

CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE EVACUATION OF THE ROMANIAN TROOPS PARTICIPATING IN THE BULGARIAN CAMPAIGN IN THE SUMMER OF 1913

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The purpose of this article is to highlight the aspects of the evacuation operations from Bulgaria, executed by the Romanian troops participating in the military campaign in the summer of 1913, a chapter of the national military history less researched. The article is based on the documents studied in the national archives.

In the summer of 1913, in the face of an unstable Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece decided to conclude a defensive alliance, a process completed on 19 May/1 June 1913, which aimed to establish their own interests in Macedonia against the Bulgarian ones. Moreover, to the tensions between the former Balkan allies were added the armed incidents near the outposts of the three armies that had the mission of preserving the conquered positions. In this context, Romania's position became a very important one, in relation to the obligations assumed by the treaties concluded at international level, which is why Romania had to make a decision regarding the participation in the ongoing war.

Keywords: Balkan Wars; Tsarist Empire; groups of forces, mobilization; Bulgaria;

A NATIONAL PRIORITY – THE PRESERVATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS QUO ESTABLISHED BY THE TREATIES

In the Romanian historiography, the two Balkan wars were investigated in terms of political, international relations, the role regarding Romania's participation and the military operations of the Romanian armed forces, but less in terms of the schedule of the evacuation of the Romanian troops that had been present on Bulgarian territory.

The moment of the Second Balkan War proved once again the importance of the opportunities offered by the international context, especially for small nations, like Romania. Moreover, it pointed out that, for the same kind of nations, a certain status, acquired with great sacrifices, could only be preserved by a dignified attitude, even if it also involved the use of force of arms. Bulgaria became a threat to all its neighbours. The policy of King Ferdinand of Saxe Coburg had succeeded in setting in motion the Balkan peoples, who felt threatened by the Bulgarian territorial claims. A possible change in the balance of forces in the Balkans would put the entire international community in difficulty. If Bulgaria had reached the Straits, it would have been able to gain a very important geopolitical and strategic position. The Tsarist Empire pursued its own interests at the mouth of the Danube and at the Black Sea. Germany did not accept, for political and economic reasons, the weakening of Turkish authority in the area. Thus, Romania, after conducting a diplomatic peace policy, decided, in agreement with the international community of which it was part as an ally and not only, to end the state of conflict that threatened the stability of the entire Eastern Europe. To the tensions between the former Balkan allies were added the armed incidents near the outposts of the three armies that had the mission to preserve the conquered positions.

In this context, Romania's position became a very important one. The Romanian political class, aware of the Austro-Hungarian contribution to the termination of the agreement between the three Balkan states and the support for the Bulgarian cause, had to make a decision on the participation in the war. As expected, the tension between the two great powers that disputed their spheres of influence in the Balkans, the Tsarist Empire and Austria-Hungary, led to the concentration

of troops near the borders of Romania. Thus, to the west, east and south of the borders of the Romanian state were concentrated troops that endangered its territorial existence.

ASPECTS REGARDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BULGARIAN CAMPAIGN PLAN OF 1913. MOBILIZATION, DEPLOYMENT OF GROUPS OF FORCES AND MILITARY ACTIONS

King Carol I signed High Decree No. 4751 of 20 June/3 July 1913, after the diplomatic missions in Athens and Belgrade informed Bucharest that both countries considered themselves at war with Bulgaria. The operation effectively started on the night of 22/23 June/2/3 July 1913 at 24:00 and it was carried out in good conditions until 27 June/10 July. For the conduct of military operations it was mobilized the Great General Headquarters, at the head of which was appointed Crown Prince Ferdinand, having as a basic element the General Staff, under the command of General Alexandru Averescu. This command structure operated from 23 June/6 July to 22 August/4 September 1913 (Giurcă, Georgescu, 2012, p. 92).

The 1901-1911 and the 1895-1900 contingents were brought under arms. The mobilization lasted eight days, ending on 28 June, which was a surprise for Bulgaria, which estimated that it would last about two weeks.

Five army corps with 15 divisions were mobilized, of which five reserve divisions, three reserve infantry brigades, two cavalry divisions and a brigade of auxiliary troops, the so-called "Călărăși". The combat force was 247 battalions, 180 batteries and 93 squadrons. The mobilized troops amounted to 460,000 soldiers, 10,600 officers, 150,000 horses.

The mobilization and transport activities started on the night of 22/23 June to 5/6 July 1913 at 24:00. On 23 June/6 July 1913, passenger trains were suspended, with the railways from that date dealing only with military transport. The troops and the combat assets were transported by more than 500 military trains, on foot or by ships on the Danube. The Bulgarians had foreseen that the mobilization of the Romanian armed forces would take 14 days and, as a result, Romanian troops would enter the Bulgarian territory on 20 July/2 August 1913. No armed forces had been able, until 1913, to accomplish the mobilization in such a short time and in such a coordinated manner as the Romanian armed forces. Thus, Romania held the record from this point of view, proving to the foreign country that it had a good material and moral training of mobilization in case of necessity. The speed at which the mobilization and concentration of the Romanian armed forces were carried out

determined the Bulgarian military command to take urgent measures to defend the capital and to withdraw the troops fighting against the Greek and Serbian troops.

The decision on Romania's entry into the war was taken on the evening of 26 June/9 July 1913. The French Minister in Bucharest, after consulting with his Russian counterpart, Nicolai Nicolaevich Schebeko, had a meeting with Titu Maiorescu, during which the Romanian Prime Minister told him that Romania was aiming to preserve the Balkan and European balance (Pohoată, 2010, p. 205).

Under those circumstances, on 17/30 June 1913, on the initiative of General Alexandru Averescu, Chief of the General Staff, "*the memorandum on guiding the operations of the Romanian armed forces in case it interferes in the Serbian-Bulgarian conflict*" was implemented (Apostol, Giurcă, Chiriac, Baltă, 2000, p. 35). Also known as "*Hypothesis 1 bis*", the memorandum represented the Romanian Armed Forces Operation Plan in the Second Balkan War (June-August 1913).

Therefore, the Operation Plan of the Romanian Armed Forces in the Second Balkan War provided for the development of operations "*on two directions: One main, directed toward the strategic centre of gravity of the Bulgarian forces, as they are arranged today; another secondary, directed toward the Rusciuc-Varna line. The first direction is indicated only by purely military considerations, the second by political considerations*" (ANIC, 1913, p. 2).

In order to achieve the strategic goal, in the **Operation Plan** of the Romanian Armed Forces, the combat actions were guided by the central idea of the plan: the two-way offensive. The main direction was aimed at the centre of the opposing forces and the capital city, helping to block the Bulgarian troops in both the Eastern and Western sectors. Moreover, the two-way manoeuvre, designed by the General Staff, ensured the possibility of working with the Serbian troops, the neighbour on the right flank of the main Romanian group. The distribution of forces followed the principle of concentration of forces and means, with the main group receiving the necessary resources to carry out their missions (Otu, 2007, p. 159).

Once the mobilization was decided, the General Staff, through its General Command, decided to form two groups of forces according to the objectives pursued. Therefore, a main group of operational forces was formed consisting of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th Army Corps as well as two cavalry divisions concentrated in Oltenia, and the 5th Operational Army Corps, in Dobrogea, consisting of the 9th and 10th Divisions as well as the 3rd Reserve Division, under the command of Division General Ioan Culcer, a reputed strategist and tactician. The forces of the 5th Army Corps were directed toward the southern border, the forces of the 9th Division were

concentrated in Cernavodă, the forces of the 10th Division in Medgidia and the 3rd Reserve Division in Murfatlar.

The 5th Army Corps received the order to act in Bulgarian territory to occupy the border line requested by the Romanian government in the framework of the Romanian-Bulgarian negotiations.

On 28 June/11 July 1913 the first Romanian troops began crossing the Danube. Silistra was the first city occupied by the 1st and 2nd Squadrons of the 5th Roșiori/ Cavalry Regiment mobilized in Tecuci and concentrated in Ostrov. As a result of the reconnaissance missions, it was found that the Silistra forts were deserted, only three Bulgarian infantry companies being reported in the city.

Silistra, a strategic point, became the base for the troops whose mission was to occupy the main cities located on the line of the future Romanian-Bulgarian border. One by one, Turtucaia, Dobrich (Bazargic) and Balchik were occupied and placed under the control of the Romanian forces, which were ordered to station there, in anticipation of future political decisions.

On 30 June/13 July 1913, the Turtucaia-Dobrich-Balchik line was completely controlled by the Romanian troops. Reconnaissance was carried out on the Rusciuc-Shumla-Varna line, which eventually led to the occupation of Varna on 2/15 July 1913 by a group of 9 members of the 6th Călărași Regiment stationed in Dobrich, an occupation that lasted until 3/16 July 1913. On the same day, the reconnaissance team of the 5th Roșiori Regiment that was stationing in Balchik arrived in Varna. Both reconnaissance troops withdrew to Dobrich and Balchik.

By the proclamation of General Ioan Culcer on the occasion of the occupation of Turtucaia on 1/14 July 1913, the local authorities and the Bulgarian population were informed that, from that date, they had the obligation to obey the Romanian laws and military commanders. All the inhabitants of the city had the obligation to hand over arms, to contribute to the needs of the armed forces through requisitions for which they received indemnities in accordance with the tariff established by the military authorities in compliance with the Law enforcement Regulation on requisitions. Any type of correspondence was stopped and local trade and agricultural works were monitored by the Romanian armed forces. The commander of the military region Turtucaia was appointed General Ioan Istrati, Commander of the 9th Infantry Division (Adevărul, 1931, p. 1).

Until the signing of the Peace of Bucharest on 28 July /10 August 1913, the 5th Army Corps remained in Southern Dobrogea or New Dobrogea, except for the occupation of Varna by a detachment of the 6th Călărași Regiment, which carried out

a reconnaissance mission without the intention of occupying the city. However, following the weak response from the Bulgarian troops stationed around the port, the Bulgarian authorities decided to hand over the city to the Romanian troops, which they left between 3/4 July and 15/16 July 1913, withdrawing to previous positions, namely on the line of the future Romanian-Bulgarian border.

EVACUATION OF ROMANIAN TROOPS PARTICIPATING IN THE 1913 BULGARIAN CAMPAIGN. ADMINISTRATIVE, MILITARY AND MEDICAL ASPECTS

On July 11/24, 1913, the Great General Headquarters of the Operational Armed Forces received from the Ministry of War the telegram no. 50, which informed it that the Bulgarian Government had yielded to the Romanian demands. King Carol I asked Serbian King Peter Karađorđević and Greek King Constantine I to conclude an armistice in the interest of peace. They agreed upon it on the condition that the Bulgarian government would have accepted the views of the two kingdoms. On that occasion, King Carol I advised the two sovereigns that the Allied armed forces should not advance too quickly toward Sofia because a threat to the capital would cause a catastrophe in Bulgaria and then the powers would have no one to negotiate with (AMNR, 1913, p. 152).

At the same time, the Ministry of War communique no. 50 of July 11/24 July 1913 stated that *“His Royal Majesty makes known to you that the order given to column heads and reconnaissance detachments is a measure required by political circumstances, it is a disposition for the moment. Thus, the positions we occupy ensure a favourable strategic situation. It remains understood, however, that stopping along the straits does not imply the rear troops stopping too, on the contrary, they must be brought closer in order to reduce the too great distance that exists today between the various elements of the army corps. His Majesty the King orders that this order should be communicated to the Army Corps and the Cavalry Divisions so that their commanders can know the political situation that dictates the measures taken for the present time”* (Ib.).

On the same day, the Ministry of Interior, through the telegram no. 4393/11/24 July 1913, sent to the Minister of War, Division General Constantin Hârjeu, an address that informed him that the President of the Council of Ministers decided to appoint a Civil Commissioner for the entire occupied territory – Southern Dobrogea – by delegating Barbu Păltineanu, deputy, who received the assignment. According to the provisions of international law during the occupation until the annexation

of those territories, the authority was exercised by the military power. Even under military authority there remained civil authorities, such as local authorities, as the state in its civil form had to be represented. In this capacity, Barbu Păltineanu was permanently collaborating with the Commander of the occupying Army, the head of the military authority. He had a team of government advisers consisting of D. Apostolu, G. Bădescu and Sebastian Teodorescu, deputies, being helped by G. Nicolau, Chief of Bureau within the Railway Directorate, C. Angelescu, Barbu B. Păltineanu, delegated by the Minister of Industry and Ion Constantinescu. The mission of Barbu Păltineanu was to study the future administrative and political organization of the territory designated to be part of Romania, in order to propose the project for adoption by the Parliament. In order to fulfil the mission, he was provided with five cars when he arrived in Silistra for the transport from Silistra to Dobrici, and with two cars to travel to the territory (Ib., p. 2).

On 18/31 July, the Romanian forces received notice of the conclusion of a 5-day truce, following the opening of the Bucharest Peace Conference on 17/30 July 1913. The first military action taken at the conference was to end hostilities and establish a demarcation line in front of outposts. On 23 July/5 August, the armistice was extended by 3 days. On 24 July/06 August 1913, the Ministry of War sent the telegram no. 311, by the High Order of the King of Romania, to the Great General Headquarters, informing that, from 25 July/7 August 1913, in view of the troops de-concentration, in order to facilitate as much as possible the subsequent transports, the 5th Reserve Division had to gradually put on leave the people who were part of the battalions in Dobrogea, starting with the oldest contingents, and, following the medical examination, with the weakest, and those with familiar difficulties.

The troops from Dobrogea, at the rear of the 5th Army Corps, enjoyed the same treatment. They were the artillery park, the ammunition columns and the subsistence columns. Thus, gradually, they decreased in number, without disorganizing the service. The transport of people to their mobilization residences was done by railway in groups of 100-250 people a day on each ordinary train, being forbidden the formation of special military trains for that purpose. Each group had to be under the command of an active officer, sergeant or non-commissioned officer, with the mission of maintaining discipline and order during transport. The units that sent people on leave announced the nearest railway station 24 hours earlier, showing the number of people leaving and the direction they were going.

For that purpose, the Railways provided the army corps with a maximum of three wagons per passenger train and five for freight trains. There was an exception

to the fast trains that could be supplemented by two train wagons. At the same time, the army corps were required to send exactly as many people as the capacity of transportation. The purpose of those leaves was to reduce the remaining troops awaiting new orders to half of those mobilized. The order was completed with the mention *“that for the Bucharest Fortress and the Focsani-Nămoloasa-Galați fortified region, orders will be given directly by the Ministry”* (Ib., n. p.).

By telegram no. 111 of 29 July/11 August 1913, the Great General Headquarters, by order of the Chief of Staff of the Operations Army, Alexandru Averescu, ordered the commands of the troops stationed in western Bulgaria that, in order to set the troops in motion, the marches must be carried out according to the indications contained in the movement tables that were to be received in time. The itineraries could not be changed, the number of days could not be changed and the stationing points as well as the length of the stages were not mandatory. The crossing points in the country were Turnu Măgurele and Zimnicea. At Turnu Măgurele crossed: the 1st Cavalry Division, the 1st and the 3rd Army Corps, the 1st Reserve Division and the 33rd Reserve Brigade. At Zimnicea crossed: the 2nd Cavalry Division, the 2nd and the 4th Army Corps and the 2nd Reserve Division. For the marches, the mobile warehouses had food supplies for 5 days. The subsistence of the troops on the right side of the Danube was ensured by the subsistence columns supplied from mobile warehouses and warehouses at the crossing points. On the right side of the Danube, subsistence was provided from the temporary warehouses installed by the Armed Forces Quartermaster Corps. The relocation of the mobile warehouses was coordinated following the instructions of the Quartermaster-General. All cholera patients and cholera suspects were left at the following points: Orhanie, Vrața, Lucoviț and Cervenibreg. On the eve of the departure, the doctors had the obligation to make a thorough sanitary inspection for the screening of the suspects and their evacuation to those points. During the march to the crossing point, doctors made an exact list of those who had cholera-specific symptoms. The sick and cholera suspects formed a detachment at the back of each unit, and at the crossing point they were handed over to the health service there to be subjected to the measures specifically ordered for that category. In order to facilitate marches, the commands could order the dispatch of some of the material they no longer needed during the march.

According to the High Decree No. 5141 of 30 July/12 August 1913, the general demobilization of the armed forces began on 31 July/13 August 1913. Regarding the occupation troops in Dobrogea, the General Staff transmitted telegram no. 2380 of 30 July/12 August 1913, by which the Great General Headquarters was informed

that those groups of forces consisted of the 33rd Tulcea Regiment with 3 battalions in Tulcea, the 34th Constanța Regiment with 3 battalions in Constanța, the 36th Vasile Lupu Regiment with 2 battalions in Cernavodă, the 39th Petru Rareș Regiment with 2 battalions in Silistra, the 35th Neagoe Basarab Regiment with 2 battalions in Dobrici and one battalion in Balchik, the 9th Hunters Battalion in Kurtbunar, the 40th Călugăreni Regiment with 2 battalions in Turtucaia, the 5th Roșiori Regiment with 2 squadrons in Dobrici and 2 squadrons in Kurtbunar (Ib.).

The remaining units that made up the 5th Army Corps, the 38th and 23rd Infantry Regiment, the 13th, 18th, 3rd and 20th Artillery Regiments and the 5th Howitzers Division entered their old garrisons. The divisions, ammunition columns, the Army Corps Artillery Park, the Division and Army Corps ambulances, the Mobile Hospital, the Mobile Warehouse and the logistics formations were fully demobilized. The divisional subsistence column had to keep the strictly necessary supplies for the occupying troops. The infantry regiments of the occupying corps kept, in addition to the contingents under arms, the first supplementary contingent, while all other troops and services remained in full strength.

In addition to the telegram no. 111 of 29 July/11 August 1913, Section I, Bureau B of the Great General Headquarters transmitted the Order of Operations no. 5 of 2/15 August 1913, which included the general tables of the troops movement from western Bulgaria and the instructions on their movement. It was forbidden to modify the established itineraries, the resting days and the number of marching days. The stationing points established along the routes and the length of the stages were not mandatory, but the rear divisions could not be stationed in the same localities where the ones at the front of the column were stationed. In each corps the divisions would be at a distance of one day. All necessary measures were taken to ensure that the crossing on bridges was made in a coordinated manner, maintaining the discipline. The troops were not brought to the bridges until the crossing, avoiding long stops in the vicinity of the bridges. The carriages were kept continuously on the right side of the bridge and only a row of carriages was allowed to travel along the road in one direction. A staff officer was assigned by the command to manage the entrance to the bridge. He had a detachment of mounted troops to execute the road police missions across a distance of at least 4 km from the bridge. The commanders chose one or two companies from each division and service to assist in the event of any stops during the movement in order to ensure a continued movement.

The movement of the army corps services was supervised by the corps commands in such a way that the crossing began immediately after the divisions other than those of the 2nd and the 4th corps that crossed one day after the crossing of the first division. With regard to the movement of mobile warehouses, the logistics troops were responsible for it, following the instructions of the Quartermaster-General to the Forces. The provisions for stationing, marching, railway transport and subsistence after crossing the Danube were mentioned in the movement and transport tables, designed for each division and army corps service, distributed to the commands on time. Apart from the provisions contained in the order of operations no. 111 of 29 July/11 August 1913, the troops' subsistence during the marches to the Danube was ensured on the basis of the special instructions given by the General-Quartermaster to the Forces.

As healthcare measures, the recommendations previously communicated remained valid, as well as the provisions already decided by the medical staff of the corps and divisional and corps ambulances. For the groups that were contaminated, a day of rest was decided on the eve of crossing over the Danube in order to make a very rigorous sanitary inspection and to choose the suspect people who were left at the sanitary observation points in Nicopolis (the Pioneer Barracks) and Șiștov (the Infantry Barracks).

Before leaving, the suspect and sick people were sent to Orhanie-Vrața-Lukoviț and Cervenibreg. From those points they were evacuated by rail to Nicopolis on 10/23 August 1913. Those from Orhanie and Lukoviț were transported, starting on 7/20 August 1913, by carriages to Vrața and Cervenibreg (Ib.).

The logistics troops began their withdrawal the day before the arrival of the column heads. Exception to this rule were the logistics troops from Vrața and Cervenibreg points, that remained stationed to guard the sick. They began their journey with them on 10/23 August 1913. In Orhanie, the 1st Army Corps left a company to guard and escort the sick to Vrața, and from there the company went with them to Nicopolis, where it re-entered the corps. The material and personnel of the railways followed the movement of the 1st Army Corps, withdrawing, until 10/23 August 1913, to Plevna and, on 11/24 August 1913, they left that locality and withdrew to Samovit (Ib.).

The corps carrying out marches on foot had to take from the warehouses T. Măgurele and Zimnicea the lime necessary for the disinfection. The logistics command had to supply not only the main warehouses but also the auxiliary ones with lime in sufficient quantities.

The troops re-entered their garrisons on foot. They carried out the marches in full freedom in terms of the length of the stages, respecting the travel routes, with the prohibition of stationing in localities for several days. Troops were allowed to camp on the route established on the condition that the guard was organized to prevent any contact between troops and inhabitants. Those who got infected during the marches were evacuated by ambulance carriages to the nearest hospitals in the area.

All the specific communications facilities were left undamaged, but the telegraph devices belonging to our armed forces, as well as the bridge material of the pioneers, were taken away. The bridges at Ghihen-Mahala were disbanded immediately after the crossing of the last elements of the 2nd Reserve Division.

On 4/17 August 1913, the 2nd Army Corps reported on the measures taken to execute the march for the evacuation of forces stationed in western Bulgaria under the general order to evacuate Bulgaria and return to the country.

According to the movement tables, the march to Vid was executed in two columns and from the Vid to Blagarene the entire army corps went in one column, then to Zimnicea in two columns. Known that all localities in Bulgaria were contaminated by cholera, no stop or stationing was executed. The 2nd Hunters Regiment, the 2nd Howitzers Division, the 3rd Pioneers Company, the 3rd Telegraph Section and the Wireless Telegraph Section went with the 4th Division to Zimnicea. The 10th Roşiori Regiment followed the 3rd Division to Zimnicea, were the last to cross the bridge over the Danube. The Biker Company went to Zimnicea having one platoon in the 4th Division, one platoon in the 3rd Division, one platoon in the Army Corps Services column. The services of the 4th and 3rd Division, except the divisional ambulances and the army corps services, respectively the Artillery Park, the Pioneer Park and the 2nd Remount Squadron, formed a single column. Those services, along with the subsistence column, followed up to Zimnicea the march of the 4th Division 4 on a half-day march. The regular marching of the column and the orderly and fast crossing of the bridge over the Danube was ensured by biker platoons and by staff officers. The divisions ensured that the bridge was crossed by 1 or 2 infantry companies located 4 km from the bridge (Ib.).

As sanitary measures, the march was carried out from 06:00 hours, and on very hot days a stop was made from 10:00 until 17:00 hours. After the march, during the morning rest, all unnecessary labour was forbidden. The troops marched with their rows flanked a few steps away or in flank, two people on each side of the road,

where it was allowed by its configuration. The soldiers were dressed according to the temperature of the day. When it was warm, they were allowed to open the uniform to their neck and chest. It was recommended hot food preferably sour soup, hot tea, boiled and acidified (vinegar) water, being totally forbidden to eat raw food. The troops were fed according to the instructions of the Quartermaster Service. The cans were filled before departure with tea, coffee or boiled and acidified water. The doctors inspected the soldiers when they left, the sick were evacuated according to orders received. For the proper management of the march, between 5/18 August and 10/23 August, the 2nd Army Headquarters stationed in Plevna.

On the evening of 3/16 August 1913, a representative of the Bulgarian railways, accompanied by a delegate of the Ministry of War, came to Plevna, where the Armed Forces General Headquarters was located. Together with General Alexandru Averescu, the Armed Forces Chief of Staff, they discussed the regulation of common rail traffic. On the same day, General Alexandru Averescu inspected the way the works of the Şiştov Bridge were executed. At that time, the bridge could ensure the troops crossing on foot, as the ramp and the pavement of the access road required at least two more days, so it was expected that on 7/20 August 1913, the 2nd Cavalry Division could cross it. At the same time, General Alexandru Averescu established the terms of the collaboration between the local authorities and the representatives of the armed forces (Ib.).

On 6/19 August 1913, General Alexandru Averescu telegraphed Prime Minister Titu Maiorescu about the discussion he had with the officer delegated from the Bulgarian General Staff about the withdrawal of the Romanian troops behind the demarcation line, as well as about the daily situation, position and movement of the armed forces columns. As a result of the completion of the specific evacuation activity of the patients left in observation at Orhanie, started on 7/20 August 1913, the town of Vraţa was abandoned on 10/23 August 1913.

According to the telegram no. 628 of 7/20 August 1913, sent by General Alexandru Averescu to the Minister of War, although King Carol I decided that the evacuation of Bulgaria should be carried out by 15/28 August 1913, the sanitary measures imposed against the spread of cholera among the Romanian armed forces questioned the observance of that date. In order to avoid the possible delay, he proposed to establish a special place on the left bank of the Danube where the sanitary barracks were to be installed for the sick, basically a sanitary corridor administered by the local authorities (Ib.).

On 9/22 August 1913, on the 48th day of mobilization, the operational armed forces reported continuing marches to re-enter the country. At that time, the 1st Cavalry Division crossed to the left of the Danube at Rahova-Becket by transshipment, except one division from the 9th Roșiori Regiment that crossed on the morning of 10/23 August 1913. The 24th Tecuci Regiment, the 10th Putna Regiment, the 11th Artillery Regiment, the Ambulance of the 6th Division, the 4th Telegraphy Company, the 6th Branch Squadron, one logistics battalion, the Mobile Hospital of the 3rd Army Corps, the 3rd Company of the 3rd Pontonier-Rivers Battalion, the 3rd Hunters Regiment of the 5th Division, the 5th Section Telegraphy of the Great Headquarters, the 5th Militia Battalion of the 3rd Army Corps, the 2nd Section Telegraphy, the 3rd Pioneer Battalion, the Horse Hospital, the Relay Squadron of the 7th Călărași Regiment, the 6th Plevn logistics company, the 4th Telegraphy Company of the Great General Headquarters and a Rural Gendarme Section crossed at Turnu Măgurele. The 4th subsistence column of the 3rd Army Corps, the 4th Pioneer Battalion, carts of supplies for the warehouse crossed at Zimnicea (Ib., p. 315).

On 13/26 August 1913, the operational armed forces continued the marches to evacuate Bulgaria, and the troops on the left of the Danube were either carrying out the de-concentration transports or were stopped in medical observation because of the epidemic. Thus, the troops that crossed through transshipment to the left of the Danube at Rahova-Bechet point were the 3rd territorial Company 3 of the Dolj Battalion, the Călărași Logistics Squadron, the central subsistence warehouse and all the requisitions carriages, thus all the sick being evacuated and installed on the lazarette in the Bechet port. The entire troops and services of the 1st Division and part of the services of the 1st Army Corps crossed at Nicopole-Turnu-Măgurele point. The services of the 4th Army Corps crossed at the Șiștov-Zimnicea point (Ib.).

On the right side of the Danube, on the Bulgarian territory, there remained in Nicopolis, waiting for crossing the great river, the 5th Hunters Regiment, two squadrons of the 4th Călărași Regiment and one division of the 14th Artillery Regiment. In the area of Șiștov there were troops of the 4th Army Corps waiting for the order to cross the Danube. The Zlatița Detachment was at Hadji-Musa. The 33rd Reserve Infantry Brigade was in Bulgăreni. On the same day, the 17th Infantry Regiment, 1st Division Headquarter and the 31st Infantry Regiment were boarded on barges for Turnu-Severin and Calafat (Ib.).

The troops stopped on the left of the Danube in medical observation, north of Turnu Măgurele, were the 3rd Călărași Regiment, in Drăgănești, the 6th Roșiori

Regiment, in Lița, the 7th Prahova Regiment, in Odaia, the 1st Dolj Regiment, the 2nd Vâlvea Regiment, the 26th Rovine Regiment, in Islaz, and the 3rd Division around Zimnicea (Ib.).

At the end of 13/26 August 1913, after carrying out the de-concentration transports on water, on foot or on the railway, in compliance with the sanitary requirements, the 1st Cavalry Division was in Bucharest, the 1st Cavalry Brigade Headquarters and the 2nd Roșiori Regiment at Segarcea station, and the 3rd Cavalry Brigade Headquarters and the 7th Roșiori Regiment were boarded in the train that left Segarcea for Iași, arriving on the evening of 14/27 August 1913. On the same day, the 8th Roșiori Regiment reached Botoșani by rail, while the Mounted Artillery Division and the ammunition columns reached Portărești station waiting for boarding. The 3rd Roșiori Regiment boarded at Portărești during the day of 13/26 August 1913 and arrived in Bârlad on 16/29 August 1913. The troops of the 2nd Cavalry Division arrived in their garrisons, except for the 3rd Călărași Regiment, stationed in Drăgănești, and the 10th Călărași Regiment, part of the Zlatița Detachment, stopped at Hadja-Musa, waiting for crossing the Danube on 14 August. The 1st Reserve Division executed the march for de-concentration from Bechet to Măceșul, where it was stopped by doctors for medical reasons. The 21st Reserve Infantry Brigade Headquarters and 2 battalions from Mehedinți Circle were transported on barges reaching Turnu-Măgurele toward the end of the day. The 2nd Reserve Division, with all its troops and services, was in the garrison (Ib.).

The troops and services of the 3rd Army Corps that were not part of any division stationed northeast of Turnu-Măgurele to be transported by rail to garrisons, except for the troops of the 3rd Pioneer Battalion and the 10th Infantry Brigade of the 5th Division, which were transported by barges to Brăila, while the 6th Roșiori Regiment was contaminated and complied with sanitary measures. The 5th Division Headquarters reached Buzău by rail, while the 3rd Hunters Regiment and the 9th Infantry Brigade were waiting northwest of Turnu Măgurele for boarding (Ib.). In the same location, the 7th Prahova Regiment was also stationed under medical observation because of the troops contaminated by cholera. The 5th Artillery Brigade, the 7th Artillery Regiment and the Divisional Ambulance were waiting for boarding in Slatina. The 19th Artillery Regiment, the Ammunition Division, the Relay Squadron and Remount Squadron of the 3rd Army Corps were on the march toward Ploiești. The 6th Division Headquarters embarked from Turnu-Măgurele and arrived in Focșani on the morning of 15/28 August 1913. The 7th Hunters Regiment, the 24th Infantry Regiment and the 12th Infantry Brigade arrived in Galați,

and the 11th Brigade and the 10th Infantry Brigade Headquarters arrived in Brăila, the 6th Artillery Brigade Headquarters and the 11th Artillery Regiment in Slatina, and the 16th Artillery Regiment was transported by train to Focșani, where the divisional ammunition column of the 6th Division also arrived. The ambulance of the 6th Division with the column of stretcher-bearers were in Turnu-Măgurele and the Relay Squadron in Slatina (Ib.).

The 1st Army Corps troops were following a predetermined route, so that the 1st Division was preparing to cross the Danube, the 2nd Division was carrying out the de-concentration marches, its headquarters arrived in Corabia, while the 26th Rovine Regiment and the 2nd Vâlcea Regiment were stopped at Islaz for medical observation, their troops being contaminated. The 4th Infantry Brigade and the 3rd Olt Regiment reached Plopi-Elizaveta on the direction Turnu-Măgurele-Slatina, the 19th Infantry Regiment, the 2nd Artillery Brigade Headquarters and the 9th Artillery Regiment reached Corabia. The Relay Squadron in Corabia and the Divisional Ammunition Column in Băneasa.

The services and troops of the 2nd Army Corps that were not part of any division were marching toward Bucharest. The 10th Roșiori Regiment was in Giurgiu waiting to board, the 2nd Remount Squadron was in Turnu-Măgurele, the 1st Divisional Ammunition Column of the Artillery Park was in Roșiorii de Vede from where it left for Pitești. The 6th Hunters Regiment and the 8th Infantry Brigade arrived with their barges at Oltenița, from where they marched to Bucharest. The 7th Infantry Brigade, which included the 5th and the 20th Infantry Regiments, entered the residential garrisons. The artillery and services of the 4th Division were marching toward Bucharest, on the evening of 13 August they arrived at Drăgănești, while the 3rd Division, whose troops were contaminated, was stopped at Zimnicea, held under medical observation (Ib., n.p.).

On 14/27 August 1913, all the troops of the 1st Cavalry Division were boarded and transported by rail to the garrisons of residence, except the 2nd Cavalry Brigade that was marching toward Bucharest, a point it reached on 17/30 August 1913. The 9th Roșiori Regiment from the brigade arrived in Turnu-Măgurele on 15/28 August 1913, from where it left for Bucharest, the march being planned in 3 or 4 stages, being expected to arrive in the capital on 18/31 or 19 August/1 September 1913. All units of the 2nd Cavalry Division reached garrisons, except the 10th Călărași Regiment that crossed to the left of the Danube at Zimnicea from where it boarded to Târgoviște, the 2nd Călărași Regiment was stopped at Drăgănești under medical observation. The 1st Reserve Division was marching toward Portărești-Segarcea,

the 2nd Călărași Regiment reached the garrison in Caracal, the 4th squadron of this regiment was at Portărești from where it left for Râmnicu-Vâlcea. The troops from Craiova garrison belonging to the 1st Reserve Division entered the city on 15/28 August 1913. The battalions from the Vâlcea Recruitment Circle embarked at Portărești and entered the garrison on 16/29 August 1913 and the battalions from the Olt Recruitment Circle embarked at Portărești and Segarcea and reached Slatina on 16/29 August 1913. The Pioneer Reserve Company and the Telegraphy Section boarded at Portărești on 16/29 August 1913 and entered Bucharest on 17/30 August 1913. The Divisional Ammunition Column embarked on 15/28 August 1913 at Portărești and Segarcea, arrived at Filiași on the night of 16/29 August 1913, from where it marched toward Târgu-Jiu. On 14/28 August 1913, one company from the Gorj Recruitment Circle, two platoons from the Dolj Recruitment Circle, two platoons from the Rovine Recruitment Circle, two companies from the 1st Hunters Regiment and two platoons from the 42nd Reserve Regiment were under medical observation at Segarcea, while the 2nd Reserve Division reached with all the troops in the garrisons of residence.

The troops and services of the 1st Army Corps crossed the Danube on 14/28 August 1913. The 1st Division was transported on the Danube, the 31st Infantry Regiment and the 17th Infantry Regiment, the 1st Hunters Regiment were on their way to Craiova, a city they entered on 15/28 August 1913, the rest of the troops arrived in Corabia. The 2nd Division Headquarters arrived in Craiova on the night of 14/27-15/28 August 1913. The 3rd Olt Regiment, the 14th Artillery Regiment and the Divisional Ammunition Column reached Slatina on 15/28 August 1913, together with the 19th Romanați Regiment. The 9th Artillery Regiment and the Relay Squadron reached Caracal on 15/28 August 1913. The Ambulance of the 2nd Division embarked and arrived in Craiova on 15/28 August 1913 (Ib.).

The services and troops of the 2nd Army Corps that were not part of any division marched to Bucharest, arriving on 15/28 August 1913. The 10th Roșiori Regiment arrived in Târgoviște by train on 15/28 August 1913. The 1st Divisional Ammunition Column of the Artillery Park reached Pitești on 15/28 August 1913. The 4th Division reported that the 7th Infantry Brigade entered the residential garrisons, the 8th Infantry Brigade, the 4th Artillery Brigade and the Division services entered Bucharest on 15/28 August 1913 (Ib.).

The troops and services of the 3rd Army Corps were stationed, on 14/27 August 1913, north of Turnu Măgurele, where they were waiting to be embarked on the railway, except the 3rd Pioneer Battalion that arrived in Brăila by the barge

on the Danube. The 5th Division Command arrived in Buzău on the same day, while the 3rd Hunters Regiment, the 9th Infantry Brigade embarked at Turnu Măgurele, with the destination Ploiești, where they arrived on 15/28 August 1913. The 2nd Battalion of the 7th Infantry Regiment was kept under medical observation, the 8th Buzău Regiment embarked in Braila to Buzău, where it arrived on 15/28 August 1913, and the 9th Infantry Regiment was marching from Brăila to Râmnicu Sărat, where it arrived on 16/29 August 1913. The 7th Artillery Regiment was stationed in Slatina, where it was waiting to embark, the 19th Artillery Regiment arrived at Băneasa, while the Divisional Ammunition Column was stopped under medical observation at Alexandria. The Relay Squadron and the Remount Squadron arrived at Băneasa. The 6th Division Headquarters reached Focșani on 15/28 August 1913, and the 10th Putna Regiment on 16/29 August. The 24th Tecuci Regiment reached the garrison on 16/29 August 1913, the 12th Cantemir Regiment reached Bârlad on 14/27 August 1913, the 16th Artillery Regiment reached Focșani on 16/29 August 1913, while the 11th Artillery Regiment and the Relay Squadron were waiting in Slatina and the Divisional Ambulance in Turnu Măgurele to embark toward the garrison. The 4th Army Corps was kept under medical observation north of Zimnicea (Ib.).

On 15/28 August 1913, the operational armed forces had evacuated almost completely the territory of Bulgaria, with the presence of two Romanian detachments being reported at Nicopolis and Șiștov. On that day, the 7th Division of the 4th Army Corps and the 33rd Reserve Infantry Brigade crossed the Danube at Șiștov-Zimnicea (Ib.).

At that time, there were kept, on the left bank of the Danube, under medical observation, in Segarcea, troops of the 1st Army Corps and the 1st Reserve Division, namely, one company and half of the 41st Infantry Reserve Regiment, two platoons from the 42nd Infantry Reserve Regiment, two platoons from the 43rd Infantry Reserve Regiment, in Corabia, two companies from the 1st Hunters Regiment, the 1st Dolj Infantry Regiment, north of Islaz, the 2nd Vâlcea Infantry Regiment and the 26th Rovine Infantry Regiment. Also under medical observation were kept troops of the 2nd Army Corps, such as the 3rd Infantry Division, north of Zimnicea, the 15th Artillery Regiment, north of Năsturel, the 6th Artillery Regiment and the Ambulance of the 3rd Division, south-east of Găuriciu, the 3rd Divisional Ammunition Column, north-west of Găujani. The 3rd Army Corps had under medical observation the troops of the 5th Roșiori Regiment, south of Segarcea din Vale, one battalion from the 7th Prahova Regiment, west of Odăi, and the Divisional Ammunition Column of the 5th Division, in Alexandria. The 4th Army Corps had the following troops stopped

for the sanitary inspection: The 7th Division, north of Zimnicea, the 8th Division, south of Bragadiru, and the services of the Corps, north of Bujoru-Petrișu. The 2nd Cavalry Division had the 3rd Călărași Regiment under observation in Drăgănești (Ib.).

On the evening of 15/28 August 1913, the 1st Cavalry Division was on its de-concentration march, the 1st Cavalry Brigade was on its way, by rail, to Mărăsești and Bârlad, the 2nd Cavalry Brigade was marching toward Bucharest and the 9th Roșiori Regiment reached Turnu Măgurele, while the Mounted Artillery Division reached Galați and its ammunition column was scheduled to reach on 16/29 August 1913. The 2nd Cavalry Division was with all its troops in the garrisons of residence. The 10th Călărași Regiment was marching to Giurgiu, from where it was going to embark on the railway to the garrison. The 3rd Călărași Regiment was under medical observation at Drăgănești, the 1st Reserve Division reached the Craiova garrison, the troops belonging to the recruitment circles Vâlcea, Gorj and Olt embarked on the railway in the stations Portărești, Segarcea toward the residential garrisons where they arrived on 16/29 August 1913 (Ib.).

As for the situation of the troops of the 1st Army Corps, , on 15 August 1913, its services were marching from Islaz to Corabia, except for the 1st Pioneer Battalion that embarked on barges for Oltenița from where it started marching to Bucharest. The Wireless Telegraphy and Projectors Section reached Bucharest while the Mountain Artillery Division was boarding the railway on its way to the capital. The Commander of the 1st Division reported that the 17th and the 31st Infantry Regiments arrived on 15/28 August in garrisons, the 1st Dolj Regiment was kept under medical observation in Corabia, the 18th Gorj Regiment and the 5th Artillery Regiment were on their way to Târgu Jiu, the 1st Artillery Regiment was marching toward Caracal with the destination Craiova, while the Divisional Ammunition Column was waiting in Corabia for the train to Târgu Jiu, with the destination Craiova, and the Relay Squadron arrived on march to Caracal. Regarding the situation of the 2nd Division, on 15/28 August 1913, all the troops were in the respective garrisons except the troops stopped for medical observation. The 9th Artillery Regiment reached Zănoaga, being scheduled to enter Craiova garrison on 16/29 August 1913 (Ib.).

The troops and services of the 2nd Army Corps that were not part of any division were, on the evening of 15/28 August 1913, stationed in their garrisons, while the 3rd Division was kept under medical observation. The 4th Division reported that all troops and services had reached garrisons (Ib.).

The troops and services of the 3rd Army Corps that were not part of any division were stationed north-west of Turnu Măgurele, where they were waiting for transportation by rail to the garrisons. Thus, the 5th Division Headquarters, the 3rd Hunters Regiment and the 9th Infantry Brigade were already boarded and transported by rail from Turnu-Măgurele to Ploiești and Buzău, while the 2nd Battalion of the 7th Infantry Regiment was kept under medical observation. The 7th Artillery Regiment was stationed in Slatina to embark. The 19th Artillery Regiment, the Relay Squadron and the 3rd Remount Squadron were taking a rest for one day near Bucharest. The Divisional Ammunition Column was kept under medical observation in Alexandria. The 6th Division Headquarters reached Focșani, the 10th Putna Regiment and the 24th Tecuci Regiment were marching from Brăila to Galați. The 11th Artillery Regiment boarded from Slatina for rail transport to Focșani, and the 16th Artillery Regiment was on the train to Focșani, a point reached on 16/29 August 1913, while the 6th Division Ambulance was waiting for boarding at Turnu-Măgurele and the Relay Squadron was waiting in Slatina (Ib.).

The 4th Army Corps was kept under medical observation and the 33rd Reserve Infantry Brigade crossed the Danube on the bridge from Șistov-Zimnicea with two regiments, the third regiment was waiting to cross the next day, namely 16/29 August 1913.

CONCLUSIONS.

ROMANIA – A REGIONAL STATUS-QUO POWER WITH INSUFFICIENT RESOURCES

Romania quickly intervened in the conflict zone, in line with the commitment made to the great powers, to contribute to the restoration of peace in the Balkans. For Bulgaria, caught between two fronts, it was difficult to cope with the third front opened by Romania, given that, at the moment of the Romanian intervention, Bulgaria had stabilized the situation on the two fronts. The Romanian armed forces deployed the troops according to the established plan, respecting the political commitments assumed by Romania toward the international community.

I appreciate that the Romanian Armed Forces, modernized and equipped as a result of the efforts made in the years preceding the conflict, played a decisive role in the victory against Bulgaria, by opening a new front in the north, given that the Bulgarian troops, having fought in the First Balkan War, were concentrated in the south and east, thus contributing to the increase of Romania's prestige, whose strategic importance, in the context of the complicated situation in the Balkan Peninsula, was reconsidered.

However, the campaign in Bulgaria in 1913 highlighted the poor operational state of the armed forces, while at the same time there were great shortages in sanitary materials. With all the cholera epidemic protection measures taken as part of the evacuation operations, the number of troops infected was over 4,800. In terms of training, equipment and cohesion between the echelons, there were significant gaps.

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