SECURITY CULTURE – CONSTRUCTIVIST CONCEPTUAL OPERATIONALISATION ESSAY –

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Hybrid warfare, a current reality, impossible to assimilate in doctrinal apparatuses and field manuals, requires a translation of the issue from the military level to the societal level and an attempt to operationalise, starting from the latter level and from the concept of "security culture", the appropriate response of society to hybrid threats. In current security research, the concept of "security culture", normatively designed through the two most recent national defence strategies (2015-2019 and 2020-2024), is most often used as a vague, even ambiguous, term, despite the normative definition in the National Defence Strategy 2015-2019 Guidance. "The totality of values, norms, attitudes and actions that determine the understanding and assimilation at the level of society of the concept of security and derived concepts" (NDS Guidance, 2015, p. 7) is not an exhaustive definition. In security studies, where the "security culture" operates as a variable subject to precise further measurements, conceptual operationalisation is required. This article is aimed at operationalising the concept so that it could be properly used in future studies, starting from the dimensions proposed by Alexander Siedschlag (2018) based on the categories identified by Peter Katzenstein (1996), filtered according to the local cultural pattern.

Keywords: security culture; conceptual operationalisation; constructivism; National Defence Strategy; norms and regulations;

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INTRODUCTION. WHAT IS THE USE
OF SECURITY CULTURE IN THE CONTEXT
OF HYBRID THREATS?

Against the background of a high interest from researchers and practitioners in relation to the term *hybrid warfare* – the original English term including the whole series of conceptual developments, thus not involving associated meanings, as it is the case of the Romanian term *war*[1] –, a diffuse and all-encompassing term in itself, invoked in numerous studies and debate contexts, the problem of countering it, namely the set of coordinated hybrid measures, arises. While non-state actors rarely develop hybrid strategies, important state-actors – for example, Russia – propose such strategies, mimicking defensive actions and accusing the West of intimidating actions, which can be

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[1] With regard to the Romanian concept of *war*, defined in accordance with Gaston Bouthoul's perspective (which probably needs adjustments to meet the major changes in conducting military actions, especially as a result of the unprecedented technological progress) as *"the bloody armed fight between organised groups"* (Bouthoul, 1978, p. 54), we have published numerous studies among which we mention *Operațiile mass-media. Echilibrul instabil dintre logica militară* și *logica media* (2013), *Introducere* în *arta militară* (2014), *Războiul informațional* (2016). The necessary conditions for a violent social phenomenon to be dubbed war are the following: the existence of two social groups in conflict, the existence of two armed forces or paramilitary forces in confrontation on behalf of the two social groups, having conflicting political goals, and the existence of open violence in the battlefield. It is not mandatory for the current hybrid confrontation to meet all the conditions established by the French sociologist, considering the results of the analysis, conducted taking into account various indicators, of the armed confrontations between 1946 and 2016, which shows the following: after 1990, the total number of casualties on the battlefield decreased considerably, the majority resulting from civil confrontations and civil conflicts involving foreign states intervention, according to the statistics used by Max Rosen (2016) in his study: in 2016, per 100,000 inhabitants, 1.08 died in civil conflicts with foreign state intervention, 0.10 died in civil conflicts, and insignificant figures in other forms of conflict, as opposed to 1972, in which the number of victims in the mentioned types of conflicts remained at the same rates, and the number of casualties resulting from conflicts between states rose to 6.28 percent of the population, or 1950, when, in conflicts between states, it reached a maximum of 19.7 percent of one hundred thousand inhabitants, and in the colonial conflicts, it reached 1.73, compared to the same calculation base.

subsumed under the concept of *hybrid warfare*[2]. Doctrinal confusion generates mistrust, on the one hand, and prevents an appropriate response, on the other hand, as it cannot be anchored in a doctrine that operates with precise and operationalised terms, which can lead to concrete courses of action and field manuals. From this perspective, in US doctrines, the concept of *hybrid warfare* is associated with that of *warfare*, but the doctrinal apparatus and the set of field manuals rather refer to counterinsurgency or special operations. In a footnote of a concluding article from a collection of texts on *hybrid warfare*, suggestively entitled *"Hybrid Threats and a Possible Counter-Strategy Still Missing: A Useful Counter-Hybrid Warfare Doctrine or Something that Looks Like a Strategy"*, Helmut Habermayer states: *"Adjacent to Hybrid War are Field Manuals (Army, Marine Corps) about counterinsurgency, military operations other than war (MOOTW), small wars, Special Forces operations etc. Often quoted is also the recent FM 3.0 Operations (2008) and FM 3.24 Counterinsurgency, both published by the Department of the Army, Washington D.C."* (Habermayer, 2011, p. 250).

Unfortunately, even at the time of writing, the US doctrine has not assimilated, considering the inability to operationalise the concept of *hybrid warfare*, the hybrid approach to conflict. Justin Baumann demonstrates the failed attempts to assimilate the concept in the article *"Using Hybrid War Theory to Shape Future US Generational Doctrine"* (2021). It is worth noting, from Baumann's plea, the way in which a strategic direction of thinking was established, focused on the idea of eliminating the terminology incapable of being operationalised and thus maintained in the area of terminological confusion. Terms with a diffuse coverage area, such as the mentioned hybrid war (fare) or gray zone, should be removed from the strategic lexicon, according

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[2] Starting with the Gerasimov Doctrine, frequently invoked in specialised studies, the concept of *hybrid warfare* has become one through which a consistent doctrinal concealment has been attempted from Moscow. We have paid special attention to this topic. Moreover, the theme has not gone unnoticed in many other contemporary studies, most mentioning a game of mutual accusations. For example, in the study *Social Media's Role in 'Hybrid Strategies'*, Thomas Elkjer Nissen (2016, p. 2) emphasises the maintenance in the limits of a generalised confusion, as an interest in conceptual non-clarification, in order to obtain doctrinal concealment: *"Nonstate actors therefore fight in an asymmetric way, but they do not employ <hybrid strategies> – while Russia does. If we are to call it hybrid warfare that is because Russia doesn't. Russia accuses the <West> of conducting hybrid warfare and information attacks against Russia, not the other way around. Russia, on the other hand, wages <New Generation Warfare> or <Non-linear Warfare>, but even those terms are not precise, although their purpose is"*.

to military historian Donald Stoker and researcher Craig Whiteside (2020)[3]. From the latter study we note, first of all, the effect obtained by the diffuse terminology that leads to the inability to distinguish between peace and war and to undermine or erode the US strategic thinking. The American term *hybrid war*, in the sense proposed by Frank G. Hoffman and subsequently developed as *"at best simply a neologism for tactical innovation"* (Stoker, Whiteside, p. 30) in line with the use of new technologies, has theoretically failed in terms of the researchers' efforts to provide precise and universally applicable research tools. Therefore, Stoker and Whiteside have suggested abandoning a path that leads to theoretical confusion and, implicitly, to an area from which no doctrinal projection and no definite course of action can stem. Moreover, according to Habermayer's 2011 study, the inclusion of the concept of *hybrid warfare* in a broader conceptual field can neither lead to clarifications: *"[...] The current Field Manual dealing with Counterinsurgency has all the ingredients for Hybrid Warfare, but is a too large volume and one wonders if a battalion commander will seek advice from a 350-page book, written like a military order, when engaged in a fierce battle"* (Habermayer, 2011, p. 251). However, if the aim of the Gerasimov doctrine and of the documents stemming from the projection of Russian General has been to create confusion, starting from the dangerous lack of precision in discriminating between peace and war (Stoker, Whiteside, p. 34)[4] in order to justify interventions that are not permitted by international law and to legalise terrorist actions, cyber-attacks and operations in the electromagnetic spectrum

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[3] In relation to the terms *gray zone*, *gray-zone conflict* and *hybrid war,* developed in line with the Gerasimov doctrine and aimed at generating the doctrinal confusion pan-chronically analysed, see Lesenciuc (2020, pp. 63-68), Donald Stoker and Craig Whiteside suggest their elimination from strategic lexicons: *"These terms, as well as the concepts arising from them, should be eliminated from the strategic lexicon. They cause more harm than good and contribute to an increasingly dangerous distortion of the concepts of war, peace, and geopolitical competition, with a resultant negative impact on the crafting of security strategy for the United States and its allies and partners around the world"* (Stoker, Whiteside, 2020, p. 13). Their suggestion is justified as long as the mentioned terms represent the content of a Pandora box opened by Gerasimov, leading to doctrinal confusion (in compliance with the goals pursued by General Gerasimov and the Russian doctrinal school) and to the impossibility of their inclusion in a functional doctrinal apparatus.

[4] The most eloquent emphasis in this chapter of the study conducted by Stoken and Whiteside refers to the Gerasimov doctrine obtaining the expected effect even on US researchers: *"American analysts are forgetting that subversion is a tool both of peacetime state interaction and of war. Believing that subversion is restricted to wartime activities, and classifying it as an act of war, clouds our thinking. Historically, subversion has always been a part of both Russian foreign policy and military action"* (2020, p. 35).

to justify sponsoring terrorist actions, it means that, up until it is abandoned, the issue of *hybrid warfare* should be scientifically placed in another area of analysis. If the (strictly) military instrument has failed in identifying the possibilities to analyse and operationalise the concept of *hybrid warfare*, it results that this concept should be studied and operationalised in a different framework, the one in which it has been pushed by the strategic thinking school in Moscow to generate doctrinal confusion, namely the entire society.

Until then, as long as this new type of hybrid action, more and more frequent and important in contemporary society, generates confusion in terms of the distinction between peace and war, because hybrid conflict is prolonged by a kind of hostility during peace, it is necessary to first address the society affected by hybridity and then hybridity as an effect on military action. By this prolongation in peacetime and in society, the whole society gets involved in the hybrid war and, implicitly, the society gets affected in a wide spectrum of fields or subdomains of activity, through a concentrated influence in relation to the major directions and intentions that directly derive from *"hybrid strategies"*. Nissen describes this way of influencing by employing hybrid strategies in the following terms: *"Influence activities are primarily carried out in <peace-time> before violence or hostilities occur, in order to shape the public, media and political discourse. Influence, in this context, is the systematic application of informational and other means by a state or non-state actor to clandestinely undermine or overthrow a liberal democratic government or an international organisation, fomenting civil strife in the interest of this actor. The activities are predominantly aimed at weakening (shaping) a country's political, economic, social, cultural, scientific, technological and military structures in order to exert the desired influence. This influence can be aimed at either a contextual change or a behavioural change in society and in the political discourse and subsequent decision-making"* (2016, p. 2).

Placing the contemporary *hybrid warfare* in the new analytical framework, the societal one, requires – as Nissen emphasises in his study – considering the appropriate response to hybrid threats. This response can be but one: to create societal resilience, a central concept in the current *National Defence Strategy* (NDS, 2020), in response to hybrid influence and hybrid threats propagated through altered and precisely targeted information. Therefore, as Nissen

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emphasises, it is important to debate *"How civil society and its information environment can be influenced both overtly and covertly"* (2011, p. 2). In the particular case of the Romanian state national security, the point we have reached debating the current influences on the global security environment, the precise and categorical response comes from the mentioned *National Defence Strategy*, which states that in order to achieve the necessary level of state resilience *"national security values must be carefully protected and further promoted, and the security culture must follow an upward path of development and inclusion of as many societal and generational segments as possible"* (NDS, 2020, p. 10).

Our assumption is the following: in order to precisely define and operationalise the concept of *hybrid warfare*, it is necessary to transfer it from the military to the social level. At the social level, the definition of societal resilience is conditioned by the definition of national security values (an issue to which strategic documents have already responded precisely) and by the definition and promotion of the security culture. Security culture, the appropriate society response to hybrid threats, is a fluid term, which has not been doctrinally operationalised. Therefore, the natural approach is to conceptually operationalise the term of security culture, at least within the limits of a school of thought. Once this term is operationalised (and once a series of security culture consolidation programmes have been developed), the extended societal framework proposes the appropriate response: resilience to hybrid threats, and hybrid warfare can be defined in precise terms, can be operationalised and transformed into a series of actions precisely described in field manuals. The purpose of the present article is to conceptually operationalise the security culture, in accordance with the projection of a certain school of strategic thought, the constructivist school, and later, through other studies, to expand research in the area of the concept of hybrid warfare operationalisation.

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DIMENSIONS OF SECURITY CULTURE

The concept of security culture is derived from the concept of culture, understood as *mental software*, as promoted by Geert Hofstede et al. (2012, p. 17), as a set of rational and emotional projections, as well as resulting actions, which *"consists in the social game unwritten rules".* The concept of security culture can be also analysed in relation

to another term, mentioned in the same study, namely that of *cultural genome*, which entails cultural continuity, preservation of deep cultural layers and their expression unaltered by different cultural patterns, even after a long period of retention in the recession zone. The *cultural genome* is not a simple theoretical construction, as Hofstede assures us; it exists and it is perpetuated through a system of values, symbols and centripetal forces that keep culture within the limits of its activation potential, i.e., the transformation of a recessive gene into a dominant gene. In other words, the *cultural genome*, according to Geert Hofstede, is what Ralph Linton (1968, p. 61) identifies as *cultural continuum* (regardless political, social or economic changes), manifested in a form of collective sharing. In order to be the object of sharing, the value of the aspects to be shared is acknowledged.

Security culture entails relating to the set of inherited patterns, transmitted through the aforementioned systems of values, symbols and centripetal forces in relation to the cultural genome, which is why, in the programmatic document entitled *National Defence Strategy Guidance* (2015, p. 7), security culture is defined as *"the totality of values, norms, attitudes or actions that determine the understanding and assimilation at the level of society of the concept of security and its derivatives (national security, international security, collective security, insecurity, security etc.)".*

In such a definition framework, which presupposes the understanding of the concept of security culture in relation to a cultural continuum and a series of behavioural patterns that can be acted upon through security education (a concept introduced by the *National Defence Strategy Guidance* and defined as an educational dimension that is achieved by *"developing a social attitude having a preventive role in personal, group and state defence and protection against risks, threats, vulnerabilities, real and potential aggression"*, 2015, p. 7), maintaining the concept in the simple normative or projective framework does not help in the development of security studies and, even less, in the precise measurement of a certain level of individual or collective security. Definitions from the Anglo-Saxon security schools – such as that provided by Ken Booth (1990, pp. 121-128), representative of the Aberystwyth School: *"The concept of security culture refers to traditions, values, attitudes, behaviour patterns, customs, symbols, achievements of a people and the special*

way in which they adapt to the environment and solve problems taking into account threats and the use of force" or even by the Romanian school (which cumulates surface and deep cultural contents and the transmission of culture from generation to generation): *"Security culture is the result of the social interactions within groups, organisations, communities concerned with the aspects of social security, of some learning processes and knowledge accumulation, in line with the human needs for protection, security, shelter. Security culture is adaptive, it is developed in relation to the evolution of society and is transmitted across generations through different forms of written and oral communication, as well as practices meant to support security values"* (Lungu et al., 2018, p. 5) – emphasise the same continuum. The definition provided by Ciprian Lungu, Ruxandra Buluc and Ioan Deac is based on a series of definition frameworks and explicitly refers to the cognitive, affective, evaluative, historical and operational dimensions of security culture (2018, p. 6).

However, in order to achieve the desired level of operationalisation, entailing the identification of a set of dimensions, variables and directly or indirectly measurable indicators, the definitions regarding the cultural continuum are unsatisfactory. We have identified, in accordance with the assumed projection of the constructivist school, a frame of reference from which we can develop a set of dimensions that allow the conceptual operationalisation. The frame of reference is the well-known *Security culture model* proposed by Alexander Siedschlag (2018, pp. 1-40), considering security studies schools in relation to the security culture issues of interest from the perspective of the types of norms derived from the perception and definition of threats, including the projected threat response, as well as to a series of standards, which entail the understanding of culture as a securi(ti)zation[5] factor or as a form of security governance. The considered dimensions are those identified by constructivist Peter Katzenstein in his 1996 paper, *The Culture of National Security. Norms and Identity in World Politics*, demonstrating that national security interests do not exist *per se*, but originate in a series of cultural frames of reference relating

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[5] Even if in *Security culture model,* Siedschlag prefers the term *"securization"*, arguing this approach, he makes reference to *"securitization"* when citing from other sources (i.e., Katzenstein's categories, which become coordinate axes in his own model), see Siedschlag (2018, p. 14).

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to the development of appropriate response to threats. The perspective presented by Alexander Siedschlag is systematised and summarised in the matrix in *table no. 1*. It can be noted that the culture-continuum perspective is only the primary hypostasis, resulting at the intersection of constitutive norms (culture understood as a factor in perceiving/ defining threats) with cognitive standards (culture as a security domain and a securitization factor):

Table no. 1: Alexander Siedschlag's Security culture model summarised

	Constitutive norms	Regulatory norms
Cognitive standards	Knowledge and interpretation	Actions repertoires
Evaluative standards	Common symbols	Affirmative values (affective engagements included)

The results of this primary class of perspectives, in which security culture is understood as *"a cognitive form by which members of social communities make sense of reality, attribute meanings to facts, as well as save and reproduce practical competences (e.g., resilient communities debates)"* (Siedschlag, 2018, p. 18), are *"knowledge and interpretation"*, included in the summarised form in *table no. 1*. This dimension is one that maintains culture, in general, security culture, in particular, in the vague, difficult to operationalise, area of the concepts that can propose as ways of practical relevance *"Culture as **software** of the mind that evolves over time"*, *"cultural selection of risk"* and the possibility of establishing a competent vision of the world through the prism of a national security system. It is based on important works such as *The Interpretation of Culture* by Clifford Geertz (1973), proposing a vague theoretical projection on the concept of culture, maintained under the influence of Clyde Kluckhohn, having internal coherence and being reducible to text and semiotic interpretation: *"The concept of culture I espouse, and whose utility the essays below attempt to demonstrate, is essentially the semiotic one"* (Geertz, 1973, p. 5) or *Risks and Culture* by Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, suggesting a cultural explanation of the relation to risk, close to that of Hofstede's studies, rather projecting a subjectivisation of the relation to risk: *"Standing inside our own culture, we can only look at our predicament through our culturally fabricated lens"* (Douglas , Wildavsky, 1982, pp. 194).

Taking into account the same cognitive standards in relation to regulatory norms (culture as a factor in responding to threats), the result is a set of *"action repertoires"* developed on the coordinates of US researcher Alasdair Iain Jonston, interested in strategic culture as understood by Jack L. Snyder (1977, p. 8)[6] and, recently, by the mass media in relation to security dilemmas, a view expressed especially in *Cultural Realism. Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (1995), as well as on the ones established by Ann Swidler, a sociologist of culture, who identifies strategies of action applicable within distinct cultural repertoires in the study *Culture in Action* (1986). According to this perspective, security culture is defined as a *"set of individual (or proprietary) experience-based strategieis associated to individual attributions of meaning and normative convictions; this concept is strong in explaining how existing strategies and courses of action may determine which policy goals are developed or met, rather than strategies and courses of action being attuned to defined goals"* (Siedschlag, 2018, p. 18), and the practical relevance is not rooted in ideological aspects but in the pragmatic ways in which national security can be projected as set of strategies based on precise meaning and normative beliefs. From this perspective, security culture can be seen as a discontinuous, fragmented structure, which can be reduced to personal interpretations regarding the uneven distribution of security in society. Moreover, a society can have more than one security culture and *"considering interpretation of security strategies may differ accross security cultures"* (Ib., p. 18). Fuelled by American studies, the issue of *"actional repertoires"* related to security culture is one that is rather covered by the British doctrinal apparatus – see, for instance, *UK Defence Doctrine,* which provides primacy to the concept of Human Security (JDP 0-01, 2014:3) followed by that of national security (United Kingdom Security) and collective security[7] – than by the US doctrines.

Regarding the summarised version of the projection of Siedschlag's model of security culture, the constitutive norms produce, in relation

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[6] *"Strategic culture can be defined as the sum of common ideas, emotionally-shaped responses and behavioural patterns learned by the members of a national strategic community by training or imitation, shared among them in relation to nuclear strategy"* (Snyder, 1977, p. 8).

[7] With regard to this aspect, David Gilmore notes that, excepting the UK Defence Doctrine, no other doctrine gives primacy to the human being but to the state; *"National security and the stability of the inter-state order still remain the foundational concern"* (Gilmore, 2015, p. 51).

to the evaluative standards (culture as a form of security governance/ as an organising factor), a series of *"common symbols"*, based on the projection of US sociologist Robert J. Wuthnow, who maintains the concept of culture in the fluid, continuous, unconstrained zone, projected on the earlier perspectives of Peter L. Berger's phenomenology, the already mentioned Mary Douglas' cultural anthropology, Michel Foucault's structuralism, and Jürgen Habermas's critical theory – see *Cultural Analysis* (1984), where culture is understood as a behavioural phenomenon or as a behavioural analytical aspect (Wuthnow et al., 1984, pp. 19-20), reducible to common symbols. Continuing the analogical (and difficult to operationalise) perspectives of constitutive norms, security culture, as series of *"common symbols"*, entails the existence of a cultural continuum as *software*, more precisely as a set of *"shared symbols on which citizens orient their actions and which are a kind of **software** for operating interfaces between actor and overarching structures (i.e. federal, state, local, tribal and territorial agencies), flexible enough to reflect and adapt to new threats and challenges"* (Siedschlag, 2018, p. 18).

Security culture, as series of "common symbols", entails the existence of a cultural continuum as software.

The practical relevance of such a perspective lies in understanding security as a public good, shared, organised and oriented based on symbols "*that represent a nation's founding values"*, focused on observable facts in relation to security needs and not to bureaucratic norms.

The common area of regulative norms and evaluative standards includes *"affirmative values"* (and affective engagements), rooted in the studies of US comparatist political scientist Gabriel Almond, promoter, together with his former student Sidney Verba, of the concepts of political culture (and civic culture[8]) in the well-known paper *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*, as well as in those of Arnold Wolfers, renowned representative of classical realism in international relations, author of the article *National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol* (1952), defining security positively within the limits of realist projection as lack of threats, objectively, and lack of fear, subjectively, (1952, p. 484) and negatively, by relating it to insecurity, as lack of security. The discontinuous perspective on security culture as set of affirmative values is limited to the sum

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[8] Based on communication and persuasion and representing *"a culture of consensus and diversity, a culture that [permits] change but [moderates] it"* (Almond, Verba, 1989, p. 15).

of discrete (measurable) entities defined as basic normative values, while security culture is understood as *"ideational representation of foundational decisions about basic normative values (e.g., the security versus liberty and freedom debate), which shape the normative arena in which homeland security takes place"*. The practical relevance of this dimension of security culture consists in identifying and defending the acquired common values, relating to national historical identities, keeping within the limits of the normative projection and identifying a set of actions that will focus on saving *"affirmative values"*, aspect that leads to *"Balance security with other social values, such as liberty and freedom, nurturing security cultures rooted in a view of the citizens being the ultimate owners of homeland security, vested with inalienable democratic rights"* (Siedschlag, p. 18).

The four dimensions of security culture offer the possibility to understand a complex picture of this concept approach, filtered through the prism of the constructivist school, but not reduced to the interpretive limits of this school.

CONCEPTUAL OPERATIONALISATION OF THE TERM *SECURITY CULTURE*

The Romanian projective-normative perspective on security culture is one that is based on its mentioned dimensions. The four dimensions identified by Siedschlag are found (with uneven focus) in the definition included in the *National Defence Strategy Guidance*, according to which security culture encompasses the set of values, norms and resulting actions (*"the totality of values, norms and actions"*) that determine the *"understanding and assimilation"* of the concept of security. The definition has a gap (attitudes) or entails a projective reversal in relation to psycho-behavioural studies, in which attitudes, structural components of the human personality, subsequently determine behavioural engagement (action). Moreover, the norms (written or unwritten) of the society prefigure the values. That is why it is necessary to revisit the set of security culture projected dimensions in autochthonous understanding. We consider Alexander Siedschlag's matrix (2018, p. 5), built on a 2013 synthesis projection of the Department of Homeland Security, according to which *"[…] Culture supports workforce resilience by encouraging **norms, values***

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and **expectations** *that are consistent with and advance it and by establishing structures and practices that enable it"*.

While revisiting the projective-normative definition of *security culture* in Romania, the logical order is: norms → values → attitudes → actions, easy to integrate in Siedschlag's matrix in relation to the cognitive and evaluative standards, and the constitutive (resulting in *"understanding"*) and regulatory (resulting in *"assimilation"*) norms, which leads to the possibility of extrapolating the matrix to the local environment, in which the definition entails the interpretive formula rewritten in *table no. 2*:

"Security culture is a set of rules, values, attitudes and actions resulting from the customs, traditions, symbols and patterns of behaviour of a people, in turn conditioned by adaptation to the environment (including response to threats), which results in understanding and assimilating the concept of security and related concepts (including the security-freedom balance), achieving and maintaining a minimum level of confidence in state institutions and societal resilience, through social interactions, learning processes in formal, informal and non-formal education, and based on a pre-existing civic culture ".

Table no. 2: Definition of security culture in the understanding
of the National Defence Strategy Guidance, applied to the Security culture model matrix
developed by Alexander Siedschlag

	Understanding	Assimilation
Cognitive standards	**Norms**	**Actions**
Evaluative standards	**Values**	**Attitudes**

This repositioning in relation to the projective-normative definition allows the limitation (in accordance with Siedschlag's matrix and with the aforementioned definition frameworks developed by the Aberystwyth School and the Romanian School of Security Studies) of the dimensions of security culture to the set of norms, values, attitudes and actions, and the reconsideration of a complex but operationalizable frame of reference (which allows the reduction to entities within which sociological measurements can be performed), presented on several occasions as the Lesenciuc-Cozmanciuc definition: ***"Security culture is a set of rules, values, attitudes and actions resulting from the customs, traditions, symbols and patterns of behaviour of a people, in turn conditioned by adaptation to the environment (including response to threats), which results in understanding and assimilating the concept of security and related concepts (including the security-freedom balance), achieving and maintaining a minimum level of confidence in state institutions and societal resilience, through social interactions, learning processes in formal, informal and non-formal education, and based on a pre-existing civic culture ".***

The graphical projection of the operationalised *security culture* formula is the following *(figure no. 1)*:


Figure no. 1: Operationalisation of the concept of "security culture"
(Lesenciuc-Cozmanciuc)

Starting from this operational framework of defining *security culture*, reducible to the dimensions (already operationalised or possibly to operationalise) *"security", "trust", "resilience", "security education", "civic culture", "threat response"* , filtered through a cultural pattern that includes norms, values, attitudes and actions, at the reference level, and traditions, symbols, behavioural patterns and customs, at the basic level, a series of variables and indicators necessary in the study of security culture (or of certain dimensions of it) can be developed, and the framework for the operationalisation of the concept of *hybrid warfare* can be established.

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