps Up*, article published in *Stars and Stripes*, Mideast edition, 29 June 2005.

Throughout this period, more than 1 000 *ROU SOF* operators have taken part in different operations and missions beyond national borders, acquiring valuable professional experience that proves highly useful in the Romanian Armed Forces process of transformation, rendering operational and interoperable with the armed forces in NATO and EU member countries.

Through performance and professionalism, dedication and determination, *ROU SOF* show the image of a solid organisation, interoperable and compatible with the *SOF* of NATO and EU member states, an active security generator, a professional contributor to the fulfilment of national and international commitments, a true ambassador for Romania's image worldwide!

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# ROMANIA'S MILITARY PRESENCE IN NATO OPERATIONS

*Colonel Alexandru MILITARU  
Colonel Dr Cristian PETRE  
Lieutenant Colonel Bogdan ROMAN*

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*The new NATO member status determined the need for defining, promoting and preserving Romania's security interests in an allied context, through the harmonisation of national efforts with international commitments, participation in major political decision-making regarding the Euro-Atlantic security and a pro-active role assumed within the Alliance. This status provides Romania with international prestige, credibility and trust, yet, it imposes obligations and responsibilities regarding the continuation of the forces combat readiness achievement process, participation in the conceptual developments regarding NATO transformation process, contribution to allied capability initiatives and, last but not least, participation in NATO missions and operations.*

**Keywords:** *security environment; allied command; peacekeeping; SACEUR*

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The new challenges to security, generated by processes having globalisation at their core, are adding to the classic forms of vulnerabilities, risks and threats. Their impact is reflected in practice in the creation of a new security environment, dominated specifically by asymmetric risks, which are rapidly intensifying in the public space and have a growing area of manifestation. Their prevention and countering cannot be achieved by a single world power centre; it is a common responsibility of all states. Under these conditions, even from the early '90s, the fundamental orientations of Romania's security policy were stated unequivocally and directed with maximum clarity towards the integration in NATO, the only political-military alliance capable of providing the member states with a stable security environment, based on respect for the democratic principles.

Our country's diplomatic and political efforts for gaining NATO membership, permanently supported by those made by the military body

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Colonel Alexandru Militaru, Colonel Dr Cristian Petre, Lieutenant Colonel Bogdan Roman  
– the Operations Directorate, the General Staff, the Ministry of National Defence.

– a true ambassador of the national values on the path to joining the Alliance – culminated, on 2 April 2004, at the NATO HQ in Brussels, in the official ceremony for the accession of Romania, together with the other six new member states, followed by the rising of our flag along with the national flags of the other allied countries.

The new NATO member status determined the need for defining, promoting and preserving Romania's security interests in an allied context, through the harmonisation of national efforts with international commitments, participation in major political decision-making regarding the Euro-Atlantic security and a pro-active role assumed within the Alliance. This status provides Romania with international prestige, credibility and trust, yet, it imposes obligations and responsibilities regarding the continuation of the forces combat readiness achievement process, participation in the conceptual developments regarding NATO transformation process, contribution to allied capability initiatives and, last but not least, participation in NATO missions and operations.

Along with the other structures from the General Staff, the *Operations Directorate* was actively involved in the accession process, contributing majorly to the implementation of the conceptual and functional standards specific to the future status and imposed by the new missions, and the development of the defence capabilities in view of an active engagement and a credible contribution to NATO-led operations.

Even if the actual accession happened in 2004, the status conferred by the Partnership for Peace made it possible for the Romanian military forces to engage in NATO-led operations long time before, even from 1996, bringing a new challenge to the *Operations Directorate* – to coordinate the participation in missions abroad under allied command. The *Directorate's* specialists were actively engaged in coordinating the whole planning and commanding process for the participating forces and providing liaison with the Alliance partners through the national liaison teams deployed in various NATO commands. Since then, according to the assumed obligations, Romania has ensured a continuous military presence in Alliance-led missions and operations, with military contingents of different specialties and variable dimensions, from all force services – land, air and navy.

Romania's military participation in the international peacekeeping effort started in the Western Balkans area, in the Bosnia-Herzegovina theatre of operations, with the 96<sup>th</sup> Engineer Battalion (200 troops), first within the *NATO-IFOR (Implementation Force)* mission and later in the *NATO-SFOR (Stabilisation Force)*. Starting with March 2000, Romania assumed the contribution to *NATO-KFOR "Joint Guardian"* mission in Kosovo province. Romania's presence in this mission

started with PSYOPS specialists to which staff personnel and company-level specialised units were added later.

Security and stability in the Western Balkans have been an utterly important objective for Romania. Therefore, our country will further be actively committed to the stabilisation of this area, by participating with forces in *KFOR*, including staff personnel and specialised structures, to which a manoeuvre company within *SACEUR's Strategic Reserve* is added. The missions of the Romanian military structures in this theatre of operations are stability operations, namely patrolling, establishing checkpoints, escorting and protecting Serbian citizens while visiting their homes in Kosovo, collecting firearms and ammunition from the population and local organisations.

A notable contribution to successfully accomplishing missions, providing a safe and secure environment, enhancing local institutions' authority, reconciling and reconstruction of the civilian society belongs to the PSYOPS structure from *KFOR*, in which Romania has been involved for 14 years, the Romanian specialists occupying part of the key positions even from the start of the mission. In recognition of the professionalism and probity of "*the Romanian PSYOPS School*", the chief of the support element has been a Romanian officer since the summer of 2013.

The experience gained in the Western Balkans has broadened the participation in NATO missions, increasing the level of interoperability with the allies and improving the skills in operations, especially the stability operations, specific to protecting civilian population, securing the area of operations and maintaining freedom of movement.

The Iraqi theatre of operations was another reference point for the professionalism of the Romanian military in participating in missions abroad. Along with the consistent participation in the Coalition Operation "*Iraqi Freedom*", Romania was one of the first countries to contribute with trainers in the *NATO Training Mission – Iraq (NTM-I)*, a domain in which the land forces specialists were highly appreciated.

The Air Force, along with a consistent participation in the mentioned operations, performed the NATO Air Policing mission in the Baltic countries, in August-October 2007, with a 65-troop detachment and 4 MIG-21 L aircraft.

Between 2005 and 2011, the Naval Forces participated every year with a *Type 22 Frigate* in *NATO Operation Active Endeavour (OAE)* in the Mediterranean Sea.

The crisis in some Middle East and North African countries, culminating with the bloody confrontations in Libya and the threats to the civilian population, determined the initial intervention for the evacuation of Romanian and European citizens and, later, the participation in the NATO operation. Between April

and July 2011, for 90 days, Romania participated with the Frigate 221 “*Regele Ferdinand*” in NATO’s Operation “*Unified Protector*” for imposing the arms embargo on Libya, actively contributing to the allied effort to resolve the conflict.

It is worth mentioning that, all this time, Romanian troops from NATO commands have actively contributed and even participated in missions under the aegis of the North-Atlantic Alliance, alongside the contingents deployed from the country.

Romania’s military involvement in the war against terrorism in Afghanistan, by far the most consistent Romanian participation in theatres of operations, started in February 2002 with mission *ISAF 1*, at a time when the mission was not yet led by NATO. For more than 7 years, Romania participated both in the *ISAF* mission and in the *ENDURING FREEDOM* operation (*EFO*).

Starting with 2006, when NATO increased its level of involvement in Afghanistan, the main effort of the Romanian forces, focused until then on *EFO*, was redirected to the *ISAF* mission, which extended its action area to cover the whole country’s territory. The deployed contingents consisted of combat forces, combat support forces, instructors, one national support element and staff personnel. Most of the missions took place in unstable areas of Southern Afghanistan, the combat forces being redeployed from Kandahar to Qalat to take over the responsibilities for providing security in Kabul province. The main tasks of the Romanian contingent were providing security on the *Highway 1* and its surroundings, and blocking infiltrations along the routes to Pakistan. The missions consisted in patrolling, checkpoint-related and other specific activities, often organised in cooperation with Afghan security forces.

From April 2011, Romania deployed a significant number of Air Force specialists with the one-year mission of operating the Kabul Airport, the most important *APOD* from the theatre of operations. It was for the first time that Romania provided the command of an *ISAF* structure.

Romania’s participation effort in Afghanistan increased constantly, from one military police platoon and one C-130 aircraft in 2002 to 1 763 troops in 2012. Currently, Romania is reconfiguring its participation in accordance with the Alliance plans, considering the perspective of closing the *ISAF* operation and contributing to the *Resolute Support Mission*.

In addition to contributing combat forces to NATO-led operations, Romania’s participation with staff personnel was a substantial one, especially in the *PSYOPS* and *CIMIC* fields, involved in promoting the legitimacy of NATO forces, winning the support of the population and increasing the confidence in local authorities.

As in the *KFOR* mission, the constant participation and professionalism of the Romanian specialists in the *PSYOPS* field in the Afghanistan mission resulted in a substantial Romanian contribution, acknowledged by the Alliance, in the summer of 2012, when our country was assigned the *ISAF PSYOPS* unit command. As such, Romanian *PSYOPS* soldiers are currently in charge of this important domain in the two big NATO operations – *ISAF* and *KFOR*.

The accomplishment of all missions of national contingents deployed to NATO operations was possible due to the common effort of the forces deployed in the theatres of operations and the activity of the General Staff, which coordinated the force combat readiness and evaluation, led the command structures transformation process and implemented a new command and control concept through the *Operations Directorate*. These elements provide compatibility and interoperability with NATO structures.

In addition to the remarkable accomplishments of the Romanian troops, the experience gathered in foreign theatres of operations has pointed out certain aspects that must be considered while planning and participating in future missions. The need for a clear mandate and efficient rules of engagement, the necessity of running reconnaissance missions, the ability to communicate in English, the optimisation of structure and mission preparation through a programme adapted to the specifics of the theatre of operations, the need for sufficient time to take over an area of responsibility during rotations, the capitalisation on the experience of the key personnel returned from missions for training future contingents are only a few elements permanently in the attention of the Romanian soldiers, regardless of their level of activity.

Through the participation in NATO missions and operations, the Romanian military have contributed to increasing trust and stability at sub-regional and regional level and promoting defence diplomacy. The participation in missions and operations abroad will benefit our country with regard to both the military (at operational level – gathering experience in real-life battlefield, training staff personnel and units according to NATO standing operating procedures, increasing forces interoperability, performing real-life operational tests of combat technique and equipment, and reviewing the major acquisition programmes based on the deficiencies detected) and our country's image, given that Romania has proved it is not only a reliable partner to the allies but also an important contributor to regional and global security.

# THE ROLE OF THE OPERATIONAL COMMAND CENTRE IN THE PROCESS OF ROMANIA'S FULL INTEGRATION INTO NATO

*Colonel Dr Marian ALMĂJANU*

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*Since 20 February 1991, Romania, under the treaties and agreements it is party to, has participated in a large number of peacekeeping missions, being recognised by the international community as a key partner in the international effort to extinguish the hotbeds of conflict and normalise the economic and social life in the affected regions.*

*The author considers that the participation in operations and missions, based on the UN Security Council Resolutions and the decisions made by the political and legislative structures in Romania, consolidates the country's firm option to integrate into the European and Euro-Atlantic economic, political, and security structures.*

**Keywords:** *NATO capabilities; theatre of operations; multinational forces; terrorism*

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**I**n this article we address some issues related to the role and place of the Operational Command Centre (OCC) in the command architecture of the Romanian Armed Forces, the way command and control are exercised over some structures in the Romanian Armed Forces that participate in missions and operations outside the territory of the Romanian state, as well as some aspects related to the participation of the Romanian Armed Forces structures in missions and operations outside the territory of the Romanian state over the ten years since Romania's accession to NATO.

Established as a result of the implementation of the provisions of the Framework Plan for further restructuring and modernisation of the Romanian Armed Forces, the Operational Command Centre is an operational military structure subordinated to the General Staff. The OCC was established on 15 April 2010, based on the Chief of the General Staff Resolution no. SMG/S-43 on 14 April 2010, taking over the responsibilities

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of “*Mareşal Alexandru Averescu*” Joint Operational Command. In essence, the OCC has two fundamental missions. The first relates to exercising operational command over the military structures that participate in missions and operations outside the territory of the Romanian state and the second to the command of the joint operation to defend the national territory.

According to the operational procedures in force, the OCC permanently exercises operational command over the structures of the Armed Forces Services Operational Components (AFSOC), the Joint Logistics Command (JLC), and the Communications and Information Command (ICC) to plan and train the national contingents that participate in missions and operations outside the Romanian territory. Command is exercised since contingents are on the national territory, as the OCC is involved in developing the mission essential task list and the operational requirements list for each and every contingent. Moreover, before the military structures enter the theatre of operations, the OCC assesses them statically and operationally. Then, it conducts the activities related to the forces entering the theatre of operations up to the Transfer of Authority (TOA) to the command they will act under. When the forces are in the theatre, the OCC exercises operational command (OPCOM) over the structures it is responsible for.

In order to defend the national territory, it commands, plans, and prepares the joint operation at operational level.

To meet its responsibilities, the OCC permanently relates to operational and strategic commands in NATO and the EU, as well as to the operational ones in Afghanistan and the Balkans that exercise OPCON over the Romanian forces. Currently, the OCC is involved in exercising the operational control over the structures deployed in missions and operations in the hottest parts of the world. Details of the Romanian Armed Forces structures participation in missions and operations outside the territory of the Romanian state over the ten years since Romania joined NATO are presented below.

The transformations in the political, military and economic environment, occurred in Central and Eastern Europe after 1989, have determined the countries in the region to orient towards international organisations to ensure security, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU).

Romania’s option to join NATO and the EU was driven primarily by the need to ensure national security as well as by the desire to belong to a structure that can guarantee democracy and development.

In this regard, Romania began a long process of transformation and adaptation of its military structures to the requirements of the new national security concept derived from its accession to NATO.

In 2004, Romania became a full-fledged member of the most powerful political and military organisation, NATO. At the forefront of the country's modernisation, the Romanian Armed Forces have decisively contributed to the current international position of Romania, becoming a true Euro-Atlantic community integration vector.

Romania's accession to NATO was a key element in the promotion and strengthening of our new status. The fact that our country is part of the great European and Euro-Atlantic community has enabled Romania to better adapt to the new security challenges and difficulties, mainly related to terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Romania was officially invited to start talks on joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation on 21 November 2002, at the Summit in Prague, this result being facilitated by the seriousness and commitment demonstrated by the Romanian authorities in implementing the *Membership Action Plan*, as well as within the Partnership for Peace Programme.

On 29 March 2004, the instruments of accession were deposited with the US Government, moment that represented the last step of the process of integration into NATO. The Prime Minister of Romania along with six other Prime Ministers of the countries that became NATO members (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia) handed over the instruments of accession to the North Atlantic Treaty to US Secretary of State. The ceremony took place in Washington. The ceremony of hoisting the National Flags at NATO Headquarters in Brussels took place on 2 April 2004<sup>1</sup>.

Prior to these activities, the ambassadors of NATO member states signed NATO Accession Protocols for Romania and for the other six countries invited to join NATO, during a ceremony in Brussels on 26 March 2003, which allowed launching the ratification process of the Accession Protocols by the Parliaments of the allied states. On completion, the invited states could join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, becoming full-fledged members of NATO. It is obvious that, alongside the reform of the military, the participation of Romanian contingents in the operations in Iraq, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Afghanistan in the early '90s decisively influenced Romania's path to NATO.

Since Romania joined NATO in 2004, the Romanian military structures have been present in missions and operations under the aegis of the UN and OSCE, and in NATO and EU coalitions in six theatres of operations (Iraq, Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Afghanistan, the Mediterranean Sea, Libya)

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<sup>1</sup> The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mircea Geoană, and the Minister of National Defence, Ioan Mircea Paşcu, attended the event.

with about 34 400<sup>2</sup> troops<sup>3</sup>, ranking the seventh among the member states contributing to the operations in the theatre of operations in Afghanistan.

In the relationship with NATO, Romania has been concerned to meet the politico-military objectives and the major topics of interest for the Romanian Armed Forces such as: NATO transformation, interoperability achievement, NATO partnerships, involvement in decision-making processes, planning the participation of the Romanian Armed Forces in missions and operations abroad.

In order to increase its visibility as a NATO member Romania has contributed forces and capabilities to NATO-led operations and missions, actively participated in decision-making and in the transformation process, helping the Alliance to enhance effectiveness in carrying out the missions of collective defence and peace support.

### ***Participation in missions and operations outside the national territory***

Since 20 February 1991, Romania, under the treaties and agreements it is party to, has participated in a large number of peacekeeping missions, being recognised by the international community as a key partner in the international effort to extinguish the hotbeds of conflict and normalise the economic and social life in the affected regions.

The participation in operations and missions has been based on the UN Security Council Resolutions and the decisions made by political and legislative structures in Romania, consolidating the country's firm option to integrate into the European and Euro-Atlantic economic, political, and security structures.

#### **❖ The theatre of operations in Iraq**

Romania, as a NATO member state, has made sustained efforts to adapt NATO structures, processes and capabilities to the 21<sup>st</sup> century challenges. In this context, the Romanian military structures that have participated in missions in the theatre of operations in Iraq have carried out a wide range of missions, promoting stability, security and the Iraqi community values.

In the theatre of operations in Iraq Romania has first participated in the stabilisation and reconstruction operation *Iraqi Freedom*, since the onset of military actions under US command<sup>4</sup>.

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<sup>2</sup>The number of 34 400 troops represents Romania's participation in NATO-led missions and operations outside the national territory between 2004 and 2014.

<sup>3</sup> Military observers, staff officers, liaison officers, military police units, combat and support units, intelligence units.

<sup>4</sup> An NBC defence company.

Since July 2003, Romania has participated in stabilisation efforts in Iraq, both within the multinational forces and within the NATO mission to train Iraqi security forces (NTM-I<sup>5</sup>). Romanian forces acted in the Multinational Division Central-South as well as in the force headquarters.

Between 1991 and 2011, Romania participated in four major operations and three assistance, observation and training missions in Iraq, totalling 8 400 troops (about 7 200 troops in the 2004-2011 period).

The history of the Romanian Armed Forces participation in peacekeeping operations and missions in Iraq is as follows:

- Operation *Desert Storm* – between 09 February and 22 March 1991, with a field hospital;
- Operation *Enduring Freedom* – between July 2002 and December 2012, with an infantry battalion; a training detachment; a special operations forces detachment; medical, observation, and civil-military cooperation teams; staff personnel.
- Operation *Iraqi Freedom* – between 12 April 2003 and 31 December 2008, with an infantry battalion; a military police company; an engineer detachment; a medical detachment; an NBC defence company; military intelligence structures and a national support element.
- Mission *Antica Babilonia*, between January 2004 and August 2006, with infantry battalion-type structures and military police structures.
- NATO Training Mission in Iraq – *NTM – I*, between 30 July 2005 and December 2011, with staff personnel and trainers.
- UN Assistance Mission for Iraq – *UNAMI*, between 2005 and 2007, with mountain troops.
- Operation *Iraqi Sunset*, between February and June 2009, with an infantry battalion.

Given the success in the Iraqi forces readiness and taking over security responsibilities, in 2008, 16 of the 22 coalition member states withdrew their troops after handing their operational duties over to the US and Iraqi forces. In November 2008, the Iraqi Government made a request to a number of 7 states, including Romania, for the continuation of the missions after the deadline imposed by the UN Security Council Resolution (31 December 2008). On 22 December 2008, at the request of the President of Romania, the Romanian Parliament approved, by Decision 32/22 of December 2008, the continuation of the Romanian forces

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<sup>5</sup> *NATO Training Mission – Iraq.*

presence in Iraq after 31 December 2008, under the conditions agreed with the Iraqi party. Since 31 May 2009, the General Staff has implemented the plan to withdraw from this theatre of operations. On 4 June 2009, in gratitude for participating structures, the withdrawal ceremony was organised at the Triumphal Arch in Bucureşti.

The mission of Romania in the theatre in Iraq lasted for about six years. During this period, 11 infantry battalions and several specialised structures of the Romanian Armed Forces were rotated.

#### ❖ Theatre of operations in the Western Balkans

The Balkans represented the first test taken by NATO in addressing the risks associated with interdependent instability in the region.

NATO action in the Balkans has consisted of ensuring a secure environment to meet the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 and other associated tasks for the return of refugees.

NATO operations in the Western Balkans have been conducted under NATO-led Multinational Stabilisation Force.

Romania's contribution to the Balkans during the period 2004 and 2014 was about 2 200 troops<sup>6</sup>.

Currently, in the Western Balkans, Romania participates in *NATO KFOR* operation in Kosovo, with staff personnel, trainers and intelligence personnel, totalling 70 military men.

#### ❖ Theatre of operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina

In this theatre of operations, the structures of the Romanian Armed Forces participated in two important missions, namely *IFOR* Mission between 8 March and 20 December 1996 and *SFOR*<sup>7</sup> between 1 December 1996 and November 2004. Despite the positive results in peacemaking and normalising the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina during *IFOR* Mission<sup>8</sup>, after the end of its mandate, in December 1996, the North Atlantic Council decided to extend the period NATO forces were present in this territory. Thus, starting on 20 December 1996, when *IFOR* mandate ended, the responsibilities of the former mission were transferred to a new mission, called the Stabilisation Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina (*SFOR*).

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<sup>6</sup> About 8 400 troops between 1991 and 2014. About 4 900 troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina and about 3 500 troops in Kosovo.

<sup>7</sup> Romania's participation in *SFOR*: an engineer battalion, three specialised detachments, staff personnel in the Force Headquarters, a military police platoon, intelligence personnel, and a strategic reserve structure.

<sup>8</sup> *The Romanian Armed Forces in International Missions*, Bucureşti, 2010.

The operation was called *Joint Guardian*<sup>9</sup>, being a mission under the aegis of the European Union (EUFOR) since 2004, under the name of *Althea* Mission.

#### ❖ Theatre of operations in Kosovo

For Romania, to participate in Peacekeeping Force in Kosovo – Kosovo Force (KFOR) meant to join NATO stabilisation efforts in Kosovo. The Romanian structures have acted based on the UN Security Council Resolution 1244, adopted on 10 June 1999. KFOR mission began in March 2000 and is ongoing.

The Romanian troops have acted in this theatre of operations since 2002, along with troops from 31 other nations. In March 2002, the first structure in the Romanian Armed Forces was introduced in the theatre of operations in Kosovo. Subsequently, 11 other structures have executed 6-month missions in the theatre<sup>10</sup>.

The Romanian contingent in KFOR have participated in only security and stabilisation missions, not having tasks related to institution building.

#### ❖ Theatre of operations in Afghanistan

For the international community, Afghanistan was and is a real stumbling block in eradicating terrorism. The Romanian Armed Forces participation in missions and operations in Afghanistan in the war against terrorism and in stability and reconstruction operations began on 21 December 2001, when the Romanian Parliament approved, by the Decision of the Parliament no. 38, the participation with personnel and assets belonging to the Ministry of National Defence<sup>11</sup> in the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF). After this date, there were negotiations related to the level of participation in ISAF mission. On 28 February 2002, the first Romanian troops entered the theatre of operations in Afghanistan<sup>12</sup>.

In this theatre of operations, the Romanian Armed Forces have participated in two major operations. One coalition operation – *Enduring Freedom* and the other under the aegis of NATO – *International Security Assistance Force – ISAF*. ISAF Mission started on 22 January 2002.

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<sup>9</sup> Operation “*Joint Guardian*” – carried out between 21 December 1996 and 19 June 1998.

<sup>10</sup> “*ROFND*” Romanian Detachment acted in the theatre of operations in Kosovo, participating in peacekeeping missions under “*AQUILA*”/*Multinational Task Force – West Command*, between March 2002 and March 2011.

<sup>11</sup> Participation with a mountain troops company, an NBC company, and a detachment consisting of 15 military doctors.

<sup>12</sup> The first structures that entered the theatre of operations in Afghanistan were: a military police platoon, and a crew consisting of 14 military men belonging to the Air Force, with a C-130 strategic transport aircraft.

In July 2002, the first battalion-type structure entered the theatre, namely the 26<sup>th</sup> Infantry Battalion, “Red Scorpions”.

In order to support the efforts of the Afghan authorities to maintain security in and around Kabul, in August 2003, NATO took over ISAF mandate. Subsequently, since September 2006, ISAF has gradually expanded across Afghanistan. The mission has been conducted under the mandate of the UN Security Council, in partnership with the international community and at the request of the Afghan Government. In this theatre of operations, alongside ISAF several other missions have been carried out, under the auspices of other institutions and governmental and non-governmental organisations in the fields of security, border management, police training and the fight against drug and weapons trafficking.

In the theatre of operations in Afghanistan, within the ISAF mission, the structures in the Romanian Armed Forces have been deployed in the hottest areas in Central and Southern Afghanistan, in Kabul, Bagram, Kandahar and Zabul province. Romania’s participation peak was between May 2010 and July 2013. Then the forces have been reduced gradually so that, at the end of 2014, Romania will participate in this theatre of operations with a minimum number of troops in compliance with the political-military commitments.

Along with the troops in the Land Forces, the troops in the Romanian Air Force have also participated in missions and military operations. They are a continuous presence in the theatres of operations and in humanitarian assistance missions. The actions have been true combat missions. Transport aircraft have proved their value and usefulness in the theatres, and the crews have demonstrated that they have the necessary training to operate together with the Alliance members.

Since accession, the Romanian Air Force has executed Combat Air Police Service under NATO command, following NATO-led air defence and the national air defence system integration into the one of the Alliance. Moreover, since the day of accession, the Air Force has implemented the necessary integration plans.

The consistency of participation in NATO missions is demonstrated by the fact that different types of operations and missions have been conducted. Thus, between August and October 2007, four aircraft have participated in *NATO Air Police* mission for the Baltic States.

Moreover, in Afghanistan, Romania acted, between 2011 and 2012, in Kabul within *Kaia*<sup>13</sup>-Lead Nation, with a detachment structure, along with the allies,

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<sup>13</sup> KAIA – Kabul International Airport.

to increase the influence, and exercise, maintain and extend the authority, and to develop the Afghan institutions capability, while supporting the social life normalisation and reconstruction efforts.

Since joining NATO, the Romanian Navy structures have been present in the hottest parts of the world (the Mediterranean Sea, Kosovo and Libya), participating in NATO operation in the Mediterranean Sea, *Active Endeavour*, in Kosovo within peacekeeping missions/Multinational Task Force – West, in Libya in Operation *Unified Protector*, and in some NATO headquarters with staff personnel. The participation in Operation *Active Endeavour* in the Mediterranean Sea began in 2005, for periods ranging from one to three months. In NATO Operation *Unified Protector* to impose embargo on Libya, they participated for three months, in 2011. Since joining NATO, the Naval Forces have contributed approximately 2 000 troops and 9 frigate-type warships to the missions and operations outside the national territory.

Currently, Romania maintains its commitments under ISAF operation in Afghanistan and it will adapt its contribution to the future operational requirements.

On the agenda of political and military decision-making structures is the successful completion of the disengagement from Afghanistan as well as the completion of the transition process in this country. The main problem is represented by the redeployment/withdrawal of the Romanian Armed Forces in the prospect of concluding ISAF mission by the end of 2014. Romania supports the process of taking over security responsibilities by the Afghan security forces by the end of 2014 and in the future.

The disengagement from Afghanistan will be gradual, as the Afghan Government authorities will take on responsibilities. The Romanian military presence in this theatre has been reduced since the second half of 2013. The last manoeuvre battalion-type structure that will end the mission in Afghanistan is the 20<sup>th</sup> Infantry Battalion, “*Black Scorpions*” in the second half of 2014.

Romania’s contribution since it joined NATO is about 23 000 troops (about 24 300 troops in the 2002-2014 period).

Currently, in Afghanistan, Romania has about 1 000 troops.

#### ❖ Other theatres

Besides the above-mentioned theatres of operations, the Romanian Armed Forces have also been present in missions/operations in other hot-spots around the world such as:

- Mission *Baltica 2007*, in Lithuania – between 1 August and 31 October 2007. The Air Force participated in NATO Air Police Mission in the Baltic States.

- NATO Operation *Active Fence* in Turkey, between 8 April and 15 July 2013, within the Deployable Communication Module, module that provided communications support for some US structures.

While actively participating in the above-mentioned operations and missions, the Romanian Armed Forces have contributed to the observation and monitoring missions under the aegis of the UN and the EU.

Besides the participation in missions and operations outside the national territory, structures in the Romanian Armed Forces have been involved in evaluation, certification, validation, affirmation exercises, as well as in annual command exercises, at expert level, in the field of applying nuclear consultation procedures and crisis management, led by NATO.

Along with the Alliance and Coalition partners, the Romanian troops have contributed to the stabilisation of conflict areas, following the asymmetric actions of insurgents, losing 33 military men while other 150 were injured.

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### *For the Romanian Armed Forces*

Romania's integration into NATO has determined the acceleration of the Romanian Armed forces full professionalisation in the direction of its transformation into a modern, downsized, flexible, interoperable force, capable of defending the national territory and of participating in missions in allied context.

The participation of our country in resolving problems in conflict areas where NATO structures were involved proved that Romania, even before being a NATO member, was one of the countries that could contribute military structures to international coalitions and, concretely and substantially, to the resolution of sensitive situations, including by carrying out missions with a high degree of complexity, along with the structures of NATO member states. Gradually, Romania's contribution to crisis management has gained momentum and diversity, our armed forces proving real capabilities to fulfil the full spectrum of NATO missions.

Every year, Romania, through its armed forces, has become more and more present in the theatres of operations, participating with personnel, technology and equipment to the international efforts for crisis management and conflict resolution. The engagement in international stability missions in different theatres of operations worldwide has demonstrated the Romanian Armed Forces ability to connect to the international community efforts to strengthen security and stability.

To meet the objectives related to the consolidation of NATO membership, Romania will continue to support the allied efforts in various theatres of operations

and will contribute forces and capabilities to carry out the tasks undertaken in the decision-making forum of the Alliance, gradually committing the ready forces.

The Romanian military participation in these operations and missions has resulted in the following achievements:

- consolidation of the status of a credible partner in US-led Multinational Coalition and in NATO;
- experience gained in actions in hostile, complex and dynamic areas;
- increase in interoperability;
- validation/revalidation of doctrines, standard operating procedures, action techniques and tactics;
- knowledge, operation and use of the assets and equipment of US or NATO origin in the military actions;
- verification of the reliability of weapons and combat assets and their limitations identification;
- enhancement of credibility as an ally and partner;
- promotion of the Romanian Armed Forces image among the population and local officials.

The Romanian troops who have participated in missions and operations in the theatres of operations have been appreciated and their high degree of readiness has been confirmed by partners, allies and the population in their areas of responsibility due to the professionalism and responsibility they have demonstrated in carrying out their missions.

### ***From NATO perspective***

The transformation NATO has undergone since the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century in order to increase its expeditionary potential and proactive attitude has enhanced the Alliance force to meet the new security environment challenges.

NATO roles have substantially diversified, the Alliance being currently able to adapt to address new missions such as: crisis management, natural disasters relief, embargo imposition, counter-terrorism, energy routes protection etc.

NATO should become more flexible – institutionally, politically and militarily – to be a strong and effective force in a very dynamic and volatile security environment. In recent years, its organisational and functional structure has continually changed to better adapt and meet the current security challenges. NATO has adopted a proactive policy regarding the new types of threats.

Today, the Alliance continues to develop its already proven capabilities, providing robust and interoperable multinational command structures.

In the last decade, the Alliance has demonstrated readiness for greater political and military flexibility, achieving broader coalitions to conduct a wider range of operations, such as those in Iraq, the Balkans, Afghanistan, Syria and Libya.

The challenges at the beginning of the new millennium, in particular those relating to the war on terrorism, have determined the following trends to become manifest in the Alliance as far as the member states contributing forces are concerned:

- orientation towards a smaller number of units, which should be deployable and sustainable;
- increase in national contributions in terms of strategic transport capabilities and logistic support;
- imposition of some types of structures that have been already tested and used successfully by developed member states;
- new types of capabilities, particularly in the field of strategic deployment and support for forces;
- introduction of deployment, self-sustainment, and fight against terrorism among the actional capabilities of these forces.

We can say that, regardless of the type of military structure required through *NATO Force Planning Process*, and accepted by member or partner states, the common performances generated by the actional requirements related to the conflicts at the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and the beginning of this millennium are as follows:

- ability to engage in joint and combined multinational expeditionary operations;
- ability to work in extreme weather conditions;
- minimum self-sustaining and supporting capacity developed on hierarchical levels, usually amounting 30 days;
- capacity to be incorporated or incorporate (depending on the unit size) or lead (in the case of commands) military structures belonging to other nations;
- ability to share information with the units of the multinational force, and even to have a Common Operational Picture of the battlefield;
- building the national capability regarding these forces strategic transport.

NATO officials admit that it takes time for the new members to integrate, to develop the necessary military capabilities, and to implement the initiatives established by various NATO meetings.

Other topics of interest are the completion of the ongoing mission in Afghanistan, the lessons learned from the mission in Libya, the situation in the Middle East and other areas of interest.

In the future, Romania remains committed to NATO, permanently adapting its contribution according to the evolution of the security situation in the hot-spots all over the globe. Finally, we consider that we should keep in mind that the process of full integration into NATO structures has to be continued. This requires considerable human and financial efforts from Romania, while budgetary commitments should be respected.

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**English version by**  
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# 10 YEARS OF LOGISTICS IN NATO

*Colonel Dan LĂPĂDAT  
Colonel BEng Cornel COMEAGĂ*

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*During the 10 years passed since the accession to NATO, at the level of the Romanian Armed Forces logistics have been accepted and implemented more than 480 NATO standardisation agreements (STANAGs) that have facilitated the coordination, cooperation and joint action with the allied command structures and the armed forces of NATO member nations and partners.*

*The author considers that the success in operations is directly ensured by the permanent support provided by logistics, without which the timely and quality support for the troops in the theatres of operations, the military equipment operation, and the post-mission restoration of the resources combat capability would not be possible.*

**Keywords:** *logistic support; defence planning; force deployment; MEDEVAC*

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for logistics to keep up with all the changes in the military to ensure the necessary support for the fulfilment of assigned missions. The status of military logistics is a key indicator for the status of the entire military system during a given period of time.

Currently, the Romanian Armed Forces logistic represents a vital component to ensure the functioning of the military system, and an integrated logistics system

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**G**iven that in the last decade the risks and threats to national and international security have multiplied, in parallel with the continuous improvement of weapon systems, the types of missions in which forces can be engaged have also diversified, which has implicitly resulted in increasing complexity as far as the logistic support for operational forces is concerned. In this context, and particularly in the last period, the logistic systems of all NATO member states have been redesigned and resized so that they can appropriately respond to the requirements related to achieving national and NATO strategic goals and objectives, while using the available resources in an effective manner according to a multinational integrated concept.

Given the multinational and joint character of NATO operations, it has become necessary

is both the fundamental aspiration and the main effort to support national forces during the execution of missions in the country and outside the national territory, and to provide host nation support for the actions of allied and partner forces.

In the field of logistics, the Romanian Armed Forces contribute to the efforts of the Alliance in compliance with both conceptual and actional commitments. Conceptually, they have contributed to the development of allied modern models in the field (*Reception, Staging and Onward Movement – RSOM, Joint Logistic Support Group – JLSG* etc.), and actionally, to the generation of specific national capabilities and the effective participation in multinational initiatives, the most convincing example being the *Integrated Engineering for Logistics Multinational Integrated Logistic Unit – IEL MILU/Infrastructure Engineering Military Capability – IMEC*, Romania ensuring management.

Since Romania joined NATO, the national logistics command, coordination and control structures have decisively contributed to the ongoing transformation process in the field. National representatives have attended, in the 10 years of membership, numerous NATO Working Group meetings that are relevant to the field: *Senior NATO Logisticians Committee – SNLC* (currently *Logistics Committee – LC*), *Logistic Staff Meeting – LSM* (currently *Logistics Committee Executive Group – LCEG*), *NATO Petroleum Committee – NPC*, *Movement and Transportation – M&T Forum*, *Logistic Planning Advisory Committee – LPAC*, *Standing Group of Partners Logistics Experts – SGPLE*, *NATO Maintenance and Support Organisation Board of Directors – NAMSOD* (currently *NATO Support Organisation – Agency Supervisory Board – NSPO – ASB*) and *Bi-Strategic Commands Logistic Coordination Board – Bi-SC LCB*, contributing to the conceptual and actional integration and to the information exchange along with the allied command structures and NATO member or partner states.

During the 10 years since the accession to NATO, at the level of the Romanian Armed Forces logistics have been accepted and implemented more than 480 NATO standardisation agreements (STANAGs) that have facilitated the coordination, cooperation and joint action with the allied command structures and the armed forces of NATO member nations and partners.

The success in operations is directly ensured by the permanent support provided by logistics, without which the timely and quality support for the troops in the theatres of operations, the military equipment operation, and the post-mission restoration of the resources combat capability would not be possible.

The logistic support for the operations outside the territory of the Romanian state is provided through a combination of organic logistic support forces,

under the arrangements concluded with the allies, and the participation in mechanisms and multinational integrated and specialised logistic support structures, depending on the particularities in the theatre of operations. Direct contracting mechanisms or integrators appointed from NATO agencies and the capabilities related to providing or benefiting from host nation support, depending on the possibilities and conditions, are considered.

The agreements concluded with specialised structures in allied states form a basis for the unification of multinational effort, efficient management, and coordination of logistics forces. The efficiency of activities and the minimisation of the logistics footprint of the system as well as the continuity of the support for ongoing actions are the fundamental objectives the concept of *collective multinational logistics* should meet. In this regard, the necessary steps have been taken to clarify and implement the concept of *National Support Element – NSE*, used to coordinate and ensure the line 3 (joint level) logistic support for the Romanian forces deployed in theatres of operations, in both current missions and activities (operations, exercises, training) and potential ones within the concept of *NATO Response Force – NRF*.

Romania has actively contributed to providing essential logistic support capabilities necessary to fulfil the Alliance expeditionary missions undertaken by aligning with *NATO Defence Planning Process – NDPP*. During the reference period there have been three planning cycles in compliance with the *Force Goals* for 2007, 2010, and the *capability targets* for 2013. On completion of each defence planning cycle, an extensive defence analysis was conducted both nationally and in NATO, which has allowed for the continuous adaptation of this process to the Alliance current financial realities and priorities.

To date, Romania has had the following support deployable forces operational and available to NATO: a field hospital type ROL 2 extensive facilities, an average strategic airlift capability, a helicopter transport and medical evacuation capability, a transport battalion, a material transport company, a CL transport company, a water transport company, a pontoon company, 2 embarkation-disembarkation detachments, 3 movement control teams, and a water purification team.

Sustained efforts have been made to achieve the *capability targets* set for Romania in 2013, which is a national priority, aiming at increasing the current operational force packages and at earmarking new types of capabilities for NATO: rail operations management structure, preventive medicine team, supply company, storage company, CL forward support detachment, bridge company, engineering company, EOD and demining routes structure, and CBRN port protection module.

The Romanian Armed Forces logistics has been a significant force multiplier, contributing to the forces deployment through: strategic and operational transport (land, air, naval and combined), movement coordination at operational and tactical level, as well as intra-theatre transport and medical evacuation (MEDEVAC).

The coordination and data exchange with NATO structures on the movement and transport is currently achieved using ADAMS/LOGFAS module, through the Movement Coordination Centre within the Joint Logistics Command. Concrete means for the development of national capabilities and multinational solutions have been operationalised to meet the Alliance requirements such as: specialised capabilities (embarkation-disembarkation detachments, movement control teams, strategic and intra-theatre transport structures) operationalisation. Moreover, Romania has participated in *Strategic Airlift Capabilities – SAC* programme since 2008 and in the regional initiative *Movement Control Multinational Integrated Logistic Unit – MovCon MILU* since 2010. It is worth mentioning that, within MovCon MILU, the Romanian component will participate in KFOR mission in the second semester 2014 and in the first and second semesters 2015.

During the reference period, Romania has made significant progress with regard to its ability to provide host nation support (HNS). Within the *Logistics Directorate* of the General Staff there is the *Host Nation Support Office*, which ensures the unitary coordination of the HNS activity in the military, and there are similar offices/departments within the staffs of the armed forces services and the Joint Logistics Command to coherently manage the activities in the field of HNS. In early 2003, the first version of the *HNS Capability Planning Catalogue (ROU-HNS CAPC)* was issued and disseminated, followed, after a short period of time, by the *Concept and General Procedures on Providing HNS by Romania for the Military Actions of NATO Member and Partner States on the National Territory*, document approved by the Supreme Council of National Defence by Decision no. 77/2004. Moreover, in 2004, the *Order of the Minister of National Defence on the Organisation, Training and Operation of Liaison Teams in Disembarkation/Embarkation Airports and Seaports* was issued, and the Romanian HNS Database, in ADAMS format, was developed.

The steps to complete the legal framework for ensuring HNS continued in 2006 by signing the *Memorandum of Understanding between Romania, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), and the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) on HNS for NATO Operations and Exercises in Romania*, which facilitates the support of NATO-led operations and exercises on the national territory.

In 2009, it was completed the development and publication in the *Official Gazette* of the *Order of the Minister of National Defence no. M -36/2009 on the Goods and Services that May Be Available to the Foreign Armed Forces that Enter, Station, Conduct Operations or Transit the Territory of Romania*. The normative act was issued for the creation of mechanisms for the implementation of regulations in section 8 of *Law no. 291/2007 on the Foreign Armed Forces Entering, Stationing, Conducting Operations or Transiting the Territory of Romania*, being aligned with the provisions of *NATO's Doctrine for HNS*.

The new version of the *Concept and General Procedures regarding Providing HNS by Romania for the Military Actions of NATO Member and Partner States on the National Territory*, approved by SCND Decision no. 102/2010, updates the concepts and procedures included in the document in 2010 from the perspective of a NATO and the EU member state, as well as from the one of the strategic partnerships to which Romania is party. It represents the main vector in the field of logistics for host nation support, able to ensure the guidelines and the general conceptual approach to HNS processes, in order to continually modernise the associated legal framework and military regulations. Moreover, the document clearly defines HNS and creates the prerequisites for the implementation of a fully consistent *HNS Management National System*, based on dedicated and comprehensive information flows between ministries, governmental agencies and bodies, non-governmental organisations, and the specific military components involved in HNS planning and execution process. The principles and concepts set out in this document, as well as the strategic aspects associated with providing host nation support by Romania, define the lines of force in the field of HNS on the territory of Romania, as host nation, the roles and responsibilities of military and governmental structures, as elements of the Romanian HNS Management System, as well as those of NATO commands, the EU and sending nations. The document provisions are applicable in the state of peace, emergency, crisis, and war, in the case of collective defence-associated military operations, crisis response operations (*CRO*), which are not covered by Article 5 (the North Atlantic Treaty, Washington, DC, 4 April 1949), disaster relief operations, as well as in the case of military exercises conducted on the territory of Romania. The information in this document equally addresses to the national decision-making factors in Romania, the authorities in the North Atlantic Alliance and in NATO member or partner states, involved in the planning and execution of operations support and military exercises that, by their nature, entail entering, stationing, conducting operations or transiting the national territory of Romania by foreign armed forces.

Romania considers that HNS is a major factor in the planning and conduct of NATO and/or EU-led operations. In this regard, the existence of a *National HNS Management System*, to aggregate the responsibilities of all state institutions whose activity involves a HNS dimension, is absolutely necessary to support the foreign armed forces that enter, station, conduct operations or transit the national territory of Romania.

In this context, the vital support provided by Romania for the multimodal transport of the US resources to and from Afghanistan began in May 2011, by leasing the infrastructure of Mihail Kogălniceanu International Airport – Constanța and of the Seaport Constanța, as well as the road and rail infrastructure in Mihail Kogălniceanu – Constanța area, as part of multimodal lasting support for NATO *International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)* operation and for coalition *Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)*. The period between 2012 and 2013 meant asserting the viability of Constanța-Mihail Kogălniceanu multimodal transport node, which successfully capitalises on the exceptional geostrategic position of Dobrogea and aims to maximally benefit from the port, airport and land transportation infrastructure, as well as the facilities that have been upgraded and/or built by the US at Mihail Kogălniceanu.

One of the priority directions in the development of regional cooperation, including in the Wider Black Sea area, is to strengthen regional cooperation in the field of HNS by drafting and negotiating memoranda to ensure mutual HNS between the government of Romania and the governments of neighbouring NATO member states. These treaties are part of the essential international documents necessary for Romania's bilateral relations with each of its neighbours in the field of HNS. Romania considers that the legal resource provided by existing agreements is insufficient and does not provide the necessary coherence for bilateral cooperation in the military field. Thus, it becomes essential to complete the bilateral legal framework with HNS memorandum, which should reflect the will of either party to provide logistical, financial, legal and procedural support in peacetime, civil emergency, crisis situations, and at war, on the national territory, for the armed forces of the other party, in compliance with NATO standards and principles, when bilateral activities such as joint military exercises/operations are conducted. In this respect, in 2012, the *Memoranda of Understanding between the Government of Romania and the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Bulgaria on Providing Mutual Host Nation Support* were completed and they are to be signed, and steps have been taken to initiate negotiations on *memoranda of understanding on providing mutual HNS between the Government of Romania and the Governments of Croatia and Georgia*.

Since 2013, the *Logistics Directorate* has been coordinating the negotiating the *Garrison Support Agreement (GSA) between the Ministry of National Defence and SHAPE on Supporting NATO CIS Deployable Module – NATO DCM “E”, București*, which will constitute the legal basis for the implementation of *NATO HNS Policies and Standards* in the operation of DCM “E” on the territory of Romania.

As host nation, Romania will continue to support allied and partner forces in a broader spectrum, according to its national abilities and interests, and in compliance with the international treaties, agreements, and other documents to which Romania is a party. In the planning and execution of foreign forces receiving, temporary stationing, and moving on the national territory, Romania can provide a wide range of key capabilities of its strategic infrastructure such as: seaports of disembarkation/embarkation (SPOD/E), airports of disembarkation/embarkation (APOD/E) rail ports of disembarkation/embarkation (RPOD/E), road and rail lines of communication (LOC), storage facilities, training facilities, and training ranges. The identification of potential areas of support and of associated facilities and capabilities is performed through Romania HNS Capabilities Planning Catalogue (ROU – HNS CAPCAT).

One area of particular importance under the coordination of the *Logistics Directorate* is *NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP)*. At the Alliance level, the decision-making authority to approve NSIP specific implementation steps is NATO’s Investment Committee, and for the projects at national level, the allocation of financial resources for their implementation is the responsibility of NATO Office of Resources. According to *Law no. 294/2007 on the Implementation of Projects Funded by NSIP in Romania*, projects are implemented through the structures of the Ministry of National Defence with responsibilities in the investment projects management, in compliance with NATO legal, technical, financial and administrative framework, in cooperation with the Alliance specialised structures.


NSIP projects are implemented in Romania within Major Programmes as follows: The Air Force – 16 projects (4 completed in 2012), the Naval Forces – 1 project, and the General Staff/Strategic Command – 2 projects.

The most significant NSIP projects, currently in various stages of implementation are: modernisation of airbases in Otopeni and Fetești, NATINADS (NATO Integrated Air Defence System), the NATO Air Command and Control (ASBE facilities), command/control surface maritime communications (BRASS), NATO major interest network communications (NATO network communications services in national strategic locations) and NATO deployable command and control (NATO Deployable Communications Module – NATO DCM “E” Otopeni).

According to NATO approvals, the total amount of funding NSIP projects in Romania is about 74 million Euros, 55 million provided by the Alliance and 19 million provided by Romania through the Ministry of National Defence budget.

Given the limited budgetary allocations for defence, not only in Romania but also in NATO, for reasons of efficiency in the short and medium term, there is a downward trend as far as the share of organic logistics structures is concerned, the alternative being outsourcing/contracting and multinational solutions, which are often affected by specific volatility. Driven by specific restrictive and notable evolutions, this phenomenon is a major concern for logistics professionals in terms of establishing appropriate command-control-coordination and execution mechanisms at all echelons, considering the long-term inherent risks to the autonomy and operational capacity of the military system, as a guarantor of fundamental values assumed at national and allied level.

*English version by*  
 *Diana Cristiana LUPU*



# THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE STRATEGIC PLANNING DIRECTORATE TO THE MODERNISATION OF THE OPERATIONS PLANNING PROCESS AT STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL LEVEL

*Colonel Dr Ovidiu-Constantin PALAGHIA*

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*The force planning, as a component part of the defence planning process, cannot be done without the contribution and expertise of operational planning specialists, which must take into consideration the national interests and responsibilities assumed towards the Alliance, the way the military actions are carried out as well as the way in which the new force structure will be accomplished.*

*In this domain, the Strategic Planning Directorate has sought to ensure a fair exchange of information, a new innovative thinking and the change in the mentality of the political and the military leaders.*

**Keywords:** *decision-making process; crisis management; operations planning*

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**T**he Romanian Euro-Atlantic integration represented a national priority and the only viable way to achieve prosperity, individual and collective security. The status of fully-fledged member of the Alliance means not only rights and benefits, but also obligations. Since the NATO accession, the Romanian Armed Forces went through a major restructuring and transformation process, in order to achieve the capacity to promote and defend freedom, democracy of the rule of law and human rights, as well as to adapt the decision-making process at strategic, operational and tactical level. Given these circumstances, the national military body made sustained efforts to adapt the philosophy of national defence to the allied framework, in accordance with the national interests and with the international security environment.

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Thus, the analysis of the military implications in relation to collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security pointed out the increasing role and place of military operations planning within the force planning and the defence planning process, having as fundamental objective the preservation of Romania's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, values whose main guarantor have been the Armed Forces.

The measures identified and taken by the Romanian Armed Forces leadership focused preponderantly on updating/reviewing and adapting national defence planning documents, fulfilling the military commitments assumed internationally and transforming the force structure, aiming at: consolidating Romania's place, role and strategic profile in NATO, as a contributor to the regional and global security, developing credible, modern, deployable, flexible, modular, interoperable, sustainable and efficient defence capabilities able to deter and counter any possible aggression against allied territory. It is worth mentioning the continuous capitalisation on the military expertise efforts in the operational planning domain for meeting these objectives – an essential factor in the implementation of the above-mentioned measures.

Within this context, the transformation of the national operations planning system at strategic and operational level was significantly influenced by the first Romanian participation in missions in Angola and Albania. Later on, the process was developed and enhanced through the crucial and continuous involvement of the experts from the *Strategic Planning Directorate (SPD)* along with the active and effective participation in UN, OSCE, NATO and EU-led missions abroad, within the regional initiatives/arrangements or coalitions for preventing war, managing crisis situations and ensuring the regional/global stability.

The pre-accession period was marked by specific actions and activities that influenced the operational planning process, as follows:

- the strategic defence review, in order to adapt the force structure to the requirements of the security environment and the need to fulfil the military engagements assumed by Romania at the international level;
- the adaptation of the legal framework to the force structure development directions and requirements and for providing interoperability between national and NATO member states forces;
- the drafting and adaptation of the national planning documents in accordance with the specified allied procedures and requirements.

In this context, we must mention the set of documents drawn up by the *Romanian General Staff*, with the major contribution of the *SPD* regarding the force structure

review (*Romanian Armed Forces 2000, Force Objective 2003 and Force Objective 2007 Reviewed*), *Romania's Military Strategy 2000* and the *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan*.

After joining NATO in 2004, we proceeded to adapt/review the operations planning process at strategic and operational level, taking into consideration the following factors:

- the evolution of the international security environment and forces engagement space;
- Romania's membership status and commitments made to the allies, the need for providing security through dynamic engagement with maintaining the consensus rule, for ensuring immediate reaction capability and deploying the forces in the *theatres of operations (TO)* and sustaining them at a strategic distance abroad, constantly lowering the effects imposed by the national caveats;
- the existing legal framework and the need to review/adapt the legal provisions, doctrinaire principles and procedures, focusing on the proportional use of the military force and the multidisciplinary integration of partners/agencies in managing crises/conflicts;
- the comprehensive approach to planning/execution of operations/military actions, through dynamic inter-institutional and inter-agency engagement of the instruments of power, to the greater involvement of non-state actors in low intensity conflicts that flexibly articulate terrorism and diversion, psychological manipulation and cyber attacks, civil violence, insurgency and border clashes, as well as the actions to influence the political will of the enemy, which weakens the solidarity necessary for managing the situation in a multinational framework;
- the place, role and the way of using the national military within the efficient joint coordination mechanism of the other instruments of power: intelligence, diplomacy, economy, development and reconstruction, in order to meet national defence objectives;
- the typology, characteristics and effects to be achieved in future joint operations, the capabilities and the way to plan and conduct operations (with major implications for the composition and structure of the capabilities used, flexibility and strength of command and control (C2), in order to achieve/obtain the decisional superiority, the complex, varied and multinational character of operations and the increased rhythm of combat forces actions;

- the new operational requirements of the forces, in keeping with the missions to be accomplished: national/collective defence, counter-terrorism, energy security, crisis response (peacekeeping, extraction, non-combatant evacuation operations and operations to impose sanctions/embargos);
- capabilities needed for accomplishing missions, achieving force projection and protection, situational awareness and developing the joint common operational picture.

In adapting the operations planning process, the *Strategic Planning Directorate* took into account the dynamic and complex evolution and the heterogeneous and fragmented character of the international security environment, marked by the multipolarity and geometry of the centres of power, redefined institutions/international organisations with security responsibilities, globalisation, demographic and climate change, economic crisis and its effects, and competition for strategic resources.

We also took into consideration the influence at strategic and operational level of the future, transparent, dynamic, pulsatory, multidirectional, automated and digitised engagement space, based on the development and use of new “vectors”, techniques, technologies and unconventional procedures determining the diversification of the joint operations, horizontal integration of new weapons and operational components, synchronisation of the direct/indirect joint actions, narrowing of areas of responsibility, diversification of targets and effectiveness of actions directed towards the objectives.

At the same time, it was also considered the impact over a fair distribution/sharing of the risks, responsibilities and costs in the multinational operations planning and execution process, characterised by asymmetry, mobility, decentralisation, dispersibility, manoeuvrability and flexibility, use of a wide variety of combat space, joint, special, psychological, information, or even ecological actions carried out simultaneously, continuously and alertly, with the establishment of a robust and flexible command and control system, techniques, tactics and operational procedures (*TTP*), with the establishment and training of hard and soft capability packages.

The efforts carried out at national level were focused on adopting the national security concept, as part of the *Programme for Government*, gradually shifting to decentralised leadership and a better demarcation of the decision-making competencies at strategic level, and on launching the operational concept of “*sufficient defence*”, in accordance with the new programmatic defence planning documents that facilitated the coordination of the reform process: *National Security Strategy*,

*The White Paper on Defence, Romania's Military Strategy, Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy and the Law on the Organisation and Functioning of the Ministry of National Defence.*

The efforts made for a better organisation and execution of specific activities resulted in a series of actions with major implications for the operations planning process at the strategic-military and operational level, aiming at:

- the transformation of the *Great General HQs* in the *National Military Command Centre* under the direct subordination of the Supreme Council of National Defence, with responsibilities for planning and conducting military actions in case of armed aggression, implementation of state of siege, mobilisation or in case of war;
- the review/updating of the legal framework related to the *Defence, Public Order and National Security System*, and the organisation and functioning of the Ministry of Defence (*Law no. 346* – stipulating that the *General Staff*, as a strategic-level central military structure, is in charge of leading, conducting, organising, planning and achieving operational capabilities, gradually increasing force readiness, mobilising the military and conducting joint operations).

For the integration of the process of planning, execution and support of the Romanian Armed Forces operations inside the country and abroad, similar with the one carried out in NATO, the *Strategic Planning Directorate* launched the review process of the institutional legal framework that included the *Romanian Armed Forces Doctrine*, in order to:

- formulate clearly the principles, norms and concepts related to the training, preparation, organisation and procurement of the Romanian Armed Forces for national and collective defence and for the fulfilment of the engagements assumed as a NATO member state;
- develop *TTPs* specific to planning and carrying out operations/campaigns, at all the levels of the military art, in order to ensure the interoperability of the Armed Forces with the similar allied structures, during operations and based on the experience gathered following the actual participation in planning and executing of real-life operations in missions abroad.

The document approved in 2012 thus ensures the continuity of the approaches and the uniqueness of provisions, identifying the following challenges faced by the Romanian commanders and military staffs: the deployment and expeditionary character of the action of the forces in the fulfilment of the whole range of missions, in accordance with national caveats. The provisions of the doctrine

were experimented during some complex strategic and operational national exercises, such as “DACIA 2010” and “BICAZ 2011”, concurrently with the process of validation and implementation of the *National Operational Planning Manual (NOPM)* and *National Operations Evaluation Manual (NOEM)*.

Another reference document drawn up by the *Strategic Planning Directorate* was the *Doctrine for the Operational Planning in the Romanian Armed Forces*, meant to ensure the interoperability between the national procedures at operational level with the allied ones and to provide the principles, norms and core concepts for the planning of operations specific to national defence and for the fulfilment of the engagements as a NATO member state. The document ensured the coherence of the processes carried out and of the operational language specific to operations planning with the Romanian Armed Forces Doctrine, the *Instructions for Operational Planning within the Romanian Armed Forces* as well as the achievement of the specific procedures standardisation. Doctrinaire elements from previous document were kept, thus ensuring the continuity of the national approaches within this domain, new concepts being included, such as: comprehensive approach and systemic approach to the operational environment in planning the effects, objectives and reaching the end state.

In order to ensure the Romanian Armed Forces training necessary for responding timely and efficiently to the challenges of the new security environment in the case of the initiation of a national operation or of the participation in a NATO/coalition led multinational operation, the *Strategic Planning Directorate* has drawn up, in 2012, the “*Instructions for Operational Planning within the Romanian Armed Forces*” and, in 2013, the “*Instructions regarding the Development of Strategic Scenarios within the Romanian Armed Forces*”, which replaced the previous provisions of the “*Instructions for the Development, Coordination and Execution of the Operational Plans for Force Employment*” and the “*Concept of the Development of Strategic Scenarios within the Romanian Armed Forces*”, both drawn up in 2007.

The documents aimed to provide harmonisation with the principles of strategic coherence in fulfilling the objectives regarding defence planning, detailed understanding of the security environment, consultation and compatibility of plans (in order to ensure the consistence of the common actions and have the predicted effects) and flexibility/adaptability of the operational planning process to the circumstances of the engagement space and the allocated resources. They establish the rules that regulate the development/use of the strategic scenarios within the Romanian Armed Forces, depending on the type of mission (national/collective defence), clearly stipulating the responsibilities and competences

regarding their development, review, annulment and employment. The scenarios are developed within the *Strategic Operations Planning Group (SOPG)* together with the other central structures from the Ministry of National Defence (MOD) and the specialised structures of the institutions from the *Defence, Public Order and National Security System*, in accordance with the cooperation protocols in force.

Last but not least, between 2011 and 2013, the two manuals mentioned before were drawn up, establishing the way operations are planned and evaluated at strategic and operational level and align the specific *TTPs* with the existing NATO standards.

First, the documents presented the main elements of the planning and evaluation processes carried out at national level, and addressed the efficiency of the support to the contribution of military power to the comprehensive approach to the response to a possible crisis. Second, they aimed at improving the national capacity to respond promptly and in coordination to such situations and increasing the efficiency in operation, based on the increase in the capacity of adaptation and institutional reaction, correlated with the improvement of inter-agency cooperation and the development mechanism of civil and democratic control over the military body. Third, they described the types of measuring indicators used to evaluate ongoing operations and the way the data are used and interpreted.

The need for adapting and reviewing the legal framework has also determined the implementation of some measures with direct impact on the force employment plans and consequently on the operations planning at strategic and operational level, as follows:

- developing and approving by the Supreme Council of National Defence of a new Command and Control Concept in 2010;
- setting up the *SOPG* within the *Strategic Command Centre (SCC)/NMCC* – the *SOPG* is a permanent inter-institutional and inter-functional group, activated upon order, designed to plan operations at strategic level;
- reviewing the existing campaign/operations plans in accordance with the evolution of the operational and strategic engagement space and environment;
- adapting the national procedures, efficiently correlating and coordinating the national forces engagement abroad (over 30 000 military personnel in the past ten years), in accordance with the national decisions adopted by the Romanian Parliament, Government and Supreme Council of National Defence – the most important being those from the Afghanistan theatre

of operations (starting with 2002 and which probably will continue after 2014, by the participation in the *Resolute Support Mission*<sup>1</sup>), Iraq (over 8 000 military personnel, between 2003-2009, and in the *NATO training mission/NTM-I*, between 2005-2011) and in the Balkans (starting with 1996 in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 1999 in Kosovo). It is worth mentioning the activities carried out in order to participate to *NATO Response Force – NRF*<sup>2</sup>, operation “*Unified Protector*” in Libya, operation “*Active Endeavour*” in the Mediterranean Sea and “*Ocean Shield*” in the Horn of Africa;

- identifying the level of national participation in NATO-led operations and missions, focused on adapting/redesigning the capabilities and resources allocated, in accordance with the operational requirements and NATO standards in this domain;
- designing generic planning situations, reviewing strategic scenarios, national contingency and defence plans necessary for guarding the national interests and fulfilling the fundamental mission of the Romanian Armed Forces, namely guaranteeing credible national defence and, in the allied context, preserving Romania’s independence, sovereignty and integrity, focusing on the improvement of the capacity to operate jointly in a multinational framework;
- creating the *Operational Command Centre (OCC)* by transforming the former Joint Operational Command “*Mareşal Alexandru Averescu*”, which eliminated the intermediary links within the command and control system and led to an optimised information and decision-making framework and the creation of the *Operational Planning Group (OPG)*;
- correlating planning documents with those related to: the process of increasing operational readiness of forces and capabilities that will be earmarked for NATO, maintaining the level of operational readiness of the structures that have already reached the readiness level, restructuring the C2 system and the force structure, carrying out the permanent fighting service and providing the immediate response capability in order to fulfil the commitments assumed regarding the participation in operations and missions abroad;

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<sup>1</sup> It has represented the main area of interest and the biggest effort in a theatre of operations, presently, 1 014 military personnel being deployed in different missions and areas, in accordance with *ISAF* priorities and operational requirements.

<sup>2</sup> In order to ensure 2% of the *NRF* forces, with the enforcement of the NATO operational standards and ensuring the efficiency of functional relations.

- restoring combat capacity and achieving a new force structure in order to improve the fighting potential and provide a more balanced distribution the areas of responsibilities;
- intensifying the cooperation with the institutions from the Defence, Public Order and National Security System with responsibilities in this field;
- ensuring an efficient and flexible framework for the organisation, planning, and increase in the operational capability, achievement of the unity in all domains related to military concepts, operational language, planning and execution of operations;
- correlating the provisions of national and allied plans with the transformations imposed by the developments in the changing security environment, with the new physiognomy of military conflicts and the lessons learned from the recent conflicts;
- fundamentally reviewing the concept and principles for training and employing the military structures in multinational missions, in staff activities, in the process of decision-making, planning and conducting military actions, taking into consideration the expanded antiterrorist campaign, regional and local crises and cyber threats;
- fulfilling the performance standards imposed by the Alliance, with the achievement on medium- and long-term of a well-balanced force structure, capable of conducting military actions in accordance with the new threats and able to accomplish the entire range of combat missions;
- participating in the achievement of some capabilities within the NATO “*Pooling & Sharing*” programme;
- participating in the *Strategic Defence Review*, in drawing up/reviewing the operational plans regarding force employment and continuing the fulfilment of the *Force Objectives 2008*, translated through the NATO – NDPP programme in *Target Capabilities 2013*.

Last but not least, an efficient way to identify the operational requirements in terms of training and procurement of the force structure and in order to improve the operational planning process was the participation in multinational and national exercises. A special role had the organisation, by the Romanian General Staff, and the conduct of two national joint exercises at operational level, *DEMEX* and *ROMEX*, between 2006-2009, under the command of the Romanian Joint Operational Command and with the support of the representatives of the Joint Force Command Naples in the Accession and Integration Working Group, for the affirmation, evaluation and achievement of the appropriate combat readiness of the planned structures.

Another important milestone was the training and participation of the military and civil personnel from the central structures of the Ministry of National Defence in NATO crisis management exercises (*CMX*), in order to test the arrangements and specific procedures for the implementation of the new strategic concept, the Political Guidance and NATO contribution to the comprehensive approach.

A special mention should be made regarding the Romanian participation in *NRF NATO Exercises* such as *STEADFAST (Jaguar/Jackpot/Joist/Juncture and Jazz*, in 2006-2013), for the evaluation, certification and validation of national structures, as well as the constant Romanian participation into Exercise “*Able Staff*” related to nuclear consultations and adaptation of the declaratory policy in this domain, all contributing to increasing the prestige and visibility of the Romanian Armed Forces.

In the near future, in this domain, the *Strategic Planning Directorate* will focus on:

- continuing the participation in the counselling and training process in Afghanistan after 2014;
- continuing the review process of the *NOPM* in accordance with the *Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive – COPD* (version 2.0), in order to ensure the compatibility and interoperability of the procedures and doctrines with the allies and partners, improve the working capacity in a multinational environment, the capacity to plan at strategic, tactical and operational level in a joint manner and also in order to form a new generation of military leaders with operational experience;
- adjusting/correcting *TTPs*, deficiencies and malfunctions in order to increase the capacity to adapt, the agility and creativity with a view to obtaining the unity of effort and actional synergy;
- integrating the national air defence system in the NATO one, carrying out the specific missions under NATO command.

In conclusion, the efforts of the *Strategic Planning Directorate* for transforming and adapting the operations planning process continues, in accordance with the missions and types of operations to be conducted in a volatile and dynamic environment, taking into consideration the place, role and the way to employ the armed forces in achieving the objectives, as well as with the efficiency of the mechanism of coordinating the other instruments of power: diplomatic, economic, information etc.

The participation in NATO-led operations in a multinational framework and in an engagement space different in terms of terrain, climate, traditions and civilisation has enabled the increase in the level of specific skills, the connection

with the military-strategic evolutions from different parts of the world and the preparation/design of some complex FTX/CPX exercises meant to develop new TTPs in this domain.

The force planning, as part of the defence planning process, cannot be done without the contribution and expertise of operations planning specialists, which must take into consideration the national interests and responsibilities assumed towards the Alliance, the way military actions are carried out as well as the way in which the new force structure will be accomplished.

In this domain, the *Strategic Planning Directorate* has sought to ensure a fair exchange of information, a new innovative thinking and a change in the mentality of political and military leaders, so that they could support the decision-making process at all levels, with multi-disciplinary integration of the partners/agencies in managing the crisis/conflicts. The planning of some national defence missions, in an allied context, will remain the core and the reason and the connection without which Romania will not be able to affirm itself as a contributor to regional stability/security, as a guarantee of our country's sovereignty, independence and integrity.

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# ROMANIAN ARMED FORCES MISSION NETWORK – An Objective Requirement –

*Colonel Dr Aurel BUCUR*

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*In the context of Article 5 and based on the agreed arrangements, national defence requires that the joint operation in the event of any aggression against Romania should be led by a joint multinational command deployed on national territory, which will be able to subordinate the task force established by Romania for defence, in addition to the forces made available by other NATO members. In accordance with this principle, the participants in the operation shall exchange information based on a mission-oriented network, to which NATO entities, national military ones, those with responsibilities in national security and public order (The Defence, Public Order and National Safety System) included and, possibly, some other countries or organisations will have access.*

**Keywords:** *command structures; interoperability; multinational operations; CIMIC*

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The development of the latest military operations and missions has pointed out a few essential features that make it possible for certain new general approaches that will substantiate future military engagements to be adopted. Thus, among others, the following aspects must be emphasised: these operations are multinational, one of the nations being the leader, the actual time in which the military force assigned to fulfil the mission is created and operationalised has become shorter and the command-control relations among structures and C4ISR systems exploitation have required real-time or near real-time information flows, which has led to large amount of information, international and non-governmental organisations have become increasingly involved in the operations even from its earliest days, the military and civil mass-media have provided in-depth coverage of the entire mission.

The severe conditions and the weak or even inexistent local communications networks have required that the network and information

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infrastructure of the engaged forces could be entirely designed and built in relation to the specifics of each mission, through the contribution of participants in order to facilitate the reception, correlation, fusion and dissemination of relevant information, from multiple sources, to all command levels, including the command structures within the national territory. In this context, achieving interoperability between participating forces has become a key element in exercising command and control, on the one hand, and in providing data and information security, on the other hand.

The Communications and Information Directorate at the General Staff has assumed the task of addressing this objective requirement and initiated the preliminary procedures for its fulfilment.

Implementing the concept of *duty to share* has been made in close correlation with the principle of *need to know* and has required that policies and procedures applied to communication and information systems of participating countries are developed and implemented with an included capacity of information sharing/dissemination, and benefit from the necessary security measures that give access to information only for authorised users.

The experience gained in operations in Iraq and especially Afghanistan has proved that network and information infrastructure must be shared by *fields of security*, with particular emphasis on ensuring the following fields:

- *NATO SECRET (NS)*;
- *MISSION SECRET (MS)*;
- *MISSION UNCLASSIFIED (MU)*.

These fields are meant for certain structures and user communities depending on their level of access to information and the structures degree of mobility, this being supported by information networks.

The *NS field* is covered by NATO Wide Area Network (WAN NS), which includes extensions in all locations of Alliance command and force structures as well as member countries, the extension of our country being *RO NS NOAN*. It is highly developed in the structures with highly static character, which can be generally found at strategic level. It is less represented at operational level, which is usually in charge of commanding the theatre and is insufficiently developed at tactical level in the theatre. In the *NS field*, most of the consultation flow within the Alliance and the relationship between the entities of NATO command and force structures are achieved.

The *MS field* enables information exchange for all forces involved in the battlefield, both in static commands and in deployable and/or mobile ones, lowering the risk of compromising and overloading the *NS field* with information. The current battle

rhythm requires that the access to *MS* field information is available up to a minimum battalion/similar level. Under the conditions of multinational operations, secret-level mission network provides the collaborative framework for achieving information flows also with structures of certain states that are not NATO members and could not gain access to the *NS* field.

The field was first mentioned in relation to NATO as a consequence to the development of the operational concept *Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF)* in document MC-389/2. The access to each of the networks corresponding to the two secret-level security fields must be ensured by the implementation of technical solutions, such as the virtual security field in a single network, provided that the information exchange between networks requires the implementation of matching *Information Exchange Gateways*, as standardised interfaces. The access to any security field, required during preparing and waging the battle, must be organised in accordance with applicable security regulations and does not necessarily involve the implementation of additional physical infrastructure.

The *MU field* will be maintained, in principle, in every location of the missions where there are forces and aims to provide the civil-military coordination (CIMIC), the relation with the media, the acquisition of open-source information and the internet connection for the personnel.

The concept of *mission network* originates in the *Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS)*<sup>1</sup>, achieved by the US for waging the global war on terror, in which the term combined indicates that forces from two or more states are involved. The system consists of multiple networks, with the same classification level, built on a common set of standardised devices, applications and services that are available globally, regionally or locally, some of which have more, others less members and others are bilateral through their nature. The standardisation implemented at the level of the entire system enables the application of the *Plug and Play* working principle in any access node, anywhere in the world and in any network, with the same type of node or terminal.

Most known networks in the system, to which our forces have been connected in operations, are *CENTRIXS-MCFI (Multinational Coalition Forces-Iraq)* and *CENTRIXS-GCTF (Global Counter Terrorism Task Force)*, available in Afghanistan. The separation according to distinct networks is based, in principle, on the need to prevent access to information for nations that are not part of the specific information exchange arrangements signed for each task separately. If, in Operation *Iraqi Freedom*, the US forces represented more than 94% of the forces engaged,

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<sup>1</sup> Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System.

in Operation *Enduring Freedom* (Afghanistan), at one point, there were forces from 48 states, which represented almost 30% of the personnel. An essential change also occurred as far as exercising the unity of command was concerned, from one entirely focused on the US, in Iraq, to the unified, coalition-type one, in Afghanistan.

In the theatre of operations in Afghanistan, the *CENTRIXS* network initially assisted the US forces participating in Operation *Enduring Freedom (OEF)*, but as more and more nations became involved in the NATO-led ISAF<sup>2</sup> operation, and especially after the Alliance took over the command of the coalition forces in Afghanistan, the need for rapidly establishing a single network infrastructure became crucial. The effort of coalition members was obvious after nearly nine years in the *Afghan Mission Network (AMN)*, a network that decisively influenced the way in which the operation is conducted, providing voice, data and video services, as well as ISR-related data and information, through a secure infrastructure. The principle applied was to achieve the interconnection of participating nations and entities, which contributed significantly with specific infrastructure elements, in addition to those provided by the Alliance, and to enable information transfer, command and control applications included. This allowed the military from participating countries to use their own systems and not other imposed ones they were not trained for.

In its current development, *AMN* has shown that a multinational network connecting the systems of every nation on the battlefield is feasible and extremely efficient, on condition that, in future operations, it does not require so much time to become operational.

At NATO level, the lessons learned from ISAF operation are the basis of designing its future operations, which will have as a focal point a longer-term vision of a mission network, called *Future Mission Network (FMN)*. In this regard, the deputy director of the US Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), Rear Admiral David Simpson, explains in an interview with a British publication: *"We don't want to go into the next crisis or contingency and wait eight years to get the right network approach. But it's not one network, it's really future mission networks. The beauty of the Afghan Mission Network is that it was tailored for that commander's information sharing relationship. The goal of the Future Mission Network is to take the fight off of SIPRNet<sup>3</sup> (DoD's US-only classified network) to reduce the defended surface area and to leverage existing national networks. When the UK comes to fight with us, they don't want to drop what they've trained with and pick up a US product.*

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<sup>2</sup> International Security Assistance Force.

<sup>3</sup> Secret Internet Protocol Routing Network (US network similar to NATO SECRET WAN).

*You want to fight with what you've trained with. And it's the same with our other partners. We want to empower the commander with the mission to create that information sharing environment".*

The *FMN* concept can be described as a capability that consists of three components: the governance, the planning, operation and development framework and, ultimately, the communication and information system (management, its processes and procedures included). The requirement for achieving a *federated mission network* capability is included in the Alliance Capability Requirements<sup>4</sup>, being also integrated in NATO and nations targets regarding static networks and deployable networks, and being subject to implementation and review in future planning cycles of the Alliance defence process.

In accordance with the second review of the *FMN* concept, in August 2012, the operational requirements for achieving it stem from the following *objectives*:

- Seamless human-to-human communication across the force for mission planning and execution.
- A single view of the battle space across the Mission Network.
- Timely provision of a Mission Network.
- Provision of consistent, accurate and reliable mission data.
- Community of Interest (COI) capabilities that align with the mission requirement.
- Well-trained staff that can support an effective decision-making cycle and take full advantage of the systems provided.

The achievement of *FMN* is based on the following principles:

- Streamlining associated costs at NATO level and in the member countries.
- Maximising the employment capacity by standardisation, collaborative procurement and service level agreements (SLA).
- Reflecting the principles of network-enabled capabilities.
- Using the C3 systems classification taxonomy.
- Ensuring the ability to adapt to the mission operational requirements.
- Providing continuous development capacity.
- Standardising the network, which *becomes mandatory within the participation in the NRF*.
- Ensuring the possibility of supporting the dynamic nature of the federated networks.
- Providing information centrality by creating a single information domain that can be used at all mission command levels.

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<sup>4</sup> NATO's *Minimum Capability Requirements*, Enclosure 1 to 1500/SHCPP CAM/FCR 201528, December 2011.

A federated network is a system in which each network is run independently, without necessarily having a central authority with a regulatory role and which has its own purpose of establishment. In multinational operations, participants may involve a number of various technical capabilities in terms of technological development, and *FMN* must enable their integration, in so far as these participants are willing to comply with the previously agreed arrangements. These may be standards, profiles, SLA, memoranda and especially joining, membership and exiting *instructions*<sup>5</sup> (JMED). Thus, the mission network will enable each member of the federated network to:

- provide services to own (national) users;
- provide services to other members of the federation of networks;
- use the services performed by other members of the federation;
- use the common services sets available on the network.

From the point of view of basic services available on the network, *FMN* will provide:

- video teleconference;
- voice over IP;
- standard chat;
- e-mail with attachments;
- Web browsing to and from users from other networks of the federation;
- global address list in the federation.

In terms of functional services, the *FMN* concept provides a broader approach, focused, just as it has been so far in NATO, on conducting research and development activities together with testing-evaluation ones, based on specific requirements for NRF and lessons learned from current operations. The essential contribution in this field was represented by the *CWIX*, *Steadfast Cobalt* and *Combined Endeavor* exercise and the technological initiatives *TACOMS* and *MIP*.

In keeping with the operational scenarios developed and the experience of AMN and CENTRIXs, *FMN* will ensure information flows in the following fields:

- operational planning;
- air situation and antiballistic defence;
- manoeuvre and freedom of movement;
- naval operation;
- command-control, effect management and synchronisation;
- joint fire support, target management;
- information operations;

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<sup>5</sup> Joining, Membership and Exiting Instructions.

- ISTAR;
- common operational picture (COP), battle space management;
- CIS networks management services;
- resource coordination, logistics and medical assistance;
- force protection.

INFOSEC matters have been a strong limiting factor for achieving network federations. If, in general, it is widely accepted that multi-level federations (with networks with different levels of classification) cannot be implemented yet, for various reasons, the current national and Alliance security limitations influence, at technical, but especially at procedural level, the ability to design and implement the federative mission networks on one level and with the efficiency and timeliness required by the operation commanders.

### National arguments

In the context of *Article 5* and based on the agreed arrangements, national defence requires that the joint operation in the event of any aggression against Romania should be led by a joint multinational command deployed on national territory, which will be able to subordinate the task force established by Romania for defence, in addition to the forces made available by other NATO members. In accordance with this principle, the participants in the operation shall exchange information based on a mission-oriented network, to which will have access NATO entities, national military ones, those with responsibilities in national security and public order (*The Defence, Public Order and National Security System – Sistemul de apărare, ordine publică și siguranță națională – SAOPSN*) included and, possibly, some other countries or organisations.

From the above-mentioned considerations for *FMN*, regarding the need for separating classified information from the strictly necessary information to accomplish the mission, the same principle should be applied at national level. Therefore, in a following stage, the NATO *NS* field is meant to connect the *INTRASS network* (top-secret level) of the Ministry of National Defence, ensuring the information framework for the consultation and information process. During peacetime, *INTRASS* will represent the main computer network of the Ministry at strategic level, which will be developed in stages towards the operational and tactical levels, in the static command points and the locations of the disposition during peacetime, up to the level of great tactical units (equivalent structures). It cannot be assimilated with a national mission network neither can it be part of a future *MS* federation of the Alliance (*FMN*), as the information sent and stored within it exceeds

the field of interest for which a mission network is provided, even for a NATO operation in the national territory.

The *INTRAMAN* network (confidential information level), although it is more developed currently, as a result of the classification level, cannot be engaged in *FMN*. It will continue to provide basic information flows in achieving command and control processes during peacetime, but cannot support information transfer or storage from the operational field (operations plans etc.) or *ISTAR* information, which will migrate in *INTRASS* for the beginning, and then exclusively use the resources of the mission network after it becomes operational.

Setting up the national mission network requires using the existing encrypted infrastructure in *RMNC* and establishing points of presence (PoP) in the participating structures. *NOC*<sup>6</sup> will be established, which will include the main servers of the network, including those for applications that will be available on the network. It will be connected via fibre, at least in two separate locations, both with the *INTRASS* network and with the NATO force mission network, using the proper information exchange gates (IEG).

In the deployable structures, PoP elements will be placed in portable containers or motor trucks, the servers and workstations being built based on existing mobile computer networks, which require top-secret level approval, in advance. Preferably, the terminals used in the mission network must be of *thin client* type (no storage media included), which will facilitate the implementation of security measures required for accreditation.

At battalion level, the mission network will be the only classified medium for dealing with operational information and will have variable development, depending on where the operation takes place (national territory or outside it), its type (national, NATO or coalition one), the tempo of actions etc. In some cases, when there is large stability in the disposition of command points, the mission network can reach to the level of the company or platoon that has a high independence degree.

The role of the national mission network must be understood in a broader context and not necessarily as an infrastructure that will be built on pre-established principles, but with ad-hoc composition (only in the case of the participation in an operation). It should be *operationalised from peacetime* and will become the main medium through which the exchange of information regarding drills and national exercises is made. Moreover, the participation in NATO exercises and the NRF, where the *MS* domain has become mandatory, requires

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<sup>6</sup> Network Operations Centre.

its accomplishment in keeping with the priorities, which must include, in the first stage, NOC and the points of presence of NRF structures and the force package, entities that can be engaged in multinational operations and must have network services available since “Day 1” of the operations. By achieving permanent interconnection with *INTRASS*, it can be adopted the solution of using mission network elements at battalion echelons in order to cover their top secret level in the peacetime locations, without the need to expand *INTRASS*.

Special attention should be paid to ensuring transport infrastructure necessary for achieving a reliable and redundant mission network. The process of sensors integration in the mission network will put special pressure on the existing capabilities, particularly the growing need to send live images to commanders at lower echelons. It is an already proved fact in Afghanistan that high definition real-time images have significantly reduced the need for their analysis performed by highly qualified personnel and has given the opportunity for direct use by the company and platoon commanders of intell data. Moreover, one must take into account storing these data, which require special capacities, if they are in HD format.

During the *CETATEA 2012* and *CETATEA 2013* interoperability exercises, a mission network was established, with classified information level, which aimed to provide information exchange between command-control structures of the Ministry of National Defence and operational centres of certain structures from the SAOPSN, in an operational context, through implementing and testing technical interoperability solutions and jointly conducting specific accreditation procedures. Although the information disseminated in the network during the exercise had no operational relevance, the following objectives were reached through the organisational, technical and procedure-related measures:

- training communications and information specialists of participating structures to ensure technical interoperability;
- identifying and implementing those security procedures which allow inter-institutional accreditation;
- testing basic network services;
- testing two different network encryption solutions;
- using accredited mobile computer networks of the participating Ministry structures.

The experience gained by the specialists of the structures involved after achieving the mission network of the exercise will provide technical and procedural support for the implementation of inter-institutional cooperation networks, based on online encryption solutions, using technology and nationally accredited algorithms.

Moreover, the experience will be useful in developing the concept of using and subsequently designing, implementing and operationalising the *Romanian Armed Forces Mission Network (Rețeaua de Misiune a Armatei Românei – REMISAR)*.

The decision-making process at all levels is the result of the analyses, development of courses of action and, finally, selection of the most advantageous course of action based on all available data and information. No military leader can make decisions solely based on information transfer solutions and network applications, which are meant to assist him, whenever he needs, with relevant information, from reliable, unprocessed or already analysed sources. The existence of multiple information networks, in different areas of classification, can lead to a situation where critical information is not immediately available, because it is in another network.

Information sharing issues are closely linked to the ones regarding the need to ensure information security, generating multiple procedural and technological barriers and it seems that the network-centric model adopted in recent years is already showing its limitations. It is expected that the development of information systems shifts from *net-centric* model to *data-centric* one, which requires that the solutions based on different types of networks are abandoned and a single type of network (preferably, from the *MS* field) is adopted, with implementing effective and standardised solutions regarding information classification, security and its management, as well as users identity management, which will lead to the establishment of *user communities* and to the implementation of the *need to know* principle, with maximum efficiency and flexibility.

**English version by**  
✍️ *Iulia NĂSTASIE*

# THE TRAINING AND DOCTRINE DIRECTORATE – 10 Years in NATO –

*Colonel Olivian STĂNICĂ*

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*The Training and Doctrine Directorate is currently the specialised structure of the General Staff responsible for the coordination, conduct and evaluation of the training process, military forces readiness, drawing up of specific regulations, military doctrines and manuals, general military regulations and expertise for military publications design process, standardisation, lessons learned, and military education system.*

*Since gaining NATO membership, the Romanian Armed Forces training system has required the collateral implementation of four activities: to redesign the training doctrinaire system; to differentiate it on training levels, structures and forms; to evaluate the training; to implement and further develop the system.*

**Keywords:** *common training; readiness; standardisation; lessons learned*

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**A**s a result of Romania's integration in the North Atlantic Alliance, the military body has undergone radical transformations, which have led to reconsidering the structural architecture of the doctrinaire system and developing new defence documents: strategies, doctrines, manuals and military regulations, techniques, tactics and standard operating procedures. In this context, the *Training and Doctrine Directorate*, established in 1997 as a structure of the General Staff, after going through a short period of reorganisations and a three-year temporary disappearance, is re-established in 2004, the year of Romania's accession to NATO, as a General Staff structure under the name of *Doctrine and Training Directorate* (J7). The restructuring process continues and, in 2006, the Directorate's structure is reassessed, according to its new responsibilities and is named the *Readiness, Force Generation and Evaluation Directorate*. Subsequently, in 2009, after the last reorganisation of the Ministry of National Defence, the structure is named the *Training and Doctrine*

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Colonel Olivian Stănică – the Training and Doctrine Directorate, the General Staff, the Ministry of National Defence.

*Directorate.* The successive reorganisations completed by the Directorate have required that the functionality of the component bodies is reviewed “on the fly” following the in-depth analysis of the areas of responsibility, tasks and their accomplishment, given the complex circumstances generated by large personnel fluctuation.

Therefore, the *Training and Doctrine Directorate* is currently the specialised structure of the General Staff responsible for the coordination, conduct and evaluation of the training process, military forces readiness, drawing up of specific regulations, military doctrines and manuals, general military regulations and expertise for military publications design process, standardisation, lessons learned, and military education system.

Since gaining NATO membership, the Romanian Armed Forces *Training System* has been focused on and adapted to the new requirements of future missions within the Alliance, which has required the collateral implementation of four activities: *to redesign the training doctrinaire system; to differentiate it on training levels, structures and forms; to evaluate the training; to implement and further develop the system.*

To ensure a proper conceptual framework in this area, the specific training regulations have been continuously adjusted, in order to achieve the interoperability with allied forces during not only operations, but also the mission training stage, in the context of an enhanced rate of common training activities with allied forces.

We can state that, at this time, the training process developed within the Romanian Armed Forces is standardised both for deployable and non-deployable forces, because there have been completed the drawing up, experimentation and implementation of the *Mission Training Programmes/MTP*, which are the most important products to standardise the collective training, as they enable the convergence of human and material resources according to established priorities, and the *Individual Training Programmes/ITP*, which contribute to increasing accountability on how the training is performed and evaluated, with the possibility of determining with greater objectivity the training level attained by each military individual.

To ensure the interoperability between Romanian Armed Forces and other NATO member nations, given the need to meet international military commitments in the field of training and exercises, as well as in other areas, the whole training process has been adapted according to the model applied in other NATO member nations armed forces. Consequently, in 2006, *S.M.G./I.F.-7/2006 – Armed Forces Training Doctrine* is developed, under the motto: “*Train as you fight!*”, being the fundamental document for harmonising the legal framework.

In this respect, starting with 2007, by order of the Chief of the General Staff, clear objectives and priorities, as well as a unitary regulation for the planning, conduct and evaluation of training and exercises for a three-year period have been established and updated annually, based on the analysis of how the mission's requirements have been accomplished.

In 2011, it is approved the *Directive for the Planning, Conduct and Analysis of Exercises within the Romanian Armed Forces*. Applied experimentally in 2011 and implemented since 2012, the Directive provides a unitary framework for planning, organising, conducting and analysing the exercises in the Romanian Armed Forces and harmonises the national provisions with the Alliance ones, a prerequisite to ensure the interoperability amongst Romanian Armed Forces and the other NATO member/partner nations' armed forces.

In 2012, for the first time in the General Staff, it is designed the *List with the general requirements for training and exercises*, to be used by the Armed Forces Headquarters and Single Service Command when they fulfil the *List with the specific requirements for training and exercises* of their own organisations.

The changes within the training field have been required not only by the change in the Romanian Armed Forces status, but also by NATO's continuous transformation. If, before, NATO saw *the training* as a responsibility of each member nation, therefore each of them was free to decide on how to train their own forces, currently, this view is about to be replaced by another one, aiming even at establishing a *training system* at Alliance level.

For achieving full operational transformation and integration goals of the Romanian Armed Forces in NATO, as well as accomplishing the commitments made at international level, the national training process is constantly improving, based on the following priorities: to standardise the individual and collective training; to implement the NATO evaluation system concerning the units operational capability; to professionalise (through training) the whole Armed Forces personnel; to modernise the military education system.

Specific for this period is the priority action of military structures to economically allocate and use financial resources according to their role, place, mission, available resources, staffing and technical equipment. Therefore, the way in which training and exercises will be carried out for subordinate units, on three levels of training, has been established at the level of Armed Forces Headquarters and Single Service Command, starting from the *Mission Essential Tasks List/METL*, as follows:

*Level 1* – the structures assigned for NATO, the structures prepared to become operational during the current year, the structures earmarked for NATO Response

Force (NRF), the European Union Battle Groups (EUBG) for the current year and the 1<sup>st</sup> semester of the next year, the structures designated for combat service or service intervention and the forces earmarked for missions outside the Romanian territory during the current year and the 1<sup>st</sup> semester of the next year carry out training and exercises up to Battalion/Brigade (similar) collective training stage.

*Level 2* – the structures planned to become operational during the next year, the structures designed to carry out missions outside the Romanian territory during the 2<sup>nd</sup> semester of the next year, the structures designed for regional initiatives, and the structures trained for immediate reaction on national territory execute training and exercises up to Company (similar) collective training stage.

*Level 3* – the structures that are not found in the *Level 1* and *2* categories perform the training and exercises up to Platoon (similar) collective training stage.

For the Romanian Armed Forces, the specific activities of the *operational evaluation* represent significant milestones of the efforts made for integration and affirmation in NATO. The purpose of the evaluation stage is to check, in terms of resources and performance, if the units that reached operational readiness are provided with and equipped according to Alliance standards, so that they could be deployed abroad in order to meet specific missions in a multinational context.

Adopting NATO standards and evaluation procedures is the first step in achieving interoperability and as proof for their achievement stands the process of the affirmation of forces, by multinational training events organised and held at NATO level (such as the case of the frigates) or hosted by Romania, with the direct involvement of NATO (such as the affirmation of Air Force and Land Forces structure).

Thus, since 2005, the first Romanian military structures made available to the Alliance have been assessed and formally recognised by NATO (JFC HQ Naples) during the *DEMEX 05* Exercise and later, during the *ROMEX 05* Exercise, then *NOBLE MIDAS 08* Exercise (the affirmation of a *22 type* frigate of the Naval Forces). The evaluation exercises in the series *ROUEX* (07 and 09) are the top of the evaluation process due to the large number of units belonging to all Armed Forces Services and Supporting Commands. During the exercises, CIMIC structures, special operations forces, EOD, tactical air control parties, military intelligence teams and brigade-level structures were also assessed.

During 2005-2006, General Staff decision-makers decided that there was a need for a specialised structure to manage the process of preparing the forces' readiness and affirmation for the next years, at the same time with a gradual inclusion

of military structures into NATO evaluation programmes. The structure could also represent the General Staff in the relationship with NATO Commands – SHAPE and JFC Napoli. That is why, and in relation to the continuing evaluation process of those structures earmarked for NATO, in 2007, some organisational actions were taken, thus the *Readiness, Force Generation and Evaluation Directorate* being established, with a specialised section to coordinate the force evaluation process.

At conceptual and doctrinaire level, under the coordination of the newly established Evaluation Section within the General Staff, directives and instructions aligned to NATO manuals (*CREVAL*, *TACEVAL* and *MAREVAL*) have been elaborated to apply NATO procedures in order to supervise and assess the operational level of the structures. To form evaluators specialised in applying NATO requirements and standards, specific actions have been taken in order to send military personnel to NATO accredited courses or invite NATO mobile teams to form and qualify military personnel specialised in applying evaluation procedures. The efforts in this direction resulted in the organisation of a *CREVAL mobile course to prepare the evaluators*, to which more than 100 participants from all Command structures of the Land Forces Staff and the General Staff attended.

The Air Force Staff sent an important number of specialists to attend the *TACEVAL* mobile course organised at NATO Command at Izmir (at that time) for training. These evaluators formed in 2007 were maintained and contributed to the successful evaluation activity conducted during the next period, 2007-2013. The Naval Force Staff acted according to the principle “*train the trainer*” in terms of evaluator development, managing to establish, ever since 2006, the “*Training, Simulation and Evaluation Centre*”, which is constantly developing, having the objective of gaining a NATO accreditation for operating at regional level.

Currently, the assessment of structures made available to NATO is a priority concern for the General Staff leadership in the context in which a generalised force training quality management is intended, in order to fulfil the assigned missions. Therefore, the achievement of the requirements related to equipment supply and training standards is subject to stringent analysis.

Substantial transformations within the Romanian Armed Forces were also made in the process of “*standardisation-interoperability*” with NATO/EU member nations military structures.

The activity of *military standardisation* in the Romanian Armed Forces is developed under the General Staff coordination and in collaboration with the Armament Department. Since its establishment, in 2004, the purpose has been to gradually raise the degree of interoperability between national forces and forces of other states member of international bodies Romania is also part of.

Given the nature of NATO membership, in the Romanian Armed Forces, the standardisation has focused its efforts on agreeing to and implementing NATO standardisation documents, based on the fact that the STANAG portfolio covers specific military fields and provides their required standardisation.

During this period, the documents that regulate the military standardisation activity in the Romanian Armed Forces have been drawn up and reviewed in accordance with the newly achieved NATO membership. 2008 represented a milestone year, in which the medium term objective (2008-2015) of the *Romanian Armed Forces Standardisation Strategy* came into force, by which priorities for a fully operational integration in NATO and the European Union were established.

A regulatory framework was rapidly developed for coping with the new challenges for force development in order to fulfil Alliance missions. Thus, the Minister of National Defence issued *Order no. M.169/2004 to approve SMG/Std.-1 "Instructions concerning the standardisation activity in the Romanian Armed Forces"*, reviewed and updated in 2012, and *Order no. M.171/2004 to approve the "Directive for the organisation and operating of the Standardisation and Interoperability Council"*. In 2006, the *Standardisation Concept in the Romanian Armed Forces* was developed.

Since 2004, the efforts and approaches in the field have resulted in 1 237 STANAGs out of a total of 1 413 active NATO STANAGs (promulgated and pending promulgation), which have been analysed and for which documents have been submitted in response to *agreement requests*. For 586 of them, the confirmation that they have been *implemented* (completely – 402, partially – 184) has already been submitted to NATO. This year, a number of other 71 STANAGs are "*under consideration*", and 53 are planned for 2015.

Currently, the standardisation activity seeks to achieve medium-term objectives (2008-2015) of the *Romanian Armed Forces Standardisation Strategy*. Current planning tools are the "*Annual Programme for Agreement and Implementation of STANAG for 2014*" and the "*Multiannual Plan for Agreement and Implementation of STANAG for 2014-2019*".

The standardisation activity has resulted in the creation of prerequisites for achieving interoperability of Romanian Armed Forces with allied forces.

The agreement and implementation of the STANAGs associated to NATO doctrinaire hierarchy (those doctrines considered "*keystone*" and "*capstone*") have laid the foundations for the *operational interoperability* between the Romanian Armed Forces and the other NATO member states' armed forces.

For the Romanian Armed Forces, this decade of membership of the North Atlantic Alliance has also meant changes in the *doctrines, military regulations and manuals*,

all of which represent the conceptual support for organising, conducting and evaluating the training process in accordance with the new action requirements of the Romanian Armed Forces and in the national and allied international environment, determined by the new realities of the security environment, the need to optimise command structures and force structures and the new coordinates of the NATO transformation process.

According to the provisions of *Romania's National Security Strategy* and *National Strategy for Homeland Defence*, the Romanian Armed Forces perform missions outside the Romanian territory as an active part of the process of implementing regional and global stability. This requires the participation in collective defence operations, crisis response operations outside the NATO area of responsibility, crisis management operations under the aegis of the EU, UN-mandated peacekeeping missions and operations carried out within coalitions of the willing. The new concept of *force professionalisation and small and flexible forces*, the emergence of new weapons systems, the shorter time interval for decision-making, correlated with the requirements of the Romanian Armed Forces transformation process, have imposed the review and adjustment of the existing conceptual framework and the development of doctrines to ensure the education and training of armed forces that are compatible and interoperable with NATO/EU member and partner nations. To fulfil the missions assigned in compliance with the Constitution and the commitments made within international organisations, the Romanian Armed Forces have created a modern doctrinaire architecture, through their specialised structure of the Doctrine and Training Directorate, namely the *Section for doctrines and regulations*. This architecture is harmonised with NATO doctrine in terms of joint military action, has set the overall framework for total transformation of the Romanian military body and has substantiated the general conceptual transformation framework of the military institution. Knowing, understanding and applying doctrines as essential documents for designing and conducting military actions mainly at joint level have led to understanding the principles of using the armed forces in close connection with the national, regional and international context.

The new doctrinaire system has resulted in increased competence at all levels of command, increased efficiency in using human, financial and material resources available and has guided the commanders/chiefs at all levels in establishing the appropriate framework of action. Romania's participation as a member in Allied Joint Operation Working Group/AJODWG conferences on issues regarding allied doctrines for joint operations has boosted the process of harmonising the joint national doctrines with allied doctrines, creating the necessary tools needed

by all the commanders of the expeditionary forces made available by our country to coalitions in theatres of operations.

In 2007, Romania hosted the spring session of the NATO Working Group on issues of Allied Joint Doctrine – AJOD-WG, held in București for a week. The activity was initiated and organised by the *Training and Doctrine Directorate* and was highly praised by all 81 participants, enhancing the integration process into the Alliance and being a reliable partner for NATO activity.

Quantitatively speaking, the structures of the General Staff have developed 32 doctrines that are fully harmonised in terms of content with the allied doctrines for joint operations, and arranged in a national doctrinaire hierarchy available for all structures of the Ministry of National Defence, through the specialised structure within the Directorate.

At present, the *Training and Doctrine Directorate* has the capacity to implement all the doctrinaire tasks resulted from the Alliance decisions and defence policies, and national strategies, ensuring the conceptual dynamism required by the process of transformation and full integration of the national military body within the Euro-Atlantic structures, in accordance with the *Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy* and the new NATO and EU concepts, namely the *Connected Forces Initiative (CFI)*, *Framework Nation (FNC)*, *Smart Defence (SD)* and *Pooling and Sharing*.

The lessons learned resulted from participating in the above-mentioned missions and various other exercises and international missions have facilitated a modern rethinking process of the training procedures and methods, content of military publications issued, providing a good opportunity for conceptually clarifying and accomplishing the “*intellectual compatibility*” of military personnel, a mission in which our Directorate is deeply involved through its *lessons learned* structure.

The end of 2003 and the beginning of 2004 are the cornerstone of the organisation and implementation of the *Unitary Lessons Learned System* in the Romanian Armed Forces.

“*The Working Plan for Developing the Concept regarding the Lessons Learned Programme*” and the “*Action Plan for Implementing the Lessons Learned during International Missions by National Detachments in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina Theatres of Operations*” are the initiating documents based on which the organisational framework of the lessons learned process was developed later:

- 2006 – *Concept on Lessons Learned in the Romanian Armed Forces*;

- 2007 – *Methodology for Developing Lessons Learned in Romanian Armed Forces*;
- 2009 – *Guidelines on the Lessons Learned System within the General Staff and its subordinate structures*.

From a structural point of view, the *Lessons Learned* domain was managed both by specialised structures, offices/departments and by specialists in the field.

Defined as a priority objective within the Directorate, the Lessons Learned domain facilitated, among other things, the improvement of future military activities, information collection and storage in specific databases, information dissemination towards beneficiaries, processing of a large number of reports, and the possibility of adapting and updating already developed doctrine, manuals, specific rules and regulations.

By the implementation of the Lessons Learned System in Romanian Armed Forces, a number of 2 758 lessons identified, and other 125 lessons learned already implemented in specific documents and operational procedures were capitalised on during 2007-2013. The collection of observations from more than 200 fields of activity within military units is the most important feature of the General Staff *Lessons Learned* System. The lessons learned analysed, together with the risks, the information collected during the annual self-assessment/assessment activities, the findings provided during the control and inspection activities at a given time of reference, the information made available by the armed forces of member countries for NATO and EU can provide an integrated picture needed for reaching the objectives of military structures.

In support of these assertions, we mention the conclusion drawn by the representatives of NATO Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre and Allied Command Transformation at the end of their official visit in 26-28.03.2012: *“The Romanian Armed Forces Lessons Learned System is complementary to the NATO Lessons Learned System and upholds military honour”*.

It is very important to mention that the *first Specialisation Course in Lessons Learned in the Romanian Armed Forces* was organised beginning with the academic year 2013-2014. The educational activities for the first series, held during 11-22.11.2013, were conducted in cooperation with the National Defence University “*Carol I*” and the NATO Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre, and were considered a successful event for NATO. The activity received media coverage on the *NATO Lessons Learned Portal – NLLP* and on the *Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (JALLC)*.

*Military education*, a domain under the responsibility of the Education Section, together with training, exercises and job assignments practice (gaining experience),

is one of the four pillars of the training system, as described in the “*Romanian Armed Forces Training Doctrine*”, document adapted to the specific of NATO forces training.

The main feature of *military education* during these 10 years in NATO has been the continuation of the structural and content reform, at the same time with the active and reserve military personnel development, improvement and specialisation plan.

Here are some capstones of the education system:

- in 2005 – the establishment of the *Regional Centre for Defence Resources Management*, under the subordination of the National Defence University “*Carol I*”;
- in 2005/2006 – the “*Bologna Process*” requirements were implemented within the Armed Forces services academies, National Defence University “*Carol I*”, and Technical Military Academy by applying the provisions of *Law 288/2004 on organising higher education for bachelor’s, master’ and doctoral diplomas*;
- starting with 2005/2006 – the length of bachelor’s studies, in *military science and intelligence* domain, was reduced from 4 to 3 years, and in *engineer science* domain from 5 to 4 years; higher studies for master’s degree are introduced with a length of 2 or 1,5 years, and the duration of doctoral studies are reduced from 4 to 3 years.

Starting from the responsibility of managing the education process in the Romanian Armed Forces, the *Education Section*, in cooperation with specialised bodies of the Human Resource Management Directorate and the Ministry of Education, have developed and implemented strategies, policies and regulations on military personnel selection and training, ensured the interface between military education and national education, and between the former and the military education in other states, coordinated the process of drafting the “*Graduate’s model*” for military personnel, and of designing the education curriculum for the military education, according to the National/European Qualifications Framework.

Another goal sought was to correlate European education standards with the national ones, drawn up by the RAQAPE (Romanian Agency for Quality Assurance in Pre-University Education) and RAQAHE (Romanian Agency for Quality Assurance in Higher Education).

The education programmes of the National Defence University “*Carol I*”, Technical Military Academy, academies of armed forces services, military schools for WOs/ NCOs, application schools/training centres have been reviewed

and adapted to the requirements resulting from the new *National Education Law* and the strategies, doctrines, NATO/EU procedures and standards. This process has aimed at including all NATO standards agreed upon and implemented by specific national publications.

*Another concern of the military education was the cooperation with the American partner. Therefore, the Air Force sent three students from the Air Force Academy “Henry Coandă” in Braşov to USA Air Force Academy, for initial professional development. Furthermore, the same Air Force selected and sent more than 30 military personnel to study different forms of higher development. These specialists presently have a decision-making role in various central structures of the intelligence, defence, public order and national security system.*

*In 2010, Romania hosted a weeklong spring session of the NATO Working Group for Individual Training and Educational Development (NTG IT&ED), in Bucureşti. The activity was initiated and organised by the Training and Doctrine Directorate and was highly praised by all the 45 participants, contributing in a substantial manner to the process of integration in the Alliance, as a credible partner in terms of training, education and Advanced Distributed Learning (ADL) in NATO.*

By the establishment of the *Land Forces NCOs Training Centre*, in 1999, with American support, the foundation of training and development of this military category was laid. Later on, in 2001, the Centre was included in the Land Forces Military School for WOs and NCOs “*Basarab I*”. The focus was on implementing career and development courses in order to enhance the skills regarding small group leadership, NCO instructor, and training and education specialist.

The *CUBIC Defence Group*, an American consulting agency, has actively and permanently paid attention to developing NCOs career by initiating specific courses: *Junior NCO Course; Commander’s Counsellor Course; Battle Staff Course; Train the Trainers Course.*

The close cooperation with the American partner can also be noticed in the BSRF (*Black Sea Rotational Force*)-type common training programmes, in which the American and Romanian military personnel in collaboration with different armed forces from Black Sea bordering countries develop common training exercises annually, with very good results.


The main outcome of the common training activity and programmes is given by a permanent evolution of the career development and training level, remarkable results of Romanian military personnel in the theatres of operations and a successful presence of Romania in NATO common exercises.

These are only a few representative keystones of the *Training and Doctrine Directorate* that have fundamentally influenced the specific engagement of the structure in the operational configuration of the General Staff.

In brief, we may say that the outcomes we have acquired are the prerequisites for fulfilling medium-term objectives the *Training and Doctrine Directorate* is responsible for, which are specific to the second stage of the *Romanian Forces Transformation Strategy*, “*The stage of operational integration within NATO and the European Union*”, a process that is scheduled to take place between 2008 and 2015.

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# THE ROLE OF THE STRUCTURES AND ARMAMENT PLANNING DIRECTORATE IN THE ROMANIAN ARMED FORCES TRANSFORMATION PROCESS

*Fleet Rear Admiral (N) Dr Cătălin-Silviu DUMISTRĂCEL*

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*The Romanian Armed Forces transformation process has derived from the Alliance new strategic orientations and major changes that have allowed for expanding the range of objectives and processes, structuring and preparing forces to participate in collective defence, as well as for enhancing the capabilities to be used in the entire spectrum of crisis management operations and in the multinational operations to combat terrorism.*

*In the context of forces, concepts and capabilities transformation, the Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy represents the medium and long-term vision of the size, training and equipment of the armed forces to participate in future operations.*

**Keywords:** *mobility; command and control; interoperability*

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**T**en years ago Romania became a full-fledged member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and its national flag was hoisted alongside the ones of other 25 states at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. The event marked the end of a period of profound transformation of the Romanian society and implicitly of the military body, resulting in our country firm option of adhering to the Euro-Atlantic democratic values and of defending them, employing the instruments specific to collective security. Up to the moment it joined NATO, Romania was actively involved in the actions of the PFP, including NATO operations, such as those in the Balkans, participating in activities that covered a wide range of actions, from information ones to complex exercises.

Romania's strategic position has been an important element in the North Atlantic strategy. In this regard, the President of the US, George Bush, visiting București in 2004, after the Prague Summit,

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Fleet Rear Admiral (N) Dr Cătălin-Silviu Dumistrăcel – Deputy Chief of the Structures and Armament Planning Directorate, the General Staff, the Ministry of National Defence.

stated that “*Romania should become a NATO outpost and a multiplier of NATO strategy in the Black Sea region*”.

These efforts and motivations have played an important role in enhancing interoperability, bringing us closer and closer to the standards of modern armed forces, adapted, in terms of structure, decision-making process and training, to the changing security environment requirements.

Following the increase in the number and the complexity of threats and operations, NATO, in turn, has undergone a transformation process related to its collective defence system, which has represented a challenge and a constant requirement for each member state. Furthermore, given the global financial crisis and the limited resources allocated to defence, member states are required to make additional efforts to maintain the defence system to optimal standards.

The Romanian Armed Forces transformation process, otherwise a natural necessity, has derived from the Alliance new strategic orientations and major changes that have allowed for expanding the range of objectives and processes, structuring and preparing forces to participate in collective defence, as well as for enhancing the capabilities to be used in the entire spectrum of crisis management operations and in the multinational operations to combat terrorism.

In the context of forces, concepts and capabilities transformation, the *Romanian Armed Forces Transformation Strategy* represents the medium and long-term vision of the size, training and equipment of the armed forces to participate in future operations. It provides decision-makers with a consolidated picture regarding the future configuration of the force structure and the capabilities necessary for the Romanian Armed Forces to carry out their missions. The adopted and designed concepts and capabilities are translated into requirements and plans through the process of defence planning in compliance with NATO standards.

Romania effectively contributes, through restructuring and modernisation activities, to NATO transformation process meant to provide the Alliance with flexible capabilities, able to deploy quickly and respond to new types of threats (terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyber attacks and so on).

The Romanian Armed Forces restructuring and modernisation have been the area of responsibility of the entities entrusted with the human and material resources management both before and after accession. This process has been aimed at aligning the new structures to the ones existing in the armed forces of allied states, providing them with high-performance equipment and assets, and making military spending, mainly that with personnel and operation, more efficient.

Since the establishment of the Great General Staff and the organisation of modern Romanian Armed Forces, it has been felt the need for a specialised

structure to manage the Romanian Armed Forces organisation and modernisation programmes. It worked in various forms and had different names up to 1 November 2006, when, by the Order of the Minister of National Defence no. B.5/1777, the *Structures and Armament Planning Directorate – J.8 (SAPD)* was established within the General Staff. In the current organisation it has three services as follows: the Structures Service, the Armament Planning Service, and the Major Programmes Coordination and Assessment Service.

The *Structures and Armament Planning Directorate* functions as a specialised structure within the General Staff and the Ministry of National Defence, having responsibilities in the following areas:

- a. the Romanian Armed Forces structural design and organisational sizing;
- b. the development and management of the documents specific to the structures organisation;
- c. the armament and equipment planning;
- d. the coordination of the operational requirements-related activities and the development of procurement regulations;
- e. the unitary coordination of the major programmes related to the General Staff and the Romanian Armed Forces force structure;
- f. the centralisation, analysis and assessment of the estimated costs for the development of military capabilities related to the major programmes coordinated by the General Staff.

The *Structures and Armament Planning Directorate* contributes to the continuation of the Romanian Armed Forces restructuring and modernisation process by their *structural design and organisational sizing*, managing the force structure necessary positions, in terms of personnel categories and budget items. To meet the above-mentioned objectives the Directorate:

- develops the staff establishment in compliance with the *Standard Organisational Structures Catalogue* provisions and the capability requirements established by *NATO Capability Code* for the structures that carry out establishment, reorganisation, and transformation activities, implemented by the *Framework Plan for the Continuation of the Romanian Armed Forces Restructuring and Modernisation Process*;
- standardises the staff establishment according to the types of structure, weapons and specific assets in inventory, depending on the structure readiness level and the ratio between peace and war establishment, especially for the structures in the rapid response force package and those committed by capability targets;
- ensures the number of positions and fills them at the level of consolidated structures according to the “*bottom-up*” principle;

- completes the consolidated structures positions in peace establishment, according to the level of operational capacity, by supplementing the present one and without exceeding the number of budgeted positions;
- identifies the optimal solutions for the modification of the staff establishment of the structures that are subordinate to the General Staff, filling the present allocated positions.

The analyses of restructuring activities have been aimed at guiding decision-makers through the change in the military system personnel structure (by military category, rank, branches and military specialities etc.) mainly focusing on the structures increasing professionalisation, enhancing education and training, improving the use of personnel etc.

The goal of the *force structure organisational design* process in the Romanian Armed Forces is to create a national military body to fully meet the modernity and effectiveness standards specific to the armed forces of NATO and the EU member states.

Military *procurement*, to which *SAPD* consistently contributes, is and will remain the basic “*pillar*” in the implementation of new operational concepts: decision superiority, decisive manoeuvre, precision engagement, integral protection of own forces and integrated logistics. All these concepts should be supported by well-equipped and trained forces that will operate safe and effective armament platforms and systems, and high-precision ammunition.

In compliance with the *Romanian Armed Forces Procurement Strategy*, the fundamental objectives of the procurement process are:

- to provide the military structures with equipment and armament systems that are necessary to meet Romania’s operational capabilities commitments in the defence planning process;
- to permanently renew the equipment and armament by phasing procurement during the assets life cycle;
- to standardise and assure the quality of equipment and armament by ensuring the compatibility of those in own inventory with those in the inventory of the armed forces of NATO and the EU member states;
- to complete the process of transition to military capabilities procurement.

To meet the procurement process objectives the following criteria are considered:

- to procure armament systems to meet NATO requirements related to precision, mobility, flexibility and interoperability and to allow the accomplishment of missions at the desired efficiency standards;
- to mainly equip the rapid response forces, the forces deployed in the theatres of operations, the deployable forces, especially special

operations forces and those engaged by Romania's commitments in NATO and the EU, in compliance with the force structure projection in the Romanian Armed Forces;

- to achieve a communications and information network infrastructure able to ensure support for decision-making at strategic level;
- to ensure integrated logistic support not only for new systems but also for the ones in inventory;
- to revitalise and modernise existing combat equipment in order to extend the life of armament systems and enhance their performance;
- to standardise the types of equipment that are common to armed forces services.

The implementation of procurement objectives entails modern and common procedures at national level to identify the forms of cooperation within the government and the private sector in order to meet the commitments (obligations) related to the procurement/modernisation projects and programmes development, management and control as well as to obtain the synergistic effect of the actions of military and civilian experts. This cooperation will allow supporting the capability of the Romanian defence industry and the industry in its aggregate in a competitive international environment.

In the process of the Romanian military body restructuring and modernisation, *defence planning* has been a priority, this area being correctly perceived as one of paramount importance to the success of military reform, in general, and of our efforts aimed at full NATO integration, in particular.

As in other important actions, the Romanian Armed Forces have become the "*pioneer*" of the process of adopting modern resource management concepts and systems, materialised in the gradual implementation of the *Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Evaluation System (PPBES)*. The system is designed to strengthen and improve the activities performed in the field of defending national values and interests, through the more efficient use of available resources, and to achieve compatibility with the common defence planning process used in NATO. The main features of *PPBES* are: centralised planning, delegation of responsibility to programme directors to develop the programmes within the financial allocations, budget preparation and decentralised budget execution, competition for resources, increased flexibility. Programme managers are given autonomy for all account titles of expenses: personnel, operations and maintenance, assets (procurement and infrastructure).

Through systematic efforts and with the advice and expertise offered by NATO partners, the programme-based planning system has continuously grown and gradually become functional.

PPBE process is based on the consistency of policies, visions, strategies, concepts, objectives and priorities derived from defence planning documents, iteratively taking the specific steps to determine the actions that should be performed to meet the set objectives, the related costs, the consistency between them and the available resources.

The General Staff, through the *Structures and Armament Planning Directorate*, coordinates the application of the PPBE system-specific principles at the level of the General Staff and the force structure major programmes, by including, reanalysing and reprioritising the actions and allocated resources to meet own objectives.

In order to ensure the consistency and continuity of the “chain of command”, the vertical hierarchical relations in this field, specialised structures having similar responsibilities function at the level of the General Staff, the armed forces services, and the support commands, as shown in *table 1*.

Table 1

Echelon	Structure	Fields of activity
General Staff	Structures and Armament Planning Directorate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• structures (structures design and evolution, staff establishment development);</li> <li>• armament planning;</li> <li>• major programmes coordination and evaluation.</li> </ul>
	GS/SC Major Programme Section	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• GS/Strategic Command Major Programme management;</li> <li>• budget and cost estimate.</li> </ul>
Land Forces Staff	Structures and Armament Planning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• structures (structures design and evolution, staff establishment development);</li> <li>• procurement;</li> <li>• major programme management (Land Forces, Air Force, Naval Forces, Logistic Support);</li> <li>• budget and cost estimate.</li> </ul>
Air Force Staff	Structures and Armament Planning	
Naval Forces Staff	Structures and Armament Planning	
Joint Logistics Command	Structures and Armament Planning	
Communications and Information Command	Planning and Budget Financing Bureau and Mobilisation Bureau (also managing the staff establishment)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• staff establishment;</li> <li>• budget planning and execution.</li> </ul>

In the current structure, the SAPD has demonstrated its effectiveness, working as an integration structure that, in conjunction with the other entities within the General Staff or subordinate to it, as well as with the central structures in the Ministry of National Defence, forwards documented proposals to the decision-makers to provide immediate, short-, medium, or long-term solutions

to the major issues facing the Romanian Armed Forces, considering the priorities and allocated resources.

The courses of action for the Romanian Armed Forces modernisation in the post-accession period, to which the *Structures and Armament Planning Directorate* has significantly contributed, are as follows:

- fundamental review of the force structure to meet the challenges related to the new security environment and NATO membership;
- provision of the financial support tailored and documented by the *PPBES* for the forces, activities and resources in the Ministry of National Defence, at the level of the General Staff and the force structure;
- achievement of balanced structures and effective ways of redundancy and personnel social protection, leading to personnel cost reduction and allowing the resources redirection to the military structures training and modernisation;
- assessment of major ongoing procurement programmes to maintain and continue those that are justified in the current context of NATO membership and abandon those that no longer meet current interests and are resource-consuming.

Alongside the restructuring and modernisation process the initiation and implementation of other procurement programmes have been considered, aiming at the enhancement of the force structure performance. Meanwhile, organisationally, structures have been dissolved, reorganised, resubordinated and established.

All these efforts have been aimed at the achievement of a lean, flexible, modular, compact force structure able to deploy and sustain in theatres of operations.

Romania's NATO membership requires a continuous process of assimilation and adaptation to the trends of this organisation, given the fact that most member states undergo an extensive transformation process similar to the one the Romanian Armed Forces undergo.

To achieve structural interoperability an important role has been played by using the available information regarding the similar structures in the armed forces of the other NATO member states as well as by creatively capitalising on own military tradition.

The resources used to achieve the Romanian Armed Forces transformation are material, financial and organisational. The efficiency of their use will be ensured by following the principles relating to the integrated programme-based management and the coordination of the institutions involved in the use of resources, as well as by measures to enhance the transparency in the use of public funds for the benefit of taxpayers.

The essence of transformation is the transition from “defence armed forces” to “stability armed forces” with a focus on maximising the effectiveness of the forces.

We share the idea that the military reform, in general, and the command and control architecture redesign, in particular, is a continuous process, the Alliance itself undergoing a process of transformation and adaptation to the newly identified challenges, and the Romanian Armed Forces reform and modernisation process should be fully harmonised with these developments in NATO and the EU.

The *Structures and Armament Planning Directorate* has been the General Staff specialised structure responsible for planning and monitoring the activities related to the implementation of the programmes meant to establish, modernise and train the structures in the Romanian Armed Forces organisation, according to the priorities and the allocated resources, in order to achieve a force structure that is modern, downsized, professionalised, properly equipped, deployable, interoperable, having self-sustaining and multidimensional protection capabilities, and a flexible command, able, based on optimal information and data, to make rapid decisions, a force structure capable of participating in joint actions and of being engaged in a wide range of missions, in compliance with the commitments to NATO and the EU.

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**English version by**

 **Diana Cristiana LUPU**

# **COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION COMMAND**

## **– The Path to Performance after Romania’s Accession to NATO –**

*Colonel Octavian RAȚIU  
Lieutenant Colonel Cătălin DASCĂLU*

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*The Communications and Information Command is an active participant, every year, in the major multinational or bilateral NATO/EU exercises, such as: “Combined Endeavor”, “Rousofex”, “HeraldHermes”, “Danube Guard”, “ROUEX”, “MILREX”, “Jackal Stone”, “Steadfast Cathode”, “Able Staff”.*

*The Communications and Information Command is interested in participating in the concept of Smart Defence. Currently, national CIS specialists are trained in e-learning by using information technology means with CISCO Academy from the Communications and Information Training Centre “Decebal” in Sibiu.*

**Keywords:** *technologic support; organisational transformation; satellite communications*

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**T**he transformation process the *Communications and Information Command* has undergone since Romania joined NATO entails tailoring its structures and capabilities to respond properly to the complex tasks of ensuring connections. From this perspective, the best solutions have been searched so that the Command can achieve the optimal structural and organisational performance (referring to its last two transformations), as follows:

- the transformation on 01.05.2006 was essentially aimed at the Command’s structure alignment with the tasks and assignments generated by Romania’s NATO membership;
- the transformation on 01.08.2008, which was aimed at adjusting the Command according to the rules generally accepted by NATO member states regarding the personnel.

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Colonel Octavian Rațiu, Lieutenant Colonel Cătălin Dascălu – the Communications and Information Command, the General Staff, the Ministry of National Defence.

The *Communications and Information Command* participates in the national capabilities development through the activities associated with the capability targets implementation process, under the coordination of the Communications and Information Directorate as follows:

- *E 5203 N: Static Networks;*
- *E 5204 N: Deployable Networks;*
- *E 5308 N: Information Assurance and Cyber Defence.*

Between April and May 2004, NATO Point of Presence in Romania, within the Military Information Systems and Services Agency, as well as *CRONOS network (ROUNSNNOAN)* became operational. Within *NATO Point of Presence* in Romania, the following services are provided:

- NATO private data network – *ROUNSNNOAN*;
- exchange of recognised air picture (*RAP*);
- NATO Nuclear Command and Control Reporting System (*NNCCRS*);
- data network of the intelligence community (*BICES*);
- voice services and voice *hotline* connections;
- secure tactical chat (*JCHAT*);
- functional applications and services: *LOGFAS, TOPFAS.*

During the same period of time, NATO crypto account of the Ministry of National Defence was established within the Military Counterintelligence Directorate. Subsequently, in December 2008, *NATO crypto subaccount* of the *Communications and Information Command* became operational, serving the General Staff on providing cryptographic material for NATO communications systems.

Following the Lisbon Summit, when the new *strategic concept* was adopted, stating that the Alliance would engage in a continuous reform process to rationalise structures, to improve working procedures and maximise efficiency, a process that began in June 2010 by the internal reorganisation of NATO headquarters, the *CIS Group* was established, which subordinates the three NATO signal battalions, deployed in Wessel – Germany, Grazzanise – Italy, and Bydgoszcz – Poland. These battalions are composed of several *Deployable CIS Modules (DCM)*. *NATO Communications and Information Systems Group (NCISG)*, located in Mons, provides support with deployable communications and information systems for SHAPE and it is responsible for providing all CIS capabilities as well as for planning and controlling CIS operations and exercises.

The result of the above mentioned transformations, at national level, was the Decision no. 28 of the Romanian Parliament on 07.06.2010 regarding the deployable NATO CIS Module – DCM “E” of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Signal Battalion

establishment and hosting on the Romanian territory, adopted by the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate in the joint session on 7 June 2010, published in the *Official Gazette* of Romania, Part I, no. 380/8.VI.2010, together with CSAT Decisions no. 143/17.12.2008 and S-93/10.09.2009. These provided the basis for negotiations, approval and establishment in Romania of this NATO unit.

Consequently, in the barracks of the 48<sup>th</sup> Strategic Communications and Information Centre, on 1 July 2010, was activated NATO DCM “E”, the only structure of this kind in the Romanian Armed Forces, having assigned exclusively Romanian personnel, which completed the operationalisation process at the end of 2011.

The personnel selection for this module was conducted with the utmost stringency and rigor, having the best specialists from the 48<sup>th</sup> Strategic Communications and Information Centre and from the subordinated units of the *Communications and Information Command*, thus succeeding in staffing the DCM “E” over the percentage expected by NATO partners, more precisely 94%.

The newly established structure operationalisation process was very intense, complex and developed in a shorter than usual time, as stated the 2<sup>nd</sup> Signal Battalion Commander, Lieutenant Colonel Kevin P. Kilburn, in a letter addressed to the Commander of the *Communications and Information Command*: *“In just a year and a half since the establishment of DCM “E”, I declared it IOC (initial operational capability), based on a comprehensive training programme, developed and executed only by my battalion staff; it has undergone a period of intensive training during which the module also received the LINC-E equipment, in addition to their already busy schedule preparing ISAF, and the final validation that I was witness to...”*

The unit was fully integrated into NATO 2<sup>nd</sup> Signal Battalion, following the assessment made by NCSA in December 2010.

Based on the *“Plan for using the forces in missions outside the Romanian territory in 2012”* approved by the CSAT Decision no. S-100 on 15 December 2011, the Order of Action no. 190/11 of the NATO Communications Systems Agency (NCSA) and the Order of Action no. 11346-86 2 of the NATO 2<sup>nd</sup> Signal Battalion Commander, the deployable NATO CIS Module – DCM “E” was deployed in the theatre of operations in Afghanistan between 19 January and 12 August 2012 to provide the communications and information support for the Command Point of the International Security Assistance Force from Afghanistan (ISAF) in Kabul.

The appraisals of DCM “E” at the end of the mission confirmed the trust placed in each of the military man in its composition. Notable in this regard is what the Battalion Commander reported in his letter at the end of his mandate in CJ6/ISAF: *“DCM “E” is a success story for 2NSB ... the soldiers from DCM “E”*

are some of the most professional and motivated that I have ever seen (...). DCM "E" performance in the theater was absolutely incredible. This is due to the professionalism of the soldiers and commanders of DCM, who take pride in their work and daily demonstrate their abilities to fulfill the mission of ISAF. I am proud to have led this structure and I will remember the DCM "E" professionals". On the same occasion, in a letter addressed to the Commander of the *Communications and Information Command*, he specified: "before my return to the USA, I wanted to express my gratitude to you and your subordinates for the hospitality you showed every time during our many visits. I witnessed the establishment of DCM "E" and its transformation in the most professional and competent military structure that I had the opportunity to see over 20 years in US military service. The national support for DCM "E" was crucial to the success of its establishment. I am grateful to Captain Daniel Rusalim who demonstrated professionalism and experience to command national structures. I will always remember my comrades from Romania, you, your subordinates and DCM "E" staff".

In 2013, 11 soldiers from NATO DCM "E" participated during 08.04 – 15.07 in *ACTIVE FENCE* operation in Turkey.

Also, one military from NATO DCM "E" attended, between 01.06 – 31.08.2013, NCIA SMD Enterprise in Mons, Belgium, in order to improve the centralised management of the *ACTIVE FENCE* operation.

During the mission, the military men in the module succeeded in substantially improving the equipment protection in case of electrical power fluctuations, they created back-up procedures for *NIRIS (Networked Interoperable Real-time Information Services)* server and for other subsystems within the local network, they improved the maintenance procedures of the equipment, they provided an excellent communications support to the American batteries ("amazing" as Lieutenant Colonel John L. Dawber, their Commander, wrote in a message addressed to NATO CIS Group).

In 2010, the *Communications and Information Command* was nominated as the structure responsible for the selection and training of the personnel who would fit deployable communications and information modules (DCIM) installed in TO Afghanistan since 2011.

Consequently, since May 2011, the *Communications and Information Command* was commissioned to install, operate and maintain the communications and information system of the Operational Command Centre (OCC) to provide the operational command over the contingents in TO Afghanistan.

During the 6-month missions, the soldiers from the communications and information deployable modules installed in TO Afghanistan have successfully accomplished their tasks.

The *Communications and Information Command* is an active participant, every year, in the major multinational or bilateral NATO/EU exercises, such as: “*Combined Endeavor*”, “*Rousofex*”, “*Herald Hermes*”, “*Danube Guard*”, “*ROUEX*”, “*MILREX*”, “*Jackal Stone*”, “*Steadfast Cathode*”, “*Able Staff*” etc.

Since the readiness period, NATO DCM “*E*” has participated, with very good results, in multinational exercises such as: “*Steadfast Indicator*”, “*Steadfast Jazz*”, “*Steadfast Cobalt*”, “*Trident Jaguar*”.

The *Communications and Information Command* is interested in participating in the *Smart Defence* concept within the project *1.6 CIS e-Learning Training Centres Network* – currently, national CIS specialists are trained in *e-learning* by using information technology means with CISCO Academy from the Communications and Information Training Centre “*Decebal*” in Sibiu.

Moreover, an interest in the development of capabilities required for the Ku-band and X-band satellite links (fixed and mobile stations) is shown. Currently, the satellite flows used to ensure the link with the country of the detachments that participate in missions in the theatres of operations are provided by civilian commercial operators (Ku band).

In November 2013, the *Anchor Station* project was completed and put into operation in Ku-band in Vârteju location. Also, in November 2013, was completed the acceptance and approval test for the satellite truck of the 48<sup>th</sup> Strategic Communications and Information Centre (X and Ku-bands).

For the next period of time, the *Communications and Information Command* will be more and more involved in achieving the main goals of the Romanian Armed Forces Communications and Information System modernisation and optimisation, as follows:

- providing the technological and information support for military-political consultations at national and NATO level;
- planning and execution of missions that require cooperation with structures within the Defence, Public Order and National Security System and civilian structures, in crisis situations or natural disasters;
- development, implementation and interconnection of integrated C4ISR systems with sufficient performance level, interoperability and efficiency to allow the force structure to properly assess the situation, plan and execute missions at all levels (tactical, operational and strategic);
- providing measures to protect systems and information by implementing the concepts;
- distribution in two stages, short and medium term, according to NATO C3 Board (*NC3B – NATO Command, Control and Consultation Board*)

- approach, of own transformation, thus ensuring a consistent approach and the possibility of simultaneous and comparative assessment;
- creating an information exchange environment where data and services are visible, accessible, usable and protected, with emphasis on deployable capabilities;
  - protecting the network, the information infrastructure, and the information processed, handled or stored, by using proper procedures and information security measures and cyber defence, including capabilities for detection and response to security incidents *CERT (Computer Emergency Response Team)*;
  - establishing/defining a mechanism for governance (coordination, direction) of the whole process, particularly with regard to taking decisions on CIS/C4ISR, monitoring performance and investment results in the field, coordinating and monitoring organisational transformation processes (organisational culture, information management, management of system risks and of operation, security, training, programming, budgeting and other risks).

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# JOINT OPERATIONAL COMMAND “Mareșal Alexandru AVERESCU” – Retrospective Evaluations –

*Brigadier General Dr Petrică-Lucian FOCA  
Colonel Dr Vasile CERBU*

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*After 2002, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Joint Operational Command “Mareșal Alexandru Averescu” played a valuable role in the participation of the Romanian military with forces in peace support operations and terrorism fighting actions under NATO and EU command (in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, Afghanistan) and under UN mandate, and with military observers and monitors (in Congo, Kosovo, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Cote d’Ivoire, Afghanistan, Georgia, Sudan and Nepal).*

*The operational command and control of national contingents participating in peace support operations could be taken over by the 2<sup>nd</sup> Joint Operational Command after the stages of selection, manning, procurement, training and evaluation of the training level reached were completed.*

**Keywords:** *operational command; crisis situations; international operations; training and procurement*

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The great changes in the international security environment, especially at the beginning of the third millennium, have brought about new approaches to security concepts, which have thus become more complex and dynamic. Under these circumstances of geopolitical transformations of the regional and global security environment, Romania, through its potential, has been an important actor in projecting security and stability at regional level as well as in other areas of interest both for our country and for NATO<sup>1</sup>.

These imperatives have triggered a broad process of transformation, reform of the military body, whose general goal has led to the accomplishment of certain targets, such as the remodelling of the command-control structure, force structure, logistic support structure, C4ISR, the increase in the quality of life, the reshaping of military education etc<sup>2</sup>.

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Brigadier General Dr Petrică-Lucian Foca, Colonel Dr Vasile Cerbu – the 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division “Getica”, Buzău.

<sup>1</sup> Visarion Neagoe și colectiv, *Armata României în misiuni internaționale (1991-2010)*, Editura Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, București, 2010, p. 37.

<sup>2</sup> Petre Otu și colectiv, *Reforma militară și societatea în România (1978-2008)*, Editura Militară, București, 2009, pp. 325-326.

In this respect, the command structures of modern combat in the Romanian Armed Forces have been subjected to profound changes regarding command and control, readiness, functionality, dynamism, actional power and mobility, and the permanent concern has been to improve the command system at all echelons in order for it to provide an objective advantage in case of confrontation.

One of the effects of these actions was the establishment of the *2<sup>nd</sup> Joint Operational Command "Mareșal Alexandru Averescu"*. In 2000, the *2<sup>nd</sup> Army Command* was changed into *Army Corps Command*. On 1 January 2003, the latter structure became the *2<sup>nd</sup> Joint Operational Command "Mareșal Alexandru Averescu"*, and was assigned, through the Order of the Chief of the General Staff no. SMG-61 of 14.11.2002, the responsibility for managing the participation of the Romanian Armed Forces structures in peace support operations and in multinational cooperation initiatives, as well as in UN and OSCE missions. As a result, the structure was in charge of the operational command/OPCOM, being assigned by a higher political or military authority (the General Staff), which exercised full command<sup>3</sup>.

For instance, the *2<sup>nd</sup> Joint Operational Command "Mareșal Alexandru Averescu"* played a valuable role after 2002 in the participation of the Romanian military, with forces, in peace support operations and terrorism fighting actions under NATO and EU command (in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iraq, Afghanistan) and under UN mandate, and with military observers and monitors (in Congo, Kosovo, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Côte d'Ivoire, Afghanistan, Georgia, Sudan and Nepal). In recognition to the merits of the Command, its war flag was decorated by Presidential Decree no. 1235 of 27.09.2009, with the Wartime "*Military Virtue*" Order, the rank of "*Knight*".

The *2<sup>nd</sup> Joint Operational Command* took over the operational command and control of national contingents participating in peace support operations after the completion of the stages of selection, manning, procurement, training and training evaluation by the armed forces services (AFS) or other commands<sup>4</sup>.

In 2005, the Order of the Chief of the General Staff no. SMG 10 of 27.01.2005 regarding the participation of the Romanian Armed Forces in missions outside the Romanian territory stipulated tasks for every structure in the Romanian Armed Forces, the tasks of the *2<sup>nd</sup> Joint Operational Command* being expanded.

The main tasks of the Command in order to exercise operational command were:

- a) during force preparation for mission: to determine mission exigencies and operational requirements of national contingents participating

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<sup>3</sup> Visarion Neagoe, *op. cit.*, pp. 45-46.

<sup>4</sup> Cornel Paraniac, *Responsabilitățile Comandamentului 2 Operațional Întrunit în gestionarea participării Armatei României la operații în sprijinul păcii*, in *Gândirea militară românească*, no. 4, 2009, p. 61.

- in missions; to assess the training level before receiving the OPCOM from AFS;
- b) during mission: to permanently monitor the situation of national contingents, to issue Fragmentary Orders (FRAGO); to carry out actions to expand/reduce the mission mandate; to meet command requirements; to draw up transport/extraction/supply plans in/from theatres of operations; to coordinate the repatriation of soldiers from theatres of operations (the wounded, the dead etc.), to assist missions hand over-take over in theatres, through commissions; to disseminate the lessons learned to the structures in charge of dealing with them etc.;
  - c) upon mission completion: to reassign the structures that carried out mission in the theatres of operations to the AFS; to organise ceremonies for troops returning from missions and to draw conclusions, make propositions and identify lessons learned during mission.

The *2<sup>nd</sup> Joint Operational Command* also had to accomplish mission tasks during crisis situations and at war in terms of military command at operational level. Thus, it was in charge of the command of joint operations on national territory, from the onset of the crisis or the state of war until the command was taken over by the Joint Force Command set by the NATO Allied Command Operations – ACO.

The *2<sup>nd</sup> Joint Operational Command* was a modular, integrated structure subordinated to the Chief of the General Staff<sup>5</sup>. During peacetime, the Command had only a functional core, capable of providing participation in the evaluation of forces earmarked for international operations, coordinating the participation of these forces in missions outside Romanian territory and conducting national and joint multinational exercises, taking place in Romania, Bulgaria or Serbia (“*BLUE DANUBE*”, “*BLUE ROAD*”, “*BLUE GUARD '07*”, “*BALKAN GUARD '09*”) and exercises for evaluating national structures meant for NATO (“*ROMEX '05*”, “*DEMEX '05*”, “*MILREX '07*”, “*ROUEX '09*”). These exercises represented an important contribution to the Romanian Armed Forces transformation process, also playing a role in increasing the interoperability with the Alliance structures. Thus, the *Exercise Planning Guide (EPG)* was implemented, and as far as operational planning was concerned, the *Guidelines for Operational Planning (GOP)* were put into practice. At the same time, these exercises resulted in making more efficient the identification of training and procurement operational requirements.

<sup>5</sup> In *Concepția privind conducerea, comanda și controlul în Armata României*, Statul Major General, 2007, p. 6.

In crisis situations and at war, the Command was supplemented with active personnel from central structures and armed forces services, subordinated to the operational commands of the armed forces services, and some units and big units from the force structure of the Romanian Armed Forces and exercised operational command or control (OPCOM/ OPCON) on them in order to fulfil the missions assigned<sup>6</sup>. In the context of collective defence, after the command was taken over by the Joint Force Command established by NATO's command authorities, the *2<sup>nd</sup> Joint Operational Command* could be used as a strategic reserve or assigned by Order of the Chief of the General Staff to command certain smaller-scale joint military actions, in a secondary direction or area of operations<sup>7</sup>.

According to Romanian military specialists, the *2<sup>nd</sup> Joint Operational Command* was designed as a command-control structure of a joint task force of operational value, which could be used in situations such as the deployment in a certain area of operations in order to deter aggression, as a self-sustainable force in order to conduct joint military operations on Romanian territory for homeland defence, as an initial entry force in the area/theatre of operations on national territory until the arrival of the NATO forces meant for military operations within collective defence, while certain of its structures could be used in Article 5/non-Article 5 operations under the command of NATO or EU command-control structures, on national territory or abroad. To conclude, the role of the joint task force was of a capability with land, air, naval and special operations components, under single command – the *2<sup>nd</sup> Joint Operational Command*, capable of carrying out operations whenever the military decision-maker would send it. In fact, when the areas of major interest for NATO were established, Romania was acknowledged its geostrategic value and was given an important role for the following decades, one of the examples being the deployment of certain missile shield elements on its national territory.

The existence of the *2<sup>nd</sup> Joint Operational Command* was generated by strategic and technological imperatives or by ones related to threats and risks reduction.

The strategic imperative determined the opportune action to threats of a joint, powerful, robust, mobile force, capable of acting and reacting from an advantageous position.

The technological imperative, by the rapid pace of technology development, required the rethinking of the operational concepts and imposed structural changes in the command-control system.

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<sup>6</sup> Vasile Hermeneanu, *Conducerea operațională la nivel strategic, operațional și tactic*, in *Gândirea militară românească*, no. 4, 2008, pp. 51-52.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid*, p. 54.

The presence of threats and the need for reducing risks required a command-control structure and a joint task force to deal with the relatively new threats (the diffusion of military power towards certain non-state actors, the increase in the diversity of sources and unpredictability of the location of conflicts, which determines a decrease in the capacity of shaping the force structure in order to face threats etc.)<sup>8</sup>.

The theory of command and control is grounded on rapidity, flexibility and resolve in action in a complex environment defined by uncertainty, fluidity and rapid changes, in which the human factor is the key element and the modern information technology is the means that supports its actions. Starting from this statement, we wish to underline that in the Romanian Armed Forces there was not a unitary vision regarding the place, role and mission of the *2<sup>nd</sup> Joint Operational Command* in peacetime, crisis situations and at war and the way in which the structure could carry out joint operations on national territory in case of potential aggressions against Romania.

There was a first opinion, according to which the role of the *2<sup>nd</sup> Joint Operational Command* was minimised, estimating that Romania, as a NATO member, benefited from the privileges of collective defence, under which joint operations, including on national territory, were carried out by the Allied Joint Force Command Southern Europe (JFC Naples). In this situation, the operationalised national forces, coming from armed forces services, were made available to this command while the other structures (generation and regeneration forces that did not achieve the readiness stage rapidly) went through the operationalisation process.

According to another view, the *2<sup>nd</sup> Joint Operational Command* was supplemented with active personnel and was in charge of the operational components of the armed forces services, through which joint operations were conducted at national level. In such circumstances, a number of limitations would occur, resulting in an increase in the chain of command, slowing down especially tactical leadership; the *2<sup>nd</sup> Joint Operational Command* lacked an organisational structure that would provide the command and planning of joint operations, showing many limitations in exercising command and control of air and naval operations, information (INFOOPS) and psychological (PSYOPS) operations and information management. In this case, the *2<sup>nd</sup> Joint Operational Command* lacked the C2 support needed for effectively commanding naval and air components.

There was a third option, according to which, in order to eliminate the flaws in conducting joint operations, especially air and naval ones, the air and naval

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<sup>8</sup> <http://www.rft.forter.ro>

operational components could be integrated in the organisational structure of the *2<sup>nd</sup> Joint Operational Command*. In this situation, the Command would become a compact, flexible, robust structure, capable of providing the command-control of joint operations that would result in shortening the chain of command.

The effort of the staff of the *2<sup>nd</sup> Joint Operational Command* was not limited to conducting the actions in the theatres. They were the agent of change through their vision and theoretical contribution to the development of many concepts specific to the command-control of military structures and conduct of joint operations. Doctrines, manuals, instructions, orders were developed, whose purpose was to achieve interoperability with similar NATO structures and improve the operationalisation of Romanian structures assigned to perform missions abroad<sup>9</sup>.

The conclusions and analyses of the *2<sup>nd</sup> Joint Operational Command* were the basis for the review of the process of selection, training, operation and reporting of deployed forces, which contributed significantly to the fulfilment of the tasks assigned to Romanian contingents.

The participation in international missions had implications on the legislative framework relevant to this area. In this regard, a set of regulations was adopted, among which the Government Decision no. 1035/2003 to establish the responsibilities regarding the unitary coordination of Romanian and foreign forces movement on Romanian territory, published in the *Official Gazette of Romania (Monitorul oficial al României)*, no. 242 of 18.03.2004.

In keeping with the same objective, the Law no. 291/2007 on the entry, stationing, operations deployment or transit of foreign armed forces on Romania territory was adopted and published in the *Official Gazette of Romania* no. 758 of 08.11.2007<sup>10</sup>.

The lack of a unified concept well enough known and accepted by all military decision-makers regarding the usefulness, role and missions of the *Joint Operational Command* brought about the decision to restructure and transform it into a Command of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division “*Getica*” in 2010. Part of the duties of the *2<sup>nd</sup> Joint Operational Command* were taken over by another structure of the General Staff.

**English version by**  
 **Iulia NĂSTASIE**

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<sup>9</sup> Visarion Neagoe, *op. cit.*, pp. 53-54.

<sup>10</sup> Petre Otu, *op. cit.*, p. 355.

# **THE LEADER AT THE BOTTOM OF MILITARY HIERARCHY – In the Cadence of the Euro-Atlantic Integration –**

*Chief Master Sergeant Gabriel ENACHE*

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*When Romania was part of the Partnership for Peace programme, the first signs of the need for taking measures regarding the Non-Commissioned Officers and Warrant Officers in the Romanian Armed Forces appeared, through their involvement in training programmes other than those whose main objective was the training for a particular specialty or for the operation and maintenance of certain assets. At the institutional level, specific staff functions were established and the role of trainers in the military education changed. The horizon of traditional responsibilities broadened, specific responsibilities changed their dimensions in the context of a new approach to education and training.*

**Keywords:** *senior enlisted advisor; military hierarchy; military education; NCO*

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Motto:

*“NATO and our partner nations are standing atop a gold mine of capability: our NCO Corps. We need to get better at mining it and refining it. In the coming weeks, I’ll outline a series of initiatives, which demonstrate our commitment to accomplishing this goal. I’m looking forward to engaging with my commanders and their senior enlisted leaders to drive this effort forward”.*

The ten-year milestone of NATO membership is both a time for celebration and a time for assessment. The importance of the event that took place a decade ago is to be found in the confirmation of the path covered by the Romanian state towards democracy and in the irreversible transformation of the Romanian Armed Forces.

The analysis of any process of embracing another doctrinaire system, besides the material efforts made, will underline the steps taken

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<sup>1</sup> General Philip Breedlove, *An Untapped Goldmine*, <http://www.eucom.mil/blog-post/25340/an-untapped-goldmine>, 5 September 2013.

to transform the human resource, regarding, on the one hand, the implementation of integration policies at macro level and, on the other hand, the need for providing a functional balance between the two components.

Without diminishing the role of providing material resources timely and in keeping with requirements, the complexity of the process of human resource transformation is obvious, because of its social and temporal dimensions, among others. Projecting long-term strategies in this field can be limited by the effects of the human and social factors, which, in turn, are forced to adapt the “*cadence*” of reaching the set objectives with strategic patience. On the other hand, the pressure of the social factor, by a multitude of means and implications, can influence the planning, continuity and rhythm of transformation just as the objective acceptance of the inevitable gaps will provide a balanced development of all the levels defining a system.

Based on these arguments and against the background of the challenges and achievements of the NATO integration process, this article is intended as a brief analysis of the path of the professional (re)definition of an important part of the human resources in the Romanian Armed Forces. The NCO Corps represents the backbone of any military and that is why special attention has been given to the creation, preparation, training and education a highly professional NCO corps.

The blurred perspective of the '90s maintained under analysis two political-military systems traditionally in opposition, only this time one could see the first “*terms*” of a new comparison made starting from a different logic. The Alliance began to provide models, too, and not just goals to be counterbalanced or balanced at strategic level. At the same time, against the background of the first contacts at tactical level, uncensored or interpreted pieces of information entered the military system. More familiar with a rather static system, in which value was accumulated most of the time in the same structure, small rank soldiers discovered new principles of defining the military career. Competition, professionalism, selection and hierarchy were new entries in their professional vocabulary. Moreover, a new dimension was added to the traditional conflict between generations – the promotion based on training and experience, namely on the capacity to develop certain abilities. If the change was not so obvious for the officers, as they remained the military leaders at command and concept level, for NCOs, who traditionally had responsibilities at the execution level, their involvement in command and concept-making seemed far away.

As our nation was being more and more committed to the NATO efforts to support democracy all over the world, the initial impact increased and multiplied. Therefore, it often was in contradiction with aspects regarding tradition and resistance to change, which are in fact features of any military system.

In the following stage, when Romania was part of the *Partnership for Peace* programme, the first signs for a different approach of the training system of NCOs were shown. There were new staff positions for NCOs and trainers played a different role in the training system. The horizon of traditional responsibilities broadened, specific responsibilities changed their features considering the new approach to education and training.

The static and conjuncture-based feature of an NCO career, in which routine was often mistaken for experience, was being more and more defined by a larger spectrum of responsibilities; therefore, different demands for training appeared. Without having a general feature, one may however mention that there were some misunderstandings of the role of an NCO in the modern military system.

The implementation and enhancement of the notions of *leadership* at the NCOs level, supported by new laws and regulations, as well as the experience gained in a multinational environment, led to the creation of a new NCO position in 2002 – the Senior Enlisted Adviser for NCO matters. He was meant to be “*the leader of the Non-Commissioned Officers, Warrant Officers and enlisted professional military from his unit, acknowledged because of his training level and professional experience in fulfilling his duties and due to his moral qualities*”<sup>2</sup>. The Senior Enlisted Adviser was the newest concept implemented in our Armed Forces. Due to the complexity of the assignment and its possible impact, it required a special behaviour within the system, through which a formal (and informal) framework could be provided for the development, training and efficient fulfilment of the tasks of such position.

In the post-accession period, the transformation process continued through consolidating the implemented principles and defining the best solutions for NCOs training and education based especially on specific national elements and on increasing the level of interoperability during operations in a multinational environment.

At the same time, one of the most important parts of the military hierarchy – the enlisted military personnel – went through a thorough process of transforming and adapting to a new concept – voluntary military service. Because of the novelty of the system, the lack of experience and sometimes of continuity, some flaws occurred, especially in terms of training, selection and use of these individuals, but it is important to point out that the system was able to correct itself due to a strong capacity to react. On the other hand, the rising professionalism of this category shortly made it the main source for NCOs selection and development.

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<sup>2</sup> *The Common Report of the Chief of the Human Resource Management Directorate and the Chief of the Personnel and Mobilisation Directorate to the Chief of the General Staff*, no. B1/7738 of 21.10.2012.

The challenges arisen following the missions assumed at the level of the Alliance in the past few years resulted in the necessity to reevaluate the responsibilities of the NCOs. Thus, in 2010, the first document exclusively meant for NCOs was adopted. The *NATO Non-Commissioned Officer Bi-Sc Strategy and Recommended Non-Commissioned Officer Guidelines* (October 2010) represented the moment when the role of the NCOs within the Alliance was (re)defined. The Strategy provided all nations with the *first* principles to define compatibility criteria at national strategic level as an important way to increase interoperability. Another important element is the *Non-Commissioned Officer Professional Military Education* (October 2013), which could generate a new perspective on common standards and criteria to evaluate and compare NCOs training and education.

Based on the respect for national values and traditions and taking into consideration the new approach to the learning process, both documents suggest a way to develop the capacity to fulfil a wide range of missions, in a complex and changing environment. Anchored in the values of the past, the militaries at the bottom of the military hierarchy, either specialists or warriors, must be a model, a trainer, a comrade, a leader and an ambassador. The modern NCOs will be defined as competent, open-to-new leaders, anchored in traditions and motivated by the heritage and the values of the past, continuously preoccupied with training and able to lead, train and motivate the soldiers. They should be flexible, efficient and well-adapted leaders, irrespective of the environment they operate in.

The models provided by these documents represent constant preoccupation for all structures and levels of authority, which is very easy to be noticed due to the results achieved so far. They are also a proof of the potential and availability of the NCOs. The synchronisation of own efforts with timely and adequate strategies at the level of the military system showed that the generic definition of an NCO – a junior leader of a small group or a simple performer – proved to be increasingly insufficient to cover all the duties and responsibilities of these soldiers.



# **NATO HUMINT CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE**

## **– Between Entrepreneurial Challenge and High Performance Management –**

*Colonel Dr Eduard SIMION*

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*NATO transformation seeks to achieve those features that provide the Alliance with decision-making and actional superiority towards any potential enemy, with the ability to integrate the capabilities necessary for producing consistent effects and to deploy and support expeditionary forces that should defend the security interests of the organisation.*

*In this respect, the Allied Command Transformation is the agent of change in NATO, leading the process of continuously improving Alliance capabilities in order to support its global security interests.*

*Keywords: military command; security policies; memoranda of understanding*

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**T**he development and institutional integration is an essential aspect for any emerging organisation, irrespective of its field of activity. This becomes even more important as we approach features related to structures belonging to the field of security – especially the military one, and even more difficult to outline as we address a speciality mostly characterised by discretion – military intelligence.

However, our approach is facilitated by the fact that it is focused on some strictly technical aspects, less related to the specifics of the activity and primarily target the way in which, both internally and externally, an international military organisation is created, functions and establishes connections with foreign partners, and the influence of its existence and specifics on multiple levels of reference – economic, social, cultural, tourist-related etc.

Personally, as a Director of the *NATO HUMINT Centre of Excellence in Oradea*, which was formally accredited by the North-Atlantic Council in July 2010, but whose establishment process was initiated in 2007, I wish to say that, given their novelty feature, each stage and aspect of the process have been challenges per se, irrespective of their nature – functional or operational: infrastructure, compliance with NATO security regulations, legal harmonisation (national

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Colonel Dr Eduard Simion – Director, NATO HUMINT Centre of Excellence.

vs. international/NATO), personnel selection, negotiations with partner states, public relations and promotion policy, necessary logistic support, investment programme and budgeting, relation with local authorities, programme of work, working relationship with other national or international structures, development of community of interest in NATO etc. By virtue of the position held and the degree of involvement required, the correlation between functional and operational requirements, and the Alliance development and transformation needs, as well as the comprehensive identification of the dimensions of social, cultural, economic and administrative impact of the establishment of such a centre at local level have developed naturally.

This has entailed a constant interaction with the decision-making factors at national level (political and military decision-makers, legal representatives, higher military echelons, administrative-logistic support elements etc.), the NATO representatives regarding the Alliance transformation network management (*Transformation Network Branch – TNB at the Allied Command Transformation*) and national representatives of the nations interested in participating in the project of the Centre.

All these aspects have exceeded the specific requirements of high-performance management, requiring rather entrepreneurial skills on the part of our project team – an element of novelty in such a strictly regulated environment: the military. The entrepreneurial spirit requires strategic thinking and vision, first of all; these were extremely manifest during the project development stage, starting from the central idea (the concept) and decisively contributing to translating it into reality (by means of a time projection), through activities that required – beside knowing the specific field of activity – the use of a great collection of knowledge (management, marketing, legislation, support services etc.).

Beyond the phase of institutional “*construction*”, the NATO HUMINT Centre of Excellence in Oradea is an organisation currently undergoing a process of self-definition and enhancement of the inter- and intra-institutional relations, from the point of view of both the operational and the functional aspect – a true challenge, in terms of management. If, as far as the internal systemic processes are concerned, the regulations and work algorithms are clear (yet, subject to challenges specific to the transformation environment), the relation with the foreign actors is overwhelmingly related to the organisation’s management factors. This interaction covers subordination and cooperation relations, nationally and internationally, each of them with their own specific requests and expectations.

The development path of the multidimensional process of institutional integration of the NATO HUMINT Centre of Excellence involves the NATO military

intelligence community of interest (specifically, human intelligence), NATO Transformation Network (within which the Centre functions as an agent of transformation and development in its field of activity), the national military environment, the academic and scientific research community and, last but not least, the local community. We will address all these aspect later in this article.

Addressing this topic, we must point out the experience gathered during covering the steps necessary for establishing and accrediting the NATO HUMINT Centre of Excellence, in an effort correlated with other similar initiatives that have resulted in the consolidation of a true NATO transformation network. Any discussion regarding the development and institutional integration of these institutions, in terms of the military command element, must inevitably address aspects regarding entrepreneurial and managerial aspects of leadership, under the circumstances of a series of foreign factors, among which:

- requirements correlated with the NATO transformation process and legislative-normative elements;
- broad relationship framework;
- specific elements regarding the management of the organisation as a system.

### ***The North-Atlantic Alliance Transformation and NATO Centres of Excellence***

The NATO transformation process is a topical issue within the Alliance, benefiting from an exceptional representation both as a working framework for those directly involved in this activity and as a subject matter for a wide number of researchers.

Organisational change management, as the process of taking a structured approach to help align the organisation with an end state, was defined by Jeff Hiatt as representing the processes, tools and techniques to manage the people-side of that organisational change – the social infrastructure of the organisation, eluding the technological implications of change. The Nadler and Tushman congruence model of change shows the organisation has a system that draws inputs from internal and external sources and transforms them into outputs through four components relevant in this process: the work itself, the systems (the formal organisation and the informal organisation) and the people – *figure 1*<sup>1</sup>.

In this model, the inputs are: the environment, the organisation's resources and its (historical) culture, the transformation representing the dynamic filtering,

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<sup>1</sup> Oliver Wyman, *The Congruence Model. A Roadmap for Understanding Organisational Performance*, Delta Organisation & Leadership, 2003, [http://www.oliverwyman.com/ow/pdf\\_files/Congruence\\_Model\\_INS.pdf](http://www.oliverwyman.com/ow/pdf_files/Congruence_Model_INS.pdf)

through the intermediary categories, of the inputs towards the outputs – with representation at system, group or even individual level.

Lessem and Schieffer take a broader approach to the phenomenon, identifying four fundamentals of transformation management: environment, organisational culture, scientific evolution and transformation management (as an administrative process of change)<sup>2</sup>.




Figure 1: Key Components of the organisation in the dynamics of transformation<sup>3</sup>

Nadler identifies four types of organisational change in the organisational culture and organisational systems, in terms of time and impact: tuning, reorientation, adaptation and re-creation. Analysing the decisions made regarding the organisation's transformation from the viewpoint of the criteria of the matrix of change provides us with the proper terminology necessary for describing such complex processes.

Thus, *tuning* assists us in adjusting certain aspects in order to align, step-by-step, to the developments of internal and external stimuli (at strategic level, *reorientation* being the overall impact of such decisions at organisation level), *adaptation* enables the organisation to react in preparation for anticipated effects of change generated by such developments. *Re-creation* of the organisation (or parts of it) is a strategic decision aiming at radical changes meant to provide its survival, focused on different levels of representation in terms of the factors

<sup>2</sup> Ronnie Lessem, Alexander Schieffer, *Transformation Management. Towards the Integral Enterprise*, Imprint: Gower, 2009.

<sup>3</sup> Oliver Wyman, *op. cit.*

involved and entailing cultural dynamics, cross-cultural learning, scientific research and innovation, transformation marketing, human resource, information knowledge marketing, sustainable development, organisational structures and systems etc.

By quantifying the impact and level of reference of the analytical approach, we can address *transformation* as a strategic process, connected to the macro-levels of the organisation, seeking support for reaching well-defined strategies and goals, and *change* as a phenomenon focused on micro-levels of engagement on interested structures<sup>4</sup>.

By transformation, we reform the internal method of operation and networking principles with interlocutors, while change gives us the perspective of the practical support required for the all-embracing process of transformation.

In a military environment-specific approach, the transformation is defined by the US Department of Defense as “*a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people and organisations that exploit our nation’s advantages and protect against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which helps underpin peace and stability in the world*”<sup>5</sup>. Consequently, the need for military transformation can be examined from the perspective of many imperatives, related to the variables of the equation of the security organisation in relation to the security environment: strategy (vision, policies, concepts, doctrine, procedures) technology (scientific research, innovation), threats (external vs. internal ones, vulnerabilities, asymmetry) and risk management (risk assessment, control measures).

In a simplified sense, P. Davis believes that military transformation should simply be understood as “*profound change*”<sup>6</sup> in military affairs. In this respect, based on the analysis of the US military transformation history, the researcher lists a number of specific domains representing the requirements of the need for change, subsumed under reference categories considered as being essential: strategy, forces and force posture, challenges “*solved*”, system capabilities, doctrines and operations, acquisition policies (modernisation and recapitalisation)<sup>7</sup>.

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<sup>4</sup> [http://www.umtha.com/change\\_management.html](http://www.umtha.com/change_management.html)

<sup>5</sup> John Garstk, *Provocarea transformării*, 2005, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue1/romanian/special.html>

<sup>6</sup> Paul Davis, *Military Transformation? Which Transformation, and What Lies Ahead?*, RAND Corporation, 2010, [www.rand.org](http://www.rand.org), p. 11.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*

US Strategy regarding military transformation (which represented a starting point for the similar process launched within the North-Atlantic Alliance) relies on four pillars<sup>8</sup>:

- Strengthening joint operations.
- Exploiting US intelligence advantages.
- Concept development and experimentation.
- Developing transformational capabilities.

The algorithm of transformation capitalisation as a power source correlates its operational goals with the processes and resources flow that lies at the basis of an approach aimed to support the advantage in a competitive environment.

In MC 324/1, the transformation in the NATO is defined as *a continuous and proactive process that involves the development and innovative integration of new capabilities for NATO forces and partners' more efficient and improved interoperability*<sup>9</sup>. Benefiting from a generous approach, the NATO transformation model is based on promoting the improvement of the capabilities needed by the support provided by lessons learned, innovative thinking, education and training process and proper material support. In this regard, the Supreme Allied Commander Transformation Representative in Europe, Belgian General Frank Hye, highlighted (in a presentation, in 2005, when the transformation process launched at the 2002 Prague summit was in full swing) a number of areas that need to be addressed through the efforts of allied nations<sup>10</sup>:

- *development of an iterative, constant transformation process, which has a spiral evolution;*
- *transformation of mentality by intellectual and cultural change;*
- *stimulation of innovation;*
- *multilateral change in the organisation, policies, concepts, doctrines, processes and training;*
- *product-oriented structures (a purpose corresponding to the goal);*
- *long-term goals planning;*
- *focus of efforts on effects-based actions, beneficiary of network systems;*
- *channelling of allied forces and capabilities within the deployable command and staff structures and NATO Response Force.*

<sup>8</sup> \*\*\*, Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Military Transformation – A Strategic Approach*, Washington, 2003, www.oft.osd.mil, pp. 20-27.

<sup>9</sup> \*\*\*, MC 324/1, *The Military Command Structure*, 7 May 2004.

<sup>10</sup> SACTREPEUR Major General Frank Hye, *Demystifying Transformation*, presentation, Kijkduin, the Netherlands, 14 December 2005, [http://www.clingendael.nl/cscp/events/20051214/speech\\_Hye.pdf](http://www.clingendael.nl/cscp/events/20051214/speech_Hye.pdf), p. 2.

NATO Response Force is the quintessence of the Alliance military power projection, characterised by flexibility, deployability, interoperability, protection capabilities and training level, at the same time representing an environment favourable for experimental phases specific to conceptual and doctrinal transformation processes.


Based on these considerations, the Allied Command Transformation addressed transformation, in a first phase, from the perspective of five areas of change:

- *Strategic concepts, policies and interoperability* (transposed into concepts regarding force interoperability, policy development and implementation, techniques, tactics and procedures).
- *Research and technologies in the field of future joint and combined capabilities* (requiring the coordination of research and technology development initiatives in NATO).
- *Experimentation, exercises and joint assessment* (with implications in synchronising and assessing the experiments regarding joint combat, capability integration, techniques, tactics and procedures experimentation).
- *Joint education and training* (seeking to develop leaders at all levels, control NATO entities involved in the education and training process, develop standardisation coordinates).
- *Defence planning/Defence and implementation of requirements and capabilities* (identifying necessary capabilities and implementing solutions through defence planning).

These areas involve people (leadership, education and training), processes (translated into concepts, doctrines, techniques, tactics and procedures, standards), form of organisation (command structures organisational chart, force structures organisation), technologies (material resource, bases, research and innovation capacities etc.) in a complex of efforts aimed at intra-institutional consistency (as gradual phenomenological event – *figure 2*) and at the message of extra-institutional stability and performance.

The NATO transformation seeks to achieve those features that provide the Alliance with decision-making and actional superiority towards any potential enemy, with the ability to integrate the capabilities necessary for producing consistent effects and to deploy and support expeditionary forces that should defend the security interests of the organisation.

The Allied Command Transformation is the agent for change in NATO, leading the continuous improvement of Alliance capabilities to support its global security interests. In this regard, the above mentioned areas of transformation become priorities addressed at institutional level, based on rigorous plans that monitor acute internal



**Figure 2: Levels of intra-institutional performance**

and external stimuli, enhance anticipative efforts regarding the developments of the challenges to the security environment and the emergence of risk categories, budget and actively support projects and research and development plans, pursue the standardisation and interoperability goals and multidimensional performance achievement.

Fundamentally, transformation – understood as the evolution of current capabilities towards the ones required by future operations, in an efficient and economical manner, seeks to produce: enhanced capabilities (ability to perform the tasks assigned by the Alliance), increased interoperability (the ability of 28 nations – plus partners – to operate as one) and strengthened common values (NATO operates by member consensus and based on shared values)<sup>11</sup>.

From this point of view and in addition to the framework provided by the command structures established over time, the NATO Transformation Network is an extension of the effort to manage the NATO transformation, based on the opportunities provided by the volunteer and/or mutually-interested presence, under different participatory forms and formulas, of NATO and partner nations and a number of international governmental and non-governmental organisations, academic and scientific institutions and even of the general public (in the field of interaction provided by strategic communication).

This connection is an original model to supplement the resources necessary for the continuous transformation that benefits NATO, as an organisation, to a great extent. Thus, significant transfers of expertise, best practices, lessons learned, technological resources and know-how are ensured, this being an important supply of value added, in compliance with NATO standards.

<sup>11</sup> [http://www.facebook.com/NATO.ACT?v=app\\_4949752878](http://www.facebook.com/NATO.ACT?v=app_4949752878)

All these aspects need to be considered by the leadership of an organisation meant to support NATO capabilities transformation and development in the specific field of expertise. These are reflected not only in the mission and in the tasks under the responsibility of the Centre of Excellence, but also in the way they are implemented – and this is where the managerial talent of the leadership team steps in.

## **NATO Centres of Excellence – General Principles: The Premises of the Establishment of the NATO HUMINT Centre of Excellence**

The existence of NATO Centres of Excellence stems from the reorganisation of the Alliance military command structure and the outset of the transformation process under the aegis of the *Allied Command Transformation – ACT*, following the 2002 Prague Summit.

Centres of Excellence are international military organisations that operate in keeping with the provisions of the Paris Protocol<sup>12</sup>, as structures affiliated to the Allied Command Transformation but without being part of the NATO command structures. The functional features and principles that lie at the foundation of their activity are the following:

- Centres of Excellence are open to the participation of all NATO member states, the access of non-member states or other organisations to their products and services being subject to their respective steering committee decision in accordance with specific security limitations;
- non-duplication of resources and means and avoiding competition with existing NATO capabilities having the final goal of contributing value-added to the capabilities; by virtue of their purpose of adding value to the already existing expertise, the Centres of Excellence must provide obvious improvements of the targeted Alliance capabilities, complementarily with the efforts of other structures/agencies involved;
- financial support regarding infrastructure, operational and maintenance costs is provided by the participating (sponsoring) nations in accordance with the level of participation with personnel;

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<sup>12</sup>The core documents that regulate the establishment, accreditation and functioning of NATO Centres of Excellence are: *MCM 236-03 (Military Committee Concept for NATO Centres of Excellence*, 4 December 2003) and *IMSM 0416-04 (NATO Centres of Excellence Accreditation Criteria*, 11 June 2004).

- compliance with NATO procedures, doctrines, standards and security policies;
- clear working relations between the participating nations and the steering committee (as decision-making body of the centre) as specified within the memoranda of understanding and other technical agreements;
- programme of work developed in accordance with NATO's requests for support.

The establishment of NATO Centres of Excellence has multiple implications, for both NATO and the participating nations. First of all, the centres provide great opportunities for the education and training process, in a general framework, lead to the improvement of interoperability and existing capabilities, assist in the process of doctrinaire evolution and validation of concepts through experimentation, contribute to the shaping and dissemination of best practices and lessons learned in the areas of expertise.

As T. Wedge shows, the idea of establishing a centre of excellence stems from two directions: NATO (as a consequence of detecting some shortfalls within the capabilities it possesses) or one of the allied nations (as a result of the initiatives launched at tactical, operational, strategic and even political level)<sup>13</sup>. In each of the situations, the support between the two entities – NATO and the framework nation (nations) – must be mutual and the initiative must be embraced by as many nations willing to participate in the project as possible.

In the case of the NATO HUMINT Centre of Excellence, the area of reference has been considered a niche area, the *NATO Military Authorities Intelligence Coordination Group – NMAICG* identifying flaws in the construction of a functional HUMINT capability within NATO, which needed to be addressed coherently and in a structured manner by allied nations.

Back then, the Romanian Armed Forces had already established an experienced body under the conditions of the development of some working capabilities in common with the NATO military structures in various theatres of operations (Kosovo, Bosnia, then Iraq and Afghanistan) and having available the services of the *General Directorate for Defence Intelligence (GDDI)*, a structure characterised by vision and flexibility in anticipating and constructing some national specific

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<sup>13</sup> Tony Wedge, *NATO Centre of Excellence Establishment Manual (Version 2.0)*, Headquarters Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, Transformation Network Branch, 2011, [https://transnet.act.nato.int/WISE/COE/COEESTABL/TheCOEEsta/file/\\_WFS/NATO%20COE%20Establishment%20Manual%20Ver%202.0.pdf](https://transnet.act.nato.int/WISE/COE/COEESTABL/TheCOEEsta/file/_WFS/NATO%20COE%20Establishment%20Manual%20Ver%202.0.pdf)

capabilities, being an active presence in the coordination groups as well as in the lucrative steps taken in the field of NATO military intelligence<sup>14</sup>.

The reached goals, the acknowledged professionalism, the interest and determination shown by the *GDDI* and subordinate HUMINT structures substantiated Romania's commitment to becoming a NATO Centre of Excellence framework-nation in the field of human source intelligence, a candidateship accepted by NATO. This step was followed by a thorough process of setting up the legal foundation of the Centre<sup>15</sup>, as well as the negotiation for the participation of other NATO nations in the project.

The core documents drawn up in this respect were: the *Concept for the Centre of Excellence*, which detailed its mission, tasks, and vision regarding the development of the institution as an agent for the HUMINT transformation in NATO, and the *Functional Memorandum of Understanding* and the *Operational Memorandum of Understanding*. Promoting them in NATO and on bilateral channels has been a real challenge for the project team, requiring sustained efforts for identifying the most adequate formulas for negotiating with the nations at the same time with ensuring an outstanding partnership with TNB.

First, these documents were signed by the ACT, Romania and the first group of participating nations – Greece, Slovenia, Turkey and Hungary, on 16 December 2009, in Norfolk/USA. Then, other nations joined the project: Slovakia, Poland, the Czech Republic and the USA, the process being further open to other NATO member states.

The Centre was established in Oradea, in an old military barracks, which was completely modernised, the existing facilities being updated to the qualitative standards required by such an institution. Apart from the military infrastructure available, there were also other features that made it possible for this location to be chosen: a relatively cosmopolitan, permissive social environment, easy access (Western location, existing transport infrastructure), good standards of living, socio-cultural integration opportunities for foreign staff.

Starting from an initial operational capacity, the functional bases were set and, based on the ACT evaluation, the Centre obtained the status of NATO-affiliated

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<sup>14</sup> Details regarding the involvement of *GDDI* in the development of specific capabilities are to be found in the anniversary issue of the Directorate's Journal (*Infosfera*, defence intelligence security and studies journal, year I, no. 3/2009, Bucureşti).

<sup>15</sup> Based on the Decision no. 12 of 26 June 2008 of Romanian Parliament regarding the establishment of a NATO HUMINT Centre of Excellence on Romanian territory.

international military organisation (according to the provisions of the 1952 Paris Protocol)<sup>16</sup>.

The official inauguration of the Centre took place on 16 March 2010 in the presence of Romanian President Traian Băsescu, Minister of National Defence Gabriel Oprea, Chief of the General Staff Admiral Gheorghe Marin, and Deputy Commander of ACT, Admiral Luciano Zappata.

Other guests who participated in the event were ambassadors and military attaches accredited in București, representatives of the sponsoring nations, generals and officers from the Ministry of National Defence and representatives of the county and local public administration, highlighting the importance of the event for both the military and the civil environment.

The ceremony benefited from extensive media coverage, thanks to the presence of the Romanian president at the event and the importance of the event in itself. There were 43 journalists from 29 media trusts, TV, radio channels and national and local online news websites from Romania and local correspondents of the Hungarian television *Duna TV*.

The inauguration of the Centre was also covered in the international media, by prestigious publications that wrote about it and about the importance and meanings of the institution, as well as its role in the NATO structure (*Courier International*, *Jane's Defence*, *Le Figaro* etc.).

### **NATO HUMINT Centre of Excellence – Institutional Integration Benchmarks from the Perspective of the Institution's Management**

The mission of NATO HUMINT Centre of Excellence is to provide a unique point of reference in NATO in terms of education and training, development of standardised policies and procedures and support for the Alliance with its HUMINT capabilities.

In this regard, the Centre has a series of responsibilities meant to strengthen its relevance to Alliance transformation process, having a central place in the HUMINT community of interest in NATO:

- Supporting NATO specialised forces to improve the process of planning, training and management of specific activities;
- Testing, validating and implementing specific concepts, techniques, tactics and procedures, based on lessons learned in military operations;

<sup>16</sup>\*\*\*\*, *Protocol on the Status of International Military Headquarters Set up Pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty*, Paris, 28 August 1952, <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b520828a.htm>

- > Supporting the research activity in the field of specific technology;
- > Providing products and services for the NATO HUMINT standardisation field in order to ensure a desirable interoperability level of national capabilities earmarked for NATO;
- > Providing specialised education framework for the unitary preparation of NATO specialists.

Translating these objectives into reality is possible through the products and services resulted from a programme of work established based on NATO requests for support and approved by the Steering Committee (the decision-making body of the Centre), following their achievement from the perspective of four pillars of reference (corresponding to the actional areas of NATO transformation): analysis and lessons learned; concept development and experimentation; doctrine and standardisation; education and training.

The level of excellence in the Centre's performance is also reached by the decisive contribution of the broad relationships the institution has built and enhanced in a short time, through a proactive policy, through the engagement and judicious prioritising of resources, ensuring its presence and being represented at the level of the main decision-making and actional entities in the field of interest.

Thus, in addition to the coordination structures within the Allied Strategic Commands, working relations were first of all established with the allied nations (through the NATO working groups focused on the HUMINT, chaired by the Centre's director himself), with structures from the operational commands, with NATO training centres, and other centres of excellence whose activities are interconnected at different levels of interest.

Given that the reform and transformation processes require vision, performance and openness, one must also consider the need for multiplying the staff's fields of expertise, for providing their access to environments that promote confrontations of ideas, facilitate the understanding of the process-related features of the phenomena and enable multidimensional elaborations on the subjects of interests. The openness and interconnection with the academic environment, development of partnerships with universities, think-tanks, research institutes, NGOs, in specific projects, provide the necessary prerequisites for some "*accumulations*" of knowledge and know-how. Each of these established relations has specific meanings, prefiguring multiple development and institutional integration perspectives. Institutional integration is a real challenge for any new organisation, in any reference framework. In this respect, the managerial factors of the institution must manage two functional integration directions, one belonging to the internal structure and relations

and the other concerning the external integration in a superior functional system – or systems<sup>17</sup>.

As far as the internal functioning is concerned, the main references reside in a “*construction*” interdependent on people, processes and technologies (including working procedures). From the point of view of the systemic framework, we can point out a first connection of the organisation with foreign entities. Organisations being generally characterised by complex, dynamic, goal-oriented processes, we may assume the relation between “*inputs*” (internalised tasks and resource ensuring) vs. “*outputs*” (product) as an important feature of institutional integration, regarding both the qualitative and the quantitative indicators.

From this perspective, we can emphasise a decisive step towards institutional integration at maximum parameters: in accordance with its constituent documents, the NATO HUMINT Centre of Excellence built its own programme of work based on the Alliance’s requests for support, centralised by the directing structure of the Transformation Network, also being open to private requests from participating nations or other beneficiaries/customers within NATO. As far as resources are concerned, all the parts of the construction – budget, staff, procedures, interconnection networks, technologies etc. are clearly stated in the constituent documents, as well as in the national legislation (taking into consideration the location of the Centre) and are provided so that they could ensure the necessary premises and optimal conditions for this specific activity. On the other hand, in order to better understand the way the organisation adapts to the action environment, the complexity theory provides the perspective of a sum of strategies and structures facilitating the integration of the “*whole*” (the organisation per se) by considering the connective performances of the component substructures.

Consequently, for a military organisation, where the independence of action of the component subsystems is strongly limited and controlled by specific rules, there emerges the need for a proper strategy that should strengthen up to maximum the opportunities and initiatives of the subordinate levels, their success being translated in the success of the organisation.

Adopting sufficient flexibility in the management of NATO HUMINT Centre of Excellence and clear vision on the role and future of the organisation, we can say that its substructures were directed so that they could contribute, both individually and within the common effort, to achieving connection with the relevant structures

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<sup>17</sup> Eduard Simion, *A View on the Integration of NATO HUMINT Centre of Excellence from Oradea in the Local Institutional Landscape*, in *Revista Română de Geografie Politică/Romanian Review on Political Geography*, year XIV, no. 1/May, article no. 141101-239, 2012, pp. 5-17.

of the Alliance; the Centre's organisational structure itself is designed so that it could provide a specialised connection, in accordance with the pillars of NATO transformation, with the branches in charge in the strategic and operational headquarters, and with other allied structures involved in the Alliance military capabilities development – *Joint Warfare Centre (Stawanger, Norway)*, *Joint Forces Training Centre (Bydgoszcz, Poland)*, *Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre (Monsato, Portugal)* etc.

From the perspective of developing the goal of the Centre – HUMINT capability in NATO – one of the priorities of the institution is setting up the HUMINT Community of Interest, around the Centre of Excellence in Oradea, involving NATO structures, nations and other organisations and having as goal the establishment of a forum for debate and the development of activities meant to ensure mutual information of participants about actions, events and significant developments in this field.

From this point of view, shortly after its activity began, the Centre was capable of reaching a series of strategic goals, fundamental to the long-term projection of its support for the transformation and development of development of HUMINT in NATO:

- providing chairmanship and secretariat of the *NATO HUMINT Working Group (NHWG)* and *NATO HUMINT Technology Working Group (NHTWG)* (the most important forums of expertise);
- custodianship (management) of NATO HUMINT doctrine and procedures;
- providing requirements regarding equality assurance in the education and training process (in accordance with the new NATO regulations aligned with the Bologna process requirements) for transforming the institution in a NATO entity in charge of managing the department corresponding to the discipline, under ACT coordination;
- establishing the NATO HUMINT Lessons Learned/Best Practices Community of Interest.

Beyond the functional matters regarding its area of interest, the NATO HUMINT Centre of Excellence evinced itself within the NATO Transformation Network as a proactive organisation, participating in all important events in the HUMINT domain or those related to concrete aspects of its connection to the pulse of the Alliance, being represented under different projects, working groups and workshops, coordination and standardisation forums etc.

Exceeding the specificity of the field of expertise and area of interest of the Centre of Excellence in Oradea, its development as a knowledge-based organisation by integrating the NATO vision, policy, and requirements in terms

of information knowledge management, adopted and adapted as a basis of its own information exchange needs, represents an extremely important element for the full institutional integration. Details regarding the activity of the institution and its ongoing projects can be found at [www.natohcoe.org](http://www.natohcoe.org).

From a strategic point of view, the political-military decision to position Romania as a framework-nation for the development of the NATO HUMINT Centre of Excellence reflects the vision of a coherent engagement of our country in the construction of security arrangements assumed when entering the North-Atlantic Alliance, an event with profound meanings that exceed the purely military aspects. Considering the partnership established with other states participating in the project (including starting from the reciprocity of engaging resources in similar projects of partners), it becomes obvious the consolidation of the bilateral relations in different fields of the broad field of security and the increase in the level of cohesion in assuming the objectives promoted within NATO or regional initiatives.

At national level, the NATO HUMINT Centre of Excellence represents a true passport of quality for the Romanian Armed Forces and its image was used (together with other relevant benchmarks<sup>18</sup>) as an argument for the importance of Romania's contribution to Alliance security efforts, in a video clip (*"What NATO means for us"*), as part of the Alliance public diplomacy campaign<sup>19</sup>. This is just one of the reasons that make us believe that the Centre will represent a permanent benchmark on the list of accomplishments the Romanian Armed Forces are proud of and through which they provide a relevant position in the NATO capability environment.

Beyond the international prestige and the political relevance of the Centre of Excellence at international level, at local level the implications regarding institutional integration are significantly multiplying and diversifying (with essential developments regarding public communication and relationships with the community – aspects that also require a complex approach from the institution's management).

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Starting from a parallel with the well-known duality in the economic environment – *entrepreneur* vs. *manager* – this article highlights the way in which the qualities of each of the two positions were required in military command

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<sup>18</sup> The most important accomplishments of the Romanian Armed Forces in the relation with NATO are briefly presented by the Minister of National Defence, Gabriel Oprea, in the article *"Armata și interesul național"* in *Infosfera* Journal, year II, no. 2/2010, pp. 3-8.

<sup>19</sup> <http://www.mae.ro/en/node/6038>

structures in the process of establishment, development and affirmation of NATO HUMINT Centre of Excellence in Oradea.

If the core values of entrepreneurship – strategic vision, initiative, innovation and risk taking – were characteristic for the initiation and structural development of the institution (unique in the Romanian military environment), involving both the leadership and coordination factors from GDDI and the project team that represented the initial core of the staff structure of the Centre, the qualities of top manager were required later in the development, integration and affirmation of the organisation in a multidimensional framework (NATO military system, the national military system, the professional community of interest, the academic environment, the local community).

Thus, the features of entrepreneurship had to make room for the basic features of the manager, focusing on stability and institutional integration, and on its development/expansion (products and services rendered, cooperation network, institutional prestige and relevance within communities of interest).

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# NATO'S NUCLEAR WEAPONS STRATEGY

Colonel Dr Ion PANAIT

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*At the summit held in London, in July 1990, NATO leaders mandated the preparation of a new NATO Strategic Concept to take account of the rapid changes occurring in Europe. In Rome, in November 1991, just one month before the collapse of the USSR, the new concept was approved, which reflected the very different situation NATO was faced with at the end of the Cold War.*

*At the NATO Summit in April 1999, a revised strategic concept was issued, focusing on the changes over the last eight years. As far as nuclear forces were concerned, the concept closely resembled the strategic concept in 1999, with some modifications that are presented by the author.*

**Keywords:** *the Warsaw Pact; nuclear weapons; conventional forces; collective defence*

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the United States maintain armed forces to deter and defend against the Soviet threat while keeping defence expenditures in check and balancing the federal budget? The administration's studies led to announcement in January 1954 of a policy of "massive retaliation". Secretary of State John Foster Dulles described a central plan of the policy as "a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our own choosing"<sup>1</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> Russell E. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), p. 404.

Since the mid-1950s, NATO has attached importance to nuclear weapons in deterring and defending any attack against the Alliance. NATO policy has evolved for the past 60 years and has increasingly stressed that the circumstances in which the Alliance might have to consider resorting to nuclear weapons are exceedingly remote. The number of US non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe has declined dramatically, from 7 000 in the 1970s to some 200 in 2012. Yet, as NATO leaders stated in their 2010 *New Strategic Concept*, "as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance".

## Massive Retaliation

President Dwight Eisenhower took office in January 1953 facing a dilemma: how could

At the end of 1954, the North Atlantic Council authorised “*NATO military commanders to use nuclear weapons against the Warsaw Pact irrespective of whether the Pact used them*”<sup>2</sup>. By the end of the 1950s, the US military had deployed some 2 900 nuclear weapons in Europe, including aircraft bombs, artillery shells, atomic demolition munitions (mines) and warheads for short-range missiles such as the *Honest John* and for longer-range missiles such as the *Tor* (with a range of 3 200 kilometres)<sup>3</sup>. Beginning in 1959, some of these warheads fell under “*programmes of cooperation*” – often referred to as “*dual-key*” systems – in which US forces controlled the warheads but in wartime could make them available for delivery by allied forces.

As President John Kennedy took office in 1961, the United States expanded its strategic nuclear forces to include large numbers of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara introduced the term “*assured destruction*” as the basis for US policy in 1964. His strategy established that US would destroy 20-33 percent of the Soviet population and 50-75 percent of the USSR’s industrial capacity would suffice to deter a Soviet attack on the United States<sup>4</sup>. McNamara accepted that the Soviet Union would at some point acquire the capability to inflict similar amounts of destruction upon the United States; hence, the term “*mutual assured destruction*” (*MAD*).

The secretary examined ways to increase the flexibility of US nuclear forces and also considered the challenge of extended deterrence.

By the time of the Kennedy administration, the United States was not the only NATO nuclear power. Britain had re-established nuclear cooperation with the United States after demonstrating its own thermonuclear capability. In 1960, France tested a nuclear weapon and proceeded to develop an independent nuclear force, motivated in part by its doubts about the reliability of the American extended deterrent as Russian strategic forces increased.

In order to ensure a credible nuclear umbrella that would cover all of NATO, Washington explored the idea of a *multilateral nuclear force (MLF)* in the early 1960s. Under this proposal, US SLBMs armed with nuclear warheads would be placed on surface ships or submarines with NATO multinational crews, constituting a NATO nuclear force. By allowing NATO countries some access to control

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<sup>2</sup> David N. Schwartz, *NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1983), p. 32.

<sup>3</sup> Robert Standish Norris, “*United States Nuclear Weapons Deployments Abroad, 1950-1977*”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 30 November 1999.

<sup>4</sup> Lawrence Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983), p. 87.

over nuclear weapons, those countries would be less inclined to seek their own independent nuclear capabilities and the *MLF* idea died relatively quickly. “Finally, McNamara was convinced that when the Europeans, who were supposedly clamoring for the *MLF*, realised that the United States would not relinquish a veto over launch and that the financial burden of creating, operating and maintaining the force would be shared among all the participants, they would quickly lose their enthusiasm”<sup>5</sup>.

Washington subsequently sought to persuade its European allies to increase their defence spending in order that NATO might strengthen its conventional forces and capability to resist a Soviet attack without resorting to nuclear weapons. The European allies, however, showed little interest in a major conventional build-up. Memories of World War II and the immense destruction of modern conventional warfare remained fresh. Most European allies preferred instead to rely on the nuclear deterrent threat.

### Flexible Response

Early in his tenure, McNamara began to develop a US strategy of flexible response that would rely on a continuum of conventional, non-strategic nuclear and strategic nuclear forces. He used a May 1962 NATO ministerial meeting to outline US thinking on this. NATO allies were slow to accept the new strategy, but transatlantic discussions continued over the succeeding several years. By 1967, NATO had formally embraced a Military Committee document known as *MC 14/3*, embodying the flexible response strategy<sup>6</sup>. The idea was to give the Alliance a range of credible response options, with the ever present threat of raising the risks of use of Soviet military force – conventional or nuclear – against NATO.

During the same period, the Alliance also moved to establish the Nuclear Planning Group, which created a formal venue for consultations on nuclear forces and doctrine issues. In particular, it created a forum in which the United States could regularly brief allies on its thinking regarding nuclear weapons issues and collect their feedback.

Meanwhile, the US build-up of nuclear weapons in Europe continued, as did the expansion of programmes of cooperation that would make those weapons available to allied military forces in time of war. The number of US nuclear warheads in Europe peaked in the early 1970s at just over 7 300, of which some 2 800 were designated for allied use under programmes of cooperation<sup>7</sup>. This spread the risks and burden of nuclear weapons among a number of allies.

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<sup>5</sup> *NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas*, pp. 94-95.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid*, pp. 156-187.

<sup>7</sup> *United States Nuclear Weapons Deployments Abroad, 1950-1977*.

## NATO's Dual-Track Decision

Soviet nuclear developments in the second half of the 1970s led NATO to a new look at the requirements of extended deterrence.

The United States and Soviet Union were making progress on a new *Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty – SALT II* – which was signed in 1979. That agreement codified strategic nuclear parity between the two nuclear superpowers. At the same time, the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact maintained their advantages in conventional armed forces. The Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks between NATO and the Warsaw Pact showed little sign of progress, despite the “*nuclear sweetener*” of a NATO offer to withdraw 1 000 nuclear warheads to incentivise Soviet conventional force reductions. In 1976, the Soviets began deploying the *SS-20* ballistic missile. Mounted on a large, mobile transporter-erector-launcher vehicle, the *SS-20* had a range of 5 000 kilometres (just under the range that would have made it subject to *SALT II*) and could carry three independently targetable warheads. It could strike targets anywhere in Europe and represented a substantial improvement over the older Soviet *SS-4* and *SS-5* missiles that it was intended to replace.

European allies expressed concern at the implications. If the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact maintained their conventional force advantages while the Soviets achieved parity in strategic nuclear forces and deployed new *SS-20* missiles for which there was no NATO counterbalance, would that not undermine NATO's deterrence strategy? Would a NATO threat to escalate to nuclear weapons in the event that conventional defence began to fail be credible to the Soviets, when they dominated in longer-range theatre nuclear missiles? Two years of transatlantic consultations produced the “*dual-track*” decision on long-range theatre nuclear forces, adopted by NATO foreign and defence ministers in December 1979.

The “*dual-track*” decision provided that the United States would deploy nuclear-armed ground-launched cruise missiles (*GLCMs*) and *Pershing II* ballistic missiles in five allied basing countries in Europe. The missiles would have sufficient range to hold targets in the Soviet Union at risk and would begin deployment and achieve initial operational capability by the end of 1983. This deployment track would be accompanied by a negotiating track aimed at securing equal limitations on US and Soviet longer-range theatre nuclear forces, hopefully with reductions in the latter. Formal negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) – a term adopted in place of theatre nuclear forces – began in late 1981.

President Ronald Reagan proposed the “zero/zero” outcome: the United States would not deploy *GLCMs* and *Pershing IIs* if the Soviet Union scrapped its *SS-20s*, *SS-4s* and *SS-5s*. The Soviets showed no interest in such an outcome, and over two years the negotiations made little progress. When the first *GLCMs* and *Pershing IIs* were deployed to Britain and West Germany in November 1983, the Soviets walked out of the negotiations.

The potential deployment of new US nuclear missiles in Europe proved hugely controversial, with anti-nuclear movements growing and conducting mass protest rallies in each of the five designated basing countries. By all appearances, Moscow hoped that domestic political opposition and public protests would cause the deployment track to unravel – without the Soviets having to limit or reduce any of their missiles. It was a near thing in the end, but the basing country governments maintained their political resolve and went forward with the deployments as agreed.

Less than a year after leaving the talks, Moscow signalled interest in resuming the INF negotiations and parallel *Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)* talks, which they had also suspended in November 1983. Secretary of State George Shultz and Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko agreed in January 1985 to resume the two negotiations.

Mikhail Gorbachev’s rise to the head of the Soviet Communist Party provoked a major reassessment in Moscow of the value of nuclear arms. To the surprise of many in the West, the Soviets in 1986-87 moved toward the US position and ultimately accepted the “zero/zero” outcome. Gorbachev and Reagan signed a treaty in December 1987 banning all US and Soviet land-based INF missiles. The treaty entered into force in June 1988. By the time that its reductions had been implemented three years later, the United States had eliminated 846 INF missiles, while the Soviets had destroyed 1 846<sup>8</sup>.

The *Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty* was signed in 1990, setting equal limits on key categories of NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional equipment, such as main battle tanks. The *CFE Treaty* required major asymmetrical reductions by the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. The following year, the Warsaw Pact dissolved itself and, by the end of 1991, the Soviet Union had collapsed.

### **NATO Nuclear Policy after the Cold War**

During their July 1990 summit in London, NATO leaders mandated the preparation of a *new strategic concept* for the Alliance to take account of the rapidly changing circumstances in Europe. When they gathered in November 1991 in Rome

– just a month before the end of the USSR – they approved the new concept, which reflected the very different situation that NATO faced with the end of the *Cold War*.

The 1991 strategic concept devoted three paragraphs to nuclear weapons. The paragraphs reaffirmed that the “*fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the allies is political: to preserve peace and prevent coercion and any kind of war ... by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any aggressor about the nature of the allies’ response to military aggression*”. Actually, the concept further stated that the Alliance would therefore maintain adequate nuclear forces in Europe<sup>9</sup>.

The strategic concept was virtually silent. It noted that the allies could “*significantly reduce their sub-strategic nuclear forces*” which would “*consist solely of dual-capable aircraft which could, if necessary, be supplemented by offshore systems*”. Shortly before the strategic concept was issued, President George H. W. Bush had announced that United States would destroy all its ground-launched short-range nuclear weapons. Between 1991 and 1993, the United States removed some 3 000 nuclear weapons from Europe, bringing the total forward-deployed there to well under 1 000<sup>10</sup>. In the 1990s, Britain removed from Germany its dual-capable *Tornados* and their accompanying nuclear bombs (and then withdrew those systems from active service entirely).

When NATO leaders met in April 1999 in Washington, they issued a revised strategic concept to take account of the changes over the preceding eight years. The language regarding nuclear forces closely followed that in the 1991 strategic concept, with a few changes. Noting the reductions that had been made in NATO non-strategic nuclear forces since 1991, the new concept added that the Alliance had significantly relaxed the readiness criteria for its forces with nuclear roles (dual-capable aircraft) and those NATO nuclear forces “*no longer target any country*”<sup>11</sup>.

Between 2000 and 2010, the United States quietly withdrew more nuclear weapons, including removing its nuclear weapons entirely from Greece and Britain.

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<sup>8</sup> Federation of American Scientists, “*Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)*”, <http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/inf/index.html>

<sup>9</sup> NATO, “*The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept*”, 8 November 1991, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/ofcial\\_texts\\_23847.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/ofcial_texts_23847.htm)

<sup>10</sup> Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “*Nuclear Notebook: U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe, 2011*,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, January/February 2011, vol. 67, no. 1, p. 65.

<sup>11</sup> NATO, “*The Alliance’s Strategic Concept*”, 24 April 1999, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/ofcial\\_texts\\_27433.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/ofcial_texts_27433.htm)

## The 2010 Strategic Concept

Preparatory work for a *new strategic concept* was well underway in spring 2010. NATO foreign ministers held an informal ministerial in Tallinn in late April 2010 and discussed how the concept might address nuclear issues. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton put forward five principles for nuclear weapons and arms control – these principles largely set the bounds for subsequent NATO debate. The allies agreed that decisions on Alliance nuclear posture would be taken by consensus. In May 2010, just a month after the Tallinn meeting, a group of experts appointed by the NATO Secretary General and led by former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright released its report on recommendations for the *new strategic concept*. With regard to nuclear weapons, the report stated that “*under current security conditions, the retention of some US forward-based systems on European soil reinforces the principle of extended nuclear deterrence and collective defence*”, noted that “*the broad participation of non-nuclear allies is an essential sign of transatlantic solidarity and risk-sharing*”, called for an ongoing dialogue with Russia aimed at reducing and even eliminating all non-strategic nuclear weapons, and recommended that “*as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO should continue to maintain secure and reliable nuclear forces, with widely shared responsibility of deployment and operational support, at the minimum level required by the prevailing security environment*”<sup>12</sup>.

The US objectives in the run-up to the Lisbon summit focused on encouraging an outcome regarding nuclear questions in the strategic concept somewhere in the broad spectrum defined by the Tallinn principles and on avoiding a major intra-Alliance fight over nuclear weapons. The poles of the debate within NATO during autumn 2010 were defined by Germany and France. Germany sought language for the strategic concept that would put greater emphasis on arms control and disarmament, while the French took a more conservative approach, insisting on the continuing strategic logic of nuclear deterrence. In the days before the Lisbon summit, the sides agreed on compromise language, leaving difficult issues such as the Alliance’s nuclear posture to a *Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (DDPR)*. NATO leaders blessed and issued the new strategic concept in Lisbon in late November. It noted that the circumstances in which the Alliance might consider using nuclear weapons were “*extremely remote*” and added that “*as long as nuclear weapons exist; NATO will remain a nuclear alliance*”. The concept termed strategic nuclear forces – particularly US strategic nuclear forces – the “*supreme guarantee*” of Alliance security (which has long been the case).

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<sup>12</sup> “*NATO 2020: Assured Security, Dynamic Engagement*”, Analysis and Recommendations of the Group of Experts on a New Strategic Concept for NATO, 17 May 2010.

The concept called for NATO to maintain “an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces” and to “ensure the broadest possible participation of Allies in collective defence planning on nuclear roles”.

As for arms control, the concept said the Alliance desired “to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons”, sought “to create the conditions for further reductions [of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe] in the future”. The concept also noted that “national decisions on arms control and disarmament may have an impact on the security of all Alliance members” and expressed NATO leaders’ commitment to “appropriate consultations among allies on these issues”<sup>13</sup>. The new concept did not contain language from its predecessors that cited US nuclear weapons in Europe as providing “an essential political and military link between the European and the North American members of the Alliance”. Some experts thus believe that the *new concept* places significantly less emphasis on non-strategic nuclear weapons than did its predecessors.

On the second day of the Lisbon summit, Alliance leaders issued a summit declaration that noted “NATO will maintain an appropriate mix of conventional, nuclear and missile defence forces”. The declaration stated that North Atlantic Council had been tasked to “continue to review NATO’s overall posture in deterring and defending against the full range of threats to the Alliance”, with that review to be undertaken “on the basis of the deterrence and defence principles agreed in the Strategic Concept”<sup>14</sup>. In follow-up, NATO began the *DDPR* in early 2011.

### The Alliance’s Current Path

As Washington and NATO members weigh the Alliance’s nuclear posture as part of the *DDPR* and consider possible approaches to limiting non-strategic nuclear weapons with Russia, NATO appears to be on a path of disarmament by default as regards non-strategic nuclear warheads. If the Alliance does not handle the nuclear issue carefully, it will find that US nuclear weapons in Europe are reduced or eliminated while NATO gains nothing in terms of reductions of Russian non-strategic nuclear warheads or in terms of political credit for a unilateral decision to withdraw the *B61* bombs.

The default decision is driven primarily by the future of NATO’s dual-capable aircraft. Although the German *Tornadoes* may fly a bit longer than originally

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<sup>13</sup> NATO, “Active Engagement, Modern Defense: Strategic Concept for the Defense and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon”, 19 November 2010.

<sup>14</sup> NATO, Official Text, “Lisbon Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Lisbon”, 20 November 2010.

planned, it is virtually impossible to see any German government or parliament supporting a proposal to make the *Eurofighter* capable of delivering nuclear bombs. The Netherlands and Belgium would most likely give up their nuclear delivery capabilities as well. That removes the rationale for maintaining *B61* bombs in those three countries.

The denuclearisation of the northern tier of Europe will put political pressure on Italy and Turkey. One cannot say with certainty how Rome and Ankara would decide, but support for maintaining nuclear weapons in those countries would undoubtedly erode. There is a high probability that the two governments would also opt for withdrawal of US nuclear weapons.

The US specialists ask whether there will be European leaders who decide, as did Helmut Kohl and Margaret Thatcher, to drive public opinion on NATO nuclear weapons questions, at a time when Europe is preoccupied with fiscal matters, economic problems, immigration and other internal questions, and when many Europeans do not regard Russia or Iran as plausible threats. The NATO members most likely to argue for keeping the nuclear presence are hindered by the fact that they do not participate directly in nuclear burden sharing (they neither host US nuclear bombs nor provide dual-capable aircraft).

Washington and NATO thus should consider the likely possibility that over the coming decade the US nuclear presence in Europe will diminish significantly, if not be eliminated all together.

# **SOVEREIGNTY AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS**

## **– Challenges and Way Ahead –**

*Lieutenant Colonel Dr Iuliana-Simona ȚUȚUIANU*

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*This article serves to illuminate an important principle which has been gradually but decisively injected into international relations system, namely “No one is above the law”. Nowadays, sovereignty cannot be absolute and impunity (effective immunity from prosecution) can no longer have realistic support.*

*The Westphalian model of sovereignty requires a new conceptualisation involving certain moral obligations for the sovereign states, both towards their own citizens and international community.*

*Although the international justice made enormous progress when the Rome Statute entered into force in 2002, thereby creating the first permanent international criminal court (International Criminal Court), there are still serious challenges to its jurisdiction due to a series of complicated but understandable – to some extent – reasons.*

**Keywords:** *criminal law; ICC; ICTY; MENA; Security Council*

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### **A New Legal Order of International Criminal Law**

The Westphalian logic of the absolute sovereignty of an independent state which does everything it wants within itself and with its relations with other states can no longer have realistic support. National identity is not achieved anymore through isolation, force or opposition, but through cooperation and active participation in optimising the systemic connections. Are we witnessing a new type of sovereignty in the post *Cold War* era, which is totally different from the Westphalian one, or an adaptation and/or reconfiguration of the concept and its ways of implementation? Given the complexity of the topic – including the current controversies surrounding contemporary wars and invasions, the creation of special institutions and organisations, or the theoretical debates on codifying “*droit d’ingérence*” in public international law – a thorough reflection on a new action philosophy which structures the international relations system after the *Cold War* is very valuable.

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Debates on the changing nature of sovereignty in the post-*Cold War* world have left many diplomats, military planners and academics uninterested. The debate has been widely treated as something of “*purely theoretical*” appeal with little or no application in the real world. There has been until relatively recently too large a gap between the post-structuralist debates on international relations theory and the more empirically based literature on conflict resolution and changing forms of governance. The evidence of emerging models of sovereignty in actual use by political actors or implied in the pragmatic compromises made or being actively discussed by political actors in contemporary nationalist politics and in peace making process fundamentally challenges the absolutist conception of sovereignty. The traditional Westphalian model of sovereignty still forms the basis of the positivist legal definition of sovereignty but it is being increasingly departed from when pragmatic compromises are being negotiated to resolve nationalist conflicts in the post-*Cold War* world. In this context, maintaining the fiction of traditional sovereignty, while perhaps comforting to voters sceptical of globalisation or regional integration, actually hampers our capacity to construct models of governance appropriate to serious ethnic conflict or areas of contested sovereignty.

As post-Westphalian elements reflected by the new dimensions of international criminal law, we may simply elaborate on the composition of the panels of judges who come from all over the world and, above all, on the fact that “*sovereignty*” can be put on trial with the help of the nation states and for their own good and relevance. A new dimension of extradition is obvious, since states handover their people more easily now, in the name of human rights. States understand that these international criminal courts do not violate their sovereignty, but rather help them to exercise it in a proper and interdependent manner.

While many victims of war put their hopes in the current work of international criminal institutions, they have often been disappointed by the light sentences given to those who committed war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, and by the slowness of the proceedings. This demonstrates the need for a focused and concerted effort in developing these institutions, so the creative energy must be directed into creating a workable, though imperfect, international justice system<sup>1</sup>.

International justice mechanisms can be sustainable only insofar as they are promoted by the states. And if the state asks for international support for its own efforts, the global community can offer significant assistance at relatively low cost.

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<sup>1</sup> Judith Armatta, *Twilight of Impunity: The War Crimes Trial of Slobodan Milosevic*, Duke University Press, 2010, p. 446.

Loans of law enforcement officials, experts and legal advisors represent an immediate and tangible contribution to the state's efforts<sup>2</sup>. Cooperation is the key word, its benefits being more than invaluable. To give an example, the work of the *International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)* with the local courts and national authorities helped speed up the accession of the countries of former Yugoslavia to the European Union.

An important issue that always haunts the international criminal courts is that they do not have coercive powers; they do not have police forces or ways to make arrests and garner evidence. This is a big factor that works against them. Strengthening the nexus between international criminal justice and national capacity to combat impunity is at stake. Building states' capacities to combat impunity at the national level is realised with tremendous UN support. Of great relevance are the lessons learned from *ad hoc* and hybrid tribunals and about how to align knowledge and initiatives from international criminal justice with efforts to strengthen domestic prosecutions and capacities. The experiences of, among others, the ICTY have contributed to the development of the *International Criminal Court (ICC)* and the principle of complementarity.

The future of international justice, particularly the ICC, depends on the extent to which political influence can be annihilated by proper and independent investigation of the cases. It is unfortunate that large countries like the US, China and Russia do not align the rules of international humanitarian law enshrined in the ICC Rome Statute. "*If the United States and other states actively seek to influence the law that is applied to others, the institutions must develop and institutionalize ways to resist. Otherwise, international humanitarian law becomes just one more venue for political intrigue*"<sup>3</sup>.

States that have not ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court pose a big challenge to international criminal law. However, an optimistic view should prevail. Thus, if the US was hostile to the universal jurisdiction of the ICC during the tenure of George W. Bush, Obama administration's positions indicate a moderate support, which enables us to consider that managing these challenges represents a matter of time.

We should take the long-view and assess these tribunals over time. There are many comments that Bashir will not be coming to The Hague. On the other hand, if we think back to Milosevic, we heard the same concerns. Now, at the ICTY, the former Serb leader Radovan Karadzic stands trial, the former commander of Bosnian Serb forces, General Ratko Mladic, faces charges

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<sup>2</sup> Steven R. Ratner, Jason S. Abrams, *Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law: Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy*, Second Edition, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 343.

<sup>3</sup> Judith Armatta, *op. cit.*, p. 445.

of war crimes at Srebrenica and Sarajevo, Milosevic stood trial but died mid-trial before he could present his defence, the former President of the Republic of Srsпка, Biljana Plavsic, pleaded guilty and cooperated with the prosecution and so received a light sentence of 9-year imprisonment. Also, former Prime Minister of Rwanda Jean Kambanda pleaded guilty for genocide and was condemned by the ICTR to life imprisonment. After 44 months of often tense courtroom action, the war crimes trial of Charles Taylor ended. The former Liberian president was convicted on 11 counts of aiding and abetting war crimes and crimes against humanity. He was sentenced to 50-year imprisonment. Laurent Gbagbo, the ex-president of Ivory Coast, was the first former head of state to stand trial before the ICC. The ICC had previously tried and failed to bring the might of international law down on Sudan's president, Omar al-Bashir, and Libya's late leader Muammar Gaddafi. Now, Kenya's president Uhuru Kenyatta and the new deputy president William Ruto, elected in March 2013, are charged with crimes against humanity for violence that took place in the 2007 Kenyan elections.

Another important phenomenon consists of the development of regional organisations. States often distrust the United Nations and prefer the affiliation to these organisations. We see this in Europe, where the European Court of Human Rights functions, also in Latin America, where the Inter-American Commission was created, or in Africa, where another court was established – *The African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights*. Obviously, it seems much easier for the Africans to accept the jurisdiction of a court consisting of African judges rather than the ICC jurisdiction with judges from all over the world.

The extradition measure of the former African leader, Charles Taylor, with the value of precedent on the African continent, has been commented in the *International Justice Tribune* by an official of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, as “*An African head of state being tried in Europe is highly offensive on a symbolic level*”. Nigeria has been harshly criticised for not having referred the case to the African Union and also for having taken the unilateral decision to hand over Taylor to a “*white man's Court*” to be tried in The Hague<sup>4</sup>.

On 11 and 12 October 2013, the African officials who gathered in Addis Ababa for an African Union summit unanimously agreed that no African sitting head of state should be obliged to stand trial during his tenure in office. African Union pushes for a deferral of the case of Kenyan president, claiming that even though the ICC mandate is global, only Africans have been indicted so far. Consultations with the UNSC are envisaged, this body having the ability to suspend ICC investigations. Kenya might be the first country to withdraw from the Rome Statute.

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<sup>4</sup> Ellen L. Lutz, Caitlin Reiger, *Prosecuting Heads of State*, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 226.

The Kenyan parliament voted to pull out of the court and the proposal needs the president's backing. However, a withdrawal, if it happened, would take a year to come into effect and would not affect the ongoing trials.

It is too soon to herald the end of impunity, but there is an encouraging "*justice cascade*", even though there is still some way to go in ending impunity. Properly conducted trials demonstrate that no one is above the law, no matter how rich, how powerful or how seemingly untouchable he or she is. This is the message currently conveyed by the trials of the Arab Spring. The *Big men in small cells* image is expected to contribute to increasing institutionalisation and respect for the rule of law in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).

Generally speaking, trials are inherently risky in the aftermath of transitions where peace or democracy are not yet fully consolidated. Fortunately, most prosecutions of heads of state or other senior leaders at the time of or immediately after a transition were not followed by violence, as showed by the Milosevic or Charles Taylor cases. A case in which further violence followed a trial was in Iraq where the particular circumstances of the insurgency and US military occupation relegated Hussein's trial to a minor causal factor. In MENA, we see countries in security turmoil due to the street confrontations between protesters and the recently empowered police or army forces. The build-up of international interest in trying former rights abusers encourages national courts throughout MENA to entertain such cases. Governments in the early phases of a transition may want to demonstrate their effort to make a fresh start by seeking judicial condemnations of the old regime, believing that it is their duty to prosecute those most responsible for serious human rights and corruption crimes, with or without international assistance. Others may want to pursue the way of international criminal courts.

Despite the positive trends, politics can still trump legal process. The long-standing tradition that former heads of state will find shelter in exile is still prevalent. For instance, former Tunisian president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali's exile has protected him from a real trial in Tunisia. He is not a singular example since exile also has protected many African leaders from going to prison: on 12 December 2006, Ethiopia's former dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam was convicted of genocide in absentia after a decade of legal proceedings and he is still in Zimbabwe being protected by Robert Mugabe; Madagascar's former leader Didier Ratsiraka was convicted for violating state security and sentenced to fifteen years in prison; Uganda's Idi Amin escaped prosecution by fleeing to Saudi Arabia. These are clear examples of legal loopholes but there is hope for improvement, thanks to the international community's efforts and pressure. It is the example of Chad's former leader Hissène Habré and, more notorious, of former Liberian president

Charles Taylor. Both enjoyed the exile treatment, the first still being protected by Senegal despite attempts to extradite him to be tried in Belgium, and the second benefiting from this treatment in Nigeria but only for a limited period of time.

### ***Looking to the Future: Lessons Learned and Policy Recommendations***

Let us try now to sum up where the international criminal justice stands today and where it may hopefully go, in the years to come. In the preceding part of this article, you have been made aware of many limitations, many ongoing tasks and many challenges that the international criminal courts have to cope with, also in the future. This is necessary for a realistic idea of the conditions in which these courts will have to function in the future.

If we think about the complexity of the international security environment and the aggressive crises in this world, these courts will always be fragile, having a symbolic moral authority. Due to reasons of capacity, the courts will only conduct a few exemplary trials. In the future, the main responsibility to prosecute international crimes must remain with the states.

Here are some lessons learned and policy recommendations regarding the current status of international criminal courts and their future perspectives:

- the ICC needs greater international recognition and more members than the current 122 states parties;
- in terms of ambitions, the ICC jurisdiction might be extended, by adding “*ecocide*” and crimes against environment to the list of crimes against peace; Nevertheless, if ICC fails to address established crimes against peace and to effectively prosecute violence against humans, this goal seems unachievable;
- an effective cooperation with states parties in preparing the cases, in particular when it comes to the key issue of arrest and surrender of the accused, is fundamental; as already stressed in this article, this lack of any form of executive power is their Achilles’ heel;
- a limiting factor is also the enormous difficulty the courts face in order to obtain the evidence required; they have to conduct complex investigations in regions far away from The Hague, regions where the security situation is volatile and it is often difficult to collect the evidence;
- since 2007, certain states parties have restricted their funding for the courts. This is an irrational move, when very often these states require more outreach or victims and when more work is referred to the Court;
- a further challenging reality is the temptation for some states, including powerful states and permanent members of the Security Council, to somehow instrumentalise the courts and use them for their political interests;

- states and the Security Council continue to be the main actors. The lack of support or political moves by states that make the role of the ICC questionable may lead to additional misunderstandings or criticisms to which the Court, as a neutral and non-political institution, cannot really respond. Substantial diplomatic efforts have been made to encourage more countries to sign and ratify the treaty. If Kenya, a member state, leaves, and subsequently seems justified in doing so, this precedent could turn against these diplomatic efforts, with other countries following in the row;
- all possible means must be exhausted to ensure that the ICC will have, after 2017, jurisdiction with regard to the crime of aggression. The consensus decision on the crime of aggression amendments adopted in Kampala (2010) has a unique chance to criminalise illegal war-making. War crimes and crimes against humanity are horrible consequence of the brutal use of armed force. We have seen this in all African states situations with which the ICC is currently seized.

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The international criminal courts will continue to face difficult tasks and challenges in the future. Hopefully, in a few decades, the International Criminal Court will have more states parties and will be more respected, as a necessary institution for prevention and deterrence against the excesses of ruthless power politics. The ICC system can maintain its relevance and credibility in the future only with the full support given by the states parties and the international community.

The message sent by the international criminal courts is very simple: *All men and women are equal before the law*. Nobody is above the law. More men and women in this world are united by the conviction that genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression cannot go unpunished, regardless of the nationality and the rank of the perpetrators.

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„Aviation: Your Reliable Connection  
to the World!“

## ROMANIAN CIVIL AVIATION – On Cooperation and Security –

Vlad LUJANSCHI

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*The author takes an approach to the economic development of air transportation starting from viable solutions for the fares, taxes and other financial mechanisms applicable to the infrastructure, operations, regulations and surveillance, consumer protection, improvement of data collection, economic forecast and analysis in the field of international civil aviation.*

*In this respect, the International Civil Aviation Organisation has defined new strategies and tools capable of bringing about more vitality regarding the financial support. As far as this objective is concerned, considering the European experience in developing an integrated and free market of air transportation, ICAO intends to develop a new framework of regulations, with implications for the access to the market of airline owners, consumer protection, fair competition, taxes as well as for the economic aspects related to airports and air navigation services suppliers.*

**Keywords:** *International Civil Aviation Day; air transportation; financial support; environment protection*

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Motto:

„The sky has nothing to envy about the most crowded roads“<sup>1</sup>.

**T**he Civil International Aviation Organisation (ICAO) was established 69 years ago, on 7 December, in Chicago, based on the *Convention on International Civil Aviation*. Three years later, it became a specialised agency of the UN. Basically, on 7 December 1944, it was signed the establishment of international relations in the field of civil aviation. Our country joined the Chicago Convention in 1965 and, together with Slovakia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Poland and Hungary, it is now a member of the Central European Rotation Group in the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organisation.

ICAO is the organisation that sets international regulations for “*aviation safety, security and efficiency and coordinates international cooperation in the field of civil aviation*”<sup>2</sup>. Thus, at world level, 7 December

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<sup>1</sup> Translated from the French phrase: „*Le ciel n’a rien à envier aux axes routiers les plus bondés*“, in *Futur: des avions supersoniques et écologiques*, *Le Parisien*, 15.11.2012, <http://www.leparisien.fr/magazine/grand-angle/futur-des-avions-supersoniques-et-ecologiques-05-11-2012-2294067.php>

<sup>2</sup> At <http://www.mae.ro/node/19501>

– *International Civil Aviation Day* – is the highlight of the activity undertaken throughout an entire year by the civil aviation, as well as a ... more than necessary balance at the end of the year: the technical and operational standards employed, the policies, the regulations indispensable for civil aviation security, the conditions of and the impediments to the environment in which air transport took place.

In 2013, the theme approved by the ICAO Council for the International Civil Aviation Day was: *Aviation: Your Reliable Connection to the World!* The starting point for this theme was the need for strengthening the international framework for civil aviation development, taking into account the “*lessons learned*”, current achievements and imminent challenges.

In May this year\*, the President of the Council of ICAO, Roberto Kobeh Gonzáles, and the Secretary General, Raymond Benjamin, as guests of the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Titus Corlăţean, underscored “*Romania’s excellent cooperation with the International Civil Aviation Organisation, the tradition of the important Romania presence in the field, as well as the contribution Romania makes to the fulfilment of the main ICAO goals*”<sup>3</sup>. Moreover, the two officials evoked the personality of Professor Nicolae Mateescu Matte, Romanian scholar in legal science, founder of aerospace law, who was awarded the “*Edward Warner*” Prize three years ago, the world’s highest civil aviation award, the equivalent of the Nobel Prize for elite activities in this field! We should all be very proud of this accomplishment!

In the same context, the Foreign Minister recommended that a regional training centre should be established in Romania, with ICAO’s support, for organising thematic meetings and conducting studies and analyses, based on both the experience and expertise of our country. In that framework, it was emphasised the importance of international partnerships – at regional and world level – for creating a climate of safety and security in international civil aviation, expanding new cooperation and collaboration systems. As far as this aspect was concerned, the President of ICAO underlined the role of cooperation in the organisation as being the “*heart and soul of ICAO*”.

Starting from these arguments, I believe that an efficient world air transport system will contribute to the economic, social and cultural development of society worldwide, as well as to the guaranteeing of a high security level, both of them resulting in the establishment of an enduring and effective connection with the entire world.

A year ago, in an opening address delivered during the sixty-first special meeting of the Directors General of European Civil Aviation Conference/ECAC, Raymond Benjamin, Secretary General of ICAO, considered that the *International*

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\* The article was published in *Gândirea militară românească*, no. 5, 2013.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

*Civil Aviation Day* was the ideal opportunity to remind all members the *five strategic objectives* of ICAO for the 2014-2016 triennium:

- *“safety of the global air transport system;*
- *establishment of the strategic basis guiding air navigation modernisation, efficiency and capacity;*
- *security and facilitation;*
- *economic development of air transport;*
- *environmental protection”<sup>4</sup>.*

In order for the goals to be reached, each of them was correlated with strategies, specific documents drawn up by specialists worldwide, actions and activities.

Last year, the airlines were making 2,2 dollars in profit by each passenger they carried, the equivalent of the cost of a cup of coffee<sup>5</sup>!



Directly or indirectly, the aviation industry brings substantial revenues to the country through the bridges between cities, no matter if they are inside the country or abroad, as well as through the shortened time for each flight, in other words, through the generated infrastructure.

In this theoretical-applicative framework, in a succinct presentation, the five objectives are implemented as follows:

➤ *Safety of the global air transport system* – the concept of *Safety* includes the change of the safety planning, a proactive approach to safety in the context of risk management and modernisation of the entire air navigation system; in this respect, in order to meet the requirements of the annexes of the Chicago Convention, ICAO will be targeting a minimum 60% state compliance rate by 2017, supporting cooperation between states regarding the progress of the evaluation

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<sup>4</sup> In Mihaela Tămășdan, press release, [http://www.caa.ro/pdf/ICAO\\_2012\\_news.docx](http://www.caa.ro/pdf/ICAO_2012_news.docx)

<sup>5</sup> Tony Tyler, IATA's Chief Executive Officer (International Air Transport Association), <http://www.ziare.com/afaceri/industria/ce-industrie-are-in-romania-75-000-de-locuri-de-munca-si-contributii-de-un-miliard-de-euro-la-pib-1256709>

and analysis of three primary accident areas: *Loss of Control; Runway Safety; Controlled Flight into Terrain.*

➤ *Establishment of the strategic basis guiding air navigation modernisation, efficiency and capacity* – ICAO has created an exhaustive guiding plan for air navigation modernisation, which could approach the challenges regarding the capability and infrastructure of the field unitarily through 2028. The organisation encourages each member state to sign agreements with the industry in the field in order to set the operational concepts and related technologies, which are indispensable to the global harmonisation of the air navigation system. Moreover, ICAO has associated the concept of *Air Navigation* with the document *Consensus and Commitment around the Global Air Navigation Capacity & Efficiency Plan, Global Air Navigation Report*<sup>6</sup>, drawn up yearly for assessing the stage of accomplishing the second strategic objective, and regarding the near future, ICAO intends to set certain standards regarding the information system and data links management at world level.



➤ *Security and facilitation* – it is focused on striking an optimal as possible balance between aviation security and facilitation in order to point out the importance of border integrity and to support their management; in addition, in order to reach consensus about the strategy to be applied in this field, ICAO has decided to refine the universal security audit programme and to move forward through a risk management-based approach and to continuously monitor the specific aspects, so that the programme could be suitable for each member state.

➤ *Economic development of air transport* – it is aimed at respecting the viable solutions for the fares, taxes and other financial mechanisms applicable to the infrastructure, operations, regulations and surveillance, consumer protection, improvement of data collection, economic forecast and analysis in the field

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<sup>6</sup> ICAO, *Global Air Navigation Capacity & Efficiency Plan 2013-2028*, Montreal, Canada, 2014, <http://www.icao.int/Meetings/anconf12/Documents/Draft%20Doc%209750.GANP.en.pdf>

of international civil aviation. After identifying the possible factors that may impede reaching this objective, ICAO has defined new strategies and tools capable of bringing about more vitality in terms of financial support. As far as this objective is concerned, considering the European experience in developing an integrated and free air transport market, ICAO intends to develop a new framework of regulations, with implications for the access to the market of airline owners, consumer protection, fair competition, taxes as well as for the economic aspects related to airports and air navigation services suppliers.

➤ *Environmental protection* – its purpose is to minimise the adverse environmental effects of civil aviation activities. The objective is associated with the research activities in the field, with the ones meant to set the policies and regulatory framework related to noise, air quality, climate change, alternative fuel, market-based measures<sup>7</sup>. As far as these succinct descriptions of the five objectives are concerned, the contribution of the aviation sector to the Romanian GDP is of 0,7%.



The aviation industry in Romania pays over 664 million lei in taxes to the state, such as income levies for employers, social insurance contributions, as well as approximately 36 million lei from the VAT on airline tickets. In the near future, an increase of 240 million lei is estimated in public revenues from the airline supply chain and of 226 million lei from levying a tax on the activities supported by the expenses made by all employers working in this industry.

No matter it is a business, personal or vacation flight, a low cost flight or a very high value cargo shipping, still, there are 8 million passengers that travel and 24 000 tons of goods shipped to, from and in Romania!

More than 500 000 regular international flights leave Romania each year towards 70 airports in 30 countries. 22 000 flights carry 2 million passengers

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<sup>7</sup> In Mihaela Tămășdan, *op. cit.*

to 15 major airports in the country sky yearly. Half of the passengers are Romanian citizens who spend 4 billion lei on tickets each year (VAT included). Senders (cargo, mail etc.) pay 225 million lei to ship 24 tons of goods to, from and in Romania. The profit of senders is estimated around 94 million lei and, based on the share of exports among the entire trade in goods, Romanian shippers receive more than a half, approximately 48 million lei, which are consequently subject to taxes.

For the time being, there are 65 routes connecting Romanian airports with other important cities throughout the world. There is an average of 1,7 flights per day on these routes, but the frequency is higher when it comes to cities that are important from the economic viewpoint and not only. For instance, there are 4,8 flights every day on the București – Paris/“*Charles de Gaulle*” route, and 5,7 flights a day on the București – Munich International Airport, providing high-speed access for various purposes, irrespective of their nature. The integration of Romania in the global air transport network provides several advantages, such as:

- opening foreign markets for Romanian exports;
- cutting transport prices, especially on long distances, which increases contribution and triggers economic growth;
- rising job opportunities and implicitly lowering the unemployment rate;
- intensifying the adoption of new business techniques, for instance, the *Just-in-Time* model.

As a future aviation engineer, I fully support the statement made by Tony Tyler, according to which “*aviation has played a more intense role in helping (Eastern) Europe integrate into the European economy after the fall of the Iron Curtain!*”<sup>8</sup>.

**English version by**  
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<sup>8</sup> <http://www.ziare.com/afaceri/industria/ce-industrie-are-in-romania-75-000-de-locuride-munca-si-contributii-de-un-miliard-de-euro-la-pib-1256709>

# THE CONTRIBUTION OF DECEPTION TO PLANNING AND CARRYING OUT THE CAMPAIGN (II)

*Colonel Eugen Anton POPESCU*

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*The author writes about deception and the way it is understood and applied in Russia (under the name of maskirovka, accomplished by camouflage, simulation feigns and dissimulation), the USA and the UK (where there are employed different terms such as deception/D and camouflage, concealment and decoy/CCD) and China (where mouloué, the modern term for stratagem, can be achieved by deception, and the cheng/ch'i manoeuvre scheme is used).*

*Moreover, the author addresses the contribution of deception to applying the principles of operations, concluding that deception can provide increasing freedom of action by reducing the involvement of the enemy. Diverting the enemy reconnaissance efforts in other areas or directions, together with taking proper camouflage measures, can ensure the secrecy of movement and staging areas of own troops.*

**Keywords:** *maskirovka; deception; camouflage; concealment; decoy; cheng/ch'i*

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## **2. Deception according to main armed forces**

A brief look at how deception is understood and applied in the main armed forces points out that, even if the terms used are different, its content is almost identical. However, there are certain differences, especially in terms of the systematisation of the deception process.

### **2.1 Russia**

Russia uses the term *maskirovka* and defines it as “... a complex of measures directed towards misleading the enemy regarding the presence and position of troops, distinguishing military equipment, their condition, military preparedness and activities and also plans of the command. *Maskirovka* assists in the achievement of surprise of acting troops, preserving their combat preparations and raising the work life of equipment”<sup>13</sup>. It is a form of support

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<sup>13</sup> A.W. Hull, A.J. Aldrin, P.B. Almquist, *Managing Uncertainty: Soviet Views on Deception, Surprise, and Control* (Institute for Defense Analyses 1801 N. Beauregard Street, Alexandria, Virginia 22311-1772), p. 21, retrieved on 31 March 2013, <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA344746>.

for combat operations, carried out to conceal the activities and disposition and to mislead the enemy with regard to the grouping and intentions of such troops<sup>14</sup>. Moreover, four means of accomplishing maskirovka are identified: camouflage, simulation, feigns and disinformation<sup>15</sup>.

Among them, camouflage is the most common means. It is achieved by using natural and artificial means in order to reduce or eliminate the electromagnetic signal generated by troops and equipment and to counter the actions of the enemy reconnaissance means (optical, electro-optical, radar, infrared or acoustic)<sup>16</sup>. An important element of camouflage is radio-disinformation (*radiodezinformatsiya*), which means broadcasting false information (through false radio networks) for the purpose of misleading the enemy regarding the state, grouping, intentions, armament, and activities of own troops<sup>17</sup>. Imitation (*imitatsiya*) is another element of camouflage, being a decoy of troops or dummy objects, false movements and disposition of troops, dummy defensive works for misleading the enemy about the true disposition of or activities of friendly troops and of drawing his fire against the dummy objectives<sup>18</sup>.

Simulation (*simulatsia*) involves the creation and use of a wide range of false military assets and equipment as well as means intended for simulating false targets in the entire electromagnetic spectrum. The false actions take place by feigned attacks, demonstrations and troop movements to mislead the enemy regarding the true location, direction, and timing of an attack or counterattack<sup>19</sup>.

Disinformation (*dezinformatsiya*) is defined as the propagation of false information about one's forces and plans of action for the purpose of misleading the enemy. It can be either political, for the achievement of propaganda, or military, intended to mislead the enemy. Means of disinformation may be: radio, press, simulated troop relocation etc. Military disinformation is developed only at the strategic and operational levels, special attention being given to measures to prevent misleading own troops<sup>20</sup>.

## **2.2 USA and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland**

Unlike Russia, different terms are employed in the USA and the UK: deception/D and camouflage, concealment and decoy/CCD. Deception consists

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<sup>14</sup> V. Randall Gressang, *Strategic Deception: Planning and Correlation with a Historical Case*, 1986, p. 2.

<sup>15</sup> A.W. Hull, A.J. Aldrin, P.B. Almquist, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>17</sup> Randall V. Gressang, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>19</sup> A.W. Hull, A.J. Aldrin, P.B. Almquist, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*

of “those operations conducted at echelons theatre and below which purposely mislead enemy decision-makers by: distortion, concealment and falsification of indicators of friendly intentions, capabilities or dispositions”<sup>21</sup>.

The goal of deception is to influence the enemy decision-makers so that they could take actions favourable to and exploitable by friendly operations<sup>22</sup>. The process of planning and executing deception is systematised and includes the following components: objectives, target, story, plan and events. The objectives refer to the actions or lack of action of the enemy that ensure that the operation objectives are reached. The target is the enemy decision-maker. False information is usually sent through the enemy intelligence system, which follows the “events” created by own troops in a unitary concept, based on a “story”. The deception plan outlines the pieces of false information that are conveyed to the enemy, as well as the measures taken to mislead the enemy or maintain secrecy. These measures are in support of misleading the enemy; even if they are included in the deception plan, they do not influence the enemy decision-makers; their role is to keep the secret regarding the intention to mislead. The essential difference between concealment and deception lies in that deception is aimed at enemy decision-makers while concealment is focused on any observer.

Another perspective on deception at strategic level is given by the use of the syntagm *Denial and Deception (D&D)*, meaning to deny an opponent accurate information and to mislead him<sup>23</sup>. *D&D* is a term used to describe a combination of information operations that a nation undertakes to achieve its objectives<sup>24</sup>. *Denial* refers to the attempt to block information, which could be used by a potential enemy to promote his interests, and, from this perspective, *Deception* refers to the effort of a nation to cause a potential enemy to believe an action or situation that is not true. Even though *Denial* and *Deception* are distinct activities, in fact, they are interdependent and used as a single concept. Thus, in order to mislead a potential enemy regarding the strategic intentions and objectives, measures are taken so that real information (such as military development programmes, policies, courses of action etc.) could be concealed.

In turn, “leaks”, “planted” information or decoys are used to make the potential enemy believe that the truth is other than the real situation, “an alternative reality”<sup>25</sup>.

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<sup>21</sup> Field Manual 90-2, *Battlefield Deception*, *op. cit.*

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5.

<sup>23</sup> Roy Godson, James J. Wirtz, *Strategic Denial and Deception*, <http://www.google.ro/#hl=ro&scIent=psyb&q=Roy+Godson+and+James+J.+Wirtz%2C+%E2%80%9E+Strategic+Denial+and+Deception>

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*

### 2.3 China

Understanding the phenomenon of war as a whole is the main feature of the Chinese military thinking. The Chinese school has a long tradition in terms of deception, Even though there are similarities between deception and stratagem, the two terms are not considered synonymous. Chinese military theorists believe that *mouloue*, the modern term for stratagem, can be achieved by deception as well (but not always). According to the Chinese vision, the stratagem consists of two elements: *Cheng* and *Ch'i*. The *cheng/ch'i* manoeuvre scheme, invented by ancient Chinese commanders, consists in exposing the enemy vulnerabilities and weaknesses (*via cheng*) and exploiting them through a decisive strike (*via ch'i*)<sup>26</sup>. The stratagem is used in all fields: political, military, foreign affairs, economic etc.

At strategic and operational levels, deception is a continuous process, covering all types of measures and activities and uses a variety of methods and means. For instance: news media for deceptive propaganda, political and diplomatic false actions and conduct, strategic camouflage and fake military targets, simulating large-unit activities and strategic demonstrations etc.<sup>27</sup>.

### 3. The Contribution of Deception to Applying the Principles of Operations

Each nation has formally adopted a set of principles regarding operations/armed fight, representing the basis of national doctrines. Thus, the USA has adopted eight principles (objective, offensive, mass, economy of forces, manoeuvre, unity of command, security, surprise, simplicity), the UK ten (aim/goal, coordination, offensive, freedom of action, concentration, economy of efforts, surprise, security, morale, control of rear), Russia seven (mobility/tempo, concentration of efforts, surprise, combat activeness, preservation of combat activeness, conformity of goal/plan to actual situation, coordination/interworking) and France only three (concentration of efforts, freedom of action, economy of forces)<sup>28</sup>.

One can notice that the principles adopted by each nation show that they have embraced certain “*values*”, but these are either understood differently or defined differently. However, there are certain principles that seem to be adopted by most nations. These are: surprise, operations security and freedom of action.

In his book *Stratagem: Deception and Surprise in War*, Barton S. Whaley<sup>29</sup> identified the stratagem as equivalent to enemy deception and surprise. Whaley analysed

<sup>26</sup> <http://thirdcops.wordpress.com/2012/12/04/entrails-of-deceit>, retrieved on 14.03.2013.

<sup>27</sup> Dr Eric C. Anderson, Jeffrey G. Engstrom, *China's Use of Perception Management and Strategic Deception*, [http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/ApprovedFINALSACStrategicDeceptionPaperRevisedDraft06Nov2009\\_0.pdf](http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/ApprovedFINALSACStrategicDeceptionPaperRevisedDraft06Nov2009_0.pdf).

<sup>28</sup> John Boyd, *Patterns of Conflicts*, p. 181.

<sup>29</sup> Barton S. Whaley, *Stratagem: Deception and Surprise in War*, Artech House Inc., 2007, pp. 81-112.

168 battles and 17 wars that took place between 1914 and 1968. The statistics of this in-depth analysis were impressive. Thus, out of 50 battles studied, in which intense surprise was achieved, in 17 of them, the results exceeded by far the objectives of the initiators and only one battle was lost. Equally, out of 50 battles fought without the advantage of initial surprise, 30 were lost by their initiators and only one exceeded significantly the results. The average rate of defeats was of 1:14,5 in favour of the attacker when surprise was achieved and only of 1:1,7 without surprise. Thus, it was demonstrated that surprise could play an essential part in gaining victory and reducing losses. Therefore, the question is: *How can surprise be achieved?* The study showed that, out of 61 battles in which strategic surprise was achieved, only four were owed to passive security measures by the attacker. Moreover, out of 57 situations of tactical surprise, only seven were achieved mainly with operations security measures. Surprise was achieved predominantly by deception operations carried out by the attacker, respectively, in 82% of the situations in which strategic situation was used and in 57% of the situations in which tactical surprise was used. Dr Whaley wrote that *“the greater the effort put into the deception plan, the greater the degree of surprise gained...”*. Moreover, he concluded: *“Your chances of obtaining or exceeding your goals are almost four times better if you can achieve at least some degree of surprise. Your chances of gaining surprise are eight times better if deception planning is used. And finally, you can greatly improve on even these most favourable odds, the more comprehensive and sophisticated is your deception”*<sup>30</sup>.

As far as the principle of “security” is concerned, deception can be an essential instrument. The main method to keep the secret is to create confusion among the enemy. This can be achieved both by employing camouflage and disseminating false information in a controlled manner. Security also can be provided by destroying enemy reconnaissance means, applying specific counter-intelligence measures, and controlling and managing the electromagnetic field.

Deception can provide increasing freedom of action by reducing the involvement of the enemy. Diverting the enemy reconnaissance efforts in other areas or directions, together with taking proper camouflage measures, can ensure the secrecy of movement and staging areas of own troops.

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*In the third part of the article, the author describes the main ways to influence the enemy strategic behaviour, starting from John Boyd's philosophy.*

**English version by**  
 **Iulia NĂSTASIE**

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<sup>30</sup> *Ibid*, p. 111.

# SECRETARY GENERAL'S ANNUAL REPORT SETS OUT PRIORITIES TO SHAPE “FUTURE NATO”

Investing in the right capabilities, maintaining connected forces and deepening and widening cooperation with partners are key to shape a NATO which is able to meet future challenges said NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the launch of his Annual Report on Monday (27 January 2014). *“In September we will meet in Wales to shape Future NATO: an Alliance that is robust, rebalanced and ready to provide security for the next generation”*, said the Secretary General.

In the Annual Report, which looked at what NATO achieved last year and set out the challenges for the year ahead, the Secretary General noted that NATO is now more effective and efficient than at any time in its history, but said that Allies will need to *“maintain the momentum of transformation”* at the Wales Summit.

Mr. Fogh Rasmussen said that NATO has already set out a strong foundation over the past few years, based on the guidance provided by the Strategic Concept, which advocates active engagement and modern defence. In 2013 NATO’s activities ranged from military operations to building relationships with partners and from efforts to acquire and preserve defence capabilities to ongoing reforms. *“We continue to assure the security of our Allies by fulfilling our three core tasks: collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security. Our operations in Afghanistan, Kosovo and off the coast of Somalia, and our Patriot deployment in Turkey are clear examples. Our forces are more capable and connected than ever before”*, he said.

However, the Secretary General said the Alliance must invest in improving capabilities to deal with risks and challenges like terrorism, piracy, regional instability and missile and cyber attacks. He said that European Allies must play *“their full part”* in developing critical capabilities such as joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and missile defence. On maintaining connected forces, Mr. Fogh Rasmussen said that at the Wales Summit, Allies should commit to a broad programme of realistic exercises, training and education as part of NATO’s Connected Forces Initiative. Finally, Allies also need to look outwards, forging closer ties with partners, including helping those partners that need help to build and develop their security sectors. *“We have a record of achievement in challenging operations, and world-wide partnerships and we are continuing to adapt to make NATO more agile and more efficient so that NATO remains an essential source of stability in an unpredictable world”*, the Secretary General said.

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Source: [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news\\_106573.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_106573.htm)



# The Secretary General's



## Annual Report **2013** (I)

*Anders Fogh Rasmussen*

Source: [http://www.nato.int/nato\\_static/assets/pdf/stock\\_publications/20140123\\_SG\\_AnnualReport\\_2013\\_en.pdf](http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/stock_publications/20140123_SG_AnnualReport_2013_en.pdf)  
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## Foreword

# Future NATO: towards the 2014 Summit



**I**n an unpredictable world, NATO remains an essential source of stability. Against the background of an economic crisis, the new Strategic Concept that we adopted at our 2010 Lisbon Summit has guided the continuous adaptation of the Alliance to meet the demands of a fast-moving security environment. While NATO is now more effective and efficient than at any time in its history, we will need to maintain the momentum of transformation at our next Summit in Wales in September.

Throughout 2013, NATO continued to protect our common values and our shared security. The men and women of our armed forces showed constant courage, determination and professionalism in a wide range of deployments on land, in the air, and at sea. This Annual Report is, above all, a testimony to their service and sacrifice.

In Afghanistan, we reached an important milestone in mid-2013, when Afghan forces assumed lead responsibility for security across the country. Having reached their full strength of 352,000 soldiers and police, their growing capability allowed ISAF to shift from a combat to a support role and prepare to complete its mission at the end of 2014, as agreed at the Lisbon summit. We also saw significant progress in Kosovo, where NATO is providing vital support to the European Union-brokered agreement on the normalisation of relations between Belgrade and Pristina.

To continue fulfilling our core tasks effectively, we agreed at Lisbon to strengthen our defences against 21st century challenges. And at our Chicago Summit in 2012, we adopted the Smart Defence mindset, through which Allies work together to acquire capabilities more efficiently than they could on their own. We have been working together in 29 different capability areas, ranging from precision-guided munitions to maritime patrol aircraft, and two projects

have already been completed. We also continued to develop our own missile defence system, and enhance our ability to defend against cyber attacks.

In 2013, we worked with our global network of partners to bring security where it is needed, and trained with them to make sure that we maintain the ability to operate together. We also made steady progress in improving the way we work and the way we manage our resources, by reforming the NATO Command Structure, NATO's Agencies, and our Headquarters in Brussels. These reforms will provide our taxpayers with greater security and better value for money.

Building on the strong foundation that we have laid, the Wales Summit will deliver an Alliance that is ready, robust and rebalanced.

The Summit will take place as we prepare to complete our combat mission in Afghanistan, and plan the launch of a new, non-combat mission to train, advise and assist the Afghan security forces after 2014. In Afghanistan and our other operations, we have learnt many lessons that we need to apply to shape "*Future NATO*".

First, capabilities. We must invest in the capabilities we need to deal with the risks and challenges that we face, from terrorism, piracy and instability in our neighbourhood, to missile and cyber attacks. I expect European Allies to play their full part in developing critical capabilities, such as joint intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, heavy transport and missile defence. As our economies start to recover, we need to show the political will to keep defence in Europe strong. This will also keep NATO strong.

Second, connectivity. ISAF brought together over one quarter of the world's nations: 28 NATO Allies and 22 partners in the largest coalition in recent history. Beyond 2014, our forces must stay connected, as Allies and with partners, so that we stand ready to operate together when called upon. At the Wales Summit, we should commit to a broad programme of realistic exercises, demanding training and comprehensive education as part of our Connected Forces Initiative.

Finally, cooperative security. This is one of the pillars of our Strategic Concept and a vital element of "*Future NATO*". At a time of global risks and threats, NATO must continue to look outwards. We must deepen and widen our unique network of political and operational partnerships with over 40 countries and organizations on five continents. One area of cooperative security that offers significant potential benefits for Allies and partners is defence capacity building. We have unique expertise, acquired over years of active engagement, on security sector reform, building defence institutions, developing armed forces, disarmament and reintegration,

which can add value to broader international efforts. In 2013, we responded positively to the request by the Libyan Prime Minister for advice on the development of his country's security sector. I believe that similar support from NATO could help others too, and enable us to project stability and help prevent conflict.

As we prepare for the Wales Summit, we draw strength and inspiration from the values that unite North America and Europe in a unique bond. The transatlantic relationship remains the bedrock of our security and our way of life, and 2014 will bring that relationship new vigour and new vitality. A Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership can give a real boost to the economic link between the United States and the European Union, while the NATO Summit will reaffirm the essential security link between our two continents and our determination to share the responsibilities and rewards of security.

As this Annual Report shows, over the past four years we have laid a firm foundation for the future. We set out a clear vision in our Strategic Concept, and we are turning it into reality. Our forces are more capable and connected than ever before. We have a record of achievement in challenging operations and world-wide partnerships. And we are continuing to adapt to make NATO more agile and more efficient. Our Wales Summit will build on this foundation to shape *"Future NATO"*.



Anders Fogh Rasmussen  
NATO Secretary General

# Active engagement

## Building security through operations

**C**risises and conflicts beyond NATO's borders can pose a direct threat to the security of Alliance territory and populations. With NATO's Strategic Concept adopted at the Lisbon Summit in 2010, Allies agreed to engage, where possible and when necessary, to prevent crises, manage crises, stabilise post-conflict situations and support reconstruction.

In 2013, NATO was actively engaged through operations to enhance security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond. NATO-led missions and operations have involved contributions from all 28 NATO member countries and over 20 partners. From training security forces in Afghanistan, to monitoring shipping in the Mediterranean and countering piracy off the Horn of Africa to providing airlift in support of the African Union, ensuring stability in Kosovo, and providing Patriot missiles in support of Turkey, NATO forces were engaged over three continents.

### Afghanistan

NATO and its partners in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) continue their commitment to Afghanistan, pursuing the same fundamental objective that has always underpinned the mission: to ensure that the country never again becomes a safe haven for international terrorists.

2013 was a year of progress and evolution for Afghanistan. At NATO's Lisbon Summit in 2010, leaders of the countries contributing to ISAF, together with the President of Afghanistan, launched the process of transition, whereby Afghanistan would steadily take lead responsibility for its own security. They agreed on a clear timetable for handover of security responsibility from ISAF to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) by the end of 2014. Each year since then, the ANSF, which has grown to 352,000 soldiers and police, has taken on more responsibility. And each year, ISAF's role has correspondingly shifted from provision of security to support for the ANSF.

### **Afghans in the lead**

On 18 June 2013, President Karzai announced the start of the fifth and final tranche of the security transition process agreed in 2010. Afghan forces are in the lead for security across the entire country. During the first fighting season in which it has had the lead, the ANSF demonstrated its capacity to provide security for the Afghan population. The ANSF conducted 95 per cent of the conventional operations and 98 per cent of special operations in Afghanistan. These achievements in 2013 built confidence within the Afghan forces and among the Afghan people.




The Afghans are now firmly in the lead. And in line with this shift in requirements and responsibilities, ISAF forces have begun to draw down. At the beginning of 2013, approximately 105,000 personnel and 184 bases or facilities comprised ISAF's presence in Afghanistan. By the end of the year, there were approximately 75,000 personnel and 88 bases and facilities. At the end of 2013, the only unilateral actions taken by ISAF were for its own security, for route clearance to maintain its own freedom of movement, and for the redeployment of equipment and vehicles no longer required.

Similarly, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), set up as one mechanism to channel development aid and assistance in Afghan provinces, are evolving and gradually closing as local Afghan authorities are able to take over responsibility for these efforts in each province. During 2013, the number of active PRTs was reduced from twenty-two to four. These last four PRTs will be closing in 2014.

The ANSF, which includes the Afghan National Army (ANA), the Afghan National Police (ANP) and the Afghan Air Force (AAF), is now capable of a wide range of operations: large and small, ground and air, responsive and preventive.

In 2013, the Afghan forces led a number of joint and combined arms operations, including Operation Seemorgh, the largest such endeavour ever undertaken by the ANSF. During this operation the AAF and ANA worked together to support troop movements, re-supply fielded forces, and conduct casualty evacuation across Afghanistan. While this kind of large-scale operation is not regularly called for in counter-insurgency, the skills involved in planning and carrying out these operations can apply in preparation for election support or in response to natural disasters and build confidence in and among the ANSF.

**Afghanistan: transition tranches 1-5**



Many of the challenges the Afghan forces face require smaller, specialised responses. With ISAF support, the ANSF is working to ensure that it has the right tools and structures to meet these challenges. Within the ANP, for example, there are units specialised in counternarcotics, counter-terrorism, and crisis response in urban environments. Special operations forces within the ANA are trained to interact with local populations and include female soldiers, who are well-placed to interact with women and children.

While ground forces comprise the majority of Afghanistan’s security apparatus, airborne capabilities are an essential component of the ANSF. The size of the Afghan

fleet grew during 2013 with the addition of two C-130 transport aircraft and 12 Mi-17 helicopters that will enable Afghanistan to better support the movement of troops and equipment throughout the country.

### **Training a sustainable force**

When ISAF's mission began in 2001, there were no unified Afghan National Security Forces. The ANSF now includes approximately 350 000 personnel, consisting of six ANA combat corps, a special operations command, hundreds of ANP units and a growing air force. The Afghan government has built structures and ministries that support and complement not only these forces but the range of functions that contribute to the security and prosperity of any country.

As agreed in 2010, ISAF has worked to prepare Afghanistan by training Afghan forces, advising Afghan officials, and standing shoulder to shoulder with Afghans as they build the capabilities and gain the experience that will support their future security. During 2013, the focus of ISAF support was on building the systems, processes and institutions necessary to make the gains to date sustainable. This included capacity-building work within the government and in the military. As part of this support, 375 Security Force Assistance Teams provided advice and assistance to Afghan army and police units, and training was provided to nearly 22 000 members of the Afghan forces.



Photo: MCpl Frieda Van Putten, Canadian Armed Forces

As the Afghan forces are increasingly capable of providing security, they are also providing more of their own training. In 2013, over 90 per cent of training was provided by the Afghans, often in their own languages. And as transition continues, the structures through which NATO provides training are also being

adapted. Since 2009, the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan (NTM-A) has served as the umbrella for NATO and national institutional training efforts; in 2013 it was integrated into the ISAF Joint Command.

Part of what NATO offers through its training is lessons from its own experience. During over a decade in Afghanistan, ISAF has worked to prevent civilian casualties. That experience is shared with the Afghans and the lessons learned are incorporated into the training that their forces receive.

Because of threats posed by improvised explosive devices (IEDs), NATO has developed methods to detect and destroy these weapons. Throughout 2013, NATO improved its ability to detect and neutralise IEDs, clear affected routes and protect vehicles, personnel and structures. These lessons are also being adopted by the ANSF and incorporated into their training. Compared to the 2012 fighting season, the 2013 fighting season in Afghanistan saw a 22 per cent drop in IED incidents.

**“In 2013, over 90 per cent of training was provided by the Afghans**

In addition to instruction on technical skills and sharing of lessons learned, Afghan forces and ministries received training related to the international norms endorsed by the United Nations (UN), including on human rights and gender sensitivity.

ISAF and the Office of the NATO Senior Civilian Representative work with Afghan security ministries, with the international community and with local and international non-governmental organisations to coordinate efforts aimed at women’s empowerment. In 2013, ISAF welcomed its highest-ranking gender adviser, a brigadier general, who will help to consolidate these efforts and support further progress. ISAF already includes training on gender issues for the ANSF and supports the recruitment and retention of women in the security sector. There are currently over 2 000 women in the ANSF, a 10 per cent increase since 2012. In preparation for the 2014 elections, ISAF is working with Afghan officials to ensure that there are sufficient numbers of female personnel to support the voter registration process and to provide support at the polling stations.

The ANSF has become an organised and professional force, with progress outpacing earlier estimates, and has achieved impressive standards in a short time under difficult circumstances. While violent incidents, including high-profile attacks,

continued in 2013, the Afghan forces demonstrated that they can react to those incidents quickly, efficiently, and increasingly without direct ISAF assistance.

### **Looking ahead**

The conclusion of ISAF at the end of 2014 will mark the opening of a new chapter in NATO's relationship with Afghanistan. At the Chicago Summit in 2012, the Afghan government welcomed NATO's offer to deploy a follow-on mission when ISAF concludes. The aim of this new mission, Resolute Support, is to continue to support Afghanistan as it develops the self-sustaining capability to ensure that it never again becomes a safe haven for international terrorism.

At the meeting of NATO Defence Ministers in June 2013, a detailed concept for the new mission was endorsed, which guides NATO military experts in their operational planning. Resolute Support will not be a combat mission; this train, advise, and assist mission will focus its efforts on national and institutional-level training, to include the higher levels of army and police command. Provided that a proper legal framework is in place, Resolute Support will begin in January 2015.

Beyond ISAF and the planned Resolute Support mission, NATO is building a formal partnership with Afghanistan, working on a range of issues that contribute to the development of a stable and prosperous country. In 2013, areas of cooperation included development of the civil aviation sector, facilitation of internet connectivity for Afghan universities, support for programmes to develop professional military education, and efforts to build integrity in the management of ministries. This Enduring Partnership, announced at the Lisbon Summit in 2010, is the basis upon which NATO is widening its cooperation with Afghanistan, developing a partnership similar to those that NATO has with numerous other countries as part of the Alliance's efforts toward cooperative security.

NATO's partnership with Afghanistan is based on mutual respect and accountability. The international community, of which NATO is a part, has made an enormous investment in Afghanistan and has pledged its long-term support. In return, the Government of Afghanistan has also made clear commitments: to hold inclusive, transparent and credible elections; to fight corruption and improve good governance; to uphold the constitution, particularly as regards human rights; and to enforce the rule of law. The ongoing efforts of the Government of Afghanistan to meet its commitments will pave the way for the continued support of the international community in the years to come.

## Kosovo

2013 was a year of progress toward creating a more secure environment in Kosovo, where NATO and its operational partners continue to fulfill the UN-mandated mission. The benefits of that secure environment are increasingly evident. Belgrade and Pristina signed a landmark agreement on 19 April 2013, providing a political way forward to overcome persistent disagreements. The agreement, facilitated by the European Union, covers a wide range of issues supporting a normalisation of relations and improvements in the northern part of Kosovo. NATO played an important role in this agreement, with both parties requesting that NATO support the implementation. The NATO-led Kosovo Force, KFOR, remains a key enabler of the political process, providing guarantees to both parties of a safe and secure environment. When there were attacks on polling stations in north Mitrovica in November, KFOR deployed quickly to the area, later supporting a re-run of the elections. KFOR also ensured freedom of movement on the routes used to transport election ballots to the counting centre.




The process of “*unfixing*” properties with designated special status in Kosovo – transferring their protection from KFOR to local authorities – continued in 2013. In September, the responsibility for the protection of the Serb Orthodox Patriarchate in Peæ/Peja was transferred from KFOR to local Kosovo police forces. The Patriarchate was the eighth site to be unfixed, from nine sites originally designated.

In July 2013, the North Atlantic Council declared full operational capability of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF). The KSF is a multi-ethnic, civilian-controlled, lightly armed professional force. Unlike the police, the KSF is primarily responsible for civil protection, disposing of explosive ordnance, fire fighting and other humanitarian

assistance tasks. The Alliance continues to support the KSF in this new phase of its development and will continue to support peace in Kosovo according to the UN mandate.

### Piracy incidents 2008-2013



Note: Disruptions in this chart occurred before pirates could attack or approach a vessel. Disruptions after piracy incidents are not included since that would imply more pirate activity than was actually occurring. Figures for piracy incidents involve vessels greater than 300 tons engaged on international voyages as defined in Regulation 19 of Chapter V of the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention of the International Maritime Organisation.

Statistics provided by NATO's Maritime Command Headquarters, Northwood, United Kingdom – the command leading NATO's counter-piracy operation.

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*In the second part of this report, the author will write about Broadening partnerships for global security, countries aspiring to join NATO and smart defence.*




# EDITORIAL EVENTS

**Author:** Lieutenant Colonel Dr Iuliana-Simona Țuțuianu – Senior Researcher with the Romanian Institute for Political Studies of Defence and Military History (Institutul pentru Studii Politice de Apărare și Istorie Militară – ISPAIM, București). She is a Doctor of International Relations and worked as a diplomat with the Permanent Mission of Romania to the United Nations.

**Book:** *Towards Global Justice: Sovereignty in an Interdependent World*, Asser Press & Springer, 2013, with Forewords by *Geoffrey Robertson QC*, Doughty Street Chambers, London, UK and *Professor Mihail E. Ionescu*, Institute for Political Studies of Defence and Military History, București, Romania. The Romanian version of this book – *Apusul Westphaliei – Statul național în sistemul relațiilor internaționale în anii post-război rece* – was published by Editura militară in 2011 and received the *Award Army Corps General Ioan Sichițiu* of the *Gândirea militară românească Journal* in 2012, [http://www.mapn.ro/smg/gmr/Engleza/Arhiva\\_pdf/2012/revista\\_4.pdf](http://www.mapn.ro/smg/gmr/Engleza/Arhiva_pdf/2012/revista_4.pdf)

**Synopsis:** [springer.com](http://springer.com)

**Reviewer:** Dr Silviu Petre



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Simona Țuțuianu describes a new model of sovereignty which is fast replacing the traditional Westphalian model embodied in Article 2 of the UN Charter and rigorously followed throughout the *Cold War*. The scholarly basis for this new model draws upon developments in international criminal law which first emerged from the Nuremberg trials and upon more recent interstate economic cooperation which has turned sovereign independence into interdependence across a range of state functions. Does this mean that traditional Westphalian concepts of sovereignty should be abandoned in constructing a new theory of world governance for the twenty-first century? Not at all. A new model, which can be called the pattern of interdependence-based sovereignty, serves to explain contemporary events that puzzle traditional theorists, such as the war over Kosovo, the invasions of Iraq and Libya, the emergence of a “*Responsibility to protect*” doctrine and its recent validation in Security Council Resolutions 1970 and 1973. We are witnessing

the emergence of a new philosophy of action, which is in the process of producing a 21<sup>st</sup> century system of international relations.

The book will appeal to academics, students and postgraduates studying international affairs, politics, international law, diplomatic history, or war and/or peace studies. It is particularly of interest for NATO establishments and national military schools, while experts and scholars will value its theory of what sovereignty means today.

The book offers a multidisciplinary approach which underpins a new theory of how human rights can be better protected in a better world. There is a unique case study of cooperative security in the Greater Black Sea Area, by one of the few experts on the politics of this region. It will be read and appreciated by those who need to understand how modern international law and diplomacy really work. Journalists, media commentators, human rights NGOs, aid agencies, diplomats and government officials need the information in this book.

 [springer.com](http://www.springer.com)\*

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If we were to choose a representative letter for the real meaning of our times, this would definitely be W!

At the historical, juridical and philosophical levels, the international system of the last 10 up to 20/25 years – depending on how much we want to access the collective memory – was marked by the deep tensions between conservative and revolutionary tendencies. From the war on terror to the anti-Wall Street movement within the context of global crisis, we question ourselves on the validity of the Westphalian world as it has been gradually codified in law and practice. Do the US actions of the past 10-20 years show an unscrupulous hegemonic state that diluted the concept of sovereignty or the inherent tendency of a world in which barriers are no longer relevant? Simona Țuțuianu's book comes to summarise and give an answer to this controversy.

Since early childhood, we have been taught about how boundaries have a moral and political relevance as they flow from difference of language, race and geographical proximity. We have also been taught that each nation has a right to independence and that inter-state relationships should be governed with cordiality, deference and must not allow interferences in other countries' domestic affairs. Difference, deference and interference are three philosophical notions that define the moral code of the modern international system.

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\* This synopsis is available at <http://www.springer.com/law/international/book/978-90-6704-890-3>.

There is too much abstraction in the above phrases, but we need little abstraction in order to clean our daily catechism vibrant due to partisan feelings. Here is the merit of the author's work.

Based on the experiences that the author's thesis has witnessed – the war on terrorism, global crisis, NATO reform, Romania's accession to the EU or the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008 –, the book reflects on the conjugations of the sovereignty concept. From extensive assessment to case studies, the author renders her arguments on the Westphalian system's history from 1648 onwards, by bringing into dialogue various schools of thought and focusing on various case studies such as the trial of Slobodan Milosevic or Romania in the Black Sea forums.

### **Westphalia or the anatomy of a myth**

Even if arbitrarily chosen, the signing of the Peace of Westphalia (24 October 1648) confirms a precedent with three components that other congresses following every major war will seek to repeat:

- religion is banished from the space of foremost political stakes and the diplomatic motivations depend on the secular reason of *Realpolitik*;
- relations between states are driven by the notion of balance of power which says that whenever a member of the system tends to become too powerful, its neighbours unite to counter it;
- sovereignty with its attribute – non-interference in domestic affairs – cemented the new codex.

Obviously, Westphalia did not abolish the medieval puzzle and did not realise immediately its assumed targets, but it has become an idea more than covered by the reality in the following centuries.

Most likely at that time, the treaties of Münster and Osnabruck were not initially invested with their later aura. For those who read them entirely, the Treaties of Westphalia were not calling for a new political philosophy but contained a rather modest number of ad-hoc legal regulations between the German Emperor, parts of his empire and the neighbours. Also, they encoded a trade by which the winners and the losers were sharing various provinces. Therefore, the documents that ended the Thirty Years War were more similar to the Yalta Conference than the Treaty of Versailles.

The Myth of 1648 appears only in the nineteenth and twentieth century, with the budding of the calls to international and universal peace.

### **State sovereignty versus citizens' security**

The theme of the sovereignty redevelopment to meet certain ethical requirements developed in modernity. Initially it belonged to the "*Megali Idea*"

philosophers (Abbot of Saint-Pierre, Kant) that advocated the abolition of the war, or at least the reduction of associated abuses. The need for an international tribunal is part of a set of initiatives launched in the nineteenth-century Belgian and Swiss space. The Swiss jurist Gustav Moynier proposed in 1872 the creation of an international tribunal to judge cases related to violated law of the gentes [p. 96]. Almost at the same time, the Belgian legislation developed the concept of terrorism whose importance has undergone the interwar reflections until after September 11.

The First World War disposed – as part of the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles – the extradition by Holland of Kaiser Wilhelm II. This fact is intertwined with the liberal discourse of President Wilson, who tried to make a clear distinction between the warring innocent nations and the militarist leaders who pushed their people in the trenches. Neither Turkey has been spared when it was asked to account for the Armenian genocide of 1915 by the Treaty of Sévres. Furthermore, the International Law Association, the International Law Institute and the International Association of Penal Law (AIDP) launched initiatives of similar range, showing the need for a forum beyond the national political jurisdictions. Romanian lawyer Vespasian Pella, President of the AIDP had major contributions by issuing in 1928 a draft statute for an international tribunal [p. 97].

The Second World War denouement will leave the jurisprudence inheritance of two courts: one in Nuremberg and one in Tokyo less publicised in the western world, called the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. The latter had 11 judges from the victorious nationalities: USA, Canada, USSR, UK, China, Holland, Australia, New Zealand, Philippines and India. 28 war criminals were tried and 7 of them were executed. The Japanese monarch was considered legally irresponsible for a role in the new postwar constitution. Worthy of note is that the Japanese attacks with chemical and biological weapons were silenced because the Americans wanted to have access to that technology [p. 98].

The '90s revived the need for supranational juridical forums due to the perverse consequences of modernity that reactivated the old tribal violence. Rwanda, Congo, Darfur and Srebrenica stand as a memorial of reediting the Thirty Years War at a global scale.

Even if the major powers exercised the dual attitude of the arms sales to the third world and passive waiting, a breakthrough was achieved by the creation of the International Criminal Court and the ad hoc tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia. International Criminal Court was established on 1 July 2002, with the approval of the Rome Statute. Under Article 17, it can work only with the consent of the national states and based on the principle of complementary

(to the national legislations). Article 27 of the Statute states that no person can be exempted from criminal liability.

Romania was present at Kampala Conference (31 May – 28 June 2010) when additional changes to the Statute were discussed. Romania ratified the Rome Statute on 7 July 1999 by Law No. 111 of 28 March 2002 [p. 103].

For the case of Rwanda, the UN Security Council established on 8 November 1994 the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda by Resolution 955. Based in Arusha, it is composed of 11 judges elected by the UN General Assembly for four years. Note that its statute does not allow the election of two judges from the same country. The tribunal conducts its activities according to certain political goals: contribution to national reconciliation process, maintaining peace in the region; trial for those responsible for the massacres in April-July 1994 [p. 135].

UN philosophy and not only – also that of states, NGOs and academic community in a post-Westphalian or still Westphalian era – no longer defines security as state-centric but increasingly wrapped around individuals.

Sovereignty moves from the masses and institutions to citizens' epidermis, no matter where they are located in the world. The compact geographic framework gives room or coexists with a functional one.

### **Sovereignty as a responsibility**

So, do we ultimately live in a post-Westphalian era in which states transfer their power to other centres and cease to define the state of exception in Carl Schmitt's formula?

The author does not provide a simple answer and her dilemma recapitulates the old ethical struggles of realists such as Stanley Hoffmann, John Herz, Hans Morgenthau, Quincy Wright. Her conclusion is prudent: *"A demise of sovereignty is questionable. Rather than speaking about a demise of the Westphalian legal meaning of sovereignty, we would prefer to embrace the approach of the maturation of states' responsibilities and their awareness of the necessity to advance international criminal law"* [p. 134]. This in conjunction with thorough reflections on the fate of socio-political structures in the failed states from the third world: *"In this context, maintaining the fiction of traditional sovereignty, while perhaps comforting to voters skeptical of globalisation or regional integration, actually hampers our capacity to construct models of governance appropriate to serious ethnic conflicts or areas of contested sovereignty"*. [p. 134].

The synthesis is tested by the reinterpretation of some pre-Westphalian assertions in the light of UN humanitarian interventions. Sovereignty ceases to act in the manner of the national state's omnipotence – Ludwig von Mises idea –

and tends to be replaced by a bunch of limits imposed on governments: “The late ’90s marked a conceptual leap of sovereignty from right to responsibility. The Westphalian sovereignty was reinvented, as far as understanding of the pivotal norm of the international relations’ system moves from a sovereignty conceived as a right to absolute jurisdiction, exclusive and complete within their own territory (sovereignty seen as inviolability and legal immunity) to a post-Westphalian sovereignty which essentially promotes an ethic of the sovereignty exercise. States and their leaders are not only beneficiaries of the privileges, rights, and immunities guaranteed by the sovereignty, but they are also the owners of its attached responsibilities” [p. 226]. “Today, sovereignty is not an exclusive isolating principle, which erects a protective wall, but a principle of identity that enables clear, direct and responsible communication and cooperation between states” [p. 186].

The return to what we might call the romantic crusade law transfers a large amount of modern state’s classical sovereignty to the legal community and allows a correction of many current negative facts. Between a utopia in which we can hope and a despairing reality we might find a middle way towards what one might call an in-legal world. One in which the asymmetry of power and wealth of governments can no longer dispense or ignore the common denominator of ethical equality<sup>1</sup>. International justice begins gradually to be synonymous with the title of the book written by Judith Armatta – *Twilight of Impunity*<sup>2</sup>.

 Dr Silviu Petre\*\*

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The editorial and layout process  
was completed on 04 April 2014.

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<sup>1</sup> In other words, an in-legal world might be conceived as an environment where “the strong are just, the weak secure and the peace preserved” – Citation: John F. Kennedy: “Inaugural Address”, 20 January 1961; <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8032>

<sup>2</sup> Judith Armatta, *Twilight of Impunity. The War Crimes Trial of Slobodan Milosevic*, Duke University Press, 2010.

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Cover 3: Press conference by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen on the occasion of the release of his Annual Report for 2013, 27 January 2014, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/photos\\_106621.htm?page=1](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/photos_106621.htm?page=1)



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