The military measures established by the Paris Peace Treaty of 10 February 1947 considerably diminished the Romanian Armed Forces combat capacity. The international diplomatic document stipulated that the armed forces should not exceed 138,000 troops, the number of military aircraft was reduced to 150, of which 100 were fighter jets, and the Navy was forbidden to have submarines and torpedoes in the inventory.

Moreover, the Navy could be staffed with a maximum of 5,000 people, and the value of the total tonnage of the ships could not exceed 15,000 TDW.

Starting in 1948, the Romanian People’s Republic Armed Forces were reorganised, in compliance with the impositions of the Allied Control Commission (Soviet Party) and the provisions of the Paris Peace Treaty.

In this context, the Navy, together with the Navy Command as a higher echelon, had a new organisation, which also took into account the budgetary problems Romania had to face after the Second World War.

Keywords: Navy; littoral defence; combat ships; combat training; Paris Peace Treaty;
INTRODUCTION

The proclamation of the Romanian People’s Republic on 30 December 1947 brought about organisational changes to the leadership of the Navy. Thus, based on the Order of the Ministry of National Defence (MND) no. 510919 on 5 January 1948, communicated by the Navy Commander Order of the Day no. 86 on 8 January 1948, the names of the Royal Navy and the Royal Navy Command were replaced with the Navy and the Navy Command respectively (Glodarenco, Croitoru, Vochițu, Stan & Rîșnoveanu, 2010, p. 230).

Starting in 1948, with the establishment of the regime of popular democracy in Romania, the new military authorities in Bucharest began to develop a new doctrine of the country defence, based on the lessons learned from the Romanian Armed Forces participation in the Second World War.

The Ministry of National Defence interest in reorganising the Navy got evident on 3 August 1948 when the Minister of National Defence, Colonel General Emil Bodnăraş, inspected the Navy vessels and units in Constanţa and had meetings with all high-rank officers on board LIBERTATEA (AMNR, f. 229).

Thus, the Minister of National Defence ordered the officers of the Great General Staff to develop the hypotheses in which Romania could have been in the event of a possible conflict. Based on those hypotheses, the specialists from the Undersecretariat of the Navy developed a plan for the equipment, training and political preparation of the Navy, achievable within a maximum of 10 years, provided that it was anticipated a combined (sea, land and air) enemy attack (Moşneagu, 2006, p. 240).

It is interesting that, without going into details related to the procurement needs in terms of combat ships, naval equipment and ammunition, as well as the arrangement of fortified points on the entire Romanian Black Sea coastal area, the total cost of the plan was estimated to amount to 91,930,000,000 lei (AMNR, ff. 164, 197-219; Moşneagu, p. 244).
Given the increasingly strain economic, diplomatic, political and military relations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America, and, consequently, between the alliances that were led by the two great powers, the leadership of the Navy Command suggested the establishment of two Large Units for the execution of specific missions. The areas of responsibility were the coastal area and the national waters of the Black Sea basin and the river area defence respectively.

**THE NAVY ADMINISTRATIVE REORGANISATION**

On 7 April 1948, Commander Eugen Săvulescu, in his capacity as Chief of the Navy, sent to the Minister of National Defence a Memorandum on the problems of the naval forces, which stated, among other things, that “... an aero-naval action in this sea (the Black Sea, A.N.), followed by a landing, would take the attackers directly to the territory of the Soviet Union, the main bastion of democratic forces. The whole of Dobrogea can be a huge bridgehead, whose important points can be occupied in a few hours by mechanised vehicles and paratroopers. A landing at this place would intercept the Danube artery, the most important means of communication between the USSR and its Balkan allies. Finally, a landing in Dobrogea would cut the connection between the USSR and the popular republics of the Balkans, which could be expected as a producer of maximum political effects. Thus, in conclusion, the maritime coast of Romania is on the forefront of importance in the event of a conflict. The essential mission of the Romanian Navy is therefore to defend this coast against such an eventuality”. (Moșneagu, p. 245).

As for the administrative reorganisation, in September 1948, the Navy became a Region, meaning that warehouses and subsistence centres were established as it should be capable of self-management in terms of food, equipment and accommodation.

In compliance with the Order of the Great General Staff no. 512990/1950, between 18 and 24 January 1950, the Navy Command organised in Constanța a convocation of the Navy large units in Dobrogea. During the convocation it was executed a war game on the map having the theme *Defence of a littoral portion*. The war game was commanded by Commander Emil Grecescu, who was the Navy Commander. Based on the exercise conclusions, the Navy Command Staff developed the *Instructions for the littoral defence*. 

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In compliance with the *Action Plan for the littoral defence*, a strictly secret document of the Navy Command, issued on 7 February 1949, the Navy represented the main structure within the Ministry of National Defence whose fundamental mission was to deny a possible aero-naval enemy landing on the Romanian Black Sea littoral as well as an enemy forces inflow in order to force the Danube crossing on the general direction Bucharest.

Under such circumstances, between 26 January and 2 February 1950, Colonel General Emil Bodnăraș, in his capacity of Minister of National Defence, accompanied by a group of officers from the superior echelon, executed a control mission at the units and large units subordinated to the Navy Command, examining a series of aspects related to “the combat capacity, the progress of combat and political training, as well as the administration of the commands and units belonging to the Maritime Forces, the Naval Force, the Littoral Defence and the 25th Moto Brigade” (AMNR, c. 351).

Following the examination, the communist minister issued, on 21 March 1950, the *Order of the Minister of National Defence of the Romanian People’s Republic* no. 10, a document structured on six great themes, namely: “the Situation of the units organisation and combat capability, the Combat and political training, the State of the armament and combat technical assets, the Administration and service in the units, the Political-moral and disciplinary condition and the Control and assistance provided by superiors to the units” (Ib.), presenting the Navy organisation as well as its combat and intervention capability in the event of a foreign aggression in the area of the Romanian Black Sea littoral in gloomy words.

The document presented, in the first part, the fact that the inspection performed by the officers of the central apparatus of the Ministry of National Defence revealed a totally unsatisfactory state of affairs in terms of the units combat capability, as well as “serious deficiencies in the corps service, in the administration and the training” (Ib.). Exceptions to this situation were the 25th Moto Brigade, as well as the 75th Artillery Division in Sector 3 of the Littoral Defence, which “presented themselves somewhat better in terms of combat and political training” (Ib.).

It is interesting that, according to the high communist military dignitary, the great deficiencies discovered in the large units...
and units deployed in Dobrogea were caused, first of all, by the lack of responsibility and the inactivity considered “condemnable of several higher hierarchical leaders” (Ib.) within the Maritime Forces, the Naval Force and the Littoral Defence.

Also, Colonel General Emil Bodnăraş considered that the Great General Staff, the Navy Command, as well as “some central bodies of the Ministry of National Defence did not make the necessary effort to raise the combat capacity of the units in Dobrogea”. Moreover, he considered that in commands and units there was often “a formal and bureaucratic command, along with a lack of initiative at work”, which led to “the harmful practice of always waiting for orders from above” (Ib., pp. 351-352).

Thus, in the first chapter, the Situation of the units organisation and combat capability, the Minister of National Defence made an objective presentation of the combat capability as well as of the organisation of the units and large units of the Navy Command that ensured the littoral defence and, implicitly, the denial of a possible enemy advance on the general direction Muntenia Plain-Bucharest.

The first problem identified in the document was represented by the fact that neither the Maritime Forces Command nor its Staff had a plan for the littoral defence and the necessary topographical maps, meaning that “the subordinate units did not make any effort in that direction” (Ib.).

Even worse was the fact that, according to the report, there was no alarm plan or instruction in any unit stating “where and how long should take the unit or subunit to get assembled, what areas or positions it should occupy, the necessary quantities of ammunition and food, the officers transportation, organisation and means of communication etc.” (c. 352).

Also, the permanent fortification works, which were built along the Romanian Black Sea coastal area, were not yet assigned to the subunits that guarded the coast, their commanders not even having plans for those works in the sectors they had under control. Moreover, the machine gun battalions, as well as the independent artillery divisions, which were part of the Littoral Defence sectors, did not have their locations fixed and arranged.

At the large units subordinated to the Navy Command, the organisation left much to be desired, too. Thus, in the opinion
of Colonel General Emil Bodnăraș, the deployment of the 25th Moto Brigade, as well as of the Command of Sector 2 of the Littoral Defence did not meet the operational needs, and the brigade units, equipped with 45 mm and 57 mm cannons as well as with 122 mm howitzers, did not have the ammunition necessary for the execution of the mission assigned to them.

The report also contained a number of details related to the mismanagement of human resources within the 25th Moto Brigade: “... older and newer people are assigned to separate subunits instead of the older forming the backbone of groups, teams of servants and crews – although I have given precise instructions in this regard. Due to these shortcomings, the combat capability of the units and subunits decreases” (cc. 352-353).

There were also shortcomings because in the order of battle of the staff of the tank and moto infantry units and subunits the function of technical deputy was not provided, and in the independent motorised infantry battalions the political apparatus was not provided either. The medical staff was also insufficient, and the company platoon members were not provided in the order of battle of any unit. However, the aspect that bothered the highest military official the most was the fact that “no commander had the initiative to raise the issue of eliminating these shortcomings in the organisation of the units” (c. 353).

Negative aspects were also identified in terms of radio transmissions. Thus, the units that had the Romanian Black Sea littoral as area of responsibility had completely insufficient radio means, and the wire transmissions between Bucharest and Constanța did not function properly, not meeting the technical conditions necessary to ensure secure, operational and permanent connections.

The dissatisfaction of the Minister of National Defence was also related to the fact that, during that inspection, the large units and units deployed in Dobrogea did not present the scheme of radio and wired connections, considered a “basic operational document” (cc. 352-353).

In the second part, the Combat and political training, the general idea of the report was that the planning of combat and political training was satisfactory. However, the Navy Command Staff did not meet the requirements and “did not understand the organisational role of planning”. That was the reason why the Minister of National Defence
noted that “instead of meticulously executing creative planning work, it was content with mechanically transmitting the provisions of the central bodies directives, without taking into account the real possibilities and the specific conditions of the subordinate units” (c. 353).

As for the combat training of officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers in the staff of large units and units deployed in the province between the Danube and the Black Sea, the conclusions of the report, presented objectively, were pretty gloomy.

It emerged from the document that the training of the staff in commands and units was not planned and, consequently, was not conducted, which is why “the staffs do not present themselves as cohesive management bodies” (Ib.). It is interesting that the same state of affairs was found in the training of the Naval Force personnel. The reason for that situation, as identified in the report, was that the commanders did no show exigency and did not create the necessary conditions for individual study and, consequently, for the good military and political training of the officers in any of the units.

However, not only the professional training of the officers but also the combat training of the conscripts was precarious, given that “preserving the obsolete methods in all branches, only the infantry combat training was executed, without providing the elementary notions specific to the respective branch. This fact contributed to a significant decrease in the units combat capability” (Ib.). That situation was complemented by the fact that no unit was prepared for the night actions, the coastal batteries lacking the necessary facilities for such a purpose.

According to the document, the quality of the combat training of troops and cadres was lower than modern requirements, “because of the poor methodological training of the cadres and the insufficient combat training assets” (Ib.). Thus, some of the reasons that led to that state of affairs were identified. The document explained that in the case of the training conducted with a platoon-level subunit, 1-2 soldiers were trained, preferably among those who had graduated at least seven primary classes, while the rest of the soldiers watched! The same thing happened with company-level training, only one platoon being trained, with battalion-level training, only a company receiving basic training, or with regiment-level units, only a battalion being trained.
The exception was the Artillery Division, commanded by Captain Mihalache, whose area of responsibility was the 3rd Sector Littoral Defence, “where this issue was understood correctly and where the soldiers were provided from the beginning with the necessary minimum of specialised training” (c. 354).

As for the equipment, the Minister of National Defence highlighted the fact that, during the combat training, the didactic material and the devices were used very rarely, the weapons recognition classes being conducted only theoretically. Moreover, in the tank battalion, subordinated to the 25th Moto Brigade, the entire training process was conducted with German-made tanks and trucks, left on the Romanian territory during the withdrawal of Wehrmacht troops, “although the unit has new Soviet weapons, which are kept, without any justification, in the warehouse” (Ib.).

Interesting are the conclusions reached by Colonel General Emil Bodnăraș, in his capacity as Minister of National Defence, in connection with the combat training of large units and units deployed in Dobrogea: “All the mentioned aspects have led to the troops poor individual training under all circumstances and to slow progress in the cadres training” (c. 355).

In the third chapter of Report no. 10, namely the State of the armament and the technical combat assets, it was highlighted the difficult situation of the armament and the combat technical assets in the inventory of the large units and units inspected by the high communist official. A first conclusion referred to the fact that neither the troops nor the officers were educated “in the spirit of love for their weapons”, which is why maintenance work was done in unsatisfactory conditions, a situation encountered especially in the 12th Artillery Regiment and on the ships of the Naval Force. The mentioned aspect was also noted in the case of the 25th Moto Brigade, where “old tanks are poorly maintained” (Ib.).

Another unacceptable situation for Emil Bodnăraș referred to the fact that the artillery material, the reconnaissance devices, as well as the optical devices were improperly kept, preserved and maintained, being stored in rooms exposed to sudden temperature variations. Exceptions were the 12th Artillery Regiment and the independent 75th Artillery Division, where the maintenance of specific materials was executed satisfactorily. Those shortcomings were also the result
of the fact that, in the inspected units, there was no regular control of weapons and ammunition by hierarchical chiefs, starting with cannon or group commanders.

Moreover, no unit had an armament repair plan, which is why there were significant quantities of armament with technical failures. At the 25th Moto Battalion, the 28th Moto Battalion, as well as at the 34th Tank Battalion, there were no armour workshops, no master gunsmiths or mechanics.

A special situation was identified at the ammunition depots in Tulcea, where the order and control of the evidence and maintenance of the stored materials were not ensured, especially in the torpedo warehouses (cc. 355-356).

The fourth part, the Administration and service in the units, presents issues regarding the way in which the commanders coordinated the services of the subordinate large units and units. Following the inspection, a totally unsatisfactory state of affairs was identified regarding the performance of the self-service in the barracks of the units, the sanitary service, as well as the guard service.

The Minister of National Defence found that, in most cases, the barracks were satisfactorily maintained, except for the barracks of the Marine Infantry Battalion and the gunboat GHICULESCU, where, “due to lack of care for people, it is cold, dirty and wet” (Ib.).

A serious problem facing all the garrisons deployed in the Trans-Danubian province was the accommodation of officers, which, according to the Minister of National Defence, was “completely unsatisfactory” (ib.), especially for the 30 December 1949 graduates.

The young officers living in the barracks did not have recreational facilities, did not eat enough, did not have the necessary furniture for their livelihood and did not have heat and light. On the other hand, the accommodation of the young officers in the city did not benefit from the support of their commanders and political deputies, who thus showed “a total lack of political understanding of the issue”. Under such circumstances, the report suggested that, “because of the mentioned aspects, officers often find their homes in a hostile environment” (Ib.).

The conditions were not better in the barracks either. According to the document, in most of the bedrooms it was a mess, the weapons were not arranged in racks, backpacks and other uniform items were stored in disorder, not distributed to people, while under the mattresses
and pillows were kept various military objects, and in the warehouses, shoes and cartridges were covered with mould. Also, the appearance of the troops was sloppy. Thus, the military did not have their hair properly cut, the equipment was unadjusted, the epaulettes were not fastened regularly, and “the caps were not matched by colour” (Ib.).

Another finding was related to the way the troops were fed. Following the control, it was found that “the food of the people during the inspection was generally satisfactory, although it is prepared, almost everywhere, in unhygienic conditions. The tables on which the food is prepared are dirty, which can lead, especially with the arrival of spring, to intoxications” (Ib.).

The food preparation process was also inappropriate: “The food distributed daily is not divided according to the menu, by dishes. This important food problem is solved only by the cook, as he can. There is no day service in the kitchen and no sanitary control of food preparation is organised. Military camp kitchens – expensive assets – are left in a state of reprehensible dirt after use” (cc. 356-357).

With regard to the healthcare service, the Minister of National Defence considered that it was operating in “primitive conditions” (Ib.), all units lacking doctors and nurses. That state of affairs was felt, especially, in the Littoral Defence sectors, where the units and subunits were dispersed. Moreover, there were no pharmacies inside the units, which is why the officers had to travel tens of kilometres to buy medicines.

Also, because of the lack of medical staff and appropriate facilities, the outpatient and inpatient treatment was “completely uncivilised” (Ib.).

Particular attention was paid to the guard service performed in the large units and units deployed in Dobrogea, its importance being underestimated. The guard service was organised only formally, and the guard corps were not properly arranged and did not have the proper documentation. A special situation was identified at the 12th Artillery Regiment, where the guard corps was installed in a passage room.

In addition, at the guard corps, the sanitary control was not ensured, and the sentries received war ammunition only during the night (c. 357).
Given that the Romanian Armed Forces underwent an aggressive and continuous process of politicisation, with the establishment of a totalitarian political regime on 30 December 1947, it is clear that Colonel General Emil Bodnăraș, in his capacity as Minister of National Defence, during the inspection of the large units and units deployed in the province between the Danube and the Black Sea, paid special attention to the political and ideological training, as evidenced by the fifth part of his report, the Political-moral and disciplinary condition. From the beginning, the high communist official's conclusion was that “the Marxist-Leninist training of officers and the political education of troops are conducted at a low ideological level” (Ib.).

It was further stated that the daily reading of newspapers with troops and officers, one of the most important activities conducted in the armed forces, was not done in an organised manner, and other means of education, such as cinema, radio or conferences, were “rarely used” (Ib.).

A critical attitude was also directed at the units and subunits commanders who “perform almost no educational work”, which was why “party political work is often performed formally, independent of the concrete tasks of units and subunits” (cc. 357-358).

The high military dignitary from Bucharest also brought serious criticism to the upper echelons, showing that “this situation is aggravated by the lack of organised and systematic work by the upper echelons to raise the level of training of the units political leaders, party and youth organisations secretaries, and especially by their absence from the field, to show how the work should be done on site” (Ib.).

Regarding this aspect, namely the non-involvement of decision-makers at the level of large units, Emil Bodnăraș noted that most bodies with political responsibilities had not given up the practice of leading from the office by written orders and directives, without going to units. The conclusion expressed was that, for those reasons, “the company and the battery have not become the centre of political and party work, in which the success of combat training and the education of soldiers is decided. The same was the reason why almost no one knows the true political-moral state of the soldiers and cadres” (c. 358).

Another interesting remark in the report is that, “in order to be able to go to shows in an organised way, they pay with their own money”,
given that “the units have no material for political and cultural work and no funds to cover these needs” (Ib.).

The Minister of National Defence made particularly critical, even acid, remarks regarding the issue of discipline, which “did not reach the required level” (Ib.). In his view, in the inspected units, the commanders, the political apparatus, the party and youth organisations did not make sufficient efforts to establish perfect order and military discipline, given that commanders of all ranks did not show exigency. Moreover, “sometimes they fall into familiarity and intimacy” (Ib.). That is why such an attitude has led, in units, to deviations from discipline, accidents and “an excessive number of immoral acts” (Ib.).

The tradition of false reporting, brought to the level of state policy in Romania in the 1980s, occurred since the establishment of the regime of popular democracy. Thus, according to the text of the report prepared by Emil Bodnăraș, “in many units it has frequently become a shameful habit to lie when reporting, either by troops or officers. Sometimes, such false reports were patronised even by the commanders and political officers” (Ib.), especially in the 20th AD Division or the 26th Independent Moto Infantry Battalion. But the most interesting remark of the Minister of National Defence was related to the fact that there were still units whose political deputies were not party members, which was considered unacceptable by the high military dignitary.

In the sixth part, the Control and assistance provided by superiors to the units, it was presented that in all inspected large units and units, there was no “planned control and work support”, the motivation of the commanders being that “the appropriate directives by which to specify who and to what extent the control functions are exercised in the Navy have not been received from the superior echelons” (Ib.). Also, the inspections performed in an unorganised and superficial manner resulted in ignoring the state and organisation of the units, the most eloquent examples being that of Commander Dumitracă and Commander Moșor, completely missing the personal example given to subordinates (c. 359).

Under such circumstances, following the inspection conducted at the large units and units subordinated to the Navy Command deployed in the province between the Danube and the Black Sea, the Minister of National Defence, Colonel General Emil Bodnăraș, issued an Order
to solve the problems identified and to thus improve the combat capability of both the Navy and the subordinate land forces, which had the mission to ensure the defence of the Romanian littoral area.

* * *

To eliminate the shortcomings that were found,

I ORDER:

1. The commanders of the Navy large units and units must remove the deficiencies listed in this order, according to the instructions we provided on site.

   The Chief of the Navy, Commander Grecescu Emil, must report the order execution until 5 April 1950.

   The Commanders of the Military Districts must eliminate in the subordinate units the similar deficiencies listed in this order.

2. Contrary to my verbal instructions, the Z.B. gun must stand on the rack with the lock closed and the spring released. In order to avoid possible accidents in the control of weapons, the commanders of the units will give instructions on the inspection of the weapons warehouses before they are placed in the rack.

3. Commanders, staffs and political bodies of all ranks must take immediate and decisive action to ensure that the units capability and combat preparation are raised.

   A high-quality leadership must be achieved, using as a basic method in the support given to the subordinates the personal example and the guidance of the work on site.

4. To ensure a planned control, according to the orders in force for the Land Forces, the Navy large units and units are assimilated as follows:

   - the Navy Command with the Military District;
   - the Maritime Forces Command with the Army Corps;
   - the Littoral Defence Command with the Division;
   - the Naval Force Command and the 25th Moto Brigade with the Division;
   - the Maritime Sectors Command with the Regiment.

5. To raise the level of combat readiness of the units, the commanders of large units and units must regularly execute training alarms by taking the units out of the garrisons, in the field or in the
areas of responsibility. Typically, these alarms must be combined with the execution of scheduled tactical themes.

By 31 March 1950, the Chief of the Great General Staff shall send instructions to the units on how to execute the training and combat alarms.

By the same date the units deployed in Dobrogea must be provided with topographical maps.

The Deputy Minister for the Armed Forces Quartermaster issues must ensure within the set term the construction in Dobrogea of the barracks necessary for the new deployment of the units of the 25th Moto Brigade.

6. In matters of combat readiness and political education, the organisation and methods of teaching must be radically improved.

To this end, the planned demonstration sessions and the daily training to improve the political work of the cadres must be employed.

The training of officers and staffs of all services must be optimised without delay, it being the main task of combat training.

Not a single minute must be lost during the training of staff officers and subunits, and the entire staff must perform practical training in the actions provided for in the regulations in a proportion of at least 80% during combat training. At the basis of the whole preparation must be the requirement “to learn only what is required in war”.

Special attention must be paid to the training of officers, non-commissioned officers and enlisted personnel, creating the necessary conditions for this goal.

The subunits and staffs of the units and large units must keep daily records of the progress of combat training. The data of these records should be analysed in order to draw the necessary lessons in order to improve the methods applied in the work.

The head of the Combat Training Directorate must develop and deliver to the units by 5 April 1950 the forms for keeping records of combat training by company (battery), battalion, regiment, division, district, separately for soldiers and non-commissioned officers and separately for officers and staffs, with the necessary instructions for filling in them.

7. The Commanders of the Large Units and the Political Deputies must decisively begin to improve the quality of the work of the political bodies, of the party and youth organisations. The political and party work must be combined with the daily tasks of the units.
An attitude of intransigence towards those who commit violations of military discipline must be adopted.

A decisive fight must be declared against the lack of responsibility, against the lack of initiative and against the lack of the spirit of organisation at work.

Troops must be educated every day in the spirit of devotion to the Romanian Workers Party and the Motherland, of love and devotion to the Soviet Union, as well as of irreconcilable hatred towards the enemies of democracy and socialism.

**The Head of the Superior Political Directorate:**

Must review by 1 May 1950 the staffing of the political apparatus, complete it and remove the elements that do not meet the requirements.

Until 5 April 1950 he must radically change the work system of the political bodies and the political apparatus, so that it could be closer to the life of the company, battery and squadron, where the success of the combat training, military and political education is decided.

Immediate measures must be taken to raise the preparation of the political apparatus cadres.

The supply of the units with political-cultural materials must be improved and the necessary funds to meet these needs must be ensured.

**8. The Armed Forces Artillery Commander:**

Must develop and submit by 15 April 1950 instructions on:

a. The periodical data to execute the control of the armament and ammunitions by all hierarchical chiefs, starting with the group commander.

b. The inspection and adjustment of infantry armament.

c. The establishment of the order of fixing the infantry and artillery armament.

d. The maintenance and storage of all categories of armament.

During April it must be executed in the armed forces artillery range a practical demonstration to establish the standard deviation of the artillery armament and to check the line of sight of the infantry armament, for which 3 officers will be assigned from each unit, the heads of the Armed Forces Armoured Service included.

By that date too, it must be checked the extent to which all the armed forces units are provided with armour workshops, and measures
must be taken to establish such workshops where there is a lack in them.

9. The Deputy Minister for the Armed Forces Quartermaster issues must submit until 15 April 1950 concrete proposals for:
   a. Reorganising the sanitary service in the armed forces.
   b. Radically improving the units kitchens and the food preparation system.
   c. Using and maintaining the camp kitchens.
   d. Gradually providing the barracks with tables, chairs, wardrobes and racks.
   e. Introducing order in the armed forces vehicles system.

10. The Chief of the Great General Staff until 1 May 1950:
   a. Must ensure the provision of the units with new regulations for the “Interior Service”, “Garrison Service” and “Discipline”.
   b. Must introduce in the order of battle of tank and moto units and subunits as well as in that of the commands and large units of all branches the position of technical deputy.
   c. Based on the proposals of the Artillery and Tank Corps Commands, there must be introduced in the order of battle of the units repair workshops for the infantry armament, artillery armament, vehicles and tanks, where there is a lack in them and they are necessary.
   d. Must organise and ensure during May the control of the present order execution in the units deployed in Dobrogea (cc. 359-363).

CONCLUSIONS

At the end of the Order of the Minister of National Defence of the Romanian People’s Republic no. 10 on 21 March 1950, Colonel General Emil Bodnăraș took a series of measures against those commanders of large units and units whose activity generated dysfunctions both in the command act and in the structures they commanded. He also congratulated and rewarded the commanders of large units and units that achieved good results in the process of military and political training.

Thus, Colonel Colceag, Commander of the 25th Moto Brigade, as well as Captain Mihalache, Commander of the Artillery Division in Sector 3 of the Littoral Defence, were mentioned in the Armed Forces
Order of the Day for “the good results obtained in the combat training of subordinate units and for initiative at work” (c. 363).

Instead, Commander Aurel Dumitrache, Chief of Staff of the Maritime Forces, and Commander Nicolae Moșor, Commander of the Littoral Defence, were made available to Armed Forces Personnel Directorate “for lack of responsibility in the performance of their duties, which led to the decrease in the combat capability of the subordinate units” (lb.).

Commander Corneliu Lungu, Commander of the Naval Forces, and Lieutenant Commander Florea Diaconu, political deputy of the Maritime Forces Command, were notified, “because they did not take severe measures to strengthen order in units” (Ib.).

However, more important is the fact that such disciplinary measures were taken at the highest level. Thus, Commander Emil Grecescu, Commander of the Navy, and Colonel Ion Enescu, Political Deputy, were informed about “the poor leadership and lack of assistance in work to subordinate units” (c. 363).

In conclusion, we may say that, in the first years after the establishment of popular democracy in Romania, the Romanian Armed Forces faced multiple problems related to the equipment, training, supply and organisation, under the circumstances of the development of an extensive programme of the military body politization.

During 1948 and 1950, following special financial and organisational efforts, 70% of the artillery and 60% of the infantry assets were repaired. However, most of the weapons continued to be in a state of degradation and could not be used either in the training process or in the event of a conflict to which Romania would have been a party.

One of the problems identified by the communist minister was related to the precariousness of the means of transport in operation, at the level of the entire armed forces in a percentage of only 10%, their reparation being particularly difficult.

The supply of the Romanian Armed Forces was at an unsatisfactory level if we take into account the provision of the necessary equipment. Thus, for peacetime establishment, the equipment was provided as follows: 75% for small equipment, 100% for clothing and barracks, and 52% for large equipment.

Regarding the provision of healthcare, important medicines were 100% missing, while dental facilities were 86% insured, and surgical furniture and appliances had a coverage of 40-50% (Duțu, 2016, p. 26).
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