

CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR A EUROPEAN UNION BATTLE GROUP

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The requirements of the current security environment have significant effects not only in all social domains but also at all levels of decision-making. The effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, the challenges caused by the conflict in Ukraine, and the ongoing technological transformations compel the involved actors to identify measures to adapt to current situations and increase their level of resilience. The deadlines for the crisis responses and for the potential military conflicts reactions become vital factors in reducing costs, decreasing consumption, and saving human lives. As the primary actor in region, the European Union is re-evaluating its available tools in order to be capable to anticipate, deter, and provide a rapid response to current security threats and challenges. In this context, this article aims to analyse, from a logistical perspective, one of the military instruments of the European Union – the EU Battle Group. Even if it was conceptualized over two decades ago, it regained relevance in the new security context.

Keywords: logistics; resources; battlegroup; military instrument; logistic support;

INTRODUCTION

The interest in this topic comes from the international attention paid to the military instruments that the European Union could use to support responses to crisis situations or regional conflicts. In this respect, the European Union’s new security and defence plan (Council of the European Union, 2022), contained in the document entitled “*Strategic Compass*”, which has been publicly available since 2022, presents the possibility of re-examining a military instrument that was conceptualised almost two decades ago, namely the “*battlegroup*”. In fact, this ambitious plan has been imposed by the hostile security environment in the vicinity and obliges the EU to assume the role of a credible security provider in the region.

Significant logistical, financial and informational flows are generated from the moment the essential tasks for mission planning, establishment, operationalisation, assumption of command, force planning in the area of operations, deployment of assigned missions and up to the mission transition phase are established. As one of the essential conditions for a battlegroup to be able to carry out its assigned mission, logistic support to the battlegroup is a sensitive point in the planning process. In this respect, in this article we have aimed to highlight some specific features of logistic support specific to European Union-led operations, but also to generate, through analysis and deduction, potential new directions for the development and adaptation of the logistic field, which may be the subject of further research.

ASPECTS OF THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY USED

In the context described above, the present article aims to sketch a topical picture of the concept of EU BG and to identify some solutions for the logistic support of a military structure set up in a multinational context, at European level. In order to achieve these two objectives, the research approach has been carried out taking into account the following steps:

- literature study, in order to identify the emergence and development of the battlegroup concept at European Union level;

- analysis of the contemporary political and security context in order to identify the requirements for the establishment and logistical support of EU battlegroup military structures;
- conduct of a cognitive-structural and observational process through which the elements of logistical support and financial support for EU battlegroup structures are extracted, and ways and means to improve them are interpreted and deduced.

The materials used are of an unclassified nature, some of which can be found in scientific articles indexed in various databases or even on the websites of European public institutions.

THE EUROPEAN UNION “BATTLE GROUP” CONCEPT

It can be seen that the European Union has recently been called upon to design, develop or adapt diplomatic, political and military instruments in order to increase its capacity to respond to crisis or conflict situations in its area of interest. The complexity of the forms that the problems of an unstable international context take is increasing. The diversity of causes contributing to increased insecurity is unprecedented. It calls for the full spectrum of threats to be taken into account, involving all levels of decision-making, both national and European supra-state structures.

From the point of view of the literature consulted and analysed, whether the concept of the EU Battlegroup¹ (EU BG), is a central or marginal topic, we consider it essential to highlight the following conclusions:

- The period 2003-2007 represented the emergence and initial development of the concept and was marked by interest in its study and analysis, as evidenced by the multitude of press and scientific articles written on the emergence, definition and development potential of the concept;
- The regional security context has contributed significantly to the way the concept has developed. The absence of real, pressing threats to the security of European Union Member States did not force the supra-state mechanisms responsible for ensuring security to deploy the conceptualized military instruments.

¹ The battle group set up at European Union level.

- The *European Union's battle group* military instrument, being developed mainly at the conceptual level, did not allow for detailed investigation. Moreover, the lack of unanimous agreement at Member State level on how to finance and use this instrument has contributed to a decline in interest in understanding the mechanisms that have emerged and been developed.

At the European Union level, “*enhanced cooperation*” has been established as the main mechanism for security policy. Although it has taken on different nuances over time, it brings to the fore the principle that within the European Union, collaboration is encouraged, but without forcing reluctant states to participate or vote in favour of certain measures (De Witte, 2019). Thus, we are looking at a *permissive framework* that addresses a *significant number of actors* with the potential to be involved in building military structures designed as the main instruments in promoting regional security and defence.

From this point of view, starting from the Status of Forces in Theatre of Operations (SOFA) and continuing with the Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) between nations and with the Host Nation (HN), the amount and complexity of the type of resources requested by the EU Battlegroup will take into account numerous variables, among which we can mention: type of mission, location, role and need for the establishment of a mission command in the area of responsibility, the assumption of the logistical lead role by one of the participating nations, deployment possibilities and the need for rapid response, the degree of support from the HN and the readiness to provide land and infrastructure in accordance with the SOFA, the expected duration of the mission, the degree of complexity of the capabilities required of the Battlegroup in relation to the mission essential requirements, the type and size of the area of responsibility entrusted to the Battlegroup, the attitude and degree of support of the population in the area for the mission to which the EU is called, the level and type of threats to the force etc.

In this context, the *Battlegroup* is one of the European Union's main military instruments designed to contribute to promoting and ensuring peace and security in Europe. At the same time, it is seen as an effective, credible and coherent military structure consisting of a minimum number of troops, a rapidly deployable force package capable of conducting independent operations or participating in the initial phase of larger operations. It is also described in the literature as “*a multinational military structure composed of approximately 1,500 military personnel, an integral*

part of the EU rapid reaction force capable of responding to crises and conflicts arising worldwide” (Diplomatic Service of the European Union, 2017).

The creation of this type of military structure was initiated in 2004 as a result of the realisation of the need for common defence, as national military instruments were outdated by the demands of the time. The need to jointly provide rapid military responses in different parts of the European continent required solutions to intervene, save lives or prevent the spread of violence. Over the period 2005-2021, 13 state actors (Leruth, 2023), both from EU and non-EU member states, have agreed to participate in various programmes with the potential objective of setting up a battlegroup structure.

The European battlegroup concept was inspired by the success of *Operation Artemis 2003* in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in which 12 states participated with forces (around 1,800 troops) for three months (Homan, 2007). It was the first military mission conducted by Europe, independently of NATO, outside European territory, and its objectives focused on providing security in Bunia, the provincial capital of Ituri, and humanitarian support in the area. The findings of the mission highlighted operational limitations due to limited strategic transport capabilities, lack of strategic reserves and difficulties in communication between command and combat forces (Ib.).

In promoting this concept, it has been envisaged that the European Union Battlegroups represent a step forward in the creation of a union, from a military point of view, at the European level. Participation in the composition of such military structures is not limited by membership of the European Union, moreover, the involvement of certain states becomes politically relevant.

The Role and Tasks of a European Union “Battle Group”

The effectiveness in limiting the spread of a conflict or in extinguishing it depends directly and proportionally on the time/stage at which forces are actually deployed. Delayed intervention in a military conflict leads to significantly increased casualties, considerable consumption of additional resources and increased potential for escalation. In an international context characterised by insecurity and unpredictability, rapid response remains the only viable option.

According to Article 43(1) of the *Treaty on European Union* (2012) the missions for which this military instrument can be used fall within the spectrum of conflict

prevention, stability and support, rescue missions and humanitarian intervention, crisis management and peacekeeping. According to the above-mentioned document, the decision on the deployment of an EU battlegroup is a matter for the European Council, which also sets the objectives and general conditions for implementation.

In the context of the missions mentioned above, it is important to highlight the main attributes/benefits that this military instrument can bring. Thus, the establishment of multinational military structures to ensure regional stability and European security requires fewer resources than the promotion of national defence solutions. Setting up a military structure, staffing it with specialised personnel, providing it with the necessary military equipment, maintaining the technical equipment, training and continuous training of military personnel, salaries and other aspects of the operationalisation of such a structure are resource-intensive. On the other hand, contributing forces or detachments to joint military structures at European level implies a limitation of the human, financial and material resources involved.

Another positive aspect is the potential for logistical improvement of the participating structures through joint activities and missions. Given that the logistical effort of contingents, detachments, national structures deployed in theatres of operations is a national responsibility, logistical support formations and units have rarely benefited from joint exercises or other actions with different EU or NATO member states. From this point of view, the experience of logistics personnel is limited to supporting the national structures they serve. However, the assumption of the responsibility of the support sub-unit for an EU multinational command² (European Union Force, 2023; Petrescu, 2023) as well as the joint deployment of the specific elements of Logistic Support Line I serving the EU Battlegroup nations leads to a significant improvement of the work of the specialist staff. The way in which it is achieved is as follows: the EU Battlegroup commander, through the General Staff – i.e. the Logistic Support Command Module – issues support orders involving concrete actions carried out both by the support company/general staff and service company (which may be multinational or assumed by a nation) and by the logistic execution microstructures of the EU Battlegroup organic national

² Romania has assumed a general staff and service company for the Multinational Battalion (MNBN) in the EU mission Eufor Althea.

sub-units. Moreover, for the accomplishment of the missions ordered, both the support/general staff and service company and the logistic support sub-units mentioned may request, if necessary, the support of the ENS to which they belong. In this joint effort, national combat and logistic support elements will have to find joint support solutions, multinational support solutions, as well as support solutions assumed by one of the nations, in which case there may be settlements according to agreed memoranda. In this multinational context, not only national logistics support tactics, techniques and procedures will be developed, but also experience will be exchanged, i.e. best practices will be imported, military logistics culture and thinking will be enriched, and the necessary changes will be created to produce emergent effects, through interoperability, throughout the national logistics ensemble.

In essence, the participation of nations, through their contribution, in EU-led missions and operations strengthens both the strategic profile of the states concerned and their commitment as a member state and the much-needed mutual trust among strategic partners.

Dimensions, Characteristics and Particularities of the EU BG in Military Operations

In terms of the size of this type of military structure, battlegroups of various sizes, structures and configurations have been considered over time. Thus, generically, we find battalion-level structure consisting of approximately 1,500 soldiers, with combined arms, reinforced with combat support elements and service support [Treaty on European Union, 2012, art. 43(1)]. At the European Union level, these structures have become operational since 2007 (Diplomatic Service of the European Union, 2017) proving to be useful tools in promoting defence at international level. The almost 20 years that have passed since the first use of this type of structure have led to their transformation and resizing, but the basic concept and fundamental mission for which they were created remain the same.

In terms of characteristics, the following can be classified as relevant:

- EUBGs are formed taking into account the principles of conducting operations in a multinational context or are developed through the complementarity of multinational structures under an overall national or coalition framework.

It is important to consider interoperability and military effectiveness in the establishment and use of such military structures;

- The size and manner of establishment of an EU BG are directly dependent on the tasks and missions assigned to it and cannot be a fixed, predefined force structure. The need to adapt is constantly present and involves a range of capabilities;
- Conceptually, these military structures were not intended to be permanent in nature, their composition being adaptable to requirements;
- They are highly deployable in a short time, provided they are operationalised in advance and forces from contributing nations are kept “on standby”;
- They have the ability to act independently or to adapt and integrate easily into military structures for participation in the initial phases of military operations.

Even if a battle group is intended to be able to act independently it must be in direct contact with a range of military or civilian actors/structures. In terms of subordination, an independent Battle Group is specified by the Operations Order as to the type of subordination and the structure to which it is subordinated. In order to be deployed in the area in which it will operate, the BG will be supported by national structures which will be responsible for its strategic movement. At the same time, a BG is initially provisioned, in principle, to be sustainable for 30 days, thus making it easier to determine the concrete arrangements for re-provisioning.

NEEDS AND OPTIONS FOR LOGISTICAL SUPPORT OF AN EU BG

Like any joint, multinational activity, the deployment of an EU battle group necessarily involves financial resources. One of the main challenges still under consideration is how and through what mechanisms these structures will be funded. The following are recognised as fundamental documents providing the general legal framework for the establishment of these military structures: the Treaty establishing the European Union (European Council, 1992), the decisions taken by the Member States under the Treaty of Lisbon (2009) and, as a model for financial support, the Athena mechanism (Council of the European Union, 2004) for financing military operations. Among the missions financed by this mechanism in which the Romanian state participates with military forces we mention: EUTM MALI, EUTM RCA and EUFOR ALTHEA (Bosnia Herzegovina). The Member States

contribute annually to the establishment of a common fund in relation to the level of gross national income (Council of the European Union, 2004).

The military responses and instruments to which the European Union has recourse are part of the Member States' reinforced approach in terms of security and defence. Guided by the two policies, namely the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the European Union has developed a series of initiatives aimed at strengthening, in a comprehensive and integrated manner, its own territorial, economic, cyber etc. security.

With the exception of Denmark and Malta, which have decided not to contribute to European military efforts, the EU has allocated significant funds to the development of a number of security and defence-specific programs, some of which are also open to third countries and are designed to improve the military status and response capability of nations through partnerships, prevention, research-innovation, capability development and defence investment efficiency, the conduct of civilian missions, engagement in military assistance missions and the enhancement of response capability through military operations. Moreover, since 2000, cooperation between the EU and NATO has made it possible to streamline and improve the way operations are planned, forces are designed and missions are conducted.

In view of the above, but also of the fact that the EU Military Committee's military planning is not aimed at engaging in major combatant-type operations similar to NATO military structures, the strategic and operational level commands of this type of operations are characterized by greater flexibility, volatility and fluidity than NATO. For example, in the theatre of operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EUFOR ALTHEA Operational Level Command has been operationalized and deployed with personnel from the contributing countries and using common funds through the Athena financial mechanism. It has responsibilities in the assigned area of operations to plan and conduct operations from the unacceptable state of affairs to the desired end state. The way in which operational level effects are achieved, entails mission-specific actions, namely support to the state armed forces in the training process and to progress towards NATO standards, measures to deter any potential enemy with interests contrary to the rule of law on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and direct or indirect contributions to building and maintaining

a secure environment in the area. Whenever these objectives are met beyond the specific acceptability criterion defined as the desired end state, the command may be relocated to fulfil other missions, reorganized or disbanded.

The budget for the operation of an EU mission is, in principle, made up of the two main components:

- common funds used under the Athena mechanism;
- funds from the countries contributing to the mission, according to the principle of *"costs lie where they fall"*.

In terms of operational costs, the establishment of a mission command is jointly funded and, subsequently, the responsibility for the financial management of the whole mission is taken over by the J8-budget and finance module of the mission command. Thus, the posts required to carry out all the logistical and financial flows of the mission are established through clear procedures, with the roles of the responsible officers established at the highest level of the EU Military Committee.

In the early stages of operations, in accordance with the SOFA, taking into account the common framework for participation in the mission and the decisions of the EU Council, the costs associated with the force planning may be incurred and are eligible to be paid from the common funds. This includes all activities from the airport/port of embarkation (APOE/SPOE), as defined in the mission operations plan (OPLAN), to the final destination (FD). Further, the tactical structures, i.e. the battlegroups, are financed and logistically supported as follows:

- with common funds used through the Athena mechanism;
- with funds managed by Mission Command and reimbursed by Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs) through the Nation Born Costs (NBC) mechanism, managed by the J8 mission structure;
- through national responsibility.

Although EU Battlegroup structures are usually multinational structures, with a designated lead nation whose responsibility is to design the conduct of operations and the tasking of missions, they are rarely funded by common funds, and where this mechanism applies it is strictly regulated by the Council and managed by the J8 mission structure. The TCNs that make up the Battlegroup are deployed to the theatre of operations with the sending nation's assets and are equipped and stocked in accordance with the OPLAN. Within a Battlegroup, nations are staffed with logistics structures specific to the 1st logistic support line that carry out flows of all support areas required by the missions and tasks ordered.

At this level, the *modus operandi* respects the level of authority that has been delegated by the nation (generally OPCOM operational command is transferred) and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) are appropriated through joint training and orders issued by the Battlegroup command element and are implemented, most often, in a similar manner to those transferred through NATO interoperability and cooperation.

From a financial point of view, the main characteristic of combat and support forces, in EU operations, is the high consumption of Class I materials (food, water) and Class III materials (fuels, lubricants and other associated lubricants for all purposes, including weapon systems using special fuels) (NTO, 2018) for supply. Thus, Mission Command is responsible for the provision of materials in Classes I, III-fuel, part of Class IV (construction and engineering materials) and a number of contracted services for the periodic resupply of the forces participating in the mission, and contributing nations receive monthly payment documents for reimbursement of the costs of the required supplies and/or services.

The procurement of services and products required by nations participating in EU operations, during their deployment, is carried out centrally through the Athena mechanism, taking into account the application of equal treatment of both candidates/tenderers from the European Union countries (Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, the Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland, Sweden and Montenegro) as well as those from non-EU countries with close relations with the European Union (United Kingdom, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Albania, Chile, Northern Macedonia, Mexico) and the host state of the operation (HN). Procurement is carried out in a similar way to the familiar national public procurement process, but the thresholds to which the European authority refers in order to ensure open and fair competition are different (€5,000, €30,000 and €300,000 for goods and services, respectively €5,000,000 for infrastructure works). The nation benefits from the goods and services thus contracted by reimbursing their value, a *mechanism known as National Born Costs (NBC)*.

The procurement of goods, services and works at centralized level, both for common benefit, supported by *common funds*, and for those supported by the **NBC mechanism**, is carried out with the same principles and procedures, the ultimate

aim being both to provide opportunely and on time, in a multinational system, with significant savings and avoidance of redundancies, and to avoid competition for resources in theatre of operations.

For the other classes of materiel (Class II, lubricants and associated liquids within Class III materiel, Class IV construction materiel not provided from common funds or through the NBC mechanism, Class V materials – ammunition and medicines), the *responsibility* for supply and re-supply is *national* and is carried out in two ways:

- by in-country assurance, with goods and stocks being deployed under the Logistics Support Line I, by the task of determining, transporting and managing the organic logistics component of the national structures integrated into the Battlegroup;
- by re-supply from the home country, with the support of the National Support Elements (NSE), during the deployment of the mission, if nations decide to deploy in theatre of operations this Voluntary National Contribution (VNC) structure, not included in the European Organization States for the mission, but which will have the same status in the theatre of operations, according to the SOFA agreements concluded, or by in-theatre procurement carried out, in particular, by these National Support Elements;
- through assurance by logistic/medical structures of other nations, with support and subsequent settlements being made through Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) bilateral (between the nation that re-supplies/provides/medical insurance and the recipient nation), multilateral (between the nation that re-supplies/provides/assure medically on the one hand and the other nations on the other hand, with the conditions of insurance and settlement being identical) or concluded by mission command, with the support of J8 and the EU Council, similar to the NBC mechanism.

Although to date EU missions have not designated a specific logistic structure for the 3rd logistic support line, such as the Joint Logistic Support Group, similar to NATO procedures, the operational level logistic effort, materialized in logistic, information and financial flows provided through the Athena mechanism and the NBC process, being substantially reduced compared to NATO operations, the lead role is taken by the mission commander, with the support of the multinational command he leads and the major effort of modules J4 – Logistics and J8 – Budget, Finance. The executing component in this case is represented by the contractors

and the inventory acquired through the common fund mechanism is kept, used and accounted for under strict rules and principles of sound financial management.

France, Germany and Poland have created a European military entity under the name of the “Weimar Battle Group”, setting out through clearly expressed technical commitments the responsibilities and involvement of each state. Thus, Germany offered its logistical support and France its medical support (F.A.2011). In the current security context characterized by the Russian Federation’s aggression against Ukraine, this trilateral was reactivated (Dumitrache, 2023) declaring its agreement and intention to support Ukraine in its efforts to defend its national territory.

Since 2007, a total of 19 battle groups have been operationalized at European level (Cristian, 2022), but none of them has been used. Of them, we would like to draw attention to the HELBROC battle group, in which the Romanian military has contributed forces.

No.	Year of initiation of the agreement	Name	Countries involved	Remarks
1	2006	HELBROC BG	Greece, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Romania, Ukraine (2011, non-member state), Serbia (from 2017), North Macedonia (from 2022)	Romania has contributed general staff officers, CBRN defence and military police structures

Table no. 1: Countries involved in HELBROC Battle Group (Source: author contribution)

Designed to be used in crisis situations or armed conflicts, European Union battle groups have never been used in practice (Clapp, 2023). Disagreements between states, due to the differing political will (Kemp, 2023) of nations and the lack of unanimous agreement on the financing of these structures have contributed to the lack of access to this type of military instrument in resolving crisis situations.

In the literature we have identified approaches that bring to attention that these military structures conceptualized under the name of EU BG have in fact been a failure (Reykers, 2017; pp. 41-56, Smith, 2016, pp. 446-460). On the one hand, the main role in the decision not to use such a military structure was directly related

to the political will of those involved, and, on the other hand, the necessary resources were a significant obstacle.




Figure no 1: Structure of the HELBROC Battle Group
(Source: <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/battlegroup-helbroc.htm>)

At present, on the initiative of 14 European Union Member States, on the basis of the European Union’s security and defence strategy, the idea of operationalising a force capable of being deployed in a very short time has been promoted and accepted. It is referred to in official documents as “RDP – Rapid Deployment Capability” (Clapp, 2023). This type of military structure is conceived as a modular force of 5,000 soldiers and the stated intention of the European Union is to have it operational by 2025 (Ib.). The main building blocks of the force will be the EU battlegroups to which other capabilities or forces identified as necessary from the Member States will be added.

As it has been proven so far, the main problem with military instruments designed at European Union level has been the ownership of their funding and the funding itself. Thus, the present EU strategy aims to use the common funds established and to emphasise solidarity in order to develop the RDP. Also, until unanimous acceptance and development of a concrete funding mechanism, suggestions from experts in the field (Meyer, 2022) have focused on compensating troop contributors

on the basis of a common cost calculation and in relation to the Gross Domestic Product of member states. It should take into account, as a matter of priority, the cost implications for transport/deployment, ammunition and fuel use.

The establishment of European battle groups requires not only a clear concept but also a tailor-made provision. They must have the capacity to fight or respond appropriately to the crisis situations for which they have been requested, to have a coherent command and control system and flexible, adaptable and sufficient logistical support.

CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS

The development of military instruments such as European battle groups is a long process. Viewed through the lens of the regional implications of setting up such structures, we recognise that this is a necessary and essential step for European security and defence policy. Therefore, a number of conclusions can be drawn, summarised along two main lines: relevant aspects of the logistical support of battlegroup structures and the potential benefits of setting up and using this type of military instrument.

Over the past decades, forces participating in international missions have demonstrated that Romania is ready to participate in operations by contributing troops, both in mission commands and in battlegroups. The experience of more than twenty years of participation in missions in Afghanistan and in other theatres of operations has given us the confidence to succeed. However, the logistical support provided, in part, through the “*Lift and Sustain*” programme, operated by the leading partner of the mission in Afghanistan, namely the United States of America, through which the contingents and personnel participating in the mission had access to a large part of the necessary resources, free of charge, created a specific way of thinking, apart from the logistical rules applicable to missions, for the Romanian military, whether logistician or fighter. From this perspective, the challenge to which the Romanian Armed Forces are called, is to create the necessary capabilities for force planning and self-sustainment, for military structures of company level and higher, and training of personnel and logistic sub-units, both on national territory and through exercises and various other projects carried out jointly with partner states, to support their own forces through national and multinational solutions. Thus, particular attention should be paid to understanding, at tactical level,

how to interpret memoranda of understanding, technical agreements, letters of accession etc. Moreover, the tools available for access to goods and services in a multinational context, logistical cooperation, as well as the conduct of procurement, within theatres of operations, are imperatives to be included in mission training plans.

The assumption of a functional legal framework allowing the establishment and use of BG-type military instruments at European level implies a number of responsibilities for the actors involved in the process but also a significant number of benefits. Increasing the European Union’s capacity to manage crises and respond adequately to potential military threats, increasing the potential for cooperation between Member States and between Member States and those outside the European Union, improving joint preparedness, ensuring the potential for the development of joint support procedures, exchange of information, expertise and training are just some of them. Assuming the joint establishment of military instruments with potential for regional use substantially limits the consumption of human and financial resources.

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