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"Art. I – The official journal named "România Militară" is founded at the Great General Staff, starting 1 January 1898, in which all officers within the Armed Forces will find military studies, which interest their training.

Through the agency of this journal, all officers, belonging to all branches, who are in active duty, will be able to publish their personal papers and the ones that interest the Armed Forces".

*Carol – King of Romania
Issued in București on 8 December 1897*

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A LEGACY SINCE 1864

The Romanian Armed Forces road to modernity started in 1859, once the United Principalities General Staff Corps, currently the Defence Staff, was established.

Soon after it, in 1864, a group of nine captains, graduates of the first series of the Officer Cadet School in Bucharest, took the initiative to develop a "military science, art and history journal" named "România Militară/Military Romania".

The initiators of the publication – **G. Slăniceanu** (Captain, Chief of the Engineer Battalion), **A. Gramont** (Staff Captain), **G. Borănescu** (Engineer Captain), **G. Anghelescu** (Staff Captain), **A. Anghelescu** (Artillery Captain), **E. Arion** (Artillery Captain), **E. Boteanu** (Staff Captain), **E. Pencovici** (Staff Captain) and **C. Barozzi** (Engineer Captain) –, educated not only in Romania but also abroad, were inspired by the necessity to develop a substantial theoretical activity in the Romanian Army too.

The journal manifesto¹, included in the first issue, which appeared on 15 February 1864, contained innovative ideas and approaches that were meant to:

- contribute to the organisation of our military system the Legislative Chamber is about to decide upon soon;

- assemble and examine the Country old military institutions that had made for the glory of Romania for several centuries and ensured our existence;

- explore, in the absence of any military study, all the aspects related to the Army training, the most solid basis of the armed forces;

- get the Romanian Troops well-informed about the military events in the world;

- join efforts to work concertedly and whole-heartedly to develop and strengthen the edifice that is meant to ensure the future of our country"².

"România Militară" was an independent publication, under the aegis of the War Ministry, and it ceased to appear in 1866 as there were no sufficient funds and subscribers. The publication was resumed in 1891, about a quarter of a century later, also as the result of the initiative of a group of officers in the Great General Staff who intended to "reproduce the serious studies on the organisation, strategy and art of commanding troops under any circumstances"³. Shortly after it, by the Royal Decree no. 3663 issued on 8 December 1897, "România Militară" became the "Great General Staff official publication".



¹ Din trecutul României Militare cu prilejul aniversării a 75 de ani de la apariția ei în viața armatei. 1864-1939, București, 1939, p. 31.

² Ibidem, p. 32.

³ România Militară, no. 1, 1981, p. 6.

English version by Diana Cristiana LUPU.



C. Barozzi
(Engineer Captain)



E. Pencovici
(Staff Captain)



E. Boteanu
(Staff Captain)



G. Borănescu
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G. Anghelescu
(Staff Captain)



G. Slăniceanu
(Captain, Chief
of the Engineer
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(Artillery Captain)



A. Anghelescu
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MILITARY EDUCATION – THE CONNECTION BETWEEN MILITARY LEADERSHIP AND CIVILIAN LEADERSHIP IN THE FIELD OF SECURITY –

Brigadier General Dorin Corneliu PLEȘCAN

Commander (Rector) of “Carol I” National Defence University, Bucharest



In the military, leadership is defined as the leader’s ability to organise and conduct the assigned missions, aiming to accomplish them in an efficient and effective manner.

In terms of the military organisation efficiency, it is the leadership that makes the difference between the standard performance and the desired end state, considering the complex, volatile and ambiguous security environment. How can leadership be provided at the level of the entire military organisation so that it can meet the challenges posed by such a constantly changing security environment and an unprecedented technological revolution? Theoretically, through the continuous education and training of leaders at tactical and operational levels. How can military leadership be exported at the level of strategic decision-makers, at the level of civilian leaders? This development is started and cultivated through military education, training and experience. It requires the understanding of what military leaders do and why they do so, through permanent institutional collaboration in the field of security culture.

The Need for Military Education

Broadly defined, the mission of the military education network is to educate, train, specialise and perfect military leaders for the tactical level. It is about direct leadership, face-to-face leadership, which is generally functional in the military structures where subordinates and leaders are in direct contact all the time such as teams, sections, platoons, companies. Numerically, the range of influence of the direct leader can vary from a few to dozens of people.

At the level of “Carol I” National Defence University – NDU, this mission is continued by educating and training leaders for operational and strategic levels. At the operational level, we refer to the organisational leaders who exercise leadership through subordinate leaders, responsible



for leading the various entities that make up the larger organisation. As for strategic leaders, this category includes military and civilian leaders who provide command at the level of the Defence Staff and at the level of the Ministry of National Defence. Strategic leadership guides and integrates several organisational-level units that perform a wide range of functions. It influences several thousand to hundreds of thousands of people. These leaders allocate resources, communicate the strategic vision and prepare both the decisions and the armed forces for future missions. Strategic leaders shape the Armed Forces culture, ensuring that the directives, policies, programmes and systems are ethical and effective.

To achieve this goal, the NDU not only delivers knowledge, it also encourages students and trainees to develop their critical thinking skills, to express themselves providing arguments, using the vocabulary specific to the military leader – an operational and strategic level planner. From the level of initial training through undergraduate studies to the strategic level courses for future generals and policymakers, the academic staff of “Carol I” National Defence University promote the active participation in the educational process of military students and trainees as well as of civilian specialists acknowledged in their own areas of expertise at all levels of the society.

Therefore, military education is necessary not only for military professionals. It is necessary for all citizens and, in particular, for civilian leaders who make decisions at the level of ministries, at the level of Parliament, at the level of all structures related to national security. The military phenomenon, the instruments of state power, the internal and external factors, the necessity for the population to support political-military decisions in crisis situations cannot be understood and analysed without education in the field of security. The same applies to crisis and conflict management.

Because of the trust built, educated and practised between military leaders and civilian leaders, at the level of the intellectual architecture, the decisions related to ensuring national security are in constant balance, benefitting the society in crisis situations.

Imbalances occur when there is lack of confidence in the political-military decision at different levels. The values of military education, expressed through rigour, sacrificial spirit, traditions, flexibility in thinking, analysis of several courses of action under conditions of stress and fatigue, critical and multidisciplinary thinking, can be transmitted to civilian leaders through the study programmes organised by “Carol I” National Defence University.

Military Leaders Education

Military professionals need in-depth knowledge in a variety of areas in order to accomplish their missions. For example, military art generally explains how to achieve military objectives during operations. Technical knowledge consists of specialised information associated with a function or system. Joint knowledge means understanding the role, place and procedures of the various armed forces services and commands that work together in joint, multi-domain operations. Expertise consists of in-depth knowledge and skills developed through experience, training and education. Military professionals employ in-depth knowledge to focus on key aspects of an issue, to make effective, ethical decisions, and to achieve a high level of performance. Being innovative in choosing courses of action requires creative thinking, which entails both adaptive approaches (based on previous expertise and knowledge) and innovative approaches (development of completely new ideas). More often than not, providing solutions to extreme situations requires the ability to be innovative, to rely on both experience and solid knowledge in different fields. Knowledge in geostrategy and geopolitics, for example, raises awareness of cultural, geographical and political differences and sensitivities in a given area, and this type of knowledge can be crucial in ensuring the success of the mission.

Equally, the internalisation of the values specific to the military organisation, such as loyalty, duty, respect, being of service, honour, integrity, courage, is the hallmark of an armed forces professional. To do so represents a pact not only with teammates but also with the people, a guarantee that the person is trustworthy and responsible.





Therefore, upholding, teaching and consolidating military values represent an important responsibility of military leaders, being a part of military education.

Consequently, the education of military leaders and the internalisation of a set of shared values are key aspects, as they contribute to creating the necessary conditions for winning victory.

Civilian Leaders Education

Civilian leaders cover, in my view, the area from the level of the mayor of a sector or locality to the level of the prefect, minister or parliamentarian. Considering the nature of their responsibilities, they cooperate, in peacetime as well as in crisis situations, with the military system representatives, be they commanders of garrisons or ministers of defence. First and foremost, a common language and a common understanding of the concrete situation are needed, in terms of the competences and roles of each structure in crisis situations. The civilian leader educated in military higher education institutions will better and faster understand how to solve a certain problem, because he will assign the tasks in line with the responsibilities of each involved structure, for the simple reason that he knows them and he has gained experience in doing it during the practical activities included in the study programmes of “Carol I” National Defence University.

Moreover, the military-educated civilian leader will know the concepts and the way to implement the national security strategy much better and more effectively than if he had not taken the necessary courses. The civilian leader promotes the national values, respects the symbols of the state, supports the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Romanian state, as well as the democratic institutions, namely the same values that the military leader promotes. In addition, the civilian control over the armed forces stipulated in the Romanian Constitution cannot be exercised without having at least minimal knowledge of national security and of the normative documents in the field of defence.

Mention should be made that strategic leaders are important catalysts for change and transformation, and their decisions have the potential to influence not only the military organisation but

even the security environment at national, regional or global level. Because they envisage a long-term strategy in terms of planning, preparation, execution and evaluation, more often than not, they cannot reap the rewards of their ideas during their tenure. The armed forces modernisation is an example where long-term strategic planning is needed. Being supported by many teams of subordinate leaders, strategic leaders rely on organisational leaders to implement the long-term strategic vision and ensure that it is known and understood by all personnel.

Based on the mentioned considerations, I appreciate that more could be done in the field of military education at the level of state universities, national colleges and even secondary schools, as it is necessary to promote the values and traditions of the Armed Forces, the connection between the Armed Forces and the nation, to mentally and physically prepare young people for the homeland defence.

Conclusion

Education is acknowledged and assumed by both military leaders and civilian leaders. Society needs models that uphold the core values of the society they belong to, honest citizens who are patriots and love their country. Performance cannot be achieved without educated specialists, without professionals. National military education needs constant evolution and reinvention as well as the ability to educate and train military professionals so that they can adapt to the realities of future military conflicts, to form strong characters, competent and charismatic leaders for all levels.

I am sure that the modernisation of military education will keep pace, as always, with the changes of the operational environment, with the new military capabilities in the inventory, and with the evolution of the Romanian society as a whole.





INNOVATION – END STATE OF HIGH-PERFORMANCE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IN A MILITARY UNIVERSITY –

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With the transition to military higher education, scientific research and innovation have become necessary prerequisites for building a successful academic environment. Amateurism has considerably diminished as a result of the training and improvement of the skills needed in this domain, whose value is increasingly recognised as a galvanising factor in achieving specific quality indicators for a modern military university. Against this background, we can argue that scientific research, scientific innovation, and military higher education intertwine in a much more active way than in previous years, with the ultimate aim of enhancing military science and practice. The emergence of new preoccupations for scientific research and innovation, as pillars supporting a modern military university, arise not only from the imperative of acknowledging this need, but also as a consequence of the identification of scientific knowledge among the solutions needed to provide the conditions specific to a future military university, able to respond to and master the wide array of challenges generated by the unknown in future military actions. The proposed approach draws attention to aspects related to the importance of knowledge, understanding, explanation, and argumentation of conceptual, structural, actional, and managerial clarifications of scientific research, scientific progress and innovation, as fundamentals of excellence in a modern military university. Thus, the postmodern military university will acquire the capacity to fulfil its specific missions only in an optimal framework, adequate for recognising scientific research and innovation as imperatives for the dynamics of change in society and in the military environment.

Keywords: scientific research; innovation; higher education; military structures; national security;



INTRODUCTION

The modern military university, or more precisely the postmodern one, is characterised by new competencies and standards springing from its status as a higher education institution that capitalises on the most important accumulations of science and technology and, especially, that creates advanced military knowledge and technologies, by responsibly using scientific research and innovation to address the needs of national and international defence and security.

Nowadays, we witness increasingly obvious efforts made by the members of the university military communities in the direction of widening and deepening the essential landmarks of scientific research and innovation, but the same cannot be said about the existence of clear-cut approaches regarding university innovation, respectively the concept of innovative military university.

Scientific research and military academic innovation imply the excellence of the university's activity as a whole, not only as a beneficiary and producer of knowledge and technology, but also from the perspective of the epistemological, methodological and praxiological clarification of the respective fields and their specific management. It is, in fact, a reality that has been valid ever since the 19th century, when experimental practice developed in the direction of innovation in social life and invention of material products, even if the scientific theory for such areas had not yet been formulated.

In turn, later, after the Second World War and in the following decades of the last century, research and innovation in the field of military science and practice underwent significant changes in terms of conceptualisation, theorising and applicability to the needs of the military domain.

In this context, there is a need to clarify the specific aspects of innovative research and progress in the military higher education field, as an inseparable part of the scientific research and innovation process

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conducted by a university, with the aim of producing the scientific knowledge required in order to lead military structures and conduct military operations.

THE NEED FOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN THE FIRST DECADES OF THE 21ST CENTURY

As experienced in the year 2020 and at the beginning of this year, the world we live in is increasingly dynamic. This statement is nothing new, as change has been, in fact, a permanent companion of history. And, as experienced by each of us, today's world is a fast-paced reality.

The first twenty years of the beginning of the century and millennium clearly demonstrate that postmodern society faces various significant challenges, among which anticipating the importance of research, progress and innovation is becoming an increasingly current, complex and comprehensive academic practice.

The beginning of the 21st century is characterised by unprecedented processes and transformations in the history of society, of its specific fields, as well as of each individual. These aspects have generated profound dysfunctions, materialised in the emergence or perpetuation of crises. An example is the year 2020, when the COVID-19 pandemic showed, among other things, that people and especially institutions with important socio-human responsibilities did not have the necessary training to stop the crisis, or at least to mitigate its consequences on human communities and at individual level. The fact that we were not prepared has a series of causes, among which a fundamental one relates to the way in which school, in general, and the university, in particular, has shaped human personalities able to anticipate the future and find solutions for its adequate management. For universities, the multiple challenges experienced by the postmodern society bring to the forefront the need to elaborate on the fundamentals of research, progress and development, as the only way to respond effectively to the noble and responsible mission the society has bestowed upon them.

Postmodernism brings along the change of paradigms and models of societal approach. Georges Balandier points out that current modernity *"is an adventure, an advance towards largely unknown social, cultural and scientific spaces, a progression in a time of rights,*

tensions, mutations. You have to learn to be an explorer of these times." (1988, p. 124).

Following the same line of thought, we believe that the beginning of this century has strengthened the conviction of political, economic, social, military and scientific institutions, as well as of specialists in different professional fields of society that there is a need to change the construction paradigm and models of the future by increasing the use of research, progress, development and, ultimately, innovation.

The boom of the interest in research and innovation worldwide, in Europe and in some countries, organisations and universities, especially those at the top of the hierarchy of scientific and applied science performance, is materialised in supporting the development of studies, strategies, projects and programmes that highlight their remarkable possibilities.

There are obvious differences between the old state of the society that progressed and developed through knowledge and the new model of the society based on scientific progress and innovation. In the new model, the presence and action of innovative scientific research increase, in a spectacular way, the possibilities of addressing the needs of individual and the societal breakthrough, through an effort that can prove the ability to reconstruct knowledge, mentalities, skills and practices in a way specific to the achievement of postmodern innovation.

In turn, as it is the most important and reliable source and resource to implement the new requirements, scientific research is increasingly and convincingly committed to professional excellence, in the evaluation of which innovation becomes a representative indicator.

By redefining their status and role in order to meet new expectations, scientific research and innovation are reshaping, so as to become timely, useful and efficient. In this regard, for military universities, scientific research and innovation maintain the specific requirements of any higher education institution, to which are added some particularities in terms of objectives, scientific field, strategies and resources employed.

Therefore, the characteristics of the military field, the role and mission of the armed forces, at national and international level, the characteristics of equipment, assets and means of combat,



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the particularities of the operational environment, the physiognomy of military actions, the requirements of military theory and science, and the personality of the professional military are some elements that typify the military reality, to which scientific research and innovation must find the appropriate answers from the perspective of the military university.

Consequently, efficient scientific research and innovation, as specific dimensions of the military university activity, must be carried out and evaluated based on the university innovation and scientific research conception and strategy in general, but correctly and clearly identified and formulated at the level of the military university. Therefore, it is necessary that innovation and scientific research at the level of the military university should conduct in-depth analyses in order to penetrate the essence of military phenomena and processes, to discover their internal causes and dynamics, their internal laws, and their links of interdependence with other phenomena. All these will generate the development of the capacity to anticipate their directions of evolution, to identify and capitalise on solutions for optimising the military practice and enriching the patrimony of military science.

SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS AND INNOVATION IN MILITARY HIGHER EDUCATION – THEORETICAL APPROACHES

In Romanian, the concept “*a inova*” (“*to innovate*”) has been borrowed from the French language, and has its etymological origin in the Latin word “*novus*” which means “*new*”. The word “*innovare*” (“*innovation*”), whose meaning is “*to accomplish something new*” is also derived from the adjective “*novus*”. According to the online *Larousse Dictionary*, the word “*innover*” (“*to innovate*”) means “*to introduce a novelty*” (<https://www.larousse.fr/dictionnaires/francais/innover/43197>).

The complexity of the *innovation* concept has generated its evolution and approach from different scientific points of view, the presentation of its defining aspects and the notes characteristic of the theoretical fields from the perspective of which various definitions have been proposed. First of all, in his book *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (1942), Joseph A. Schumpeter introduced a new concept, as he considered that the enterprise must mainly be innovative by reforming and revolutionising production, discovering new material

sources, by reorganising administration (Nagâț, 2001, p. 18), understanding that this is the action of producing *something else* or *different* (Plumb, Vișan, Botez, Florescu, Angheliescu, 2007, p. 31). The definition has the attributes of generality, which urges us to always do something *different*, to change things continuously, no matter how small the change.

In 1974, the British author Brian Twiss considered that innovation is the process by which an investment or an idea is translated into the economy (p. 64). Extending the scope, Dorothy A. Leonard and Walter C. Swap (2005, p. 76) think of innovation as the materialisation, combination and/or synthesis of knowledge into a new, relevant and valuable product, process or service. On the same epistemological coordinates, we find Željka Šporer (University of South Australia), who signals the existence of differences in the content of this concept from the perspective of sociological theory and economic theory (2004, p. 41). If sociologists define innovation as a new way of using knowledge or applying existing information to problems or situations different from those known before, economists establish that innovation is the transformation of existing knowledge and ideas into a new or better commercial product, with increased value for the customer.

A broader definition and a concrete proposal for a conceptual standard for *innovation* were proposed by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development – OECD in 1991. In 1994, the OECD published the *Frascati Handbook*, which provides a similar definition. Scientific and technological innovation was seen as the transformation of an idea into a saleable, new or improved product, into an operational process in industry or commerce, or into a new social method (Băloi, Frăsineanu, 2001, p. 40).

Regarding the options of the Romanian specialists, we can consider that they also converge either towards the economic field, par excellence, or towards a boarder approach, with elements specific to the societal macro-environment. Usually, for the Romanian authors, *innovation* is an achievement consisting in the application of new ideas, products or technologies, or it is considered to be the process of transferring an idea or a new concept into the final stage of new products, processes, activities or services accepted on the market.



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“Innovation” is understood as a process aimed at producing and transforming ideas into practical processes and activities or new methods of research, respectively management of the human, social or natural environment.

Innovation is one of the concepts that has entered the area of theoretical concerns of specialists in various fields. J.B. Taylor is presented as the first author to use the term “innovation”, understood as a new way of doing things to meet a social need.

Furthermore, this term has a normative content stipulated in the Government Ordinance no. 57/2002, which specifies that the research-development activity includes fundamental research, applicative research, and technological development (OUG no. 57, 2002, art. 6) At the end of this normative act, *innovation* is defined as an activity oriented towards the generation, assimilation and capitalisation of research and development results in the economic and social sphere.

Several other authors directly target the content of *innovation* in the educational process, considering that it is a deliberate activity, which aims to introduce a novelty in a given context; furthermore, it has a pedagogical dimension, because it aims to substantially improve student training through a situation of interaction and interactivity (Béchar, 2001, p. 263).

Based on the given definitions, we appreciate that *innovation* is understood as a process aimed at producing and transforming ideas into practical processes and activities or new methods of research, respectively management of the human, social or natural environment.

In our opinion, we are witnessing the development of new variants or more complex models for the innovation process, which directs the effort towards a better knowledge and exploitation of what is specific to the content of innovation (Slătineanu, 2005, p. 29).

In turn, innovation is one of the concepts that has entered the area of theoretical concerns of specialists in various fields. J.B. Taylor is presented as the first author to use the term *innovation*, understood as a new way of doing things to meet a social need (Pogolșa, 2016, p. 3).

In the context of the concerns of some international bodies and organisations and of some authors regarding definitions of innovation from the perspective of the general field of reference, a special place is occupied by the definition of social innovation. The agreed OECD definition is that “*social innovation represents new ideas [...] refers to the improvement of economic opportunities and quality of life and can refer to social welfare, working conditions, labour force, community development*” (Règimbald, 2007, p. 10).

For the research team on social innovation in enterprises and unions, (CRISIS – Centre de recherché sur les innovations sociales – a Canadian national body), social innovation means “*all new approaches, practices or interventions, along with all newly created products,*

all new services for the improvement of a situation or the solution of a social problem, which occur at the level of institutions, organisations, communities” (Bouchard, 1999, pp. 1-26).

Furthermore, the education system, as a system focused on innovation, has utilised many options for the clarification of this concept in and for this field. Considered as a benchmark for defining innovation in education, Allen M. Huberman states it is “*a measurable, deliberate, sustainable, and unlikely frequent improvement*” (1973, p. 7). The same author differentiates between innovations that introduce technical changes, innovation of a conceptual nature (new courses, new educational programmes, new teaching methods) and, respectively, those that introduce changes in interpersonal relationships (ib., pp. 20-21).

In the same area of concern, in an attempt to establish a definition much more correlated with the particularities of innovation in education, the *Council for Social Research and Activity on Technological and Social Innovation* from Canada suggests three dimensions of innovation, namely: *the curricular dimension*– innovation at the level of study programmes; *the pedagogical dimension* – innovation at the level of the educational process and *the organisational dimension* – innovation at the level of structure, roles and functions fulfilled by the persons involved in the education process (Rapport annuel, 2004/2005).

Analysing the issue of *innovation* in higher education, another author, J.P. Béchar (ib., p. 267) proposes a list of favourable or inhibitory factors that influence innovation, all depending on the context in which they function.

The localisation of *progress* and *innovation* from different perspectives has created misunderstandings of the possibilities to differentiate between them, because the boundaries that separate them are less visible and more difficult to detect. However, we can argue that the two concepts are synonymous within the same reality, even if in the Romanian language we utilise two different words (“*inovație*” and “*inovare*”), whose entry point in the language is generated by two different roots, namely English for the former and French for the latter.

In our opinion, *innovation* has in its intimacy the capacity and strength to change something, while *progress* brings the new



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“Progress” in military higher education can be defined as the idea, action or process, respectively the set of ideas, actions, processes and technical means of a deliberate nature, as bearers of novelty and originality, which ensure modification or transformation at managerial, curricular, structural and functional levels of the academic environment, through which academic excellence is obtained and maintained in order to sustainably increase the performance of military education and modernise the military university.

to the highest possible rank by making available something surprising, extremely novel, which completely transforms the reality known until that time. If *innovation* is much closer to improvement, *progress* can be defined as a process of transformation, for which the relevant originality and the absolute novelty of discovery are the essential attributes.

From these perspectives, we consider that it is necessary to delimit the concepts of *innovation* and *progress* in the military university, respectively the concepts of *innovative military university* and *progressive military university*. We postulate that *innovation* in military higher education is the idea, action or process, respectively the set of ideas, actions, processes and technical means of novelty that intentionally determine and ensure qualitative improvement or change in structural, curricular and managerial terms in order to improve performance in military education and in the activity of the military university.

Based on the same arguments presented above, we consider that *progress* in military higher education can be defined as the idea, action or process, respectively the set of ideas, actions, processes and technical means of a deliberate nature, as bearers of novelty and originality, which ensure modification or transformation at managerial, curricular, structural and functional levels of the academic environment, through which academic excellence is obtained and maintained in order to sustainably increase the performance of military education and modernise the military university.

When we discuss the definition of the *innovative* or *progressive* military university, we could summarise the approach by the fact that one meets the attributes of military innovation, while the other focuses on progress at the level of military higher education. However, developing the above aspects, we can say that if the innovative military university supports and promotes innovative policies and strategies that ensure the overall improvement of institutional performance, then the progressive military university obtains, maintains and promotes high performance policies and strategies specific to modern military university. Although constructed to delineate and explain the concepts of innovation and progress at military university level, the definitions can be extended to the entire military education system. For example,

if a proposal is made to change the content at the level of military higher education and this must be constantly taken into account, then it is necessary to change it at the level of the application schools or of the postgraduate courses.

Our intention and desire to clarify these concepts are in line with the evolution of the scientific epistemological approaches that aim not only to customise the specific terms of one science or another, but also to find the same meanings in the concepts with which they operate. We believe that presenting the opinions of specialists and institutions as well as our own point of view regarding the concepts of *innovation*, *progress*, *innovative military university* or *progressive military university* help strengthen the need to understand that a modern military university must develop a coherent conception of its own possibilities in order to meet the challenges posed by the place and role it needs to offer to scientific research, progress and innovation.

EDUCATION, SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND INNOVATION – THE SUCCESSFUL TRIAD FOR A MODERN MILITARY UNIVERSITY

On 21 November 1999, the Prime Minister of Italy, Giuseppe D’Alema, invited the presidents of Italy, the United States of America and Brazil, as well as the prime ministers of France, England and Germany (considered the most reformist heads of state) to Florence, for a meeting aimed to discuss developments towards the 21st century. It has been stated there that the major developments in the 21st century will be driven by two factors: *education* and *innovation*. The European Union’s efforts to designate 2009 as the “*European Year of Creativity and Innovation*” (Regional Centre Northern Transylvania, 2008) are part of the same initiative (<http://europedirect.nordvest.ro>).

In the context of understanding that only through research and innovation can knowledge be produced as a vital source of well-being and solving the new challenges of the knowledge-based society, European states have developed national systems and strategies and have increased their competitive international interactions. This is also the case of Romania, which, after the first *National Strategy for Research, Development and Innovation* (2007-2013), and in the context of the commitments assumed with reference to Europe 2020 Strategy,



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Romania, after the first National Strategy for Research, Development and Innovation (2007-2013), and in the context of the commitments assumed with reference to Europe 2020 Strategy, has based its National Strategy in the field of research, technological development and innovation for 2014-2020.



has based its *National Strategy in the field of research, technological development and innovation* for 2014-2020 (<http://www.cdi2020.ro>).

The establishment and achievement of these major goals place the modern university, through its objectives and mission, among the pillars able to ensure a favourable environment for education, scientific research and innovation, as an institution generating knowledge and training future academic graduates with innovative personalities. The modern university, as a catalyst for scientific research, will become the strong core of scientific creation through innovation and dissemination based on high-performance methods and technologies.

The immediate logical consequence is that even the modern military university can no longer stick to simplistic educational content, outdated teaching-learning-assessment strategies, mentalities trapped in the shell of minimal educational effort, based only on own experiences, empirical and unscientific procedures, often sterile speculation. It is necessary to discover the essential landmarks of the modern military university, representative for these first decades of the 21st century. In this regard, we appreciate that the modern or, more precisely, the postmodern military university can increasingly become one of the main factors generating military scientific knowledge, whose openness to scientific research and innovation represents its existential landmark. A first requirement for a modern military university is the correct identification and establishment of the essential milestones of theoretical approaches to research and innovation in the university, in general, in the military university, in particular, based on the views of renowned authors or academic institutions, as well as on the contents of strategies tailored to national military education, NATO, the European Union and other foreign armed forces.

Once the general theoretical and conceptual framework of military academic innovation has been deciphered and understood, we move on to assessing the factors that can enhance its own creative, innovative heritage, especially that specific to new knowledge, as the military university balances the indicators of high-performance innovation, specific to military higher education, with its scientific potential, in terms of human, financial, technical, structural and managerial resources.

Nonetheless, in order to develop and establish the appropriate strategy, the military university will make a careful analysis of the internal and external factors that greatly contribute to ensuring the characteristics and performance of a university open to scientific research and academic innovation.

Knowledge and permanent consideration of both internal and external factors will increase the likelihood of redefining and substantiating efficient management strategies in the military university, thus accelerating the implementation of the research-development-innovation process. Only thus will there be chances to enrol the military university among higher education institutions of excellence with national and international recognition in terms of research and innovation results.

That is why, in order to increase the success of the innovation process, it is important for the military university to achieve and promote a permanent and well-delimited transfer of responsibilities in the educational process, through the direct involvement of a variety of actors (national and international military and civilian universities, academic staff, representatives of military units and higher armed forces leadership structures, soldiers participating in theatres of operations etc.). The involvement of a wide range of different actors is beneficial, given that innovation involves the acquisition of new views, different perspectives on the same issues and dialogue to establish strategies for transforming the military higher education institution and increasing the capacity to consider new approaches in organising and conducting military actions.

Within the strategic innovative university management, the general projection of the strategy for implementing the specific requirements of scientific research and innovation is developed based on these well-diagnosed data. Thus, special attention will be paid to establishing, achieving and consolidating an innovative environment by developing a coherent system of criteria for assessing the creative, innovative capacity of the academic staff, scientific researchers and students. This system will have to be implemented equally in scientific research and in didactical activity.

We appreciate that the innovative scientific spirit is neither opposite nor foreign to the didactic spirit. In order for faculty members



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The knowledge of foreign languages plays an ever-increasing role in all the activities that can generate the necessary conditions to identify and achieve performance in innovation, at the level of military university, of the faculty and students alike. The opportunities offered by foreign languages create the possibility to open new avenues for knowledge, which becomes essential for education and academic scientific research, respectively for the promotion of partnerships with other international military and civilian universities.

and students to become true innovators, it is necessary that they should receive specialised training in the military university, based on a well-defined conception and in a motivating environment, typified by an innovative culture and mentality. Active participation in didactical activity and scientific research, by stimulating arguments and critical thinking, contributes to the development of creativity, scientific imagination, and the ability to discover and build the new and, consequently, ensure academic innovation. In the military educational process, it is necessary for students not only to be connected with the “known” but also to use their interaction strategies with the “unknown”. It is important that both the faculty and the cadets should understand the true value of taking charge of their own training and implicitly of their own destiny. In the absence of collaboration, cooperation and trust, of the will and presence of the permanent spirit of renewal, the military academic environment remains dependent on conservatism, without possibilities to benefit from the mobilising the energy that drives scientific innovation.

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The aspects presented here can be considered suggestions for the knowledge and management of some of the specific actions of innovation in the modern military university. However, there are still other questions to which the best answers must be sought and identified. For example, questions such as: *What factors may determine faculty members or students to know or apply the specific mechanisms of an innovative activity?* (Slătineanu, 2001, p. 3) *What are the conditions and factors that can contribute to the engagement of academic management in the innovation process? What are the qualities that promote the innovative spirit of students and faculty members?*

With regard to the answer to the latter question, it is very important to highlight the characteristics and criteria specific to the innovative competence of academia. They can be:

- *ease of identifying and solving problems;*
- *availability and risk-taking capacity, inevitable for any renewal;*
- *creative imagination and permanent optimism;*
- *ability to communicate with people;*
- *high-performance training and consolidated experience in a certain field;*
- *originality and novelty of ideas, solutions, behaviours;*
- *desire to achieve performance in the field;*
- *rich fantasy;*
- *ability to lead a group of people.*

As a consequence, these qualities are indispensable for the innovative individual – teacher or student, so that their activities may be successful. We must also take into account that the history of science shows us that some of the greatest discoveries were made by very young people (for example: Niels Bohr was under 25 when he discovered the structure of the atom; Einstein, too, when he published the first article on the theory of relativity; Bill Gates was a student when he imagined the new business model promoted by *Microsoft*, Larry Page and Sergey Brin were students when they created the new Internet search system, on which they founded the famous *Google* Company).

Therefore, the university professor is the one who becomes the initiator, coordinator and manager of the process meant to meet the three intrinsic components of the postmodern military university missions, respectively education, research and innovation.

Faculty members, students and research teams need to be encouraged to develop their ideas, to be creative, to have initiative, to be supported to try all directions of creative effort, while being given autonomy in expressing themselves. Academic management must lead the strategy of the modern military university for research and innovation, without dictating how each stage and operation should be carried out (Nica, Iftimescu, 2008, p. 66).

The optimal use of each and all innovative requirements can create and strengthen the innovative academic environment and thus the formation of an innovative culture capable of ensuring the efficiency



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Research and innovation depend on a clear strategy of the military university, on well-defined objectives, on competent management, on the establishment and functioning of groups, on cohesive and efficient interdisciplinary teams, on the existence of objective and motivating performance evaluation procedures, respectively on a competitive and collaborative climate.

needed for scientific research and innovation as essential dimensions of the modern military university. Therefore, in order for a military university to be identified and maintained as a modern university, it is necessary to occupy a position that allows it to compete in the field of scientific research and innovation, through a continuous search for change, for novelty, not simply for the sake of being innovative, but rather as an existential condition, as an institution for which research-development-innovation are the requirements of the normality of specific activities stemming from its academic status.

CONCLUSIONS

Innovation has become a specific and necessary component for the development of human society, with new distinct aspects and significant developments in the first decades of the 21st century.

The quantitative and qualitative accumulations made during its evolution show that the roots and factors contributing to innovation have been represented by people taken as isolated individuals or as members of groups and collectives with distinct responsibilities in this regard. On these coordinates, a specific nucleus has appeared and manifested itself – that of the organisation and development of scientific research and university innovation.

Therefore, society in general, every layer in its structure, the individual and the universe have been the fundamental landmarks from which significant questions arise regarding the place and role of the modern university, its mission and objectives. Considering this reality alone, the *modern military university* appears as a necessity and hope to efficiently manage the military academic educational phenomenon, the multidimensionality and the infinity of variables that it subsumes.

Today, every military university wishes to become a modern, high-performance military institution with a real and wide recognition in the field of education and academic research. Bound by the very important role it plays in society and in the field of the military education system, it must substantiate and create the necessary conditions for the functioning of the *education-research-innovation* paradigm.

Research and innovation depend on a clear strategy of the military university, on well-defined objectives, on competent management, on the establishment and functioning of groups, on cohesive and efficient interdisciplinary teams, on the existence of objective and motivating

performance evaluation procedures, respectively on a competitive and collaborative climate.

We consider that the *Romanian military university* has continuously and increasingly managed to take new important steps in the field of *research-development-innovation*. Further visible and effective intervention is needed at the level of each military university, of the national military university system and of other factors outside it to ensure the necessary conditions for an innovative modern university open to addressing the requirements of military theory, science and practice.

Therefore, only if understood and supported, can scientific research and innovation become more productive, by creating an academic research environment and a research culture based and developed on innovation.

It is absolutely clear that we are facing new transformations that require the preparation of tomorrow's officers for a more distant future, in which the military profession will demand a new system of values, a different lifestyle, and different patterns of thinking, different behaviours and conducts. This change requires new forms of military academic education, roles and actions specific to the military university among which scientific research and innovation will be dominant factors, the only ones able to vitalise scientific creation and focus the intellectual energies of faculty and students on increasing and maintaining high-performance indicators specific to the modern military university.

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CULTURAL INFLUENCES AND INTERACTIONS WITHIN AERONAUTICAL ORGANISATIONAL SYSTEMS AS PREREQUISITES FOR OPERATIONAL PROCESSES

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In the society we live in culture tends to become an abstraction, but the elements created in a social and organisational context that derive from culture are extremely important. If we do not understand how to manage these elements, which are in a complex and dynamic system, such as in the aeronautical system, then we will become their victim. Cultures have an impressive ability to create cohesion, performance and identity. They provide rules that allow diversity, regardless of its nature, to coexist. All organisations have a culture, and that of an aeronautical organisation must achieve maximum efficiency in risk conditions.

Knowing the influences of each subculture helps reduce risks, costs, and improves the organisation's efficiency and air safety. This paper aims to present the main cultures, and the link between them, within an aeronautical system and, at the same time, to help raise awareness of the importance of understanding the cultural elements in order to improve efficiency during operational processes.

Keywords: culture; organisation; efficiency; aeronautical safety; operational processes;



INTRODUCTION

The real efforts to achieve a high level of safety should take into account the need to understand culture and the various cultural influences existing in the conducted operations. The fundamental premise is that it is essential to build on the strengths of national culture and enhance professionalism and organisational culture to achieve a robust safety culture.

Culture surrounds us, it is not something tangible, material. The Indian leader Mahatma Gandhi stated that *“the culture of a nation is found in the hearts and souls of its people”*. It influences the values, beliefs, attitudes and behaviour within a group of people. Cultures are meant to improve the relations within a group and to provide indications and directions regarding the proper behaviour in normal and/or unusual situations.

The lessons learned are those that make us aware that the aeronautical systems development must have as a starting point the organisation. The culture within the aeronautical organisation is what determines, or not, the progress, which influences the mentality and attitudes, but especially, it is the one that conditions the level of aeronautical safety. In order to achieve performance and meet the desired objectives, the first steps are to understand the theories and managerial principles, to thoroughly know all elements, positive or negative within the system, and to effectively adapt, in accordance with the particularities of the system in which the implementation of these elements is intended.

Good organisation is achieved only through an efficient culture; there are no good or bad cultures, everything is related to the underlying values. The existing culture within an organisation has the role of stabilising internal processes, even when the staff involved have other points of view for moral reasons. The level of stability determines the strength of that organisation, and the way in which

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the objectives are met reflects the values that underlie the culture. The issue of culture and the need to define values very clearly are not new aspects. Thus, in his paper *A Proposed Code of Ethics for Air Force Officers*, H.G. Jensen (1968) offered two examples of values that have the role of imposing stability and from which a power with positive or negative effects can result.

The first example is *The American Revolutionary War* (1775-1783) where the probability of success of revolutionaries, under the austere conditions and the power deficit existing at that time, was extremely low, but overcoming encountered obstacles in the fight with an experienced and professional army, General Washington managed to achieve victory. The mentioned historic success, in Jensen's opinion, was probably the result of the ethics and values at that time, which acted as elements of force for the American revolutionaries. The second example of values that acted as a factor of power in history is Germany led by Hitler. For a short time, Germany was a stable and strong country, achieving its proposed objectives. The values imposed by Hitler were directed towards conflict, not peace, which pushed him to execute certain military manoeuvres that did not have a realistic execution. History shows us that military success is directly related to ethics because, from a rational point of view, it determines the quality of leadership in an organisation (Janseen, lb., p.78).

Cultures cannot necessarily be categorised as good or bad, but they can be called so when we talk about resulting effects. Cultures are learned by the members of an organisation, so a change of mentality at organisational level requires a lot of discussion, communication and learning. Changing people's behaviour is another difficult aspect, because people have some fixed patterns that they follow as automatisms, being generally unaware of their own assumptions. Leaders change culture by implementing values and beliefs different from existing ones and by materialising them with words and deeds. Subcultures are present in any organisation, small or large, and in order to be able to modify these subcultures, those that already exist must be very well understood.

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THE MAIN CULTURES IN AVIATION AND THE RELATION BETWEEN THEM

For aeronautical personnel there are three cultures that shape actions and attitudes. The first, of course, is *national culture*. There is also a *professional culture*, having strong effects, which is associated with belonging to the category of aeronautical personnel. At the same time, *organisations have their own culture*, which is closely linked with the daily activities of its members. While national culture is very resistant to change because it influences the individual since birth, the professional and organisational cultures can be changed if there are strong incentives.

National culture represents the common components of national heritage. It includes behavioural norms, attitudes and values. Certain aspects of national culture have been identified as critical in aviation; among them the following can be mentioned: individualism-collectivism, power distance, avoidance of uncertainty or consideration of rules and discipline. Individualism focuses on the individual and his personal benefits while collectivism focuses on the group. Collectivism is often associated with power distance, which reflects the will to accept unequal statutes and respect for superiors. Behaviourally, the superior power distance is the refusal to question the decisions or actions of leaders, even when they are inappropriate. When we talk about a proactive mentality to avoid uncertainty (rules and discipline), it is considered that existing rules should not be violated, even if this would be beneficial for the organisation and its safety. A mindset against avoiding uncertainty is prone to disregarding standard operating procedures, but it can still be more effective in developing methods of cooperation in unknown situations (Helmreich, 1999, p. 2).

Communication between people from different national cultures is often damaged by language barriers as well as by cultural values. The fact that English is (in theory and in practice) a universal language may accentuate the problem. While people from different cultures speak several languages, those in the Anglophone sphere frequently speak English, so it may be possible for them to not understand the problems because other cultures have a different way of expressing



For aeronautical personnel there are three cultures that shape actions and attitudes. The first, of course, is national culture. There is also a professional culture, having strong effects, which is associated with belonging to the category of aeronautical personnel. At the same time, organisations have their own culture, which is closely linked with the daily activities of its members.



National culture differentiates nation-specific features, including the role, place, and individual image of specialists in society, of the organisations to which they belong, as well as the aeronautical activities (including the military ones).

Organisational culture sums up the usual practices and habits of aeronautical organisations; however, certain practices and habits that have become a norm in daily operations do not ensure a high level of safety.

in English. There is no simple solution to language problem, but it must be accepted and confronted.

National culture differentiates nation-specific features, including the role, place, and individual image of specialists in society, of the organisations to which they belong, as well as the aeronautical activities (including the military ones). This component also includes, in general terms, the way and criteria for allocating, understanding and accepting authority; distribution of resources; responsibility and guilt; morality (Ib.).

A beneficial aspect in pilots' culture is the pride in their profession. They love their chosen profession and they are very motivated to progress and achieve everything very well. This can help organisations to improve operational safety and efficiency. The professional culture of pilots has also a strong negative component in the context of personal invulnerability. It has been found that most pilots in all cultures consider their ability to make decisions in crisis situations to be as effective as in normal situations, that their performance is not affected by personal problems and that they do not make more mistakes in situations of intense stress. This misperception of personal invulnerability may be the result of a failure to properly use management practices as measures against errors (Ib.).

Organisational culture sums up the usual practices and habits of aeronautical organisations; however, certain practices and habits that have become a norm in daily operations do not ensure a high level of safety. The mentioned actions, as well as overloading the aircraft by reaching the limits of flight envelope can become commonplace in activities within an aeronautical organisation. Once they have become a norm and everyone is accustomed to and accept them, those elements that pose a real danger are omitted. In aviation the systems are prone to error. In this respect, one must be aware of the practices and habits that have become norm. Certain beliefs, practices and habits that exist in aeronautical culture can be perceived as both positive and negative. In some cases, dangerous practices may be exploited. Some people believe that such practices/attitudes demonstrate superior skills and they are nothing more than a way in which they can be demonstrated.

In other situations, safe practices, such as refusing to fly tired or not flying when weather conditions are unfavourable, may be perceived as negative by operational air units or by management structures (Sedam, 2006).

An organisation represents the framework in which the national and professional cultures operate, having an important role for behaviour. At organisational level, culture has the greatest influence and it is exercised to create, maintain and sustain the culture of safety. Achieving it requires strong senior management to demonstrate commitment to safety, as well as implementation of policies, regulations that encourage communication and actions rather than denial, in response to undiscovered issues and risks. Together, the organisational and professional culture, placed in the same spirit of simultaneous support, coherent and balanced approach to performance (operational capacity), quality (compliance with rules/rules) and safety (protection of people, property and environment) can be the powerful engine for organisational development.

Culture shapes attitudes about stress and personal abilities; it also influences adherence to standard operating procedures and the way automations are used. Each of these three cultures has strengths and weaknesses. Strengths increase safety, and weaknesses diminish it (Helmreich, Ib., p. 3)

Although the interpretations of definitions regarding organisational culture are varied, the way in which they are developed can help us to understand its nature and content. It continuously operates with various interorganisational factors and substantially influences the efficiency of operations as well as the organisational development. Organisational culture coordinates all ongoing processes. Everything that happens within an organisation as well as everything that is produced as independent entity or in the interest of society, with direct influence on the environment and general public, is the result of collective work.

The success of an organisation consists in achieving the desired objectives in the context of challenges and economic and financial situation at a certain time. The most important element is represented by people – the human resource, who must know and master modern



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Jim Hall, President of National Transportation Safety Board/NTSB, stated three ideas/starting points related to organisational culture, as follows: beliefs held by staff and managers within an organisation about how operations should be conducted; practices and habits that have become the norm; how different factors can be exploited in a manner that is either positive or negative.

methods and procedures and the operating modes for equipment. Moreover, they must be also aware of their involvement, quality of work and responsibility at the group, team and management levels.

On 24 April 1997, Jim Hall, President of National Transportation Safety Board/NTSB, stated three ideas/starting points related to organisational culture (Sedam, 2006), as follows:

- beliefs held by staff and managers within an organisation about how operations should be conducted;
- practices and habits that have become the norm;
- how different factors can be exploited in a manner that is either positive or negative.

These three ideas are, without a doubt, applicable in any modern aeronautical system, and for a better understanding of how these elements affect the organisation, different events must be analysed, an example in this regard being the Challenger space shuttle catastrophe. On 28 January 1986, space shuttle Challenger, having a seven-member crew on board, exploded 73 seconds after launch. It happened because of a technical failure in one of the propellant rockets. Even if the explanation in the final report was relevant and correct, highlighting a technical problem, the organisational culture that existed within NASA at that time was the one that contributed to the mentioned accident because it normalised the attitude that made the decision to launch the rocket. The way in which the culture was organised was questioned, because the decision-makers omitted certain elements, alarm signals, which announced a possible malfunction of the component that failed. Organisational culture is intrinsically linked to safety and it should be a topic of discussion to positively affect safety culture within aeronautical organisations.

Cultures are deeply rooted and their values can be so resistant to change, especially for airlines with strong identity, that desired changes cannot be achieved without determination or generic training programmes. For this reason, organisational culture can be much more difficult to change than policies or processes. However, a combined change in the management programme that involves personal motivations can have dramatic effects in a relatively short time.



The culture in the structure of aeronautical organisations can significantly differ from one organisation to another. Philosophies, values and expectations at group level can be considered as the culture of an organisation. The attitude and safety practices developed at group level are direct results of organisational culture. Every system has a safety culture, not just the aeronautical one, but the question is whether safety is a priority or not.

SAFETY CULTURE – FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENT OF OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY. THE INFLUENCE OF ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE ON SAFETY

The main issue is how the safety culture of the aeronautical organisation is determined; from the moment safety culture is established, then it must be known how it can be influenced, so modelled.

An organisation with a good organisational culture is one in which safety and professional behaviour are fully internalised in the personnel way of thinking and action. Safety is perceived as a necessity during all air operations in which safety and professional practices are not only supported by management, but also proactively demonstrated. The activities and attitudes in the spirit of aeronautical safety must lead to the identification of causes and factors of influence as well as of their activation mechanisms in order to prevent the occurrence of other aviation events.

Depending on aeronautical organisation and its operational particularities, there can sometimes be pressure because of the financial aspects related to preparing an aircraft for flight in a short time and with functional sacrifices. Given these circumstances, it is very easy to develop a poor safety culture, in which staff members are congratulated and rewarded for preparing the aircraft in a short time, even if everyone knows that compromises have been made to achieve the end result. As an adverse reaction, this attitude can transform the organisational culture in such a way that omissions and violations become commonplace and then become accepted as normal within the organisation. The cultures having such characteristics can be very difficult to modify, the process being a slow one.

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Safety culture represents the sustainable values and priorities that affect the individual and the public safety of each member of a group at all organisational levels. It refers to the extent to which individuals and groups assume obligations regarding personal safety responsibilities, such as: actions to maintain, improve and communicate safety-related elements; the desire for continuous learning, adaptation and modification (both individually and organisationally) of behaviour based on lessons learned; recognition of merits in an appropriate manner in relation to the values of adopted culture (Zhang, Wiegmann, Thaden, Sharma, Mitchell, 2002, p. 3).

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The safety climate is a temporal state to measure the safety culture, with common topics between individual perceptions within the organisation. It is, therefore, based on situation, and refers to a perceived state of safety at a certain moment and time; it is relatively unstable, and subject to changes, depending on the attributes of environment or prevailing conditions (Ib.). The organisational climate changes very quickly following a significant event, but there is a possibility that the organisational culture cannot change enough to prevent future events. In these situations, management structures will act to implement changes, usually by establishing additional control methods (quality management).

In an aeronautical organisation, the safety culture should be very strong (figure no. 1), analysing *what people do, not what they say*. Several factors contribute to the creation of a strong safety culture, such as:

- commitment to transparent management;
- effective communication when it comes to safety elements;
- safety is considered, in the organisation mindset, more important than the desired objectives;
- the organisation must always have the willingness to accumulate new knowledge;
- active participation is needed to enforce safety;
- it is ideal to have a sufficient amount of health and safety resources available;
- low level of inappropriate safety behaviours;

- trust between management and higher echelons;
- effective maintenance management;
- high level of competence (Shaw, Flynn, 2010, p. 35).




Figure no. 1: Important organisational aspects of safety culture (Shaw, Flynn, 2010, p. 5)



The structure of aeronautical organisations includes a number of common subcultures such as: executive culture, technological culture, operational culture, regulatory culture.

The structure of aeronautical organisations includes a number of common subcultures such as: *executive culture* – focuses on financial issues, analysis, processes, information and abstractions, being a direct and control culture; *technological culture* – focuses on scientific elements, equipment, automation, technological information and others; *operational culture* – aims to carry out the actual processes; *regulatory culture* – emphasises the role of authorities, the role of experts and the role of public, organisational activities being influenced by this type of subculture.

The safety culture consists of eight key elements (subcultures) as follows: informed culture, reporting culture, just culture, learning culture, flexibility culture, risk perception, safety attitude and safety behaviour. The first five elements were identified by James Reason and are complemented by three elements identified in the works of the Civil Air Navigation Services Organisation – CANSO (figure no. 2).

Informed culture is based on reporting culture that, in turn, is based on just culture. All organisational personnel must understand



and recognise that it is unacceptable for all errors and unsafe actions to be punished regardless of their origin and circumstances, while immunity from sanctions is unacceptable to all actions that contribute, or may contribute, to organisational accidents. The culture of justice, in general terms, refers to a set of principles that delimit acceptable from unacceptable actions (CANSO 2008, p. 5).

Reporting culture depends on the way the organisation manages accountability and sanctions. If blaming is a routine response to errors, then the reports do not have the same meaning; on the other hand, if blame is the result of unsatisfactory behaviour involving, for example, indifference or malicious actions, reporting will not be discouraged. Informed culture refers to embedded management culture where people understand dangers and inherent risks in operational dynamics. Personnel must be provided with necessary knowledge, skills and lessons learned to work safely, they should be encouraged to identify elements that may affect safety and take necessary and effective measures to eliminate them; a good informed culture depends on the quality of reporting culture. Reports are efficient for the organisation if one can learn from it. Learning arises from both reactive and proactive safety assessments and it is promoted through the organisational desire to adapt and improve. A safety culture is flexible, in the context that the decision-making process varies depending on the situation and different operational variables.

Individuals at all organisational levels must have the same perceptions and reasoning regarding the severity of risks, as these perceptions affect behaviour and decision-making. Risk perception or people's reasoning about risk are influenced by different hazards attributes (e.g., controllable-uncontrollable). The attitude regarding safety is the result of the perceptions and behaviours towards safety, which gets materialised not only by respecting procedures, rules and regulations, but also by training, discrimination, communication, demonstration and mutual support.

It must be mentioned and understood that there are interrelations between elements. These connections, in turn, depend on the role played by management structures in establishing the policies, procedures and tools needed to manage the above elements and ensure their dynamic success.

Informed culture refers to embedded management culture where people understand dangers and inherent risks in operational dynamics. Personnel must be provided with necessary knowledge, skills and lessons learned to work safely, they should be encouraged to identify elements that may affect safety and take necessary and effective measures to eliminate them.



Figure no. 2: Elements of a safety culture (CANSO, lb.)

An example of how organisational culture can affect safety culture is Boeing's recent history, as proven following the two air disasters from Indonesia, on 29 October 2018, (flight Lion Air 610) and from Ethiopia, on 10 March 2019, (flight Ethiopian Airlines 302), involving Boeing 737 MAX 8 aircraft.

Boeing aircraft safety has proven to be particularly high among US airlines – many companies have preferred Boeing aircraft in their own fleets over others. US companies did not have any fatal accidents for nine years until 2018 when a passenger died after being almost pulled out of the aircraft during flight because of a broken window – the event occurred on a Southwest Airlines flight. This state of safety was the main element that led to a very high level of confidence in the equipment and systems implemented on Boeing's aircraft for operators in the US commercial air transport market.

It is a proven mistake to believe that progress in the field of automation has made flight much safer; Boeing's mistake was also human error. Gapper (2019) said that Boeing was lured into hubris due to its commercial success and safety record. They did not start from the premise that they could be so wrong in trying to support the human factor by implementing the MCAS (Manoeuvring Characteristics Augmentation System), which acts on flight controls; as an adverse



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reaction, this system, in both air disasters, was the main cause for the fight between man and machine, for priority over flight commands, the system receiving erroneous information from sensors regarding the aircraft's flight attitude.

The two aircraft that crashed in Indonesia and Ethiopia had one thing in common: they were not equipped with safety features that could have prevented these accidents. These items were optional, with Boeing implementing them on aircraft only if requested by airlines, implicitly paying for them.

The mentioned optional elements could have helped pilots understand the problem in a timely manner, and aeronautics experts say they should not have been optional from the start. Bjorn Fehrm, an analyst at aeronautical consulting firm Leeham, said that *“these are critical elements and the cost is almost nothing for the airlines. Boeing is asking for money for them because it can. But they are vital to flight safety”*.

The implementation of a new system led to several problems, which could have been avoided through communication – organisational and interorganisational reporting system – and a much more active involvement of those in aeronautical structures. All these aspects can be remedied in the future only by creating a well-defined plan/algorithm/process to follow well-defined and logical steps to improve operational quality with implementation of new technologies and many features that can create new risks.

Following the two events, Boeing will implement the warning elements not only on new aircraft but also on the operational ones, in addition to updating the 737 MAX 8 aircraft control system software.

Regarding this situation within Boeing, Cătălin Prunariu (2020, p. 39) concludes: *“At the moment, Boeing is facing an identity crisis rather than a financial crisis. To get out of this impasse, the company will have to redefine its entire set of policies and hierarchical relations between employees. They will also have to change their approach regarding risk management. The main role of feedback from employees and small management, particularly the one that reports risks associated with flight safety, will be very important and will have to reach the highest levels of company management. Managers in upper*

echelons will have to take this information into account and adjust their decisions accordingly, putting first the aviation safety and production quality and secondly the financial interests. To achieve these goals, a new leadership will be needed, with a set of values unaltered by the company culture that has existed so far”.

It is obvious that even within Boeing there is a problem of organisational culture that directly affects safety culture; therefore, the values needed to improve the efficiency and safety of the aircraft they produce must be redefined and implemented in order to realign them to the worldwide needs and rigours of commercial air transport market.

CONCLUSIONS

Although it is a rare topic, culture is of fundamental importance not only in the development of aeronautical organisation, but also in improving the operational processes carried out in order to achieve the established objectives.

Every process must have a starting point, a foundation, and culture is the one that has the role of establishing this foundation on which to continue the organisational development, constantly taking into account those elements of adjacent culture – national and professional – to optimise processes and thus to improve efficiency.

The problem of organisational culture has theoretical solutions, being a very complex phenomenon, difficult to define and which can have unpleasant repercussions, but which significantly affects the long-term success of an organisation. It can be the source of power for an organisation, being a strong advantage, or it can hinder the development of an organisation, there being the possibility that it will be the main element that will destroy it.

Each organisation has its own particularities. To a large extent, these particularities are, from my point of view, influenced by national culture. There is no ideal pattern for culture. An effective culture for achieving a strong system depends on how its particularities and characteristics are understood, adapted and managed. In order to achieve performance, a leader must be aware of such particularities and characteristics, identifying them in time, and adapt into the internal



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organisational structure the necessary elements to achieve a strong culture system, with clearly defined values, beliefs, visions and habits on the basis of which a strong aeronautical system can be developed and maintained.

Every organisation wants to achieve performance, to be efficient, but in order to achieve it, there is a constant need to improve knowledge. Society is constantly evolving, and organisations must adapt to its requirements; moreover, through its contribution to society and its desire to improve final results, the organisation must have not only the ambition and skills to draw relevant conclusions from its work, but also the will for major reforms if necessary.

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POLISH SPECIAL FORCES IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND: THE LEGAL ASPECTS

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The changing nature of global and national security threats have made Special Forces the fundament of many states' armed forces. This article focuses on the Polish Special Forces, their roles and functions, both independently and in cooperation with other armed services of the Republic of Poland. After outlining the Polish national security system, the analysis proceeds with a discussion of the modalities of the Special Forces functioning in the times of peace, crisis and war. The article concludes with suggestions regarding legislative changes which would contribute to further development of the Polish Special Forces.

Keywords: special forces; national and international security; asymmetric and hybrid threats; military alliances; command and control;

“There is another type of warfare – new in its intensity, ancient in its origin – war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of by combat, by infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him. It preys on unrest”.

U.S. President John F. Kennedy, 1962

INTRODUCTION

Polish *raison d'état* is the idea of the state's functioning based on the existing international and national political conditions, financial possibilities of the Republic of Poland, historical experiences, as well as economic, social and military potential (*Polish National Security Strategy*, 2014, p. 8). Fundamental interests of the state, ensuring the existence of the state as an international law subject, are the rules defined in the Polish Constitution: safeguarding “the independence and integrity of its territory”¹ (*Constitution of the Republic of Poland*, 1997), as well as ensuring national security.

The subject of the national security of the Republic of Poland is the nation – the sovereign body – organised as a state (*White Book on National Security of the Republic of Poland*, 2013, p. 248). People unite and create a state, conceived as the highest form of organisation, precisely for the reason of safeguarding their security. Security is, in turn, the fundamental condition of state functioning, allowing for not only its future existence, but also for the realisation of the national interests in the given circumstances through taking the changes, using the opportunities, reducing risks and preventing all sorts of threats (Kitler, 2013, p. 23).

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¹ Article “The Republic of Poland shall safeguard the independence and integrity of its territory and ensure the freedoms and rights of persons and citizens, the security of the citizens, safeguard the national heritage and shall ensure the protection of the natural environment pursuant to the principles of sustainable development”.



National security entails more than lack of an imminent threat of war or an armed conflict. The analysis of the wide range of contemporary threats and the prognosis of the existing and envisioned global conflict situations clearly suggest that Poland needs modern, well-equipped and excellently trained armed forces capable of executing their missions in the state territory and abroad.

Polish security and *raison d'état* are safeguarded by the existence of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland, subjected to civil and democratic control², functioning as part of the Polish national security system in the times of peace, crisis and war. The core function of the Polish Armed Forces is maintaining the capacity to protect the territory and population of the state, and comprehensibly counter potential external aggression against Poland or its allies, as set forth in the State's international obligations. Polish Armed Forces are also tasked with contributing to the international stabilisation processes, as provided for in international treaties and conventions ratified by Poland, as well as supporting other state organs in maintaining national order through providing the military assistance, a function particularly important in light of the current global political situation.

Nowadays, national security entails more than the lack of an imminent threat of war or an armed conflict. The analysis of the wide range of contemporary threats and the prognosis of the existing and envisioned global conflict situations clearly suggest that Poland needs modern, well-equipped and excellently trained armed forces capable of executing their missions in the state territory and abroad. Armed forces, even more than before, have to perform the external state policy and the tasks they are entrusted within the NATO and EU framework in a manner interoperable with the armed forces of the other member states thereof. Ever since the creation of the Special Troops Command as a separate branch of the Polish Armed Forces in 2007³, this role has been exercised by the Special Troops, often conceptualised as the main "export product" among the Polish Armed Forces. Special Forces (SF) are an important element of political alliances' strategies, as well as a one of a kind 'tool' of the Polish Armed Forces in planning and executing expeditionary missions. Their main tasks include conducting – individually or in concert with other nations SFs – national, allied and coalition special operations in the times of peace, crises and war, both domestically and abroad.

² Polish Constitution, *supra* note 3, Article 26 para 1 provides: "The Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland shall safeguard the independence and territorial integrity of the State and shall ensure the security and inviolability of its borders".

³ Created by the Act of 24 May 2007 amending the Act on Universal Duty to Defend the Republic of Poland and other Acts (Dz. U z 2007 r., Nr 107, poz. 73).



As indicated by one of the former Polish SF Commanders "(...) over the ten years since their creation, Polish Armed Forces have undergone a significant transformation, building their national and allied capabilities, the result of which was to entrust a Pole with command of the special forces component of NATO Response Force 2015, the core of which were the Polish "specjals" (as the SF are referred to in the Polish military parlance). In the meantime, separate troops and units of the SF effectively realised combat and advisory missions in Iraq, Afghanistan and other countries, as need the Polish national interests required, helping to build prestige and trust of allies and coalition partners" (Bieniek, Mazur, 2016, p. 7).

SF are the first to employ modern technologies and set forth the standards for the rest of the Polish Armed Forces. They also take part in international exercises, manoeuvres and trainings more frequently than the services of armed forces. Over the last few years, due to their specific operational capacities, pursuant to the orders of the Polish President and the decisions of the Minister of Defence, SF have been designated to fulfil international tasks and missions pursuant to the orders in accordance with national laws and regulations in this matters. To list just a few, Polish SF have been involved in international training missions in Ukraine and operated, as part of the Polish Military Contingent, in the territory of the Republic of Iraq.

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NATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND

Security is one of the fundamental human needs without which the activity and development of individuals remain impossible. Conceptually, the subject of security can be individuals, communities, as well as entire nations or international community as a whole. Lack of security leads to their anxiety and give rise to the sense of threat (Pieczywok, 2010, p. 225).

National security can be achieved thanks to a complex, adaptable system incorporating a plethora of military, political, social, economic elements. It is important to note that the contemporary understanding of security is not limited to military aspects but extends to, *inter alia*, economic and social dimensions of human life (Koziej, 2010).

The Polish national security system mirrors that complexity; it is composed of a variety of institutions and bodies in which powers



and competencies are regulated in national laws, up to and including the Polish Constitution. The system encompasses all bodies of the Polish government, that is: both Houses of the Parliament – Sejm and Senate, the President, the Council of Ministers, as well as state administration.

In May 2013, the very first edition of the *White Book on National Security of the Republic of Poland* was published. The *White Book* is a document including “*the diagnosis of Poland as a strategic security entity*” (*White Book on National Security of the Republic of Poland*, 2013, p. 9), prognosis of the expected changes, and potential answers to questions and challenges arising under the evolving geopolitical conditions. Despite the passage of time, and ongoing geopolitical conditions, the *White Book* remains in force (*Ibid*, p. 35).

As indicated in the *White Book*: “*the national security system (that of security of the state) is understood as the entirety of resources, means and forces (entities) earmarked by the state for the performance of tasks in the field of security, organised (into subsystems and components), maintained and prepared in a manner adequate to the purpose of performing such tasks*” (*Ibid*). The national security system needs to be prepared to function effectively in all possible variants from the perspective of the functioning of the state, that is in: a normal operation state (normal functioning including potential *ad hoc* reactions), state of crisis, state of emergency, as well as state of war or occupation.

In 2014, based on the analysis of the *White Book*, the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland was published. In the current year, the National Security Bureau presented the new 2020 National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, characterising the national security system in a similar way.

The Strategy is a document comprehensively addressing issues related to the national security, identifying national interests and strategic objectives in the security domain, in accordance with rules and values included in the Polish Constitution. It evaluates Poland’s security environment and its global, regional and national dimensions.

The Strategy also shows how to understand and build the national security system, in a way that allows for preparing the State for ensuring security in the military, civil, educational, political, legal and social dimensions (*Polish National Security Strategy*, 2014, p. 7).

Furthermore, the document has a direct effect on defining the objectives of the military strategy, understood as “*that component of national or multinational strategy, presenting the manner in which military power should be developed and applied to achieve national objectives or those of a group of nations*” (*NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*, 2017).

The goals of a military strategy – encompassing also the functioning of the SF – result from the determinations and directions made by the highest state organs, and are a base for building, developing and deploying the Polish Armed Forces as a whole. Main objectives of the military strategy of the Republic of Poland in the national security domain are as follows:

- national security interests are a supreme value,
- Polish military strategy cannot contradict the NATO’s strategy,
- Polish Armed Forces develop their operational capabilities through the use of modern technologies and employ modern organisational and training solutions,
- Polish Armed Forces take part in the NATO planning cycle and collective defence of the Alliance,
- Security threats are to be counter at their origin, even if it is abroad,
- Polish Armed Forces master gaining information advantage by developing command and control, reconnaissance, communication and IT systems,
- Polish Armed Forces use and further improve their capabilities in actions abroad,
- Polish Armed Forces remain ready to support non-military actions domestically and abroad (*Doktryna Działań Połączonych D-01(E)*, 2019, p. 65).

ACTIVITIES OF THE POLISH ARMED FORCES – CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS –

Polish Armed Forces are a fundamental element of the national defence system. As provided for in the Constitution, Polish Armed Forces safeguard the independence and territorial integrity of the State; they also protect the security and inviolability of state’s borders (*Constitution of the Republic of Poland*, 1997, Art. 26). According to the Constitution, national security is paramount for the overall functioning



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The Polish national security system mirrors that complexity; it is composed of a variety of institutions and organs which powers and competencies are regulated in national laws, up to and including the Polish Constitution. The system encompasses all organs of the Polish government, that is: both Houses of the Parliament – Sejm and Senate, the President, the Council of Ministers, as well as State administration.



of the state (Wojciechowski, 2015, p. 45), and the Polish Armed Forces as a guarantor thereof.

Chapter I of the Constitution defines the fundamental norms concerning the national security and connect them with the constitutional sovereignty rule of the state⁴, as set forth in Article 5 which provides that: “[t]he Republic of Poland shall safeguard the independence and integrity of its territory and ensure the freedoms and rights of persons and citizens, the security of the citizens, safeguard the national heritage and shall ensure the protection of the natural environment pursuant to the principles of sustainable development”⁵ (Wołpiuk, 1998, p. 40). This provision “delineates state’s functions understood as core objectives and priorities of its activity. Safeguarding the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Poland is undoubtedly a key function because only its effective fulfilment allows for the execution of other functions, such as: ensuring individual freedom and security as well as human and civil rights” (Skrzydło, 2013).

Article 26 para 1 of the Constitution further delineates the rules regarding the functioning of the Polish Armed Forces and provides that “The Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland shall safeguard the independence and territorial integrity of the State and shall ensure the security and inviolability of its borders”. This provision is thus closely connected to Article 5, defining state functions with regard to safeguarding independence, territorial integrity and national security.

While para 1 of Article 26 of the Constitution entrusts the execution of those tasks to the Polish Armed Forces, the next paragraph of said article entrusts the executive branch with the command and control functions⁶ (Constitution of the Republic of Poland, 1997, Art. 10, para 2). Pursuant to Article 26 para. 2: “The Armed Forces shall display neutrality regarding political matters and shall be subject to civil

⁴ Under Article 126 para. 2 of the Polish Constitution, President is the guardian of the Polish sovereignty and independence: “The President of the Republic shall ensure observance of the Constitution, safeguard the sovereignty and security of the State as well as the inviolability and integrity of its territory”.

⁵ “From a legal perspective, ‘sovereignty’ defined as ‘the ability of the state to decide for itself on matters concerning it’ is a legal state, while ‘independence’ defined as ‘the individuality of state existence’ is a factual state.” (Author’s own translation).

⁶ “Legislative power shall be vested in the Sejm and the Senate, executive power shall be vested in the President of the Republic of Poland and the Council of Ministers, and the judicial power shall be vested in courts and tribunals”.

and democratic control”⁷ (Skrzydło, 2013). That means that command and control is to be performed by civil bodies – executive organs assigned with competencies regarding state security and defence, under the binding national laws, mainly the Constitution (Surmański, 2013, p. 125).

In the Polish national security command and control system, the core roles are played by the President (the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces) and the Council of Ministers including the Minister of Defence, through whom the President exercises his command in times of peace (Pacek, 2013, p. 5). The two houses of the Parliament – Sejm and Senate – also have some functions in the command and control of the Polish Armed Forces under the Constitution provisions.

Concomitant with Article 5 of the Constitution are articles 82⁸ (Constitution of the Republic of Poland, 1997) and 85 paras 1-3 thereof, setting forth the duty of all Polish citizens to defend the Homeland⁹ (Ibid).

Article 117 of the Constitution, in turn, provides that “[t]he principles for deployment of the Armed Forces beyond the borders of the Republic of Poland shall be specified by a ratified international agreement or by statute. The principles for the presence of foreign troops on the territory of the Republic of Poland and the principles for their movement within that territory shall be specified by ratified agreements or statutes”. This article is of fundamental importance for SF operations abroad, construed in the Polish legal system as the “use” of the Polish Armed Forces.

Article 134 of the Constitution – delineating the President’s prerogatives – also plays a crucial role in the command and control system of the Polish Armed Forces:

“1. The President of the Republic shall be the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland.

⁷ Commentary to article 26: “Paragraph 2 of Article 26 underlines the characteristics of the armed forces, which correspond to contemporary standards (...). These characteristics are a neutral attitude of the armed forces in political matters, which means that they are prohibited from engaging with any party or organisation or person seeking to seize state power. The armed forces are also subject to civilian control and democratic supervision, which is characteristic of the armed forces of NATO Member States”. (Author’s own translation)

⁸ Article 82 provides “Loyalty to the Republic of Poland, as well as concern for the common good, shall be the duty of every Polish citizen”.

⁹ Article 85 provides: “It shall be the duty of every Polish citizen to defend the Homeland. The nature of military service shall be specified by statute. Any citizen whose religious convictions or moral principles do not allow him to perform military service may be obliged to perform substitute service in accordance with principles specified by statute”.



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2. *The President of the Republic, in times of peace, shall exercise command over the Armed Forces through the Minister of National Defence.*

3. *The President of the Republic shall appoint, for a specified period of time, the Chief of the General Staff and commanders of branches of the Armed Forces. The duration of their term of office, the procedure for and terms of their dismissal before the end thereof, shall be specified by statute.*

4. *The President of the Republic, for a period of war, shall appoint the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces on request of the Prime Minister. He may dismiss the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in accordance with the same procedure. The authority of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, as well as the principle of his subordination to the constitutional organs of the Republic of Poland, shall be specified by statute. (...)*

LEGAL GROUNDS FOR ACTIVITIES OF THE SPECIAL FORCES IN THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND

SF, alongside the others branches of the Polish Armed Forces – Land Forces, Air Forces, Navy and Territorial Defence Forces (soon, also, Cyberspace Defence Forces) – are authorised to operate in the territory of Poland and abroad in the times of peace, crisis and war.

Over the last few years, SF were expected to do more than execute *strict* military tasks in the times of war, the way other branches of the armed forces do. The likelihood of a global international armed conflict (IAC)¹⁰ has been gradually decreasing. Today it is self-evident that SF must be ready not only to support other forces but also to be used independently or in concert with the other state organs in its own territory when faced with a range of the new threats, in particular of asymmetric and hybrid nature¹¹ (Pacek (ed.), 2013).

¹⁰ The currently accepted picture of war without a formal declaration of war, with blurred borders of states or parties to the conflict, where the political opposition, a national minority or even a terrorist organization, financially supported by the aggressor's state, may be a party, is widely described in the implemented 'War Doctrine' of the Russian Federation, which presents 'hybrid actions' as one of the possibilities of warfare.

¹¹ ("Nowadays, terrorism is understood as the activity of individuals or groups aimed at disorganizing social and political life, it is a cruel form of rebellion and an attempt to intimidate the stronger (the state and its officers and society as a whole) by the weaker (a group of terrorists)". (Author's own translation).

While Poland has not yet experienced a terror attack in its territory, as a member of the EU and NATO, it definitely needs to be prepared for such a possibility, especially in view of the developments beyond its western and eastern borders. Hence, on the one hand, the Schengen Zone Poland is part of and has open borders with, regularly suffers from a variety of incidents and attacks of terrorist nature. On the other, Ukraine is also experiencing similar challenges since 2014. Consequently, Poland has to be ready to use various tools at its disposal to counter these kinds of threats, should they materialise (Gryga, 2017, p. 19).

NATO shares this assessment. According to the Allied Doctrine, SF can be used against the adversary in a manner and mode differing from general regulations and manuals, both on one's own and in the foreign territory, to augment the political and diplomatic state efforts in the time of crisis before the conventional armed forces are deployed.

SF are one the most important elements of the armed forces, and as such they constitute the core of every state's defence potential. The Republic of Poland thus needs not only modern conventional armed forces capable of performing a number of tasks in the state territory and abroad, but it also has to have high readiness SF which can cooperate with other forces in the course of unconventional missions, using special munitions and equipment.

Contemporary Polish SF are devoted to conducting special operations in Poland and abroad in the times of peace, crisis and war. They function as part of the national armed forces command and control system, based on:

- control system – provisions of the Constitution and the statutes,
- command system – military doctrinal documents.

Command and control over the Polish SF has three levels:

- political – military, relating exclusively to the control over the Polish Armed Forces by civilian constitutional organs of the state;
- strategic – operational, from which the command over armed forces including SF begins;
- tactical – at the execution level.

The principles of command and control over the SF in the time of crisis, peace and war stem from general rules regulating the functioning of the Polish Armed Forces in the complex state security system.



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In the times of peace, crisis and war, at the political-military level, the following constitutional bodies and institutions have control competencies: Sejm and Senate (legislative branch), the President in concern with supporting organs, such as the National Security Council, National Security Bureau and the Council of Ministers, in particular the Minister of Defence and the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces immediately subordinate thereto. In the times of crisis, at the political – military level, the Council of Ministers plays a crucial role with regard to the use of the Polish Armed Forces abroad¹².

At war, the main task of these bodies is to set forth national and international security objectives by using the country's recourses, mainly the military one. For example, as the Supreme Commander of the Polish Armed Forces, the President issues decisions declaring (and recalling) the time of war, and pursuant to Article 134 para 4 of the Constitution, he appoints the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces¹³ (*Constitution of the Republic of Poland, 1997*). Once the Commander-in-Chief is appointed and takes over the command, the President directs the defence of the State in concert with the Council of Ministers¹⁴ (Dz. U. z, 2019).

In the times of war, the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces becomes an assisting authority of the Presidents in the defence of the Republic of Poland¹⁵, with the collaboration of the Council of Ministers¹⁶.

Various prerogatives and competencies of the executive branch indicated above, operating at the political – military level of control

¹² See, among others, Act of 26 April 2007 on crisis management (Dz. U. z 2019 r. poz. 1398.)

¹³ Article 134, para 4 provides: "The President of the Republic, for a period of war, shall appoint the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces on request of the Prime Minister. He may dismiss the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in accordance with the same procedure. The authority of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, as well as the principle of his subordination to the constitutional organs of the Republic of Poland, shall be specified by statute".

¹⁴ Law of 21 November 1967 on the Universal Duty to Defend the Republic of Poland Article 4a para 1 (4b) providing that "The President of the Republic of Poland (...) directs the defence of the state, in cooperation with the Council of Ministers, as soon as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces is appointed and takes command".

¹⁵ Act on Universal Duty, supra note 34, Article 4a para 1b providing that: "The Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army is an auxiliary body of the President of the Republic of Poland in the process of managing the state defence".

¹⁶ See also Article 146 para 4(8) in concert with 228 para 3 of Polish Constitution, which provide that the general control of national defence is a constitutional task of the Council of Ministers.

over the Polish Armed Forces, relate also to the SF, as one of the branches of the Armed Forces. At this highest level, control over the Armed Forces implies the exercise of powers by the state organs, in particular the President, as the Supreme Commander, in a manner leading to the most effective, successful preparation and use of the Polish Armed Forces in the time of emergency, as well as to efficient training and modernisation in a time of peace.

The constitutional rules regulating the functioning of the armed forces and the general objectives set forth by the highest organs of the State, including the SF, are implemented at the strategic-operational level.

In a time of peace, SF perform tasks related to creating conditions conducive for training of the headquarters, commands and units; ensuring substantive supervision of the training, preparing doctrines and related documents, as well as determining the direction of the professional training of SF personnel.

The rules regulating the functioning of the Polish SF are most important and interesting in times of crisis. In Poland, the crisis management system is premised on the two modes operation: i) the normal one, meaning the time of minimal threat level not requiring any extraordinary actions, and ii) the states of emergency (Constitution, Article 228 and following).

In times of crisis, as a general rule, units of the Polish Armed Forces are designated to support the civilian organs and institutions' response to the crisis situation, whether military or not or involving a potential activity of terrorist groups. Usually, such designated units enjoy the same powers, in particular executive powers towards Polish citizens, as the Police. The list of the main tasks performed by the military units, including SF, in a time of crisis, includes: provision of the assistance in the time of crisis (performance of tasks related to crisis management) in the times of emergencies as set forth in the Polish Constitution, martial law¹⁷ (*Constitution of the Republic of Poland, 1997*), state

¹⁷ Article 229 provides: "In the case of external threats to the State, acts of armed aggression against the territory of the Republic of Poland or when an obligation of common defence against aggression arises by virtue of international agreement, the President of the Republic may, on request of the Council of Ministers, declare a state of martial law in a part of or upon the whole territory of the State."



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As the Supreme Commander of the Polish Armed Forces, the President issues decisions declaring (and recalling) the time of war, and pursuant to Article 134 para 4 of the Constitution, he appoints the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (Constitution of the Republic of Poland, 1997). Once the Commander-in-Chief is appointed and takes over the command, the President directs the defence of the State in concert with the Council of Ministers.



Possibility of using units of the Armed Forces, including the SF, in times of crisis, is also established by the Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 21 July 2016 on detailed conditions and manner of use of the Police and Armed Forces branches and units of the Republic of Poland in the event of a threat to public security or disturbance of public order, issued on the basis of Article 18 para. 8 of the Police Act.

of emergency¹⁸ (*Ibid*), state of natural disaster¹⁹ (*Ibid*), supporting the Police units in accordance with the Police Act, in the case of threats to security of the citizens or public order; supporting the Border Guard in the case of threats to the security of the citizenry or public order in the proximity of State's external borders or within the border regions; supporting the Border Guard to prevent, reduce or remove serious and imminent danger to ships, port facilities and ports and related infrastructure arising from the use of a ship or floating facility as a means of a terrorist attack; the maritime RENEGADE, as well as the conduct of activities aimed at destroying or immobilising unmanned aircraft or taking control of their flight; providing assistance to police units in accordance with the act on Counter-Terrorist Activities.

There are three main acts regulating the use of SF internally, in case extraordinary measures are necessary, specifying the general provisions of the Constitution: *The Emergency State Act of 21 June* (Dz. U. z, 2017), *the State of Natural Disaster Act of 18 April 2002* (Dz. U. z, 2017) and *the Act of 29 August 2002 on martial law and the powers of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and the principles of his subordination to the constitutional bodies of the Republic of Poland* (Dz. U. z, 2017).

Possibility of using units of the Armed Forces, including the SF, in times of crisis, is also established by the Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 21 July 2016 on detailed conditions and manner of use of the Police and Armed Forces branches and units of the Republic of Poland in the event of a threat to public security or disturbance of public order, issued on the basis of Article 18 para. 8 of the Police Act (Dz. U. z, 2016). SF can be used, among others, to: protect specific categories of objects or equipment – Important for the interests of the state, shield or isolate specific objects, roads, separate streets or parts of cities, undertake actions restoring public safety and order, including anti-terrorist actions (see the statutory provision – “*support for police*

¹⁸ Article 230 para 1 provides: “*In the case of threats to the constitutional order of the State, to security of the citizenry or public order, the President of the Republic may, on request of the Council of Ministers, introduce for a definite period no longer than 90 days, a state of emergency in a part of or upon the whole territory of the State.*”

¹⁹ Article 232 provides: “*In order to prevent or remove the consequences of a natural catastrophe or a technological accident exhibiting characteristics of a natural disaster, the Council of Ministers may introduce, for a definite period no longer than 30 days, a state of natural disaster in a part of or upon the whole territory of the State. An extension of a state of natural disaster may be provided with the consent of the Sejm.*”

actions within the framework of the threat of a terrorist crime that may result in a threat to the life or health of participants in cultural, sporting or religious events, including gatherings or mass events”).

In such a case, soldiers of SF may also: request a proof of individual identification, detain persons, carry out personal inspection, and in particular use direct coercive means and firearms, for example, in a situation of an direct and immediate threat to health or liberty of the authorised person or another person, or the need to counteract actions aimed directly at such an attack, or against a person who does not comply with a call for immediate abandonment of a weapon, explosive or other dangerous object, the use of which may endanger the life, health or liberty of the authorised person or another person.

Another implementing act is the Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 6 October 2015 on the use of Border Guard forces and units of the Armed Forces in the event of a threat to public security or public order disturbances in the territorial range of a border crossing point and in the border zone (Dz. U. z, 2015), issued on the basis of Article 11b section 11 of the Act of 12 October 1990 on the Border Guard, specifying, *inter alia*, methods of coordinating actions undertaken by the Border Guard and the Armed Forces and modalities of the information exchange and logistical support for the Border Guard activities carried out with the help of the Armed Forces.

The aforementioned Act of 12 October 1990 on the Border Guard indicates that support by SF may take place in the event of a threat to public security or disruption of public order in the territorial range of the border crossing point and in the border area and will be implemented in particular in case of: a direct threat of an attack on the integrity of the state border or its execution, an immediate and widespread danger to the life, health or freedom of citizens, direct threat of attack on objects or devices used by the Border Guard, threat of a terrorist offence or its execution in relation to objects or devices used by the Border Guard or which may result in danger to human life.

With regard to the use of SF in the time of crisis, the Act of 4 September 2008 on the protection of shipping and seaports (Dz. U. z, 2019) is also noteworthy. Article 27 para 1 of this Act provides that “[t]o prevent, reduce or remove a serious and imminent danger to ships, port facilities and ports and related infrastructure resulting from using a ship or a floating object as a means of a terrorist attack,



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after the Border Guard has exhausted all the means provided for in the Act of 12 October 1990 on the Border Guard, the Minister of National Defense may issue a decision to apply the necessary measures in Polish maritime areas, which may also entail sinking the ship or floating object”.

This means that under the Polish domestic law, all available forces, means and ways can be used to eliminate the threat. The provisions of the Act of 3 July 2002 on Aviation Law should also be recalled here. The Act defines the possibility of using SF to carry out actions aimed at destroying or immobilizing unmanned aircraft or taking control of their flight (Dz. U. z, 2019).

Last but not least, with regard to the possibility of using Special Forces in a crisis situation, an analysis of the relatively ‘new’ in the Polish legal system Act of 10 June 2016 on counter-terrorist activities should be made (Dz. U. z 2019). The Act introduces into the Polish legal system clear definitions of a bunch of important concepts and terms, such as: “*anti-terrorist activities*” – understood as activities of public administration bodies consisting of preventing terrorist events, preparing to take control over them by means of planned undertakings, reacting in the event such events occur and removing their effects, including recreating resources intended to respond to them; “*counter-terrorist actions*” – understood as actions against perpetrators, persons preparing or assisting in committing an offence of a terrorist nature referred to in Article 115 § 20 of the Act of 6 June 1997. Penal Code, conducted to eliminate an imminent threat to the life, health or liberty of persons or property using specialised forces and means and specialised tactics; “*events of a terrorist nature*” – shall mean a situation which is suspected to have arisen as a result of an offence of a terrorist nature referred to in Article 115 § 20 of the Act of 6 June 1997, Penal Code, or a threat of such an offence.

The legislator has decided that if the use of Police troops and subunits proves to be insufficient or may prove to be insufficient, the troops and subunits of the Polish Armed Forces may be used to assist the Police, according to their specialist preparation, equipment and armament and the needs that have arisen.

Article 22 para 7 of the Act of 10 June 2016 on counter-terrorist activities refers to SF *expressis verbis* and states: “[t]roops and subunits of Special Forces used to assist troops or subunits of Police may use

and employ in counter-terrorist activities means of direct coercion and firearms in the manner provided for in Article 3, paragraph 2a of the Act of 21 November 1967 on the universal obligation to defend the Republic of Poland, subject to the admissibility of the use of firearms in cases specified in Article 23, paragraph 1”. The provision refers to the so-called ‘special use of firearms’ that is, *de facto*, the use of a firearm without a warning shot and in a way that, by definition, does not have to lead to cause as little damage as possible (lawful elimination of personal hazard).

Due to the classified nature of Polish legal acts regulating the wartime, the rules of operation of SF will be analysed in general terms. During the war, SF are responsible for, among others:

- conducting protective activities (protection and defence of objects particularly important for the security and defence of the state, as well as support for the protection of critical infrastructure objects and important military installations) and defence activities in the part of the country where no direct hostilities are taking place,
- cooperation with the Police, Military Police, Border Guard and other services.

In recent years, there has been an attempt to codify all SF’s powers in one legal act – the Special Forces Act. However, the legislative plans were abandoned. The statutory changes would grant broad powers to the SF. Some of them were controversial, because the planned field of regulation went far beyond the current norms of the SF, indicated e.g. in the Act of 10 June 2016 on counter-terrorist activities. This is because SF soldiers, as part of their tasks related to combating threats of a hybrid or terrorist nature, were supposed to have, among others, the following powers:

- to require proof identification and collect personal suspected of participating in terrorist or hybrid activities,
- to wear civilian clothing and carry concealed service weapons while performing the tasks in accordance with the rules provided for officers of the Internal Security Agency/Military Counterintelligence Service,
- to use civilian vehicles and operational documents that guarantee their anonymity (so-called legalisation documents - e.g.: plates and registration cards, identity papers and others),



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Development of SF in line with the vision and mission of this kind of armed forces must have certain statutory implications. These include not only proposals of entirely new solutions, but also amendments to existing regulations. The proposed statutory changes could provide SF with appropriate powers to actively participate in anti-hybrid, anti-terrorist and counter-terrorist activities by making full use of the Special Forces' potential and capabilities.

- to carry out on the territory of the Republic of Poland operational and reconnaissance activities in cooperation with other services or under their supervision, including the use of imaging and electromagnetic reconnaissance means, and in particular unmanned aerial vehicles,
- to conduct reconnaissance activities to identify and mitigate threats in cyberspace by scanning of and eavesdropping on telecommunications and ICT networks,
- to employ technical disposal measures against unmanned aerial vehicles – UAV – both by disrupting communications with such aircraft operators and by physically damaging or destroying unmanned aircraft.

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Undoubtedly, the issue of hand is undoubtedly complex and requires a thorough and professional development of concepts and procedures.

CONCLUSIONS

As pointed out by the Chief of General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces General Rajmund Andrzejczak: *"(...) the whole society constitutes the state's defence potential" (O potencjale obronnym państwa stanowi całe społeczeństwo. Gen. Andrzejczak: musimy odrobić lekcje, 2019)*. The defence potential of the state is also a system based on the proper functioning of the Polish Armed Forces, on the use of the full range of operational capabilities offered by different types of armed forces, including SF. On the basis of amendments to various legal Acts discussed above introducing, *inter alia*, the notions of anti-terrorist activities or counter-terrorist actions into the Polish system, the SF have been and will continue playing an increasingly important role in the future.

The evolution of the security environment, both nationally and internationally, discussed in this article, makes it necessary for states

and their armed forces to audit their operational capabilities, legal frameworks, and the possibility of cooperation in the international environment. Recent and contemporary theatres of military conflicts show very clearly the need for fully interoperable, rapid readiness troops.

This description fits Polish contemporary SF perfectly. The Republic of Poland made an identical assessment as early as in 2002, during the Prague NATO Summit²⁰, and this assessment remains valid, taking into account, among other things, the fact that the Polish SF were again entrusted with the command of NATO special operations under NATO Response Force again in 2020.

As indicated in the 2020 National Security Strategy of Poland: *"[i]t is necessary to develop the operational capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland, in particular Special Forces, to combat threats, including hybrids and counterterrorist actions, during all three types of states of emergency and state defence preparedness" (National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland, 2014, p. 19)*.

In the present article, analysing the time of crisis, the legal acts currently in force clearly indicate the supporting role of SF towards the Police or Border Guard in counteracting terrorist threats in the country. This means that even the direct use of SF should be treated as a supplement to activities undertaken by the Police or Border Guard (including special reconnaissance, patrolling, image reconnaissance, radio electronic or personal reconnaissance, as well as organisation of direct actions carried out for the benefit of Border Guard facilities and branches), not their substitute or competition.

Therefore, it seems that the current legal framework for the operation of the Polish Armed Forces, and in particular the SF, in times of peace, crisis and war in Polish legislation is precise, providing the possibility of operation of such forces without the necessity of excessive, often disputed, interpretation of legal regulations.

The potential legislative changes described in this article, extending the powers of the Polish SF, require not only parliamentary works, but also a specific evolution in the way of thinking of military specialists, the theory of the art of war and the ways of taking multifaceted actions, including the structural location of the Special Forces leading to the possibility of using them in an emergency situation as soon as possible.

²⁰ The Republic of Poland proposed to recognise Special Forces as a *"Polish specialty"* in NATO.



The evolution of the security environment, both nationally and internationally, discussed in this article, makes it necessary for States and their armed forces to audit their operational capabilities, legal frameworks, and the possibility of cooperation in the international environment. Recent and contemporary theatres of military conflicts show very clearly the need for fully interoperable, rapid readiness troops.



It is worth remembering that any potential new solutions should not duplicate specific abilities and powers but should rather contribute to a more rational use of SF's potential. The ongoing changes in the security environment, however, show that gradually more and more intensive presence of the armed forces in the civilian environment will be taking place in Poland and other states. SF's powers need to reflect this tendency.

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SOCIAL MEDIA – INSTRUMENT OF THE INFORMATION WARFARE. FROM INFORMATION TO INFLUENCING –

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Information is a very valuable weapon, it can help in manipulation and it can result in changing behaviours and actions. Information warfare in the cyber environment can be considered the most developed form of warfare, through which the goal is achieved without human loss and without bloodshed.

While many studies and researches have been conducted on the “weapons of attack” of this unconventional war, fake news and propaganda, since ancient times, less has been written about “weapons of defence” counteracting and combating their effects, and scientific studies and research are still far from finding the answer.

In this article, we aim to analyse both the main weapon of attack: communication, as a method (technique, tactics) of transmitting fake news and propaganda and the main means of conducting information warfare, social media, by the force (speed) of the dissemination of communication. We will make this analysis starting from the origin and characteristics of interpersonal communication and social networks, which we will identify in disciplines such as psychology, sociology, social psychology and anthropology and show how each of these areas contributes to shaping the lives of users of virtual social networks. They can thus be used in information warfare.

In our approach, we start from the hypothesis that communication aims to influence, the social network broadens the communication environment and promotes influence, and the Internet makes the communication process take place at the mass level, amplifies the speed of dissemination, which further accentuates influencing and recommending social media as a tool in the information war.

We also aim to analyse this process of modelling (influencing) from socio-psychological perspectives to highlight how propaganda and fake news in social media work and how they could be countered using simple principles of communication and psycho-sociology.

Keywords: social media; fake news; propaganda; information; influence;



INTRODUCTION

Social media is an extremely generous space both in terms of reach, including social networks, wikis, blogs, newsgroups, online games, chat and news feeds, and as a potential for data and information storage and rapid dissemination of information, which is why social networks Twitter and Facebook have become synonymous with Web 2.0 (O’Reilly, pp. 1-5). Both dimensions play an important role, as directions of action used in the information war.

Starting from this aspect, it is necessary to highlight the basic feature on which web 2.0 is centred: socialisation, the interaction between users, which from our point of view must be viewed from two perspectives.

On the one hand, social media is an environment where information spreads at a fast pace, in which each of the billions of user accounts is a source of information that can reach from the moment of posting to other users of the network. This space where everyone shares what they want and, with the help of the algorithms behind the social media platform, that “*what they want*” is seen by someone else, who, by a simple reaction, sends it to someone else, is a space to which individuals, groups, companies and organisations attach special importance to promoting their own interests, sometimes using fake news and propaganda to achieve them.

On the other hand, the content generated by the users of these social networking sites offers the possibility to understand human behaviours and social phenomena representing practically a reference environment for understanding users’ choices, intentions and feelings in real time. The information posted, comments, shares, likes, re-tweets, inbound links are invaluable values that give us direct feedback, showing us what people think and how they found us, and whether engages (or does not!) with our content. This intelligently identified, collected and used data and information can be used as a tool

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to make a decisive contribution to the achievement of military, political, economic or social goals, with minimal costs and maximum efficiency.

In this article, we aim to analyse social media and its role in information warfare, starting from the origin and characteristics of interpersonal communication and *social networks*, analysed in disciplines such as psychology, sociology, social psychology and anthropology and making a parallel with *virtual social networks*, as a component of social media with an important role in the process of *modelling (influencing) users*.

In other words, starting from the hypothesis that communicating may also mean influencing, we will argue that the social network makes the process of social media communication take place at the mass level, which emphasises the influence and recommends it as a tool in information warfare. We also aim to analyse this process of modelling (influencing) from socio-psychological, politico-economic, military and security perspectives, as well as to highlight how each of these areas contributes to shaping the lives of users of virtual social networks and how they can be thus used in information warfare.

Consequently, we appeal to Aristotle's ancient rhetoric to substantiate that *communicating means influencing* (Aristotle, pp. 17-58). Also, in order to understand social media, and, implicitly, why influence has found a perfect framework for action in this environment, as well as to test the hypothesis of a multidisciplinary approach to social media, we will direct this approach to the origin of social networks and to the disciplines that analysed it, as well as to social networks as part of social media and the disciplines through which we need to analyse it in order to have a complete picture and achieve effective strategic communication in combating fake news and propaganda.

THE ORIGINS OF STUDYING COMMUNICATION

Communication is a privileged field, to the development of which the great thinkers of humankind have contributed and who, for over two millennia, have known a variety of approaches and theorisations that force the boundaries of the field and interconnect disciplines and adjacent fields.

In the context in which the study of this field impresses as antiquity and abounds in terms of quantity and diversity of approaches, it is natural that scientific research leads to the identification of various types of communication, from public to internal communication, from communication from direct, interpersonal or group to indirect or mediated, and then move to interdisciplinary approaches, where strategic communication comes to integrate the field of public communication with specialisations such as marketing and advertising and with mass, group or individual interests in areas such as economic, political, military or social.

We communicate in order to convince. Based on deliberate activity to achieve goals, communication has been labelled as *a means of social influence* (Stanton, 1995, p. 1) for thousands of years in ancient Greece, when persuasion was identified with the need for people to defend themselves in court of justice, newly appeared at that time, to decide the truth and to attribute justice.

The first concept of communication is attributed to one of the most influential thinkers, the Greek philosopher Aristotle (384 and 322 BC): identify the elements with which you can convey a persuasive message. The Greek philosopher wrote about the use of language to impel people to think and act according to certain patterns, as described in the art of rhetoric (Argenti, 2009, pp. 11-16), being the author of an efficient and detailed communication system that allowed the understanding of both which is convincing, as well as the way to create convincing messages. Aristotle was the first to argue that through communication we try to influence, that we use words to persuade, showing that persuasive messages can be supported by logic and reasoning (logos), credibility (ethos) and emotion (pathos), proposing the first model of persuasion (Docimo, Littlehale, 2017).

The model of an efficient communication process, using the elements of ancient rhetoric, can be represented graphically in the form of a triangle, as in *Figure 1*, which has at each end an element of Aristotelian rhetoric: logos, ethos, pathos proposes targeting the listener and transmitting messages in order to influence – and inside it another triangle, kairos – by which the communicator ensures



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that he sends messages appropriately, at the right place and time, to reach the target audience in order to achieve the desired effect. Each of the four elements can act independently forming its own persuasion triangle.



Figure no. 1: The model of persuasion in ancient Greek philosophy used in rhetoric.

Persuasion is given by the personal character of the speaker when the speech is spoken so as to make us perceive him credibly. Since ancient times, communication has been studied beyond its function of information in connection with areas such as social, political, military or economic, in order to influence to obtain an attitude, perception or behaviour.

A feature of all communication processes is that the whole communication involves change. Whenever communication takes place, a change of state takes place – something happens that changes the relationship of the participants towards each other or towards the external world (McQuail, 2010, p. 34). This theory is taken up again in 2010 by practitioner and researcher Christopher Paul, who, analysing strategic communication, mentions that information cannot be made without influence and is allowed to influence the public as long as it is not about manipulation. (Christopher Paul, 2011, p. 14)

There is, however, a line to be drawn between social influence, on the one hand, and manipulation, deception or propaganda as forms of influence, on the other. The latter are forms of inappropriate influence

that are not sustainable in the contemporary information environment and undermine the credibility of current and future messages and communication efforts. Seen as real weapons of information warfare, propaganda and fake news are currently the major concern of researchers.

THE ORIGINS OF SOCIAL NETWORKS

The first scientific approaches to social networks date back to the first half of the twentieth century. Two of the studies in the fields mentioned above, *Networks in social psychology*, starting with Kurt Lewin (Doreian, 2014) and *Network analysis in French sociology and anthropology* (van Meter, 2014, p. 20), bring forward excerpts from the reports to John Scott (1991) and Linton Freeman (1996, 2004) and studies the psychological, sociological and anthropological aspects of social networks.

The first theories of socialisation are attributed to the German sociologist Georg Simmel (1858-1918), considered by many researchers to be the founder of the field, even though he never used the term social network. Simmel's ideas about "socialisation", the fundamental form of interactions between people, was the basis of subsequent theories and analyses of social networks. The German sociologist is the author of the theory that the fundamental social unit is *the triad, not the dyad*, a principle that underlies the theory of social networks. According to this theory, the relationship between two people is intensified by "a third element or a social framework that transcends both members of the dyad" (G Simmel, 1950, p. 136), regardless of the content of these connections (e.g. friendship, business, kinship). To support this theory, Simmel exemplified that *a marriage with a child has a completely different character from that of a marriage without children, but is not significantly different from a marriage with two or more children* (Simmel, 1955, p. 154) arguing that while an isolated dyad favours a greater individuality of both persons, since no majority can exceed the vote of one person, the addition of a third member makes such a majority possible. As a result, *strong individuality is devalued in a triad*, and compliance with group norms is greater.



Simmel's ideas about "socialisation", the fundamental forms of interactions between people, formed the basis of subsequent theories and analyses of social networks.



SOCIOMETRIC DIAGRAMS – FORERUNNER OF SOCIAL NETWORKS –

The Austro-American psychiatrist Jacob Moreno (1889–1974) developed in 1925, in New York, *the theory of group psychotherapy and the methodology of psychodrama*. His fundamental contribution to the analysis of social networks appeared in *Who will survive?* (Moreno, 1934), which was a signal event in the history of social network analysis, a turning point for field development (Freeman, 2004). Moreno used the term “network” in the modern sense, fulfilling three of the four key criteria – *structural links that link social actors, systemic collection of empirical data and graphical images – but did not use mathematical models* (L. Freeman, 2004, p. 7). This is how the sociogram appeared, *a diagram (graph) of points and labelled lines that represent a set of relationships between individuals from a small social group*. Relational data could be collected by multiple methods, including observations, experiments, interviews, or questionnaires. *For Moreno, social configurations had defined and perceptible structures, and mapping these structures into a sociogram allowed a researcher to visualise the channels through which, for example, information could flow from one person to another and through which an individual could influence on another* (Scott, 1991, pp. 3-11).

The construction of a sociogram allowed a therapist, for example, to identify group leaders and isolated individuals and to reveal indirect connections, reciprocities, and asymmetric choices (Ibid). For example, a sociometric “star” receives many friendly choices from others, reflecting her popularity and leadership in the group. Moreno applied sociometric methods to the investigations of Sing Sing Prison and the problem of an escape to the Hudson School for Girls in New York (Moreno, 1932). In the latter study, he showed that, by mapping the preferences of girls to sit at the table with and implementing changes based on diagrams, fugitives have dropped dramatically.

The Yankee City study found numerous cliques, defined as *informal subgroups whose members develop a sense of group, intimacy, and norms* (Warner et al, 1975, p. 32). After discovering the existence of these clicks in the comments made by those they studied, Warner

and his associates claimed that they are second only to family in placing people in society. People are integrated into communities through ‘informal’ and ‘personal’ family and clique relationships, not just through the ‘formal’ relationships of the economy and the political system (Scott, 1991, p. 21). Because many people belong to multiple cliques simultaneously, *such a clique overlap spreads into a network of relationships that integrates almost the entire population of a community into a single vast system of clique relationships* (Warner et al, p. 32). Thus, network subgroups structure the larger social systems in which they are incorporated.

In *The Human Group*, Homans (1950) reanalysed data from several classical network studies to demonstrate how his triple classification scheme explained structural relationships. Using data from the *Old City* project, he displays a two-way matrix of 18 white southern women participating in 14 social events ordered by date (Freeman et al, 2003). By rearranging the matrix row and columns, Homans showed that the women were divided into two cliques whose members participated in various party groups.

Social network contamination

The idea of contamination in the social network is based on the tendency of people to imitate each other. The desire to smoke, for example, can be transmitted in a social network just as the decision to quit smoking can be determined by the decision of a friend of your friend who has quit. Social network contamination is argued from examples such as laughter crises to suicides or even political beliefs and ideas.

Although researchers claim that *we still do not know whether the Internet will increase the speed or spread of contamination in general* (Christakis, Fowler, 2009, pp. 3-105) on a much larger scale, the phenomenon of contamination can be easily observed today, an eloquent example of this is the interpretation of social media users and political decisions on immigrants in Syria, or, recently, the issue of vaccination within COVID 19 pandemics. The expansion of the Internet, access to social platforms such as Facebook or Twitter,



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The idea of contamination in the social network is based on the tendency of people to imitate each other.



the flow of information through various forms of media have made people away from events to be influenced even emotionally. Moreover, the influence of the phenomenon can be seen in the reactions and decisions of some Western governments.

Dr. Christakis and Dr. Fowler, authors of the famous book *Connected* state that the tendency to form social networks is part of our biological heritage, the human brain being built in this regard. If a man is led to the idea that he will end up disconnected, his belief in supernatural forces in God will increase. Moreover, social networks are inscribed in our genes. The number of friends, the location in the centre or at the periphery of the network are genetically determined. Man is, in fact, *Homo dictyous*, the man of networks, altruistic, cooperative, but also selfish and vengeful, different from *Homo economicus* (Stanford Encyclopedic Dictionary of Philosophy, 2018), who pursues only his own interest to obtain maximum personal gains with the most low possible cost. *Altruism, cooperation, the desire to punish and take advantage of others are inscribed in our DNA*, the researchers argue.

They also show that the theory that the individual acts rationally and out of self-interest cannot be valid because it leaves no room for altruism and does not study how people get to want what they want, they build a new theory of *Homo economicus* (Rakesh Sharma, 2020), in which the pursuit of one's own good contributes to the good of society. By belonging to a social network, man pursues his own interest, taking into account the well-being of others, *we want what other people we are connected to want*.

THE SOCIAL NETWORK – A SOCIO-PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE –

Extensive analyses argue and highlight the power of social networks by presenting how they *shape (influence) our lives*. (Christakis, Fowler, 2009, pp. 3-105).

To establish the basis of this argument, researchers identify five rules according to which networks are formed and influence is produced in the network:

1. We model our network;

2. We are shaped by our network;
3. Friends influence us;
4. Our friends' friends influence us;
5. The network has a life of its own.

Although the theory is generally accepted that friendships are not accidental and that social relationships depend on factors such as culture, geographical boundaries, political affiliation, socioeconomic status, or even genetic factors, researchers bring arguments, examples, and statistics to support idea *that if you are rich, you will attract more friends, and if you have more rich friends, you will find more ways to get rich* (Ibid), is an illustrative statement in this regard.

Connection and contamination are two fundamental aspects of social networks and anthropological studies have shown, on the one hand, that the distance between two strangers is six steps (Miligram, 1967) – your friend is one step away from you, the friend of the friend is two steps, etc., and, on the other hand, researchers argue that the *influence in the network* is achieved only in *three steps* (Christakis, Fowler, 2009, pp. 4-103) starting from the idea that everything we do and say tends to be sent in our network, influencing our friends, one step, then our friends' friends, two steps, and our friends' friends, three steps. This theory identifies three possible reasons for limiting influence:

- deterioration of the accuracy of the information as it is transmitted,
- the uncontrollable evolution of the network in the sense of the inconsistency of the connections,
- evolutionary biology whose history holds that humans evolved in small groups.

For example, Dr. Nicholas A. Christakis and Dr. James H. Fowler refer to a study of happiness that argues for the ability of social networks to influence people's emotions. Happy people prefer the company of those like them and pass on the same feeling to others. The probability of being happy increases by 15% if you are at *a level of influence of a happy friend*, by 10% for the *second level of influence*



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and by 6% for the third. Also, the probability of people being happy increases with the number of friends. Instead, people who feel alone will lose 8% of their friends in a year.

From “group thinking” to epistemic bubbles and “echo chamber”

In support of the theory of belonging to the social network is the theory of “group thinking” (Billow, 2002) – a psychological phenomenon in which people give interest to reach a consensus within a group. In most cases, people set aside their own personal beliefs to adopt the opinion of others in the group (Cherry, 2020). The term was first used in 1972 by social psychologist Irving L. Janis (1972, p. 276).

According to this theory, people who oppose the dominant decisions or opinions of the group as a whole often remain quiet, preferring to keep the peace instead of disturbing the uniformity of the crowd. The phenomenon can be problematic, but even well-meaning people are prone to make irrational decisions in the face of overwhelming pressure from the group.

Signs of group thinking

Group thinking may not always be easy to distinguish, but there are some signs that it is present. There are also some situations where there are indications that it is likely to occur. Janis has identified a number of different “symptoms” that indicate group thinking (Lunenburg, 2010, p. 13):

- *The illusions of unanimity* lead members to believe that everyone agrees and feels the same. It is often more difficult to speak when it seems that everyone else in the group is not on the same “wavelength”;
- *Unquestionable beliefs* lead members to ignore possible moral and sometimes even legal issues and not to consider the consequences of individual and group action;
- *Reason* prevents members from reconsidering their beliefs and causes them to ignore warning signs;
- *Stereotyping* causes group members to ignore or even demonize members outside the group who may oppose

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or challenge the group’s ideas. This causes group members to ignore important ideas or information;

- *Self-censorship* causes people who may have doubts to hide their fears or doubts. Instead of sharing what they know, people stay calm and apply the principle that the group needs to know best.

THE “MINDGUARDS” ACTIONS TAKEN OVER BY THE 2.0 ALGORITHMS

The “guards of the mind” are constraints that social groups add to decision-making processes acting as self-censors to hide problematic information from the group. Rather than sharing important information, they remain silent or actively prevent sharing. In this context, the *illusions of invulnerability* lead the members of the group to be overly optimistic and to take risks. When no one expresses or expresses an alternative opinion, it leads people to believe that the group must be right.

Direct pressure to comply is often put on members who ask questions, and those who question the group are often seen as disloyal or traitors.

From this information, one can easily notice the similarity with the process of algorithms in social networks. Basically, the algorithms do the same thing on social media and the recent documentary Social Dilemma (Netflix, 2020) in which former employees of the main social networks make public the mechanism described above with concrete examples.

Tristan Harris, a former Google employee, explained, in 2019, the fact that Google and other social networks have no need to spy on you in order to know what you want. “Companies such as Facebook, Google do not have to listen to conversations, because they’ve already collected the cookies and links that you accessed, so they make these voodoo dolls that act more and more like you do” (Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 2019).



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By “voodoo dolls”, he means the digital avatars built on the user’s profile. All it needs to do is simulate a conversation the voodoo doll would have and they already know the conversation that they just had, without listening to your microphone. Australian Broadcasting Corporation (2019) states these in order to accurately show there was social media is able to influence its users.

GROUPTHINK IMPACT VS. SOCIAL MEDIA IMPACT

Starting from the studies of the “group thinking” phenomenon, the perspective of the “bubbles” in social media no longer seems so distant. We are all connected, like a network we cannot see (Mickensberg and Dugan, 1995: 5-12). We find it difficult to see the network while you are inside it, whether we are talking about a social network that uses technology or not.

“Group thinking” can lead people to ignore important information and can eventually lead to poor decisions.

“Group thinking” can lead people to ignore important information and can eventually lead to poor decisions. This can be harmful even in minor situations, but can have much more serious consequences in some settings. Medical, military, or political decisions, for example, can lead to unfortunate outcomes when the effects of group thinking affect them.

While group thinking can generate consensus, it is by definition a negative phenomenon that results in poor or uninformed thinking in decision-making. Some of the problems it can cause include (Gokar, 2013, pp. 225-240):

- Blindness to potentially negative results;
- Failure to listen to people with opposing views;
- Lack of creativity;
- Lack of preparation to deal with negative results;
- Ignoring important information;
- Inability to see other solutions;
- Interest in other things than those discussed in the group;
- Listening to authority;
- Overconfidence in decisions;
- Resistance to new information or ideas.

Consensus can allow groups to make decisions, complete tasks and complete projects quickly and efficiently, but even the most harmonious groups can benefit from some challenges (Ibid).

Relating these issues to those generated by social media in the web 2.0 era, we can say that in order to have a correct perspective *the high costs estimated by researchers must be multiplied by the speed of spread in online social networks in terms of time to create such a group (called the bubble or resonance chamber in social media language), as well as with “2.0” in terms of amplifying symptoms and problems. We base these statements on the fact that the online favours through algorithms (Farrell, 2018) the instant creation of such groups based on common passions, studies, political affiliation, etc., as well as by the fact that “bubbles” or “resonance chambers” are much harder to prevent and getting out of them is much more difficult than in the case of “group thinking” because in real space freedom and privacy are greater than online, applying the principle of reducing the number of social steps (Christakis, Fowler, 2009, pp. 4-104) previously presented.*

If in working groups it has been shown that the diversity of group members improves decision-making and reduces group thinking, this principle is much more difficult to implement in online social networks because the group’s intervention is much more prompt and group thinking is the only one the members of the group hear, due to the information selection algorithms that reach them, this aspect determining them to be sure that this is the only available alternative.

When people in groups have diverse backgrounds and experiences, they are better able to bring different perspectives, information, and ideas to the table. This improves decisions and makes it less likely to fall into group thinking patterns. Starting from this premise, we consider that in order not to fall into the trap of these “bubbles” one of the viable solutions is an alternative that offers exposure to diversity even if this alternative will also be a component of the virtual environment and the most possible it could be one that provides more security when it comes to the use of personal data – the biggest risk identified



Consensus can allow groups to make decisions, complete tasks and complete projects quickly and efficiently, but even the most harmonious groups can benefit from some challenges.



by users of online social networks. A concrete example in this sense can be exemplified by the recent migrations from Facebook, respectively WhatsApp networks, to the detriment of networks such as “Me we”, respectively “Signal”, following the announcement of data sharing between WhatsApp and Facebook.

In other words, both in the real and in the virtual environment, the social network represents *the connection* with at least two other people, and this communication connection implies the influence that in the social networks expands step by step leading to the contamination of the network.

From origin to cause, from cause to effect

As we have shown in *the origin of communication study*, messages designed to influence behaviour have existed for centuries, but it has become easier because the methods of mass communication have allowed a wider dissemination of propaganda.

The model of persuasion used in ancient Greek rhetoric may from my point of view be an approach to false news and propaganda.

Kairos is actuality, adequacy, decorum, symmetry, balance – awareness of the rhetorical situation or “circumstances that open moments of opportunity” (Kinneavy, Eskin, 1994, pp. 42-131).

As neglected in classical rhetoric as the current concept of *kairos* practically translates into Aristotelian key communication as *correspondence truth*, another Aristotelian theory (Aristotle, 2007, pp. 23-39) may have applicability in combating false news This theory is based on the foundation that truth has a much greater persuasive force than false, regardless of rhetorical arguments, and that only because of lack of preparation, knowledge the use of evidence, plaintiffs lose some cases in front of more educated or skilled. *A sentence is true when it says about something that it is what it is or that it is not what it is not. It is false when it says about something that it is what it is not or that it is not what it is* (Aristotle, 2007, pp. 23-39). Truth is what corresponds to reality, because the truth is to tell as it happens in reality.

When people in groups have diverse backgrounds and experiences, they are better able to bring different perspectives, information, and ideas to the table. This improves decisions and makes it less likely to fall into group thinking patterns.

Basically, starting from his theory, a sentence is true when it says about something that it is what it is or that it is not what it is not. It is false when it says about something that it is what it is not or that it is not what it is. This type of truth is also called correspondence truth. *“Rhetoric is less the art of persuasion than the art of discovering everything that, in a given case, involves something persuasive”.* (Aristotle, 2004, p. 24).

In Aristotelian vision, the means of persuasion or evidence are:

- a) extratechnical, represented by various testimonies, documents, etc., which exist before the demonstration, are not procured by the speaker but can be used by him;
- b) techniques, these being the invention of the speaker: the character and authority of the speaker, his real or apparent demonstrative argumentation and the disposition in which the audience is (Ibid).

Applying the Aristotelian theory, we can identify a model for combating false news by simply promoting the truth (*figure no. 2*).




Figure no. 2: Fake news combat model using the Aristotelian correspondence truth.

If the truth has a greater persuasive force than the false, it is logical that telling the truth to the person exposed to the false will decrypt the initial message and categorise it as false. Continuing the Aristotelian reasoning, the uneducated (untrained) can be an exception to this theory, for which the model of combat must provide a component of education (training).



“Rhetoric is less the art of persuasion than the art of discovering everything that, in a given case, involves something persuasive”.



To help readers recognise false news, the International Federation of Library Associations (IFLA) has published a best practice guide that includes tips that should be applied by all readers to protect them from false news and, moreover, to prevent the spread of false news. Among the association's recommendations are: consider the source; read beyond, reading the whole article, not just the headline; check the author: who sign the articles; check the date the information was written; ask the experts: check the information with experts in the field.

This exception is not negligible because fake news professionals use increasingly diverse methods, Claire Wardle identifying, in 2017, no less than seven types of fake news (Wardle, 2017). This aspect reinforces the importance of the education component, with an essential role in the first stage of the process of combating fake news, that of identification (figure no. 2). For example, to help readers recognise false news, the International Federation of Library Associations (IFLA) has published a best practice guide¹ that includes tips that should be applied by all readers to protect them from false news and, moreover, to prevent the spread of false news. Among the association's recommendations are:

- Consider the source: searching and investigating the source of the accessed information as well as its contact list;
- Read beyond: reading the whole article, not just the headline, which often has nothing to do with the text of the article;
- Check the author: who signs the articles? Are they real? Are they credible?;
- Check the date the information was written. Old articles can be reviewed and reposted and introduced in a context;
- Ask the experts: check the information with experts in the field.

So these concepts, written and argued by Greek philosophers as a necessity to answer current problems of the time, the need for people to defend themselves before the courts, which had the role of cutting the truth and assigning justice, find applicability to you. and current issues such as combating false news and propaganda. Given the circumstances in which the communication took place - people's need, their personal interest in defending and convincing to achieve the desired effect – I consider this type of communication to be a starting point in addressing the phenomenon of false news and propaganda. In other words, in our opinion, *kairos*, translated by saying the right word at the right time, supported by the Aristotelian triangle of rhetoric

¹ "How to Spot Fake News". IFLA blogs. <http://blogs.ifla.org/lpa/files/2017/01/How-to-Spot-Fake-News-1.jpg>, 27 January 2017, retrieved on 12.10. 2019.

can be considered a first variant of the strategic communication approach. To combat fake news and propaganda.

In the same vein, starting from the theory of the French philosopher Jacques Ellul (1865, p. 6) according to which *propaganda ends where dialogue begins*, we consider that the tool to be used to counter propaganda and fake news is social media. All the more so as social media is the main medium for using and spreading false news and propaganda.

For example, at the level of the Ministry of National Defence, an institution with an active presence in social networks, we consider that it is necessary to use the official pages of the institution both for reporting (presenting) false news and prompt public information on the topic debated by them, and for education the public for their recognition and involvement in the detection and reporting of false news. The online communication strategy should also develop an information and message transmission component on the general topic addressed by the opponent's narratives. As arguments for this mode of action are *the credibility of the military institution (materialised in the large number of followers of the institutional pages)*, which would lead to efficient and real-time dissemination of institutional information and messages, *the interaction offered by social networks*, which would help educate the public and implicitly would lead to both the detection and the reporting of false news. Also, this type of content posted on the official pages of the institution would be taken over by the media, which would contribute to the expansion of the information dissemination environment.

CONCLUSIONS

To get an overview of social media, in addition to the fact that web 2.0 uses technologies focused on the concept of user-generated content, online collaboration and information exchange and collective intelligence (Davidson, Yoran, 2007, pp. 117-119), we must keep in mind that these technologies are focused on the concept



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Therefore, the social network broadens the communication environment and promotes influence and the Internet makes the communication process take place at the mass level, amplifies the speed of dissemination, which further emphasises the influence and recommends social media as a tool in the information war.

of **social network**, a concept that integrated users and made possible the generation and exchange of content, producing collective intelligence and, implicitly, the emergence of Web 2.0. Therefore, social media and web 2.0 are new concepts based on a concept recognised for its characteristics, developed with the help of technological evolution and the emergence of the Internet.

We consider that, regardless of the environment, either social or virtual, the social network means *the connection* with at least two other people, and, according to the triad theory, this connection involves influencing. The social network propagates this influence according to the theory of social steps, and the Internet increases the speed of propagation and rapid contamination of the network.

Basically, if the social network makes the difference from “one to one” or “door to door” communication to “from three to infinite plus” communication, virtual space, Internet and web 2.0 make the transition to *virtual social networks* where it is stored and it even amplifies the intention to communicate with the transmission of the desire and intention to influence.

Therefore, *the social network broadens the communication environment and promotes influence and the Internet makes the communication process take place at the mass level, amplifies the speed of dissemination, which further emphasises the influence and recommends social media as a tool in the information war. On the other hand, we consider that propaganda and fake news could be countered using simple social networks principles of communication and psycho-sociology.*

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ARE THE IMPROVISED CHEMICAL WEAPONS AS EFFICIENT AS MEDIA CLAIMS THEY ARE? CASE STUDY: THE SYRIAN WAR

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It is reported by various media sources that, since the beginning of the Syrian war in 2011, more than 11.5% of Syria's population has been wounded or killed. The scarcity of war resources forced the belligerents of the Syrian civil war to use many improvised weapons among which the chemical barrel bombs hold the headlines. Although the exact number of casualties produced by chemical weapons in Syria is unknown, reportedly a few thousand were killed or intoxicated. This article seeks to determine the efficiency of improvised chemical weapons used in Syria and compare them with the specially designed ones. For comparison, the military standards are to be used and the conclusion will show if the media is exaggerating or the humanity faces a new type of chemical warfare.

Keywords: chemical barrel bomb; chemical contamination; chemical warfare; lethal dose; civil war;

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of any of the institutions for which the author works or worked or any other entity to which the author is affiliated.



BACKGROUND

The Syrian ongoing civil war started in March 2011 with anti-government protests before escalating into a *full-scale civil war*. In more than six years of armed conflict, it claimed more than 500,000 lives. The length of the war and the multitude of the belligerent groups that take part in the conflict generated a scarcity of military resources and raw material for manufacturing weapons and ammunition. Consequently, all belligerents started manufacturing and inventing new types of improvised weapons like barrel bombs, "hell cannons" and pipe bombs or grenades. Those improvised weaponry may be considered as "crazy weapons" by military designers as they are made from PlayStation controllers, rope, fertilizer, and the explosive material of unexploded bombs. The creativity of belligerents reached the maximum destructive effect by using the so-called "barrel bombs" technology. Although the idea of such bomb is not a new one, in Syria such weapon was manufactured at large scale and in various versions. As the conflict in Syria is mainly run in the build-up areas, the core objective of the Syrian barrel bomb program is to provide cheap and lethal damage on urban areas.

CHEMICAL BARREL BOMBS

The barrel bomb technology was initially developed in order to be deployed by low speed aircrafts and helicopters and released over the target of interest from a low altitude. Those conditions, low speed and altitude were necessary for achieving the pinpoint accuracy of the barrel bomb and damage the only specifically identified target. However, along the conflict timeline, the belligerents were able to acquire or manufacture Man Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS) that deterred these low launched bombings.

The attack of the MANPADS forced the low speed aircrafts to launch the barrel bombs from a higher altitude (around 5,000 meters)

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The attack of the MANPADS forced the low speed aircrafts to launch the barrel bombs from a higher altitude (around 5,000 meters) but with the cost of the accuracy. Consequently, by decreasing the accuracy, the impact points became randomly and currently, the barrel bombs are rather used for attacking large urban areas killing humans and damaging military and civilian infrastructure.

but to the detriment of the accuracy. Consequently, by decreasing the accuracy, the impact points became randomly and currently, the barrel bombs are rather used for attacking large urban areas killing humans and damaging military and civilian infrastructure.

Of specific interest for the purpose of this article is the “*chemical barrel bomb*”. This weapon was developed by using the same technology as for conventional barrel bombs but they were filled with toxic chemicals. Based on multiple open sources, videos, and social media reports, one may observe an evolution in design of such chemical barrel bomb that ranges from some simple cylinder filled with toxic chemicals to a more advance binary model.

Based on author understanding regarding the improvised barrel bomb construction, the multiple open-source videos showing the remnants of barrel bombs and debris found at alleged chemical attacks location, he can assess that the most complicated improvised chemical barrel bombs used in attacks include the following components:

1. an outer shell (in general, an empty standard barrel or a manufactured) designed to hold inside a various number of gas cylinders;
2. a number of gas cylinders of various shapes and sizes filled with chemical compounds (which are most probably gases or liquids);
3. multiple plastic bottles filled with an chemical compound which, in reaction with the chemical compound stored in the gas cylinders, will release a toxic gas;
4. a detonation cord or an explosive mixture designed to brake the gas cylinders and the plastic bottles, allowing the chemical reaction to take place;
5. an ordinary time or impact fuse consisting of a blasting cap and a time calculated fuse wick (fuse cord);
6. several and various connectors that hold the components together;
7. some elements designed to stabilise the bomb during flight to target and for land transport and loading into the low speed aircraft.



The improvised chemical weapons construction consists of a time fuse, a detonation cord wrapped over the pressure valve sit, and an outer shell.

This chemical barrel bomb releases the toxic chemical compound by using the detonation cord or an explosive mixture to destroy the walls of both the gas cylinders filled with toxic chemical and the outer shell. Improvised chemical barrel bombs designs that are observed through social media demonstrate that there is an evolution of their manufacture driven by trial and error process. By assessing and evaluating the social media pictures and videos, the author could identify three (3) generic constructions of the toxic chemical barrel bomb as they are presented below.

This version of the chemical barrel bomb is the simplest one, and it uses the chlorine cylinders as a chemical load. In general, most common sizes of chlorine cylinders contain 45 or 68 kg of chlorine. In case of Syria, there is information in the media about chlorine cylinders made in China. In this case, the capacity of the cylinder is of 50 kg of chlorine. The construction is very simple, a steel cylinder with a pressure valve. Cylinder valves are equipped with a pressure relief device consisting of a fusible metal plugin the valve body, located below the valve seat. The fusible metal is designed to melt between 70°C and 74°C to relieve pressure and prevent rupture of the cylinder in case of exposure to high temperatures. Based on those characteristics, the improvised chemical weapons construction consists of a time fuse, a detonation cord wrapped over the pressure valve sit, and an outer shell (see Figure 1). The bomb is launched from a low speed aircraft and it explodes at a time controlled by the time fuse – the length of safe fuse. This time is correlated with the flying time of the bomb, the flying altitude depending of the tactical mission. The chlorine is released following the explosion of the detonation cord, which destroys the pressure valve. This improvised chemical bomb is simple by construction and cheap. However, it has some important falls. The precision of this bomb depends on the flying altitude. The increase of the flying altitude results in lower accuracy for the bomb. Also, the time fuse may not be accurately calculated and therefore the dude rate of these bombs increases, reducing the effect on target. In addition, the low altitude exposes the aircraft to MANPADS. Consequently, increasing the altitude, the bomb will tumble in the air and the accuracy is lost.



CHEMICAL BARREL BOMB version 1




Figure 1: Improvised chemical barrel bomb, version nr. 1
(Source: Carol-Teodor Peterfi)¹

¹ The various pictures used for drawing the sketch can be accessed in social media: <http://brown-moses.blogspot.com/2014/05/photographs-from-daniele-raineri-of.html>, retrieved on 16 September 2019.



Another construction defect of the bomb is that of the position of the fuse and the probability of it to detach from the overall construction at the impact of the bomb with the soil. This results in either a dud bomb or only the explosion of one cylinder, decreasing the contamination area and implicitly the tactical effect on target.

The second version of the improvised chemical bomb replaces the chlorine cylinders with the propane cylinders (see Figure 2).

The author could not assess the exact reason for this change but it may be confidently assumed that it has to do with the scarcity of the chlorine cylinders as they have also important industrial purposes, most significant being water purification. The main improvement of this bomb is the transversal rebar which probably is designed to keep in place the gas cylinders when the bomb impacts the target. Also, this improvement keeps in place the time fuse and this reduces the dud rate of the improvised chemical barrel bomb. However, the author considers that another improvement of this type of bomb is the addition of a burster into the explosive train. This additional explosive is needed to destroy the steel propane cylinder as the detonation cord is unlikely to do it. The author considers that the burster is made available from the mining industry and it is not necessary to use a military explosive. As can be seen in the Figure 2, probably the burster is placed at the bottom of the propane cylinders as the cylinder valve is not destroyed. In this type of construction, chlorine is allegedly released by cracking the propane cylinder through the explosion of the burster. The rebar used to keep in place the propane cylinders improve, the effect on target of the bomb by increasing the contamination density. Also, the main advantage of such improvised chemical bomb is the availability of the propane cylinders and the main drawback is low accuracy.

The third type of improvised chemical bomb is more sophisticated and falls in the category of binary chemical weapons. Those type of ordnance uses two or more chemical substances that combined form the chemical warfare agent and requires the mixture of the components in the last phase of the chemical warfare agent production and those components are usually not toxic or far less than the final compound.

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


Figure 2: Improvised chemical barrel bomb, version nr. 2
(Source: Carol-Teodor Peterfi)²

² Ibid.
No. 2/2021



Although such binary chemical ordnances usually require a certain level of technology, it seems that the Syrian war pushed to a very ingenious improvised version (see Figure 3). This type of improvised chemical bomb uses the reaction between potassium permanganate³ and an acid, probably hydrochloric acid to produce chlorine: $2 \text{KMnO}_4 + 16 \text{HCl} = 2 \text{KCl} + 2 \text{MnCl}_2 + 8 \text{H}_2\text{O} + 5 \text{Cl}_2$. The construction of the improvised bomb is more complicated than the previous versions. The bomb components are: an impact plate, an outer shell, a number of bottles containing potassium permanganate and air conditioning cylinders containing hydrochloric acid. All components are wrapped into a detonation cord that, once exploded, will destroy the cylinders and bottles allowing potassium permanganate and hydrochloric acid to react. The toxic result of reaction is chlorine (see Figure 3).

There are some important elements in the evolution of improvised chemical barrel bombs as for example the impact plate and fins. The impact plate increases the rate of explosion as it can hit the tactical target at any angle and the explosion is initiated by the blasting caps placed under it, in between impact plate and outer shell of the bomb. Another improvement is the appearance of the stabilising fins that help the bomb flying trajectory and increases the targeting accuracy. Also, the stabilising fins allow the launching of the bomb from a higher altitude than the previous version with an improved accuracy. The rationale behind of having three stabilising fins and not more comes from practicality of deployment. For an easier transport, the improvised chemical air bombs were design with a transport train comprising of two wheels in the front and one on the back of the bomb. The three stabilising fins are the cheapest technical solution that match both transport and stabilisation requirements. Much more, some of the social media sources show the improvised bombs loaded into a helicopter. The internal design of helicopter and the launching procedures do not allow a bomb designed with four fins (see figure 4).

³ Potassium permanganate is an inorganic salt. It dissolves in water to give intensely purple solutions. Potassium permanganate solution (KMnO₄) is often used in analytical chemistry as an oxidising titrant for redox titrations. Solid potassium permanganate is oxidising. Solid KMnO₄ is a strong oxidiser that reacts dangerously when mixed with glycerine, ethylene glycol, sulphuric acid and benzaldehyde.





Figure 3: Improved chemical barrel bomb, version nr. 3
(Source: Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons⁴)

⁴ The pictures used for forensic analysis can be accessed on social media: <http://brown-moses.blogspot.com/2014/04/>, retrieved on 16 September 2019.



Figure 4: Comparison between classic and improvised bombs
(Bellingcat, 2015)

The most recent improvised chemical bomb used in Syria comes from the Douma chemical attack. The bomb used in that attack consist of a simple chlorine cylinder to which an interesting prefabricated harness system was attached. To that harness, the designer attached three stabilising fins and a simple transport train. This construction indicates that the cylinder and the harness have different supplier and those two parts were assembled as weapon before being loaded for launching. The harness improved the accuracy and the mobility of the weapon while the costs are kept low by using a simple chlorine cylinder. The toxic gas is released on impact when the pressure valve is ruptured or detonated. The author cannot exactly assess from the media if the improvised ordnance presented in the *figure 5* released chlorine on impact or by detonation.

In addition to the aerial improvised ordnances, the media also presents some improvised versions of artillery type of chemical projectiles. In general, these types of artillery improvised chemical ordnances are designed as reactive artillery consisting of a racket engine and an improvised chemical warhead. The racket engine is in general taken from the Grad 122 mm missile⁵. The warhead is improvised and therefore can be filled as the user considers. In the improvised chemical weapons, the easiest construction is to attach to the Grad engine a propane cylinder filled with chlorine. The improvised artillery barrel

The warhead is improvised and therefore can be filled as the user consider. In the improvised chemical weapons, the easiest construction is to attach to the Grad engine a propane cylinder filled with chlorine.

⁵ The BM-21 "Grad" is a Soviet truck-mounted 122 mm multiple rocket launcher. The complete system is more commonly known as a Grad multiple rocket launcher system. In NATO countries, the system (either the complete system or the launch vehicle only) was initially known as M1964. Several other countries have copied the Grad or have developed similar systems.




Figure 5: Improvised chemical barrel bomb, version nr. 4
(Source: Carol-Teodor Peterfi⁶)

bomb lacks precision due to unpredictable trajectory. The liquid fill does not help the rocket flight and it is highly probable to tumble in the air and therefore miss the target. The effect on target is achieved by releasing the toxic chemicals at impact, by destroying the pressure valve or detonating it through a time fuse (see figure 6).

METHODOLOGY

For calculating the effect of improvised chemical barrel bombs, the article uses the first responders' tools available online, mainly ALOHA and CAMEO. It calculates the effect on target based on the physical and chemical properties of chlorine assuming that only chlorine was used

⁶ For forensic analysis and explanations, various social media sources were used: <https://twitter.com/eliohiggins/status/988341105623228417?lang=ga>; <https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2018/04/29/pieces-matter-syrias-chlorine-bombs-douma-chemical-attack/>, retrieved on 16 September 2019.




Figure 6: Improvised chemical barrel bomb based on Grad rocket
(Transcend Media Service)

as toxic chemical in the construction of those improvised chemical ordnance. The tactical norms and principles for using of chemical weapons are documented from NATO manuals and those may be different, depending on the bibliographical source and the NATO country that published it.

The source of the pictures used to analyse and draft the drawings presented in the "Background" are exclusively from the media. If one may google the keywords "chemical barrel bombs" the search engine will return about 5,890,000 results in 0.46 seconds⁷. The images used for identify the design of the above presented ordnances are taken from those results.

As the target audience of this article are not only the CBRN specialists, the calculations are kept as simple as possible and at the level of understanding of the general public. If someone needs more details regarding those calculations, the author will be more than glad to answer to any questions regarding those and to add more scientific details as well.

For simplification of the calculation, the author will consider the physical volume of the chlorine cylinder of 50 kg and chlorine liquefied. The chlorine exposure levels and effects on humans are those recommended by Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), United States.

⁷ The results displayed by Google when the expression "chemical barrel bomb" is searched varies depending on geographical location of the server, language used, and the operation system. The result displayed on text was obtained in Pueblo, Colorado, USA, on 16 September 2019.

The source of pictures used to analyse and draft the drawings presented in the "Background" are exclusively from the media. If one may google the keywords "chemical barrel bombs" the search engine will return about 5,890,000 results in 0.46 seconds.



Based on the results of the calculations, the author will further present the conclusion regarding the possible effect on target of those improvised chemical ordnances and will compare with the effect presented in Media.

LIMITATION OF RESEARCH

The research only rest on the media information and does not use any other information collected by specialised agencies. Therefore, the author is not in the position to confirm or deny the chemical attack happened in Syria. For the aim of the research, the author assumes that the information presented in the media are correct and the result are expected to confirm or deny the damaging potential of the improvised chemical weapons.

The research will be limited to only chlorine and it will be considered only as suffocant warfare agent. The chlorine toxic general effects will be neglected. The constructive model of the cylinders used for containing chlorine will not be analysed, the author assumes that they fit the necessary standards for this purpose (pressure, corrosivity, safety devices, etc.).

For the calculation purposes, the author will consider the most favourable meteorological conditions (temperature, air stability, wind direction and speed) in order to find out the most effect of improvised chemical barrel bomb.

Another important limitation of this research is that it does not seek to analyse or to name the perpetrators of the chemical attacks performed during the Syrian war, but only to evaluate their impact and efficiency on the security stage.

CALCULATIONS

General presentation of chlorine

Chlorine is primary used in water treatment and as disinfectant it destroys harmful organisms. The chlorine is also used to remove colour and ammonia compounds, eliminate hydrogen sulphide, oxidize iron and manganese to insoluble forms, and reduce undesirable taste and odours. In simple terms, chlorine is a very accessible toxic chemical compound and it is intensively used in the chemical industry. As such,

in spite of its toxic properties, chlorine is an essential element for daily life and welfare of any human society. Although it qualifies for the definition of chemical weapons, it cannot be considered as such because of its extensive use in industry.

The chemical symbol for elemental chlorine is Cl. Chlorine exists as a molecule containing two atoms, shown chemically as Cl₂. Chlorine has an atomic weight of 35.453, a molecular weight of 70.906, and an atomic number of 17. Some of the physical properties of chlorine are given in *Table 1*. While it is not explosive or flammable, as a liquid or gas it can react violently with many substances. This property of not being flammable is an advantage for weaponising it because it does not pose any difficulties in being released by explosion. Chlorine gas has a greenish-yellow colour. It has a typical unpleasant and pungent odour, similar to chlorine-based laundry bleaches, and it is detected by smell at concentrations as low as 0.58 to 1.16 mg/m³(0.2 to 0.4 ppm)⁸. It is about two and a half times as heavy as air. Consequently, if chlorine gas escapes from a container or system, it will seek the lowest level in the building or area. Liquid chlorine is amber in colour and is about one and a half times as heavy as water. Chlorine is occasionally seen as a liquid because it boils (converts to a gas) at about -34°C (-29°F) at atmospheric pressure.

Table 1: Physical properties of chlorine
(Source: Carol-Teodor Peterfi)⁹

Boiling point (liquefying point) at 1 atmosphere = 14.696 psi (101.325 kPa)	-33.97°C (-29.15°F)
Melting point (freezing point) at 1 atmosphere	-100.98°C (-149.76°F)
Liquid density at 16°C (60°F)	1,422 kg/m ³ (388.76 lb/cu ft)
Gas density at 1.1°C (34°F)	3.213 kg/m ³ (0.2006 lb/cu ft)
Specific gravity (liquid) at 0°C (32°F)	1.468 (water = 1)
Specific gravity (gas) at 0°C (32°F)	2.485 (air = 1)

⁸ At 25° C and 1 atmosphere.

⁹ For compiling data presented in the table, the author used material Safety Sheet for chlorine as in is communicated by Hazard Communication Standard: Safety Data Sheets – OSHA, *The Chlorine Manual*, 2001.



It is about two and a half times as heavy as air. Consequently, if chlorine gas escapes from a container or system, it will seek the lowest level in the building or area. Liquid chlorine is amber in colour and is about one and a half times as heavy as water.




Another important characteristic of chlorine for this research is the liquid-gas volume relationship. One volume of liquid chlorine yields about 460 volumes of chlorine gas. For example, 0.5 kg (1pound) of liquid chlorine produces approximately 153 litres (5.4 cubic feet) of 100%chlorine gas when vaporized at normal temperature [20°C (68°F)] and atmospheric pressure.


Water solubility at 21.1°C (70°F)	0.7% by weight
Vapor pressures:	
at 0°C (32°F)	53.51 psi (368.9 kPa)
at 25°C (77°F)	112.95 psi (778.8 kPa)
at 48.9°C (129°F)	191.01 psi (1,316.8kPa)

Very important to consider for the purpose of this research are the chemical reactions of chlorine with water. Those reactions produce chemical compounds that are highly corrosive and by this reason they damage the human body. The corrosivity of hypochlorous acid and hydrochloric acid are responsible with the blindness of the soldiers attacked during the World War I with chlorine. The chlorine reacts with the human body moisture and the acids formed destroy the human tissue.

Chlorine gas reacts with water to form both hypochlorous and hydrochloric acids (Eq. 1):



Hypochlorous acid dissociates in water to form the hydrogen and hypochlorite ions (Eq. 2):



Another important characteristic of chlorine for this research is the liquid-gas volume relationship. One volume of liquid chlorine yields about 460 volumes of chlorine gas. For example, 0.5 kg (1pound) of liquid chlorine produces approximately 153 litres (5.4 cubic feet) of 100% chlorine gas when vaporized at normal temperature [20°C (68° F)] and atmospheric pressure. Therefore, one 68 kg (150-lb) cylinder would completely fill a 3 x 3 x 2.5-meters (10 x 10 x 8-foot) room with 100% chlorine gas.

The vaporisation of liquid chlorine on skin or clothing may reduce the temperature enough to cause frostbite (even through high-quality protective clothing).

Chlorine is an irritant to the eyes, skin, mucous membranes, and the respiratory system. The main concern with exposure to chlorine

is the respiratory system, followed by the eyes. The impact of exposure to chlorine is both concentration and time dependent. Table 2 summarises exposure levels and effects on humans as are described by United States occupational safety and health.

Table 2: Toxic properties of chlorine
(Source: Carol-Teodor Peterfi)¹⁰

Exposure levels (mg/m ³)	Effects
0.58 to 1.16	Odour threshold (different by individual)
less than 1.5	No known acute or chronic effect
1.5	ACGIH 8-hour time weighted average
2.9	OSHA ceiling level (PEL ¹¹) TLV ¹² -STEL ¹³ ERPG-1 ¹⁴
3 to 30	Irritation of the eyes and mucous membranes of the upper respiratory tract. Severity of symptoms depends on concentrations and length of exposure.
8.7	ERPG-2 ¹⁵ (Emergency Response Planning Guidelines as values developed by AIHA) is the maximum airborne concentration below, which it is believed that nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing or developing irreversible or other serious health effects that could impair an individual's ability to take protective action.

¹⁰ For compiling the data presented in the table, the author used data from the Safety Sheet for chlorine as communicated by Hazard Communication Standard: Safety Data Sheets – OSHA and Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare.

¹¹ Permissible Exposure Limits. PELs are legal limits for the degree to which workers may be exposed to chemicals and other hazards (such as noise) without suffering harm.

¹² TLV defines the threshold limit value of a chemical substance and is believed to be a level to which a worker can be exposed day after day for a working lifetime without adverse effects. Strictly speaking, TLV is a reserved term of the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH).

¹³ STEL defines the short-term exposure limit that is the acceptable average exposure over a short period of time, usually 15 minutes, as long as the time-weighted average (TWA) is not exceeded. STEL is a term used in occupational health, industrial hygiene and toxicology.

¹⁴ The ERPG-1 is the maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed that nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hr without experiencing other than mild transient adverse health effects or perceiving a clearly defined, objectionable odour.

¹⁵ The ERPG-2 is the maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed that nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hr without experiencing or developing irreversible or other serious health effects or symptoms which could impair an individual's ability to take protective action.





Exposure levels (mg/m ³)	Effects
29	NIOSH IDLH ¹⁶ (immediately dangerous to life and health)
58	ERPG-3 is the maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed that nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to one hour without experiencing or developing life-threatening health effects.

As the duration of exposure or the concentration increases, the contaminated individual may become apprehensive and restless, with coughing accompanied by throat irritation, sneezing, and excess salivation. At higher levels, vomiting associated with difficult breathing can occur. In extreme cases, difficulty in breathing can progress to the point of death through suffocation.

Calculations regarding release of chlorine

Calculation data:

- Location: Douma, Syria: 33°34'27" N; 36°24'20"E; elevation 659 meters;
- Building type: double stories buildings; unsheltered surroundings;
- Chemical: chlorine, pure chemical;
- Atmospheric conditions: wind 2.7 meters/second from ESE measured 3 meters above the ground; urban environment; partially cloudy; 75% humidity;
- Source: direct source; 50 kg; release duration 1 minute; release rate: 0.83kg/sec; source height 0 meters; total amount released: 49.89 kg.

The results of the calculations are displayed below. As it can be observed, the IDLH concentration is realised at surface of approx. 0.25 km² – 759 meters from the source (830 yards) on the downwind

¹⁶ IDLH is defined by the US National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) as exposure to airborne contaminants that is "likely to cause death or immediate or delayed permanent adverse health effects or prevent escape from such an environment".

direction. As the population density in Syria is 93 per km² (241 people per sq mi²)¹⁷ means that a number of approx. 45 people will be exposed to the IDLH dose of chlorine. Although this number is not consistent with the number of victims reported in various sources of the media, the author can assume that the reported number of deaths – between 40 and 50 people – is possible in certain conditions. The reported number of injuries – more than a hundred – is also possible. In addition, although the chlorine is very volatile and in proper weather conditions its concentration decreased to at non-lethal one in 15 to 20 minutes, it may cause the death of the affected people if they do not evacuate the area in due time.

However, if the effects of the chlorine used as a chemical weapon is compared to that of sarin, a nerve agent allegedly used in the attacks at Ghouta¹⁸ and Khan Shaykhun¹⁹ chemical attacks (The White Helments), than the number of the victims exposed to IDLH level will rise at 1088 people (see Figure 8) (United Nations Security Council, 2017, pp. 25-31).

THE USE OF CHEMICAL BARREL BOMBS IN THE SYRIAN WAR

The use of improvised chemical barrel bombs and other chemical ordnances in the Syrian war is a reality which cannot be denied and cannot be considered as propaganda. However, there are some questions that have to be addressed before going to a conclusion of their efficiency in the current Syrian war. According to the principle of the chemical warfare, the use of those weapons has to have a tactical purpose and to offer an advantage over the opponent.

In the media, there is no relevant information regarding the tactical value of chemical attacks. In general, the impact areas are mostly

¹⁷ The mile (mi) is the British Imperial Unit of length and is equal to 5,280 feet or 1,760 yards; in the International System, a mile is standardised at exactly 1,609.344 metres, by an international agreement back in 1959.


¹⁸ The Ghouta chemical attack occurred in Ghouta, Syria during the Syrian Civil War, in the early hours of 21 August 2013. Two opposition-controlled areas in the suburbs around Damascus, Syria were struck by rockets containing the chemical agent sarin. Estimates of the death toll range from at least 281 people to 1,729. The attack was the deadliest use of chemical weapons since the Iran–Iraq War.

¹⁹ The Khan Shaykhun chemical attack took place on 4 April 2017 on the town of Khan Shaykhun in the Idlib Governorate of Syria.



ROMANIAN
MILITARY
THINKING

As the population density in Syria is 93 per km² (241 people per sq mi²) means that a number of approx. 45 people will be exposed to the IDLH dose of chlorine. Although this number is not consistent with the number of victims reported in various sources of the media, the author can assume that the reported number of deaths – between 40 and 50 people – is possible in certain conditions. The reported number of injuries – more than a hundred – is also possible.



SITE DATA:
 Location: DOUMA, SYRIA
 Building Air Exchanges Per Hour: 0.40 (unsheltered double storied)
 Time: September 7, 2019 2349 hours DST (using computer's clock)

CHEMICAL DATA:
 Chemical Name: CHLORINE
 CAS Number: 7782-50-5 Molecular Weight: 70.91 g/mol
 AEGL-1 (60 min): 0.5 ppm AEGL-2 (60 min): 2 ppm AEGL-3 (60 min): 20 ppm
 IDLH: 10 ppm
 Ambient Boiling Point: -32.4° F
 Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: greater than 1 atm
 Ambient Saturation Concentration: 1,000,000 ppm or 100.0%


ATMOSPHERIC DATA: (MANUAL INPUT OF DATA)
 Wind: 2.7 meters/second from ESE at 3 meters
 Ground Roughness: urban or forest Cloud Cover: 5 tenths
 Air Temperature: 17° C Stability Class: D
 No Inversion Height Relative Humidity: 75%

SOURCE STRENGTH:
 Direct Source: 50 kilograms Source Height: 4 meters
 Release Duration: 1 minute
 Release Rate: 1.84 pounds/sec
 Total Amount Released: 110 pounds
 Note: This chemical may flash boil and/or result in two phase flow.

THREAT ZONE:
 Model Run: Heavy Gas
 Red : 830 yards --- (20 ppm = AEGL-3 [60 min])
 Orange: 1.2 miles --- (2 ppm = AEGL-2 [60 min])
 Yellow: 2.0 miles --- (0.5 ppm = AEGL-1 [60 min])

Figure 7: Results of the calculation of the use of the improvised chlorine barrel bomb (Source: Carol-Teodor Peterfi)²⁰

²⁰ For calculation of dispersion model, the ALOHA software was used.



Text Summary

SITE DATA:
 Location: DOUMA, SYRIA, SYRIA
 Building Air Exchanges Per Hour: 0.40 (unsheltered double storied)
 Time: September 7, 2019 2349 hours ST (user specified)

CHEMICAL DATA:
 Chemical Name: SARIN
 CAS Number: 107-44-8 Molecular Weight: 140.11 g/mol
 AEGL-1 (60 min): 4.8e-04 ppm AEGL-2 (60 min): 0.006 ppm AEGL-3 (60 min): 0.022 ppm
 Normal Boiling Point: 147.2° C
 Note: Not enough chemical data to use Heavy Gas option

ATMOSPHERIC DATA: (MANUAL INPUT OF DATA)
 Wind: 2.7 meters/second from ese at 3 meters
 Ground Roughness: urban or forest Cloud Cover: 7 tenths
 Air Temperature: 17° C Stability Class: D
 No Inversion Height Relative Humidity: 75%

SOURCE STRENGTH:
 Direct Source: 50 kilograms Source Height: 4 meters
 Release Duration: 1 minute
 Release Rate: 833 grams/sec
 Total Amount Released: 50.0 kilograms

THREAT ZONE:
 Model Run: Gaussian
 Red : 3.9 kilometers --- (0.022 ppm = AEGL-3 [60 min])
 Orange: 6.4 kilometers --- (0.006 ppm = AEGL-2 [60 min])
 Yellow: greater than 10 km --- (4.8e-04 ppm = AEGL-1 [60 min])

Figure 8: Results of the calculation of the use of the improvised sarin barrel bomb (Source: Carol-Teodor Peterfi)²¹

²¹ For calculation of dispersion model was used ALOHA software, *Ibid.*



The impact areas are mostly populated area or on contrary, areas without a significant importance like agriculture terrain (farms), isolated buildings, crossroads etc. This situation reflects either a wrong accuracy of the improvised chemical barrel bombs or a bad targeting process. In addition, other purposes as terrorism or provocation cannot be excluded.

populated area or, on the contrary, areas without a significant importance like agriculture terrain (farms), isolated buildings, crossroads etc. This situation reflects either a wrong accuracy of the improvised chemical barrel bombs or a bad targeting process. In addition, other purposes as terrorism or provocation cannot be excluded.

The chemical attacks are in general sporadic and the perpetrator generally used a very limited number of the assets. This is not in line with the principles of using chemical weapons because, by using a single “round”, the effect on target cannot be reached. In other words, one strike cannot reach the contamination norms²² necessary for achieving the desired effect.

Another element that triggered the author attention, beside the single use, is the fact that the chemical munitions were used without being combined with the classic explosive munitions. It is common in the literature regarding the use of chemical weapons to be used in combination with other types of lethal munitions for increasing the effect of both. In the Syrian case, media reports only use of chemical munitions stand-alone.

The evolution of the chemical barrel bombs presented in the background of this paper suggests a sort of amateurism in the design and construction of such weapons. The simplicity of the weapons suggests that the user did not pay too much attention to the accuracy and the effect on target, but rather to affect non-protected and not chemically trained population. This suggests rather a terrorist purpose than the achievement of any military objectives.

Regarding the efficiency of the chlorine used in chemical weapons, it is clear that it cannot produce huge casualties and the protection against it is relatively simple. Chlorine was used as an efficient weapon only during the World War I and indeed produced thousands of casualties. However, the attacks were with huge quantities of chlorine and in short time, once the belligerents introduced the gas mask as protective measure, the use of chlorine was discontinued as it was

²² The contamination norms are 10 – 25 mg/m² for nerve agents and 50 – 100 mg/m² for vesicants. Those military norms can vary from country to country. For example, in Romanian bibliography, a battery of mortars of 106.6 mm can contaminate with sarin 21 hectares in one strike realizing a contamination of 0.04 mg/l*min. This concentration can kill a 70 kg person at one single breath even at a temperature of – 10°C.



The chemical attacks, who ever executed them, were of huge impact worldwide. Following the Khan Shaykhun chemical attack on 4 April 2017, the United States stroke with missiles the Shayrat Airbase on 7 April 2017. This it is one of the first international community military actions against Syria and was triggered by the chemical attack allegedly executed with a “sarin like” chemicals.

considered as ineffective. However, here is another point to consider about the chlorine attacks in Syria. During the World War I, the most affected external organ of the soldiers were the eyes. It is well-known the picture with the blind soldier lining up for movement and medical treatment. This is because chlorine reacts with water from the human body and the results, the hypochlorous and hydrochloric acid, damage the soft tissue of the eye, lungs and skin. In the Syria chemical weapons related pictures a patient with eye problems can be barely seen, most of them accusing breathing difficulties, which is also one of the main effects of chlorine contamination.

All those above elements are analysed from tactical perspective. At operational level, as the Syrian war is presented in different media sources, the author could not find any coherent operational plans or manoeuvres that are supported by those chemical attacks. In this respect, the author could not identify any kind of military operations that required a chemical attack in support of achieving an operational objective. All those chemical attacks are mainly sporadic and they seem to be uncoordinated at the operational level. In principal, those chemical attacks targeted a small tactical objective (if any) and it seems they are not part of a bigger military operation. As the judgment of such operations in Syria war are based exclusively on media reports, such operational plans may exist but, as the military operations of all belligerents were run, it is hard to believe that those chemical attacks were coordinated at operational level.

At the strategic level, the situation seems to be clearer. The chemical attacks, who ever executed them, were of huge impact worldwide. Following the Khan Shaykhun chemical attack on 4 April 2017, the United States stroke with missiles the Shayrat Airbase on 7 April 2017²³. This is one of the first international community military actions against Syria and was triggered by the chemical attack allegedly executed with a “sarin like” chemicals (*The Washington Post*, 2017). This deliberate attack against Syria triggered many reactions at international level

²³ On 7 April 2018, in response to chemical weapon attacks (most notably the Khan Shaykhun chemical attack) against Syrian civilians by the Syrian government, the U.S. launched missile strikes on the airfield from which the chemical weapon attacks were allegedly launched. This incident marked the first deliberate direct attack by the U.S. on the Assad government.



and also many controversies regarding the legitimacy of such independent actions. For example, the Russian Foreign Ministry condemned the attack as being based on dishonest intelligence and against international law, suspended the Memorandum of Understanding on Prevention of Flight Safety Incidents that had been signed with the United States, and called an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council (*Statement by the Russian Foreign Ministry*, 2017). Following the chemical warfare attack (2 cylinders with chlorine) that was carried out in the Syrian city of Douma on 7 April 2018, the United States, France and the United Kingdom carried out a series of military strikes against multiple government sites in Syria. Those bombing actions were also heavily criticised by Syria, Russia and their allies as those countries consider ethos attacks as staged by Syria opposition forces (Envoy to OPCW..., 2018).

The United Nations was also involved after the attack and it became the place of a fiercely diplomatic battles. On 10 April 2018, member states proposed competing United Nations Security Council resolutions to handle the response to the chemical attack. The United States, France, and United Kingdom vetoed a Russian-proposed United Nations resolution. Russia had also vetoed the United States' proposed resolution to create *"a new investigative mechanism to look into chemical weapons attacks in Syria and determine who is responsible"* (*"Russia Vetoes U.S. Resolution on Syria"*, 2018). On 14 April 2018, France, the United Kingdom and the United States hurled airstrikes against four Syrian government military objective in retaliation to the attack (ABC News, 2018). The airstrikes were claimed to effectively destroy the chemical weapons capabilities of Syria. However, according to Pentagon, the Syrian Arab Republic still retains the ability to launch chemical weapons attacks (*"Russia, Syria Trying To 'Sanitize' Chemical Attack Site"*, 2018).

To sum up, those above analysed chemical weapons attacks were improvised chemical weapons were used, although without a notable efficiency at tactical and operational level, triggered a fiercely diplomatic battles on the stage of the international organisations and anyone can observe that this fight is far from coming to an end.

CONCLUSIONS

Based on the facts and calculations presented above, one may conclude that the efficiency of the improvised chemical weapons ordnances allegedly used in Syria are not of high efficiency at tactical and operational level and those have been used rather as terrorist weapons or with a provocative purpose. As it is presented by Media, the result of those attacks determined the international community to respond and some countries were fast to attack Syrian targets while other were keener to wait for a United Nations resolution in this respect. This situation may suggest two different patterns of using the chemical weapons.

The first pattern is that of terrorist attack. As any terrorist attacks, the use of chemical weapons is against civilians and has the purpose to attract the attention over some claims of a terrorist group or to achieve some 'politic' purposes (Fortna, 2015, pp. 519-556).

In general, the concept is used in this regard mostly to refer to violence during peacetime or in context of war against non-combatants (mostly civilians) (Stevenson, 2010). The chemical attacks in Syria may fall under this definition and therefore the author can confidently assume that the chemical attacks in Syria are terrorist attacks.

The second pattern seems to bring in attention an old security concept, namely that of 'strategic caporal' (Stirm, 2019). The concept refers to low-level military leaders who have to make critical tactical decisions in complex situations that could affect the operational and strategic levels. It also refers to the high demands that military leadership places on soldiers (Jordaan, 2017, pp. 149-154). In our studied cases, the chemical attacks executed at tactical level, coordinated or not at operational level, achieved a high strategic impact that triggered the military intervention of other states in the Syrian war. Many investigations regarding those chemical attacks are ongoing and the results of some of them were already presented in various reports of various international organisations or non-governmental organisations. However, a big part of those reports are Media based and, although they tried to be scientifically accurate, more other questions are raised up. Some of the Media reports and analyses suggest that at least some of those attacks were staged.



In general, the concept is used in this regard mostly to refer to violence during peacetime or in context of war against non-combatants (mostly civilians). The chemical attacks in Syria may fall under this definition and therefore the author can confidently assume that the chemical attacks in Syria are terrorist attacks.



If this is so, then the world is facing another type of chemical warfare. In this new type of war, the toxic chemicals are used not for achieving an immediate tactical or operational objective but, for achieving a bigger strategic purpose. Bearing in mind the military interventions following the chemical attacks in Syria and correlating their follow ups with the Skripal case²⁴ and its consequences, there are no doubts that such scenario is possible.

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²⁴ On 4 March 2018, Sergei Skripal, a former Russian military officer and double agent for the UK's intelligence services, and his daughter Yulia Skripal were poisoned in Salisbury, England, with a Novichok nerve agent known as A-234, according to official UK sources (*The Guardian*, 2018); and Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

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RESTRICTIONS OF THE FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS DURING THE STATE OF EMERGENCY GENERATED BY THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC

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During the state of emergency declared for limiting the spread of the COVID-19 virus, the central and local governmental authorities imposed a series of restrictions on fundamental human rights and freedoms, of essentially temporary nature and, where appropriate, tailored to meet the expected or actual severity level of the epidemic, aimed at eliminating the risk factors and minimising the effects on the population. National and international public policies focused on threats to public health, these threats being seen as a global human security issue for which governmental authorities intervened through firm and prompt measures that took into account the public interest, even by affecting fundamental rights and freedoms at the individual level. The purpose of this article is to identify the legal framework at the national level regarding the adoption of restrictions in exceptional circumstances, the restrictive measures that were put in place during the emergency period declared in the context of the coronavirus pandemic while highlighting the role of the armed forces in implementing and monitoring compliance with these restrictions.

Keywords: fundamental rights; freedoms; restrictions; human security; pandemic;



INTRODUCTION

I started this research initiative on the premise that the pandemic generated by the COVID-19 virus has been a global challenge for all countries of the world, the state power being engaged in all its forms to combat it. The declaration of the state of emergency throughout Romania and the adoption of restrictions on fundamental human rights protected by the Romanian Constitution were exceptional measures meant to limit the spread of the virus.

In this respect, I have considered the hypothesis that the restrictive measures were necessary to prevent and remove the imminent threats to human security, being applied in a non-discriminatory manner, and without prejudice to the existence of other fundamental human rights. Within the article, I propose three research objectives. The first objective is to achieve a correlation between the coronavirus pandemic and the concept of *human security*. The second objective is aimed at highlighting the legislative instruments by which restrictions on fundamental human rights were imposed, strictly necessary for the prevention and removal of imminent threats to conventional, union and constitutional rights to life, physical integrity and health of individuals. The last objective is to identify how the armed forces acted to protect the right to life and the fundamental values of democracy, supporting the efforts of the civil authorities in managing and stopping the crisis generated by the CoVID-19 virus, as well as in implementing the restrictions put in place.

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THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC AND THE HUMAN SECURITY CONCEPT

In general terms, a *pandemic* is a situation present in several countries around the world at the same time, in which a disease has a significant and continuous spread from person to person. Following the declaration of the COVID-19 pandemic, also known as *coronavirus*, due to the spread of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 2 (SARS-CoV-2),



Following the declaration of the COVID-19 pandemic, also known as coronavirus, due to the spread of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 2 (SARS-CoV-2), in March 2020, the World Health Organisation asked states around the world to intensify their efforts to eliminate the risk factors and to adopt, as a matter of urgency, measures for activating and expanding the crisis response mechanisms for emergency situations.

in March 2020, the World Health Organisation asked states around the world to intensify their efforts to eliminate the risk factors and to adopt, as a matter of urgency, measures for activating and expanding the crisis response mechanisms for emergency situations. The global response to the coronavirus pandemic was interpreted differently by nations, as they adopted various strategies ranging from imposing the exceptional state of emergency to reduced measures that would affect their society as little as possible.

The general preparation of the society and the state, simultaneously with minimising the impact of the virus on the population, were the main objectives of the restrictions imposed by the governments. The exceptional situation determined the citizens to accept some limitations of their fundamental rights, imposed by political leaders. According to Ambassador Sorin Ducaru, one of the particular effects of the COVID-19 pandemic is *“the potential for direct, strong and personal impact on each of us. It is a black swan phenomenon that profoundly and immediately affects the lives of everyone, of communities, societies, the states in which we live and the humanity as a whole.”* (Ducaru, 2020, p. 37).

Thus, while some authors consider the pandemic as being a *black swan* event, others do not see it as surprisingly difficult to predict. According to them, *“the coronavirus pandemic hit the world with such unexpected power that some might consider it a black swan, although it was neither unknown nor unexpected. Almost all works on security and future risk published over the past decade have warned about the global pandemic threat. The problem was that social and economic restrictions were rarely taken into account in these scenarios.”* (Friis, 2020, p. 108).

The enforcement of exceptional states during the pandemic was seen as a security provision and a risk limitation tool. Today, the concept of *security* is not interpreted in a narrow sense, limited to territorial security against external aggression and the protection of national interests. The security of individuals is indivisible and universally applicable to any citizen without discrimination. *The Human Development Report* issued in 1994 by the United Nations Development Programme, highlights that *“human security is as important*

as territorial security” (UNDP, 1994) and identifies the seven categories of human security as follows:

- *economic security*, in the sense of having a secure income, but also ensuring net public security measures such as ensuring an income for those who cannot obtain one;
- *food security*, by ensuring adequate access to food, physically and economically;
- *health security*, by ensuring access to healthcare and protection against diseases;
- *personal security* addresses threats posed by physical violence;
- *community security* is the security that individuals receive within a group, the sense of belonging and identity rooted in common practices and values;
- *political security* requires the freedom to be governed in a way that respects human rights, protected by democratic institutions in which individuals are a voice;
- *environmental security* addresses environmental challenges arising from deforestation, damage to the ecosystem, desertification, including human conflict.

Security analyses focus on the protection of all vital aspects that are intended to strengthen human freedom and fulfilment. From this perspective, human security is interconnected with fundamental human rights. In its narrow sense, human security is a human right, edifying in this respect being the provisions of Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which provides that *“everyone has the right to life, liberty and personal security”* (UN, 1948). To protect human security, responsible political institutions must identify effective solutions for managing risks and limiting the causes of insecurity. Consequently, human security associates state sovereignty with the duty to protect its citizens under the state umbrella.

The global immediate response to the disease caused by the COVID-19 virus can thus be viewed from the perspective of *securitisation*. *“The term securitisation describes the process by which a subject becomes so hot that it is removed from the usual decision-making process and turned into an existential problem. As a result, extraordinary countermeasures are allowed in the name of security.”* (Friis, 2020, p. 110).



The Human Development Report issued in 1994 by the United Nations Development Programme, highlights that “human security is as important as territorial security” and identifies the seven categories of human security as follows: economic security, food security, health security, personal security, community security, political security, environmental security.



The spread of the COVID-19 virus has shown us, once again, that our security is not just about being safe from the risk of external invasion, and that threats do not exist only outside our borders and do not always carry weapons. Thus, health security was prioritised at the expense of economic security and shaped the framework within which the State apparatus acted to restrict fundamental rights. The facts of the pandemic declared in 2020 define an exceptional context that could not be predicted, aimed at the general public interest and at protecting the lives of citizens through measures to support public health.

DEMOCRATIC DEFENCE OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS

The Constitution of Romania enshrines in its 1st Article, 3rd paragraph, that *“Romania is a state of law, democratic and social, in which human dignity, the rights and freedoms of citizens, the free development of human personality, the justice and the political pluralism represent supreme values, in the spirit of the democratic traditions of the Romanian people and the ideals of the Revolution of December 1989, and are guaranteed”*. (Constituția României, 2003). In this respect, citizens benefit from the rights and freedoms provided by the fundamental law, meanwhile having the obligations laid down therein.

According to the Constitution, the restriction of exercising some rights is permitted only by law for one of the following reasons: the protection of national security, the public order, health or ethics and the citizens’ rights; the conduct of the criminal investigation; the prevention of consequences of a natural disaster or a particularly serious disaster. The measure of restriction must be proportionate to the situation which generated it, it must be applied on a non-discriminatory basis and it must be without prejudice to the existence of the rights or freedom.

To limit the effects of the pandemic, the Romanian authorities had a prompt response by establishing a state of emergency, a measure of an exceptional nature provided for the situation of the existence of current or imminent serious dangers concerning national security or the functioning of constitutional democracy. In such situations, the provisions of *Emergency Ordinance No. 1/1999 on the regime*

of the state of siege and the state of emergency apply. During the state of siege and the state of emergency, the exercise of some fundamental rights may be restricted only to the extent that the situation requires it and in compliance with the provisions of the Romanian Constitution. Some exceptions to this rule are provided concerning the limitation of the right to life, the application of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the conviction of unforeseen offences as such under national or international law and the restriction of free access to justice.

We can therefore conclude that *“in the case of the establishment of the state of emergency, cumulative compliance with both the constitutional rules on the restriction of fundamental rights and freedom, from a constitutional perspective (art. 53 of the Constitution) and those concerning the state of emergency, from a legal perspective (the content of the OUG no. 1/1999)”* (Barac, 2020).

RESTRICTION OF THE EXERCISE OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC

This turning moment generated by the COVID-19 pandemic led to profound changes globally and, implicitly at the national level in the most varied areas of our society. It was therefore necessary to activate national mechanisms to respond to a major crisis by shaping the legal regulatory framework allowing for effective measures and joint efforts on the part of both decision-makers and the civilian population. *“We have faced the biggest challenge since 1989 for our society, and the economic crisis already triggered will be the strongest of those that have hit Romania in this century. Managing the viral crisis has shown that our institutions still can face great challenges.”* (Scutaru, 2020).

Following the mandatory legal provisions, the state of emergency is established by the President of Romania by decree, countersigned by the Prime Minister and published immediately in the Official Journal of Romania. It must include the first emergency measures to be taken, the military and civil authorities designated for the execution of its provisions as well as their competencies. From a normative point of view, *“the decree of the President of Romania, an infra-legislative act, establishes the state of emergency or the state of siege, according to the Constitution and according to the special organic law, this organic*



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The spread of the COVID-19 virus has shown us, once again, that our security is not just about being safe from the risk of external invasion, and that threats do not exist only outside our borders and do not always carry weapons. Thus, health security was prioritised at the expense of economic security and shaped the framework within which the State apparatus acted to restrict fundamental rights.



At the time of the adoption of Decree No. 1/2020, Romania has already had the image of the experience of some European countries that had been severely affected by the evolution of COVID-19, and which legislated measures that had been shown to have a positive impact in limiting the spread of the virus. The adoption of special restrictions by establishing an exceptional state was carried out based on the analysis of the epidemiological situation on the national territory for mainly protecting the right to life and secondly the citizens' right to health.

law regulating the legal regime of the state of emergency or siege, including as regards the restriction of the exercise of fundamental rights or freedoms.” (Popescu, 2020).

Thus, by the Decree of the President of Romania no. 195/2020, a state of emergency was established throughout Romania for 30 days from 16 March 2020. Subsequently, by Decree No. 240/2020, the state of emergency has been extended by a further 30 days from 15 April 2020.

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The Decree of the President of Romania for establishing a state of emergency lays down at Article 2, within the limits of the organic law on the regime of the state of emergency and the state of siege, the list of fundamental rights and freedoms that may be restricted and the forms of restriction. Thus, the administrative act provides that *“to prevent the spread of COVID-19 and to perform the management of the consequences, concerning the evolution of the epidemiological situation, the exercise of the following rights is restricted during the state of emergency: the free movement, the right to intimate life, family life and private life, the inviolability of the home, the right to education, the freedom of assembly, the right to private property, the right to strike and the economic freedom.”* (Decretul nr. 195/2020).

These restrictions included measures concerning the isolation and quarantine of persons coming from risk areas, those who contact them and lockdown measures on buildings, communities or geographical areas. As an exception from the freedom of movement guaranteed

by Article 25 of the Constitution as well as the European Convention on Human Rights, it was decided to gradually close the state border crossing points, to limit or prohibit the movement of vehicles or persons in or to certain areas or between certain times, as well as leaving those areas. The right to intimate, familial and private life, protected by Article 26 of the Constitution, was affected by medical examinations for identifying the presence of COVID-19 virus infection in the body. To prevent the spread of the epidemic, the responsible authorities could enter the residence of persons suspected of infection with coronavirus without their consent, therefore the decree included a derogation from the fundamental right provided for in Article 27 of the Constitution on the inviolability of the private homes. During the state of emergency, restrictions on the right to education provided under Article 32 of the Constitution were put in place, with classes in all educational establishments and institutions being suspended. The restriction on the private property right guaranteed by Article 44 of the Constitution could be materialised by identifying and requisitioning stocks, production and distribution capacities, protective equipment, disinfectants and medicines. Economic freedom was also seriously affected, with measures taken to temporarily close facilities in the hotel or food industry, offices of associations and other public establishments.

Against the background of the persisting exceptional context that led to the declaration of the state of emergency, in conjunction with the fact that the general public interest required the extension of this state and concerning the benefit of the continued application of the restrictions, the President of Romania adopted the *Decree No. 240/2020 on the extension of the state of emergency on the territory of Romania*. The restrictions of fundamental rights and freedoms provided for in the first decree were maintained for a further 30 days in the assessment that these unprecedented restrictions were necessary to ensure a smooth return without major difficulties to the situation of normality.

At the same time, new measures were adopted to enable public authorities to intervene effectively and with adequate means to manage the crisis. By derogation from the freedom of assembly, during the state of emergency, it was forbidden to organise and hold rallies, demonstrations, processions or any other meetings in open



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The Ministry of National Defence supported central and local public administration authorities by carrying out specific activities or actions to limit the infection with the coronavirus of communities, based on the training and available resources. The armed forces, which are the foundation of national security and national defence, have been tasked with the protection of human security for Romanian citizens.

spaces and any other meetings of the nature of cultural, scientific, artistic, religious, sporting or entertainment activities in indoor spaces. The Romanian President's act also stipulated that the servants of religious cults may officiate in places of worship, practices and rituals of a public nature specific to the cult, without the participation of the public, while practices and rituals of a private nature specific to the cult, such as baptisms, weddings or funerals, with the participation of the minimum number of persons according to the canonical rules and with strict observance of individual and collective protection measures for preventing the spread of the COVID-19 virus.

THE CONTROL EXERCISED BY THE ARMED FORCES ON THE COMPLIANCE WITH THE RESTRICTIONS DURING THE STATE OF EMERGENCY

The restrictions on fundamental rights and freedoms and certain measures imposed by the presidential decrees were compulsory for both public authorities and legal entities, as well as for individual persons. For the restrictions to be effective, the government created a monitoring and control mechanism in which the Ministry of National Defence has had increased powers, the area of which exceeded the provisions of *Government Decision No. 557/2016 on risk management*. The Ministry of National Defence supported central and local public administration authorities by carrying out specific activities or actions to limit the infection with the coronavirus of communities, based on the training and available resources. The armed forces, which are the foundation of national security and national defence, have been tasked with the protection of human security for Romanian citizens.

Considering the need for the armed forces to be always available for intervention in actual cases arising from the pandemic, during the state of emergency, exercises, simulations, applications and any other activities which could interfere with the measures taken by the relevant authorities to prevent and combat the spread of COVID-19 infections were suspended, except for those of a military nature carried out in the training ranges, so that the armed forces have been continuously operational and dedicated to this major objective.

One of the main motivations for the involvement of the armed forces in the management of the pandemic was that the armed forces had specific capabilities that could essentially support and complement



The military personnel who participated in public order support missions or to ensure the security and protection of objectives or areas have been empowered under Article 85 of Decree No. 240/2020 "to identify and establish the identity of persons and to verify the reason for the movement of persons outside the dwelling/household".

crisis response efforts. The rapid mobilisation of resources, how resources were organised and prepared to act in conditions of uncertainty and stress, and the conduct of activities that contributed to the health effort but were not within the competence of public health institutions, made the actions of the military decisive for the expected outcome.

"More controversially, however, troops have also been deployed to enforce mandatory lockdowns by patrolling the streets, constructing roadblocks and curbing movement. These measures, which aimed to stem the spread of the coronavirus, have been adopted throughout the world" (Kalkman, 2020, p. 1). The military personnel who participated in public order support missions or to ensure the security and protection of objectives or areas have been empowered under Article 85 of Decree No. 240/2020 *"to identify and establish the identity of persons and to verify the reason for the movement of persons outside the dwelling/household"* (Decretul nr. 240/2020). The armed forces also had the power *"to prohibit, temporarily, the entry into buildings, communities or delimited and marked geographical areas in which quarantine or lockdown measures are ordered, in a means of transport, or to order the temporary evacuation from them of any person, if there is a danger to life, health or body integrity, to himself or another person"* (Decretul nr. 240/2020). The military could warn people, by any means of communication, to cease actions affecting quarantine or containment measures.

All these missions carried out by the armed forces were intended to implement exactly and promptly the measures imposed by political decision-makers, while watching over how the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens, even restricted in the emergency situation, are respected. *"While the use of armed forces for domestic crisis management is not unique, the sheer scale and size of military capabilities deployed inside countries are unprecedented in recent times. This contribution aims to explain the prominent role of the armed forces in managing the COVID-19"* (Kalkman, 2020, pp. 1-2).

CONCLUSIONS

The adoption of some restrictions on fundamental rights and freedoms for stopping the spread of the coronavirus did not allow the civil liberties to be undermined more than it was strictly necessary to achieve the aim of limiting the virus transmission within the community.



In very realistic and non-ideological terms, the COVID-19 pandemic showed the true contemporary meaning of global human security. National and international public policies focused on threats to public health, these threats being seen as a global human security issue for which governmental authorities intervened through firm and prompt measures that took into account the public interest, even by affecting fundamental rights and freedoms at the individual level.

In adopting restrictive measures, the political authorities took into account the balance and proportionality between the health objectives of the population and the fundamental human rights and freedoms, which are the essence of democratic governance. The restriction of fundamental rights and freedoms under the constitutional provisions aimed for implementing the principles of necessity, proportionality and good faith.

The pandemic brought up once again uncertainty as a certain element of the contemporary world, despite all the current contingency plans or the degree of development of science and technology. In very realistic and non-ideological terms, the COVID-19 pandemic showed the true contemporary meaning of global human security. National and international public policies focused on threats to public health, these threats being seen as a global human security issue for which governmental authorities intervened through firm and prompt measures that took into account the public interest, even by affecting fundamental rights and freedoms at the individual level.

Romania, like most countries around the world, used its armed forces in response to the pandemic and their contribution to monitoring and controlling the restrictions imposed has materialised into concrete actions to limit the spread of the coronavirus during the period when the state of emergency was established at a national level while continuing to fulfil their national and collective defence responsibilities in the allied context.

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Public Relations *avant la lettre*:

PRESS ACCREDITATION IN WARTIME DURING THE 19TH CENTURY

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This study highlights how military-press relations evolved in the 19th century towards institutionalising press accreditation during the armed conflicts with the aim of gaining the public trust and promoting the reputation of military organisations by managing the information release to audiences. A special focus is on the nascent press accreditation practices used by the military when interacting with correspondents sent by European and North American publications to cover, first-hand, the Eastern Question events unfolding on the battlefields of the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878), in which Romania fought to win its national independence.

The study reveals the crystallisation of Public Relations techniques and procedures in wartime – press officers’ appointment, written regulations on the terms and conditions for the press accreditation, ground rules for correspondents’ access to press briefings, interviews and documentation activities at combat units as members of press pools or as embedded journalists. These practices are enshrined nowadays in the Public Relations policies on media relations, and their emergence deserves better recognition in the history of communication sciences.

Keywords: press accreditation; war correspondent; PR history; Russo-Turkish War; public information;

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Following the presentation, the author became the recipient of an award for originality and for the effort made to reconstruct the public relations history having as focus the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878).



INTRODUCTION

The history of journalism and periodical press in the 19th century reveals the emergence of public communication practices used by commercial companies and government institutions for spreading their messages to reach a wider range of diverse audiences. Because of their increase in circulation and accessibility, newspapers and magazines imposed themselves as the ideal tools for sourcing public information. Thus, both private and public organisations discovered the mechanism to address internal and external audiences by collaborating with journalists in a formal setting – press accreditation.

The public information management implemented by state bodies is attestable in the history of journalism and periodical press with factual data, and it is equally important for the history of public relations. Surprisingly, as opposed to recording the establishment of press services by private companies Krupp (1870) and Westinghouse (1889), PR history does not pay due attention to the moments when the public organisations began to use feasible options for communicating with their audiences and to promote themselves through publications (Bentele and Junghänel, 2004; Newsom *et al.*, 2010).

Symbiotically linked with the states they belong to, military organisations became interested in exploiting the press to inform and influence domestic and foreign audiences – troops, leaders, governments, and populations. Applied to meet various armed forces objectives such as cohesion, morale and credibility, these practices are embraced nowadays by corporate communication and PR theories as internal information, public information, media relations and reputation management. Their use indicates the presence of incipient PR practices in the second half of 19th century, facilitated by pioneering the press accreditation during the Mexican-American War (1846-1848), First Schleswig War (1848-1851), Crimean War (1853-1856), American Civil War (1861-1865), Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871), Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878), Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-1880), Boer Wars (1880-1881, 1899-1902), Spanish-American War (1898) and Philippine Insurrection (1899).

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The main line of investigation in this research is unveiling the use of press accreditation by the military in the 19th century, with a particular focus on the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878). This interest is justified by the analysis of bibliographies accessible so far, which shows how the Tsarist General Headquarters introduced the rules for granting the press accreditation to war correspondents. Those rules were also adopted by the cobelligerent Romanian Army.

The nascent public information techniques used by the military organisations are attested by studies on war reporting, centred mainly on events and characters, and less on formalising the press accreditation within the military-press relationships. Since the specialised bibliographies do not explicitly look at the press correspondents' activity from the perspective of military headquarters, the study of organising the press accreditation during wartime is a promising field of research for PR historians. It reveals that the well-established practices of nowadays public relations have their origins in the procedures applied by the military to manage the press relations during the military campaigns in the second half of the 19th century. Press accreditation was one of the emerging procedures.

Therefore, the main line of investigation in this research is unveiling the use of press accreditation by the military in the 19th century, with a particular focus on the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878). This interest is justified by the analysis of bibliographies accessible so far, which shows how the Tsarist General Headquarters introduced the rules for granting the press accreditation to war correspondents. Those rules were also adopted by the cobelligerent Romanian Army for managing the relationship with the special envoys of Romanian and foreign publications – journalists, photographers, graphic artists and painters.

Press accreditation, as a specific technique to work collaboratively with journalists, was later developed in the media relations practices of other armed forces, public and private organisations, as well as the use of formal and informal meetings, press briefings, interviews, *press pools* and *embedded journalists*. The significance of these military-media relations techniques and procedures is still to be properly highlighted in the PR history.

REFERENCES ON PRESS ACCREDITATION IN THE 19TH CENTURY

In most cases, the press correspondents' activity during wartime in the 19th century was summarised by themselves. It is attested by collections of periodicals containing numerous articles, which are genuine after-action reports regarding the military operations on the battlefields, as well as by books and memoirs published in the following years. They usually describe in detail the unfolding of war events, and particularly in the case of the Russo-Turkish War contain

comprehensive references to the military-press relations and to the press accreditation system implemented by the military headquarters of the warring parties (Boyle, 1877; Lachmann, 1877; de Belina, 1878; Nemirovich-Danchenko, 1878; Drew Gay, 1878; Kohn-Abrest, 1879; Pain, 1879; Huyshe, 1894; Forbes, 1894).

A special contribution goes to *The Daily News* war correspondence volumes, published in 1878, which contain articles signed by renowned journalists – Archibald Forbes, Januarius MacGahan, Francis Millet, Edwin Pears, Edmund O'Donovan, among several other correspondents, seventeen in total.

Other primary sources, which provide information about the war correspondents' activity and their relations with the armed forces, consist of official documents, articles, books and memoirs written by officers responsible for organising the press accreditation (Hasenkampf, 1908), who professionally observed the war as military attachés (Greene, 1879, 1880), provided medical assistance (Ryan, 1897) and counselling to the combatant sides as advisers (Pfeil, 1893) or even as commanders (Baker, 1879). However, despite the abundant references on war reporting in a series of books analysing this subject in relation to the Russo-Turkish War (Furieux, 1958; Roth and Olson, 1997; Knightley, 2004; Patton, 2015; McLaughlin, 2016; Williams, 2020), the use of press accreditation by Tsarist military is not highlighted in the history of journalism, periodical press, and public relations. In the Soviet era, the studies on the history of Russian journalism have not considered the press accreditation during Tsarist wars. Investigation of this topic has only begun in recent years by Russian researchers (Muminova, 2008; Gokov, 2011; Manakhova, 2018), who evaluate the war reporting during Tsarist conflicts in connection with the developments of domestic and foreign press. After scrutinising the archives, war veterans and journalists' memoirs, several articles have been published highlighting that the press accreditation was practiced during the Russo-Turkish War in accordance with the orders issued by the Tsarist General Headquarters, No. 87, on 22 April 1877, and No. 131, on 7 June 1877.

The Turkish authors (Kaplan, 2016; Yürükçü, 2018) note the Tsarist efforts to develop viable procedures with Russian and foreign journalists, which were in a marked contrast to the inhibited attitude of the Ottoman authorities toward the press.





Regarding the activity of war correspondents, which consisted of dispatches, letters and background articles, sketches, and photographs, an important source is represented by the collections of newspapers and illustrated magazines from 1877 to 1878. Due to the commendable efforts of state libraries and the private initiatives in the countries where they were published, some of the most relevant ones are accessible in digital format.

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WAR REPORTING AND PRESS ACCREDITATION IN THE 19TH CENTURY

The 19th century wars were increasingly covered by the press because of the innovative methods in typography and photography, with the expansion of railway, telegraphy, and news agencies, which accelerated the transmission of dispatches and enlarged the intercultural communication. Those accumulations enabled the press to assume a key role in moulding the public opinion, becoming a real power in society. Under such conditions, the war correspondent established himself as the central figure of press reporting from the front lines.

The war reporting in the early 19th century contains William Hicks' description of the Battle of Trafalgar (21 October 1805) for *The Times*, followed by Henry Robinson writing correspondences along 1807-1809 about Napoleon's campaigns in Germany and Spain.

The Mexican-American War (1846-1848) revealed the shaping of the political and commercial interests of the publications in New Orleans, Philadelphia, Boston, and New York to provide their readers with the latest news received from their special envoys accompanying the US troops during the campaign. The military operations were reported by at least 13 press correspondents, including George Kendall, James Frenner, William Tobey, John Warland and Jane McManus Storms.

As a world premiere it was then recorded the use of daguerreotype to take the first photographic images during a war, with US General John E. Wool passing through Mexican town Saltillo, captured by his troops in 1847. Another premiere of that war was the partnership of several newspapers in New York settled in 1846 to share the costs of telegraphic correspondence sent by their reporters from Mexico, a salutary initiative leading to the establishment of the Associated Press (Reilly and Witten, 2010).

However, it was not until the second half of the 19th century that a new type of journalist claimed his place in the history of the press – the war correspondent, described as a member of a “luckless tribe” by its self-proclaimed “miserable parent”, William Howard Russell (Knightley, 2004, p. 1). He entered the scene of war reporting in 1850 recounting the Battle of Idstedt (25 July 1850) as the envoy of *The Times*, eyewitness in the hot spots of the First Schleswig War (1848-1851).

In 1854 and 1855, Russell was accredited by *The Times* to follow the British military fighting alongside the Ottoman, French, and Sardinian troops against the Tsarist Empire in the Crimean War. Russell did not have the status of an *embedded journalist*, and his dispatches were not censored. Those two conditions amplified Russell's dilemma: whether he should write about his findings living alongside the soldiers – incompetent leadership, poor logistics and deficient medical assistance affecting the British combat power.

Asserting his professional creed that the journalist has the fundamental responsibility to the general public, and that in all his reporting he must respect the truth regardless of the consequences this might have for himself, Russell decided to make widely known his findings on the poor condition of British troops in Crimea. To John Delane's credit, the editor of *The Times*, who perfectly understood and unreservedly supported Russell's approach, his dispatches from Crimea were published. They generated hostility in government circles against the magazine and his Crimean envoy, in conjunction with public discontent on the way the British troops were led in war, finally forcing the Aberdeen cabinet resignation in January 1855.

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through a fundraising campaign aimed at improving the situation of the British troops on the Crimean front, and by the governmental assistance given to Florence Nightingale for the reorganisation of British military medical service in Constantinople (McLaughlin, 2016). Therefore, “*after the Crimea, governments and military chiefs went to great lengths to manage the reporting of conflicts*” (Hood, 2011, p. 12), from this point on the state authorities understanding that the press can no longer be ignored without losing their reputation.

Henceforward, the journalist would be accompanied by the photographer for a more accurate recording of the war. As a result, the documentation of the Crimean War includes photos taken by Carol Popp de Szathmari on the Danubian front in 1853-1854, portraying Russian and Ottoman officers, military formations, fortifications and battle scenes. Szathmari, the owner of a photo studio in Bucharest, achieved his international reputation as one of the first war photographers in the world presenting his album on the Crimean War to Queen Victoria, Napoleon III, Franz Josef I, as well as at the 1855 International Exhibition in France (Ionescu, 2002).

Russell’s dispatches, unappreciated by the British executive, determined Roger Fenton’s photographic mission in Crimea, the first attempt of state authorities to influence the public opinion through photos. Commissioned by the British government as an official campaign photographer, Fenton spent three months in Crimea, from March to June 1855, portraying the actions conducted by Her Majesty’s Armed Forces in a positive light. Fenton’s work was continued by James Robertson and Felice Beato. Unlike Fenton, who avoided to take pictures reflecting the horrors of war, they photographed the destruction and human suffering on the battlefield.

Concurrently, on the other side of the Atlantic the press already proved to be a growing industry and a factor of influence in the political and social life of the United States of America, amounting to a total of about 3,700 publications by the midpoint of the 19th century. The rapid and large dissemination of information was facilitated by the expanding coverage of the American press, sustained by the highly performance of news wire services which multiplied to feed the national and local publications with news collected and distributed using the telegraph lines.

After the outbreak of the American Civil War in 1861, to cover the readers’ information needs about the military operations, the publications from both sides sent their journalists, photographers, illustrators, all known as *specials*, to report from the front. The number of *specials* is estimated at 500, of whom 350 wrote for Northern publications, and 150 for Southern ones.

The fear that sensitive information might be disclosed to the enemy, the attempts to enforce censorship since 1862 and the outcomes on the battlefield led the military commanders to adopt widely varying attitudes towards *specials*. They ranged from the denial of any relations and banning their access in the area of military operations to full support (Patton, 2015).

The arbitrary management of the military-press relations is exemplified by William Russell, who joined the *specials* in 1861. Initially he was warmly welcomed to the Union side, being appreciated for his independent reporting during the Crimean War. It was generally accepted that Russell’s correspondence would present the Union cause in a favourable light, primarily in Britain. It did not happen. After *The Times* published Russell’s article describing the panicked retreat of Northern troops following the First Battle of Bull Run (19 July 1861), his access to the Union army was denied, and he was later expelled from the United States.

The studies on military-press relations during the American Civil War do not reveal specific regulations regarding the journalists’ activity, the permission to enter the warzones being usually granted on the spot. The correspondents were requested to pledge not to jeopardise the operational security by disclosing sensitive information (locations, strength, movements), and to assume their reports aimed for publication with a byline mentioning the author’s name, pen name or initials (Roth and Olson, 1997, p. 5).

The press accreditation was implemented in a more articulate manner during the Franco-Prussian War, even though the warring parties initially considered prohibiting the journalists’ access to the front.

The French authorities primarily banned the journalists from following the troops, and even issued an order to forbid the publication of any information regarding the military movements. Later on, the war correspondents were accredited, provided that they respected a set of severe restrictions.



ROMANIAN
MILITARY
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The participation of the Romanian Army in the military operations against the Ottoman Empire is substantiating the assertions of the historians who state that Romania won its national independence on the battlefield, later on recognised internationally by the Treaty of San Stefano (3 March 1878) and at the Congress of Berlin (13 June-13 July 1878).

The Ems Dispatch, which became *casus belli* in the Franco-Prussian War, attests the ability of Prussian Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck, to use the power of the press. His approach toward press relations included not only the journalists' accreditation and release of official communiqués, but also censorship and placement of articles promoting his views in independent journals. Thus, while the French were transmitting the official information in a late and often unusable fashion, the Prussians were responding as quickly and thoroughly as possible to the correspondents' information requests. Even more, when the French refused the accreditation required by William Russell, Bismarck seized the opportunity by inviting him to report on the war from the Prussian side. Aware of Russell's fame, Bismarck favoured his access to information, including through personal meetings, thus promoting the Prussian view on the war through *The Times*.

Several other journalists encountered the same experience, their access to the troops being denied by the French. Instead, their press accreditation was granted by the Prussian General Headquarters, whose procedures for working with the journalists were simple and efficient, according to another British correspondent, on his way to becoming famous, Archibald Forbes (Dietrich, 2012, p. 26).

PRESS ACCREDITATION DURING THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR (1877-1878)

One of the greatest wars in the 19th century Europe, the armed conflict between the Tsarist Empire and the Ottoman Empire emerged as a new stage in the succession of political and military crises generically known as the *Eastern Question*.

Romania's total commitment to this geopolitical endeavour, by allocating all its political, economic, and military resources in the war effort alongside the Tsarist Empire, was perhaps decisive for facilitating the final victory of Russo-Romanian co-belligerents.

On its own, the participation of the Romanian Army in the military operations against the Ottoman Empire is substantiating the assertions of the historians who state that Romania won its national independence on the battlefield, later on recognised internationally by the Treaty of San Stefano (3 March 1878) and at the Congress of Berlin (13 June-13 July 1878). For these reasons, the Romanian historians are frequently referring to the 1877-1878 military conflict as the Romanian War

of Independence, sometimes calling it also the Russo-Romanian-Turkish War, especially when focusing on the Romanian participation in the Russo-Turkish War.

From the very beginning, on 12 April 1877, the Russo-Turkish War was widely reflected in the European and North American press which regularly published dispatches, photos and graphics sent by correspondents from the battlefields in the Balkans and in the Caucasus. The journalists' access to the theatre of war became of very high concern for Tsarist military commanders, aware of the press growing influence. The effect was compounded as they had seen the results of press reporting on the British government during the Crimean War, and the active journalism during the American Civil War, Franco-Prussian War, Serbian, Montenegrin, and Bulgarian uprisings against the Ottoman Empire.

This concern is confirmed in a letter addressed in 1876 by the Minister of Internal Affairs, A.E. Timisev, to the Minister of War, D.A. Milyutin: *"Thanks to the railways and the telegraph, it became a well-established rule the possibility of receiving rapidly detailed news from the theatre of war. From the beginning of the war, Russian and foreign newspapers will be filled with extensive correspondences from the area of operations, so that Russian newspapers will receive mostly inappropriate and contradictory reports, and foreign newspapers, hostile to Russia"* (Manakhova, 2018, p. 33).

On 19 April 1877, Grand Duke Nikolai Nicolaevich the Elder, the Commander in Chief of Tsarist armies on the Balkan front, held a meeting with highest imperial officials to analyse the issue of banning or allowing the journalists in the theatre of war. It was attended by the Minister of War, D.A. Milyutin, Chief of Staff, Adjutant-General A.A. Nepokoichitsky, Head of the Third Department of His Majesty's Chancellery, A.F. Hamburger, with responsibilities regarding censorship and foreign nationals, former Ambassador to Constantinople, Adjutant-General N.P. Ignatiev, member of the State Council, and Chief of Civil Affairs of His Imperial Highness, Prince V.A. Cherkassky (Hasenkampf, 1908, p. 6). They agreed that denying the journalists' access cannot eliminate the risks of sensitive information being disclosed. If implemented, such a decision would reduce the possibilities of using the press to inform and influence domestic and foreign audiences by disseminating their own messages about the war



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effort. To meet the publishers' demands, granting the access to the frontlines for press correspondents, and even providing them with official information about the progress of military operations, were considered opportune. That approach was regarded as effective in strengthening the social stability, the cohesiveness, and the morale of the troops, concurrently with fostering the reputation of the Tsarist Empire (Collection, Vol. 2, 1898, p. 36; Manakhova, 2018, p. 34).

At the meeting, Colonel Mikhail Alexandrovich Hasenkampf presented a memorandum on the press accreditation. He specified that it was preferable to work closely with journalists as their reports in influential publications might improve the state's image, increasing the popularity of its organisations and the leaders' credibility, and gaining the public's trust and support. Hasenkampf asserted that even if journalists were forbidden from documenting and transmitting their dispatches from the front, it would be impossible to ban them from writing about the war. Consequently, their articles will be insufficiently motivated or biased, multiplying the echo of *"false rumours and malicious fictions, which will disturb the Russian public opinion and incite against us the readers of foreign newspapers"* (Hasenkampf, 1908, p. 4).

To avoid the negative consequences of such a development, Hasenkampf argued that *"it is necessary to allow the presence of both Russian and foreign correspondents at the General Headquarters, as well as at the headquarters of army corps and independent detachments, under the following conditions:*

1) *The access of Russian correspondents to be allowed based on the requests made by publishers.*

2) *The access of foreign correspondents to be allowed based on the recommendations made by our embassies and high dignitaries of the state.*

3) *Preliminary censorship should not be established in any form, but only the permanent obligation of all correspondents to not communicate any information about the movements, disposition, and strength of our troops, nor about future operations; correspondents will be warned that non-compliance with this obligation will lead to their expulsion from the army.*

4) *In order to supervise the exact fulfilment of the obligations, the editorial offices will be asked to send all the issues of the newspapers,*

in which the dispatches from the theatre of war are published, to the staff officer appointed to lead the activity with correspondents.

5) *Correspondents will be offered such information from the same person, whom the Chief of Staff considers useful and communicable. To this end, a schedule with certain days and hours shall be clearly established. At these meetings it will even be possible to influence the correspondents in an indirect manner, without harming their professional pride"* (Hasenkampf, 1908, p. 5).

Although initially Grand Duke Nikolai advocated *"introducing preliminary censorship, in general, for all dispatches, as well as preventing the access of correspondents sent by hostile newspapers"* (Hasenkampf, 1908, p.7), finally he accepted Hasenkampf's arguments that censoring the journalists' articles was not only worthless, but also counterproductive. Hasenkampf asserted that the readers will inevitably learn about the Tsarist military *"sanitising"* the dispatches sent from the front, concluding that censorship undermines both the correspondent's credibility and the Tsarist authorities' reputation.

Hasenkampf considered that in no way should journalists be asked to write positive articles about Russia. Such an approach, like censorship, will lead the readers to question the correspondent's credibility. Even when negative articles about Russia were published by the newspapers whose representatives were accredited in theatre of war, *"this could be neglected, because the articles that are favourable to us will be even more trustworthy for public opinion"* (Hasenkampf, 1908, p. 5). After weighing the advantages and disadvantages of working with the Russian and foreign press, the Tsarist General Headquarters decided that the press accreditation provided the formal framework to ensure the controlled access for correspondents to the theatre of war.

THE PRESS ACCREDITATION: RULES AND ORGANISATION

The method of organising the press accreditation during the Russo-Turkish War can be decrypted based on Hasenkampf's memoirs, and on the orders of the Tsarist General Headquarters. The Order No. 87, enforced on 22 April 1877 by the Chief of Staff, General A.A. Nepokoichitsky, resumes Hasenkampf's rules on working with journalists, as follows:

"1) If the heads of the detachments, after analysing the military situation and depending on the position of the detachment, consider



Hasenkampf considered that in no way should journalists be asked to write positive articles about Russia. Such an approach, like censorship, will lead the readers to question the correspondent's credibility.



that it is possible, there will be accepted in the area of operations only those correspondents who: a) have a special external sign on the left sleeve – a round bronze plate embossed with the imperial double-headed eagle, the number and the inscription «Correspondent», and the seal of the Headquarters of the Army of Operations; b) may present their photographic portrait, as an identity card, having printed on the reverse the authorisation granted by the Headquarters of the Army of Operations.

2) The presence in the area of operations of persons who do not hold both identification signs shall not be tolerated. The possession of the external identification sign, without the certified photographic portrait, will not have the value of an authorisation.

3) In general, all officers performing command functions will be responsible for monitoring the correspondents' activity. In the case of suspicious actions and relationships and even more so in the case of attempts to move to the enemy side, send them to the headquarters, explaining the reasons for the detention.

4) Without restricting their freedom of movement, the correspondents shall be required to notify each time they change their position by sending written notes to the headquarters: who, where and when they are travelling.

5) In case of conversations with correspondents, be generally attentive and do not inform them in any way about the composition, manpower, direction, purpose of the movement of our convoys and the disposition of military units" (Collection, 1900, Vol. 28, pp. 248-249).

Colonel Hasenkampf was appointed to organise and lead the activity with the envoys of the Russian and foreign publications accredited by the Tsarist General Headquarters. A fluent speaker of French and German, efficient and polite, Hasenkampf proved to be the right man in the right place. His tasks included: correspondents' accreditation; establishing functional rules with journalists; providing them with information, advice and support, including as well guidance on how to use the post and telegraph free of charge; monitoring their activity; withdrawal of accreditation for non-compliance with the established rules; dissemination of official communiqués using the news agencies. The correspondents were regularly welcomed at the Headquarters for press briefings, from 09.00 till 11.00, Hasenkampf providing them with official information approved by Grand Duke Nikolai.

In order to receive permission to enter the warzones, the correspondents were requested to appear in person at the Tsarist General Headquarters to be registered. They had to present their recommendations and three portrait photos. On the back of the photo, the correspondent's name was to be written, the name of the publication represented by him and the authorisation of free passage in the theatre of war. Following that, a seal of confirmation would be stamped. The result was a genuine press card, used by them to prove their accreditation. The second photo was to be kept in the album of the Tsarist General Headquarters, the third one being sent to the archives of the Ministry of War.

As another condition to get the accreditation, correspondents were asked to make a commitment to not include in their dispatches any details of military interest about combat readiness, positions, movements, equipment, and troops condition.

Because of its weight, the identification sign was not much appreciated by correspondents. Therefore, by order No. 131, issued on 7 June 1877, it was replaced with a silk brass in the colours of the Tsarist imperial house, black, yellow and white, embroidered with the imperial coat of arms, the word "Correspondent", as well as the journalist's registration number.

Francis Vinton Greene, First Lieutenant in the Corps of Engineers of the US Army, nominated by the War Department to observe the military operations on the Balkan front as military attaché to the United States Legation in Saint-Petersburg, confirms the Russian approach to the relationship with the war correspondents, as follows: *"At the beginning of the war, the Russian military authorities received the press in a way that it had probably never been received before. Regulations were drawn up, which permitted any regularly accredited correspondent of a responsible journal to accompany the army, provided he agreed in writing to a few simple rules. The principal of these were that he should always carry on his person his photograph, on the back of which was written his authority to accompany the army, as a sort of passport by which he might at any time be identified; that he should wear a band around his arm bearing the word «Correspondent» in Russian letters, and his number, and that he should give his word of honor not to report the number of troops, the intended movements of the army, or any other information which might compromise its success" (Greene, 1880, p. 163).*



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PRESS CORRESPONDENTS ON THE FRONTS OF THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR

The imperative to meet the public opinion information needs, the access requests made by influential publications and the increasing influx of journalists in the theatre of operations led the military to adopt working procedures with the special envoys of newspapers and magazines interested in covering events from the war zones first-hand.

Among the correspondents accredited by Tsarist, Romanian and Ottoman headquarters, there were many famous journalists, photographers and painters – Januarius MacGahan, Archibald Forbes, Francis Millet, Frédéric Kohn-Abrest, Mlochowski de Belina, Melton Prior, Irving Montagu, Johann Schönberg, Frederic Villiers, Dick de Lonlay, Vasily Nemirovich-Danchenko, Vasily Vereshchagin, Vasily Polenov, Nicolae Grigorescu, Carol Popp de Szathmari, Jose Luis Pellicer y Fener, to mention only a few among others.

Along the hostilities on the Balkan and Caucasus fronts of the Russo-Turkish War, for shorter or longer periods of time, there were about 125 active press correspondents, representing around 100 publications and news agencies from Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Romania, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States of America, Tsarist and Ottoman Empires.

This estimate was determined by analysing, comparing, and summarising the data offered by the primary sources, the most important being Hasenkampf (1908), Collection (Vol. 2, 1898), Greene (1881), Boyle (1877), Mlochowski de Belina (1878), Drew Gay (1878), Nemirovich-Danchenko (1878), Kohn-Abrest (1879), Pain (1879), Forbes (1894), Huyshe (1894), Ryan (1897), and *The Daily News* 1877-1878 war correspondence volumes (1878).

The secondary sources, Furneaux (1958), Gal *et al.* (1977), Ștefan (1989), Ionescu (2002), Knightley (2004), Muminova (2008), Gokov (2011), Patton (2015), McLaughlin (2016), Manachova (2018), Yürükçü (2018), Williams (2020), focus on the progress of political and military events through the lens of the press coverage provided by the correspondents that were active on the Balkan and Caucasian fronts of the Russo-Turkish War, without considering the analysis of military-press relations from the perspective of PR history.

The tertiary sources, Roth and Olson (1997), Rosetti (1897), Österreichisches Biographisches Lexicon – ÖBL (online), Oxford

Dictionary of National Biography – ODNB (online), presented additional data about some correspondents, which proved helpful in correctly mentioning the correspondents' names or in confirming their working relationships with one or more publications which were not mentioned by primary or secondary sources.

The evidence provided by Russian primary sources, Hasenkampf (1908), Collection (1898), Nemirovich-Danchenko (1878), and secondary sources, Muminova (2008), Gokov (2011), Manakhova (2018), pointed only to the journalists, publications and news agencies that had been accredited by Tsarist military authorities in charge to the General Headquarters and to the Army of operations.

Therefore, it was necessary to complete the estimate of newspapers, illustrated magazines, news agencies and their special envoys that covered the Russo-Turkish War with publications and correspondents' names that were not accredited by Tsarist military authorities or even those that did not request to be accredited by them.

In this situation, there were journalists and graphic artists, Austrian, English, French, German, Romanian and even Russian, whom were not mentioned by Russian sources as being accredited by Tsarist military authorities, but reported on war events when finding opportunities to travel north and south of the Danube, as well as from their offices located in Bucharest or elsewhere.

Excepting Carol Popp de Szathmari and Franz Duschek, the official photographers of Prince Carol I, the Russian sources do not mention the activity south of the Danube of other Romanian war correspondents, among the most famous being Alexandru Ciurcu, journalist, and Nicolae Grigorescu, Sava Henția and George Demetrescu Mirea, painters. Despite it, their activity as war correspondents is attested by their press dispatches, articles, letters, and graphic works, published by Romanian and foreign publications.

The estimated number of correspondents resulted from the analysis of the Russian sources is acknowledged by F.V. Greene. In his book, *The Russian Army and Its Campaigns in Turkey in 1877-1878*, published right after the war, in 1879, Greene mentions that on the Russian side “about seventy-five correspondents began the campaign” (Greene, 1879, p. x). In his next book, *Sketches of Army Life in Russia*, published in 1880, Greene describes the war correspondents' activity accredited by the Tsarist General Headquarters during campaign,



Along the hostilities on the Balkan and Caucasus fronts of the Russo-Turkish War, for shorter or longer periods of time, there were about 125 active press correspondents, representing around 100 publications and news agencies from Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Romania, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States of America, Tsarist and Ottoman Empires.

It was necessary to complete the estimate of newspapers, illustrated magazines, news agencies and their special envoys that covered the Russo-Turkish War with publications and correspondents' names that were not accredited by Tsarist military authorities or even those that did not request to be accredited by them.



raising that “something over eighty correspondents joined the army..., about one-third of whom were Russians” (Greene, 1880, p. 164).

The aspects related to the use of press accreditation, correlated with their own activity as war correspondents, are also mentioned by other special envoys of Romanian and foreign publications – Archibald Forbes, Januarius MacGahan, Frederich Lachmann, Frédéric Damé, Johann Schönberg, Alexandru Ciurcu.

There are also references to a Romanian officer, Colonel Alexandru Lipoianu, who was dealing with military-press relations (Hasenkampf, pp. 126-128), a fact that could attest to the existence of incipient procedures for press accreditation used by the Romanian army. An example in support of this assertion is given by Sava Henția, painter, who made an extensive battlefield documentary south of the Danube having on him a free passage travel document issued by the Romanian General Headquarters with No. 465 on 5 August 1877, and signed by General Carol Davila (Ionescu, 2002, p. 196).

The use of *embedded journalists* within the units of the Romanian Army is confirmed by Frederich Lachmann, the correspondent of the dailies *Der Bund* (Swiss), *The Chicago Gazette* (USA) and *Pester Lloyd* (Austria-Hungary). In a letter dated Grivitza, 29 August 1877, addressed to the Romanian dailies *Românul*, *România Liberă* and *Telegraful*, Lachmann stated that he had just completed a five-week stage as an *embedded journalist* to the 4th Infantry Division, commanded by Colonel Alexandru Angheliescu. In this letter Lachmann emphasised that he thus had the opportunity to observe the combat actions carried out by the Romanian troops at Grivitza redoubt, and that as a former officer he highly appreciated the bravery of the Romanian troops, the intensity of the fighting, the precision of infantry manoeuvring and the accuracy of artillery fire. Describing a combat action carried out on 27 August 1877, Lachmann mentioned: “I even joined the 5th Company of the 5th Regiment, going with the line of tirailleurs. After a few moments we received such a fire like I had not seen in Solferino or Custoza, but the line of tirailleurs remained steady. Perfect order reigned in all the columns that advanced step by step towards the great redoubt... I would never have thought to see so much bravery in a troop that has never known the fire before. Today I am firmly convinced that the Romanian Army deserves to be placed next to any other army of Europe, and anyone can be proud of its soldiers

and officers who have given such brilliant evidence of bravery” (*Telegraful*, 4 September 1877, p. 2; *România Liberă*, 4 September 1877, pp. 2-3).

Organised in small groups, currently defined in the PR policies on military-media relations as *press pools*, war correspondents can be identified in the imagery, graphic sketches and photographs, published by newspapers and illustrated magazines of that epoch. They are shown while witnessing the events or preparing their press reports on the major operations of the Russian and Romanian troops on the Balkan front – crossing the Danube, the battles of Nikopol, Shipka Pass and Grivitza, the siege of Plevna and Vidin, and the advance of Russian troops to Constantinople.

As a member of a *press pool*, observing the Russian preparations to cross the Danube at Brăila, *The Daily News*' special envoy noted in an article dated on 24 June 1877: “Colonel Hasenkampf was detached for the service of the Press, for the purpose of giving information to journalists”, continuing caustically “the information obtained from him in the course of the last month might be written by a skilful calligraphist on one’s thumb nail” (*The Daily News*, 5 July 1877, p. 5).

Proud of the professional conduct shown by the American special envoys during the war, F.V. Greene provides an overview of how the journalists accredited by the Russian Headquarters tracked the course of military operations south of the Danube: “Of these eighty correspondents about half were at the front throughout the summer, and the greater part of them exposed themselves with the utmost fearlessness in battle and endured the greatest hardships without flinching. One of them, Mr. Millet, received a decoration for extraordinary bravery in aiding the wounded under a very hot fire. For the other half, the comforts of Bucharest possessed the greater attraction. They came to the army occasionally, visited the camps and hospitals, studied the Russian character, and went back to Bucharest to digest their studies. But when the winter came on, the ardour of nearly all was benumbed, and their interest began to flag. Some went back to Paris and London, others remained in Bucharest. But only four of them, MacGahan, Grant, Millet, and Villiers – the latter representing the *London Graphic* – trudged through the snow in the Balkans and arrived at Constantinople with the troops. Of these four, the first three were Americans” (Greene, 1880, pp. 166-167).



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In the attempt to supplement the data on the press correspondents who were active in the Balkan theatre of war, either on the Russo-Romanian or on the Ottoman side, the investigated sources proved to be very useful, as well as the 1877-1878 Romanian and foreign publications. They confirm the presence in the Balkan warzone of some press correspondents, who are not recorded by the Russian sources.

The number of war correspondents in Romania and Bulgaria as well as the duration of their presence in the warzones was variable. Thus, there are cases of correspondents who ceased their activity as a consequence of their press accreditation being refused or withdrawn, followed by expulsion from Romania (V. Howard, F. Boyle), or they needed hospitalisation due to illnesses or injuries suffered in the front lines (N.V. Maximov), or simply they were replaced by other envoys of the publications they represented.

If some journalists were refused accreditation by Tsarist authorities, the typical excuses consisted of suspicions regarding their involvement in espionage or the attitude of their publications, considered hostile towards Russia. Examples of such a circumstance are those of *The Daily Telegraph*, the Viennese *Neue Freie Presse* and *Kölnische Zeitung*.

The extensive research of periodicals will lead to a more accurate understanding of the way the Russo-Turkish War was reflected in the contemporary press. It will also allow filling the incomplete personal data and profiles, updating the information about the war correspondents' activity and affiliations, as well as about the publications that have benefited from dispatches, articles, photos and sketches sent by them from the front lines.

The publications, especially the illustrated ones, which were being released in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, were best represented in the theatre of operations in the Balkans, by journalists accredited to Tsarist and Ottoman military headquarters, as well as in Bucharest and Constantinople. The very large number of British correspondents and publications demonstrates the interest of the public opinion in Great Britain as well as of the British authorities in the political and military developments of the *Eastern Question*.

Table no. 1: Publications and war correspondents from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland

No.	PUBLICATION	CORRESPONDENT	ACTIVE ON / ACCREDITED BY
1.	<i>The Daily News</i>	Archibald Forbes, Januarius MacGahan, Francis Davis Millet	Balkan Front / Russo-Romanian side
		Edmund O'Donovan, Edwin Pears J.H. Skinner V. Julius	Balkan & Caucasian Fronts / Turkish side
2.	<i>The Times</i>	C. B. Brackenbury, Sir Henry Havelock, Herbert -, E. M. Grant	Balkan Front / Russo-Romanian side
		R. Conigsby, Charles Austin, Antonio Gallenga, Dobson	Balkan Front / Turkish side
3.	<i>The Illustrated London News</i>	Edward Hale, Johann N. Schönberg, Irving Montague, William H. Overend	Balkan Front / Russo-Romanian side
		Richard Caton Woodville	Balkan Front / Turkish & Russo- Romanian side
		Melton Prior	Balkan Front / Turkish side
		Joseph Bell	Caucasian & Balkan Fronts / Turkish side
4.	<i>The Graphic</i>	Frederick Villiers	Balkan Front / Russo-Romanian side
		J. Ananian	Balkan Front / Turkish side
5.	<i>The Standard</i>	Frederick Boyle	Balkan Front / Russo-Romanian side
		Fitzgerald	Balkan Front / Turkish side



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Some British journalists sent correspondence to American newspapers and illustrated magazines and vice versa. One of them is Edwin Pears, the special envoy of *The Daily News*, who sent correspondence to *The New York Herald*, while some American correspondents transmitted correspondence to British and even Russian newspapers.

No.	PUBLICATION	CORRESPONDENT	ACTIVE ON / ACCREDITED BY
6.	<i>The Manchester Guardian</i>	Francis Stanley, Neocles Mussabini	Balkan Front / Russo-Romanian side
		Camille Barrère	Balkan Front / Turkish side
7.	<i>The Scotsman</i>	D.L. Carrick, William Rose	Balkan Front / Russo-Romanian side
		David Christie Murray	Balkan Front / Turkish side
8.	<i>The Daily Telegraph</i>	George A. Sala, John Drew Gay, William Kingston, Campbell Clarke, James Dow, Paul Franke, Nicholas Leader, Frank Power	Balkan Front / Turkish side
9.	<i>Sheffield Daily Telegraph</i>		
10.	<i>The Morning Post</i>	Wasborough -, Alexandru Ciurcu	Balkan Front / Russo-Romanian side
11.	<i>Freeman's Journal</i> Irish daily, Dublin	Francis Stanley	
12.	<i>The Pall Mall Gazette</i>	Camille Barrère	Balkan Front / Turkish side
13.	<i>The Pictorial World</i>	-	
14.	<i>The Economist</i>	-	
15.	<i>The Globe</i>	-	
16.	<i>The Echo</i>	-	

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Table no. 2: Publications and war correspondents from the United States of America

No.	PUBLICATION	CORRESPONDENT	ACTIVE ON / ACCREDITED BY
1.	<i>The New York Herald</i>	John P. Jackson, Francis Davis Millet, Januarius MacGahan,	Balkan Front / Russo-Romanian side
		Edward Hale, Dokankoz -	
		Wentworth Huyshe	Balkan Front / Turkish side
2.	<i>The Boston Journal</i>	Edward King	Balkan Front / Russo-Romanian side
3.	<i>Harpers' Weekly</i>	Richard Caton Woodville	Balkan Front / Turkish & Russo-Romanian side
4.	<i>The Chicago Gazette</i>	Friedrich Lachmann	Balkan Front / Russo-Romanian side

The publications which were being released in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy also followed with great interest the evolution of political and military events in the Balkan Peninsula, sending press correspondents to Bucharest and Constantinople.

Table no. 3: Publications and war correspondents from Austro-Hungarian Monarchy

No.	PUBLICATION	CORRESPONDENT	ACTIVE ON / ACCREDITED BY
1.	<i>Neues Wiener Tagblatt</i>	Johann Lukeš, Alexandru Ciurcu	Balkan Front / Russo-Romanian side
2.	<i>Die Presse</i>	Johann Lichtenstadt	
3.	<i>Neue Freie Presse</i>	Alexandru Ciurcu	Caucasian Front / Turkish side
		August Baron Schluga von Rastenfeld	
4.	<i>Neue Illustrierte Zeitung</i>	Johann N. Schönberg, Mathes Koenen	Balkan Front / Russo-Romanian side
5.	<i>Neue Militär-Zeitung</i>	not identified	



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No.	PUBLICATION	CORRESPONDENT	ACTIVE ON / ACCREDITED BY
6.	<i>Pester Lloyd</i> Budapest, German daily	Friedrich Lachmann	Balkan Front / Russo-Romanian side
7.	<i>Die Politik</i> Prague, German daily	Tammenbach- Reinschtein, Friedrich Lachmann	
8.	<i>Národní Listy</i> Prague, Czech daily	Heller	

The unfolding of military operations during the Russo-Turkish War was largely reflected in the newspapers and illustrated magazines published in Germany as a result of the dedicated work of their special envoys – journalists and graphic artists, some of them having a military background as active or reserve officers.

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Table no. 4: Publications and war correspondents from Germany

No.	PUBLICATION	CORRESPONDENT	ACTIVE ON / ACCREDITED BY
1.	<i>Die Post</i>	von Brauchitsch	Balkan Front / Russo-Romanian side
2.	<i>Neue Militärische Blätter</i>		
3.	<i>Militär-Wochenblatt</i>	Dannhauer	
4.	<i>National Zeitung</i>		
5.	<i>Hamburger Nachrichten</i>		
6.	<i>Ausburger Allgemeine Zeitung</i>	von Marees, Alexandru Ciurcu	
7.	<i>Über Land und Meer</i>	von Marees, Johann N. Schönberg	
8.	<i>Illustrierte Zeitung</i>	Mathes Koenen, Themistocles von Eckenbrecher, Carol Popp de Szathmari	

No.	PUBLICATION	CORRESPONDENT	ACTIVE ON / ACCREDITED BY
9.	<i>Die Gartenlaube</i>	Heinrich Trenk, Wilhelm Camphausen, Frédéric Kohn-Abrest	Balkan Front / Russo-Romanian si
10.	<i>Berliner Tageblatt</i>	not identified	
11.	<i>Kölnische Zeitung</i>	von Huyn	Balkan Front / Turkish side
		Carl Schneider	

The publications in France and Belgium showed a similar great interest in the developments of political and military events in the Balkan Peninsula, proved by the extensive press coverage of the war events.

Table no. 5: Publications and war correspondents from France and Belgium

No.	PUBLICATION	CORRESPONDENT	ACTIVE ON / ACCREDITED BY
1.	<i>XIX Siècle</i>	Philibert Bréban	Balkan Front / Russo-Romanian side
2.	<i>National</i>	Philibert Bréban Emile Galli	
3.	<i>Le Figaro</i>	Ivan de Woestyne	
4.	<i>Moniteur Universell</i>	Dick de Lonlay (Georges Hardouin's pseudonym), Paul A. Kauffmann,	
5.	<i>Le Monde Illustré</i>	Jean Bergue, Daniel Vierge, Filip Montoreanu	
6.	<i>Estafette</i>	Mlochowski de Belina	
7.	<i>Le Temps</i>	Henri de Lamothe, Alexandru Ciurcu	
8.	<i>L'Illustration</i>	Auguste Lançon, Ladislaus E. Petrovitz	
9.	<i>Le Siècle</i>	Frédéric Kohn-Abrest	
10.	<i>Le Rappel</i>		
11.	<i>La France</i>	Camille Farcy	

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The Italian publications regularly provided rich information, news, articles and narratives, often illustrated with graphic works on the war events, which were transmitted from the battlefields by their own correspondents, accredited either on the Russo-Romanian side or on the Ottoman side.

No.	PUBLICATION	CORRESPONDENT	ACTIVE ON / ACCREDITED BY
12.	<i>Republique Française</i>	Granet	Balkan Front / Russo-Romanian side
		Camille Barrère	
13.	<i>Journal des Débats,</i>	Lucien Le Chevalier	Balkan Front / Turkish side
14.	<i>Le Bien public</i>	Olivier Pain	
15.	<i>La Lanterne</i>		
16.	<i>L'Indépendance Belge,</i> Brussels daily / Belgium	Frédéric Kohn-Abrest	Balkan Front / Russo-Romanian side

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Table no. 6: Publications and war correspondents from Italy

No.	PUBLICATION	CORRESPONDENT	ACTIVE ON / ACCREDITED BY
1.	<i>L'Opinione</i>	M.A. Canini, Luigi Cazzavillan	Balkan Front / Russo-Romanian side
2.	<i>Pungolo di Napoli</i>		
3.	<i>Gazzetta Piemontaise</i>		
4.	<i>Corriere della Sera</i>		
5.	<i>Fanfulla</i>	Marcotti	
6.	<i>Gazzetta di Roma</i>	Nicola Lazzaro	
7.	<i>L'illustrazione italiana</i>		

The Spanish magazine *La Ilustracion Española y Americana* was represented by Jose Luis Pellicer y Fener. Colonel Hasenkampf, writing at his desk, became the subject of a sketch signed by Pellicer. Their meeting took place on 1 June 1877. It is recollected by Hasenkampf as follows: "Don Jose Luis Pellicer, correspondent and painter of a Spanish illustrated magazine, arrived today, but without any recommendation. With his honest open face, he inspired such confidence in me that I asked Grand Duke to approve his accreditation

on my responsibility. Grand Duke gave his consent" (Hasenkampf, 1908, p. 34).

In Sweden as well the conduct of military operations within the Balkan theatre of war was a subject that aroused public interest, the Swedish General Staff sending to Romania and Bulgaria an officer, Lieutenant Björlin, as correspondent of the daily *Stockholms Dagblad*.

To cover the war events, Swiss publications were represented by frontline journalists who were accredited at the Russian and Romanian military headquarters or at the Ottoman ones.

Table no. 7: Publications and war correspondents from Spain, Sweden, and Swiss Confederation

No.	PUBLICATION	CORRESPONDENT	ACTIVE ON / ACCREDITED BY
1.	<i>La Ilustracion Española y Americana</i>	Jose Luis Pellicer y Fener	Balkan Front / Russo-Romanian side
2.	<i>Stockholms Dagblad</i>	Björlin -	
3.	<i>Der Bund</i> (Bern)	Friedrich Lachmann	
4.	<i>Journal de Genève</i>	Olivier Pain	Balkan Front / Turkish side

The Romanian publications were fed with correspondence, news, and reports, illustrated with photographs and drawings prepared in the front lines by journalists, photographers and painters accredited at the Tsarist and Romanian headquarters. Among them was the journalist Alexandru Ciurcu, who could be successfully considered the first Romanian journalist of European reputation (Ștefan, p. 23). The illustrations for Romanian publications and for some publications from abroad were provided by photographers Carol Popp by Szathmary and Franz Duschek who were in the service of Prince Carol I, accompanied by Andreas D. Reiser, as well as by a team of painters and graphic artists, the best-known being Nicolae Grigorescu, Sava Henția, George Demetrescu Mirea and Filip Montoreanu (Ștefan, 1989; Ionescu, 2002).



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Table no. 8: Publications and war correspondents from Romania

No.	PUBLICATION	CORRESPONDENT	ACTIVE ON / ACCREDITED BY
1.	<i>Românul</i>	Alexandru Ciurcu,	Balkan Front / Russo-Romanian side
2.	<i>România Liberă</i>	Carol Popp	
3.	<i>Telegraful</i>	de Szathmari,	
4.	<i>Timpul</i>	Franz Duschek,	
5.	<i>Resboiul</i>	Andreas D. Reiser, Nicolae Grigorescu, Sava Henția, Filip Montoreanu, Henri Trenk, George D. Mirea, Hipolit H. Dembitzki, Isidor Selagianu	
6.	<i>Dorobanțul</i>	-	
7.	<i>Gazeta Transilvaniei</i>	Alexandru Ciurcu	
8.	<i>Familia</i>	Alexandru Ciurcu,	
9.	<i>L'Orient</i>	Frédéric Damé	
10.	<i>L'Indépendance Roumaine</i>		

The special envoys of the publications from the Tsarist Empire, journalists, photographers, painters and graphic artists, accredited to accompany the troops, are mentioned in the *Collection of Materials on the 1877-78 Russo-Turkish War in the Balkan Peninsula* (vol. 2, 1898) and by Colonel Hasenkampf in his memoirs, published in 1908.

The special envoys of the publications from the Tsarist Empire, journalists, photographers, painters and graphic artists, accredited to accompany the troops, are mentioned in the *Collection of Materials on the 1877-78 Russo-Turkish War in the Balkan Peninsula* (vol. 2, 1898) and by Colonel Hasenkampf in his memoirs, published in 1908. This information is supplemented by the memoirs, books and articles of war correspondents, journalists and painters, N.V. Maximov, V.V. Krestovski, V. Alushkin, V.I. Nemirovich-Danchenko, A. Kuropatkin, L.V. Shachovkoy, V.V. Vereșciaghin, accessed indirectly through the researches published by Muminova (2008), O.A. Gokov (2011), E.M. Muminova and A.V. Manakhova (2018). Information on the activity of Russian war correspondents appears also in the articles and memoirs of foreign journalists (Kohn-Abrest, Ciurcu), advisers and military attachés (Pfeil, Greene).

Table no. 9: Publications and war correspondents from the Tsarist Empire

No.	PUBLICATION	CORRESPONDENT	ACTIVE ON / ACCREDITED BY
1.	<i>Birzhevyye vedomosti</i>	N.V. Maximov	Balkan Front / Russo-Romanian side
2.	<i>Vsemirnaya illyustratsiya</i>	N.N. Karasin, M.P. Feodorov	
3.	<i>Golos</i>	P.P. Sokalsky	
4.	<i>Moskovskiye vedomosti</i>	L.V. Schchovskoy, M.F. Metz, Ilovaisky	
5.	<i>Nash vek</i>	G. Stambolov V.I. Nemirovich-Danchenko	
6.	<i>Novoye vremya</i>	A.A. Suvorin, N.P. Feodorov, V.P. Burenin, N.N. Karasin, P.P. Sokalsky, A.D. Ivanov, N.N. Rossolovsky, V.I. Nemirovich-Danchenko, Maslov -	
7.	<i>Odesskiy vestnik</i>	P.P. Sokalsky	
8.	<i>Pravitelstvennyy vestnik</i>	V.V. Krestovski	
9.	<i>Russkiy mir</i>	E.K. Rapp, Gheorghievici -	
10.	<i>Sankt-Peterburgskiye vedomosti</i>	M.P. Feodorov, N.V. Maximov, A. Teoharov, Modzolevsky -, Komarov -	
11.	<i>Severnyy vestnik</i>	D.K. Gyrs, Baikov -	
12.	<i>Tiflisskiy vestnik</i>	N.Y. Nikoladze	
13.	<i>Russkoye obozreniye</i>	-	
14.	<i>Russkiy invalid</i>	M.P. Feodorov, Suhotin -	
15.	<i>Russkiye vedomosti</i>	A. Teoharov	
16.	<i>Journal d'Odessa</i>	Philibert Bréban	
17.	<i>Sankt-Peterburger Zeitung</i>	N.V. Maximov	





News agencies were routinely used to disseminate the official communiqués of the Tsarist General Headquarters as well as the information provided by Romanian authorities. By order, when sending the public information reports, Hasenkampf prioritised Léon Pognon, the chief of *L'Agence Havas* office in Bucharest, thus ensuring that the French news agency received valuable data a few hours earlier than its competitors.

Accredited at the Tsarist General Headquarters, Poggenpohl, the head of the *Agence Générale Russe*, provided correspondences about war operations to *Havas*, *Reuters*, *Associated Press*, *Wolffs Telegraphisches Bureau* (Berlin) and *Telegraphen Korrespondenz Bureau* (Corrbureau/Vienna). This fact indicates the existence of agreements between the news agencies for sharing the information in order to cover as best as possible the war events (Hasenkampf, 1908, p.25; Collection, 1898, Vol. 2, p.174; Palmer, 2019, p.53, Frédéric, p. 146).

Table no. 10: News agencies and their correspondents

No.	PUBLICATION	CORRESPONDENT	ACTIVE ON / ACCREDITED BY
1.	<i>L'Agence Havas</i> / Bucharest office	Léon Pognon	Balkan Front / Russo-Romanian side
2.	<i>Agence Générale Russe</i>	Poggenpohl	
3.	<i>Wolffs Telegraphisches Bureau</i>	Alexandru Ciurcu	
4.	<i>Agence Reuters</i>	Sigismund Engländer	Balkan Front / Turkish side
5.	<i>L'Agence Havas</i> / Constantinople office	Chateau -,	

The restrictive rules imposed by the 1876 Ottoman press law and the decision to make the access to the front conditional in accordance with the Sultan's written approval (ferman) limited the journalists' possibility to cover the war in the Balkan Peninsula and in the Caucasus. The censorship affected the activity of Ottoman newspapers *Basiret*, *Hayal Gazetesi*, *İstikbal Gazetesi*, *İttihad Gazetesi*, *Medeniyet Gazetesi*, *Sabah Gazetesi*, *Şark Gazetesi*, *Tercüman-ı Hakikat Gazetesi*, *Takvim-i Vakayi*, *Tercüman-ı Şark Gazetesi*, *Vakit Gazetesi* and *Zaman Gazetesi*,

whose journalists are not mentioned in the examined bibliographies. This fact might be explained by the fact that the Ottoman publications were frequently executed by compiling the articles printed in foreign ones.

Similar rules were applied to foreign publications and correspondents accredited in Constantinople: *The Daily Telegraph*, *The Times*, *Pall Mall Gazette*, *Manchester Guardian*, *Republique Française*; *Kölnische Zeitung*, *The Daily News*, *The New York Herald*, *The Illustrated London News*, *Journal des Débats*.

In July 1877, the presence of the foreign press at Shumen, in the area of the Ottoman forces, is attested by a report signed by C. Fitzgerald, Emerick Bulkovics, J. W. Saterger, August Jacquot, Charles Winter, Henry Dimone, Harry Suter, Jules Zukab, Wentworth Huyshe, Senanian Camille, Borthwick, Camille Barrère, Drummond, Carl Mayers, Melton Prior, without any reference to their publications (Yürükçü, 2018, p. 422).

The Caucasian front attracted far less press coverage at the time. In this regard, the bibliographies mention the exceptional war photos taken in the Russian part, and the presence of foreign correspondents in the Ottoman part, as Edmund O'Donovan, the special envoy of *The Daily News*, Joseph Bell, graphic artist, sent by *The Illustrated London News*, and August Baron Schluga von Rastendorf, envoy of the Viennese newspaper *Neue Freie Presse* (*The War Correspondence of the Daily News 1877-78*, vol. 2, p. 311, Charalambous, 2014, p. 34).

PRESS ACCREDITATION IN THE MILITARY: PRACTICAL AND DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS

The way of regulating the military-press relations during the Russo-Turkish War through orders and procedures applied by Tsarist and Romanian military headquarters was not without practical and doctrinal significance. Thus, it was established the formal framework for dialogue and cooperation between the representatives of military organisations and the war correspondents and their publications, objectified by the press accreditation. Its acceptance and implementation demonstrated the increasing understanding among the military commanders and political leaders of the power of the press, whose possibilities



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Proving its usefulness during the subsequent armed conflicts, the press accreditation allowed the organisation of military-press relations predictably, based on mutual trust and benefit. This approach led to the implementation of rules and procedures aimed at supporting the achievement of operational and strategic goals by valorising the military-press relations and the activity of accredited correspondents included in press pools or acting as embedded journalists.

to address large audiences became subject of reflection on the ways and means to strategically spread the information to support the armed forces in achieving their objectives.

The press accreditation and the procedures used by the military to interact with publications' special envoys – journalists, photographers, graphic artists, painters – responded to the immediate needs to regulate their access to the area of military operations. It was conditioned by the correspondent's commitment to comply with the rules laid down by the military, which aimed primarily at reducing the risks of disseminating, through the publications, of data and information that could have compromised the secrecy of military operations.

The correspondents' accreditation at the military headquarters and their access to the troops, either grouped in *press pools* or as *embedded journalists*, attached to the combat units, will spread as a standard practice of the military-press relations, being gradually introduced by the end of the 19th century in the armed forces of other states, initially in wartime only.

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These rules and procedures have stood the test of time, and they are reflected nowadays in all military policies and doctrines on information and public relations, influencing to a certain degree, as an example to follow, the public communication practices of other state authorities or private companies.

For the Romanian military, the practice of military-press relations during the Romanian War of Independence remains a page not yet fully completed, that still requires research, evaluation, and interpretation of national and, especially, foreign sources. The Romanian experience of military-press relations including the use of press accreditation, *press pools* and *embedded journalists* was depicted in valuable articles and memoirs, photo albums, sketches, graphic works and famous

paintings dedicated to Romanian Independence and to all those who made it possible on the battlefields – the Romanian Army and its brave soldiers.

TOWARDS INSTITUTIONALISATION OF THE PRESS ACCREDITATION

By adopting and improving the working rules with the war correspondents, the military headquarters gradually introduced the press accreditation within the armed forces, initially during the war campaigns and, subsequently, in peacetime. The progressive institutionalisation of press accreditation was an essential part of the process of adopting and perfecting the set of permanent practices, rules and procedures used by the military organisations to manage military-press relations. It was determined by the right understanding, at the level of military command groups, of the importance of running mutually beneficial relations with the publications interested in reflecting the activity of the armed forces.

The institutionalisation of press accreditation can be defined as the adoption of suitable principles, ground rules and working procedures, and the appointment of press officers in charge to liaise with publications and their envoys, which are described in written regulations approved by military decisions as distinct policies for managing the military-press relations with the aim to support journalists to inform the public about the activities of the armed forces.

On the way towards the institutionalisation of press accreditation in the military, Major General Sir Frederick Roberts, successfully leading his troops during the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878-1880), used to say that the best approach when working with press correspondents is the truth strategy. By this he meant to underline how important it is to build mutual trust between the society and its armed forces by an open communication, telling the truth to the press. However, this conviction did not prevent him from introducing censorship and reducing the number of accredited journalists, when protecting the operational secrecy made it necessary (Williams, 2020, p. 8).

The interest of journalists in the First Boer War (1880-1881) prodded the British military to consider measures for preventing



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By the end of the 19th century in the Romanian Armed Forces there were not recorded new approaches towards the organisation of military-press relations, a responsibility of the Great General Staff in peacetime, respectively of the Great General Headquarters in wartime, which were considering the accreditation of press correspondents, among whom again Alexandru Ciurcu, during the Second Balkan War (1913).

the threats to operational security by disclosure of sensitive information through the press. Thus, in 1881 the British War Office formally warned the editors to not publish any data relating to locations, troop movements, strength, weapons, equipment, and logistical support.

In the British Armed Forces, the press accreditation procedure was attested in 1889, when the headquarters “introduced a system of registration for war correspondents, which allowed them to draw food and fodder rations, gave them tacit permissions to use the military telegraph for censored dispatches and entitled them to campaign medals” (Hood, 2011, p. 19).

In the United States, the press-military relations became subject to the specific regulations of the War Department during the Spanish-American War (1898) and the Philippine Insurrection (1899).

At the same time, the Second Boer War (1899-1902) was attracting many correspondents, already famed, or pursuing fame, like Winston Churchill. Benefiting from more extensive press coverage than the previous wars, it was sometimes called “the first media war” (McLaughlin, 2016, p.74). This situation encouraged the British War Office to refine its regulations regarding press accreditation, imposing severe restrictions on using the photographic and cinematographic equipment in areas of military operations.

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The interaction between the war correspondents and the military on the battlefields led also to the acknowledgment of the journalist’s condition in relation not only to the military authorities that granted him the press accreditation, but especially to those of the enemy.

Thus, the end of the 19th century brought the first recognition of the war correspondent’s professional and legal status in an international document, the Hague Convention of 1899, whose Article 13 states that: “Individuals who follow an army without directly belonging to it,

such as newspaper correspondents and reporters, sutlers, contractors, who fall into the enemy’s hands, and whom the latter think fit to detain, have a right to be treated as prisoners of war, provided they can produce a certificate from the military authorities of the army they were accompanying”.

The mentioned provisions will be taken over and developed in Article 4 of Title I in the *Third Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War* (12 August 1949) and in Article 79 of *Protocol additional (I) to the Geneva Conventions, relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts* (6 June 1977), which state that the correspondents who accompany the armed forces to report on the conduct of military operations will be treated as war prisoners and will benefit from protection provided they do not take actions that contravenes their status as civilians and journalists.

CONCLUSIONS

The analysis of military-press relations in the last decades of the 19th century reveals the military effort to control the journalists’ reporting from warzones by imposing ground rules, procedures and even penalties.

The press accreditation procedures were established and gradually improved by military headquarters through standardised documents, orders, and regulations, and by nominating competent personnel to liaise with journalists and their publications – press officers. Their duties involved defining the working rules with the press to provide the accredited journalists with access to current information on the conduct of military operations during official meetings held regularly (press briefings, interviews) or informal ones (working lunches).

To facilitate their documentation, the press officers were authorised to provide the war correspondents with documents for free passage and access to the troops in the area of military operations. The press officers’ responsibilities also included to organise the visits of journalists to the front lines on an itinerary and according to a pre-arranged schedule or even, by request, to attach some of them to the combat units for longer periods of time. These practices are familiar to current military PR officers, who regularly appeal to *media pools* or *embedded*



Press accreditation proves its usefulness for managing the military-media relations, for granting correspondents' access to public information by providing them constantly with press releases, newsletters and media packages, and by inviting them to attend the press conferences or to join the troops in theatres of operations as members of media pools or as embedded journalists.

journalists in wartime or in peacetime, during various missions in theatres of operations and major exercises.

The efforts towards the institutionalisation of press accreditation within the practices of military headquarters have evolved from the Crimean War to this day as a standard PR procedure.

Press accreditation proves its usefulness for managing the military-media relations, for granting correspondents' access to public information by providing them constantly with press releases, newsletters and media packages, and by inviting them to attend the press conferences or to join the troops in theatres of operations as members of *media pools* or as *embedded journalists*.

The war correspondents' accreditation resulted in determining that the press relations should be treated in the military organisations as being a responsibility of the command group, as a managerial function, with the aim of informing and influencing internal and external audiences alike.

To clarify the origins of press accreditation in wartime, the military orders No. 87 and No. 131, issued by the Tsarist General Headquarters on 22 April 1877, respectively on 7 June 1877, should be considered among the first official documents regulating the military-press relations. Although they were not negotiated to best express the interests of both the military and the press, the mentioned orders reflect the progress of PR practices in the 19th century.

The bibliographic testimonies on war correspondents' activity underline the interdependencies between the development of the press, journalism, war reporting and the institutionalisation of the press accreditation by military organisations. Altogether, they certify the use of internal information, public information, press relations and reputation management, that would later be subsumed under PR theories.

Hence what was to be proved. Namely that in the second half of the 19th century the *PR triad* had already been made up by its founding elements – *the Organisation* (represented by the press officer), *the Media* (publications and press correspondents) and *the Public* (internal and external audiences of the organisation), all connected

by the common interest of sharing information and meanings to create mutual understanding, trust and consensus.

These facts are of great significance not only to the history of journalism and periodical press, but also to the history of public relations, and require further interdisciplinary studies conducted by historians and theorists of communication sciences.

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THE MILITARY INSTRUMENT OF POWER IN THE 21ST CENTURY – THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE STATES IN THE WIDER BLACK SEA REGION –

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A nation’s power to impose its will and to achieve its national objectives emanates from its instruments of national power. Today, the instruments of national power include diplomacy, information, military, and economy, collectively identified by the acronym DIME. A nation does not necessarily have to be superior in each element of the DIME to achieve its national goals and interests. However, it has to be adept in managing each element of national power synergistically in order to achieve its desired results. The military element of national power represents the military might of a nation. Referred to as a “hard power” due to its kinetic nature, the military component of DIME might appear to be a measure of last resort. This is not always the case, however, as the credible threat of hard power alone in combination with other elements of DIME (sometimes known as “smart power”) can often allow a nation to achieve its interests.

The armed conflict in Ukraine and the illegal annexation of Crimea, the changes in the relations between major global and regional actors, the persistence of frozen conflicts in the Republic of Moldova and Georgia and the difficult path of state consolidation and economic development in some of the Black Sea states – all require a much greater attention of the international community to the region, which changes almost everything about using the instruments of power and of course the strategy regarding the Black Sea region.

Keywords: strategy; power; diplomacy; information; Black Sea;



INTRODUCTION

Taking into account the role it plays in the social life, power is that component without which there can be no orderly human activity, because power is what establishes the goals of human activity, how and by what means they will be achieved, and the strategy according to which action is taken to meet them. In this regard, power is what contributes to the manifestation of each member of society by organising all social actions, while it also imposes the social order, which, in turn, generates power.

The best known and simplest definition of the concept of power is the relational definition, which belongs to the American political scientist Robert Dahl. According to him, “power is an asymmetrical relationship between two subjects, where power is the ability of A (the holder of power) to determine B (the subject of power) to do what B would not do if there were no intervention by A” (Chițu, 2018).

The national security of a European state is in close interdependence with regional and global security, and, under such circumstances, any approach to this issue can only be taken in the context in which it is seen as part of the European and Euro-Atlantic security systems.

Today, more than ever, security is perceived as a dynamic process that requires constant consideration of various types of external threats: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organised crime, illegal migration, border insecurity, state entities or unconsolidated or democratically deficient states, ethnic and religious conflicts, and more. The security strategy responds to the need and obligation of legitimate protection against risks and threats that endanger human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as the foundations of the existence of states, and focuses, with priority, on areas and activities dedicated to the rule of law, public safety and security, and national defence.

Military power, in the context of the new zonal, regional and global security environment as well as of the diversification of security

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threats, must be mainly focused on fulfilling its fundamental mission of defending interests, according to constitutional democracy and civil democratic control over the armed forces. At the same time, it must be doctrinally, structurally, operationally and from the point of view of combat instruments adapted to the new requirements specific to modern armies, in order to be able to meet the commitments deriving from treaties and alliances.

THE WIDER BLACK SEA REGION GEOSTRATEGIC PROFILE

The *Wider Black Sea Region (WBSR)* represents, according to the definition provided by the European Commission, a distinct area composed of 10 states (*figure no. 1*): six coastal states – Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, the Russian Federation, Georgia and Turkey – and four states – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Republic of Moldova and Greece –, whose history, proximity and close relations with the Black Sea Basin recommend them as important actors in the region.




Figure no 1: Wider Black Sea Area (Pop, Manoleli, 2007, p. 9)

In this context, the European definition of the region overlaps, to a large extent, the concept of Wider Black Sea Region promoted by NATO in its relations with the allies and partners in the area (Pop, Manoleli, Ib.).

Security in the Wider Black Sea Region cannot be analysed without studying the influence of military power, the economic aspects and mainly the use of power to dominate energy resources, power projection, alliances formed to impose their own interests.

In the presented material, we intend to analyse the military instrument of power, its importance in the study of the geopolitical implications of the Black Sea Area, a sensitive area in terms of latent or apparently frozen conflicts. We used as a method the historical research of certain conflicts and how the military instrument of power decisively influenced the rise of the great nations representing the important geostrategical players in the region.

THE MILITARY INSTRUMENT OF POWER IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Instruments of national power usually consist of concrete sources of power or a set of sources of power that can be used to promote and defend the national interests of a state. Their main feature is that they are malleable and have a high degree of adaptability to the changes that may occur in the international security environment or even in the internal environment of a particular state. Moreover, their structure and operationalisation depend on the form of leadership of the respective state, as well as on the general political line adopted at a certain moment. Basically, *the instruments of national power are “tangible sources that can be shaped, modified, depending on the strategic situation of the domestic and international environment, the national interests and objectives of the state at a given time and the general policy imposed by the national leadership on the state”* (Frunzeti, 2009, p. 51). At the same time, we should not omit that they are also determined by the level of power of the respective state. Their degree of flexibility, the possibilities of operationalisation depend on the main factors that must be taken into account when we intend to analyse the power of a state in a regional and international context (quantitative and qualitative factors). Similar to national interests, perceptions of power instruments may vary, but in general



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The military instrument of power can be considered not only the most effective of them but also the most expensive. It usually fulfils the role of deterring a possible military attack as well as that of carrying out armed combat actions to promote the vital national interests of a state. The military power of a state is difficult to assess because we have to take into account both quantitative factors (number of soldiers, equipment) and qualitative factors (level of training, degree of applicability of modern technologies).

most authors agree that states have four major instruments of power: *diplomatic, informational, military, and economic.*

The *military instrument of power* can be considered not only the most effective of them but also the most expensive. It usually fulfils the role of deterring a possible military attack as well as that of carrying out armed combat actions to promote the vital national interests of a state. The military power of a state is difficult to assess because we have to take into account both quantitative factors (number of soldiers, equipment) and qualitative factors (level of training, degree of applicability of modern technologies). Moreover, both the characteristics and the operationalisation of this instrument have changed, under the circumstances of globalisation and the emergence of new types of security risks. With regard to the Euro-Atlantic region, we cannot speak, at this moment, of the existence of the risk of the emergence of an armed conflict between NATO and other military forces in the region. However, we can talk about the use of the military instrument in managing crises that occur outside this region and that can affect it. We can quote, in this regard, the *European Security Strategy* (2009, p. 6), which mentions that the first line of defence will often be located outside national borders. Another contemporary feature of the military instrument is the diversification of its roles. This phenomenon is related to the benefits and challenges of globalisation. On the one hand, it has favoured the creation of a security space in the Euro-Atlantic region, where the risk of being attacked militarily by a state is almost zero. Even a regional power with global aspirations such as the Russian Federation, at the moment, in our view, cannot engage in a major conflict with NATO without being part of an alliance. But, on the other hand, globalisation has also made it possible for the existence of instability at great distances from national borders to be considered a security risk. Basically, from the perspective of the Euro-Atlantic space, we can talk about the use of the military instrument in promoting the national interests of the states that compose it beyond national borders. NATO and EU missions in the Middle East, Africa and the Western Balkans are relevant examples of how this instrument is used today.

Military interventions are not conducted on the basis of the desire to conquer, but on the basis of the desire to promote and defend

national interests. Moreover, given the global nature of security risks and threats, such as international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, illegal migration or organised crime, they need an integrated approach that is the sine qua non of promoting and defending vital national interests. On the other hand, the deterrent potential of the military instrument for the purpose mentioned above should not be disregarded. Military exercises, forward presence or patrol missions have a clear contribution to the pursuit of national interests. Along with the military instrument, the diplomatic, informational and economic instruments of power are not used independently of each other, but in parallel or even in conjunction, supporting each other, in a unitary conception of the international environment, of the position of the state in the international arena, the level of power that it owns, and the national interests it pursues. Moreover, the proportion in which these instruments are used may differ depending on the power sources of the state or depending on the strategic objectives it sets because this is the essence of power instruments: they are flexible, adaptable power sources to the international context and to national interests. In addition, another feature of them is that they are used not only by states, but also by other non-state international actors that have developed on the international stage. In this case, we are talking primarily about intergovernmental organisations, but also about transnational corporations (they can use the economic instrument in particular). At the same time, we consider useful for our analysis another perspective on the concept of instrument of power, seen as a means by which power is exercised by the government representatives. Parliament, the government, the military, the church, civil society organisations and the media become, from this point of view, instruments of the power of a state. We can consider this vision as an institutional one, which emphasises how each institution that can exercise power contributes to the pursuit and promotion of national interests.

Humanity mainly works on land, but everything that happens in the air or at sea is a supporting element in shaping military actions, which is why we will analyse the *theory of maritime power* (Alfred T. Mahan) and the *theory of air power* (Alexander de Seversky) in order to highlight the importance of the military instrument of power in imposing the will of a state.



ROMANIAN
MILITARY
THINKING

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MARITIME POWER THEORY

Admiral Alfred Mahan (1840-1914) and President F.D. Roosevelt (1882-1945) are among the greatest figures in American geopolitics. Alfred Mahan was an author who developed his work in the strategic terms that the United States of America so desperately needed at the time, and President Roosevelt ensured that many of the American thinker's ideas were put into practice. The purchase of the Panama Canal in 1903 and its actual opening in 1914, an action initiated by the American President, began with Mahan's assessment (Davies, 2013).

Mahan's work could be characterised as a plea for the construction of a strong naval fleet, indispensable to the new US power status. President Roosevelt was one of those who put this idea into practice and, between 1907 and 1909, he sent the new American fleet around the world as a symbol of the power of the United States of America.

Alfred Mahan was also a professor at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, where he wrote his major work, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History*, published in 1890. The volume is a monographic look at the role played by the naval force, between 1660-1783, in the rise of Great Britain. Three years later, Mahan published another monograph, entitled *The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire*, which traced the evolution of the French fleet between 1793-1812.

The American author pointed out that the influence of maritime power in the history of various countries and in their prosperity had been acknowledged, but it had been invoked in such a general way that it made no effective contribution to clarifying the influence of its manifestation. *"It is easy to say in a general way that the use and control of the sea are and have always been an important factor in human history. It is much more difficult to look for and show precisely and exactly its importance in a given situation"* (Century Magazine, 1911).

Mahan noticed that the events in which maritime power played a decisive role were treated and interpreted without taking into account this very influence. The author quotes two famous military confrontations: that between Hannibal and Scipio the African, which was to determine the fate of Rome, as well as another historical route to Carthage, and that between Napoleon Bonaparte and the European

anti-Napoleonic coalition led by the Duke of Wellington, in Waterloo. Both events are strikingly similar, overlooked by historians. In both cases, *"victory was decided by control of the sea"*. Roman control of the sea forced Hannibal to resort to the long march through Gaul, during which more than half of his troops were scattered.

The Carthaginian General could not bring the troops stationed in Spain directly to Italy – as the Romans did, because the roads were controlled by the Romans. The final battle of Metaurus was decided both by the internal positions occupied by the Roman army in relation to the Carthaginian forces and, above all, by the delay with which Hannibal's brother arrived with reinforcements. The same cause – the lack of control over the sea – twice disadvantaged the Carthaginians: first, Hannibal's troops were halved at the gates of Rome; second, the reinforcements arrived late. Thus, the two Carthaginian armies were at the decisive moment separated throughout Italy.

From another perspective, it is important to point out Mahan's idea that power, in order to be effective, must be accompanied by the ability to project it. Even if the American author limits this capacity only to the naval instrument, the idea as such is an essential element of any modern geopolitical approach. Later, other authors, also from the American space, will talk about the air power and even about the capacity of the United States of America to control the cosmic space, a kind of *"maritime space of the 21st century"*. The instruments employed by a country to project its power are and must be different from age to age. However, the ability to project power with the right means for one stage or another remains constant. Mahan's contribution is that he noticed, earlier than others, the potential of power that the maritime fleet represented for America and that he stated the requirement of its construction in clear, even imperative words.

AIR POWER THEORY

Born in Russia, Alexander de Seversky (1894-1974) served in the Russian Navy in the First World War. He had a mission in the United States of America in 1918 and sought asylum in that country, where he settled permanently. He received American citizenship in 1927.

In 1942, Alexander de Seversky published *A Victory through Air Power*, in which he criticised the Allied underestimation of aviation



In 1942, Alexander de Seversky published A Victory through Air Power, in which he criticised the Allied underestimation of aviation as an indispensable tool in modern warfare and without which no decisive victory could be achieved. Modern strategy cannot be conceived without modern aviation.

Mahan's work could be characterised as a plea for the construction of a strong naval fleet, indispensable to the new US power status. President Roosevelt was one of those who put this idea into practice and, between 1907 and 1909, he sent the new American fleet around the world as a symbol of the power of the United States of America.



Currently, the security situation in the Black Sea basin and the Caucasus area is characterised, on the one hand, by a process of reaffirming the regional security architecture, as part of the Euro-Atlantic one and, on the other hand, by the existence of a potential for conflict, determined by the maintenance of “frozen conflicts” between or within the Commonwealth of Independent States, as well as by the amplification of asymmetric threats, illegal drug and human trafficking, the phenomenon of migration and terrorism.

as an indispensable tool in modern warfare and without which no decisive victory could be achieved. Modern strategy cannot be conceived without modern aviation. In 1950 he published *Air Power: Key to Survival*, in which he tried to show that air power had a clear superiority over land and sea power and in which he suggested that the United States of America should develop its air capabilities and give up its overseas naval bases, very expensive, or reduce their number. Alexander de Seversky uses the notion of *air domination area* and considers that the air domination areas of the two superpowers of the moment overlapped the northern polar zone; this area was seen by the author as the “*decision area*” (Silsbee, 1942). Experts consider that the efforts made by the USA and former Soviet Union for the air control of this area also started from Seversky’s studies and conclusions. Several analysts believe that Seversky’s assessments of the development of a strong air force are all the more current as, due to the development and diversification of communications, the USA can no longer benefit from the once important advantage of natural semi-isolation. In this context, the air force is an indispensable means of self-protection and the projection of power in the world.

THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE STATES IN THE WIDER BLACK SEA REGION

The Black Sea, under the influence of political and military events, has become an intersection of geopolitical and geo-economic borders. Global geopolitical developments have been driven by the advance of the Euro-Atlantic border into Central Asia. Currently, the security situation in the Black Sea basin and the Caucasus area is characterised, on the one hand, by a process of reaffirming the regional security architecture, as part of the Euro-Atlantic one and, on the other hand, by the existence of a potential for conflict, determined by the maintenance of “*frozen conflicts*” between or within the Commonwealth of Independent States, as well as by the amplification of asymmetric threats, illegal drug and human trafficking, the phenomenon of migration and terrorism.

The interest of the countries bordering the Black Sea that are part of NATO or that have aspirations of membership in ensuring security in this region coincides with the objectives of the Alliance.

One of the main mechanisms for guaranteeing peace in this area is the internationalisation of the security process in the region. It entails the political and military presence of NATO and allied states, for an efficient management of the asymmetric threats that manifest in the Black Sea area. By establishing US or Alliance bases on the territories of the new member states, partnership actions such as NATO-Russia and NATO-Ukraine councils, as well as by the direct involvement of the European Union and other security organisations and bodies, it is expected to defuse or alleviate these pressures and create conditions for strengthening a stable and long-lasting security environment.

The propulsion of the Black Sea basin and its adjacent area in terms of strategic concerns is not only a requirement of current global interest but also a condition for the positive evolution of the political situation, a guarantee of regional and global stability and security.

After 1991, six states have direct access to the Black Sea: Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey and Georgia. For four of them – Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria and Georgia – it is the only maritime access. There are also European countries – Austria, Slovakia and Hungary, which are especially interested in the basin as they have maritime access through the Danube. The Republic of Moldova, through the maritime Danube, which borders on a length of 1.8 km, is also considered a country bordering the Black Sea. Through the Danube, which has the status of an international waterway, Germany, Serbia and Croatia also have access to the Black Sea. Belarus has access to the Black Sea through the Dnieper.

Today, the political map of the Black Sea area is influenced by a former superpower, Russia, and two regional powers, Ukraine and Turkey. As the successor to the USSR, Russia is still a major factor in the Black Sea region. The Black Sea is a region of convergence of the interests of the great actors on the international scene, and the positions of smaller actors must be permanently related to these interests. The Black Sea region is very important for both Europe and the United States of America, being a bridge in the supply of energy between west and east, but also a barrier against transnational threats (Rumer et al., 2016, p. 1).

The Montreux Convention, concluded in 1936, restored Turkey’s full sovereignty over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits and allowed



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their remilitarisation. This act was signed by Turkey, Great Britain, France, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, Yugoslavia, Australia and Japan. The Convention regulates the access of military and commercial vessels, in times of peace and war, to the Black Sea. Beyond the apparent significance of the Montreux Convention for Turkey's security, the Soviet benefit was absolutely obvious. The new convention ensured, with Turkish goodwill, the naval domination of the Soviet Union in the Black Sea and the almost unrestricted possibility of this power to operate with its fleet in the Mediterranean.

The Black Sea is a real strategic link in the Eurasian space. In addition to the three major strategic corridors that, in a way, are also related to the Black Sea, there are also corridors in the Asian area, such as: the strategic energy corridor (Caucasus, Caspian Sea, Central Asia); the strategic corridor (space) of Southwest Asia (Black Sea, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Persian Gulf, through the Mesopotamian Plain); the strategic corridor (space) Don, Volga, Western Siberia; the Ukrainian-Polish strategic corridor (Văduva, 2015, p. 16). Moreover, the Black Sea unites and separates two major religions, two major cultures and two major mentalities: the Orthodox North (Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine, Russia, partly Georgia) and the Islamic South (Turkey and part of the Caucasus). The most important of the geostrategic determinations that will reconfigure the Black Sea area, as an area of strategic synergy, are the following:

- the area east of the Black Sea – Caucasus, Caspian Sea, Central Asia – is very active and corresponds to a significant section of the old silk road, which expresses a historical continuity;
- the Black Sea region is located in an area of delineation, confluence and confrontation, which results in the special importance of the evolution of the Eurasian security system, in an area of ambiguity and bifurcation;
- it is adjacent to the Islamic corridor;
- it is located in the immediate vicinity of the old disturbing foyer (from Antiquity and the Middle Ages), currently activated by drug trafficking, illegal migration and the battle for Caspian resources and their transport;
- it is in the vicinity of chronic conflict areas, with many problems.

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Romania, a NATO member country, has a major advantage considering the presence, on its territory, of some elements of the missile defence system, some bases where NATO forces are deployed, and the benefits given by the Danube River, the control of the mouths of the river, one of the key elements of the Black Sea. Romania's strategy for ensuring security in this quite volatile area is represented by the strategic partnerships.

The Russian Federation is the largest state bordering the Black Sea and possessing an appreciable conventional and nuclear arsenal. The Black Sea Fleet, deployed mainly in the Crimean Peninsula, in the Sevastopol naval base as well as in the east, in the Novorossiysk naval base, is the main vector of military influence. This state has made special efforts to attract other states, especially China and India, to create an anti-NATO bloc. Simultaneously with these measures, it has taken action to impose "energy diplomacy", which aims to provide cheap energy to allied states and expensive energy to opponents, and to control the energy sources and its transport routes to Europe. It has also encouraged and even actively supported separatist groups operating in the region. The primary geostrategic interest is the connection and the projection of power on the Arctic Ocean-Baltic Sea-Black Sea-Mediterranean Sea axis.

Bulgaria, although a NATO member country, oscillates between the mirage of opportunities provided by EU and NATO membership and the tradition of historical relations with Russia. Even if it has military bases where NATO troops, especially US ones, are stationed, and has encouraged the actions of GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova), it has also provided advantageous facilities to the Russian companies Gazprom and Lukoil, as well as other Russian companies operating in the energy field, including nuclear. Together with Romania, it constitutes the eastern border of the EU.

Turkey, a geopolitical pivotal NATO member state, controls the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits, which manage the access from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea and the world's seas.



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Ukraine is another geopolitical pivotal state in the Wider Black Sea Region, which is under obvious aggression by Russia after 2014 by annexing Crimea. Ukraine is a torn territory between the Russophile East and the nationalist West. By annexing Crimea, Russia gained a true strategic checkpoint of the entire WBSR. The country is in permanent redefinition, it is crushed by civil conflicts, so we cannot say that it has a coherent strategy related to belonging to European values or to continuing its existence under the Russian umbrella.

It is increasingly influential in the Middle East and the South Caucasus. It is increasingly cooperating with Russia both in the military field through the acquisition of missile systems and in the energy field, through the construction of the Russian *Turkish Stream* and *Blue Stream* gas pipelines by Gazprom and the Akkuyuk nuclear power plant by the Russian company Rosatom.

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Georgia and Moldova are states that are geopolitically similar in some respects. The size of the two states is relatively small, with a population of five to seven million, and, on their territory, there are "frozen conflicts" – sources of continuing insecurity. Also, both states have complex relations with Russia, have no control over part of their territory and are dependent on Russian energy resources, primarily gas and partly energy (Ib., pp. 70-71).

Armenia is one of the actors in the WBSR, and a strategic partner of Russia. Despite it, Armenia has been abused by its strategic partner, as it has agreed to sell the economy for a low price for oil and gas. For Russia, Armenia is a strategic stake in the fact that it has bought its energy production and transportation infrastructure.

Azerbaijan, the most important energy player in the South Caucasus, is subject, like the others in the region, to the actions of Russia, which has turned its energy policy into an instrument of domestic policy. Through these actions, Azerbaijan is being blackmailed into accepting the price of natural gas and oil imposed by Russia.

There is no unanimously accepted definition of the Black Sea area either in the political or in the scientific environment. The term *wider* is, we can say, recently introduced, and it is used especially related to the area geopolitical and geostrategic projections. Thus, we can say that the Wider Black Sea Region is influenced by other major actors such as the United States of America, the European Union and last but not least China.

CONCLUSIONS

Military power can be considered as a resource of political power or as an instrument that can be latter used in extreme circumstances (there have been many situations in the history of nations when the establishment and continuation of political power was based on the intervention of the military factor).

It should also be mentioned, however, that political power has sometimes become the prerogative of military power, becoming totally subordinated to military strategies.

Although the practice of national and international relations gives us sufficient arguments so that the military power could not be considered the absolute resource of the political one, we find it appropriate to point out that this is the normal trajectory of relations between the two forms of social power, with emphasis on the contribution of military power defending the democratic characteristics of political power.

The Black Sea region is an important area for both Europe and the United States of America, being a bridge between East and West in energy supply, but also a barrier against transnational threats. One of the main mechanisms for guaranteeing peace in this area is the internationalisation of the security process in the region.

It entails the use of the military instrument, of course in close cooperation with the efficient use of the diplomatic one, the political and military presence of NATO and allied states, for an efficient management of the asymmetric threats that manifest in the Black Sea area.

Because of the fact that the Caucasus and Central Asia represent the strategic energy corridor of Eurasia, the Black Sea plays and will continue to play a very important role in the strategy of reconfiguring the Eurasian space, in European and Euro-Atlantic vision.



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In the context of NATO's growing involvement in crisis management beyond the area of responsibility, the Black Sea basin and its adjacent area represent the Alliance's necessary and useful outpost in projecting stability and security throughout the region.

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It is obvious that the strategic value of the WBSA will continue to increase with the awareness of its real importance by all major geopolitical actors with interests in the area, determining the definition and application of policies specific to this area.

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COMPETITION FOR THE LEADERSHIP OF THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF DURING THE BALKAN CRISIS AND THE NEUTRALITY PERIOD (1912-1916)

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The study analyses the competition for the position of Chief of the General Staff during the Balkan crisis (1912-1913) and during Romania's neutrality (1914-1916). The position was very important and enjoyed an increased prestige, because it created the conditions for standing out on the battlefield and, implicitly, for winning military glory. Therefore, the number of competitors was quite high. However, the major decision-maker regarding the appointment of the Chief of the General Staff, which, during the war, was transformed into the General Headquarters, was the political factor, namely the ruling party and the king, who was "the head of the armed power".

The solution chosen at the beginning of the world conflict, which worked even after Romania entered the war, with General Vasile Zottu as Chief and General Dumitru Iliescu as Deputy Chief, actually leading the Romanian armed forces operations, was inefficient. The right person to lead the General Headquarters, namely General Constantin Prezan, was found only at the beginning of December 1916.

Keywords: General Staff; Ion I.C. Brătianu; European armed forces; Vasile Zottu; territorial resources;

INTRODUCTION

One of the components of the *revolution in military affairs* in the second half of the 19th century was the establishment of the *Staff* throughout the hierarchy, from unit to state level, at the top of the pyramid being the Great General Staff. At first, it had relatively limited responsibilities, but gradually, it was assigned new tasks, so it became an essential structure in the European armed forces organisation.

A very important role in the improvement of this structure was played by German Marshals Helmuth von Moltke (1800-1891) and Alfred von Schlieffen (1833-1913) in the second half of the same century (Black, 2004, pp. 115, 131-132). The former, also known as "*Moltke the Elder*", to distinguish from his nephew, played an active role just before and at the beginning of the "*Great War*", being Chief of the German Great General Staff between 1857 and 1888, making an essential contribution to the victories won by Prussia against Denmark (1864), Austria (1866), and France (1870-1871), which led to the Second German Reich (Droz, 2006, pp. 56-75). His work was continued by Alfred von Schlieffen, who held the mentioned position between 1891 and 1906, best known for the Plan of Attack on France (Schneider, 1964).

In essence, the General Staff was responsible for preparing the armed forces for war, planning combat and operations, while the main tasks of the relevant ministry were to build the armed forces structures as a whole and to provide them with all they needed to be successful on the battlefield.

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THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF ESTABLISHMENT AND ITS DEVELOPMENTS UP TO 1914

In the full process of modernisation after the first strong assertion on a modern battlefield, between 1877 and 1878, the Romanian army still felt the need of a staff-like central body, to ensure the successful coordination of the efforts to increase its effectiveness. A staff structure,



established on 12/24 November 1859 (*Monitorul Oastei*, 1860, pp. 322-325; Cioflină, 1994, pp. 77-78)¹, had been also functional up to that time. However, with all the legislative and institutional changes, it did not fully meet the requirements of the revolution in military affairs, which was in full swing in Europe, and of the new stage of evolution of the Romanian military body.

The mentioned shortcoming was addressed between 1882 and 1883, when it was adopted the legislation that led to the establishment of the Armed Forces Great General Staff, through the High Decree no. 2945, on 29 November/11 December 1882 (Cioflină, *ib.*, pp. 16-17, 87-97). The normative act stipulated that the new body was directly subordinated to the Ministry of War, and it was under the direction of the Chief of the Armed Forces General Staff. The responsibilities of the latter were established as follows:

- to study the issues related to the military organisation;
- to study and prepare the operations for war (troops mobilisation and concentration, logistics and auxiliary services – railway, post, telegraphy, information);
- to develop and update the map of the country;
- to study the geography and topography of foreign countries;
- to study the armed forces of different countries and to permanently analyse their military affairs.

A step forward was the promulgation, on 6/18 March 1883, of the *Law on Staff Service*, adopted by Parliament in the previous year. According to Colonel Ștefan Fălcoianu, the normative act concerned one of the most important services of the army, filled a gap in military legislation and had as its object the dissemination of military knowledge in the army, as well as the organisation, on a solid basis, of the most important service in any army, namely the *staff service* (*Apărarea națională și Parlamentul României*, 1992, p. 150).

The generous principles of this legislation, initiated under the leadership of Prime Minister Ion C. Brătianu, who was also the Ministry of War (1 August 1882-22 June 1884), were amended and, in many

¹ Through the High Order of the Day no. 83 on 12/24 November 1859, the ruler Alexandru Ioan Cuza established "*Corpul de Stat Major General al Principatelor Unite/the United Principalities General Staff Corps*", having responsibilities in the field of "*executing military technical works and other missions that required special military qualification*". Thus, 12 November is celebrated as the Day of the Defence Staff, the current name of the structure.

cases, even violated by the regulations of 1895 and 1909, as well as by the operating regulations of 1884, 1891, 1899 and 1912.

In this regard, by the *Regulation of 1891*, the Great General Staff formed a special superior directorate within the Ministry of War. In case of armed conflict, it had to be divided into a "*sedentary part*" and a "*mobile part*", which would later become the General Headquarters (Otu, 2009, p. 56).

In 1895, new amendments were made to the *Law on the Staff Service* of 1883. It was divided into three sections:

- a) the Army General Staff Service, executed by officers with special studies included in the Great General Staff;
- b) the Army Geographical and Topographical Service, executed by officers with special knowledge of geodesy and topography included into the Army Geographical Institute;
- c) the High Commands Staff Service.

Several other important changes concerning the improvement of the organisation and functioning of the Staff Service, the improvement of the staffing and of the level of training of the personnel were made by the *Law of 1909* and the *Rules of Procedure of 1912*. Thus, starting in 1909, the Staff Service had two components: the Great General Staff and the large units staffs. The selected officers were sent to the Great General Staff to follow a "*complementary staff course*". In 1912, a more detailed organisation of the Great General Staff for mobilisation was established, on the two echelons, as follows:

- a) the General Staff (in fact, the Great General Headquarters), the "*active part*", with the task of operatively leading the troops engaged in the conflict; it was placed as close as possible to the front and under the authority of the commander-in-chief of the army;
- b) the Great General Staff, the "*sedentary part*", which remained at the Ministry of War, exercising its authority over the interior area, with the mission to mobilise all territorial resources and to continuously supply, with people and materials, the troops in the area of operations.

The central administration became even more complicated following the establishment, at the Ministry of War, of Weapons Inspectorates (Directorates), which overlapped with the duties



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The position of Chief of the Great General Staff was a coveted one, being filled by a series of important personalities of the time, such as: Alexandru Cernat, Constantin Barozzi, Alexandru Carcalețeanu, Constantin Poenaru, Iacob Lahovary, Nicolae Tătărescu, Grigore Crăiniceanu.

of the Great General Staff (*Anuarul Armatei*, 1909, pp. 3-17)². Numerous committees and councils were added, such as: the Superior Council of the Army; the Committees of General Inspectors; advisory committees: of the General Staff, of the Infantry, Cavalry, Artillery, Engineer Troops, Navy, Health Service, Quartermaster, Armament, Military Education etc. (*Anuarul Armatei*, 1915, pp. 25-27). In addition, the General Secretariat of the relevant Ministry acquired increased importance, with a person close to the ruling party usually taking the lead.

The structure of the Central Military Administration was completed with the Army General Inspectorate, headed by Crown Prince Ferdinand. Under those conditions, many sources show the modest role that the Great General Staff played among governing bodies, as well as the fact that it was parasitised by other bodies created in the meantime. The conclusion was that *“the Great General Staff is unable to give due impetus to the preparation of the army for war”*. (*Armata Română în timpul ultimilor 40 de ani*, 1906, p. 34).

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THE BALKAN CRISIS

An event that increased the importance of the Staff Service was the Balkan crisis of 1912-1913. The First Balkan War took place between 25 September/8 October 1912 and 30 May/13 June 1913, the belligerents being the Ottoman Empire, on the one hand, and the Balkan League (Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, Montenegro), on the other hand (*A Concise History of the Balkan Wars 1912-1913*, 1998).

In the conflict, which ended with the victory of the Balkan allies, Romania maintained its neutrality, declaring that it would intervene if the balance of forces south of the Danube changed³. The critical

² 1st Directorate – Infantry, 2nd – Cavalry, 3rd – Artillery, 4th – Engineer Troops, 5th – Navy, 6th – Health Service, 7th – Quartermaster. Subsequently, there were added the 8th Directorate – Armament, and the 9th one – Military Schools.

³ Related to the position of Romania in the crisis see *Documente Diplomatice. Evenimentele din Peninsula Balcanică. Acțiunea României 20 septembrie 1912-1 august 1913* (1913). (The Green Book); Maiorescu, 1995; Zbucnea, 1999.

situation in the neighbourhood required extensive measures to strengthen the army, including an increased role of the Great General Staff, especially since, in the prospect of the intervention, it had the obligation to complete the strategic projects.

The Chief of the Great General Staff was General Alexandru Averescu, who took office on 18 November 1911, the relevant Minister being Nicolae Filipescu. His predecessor was General Vasile Zottu, but Filipescu preferred Averescu, although he had to overcome the opposition of his party colleague, Alexandru Marghiloman. He had a major role in removing Averescu from the office of Minister of War, accusing him, in an interpellation, of administrative irregularities (Otu, 2019, pp. 73-85)⁴. Practically, Marghiloman played the game of Ion I.C. Brătianu, who wanted to get rid of Averescu, whom he suspected of sympathising with Take Ionescu.

The Romanian-Bulgarian war in the summer of 1913 represented the first presence of the Romanian armed forces on a battlefield, after three and a half decades. General Alexandru Averescu was Chief of the Great General Staff⁵, and the Commander-in-Chief was Crown Prince Ferdinand (Parfeni, 1914; Petrescu, 1914; Lascarov-Moldoveanu, 1915; Otu, 2017). The campaign south of the Danube reflected the state of the armed forces, after a long period of peace, in which the reforms had neither the coherence nor the scale that were necessary to modernise them. Therefore, although no fighting took place, as Bulgaria capitulated, the Romanian large units emphasised a series of structural shortcomings in terms of organisation, equipment, staff training, troop training, health etc.

Alexandru Averescu performance was appreciated in different ways. Thus, some personalities that participated in the Campaign south of the Danube remarked the work power and energy of Alexandru Averescu: *“The only one who fulfilled his duty – as Constantin Argetoianu put it – was General Alexandru Averescu, the Chief of the Great General Staff, who did his best with the available resources”* (2008, p. 231).

⁴ Alexandru Marghiloman, in his memoirs (1927, pp. 85-87), provides details about the appointment of Averescu, who was persuaded to accept by Titu Maiorescu and Petre P. Carp. Filipescu appreciated that *“he could not work for the Ministry without Averescu”*, Marghiloman consenting with *“effusion”* and ensuring *“reciprocity”*.

⁵ The official name was Chief of the Staff Service.



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Nicolae Iorga, who was also in Bulgaria, assessed Alexandru Averescu in a positive way. Describing his unexpected visit to the 1st Army Corps Headquarters to get informed about the too rapid advance of the Romanian troops, the illustrious historian saw him as *“slim, slender, reduced to a known mathematical formula (...), as he is, he does not need rest and he does not have any other human needs”*. (1913, p. 174).

It was also Nicolae Iorga who, in *Memorii/Memoirs* (1934, p. 190), characterised him using laudatory terms: *“That whole action, the scientist wrote, was more like a trip (...) and the supreme leadership was entrusted to a man of great merit, whom I met for the first time, namely General Averescu, who was tall, extremely slim, bony, with a phosphoric look in his small, cold eyes, enchanting those who met and ensuring them that everything he did had to be done, and had to be done that way, with confidence in the final success. That unusual commander was for sure a skilled strategist and especially someone who could inspire the troops, although he lacked the appropriate voice, gesture, oratorical talent and warmth. A silhouette and warmth resembling that of Moltke, with the same exact calculation of all the possibilities, with the same indifference to everything around him”*. (ib.).

His opponents, not a few, especially those in the political area, but not only, criticised his strategic conception and the way he led the troops south of the Danube. It is worth mentioning the furious campaign carried out by the National Liberal Party and by some publications, such as *“Viitorul”* and *“Adevărul”*, against the armed forces and, implicitly, against Averescu.

As General Radu R. Rosetti wrote, the Liberal press campaign did much harm to the military. That is why he insisted on Ion I.C. Brătianu (the two were brothers-in-law), to put an end to the campaign. *“He invited me to his brother, Vintilă – wrote Radu R. Rosetti -, who also invited I.G. Duca. After a long discussion, I persuaded them to put an end to the campaign led by the Liberal press against the military, a campaign aimed at, according to Ion I.C. Brătianu, preventing N. Filipescu and General Averescu from returning as triumphant to Bucharest”*. (2020, p. 481).

NEUTRALITY. COMPETITORS FOR THE HIGH POSITION

After the end of the Balkan crisis, whose last act was the Peace of Bucharest (28 July/10 August 1913), the government led by Titu Maiorescu practically exhausted its resources. In addition to the Liberal campaign on the need for reform, a factor contributing to the loss of credibility was represented by the disputes within the Conservative camp. At the end of 1913, the Conservatives were forced to leave power (Iordache, 1972, pp. 259-271), the government being taken over by the Liberals, led by Ion I.C. Brătianu, who became, for the second time, Prime Minister (Mamina, Bulei, 1994, pp. 127-132).

The Prime Minister reserved for himself the leadership of the Ministry of War, one of the most important departments in any government. This situation was not new, as there were other cases in which the Prime Minister took over the Ministry of War. For example, former Liberal leader D.A. Sturdza, cumulated both positions, Prime Minister and Minister of War, between 11 February 1901 and 20 December 1904 (*Miniștrii apărării naționale*, 2012; Damean, 2013).

The solution had both advantages and disadvantages. Knowing well the state of the armed forces, Prime Minister Brătianu, participant in the Romanian-Bulgarian war, could drive, with the authority of the office, the reform process, which became a priority in the governance programme (Otu, 2015; *Armata României și politica națională*, 2015, pp. 44- 45). At the same time, given the multitude of responsibilities that a prime minister had, he had relatively little time to dwell in detail on such complex military issues. Under such conditions, he appointed Colonel Dumitru Iliescu, immediately promoted to the rank of General (14 March 1914), as the head of the General Secretariat of the relevant department. He thus became the most important person in the administration of the activities of the Ministry of War.

That high position was based on the friendship between the Prime Minister and General Iliescu. The circumstances of that very close connection were explained, after the war, by Dumitru Iliescu. During the meeting of the Senate on 13 June 1924, he emphasised: *“Statesmen, becoming a second lieutenant on 1 July 1886, ranking the first among my colleagues, as I also ranked while attending the School of military sons in Craiova, I introduced myself to illustrious stateman, Ion C. Brătianu, who became the interim Minister of War that year, on the occasion of leaving for France, on a five-year vacation,*



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On 1 April 1914, Vasile Zottu was appointed Chief of the Great General Staff. He was a capable general, from the Engineer Troops, who had distinguished himself in various functions, including in the construction of the Palace of the Military Circle in the Bucharest garrison. He had been placed on the reserve a few days ago, but he was reactivated and appointed Chief of the Great General Staff at the age of 61, being the oldest holder of this high position to date.

where I was going to attend the courses of the Polytechnic School of Paris and those of the School of Applied Artillery and Engineering from Fontainebleau. During the audience with the great Romanian man, among other recommendations, he told me to make friends in Paris with his son, Ionel, who was also a student of the Polytechnic School. That recommendation lies at the basis of the relationship with today's Prime Minister of the country and with the Brătianu brothers, because we were all students of the schools in Paris. The origin, therefore, of my friendship with the Brătianu brothers was a school camaraderie, and not a political affinity". (Iliescu, 1924, pp. 3-4).

Despite those clarifications, the high position in which Dumitru Iliescu was invested was due, in large part, to the old friendship between the two. But not entirely. Ionel Brătianu participated in the armed forces Campaign south of the Danube as a reserve officer and came to the conclusion that the general corps had a low value. Therefore, he wanted the position to be filled by a younger and loyal man who would be able to carry out the great reforms in the military field. The option was Dumitru Iliescu. He was a capable, energetic military, but he was not an outstanding figure. In addition, being young and reaching a high position, coveted by many others, older in rank, he did not enjoy much sympathy among the officer corps.

The solution at the level of the Great General Staff was equally debatable. As it was known that the Liberals would come to power, in order not to risk a dismissal from them, Alexandru Averescu resigned from the position of Chief of the Great General Staff, taking over the command of the 1st Army Corps whose headquarters were in Craiova. Colonel, later General, Constantin Christescu, deputy chief of the structure until that date, was appointed ad-interim to lead the Great General Staff (Cătănici, 2014, p. 113).

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and his age, General Zottu was not the most suitable solution, and his role gradually became increasingly weak, ending up in being the nominal head of the structure.

The outbreak of the world conflagration on 15/28 July 1914, by the attack of Austria-Hungary on Serbia, accentuated the competition for the leadership of the Great General Staff, many considering that the option for Vasile Zottu was provisional in view of Romania's entry into the conflict. However, at the outbreak of hostilities, the structure of the central administration of the Ministry of War remained the same: Minister – Ion I.C. Brătianu, Secretary General – Dumitru Iliescu, Chief of the Great General Staff – General Vasile Zottu.

In regard to the competitors for the high position, one of them was General Alexandru Averescu, although, as I have mentioned, he did not enjoy the appreciation of Prime Minister Brătianu. But he had illusions. On 18 July 1914, he noted: *"It was written to me, in particular, that I would be destined to command an army. A few days ago, the idea was revisited. By not appointing or assigning another, I assume that I will be replaced with General Zottu and appointed Chief of the Great General Staff"*. (1937, p. 12).

He thought it was rational, but the prospect of working with Prince Ferdinand again did not please him at all. However, as it results from his notes, the permanent ties with the Conservative leaders Nicu Filipescu, Take Ionescu, Ionaș Grădișteanu (Ib., pp. 34, 38, 66-67, 71, 82, 138) and others nurtured his hopes for that dignity, especially in the prospect of a national union government.

On 17 February 1915, General Iliescu noted that, according to Lieutenant-Colonel Ion Rășcanu, Chief of the Operations Section within the Great General Staff, *"Averescu went to Nicu Filipescu and asked him to appoint him Chief of the Great General Staff, in case a national government was formed. Averescu told it to Arghirescu, too, who repeated it to Rășcanu; the latter seemed sincere when he was against that appointment, given his character and the fact that those we had prepared for a year in B hypothesis were unknown to him"*. (Biblioteca Națională a României, p. 96).

Alexandru Averescu did not fulfil his dream of being, again, Chief of the Great General Staff. When the war was declared, he was appointed Commander of the 2nd Army, which he commanded except for a short period, when he led the group of forces that organised the manoeuvre



Alexandru Averescu did not fulfil his dream of being, again, Chief of the Great General Staff. When the war was declared, he was appointed Commander of the 2nd Army, which he commanded except for a short period, when he led the group of forces that organised the manoeuvre in Flămânda, according to his own conception, until the end of January 1918, when he was appointed Prime Minister of the country.



Another contender for the position of Chief of the Great General Staff/the Great General Headquarters was General Constantin Christescu, Deputy Chief at that time. He did not enjoy favourable appreciations from some politicians, such as Nicolae Filipescu, who considered him superficial and theoretical as a military man. There were many others who considered that he also suffered the consequences of his character flaws, and his options were directed towards Germany, at least in the first phase of the world conflict.

in Flămânda, according to his own conception, until the end of January 1918, when he was appointed Prime Minister of the country. The cold relations with King Ferdinand, dating back to the Campaign south of the Danube, the adversity of Ionel Brătianu, the animosities of some generals prevented him from reaching the position he most wanted and considered most suitable for him.

General Radu R. Rosetti, in his *Mărturisiri/Confessions*, made a characterisation of the potential chiefs of the Great General Staff in case of hostilities. Regarding Alexandru Averescu, he noted that *“he was supported by Take Ionescu and Nicu Filipescu, but he did not enjoy the confidence of the King, nor of Brătianu, nor of many generals and senior officers. In fact, he did not want to be the King’s Chief of Staff, but he did not consider that the position of commander-in-chief did not suit him. Of course, Averescu had military knowledge, he knew the staff service well. I am, after much thought, of the opinion that far removed from certain political influences and with a leader who knew how to impose his will, he could have been an acceptable chief of staff. As he was in the circumstances of the time, he pointed out that his best definition was that given by one of [Joseph Rudyard] Kipling’s soldiers⁶ to Marshal Lord Wolseley⁷, a definition that, freely translated, would be: he was looking with one eye at the influential political circles and with the other eye at his own blessed person”*. (Rosetti, lb., p. 587).

Another contender for the position of Chief of the Great General Staff/the Great General Headquarters (in wartime, the sedentary part maintaining the name in peacetime) was General Constantin Christescu, Deputy Chief at that time (Stroea, Ghinoiu, 2016). He did not enjoy favourable appreciations from some politicians, such as Nicolae Filipescu, who considered him superficial and theoretical as a military man (Biblioteca Națională a României, pp. 18-19). There were many others who considered that he also suffered the consequences of his character flaws (lb. p. 91, 205), and his options were directed towards Germany, at least in the first phase of the world conflict.

⁶ Joseph Rudyard Kipling (1865-1936). British poet and novelist, recipient of the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1907. He is famous for the *“Jungle Book”* (1894).

⁷ Garnet Joseph Wolseley (1833-1913) was an Anglo-Irish officer in the British Army who became a Field Marshal. He was one of the most influential and admired British generals after his military successes in the Crimean War, Sudan, Egypt, Burma etc. Between 1895 and 1900 he was the Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces.

Radu R. Rosetti characterised him as follows: *“He was better prepared than Iliescu, from a strategic, tactical point of view, and as a staff officer, not from other points of view. He was attributed some flexibility of character and did not enjoy the confidence of the decision-makers. Being a young general, he would have had against him, like Iliescu, the jealousy and bad will of many generals. I repeat that, from a purely operative point of view, I consider that he was superior to Iliescu and, like Averescu, with a commander-in-chief knowing how to impose his will, he could have brought services”*. (Rosetti, lb.).

A surprising contender for the leadership of the Great General Staff was General Grigore Crăiniceanu, who had previously been both Minister of War and Chief of the Great General Staff, but who was retiring, leaving the armed forces after the 1913 Campaign. In October 1915, after the great defeats of the Russian armed forces in the summer, Ionel Brătianu approved General Crăiniceanu’s departure to Russia, in order to analyse the state of the Russian armed forces and persuade the officials in Petrograd to attack Bulgaria with sufficient forces (Biblioteca Națională a României, f. 231).

But, on 5 October 1915, he set some conditions, the most important of which was that, upon mobilisation, he would be given the command of the General Staff (lb., p. 232). After the defeat at Turtucaia, General Crăiniceanu was appointed Commander of the 2nd Army, replacing Alexandru Averescu, appointed first Commander of the 2nd Army, then Commander of the Army Group that bore his name, which organised the famous manoeuvre from Flămânda. General Crăiniceanu did not confirm, so he was replaced, Averescu returning to the command of the 2nd Army, after the failure of crossing the Danube.

There were different opinions about General Crăiniceanu personality and activity. He was one of the most important military theorists of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the works on fortifications being very solid from a scientific point of view (Otu, Oroian, Emil, 1997, pp. 129- 135). General Gheorghe Dabija, who was his Chief Cabinet Secretary during his term as Chief of the Great General Staff and Minister of War, greatly appreciated him in his *Amintiri/Memoirs* (2020, pp. 187-193). Other appreciations are more nuanced, some even critical. Thus, I.G. Duca wrote that the appointment of Crăiniceanu as Commander of the 2nd Army was a mistake: *“I was, alongside Brătianu, part of Crăiniceanu’s headquarters in 1913, the illustrious memorialist*



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At the beginning of March 1916, it was established the armed forces order of battle, which was to become operational once Romania entered the war. Gheorghe Dabija, at that time Commander of the 2nd Hunters Battalion, which guarded the Royal Palace, found out that General Dumitru Iliescu would lead the Great General Staff, either from the position of General Vasile Zottu Deputy or as direct chief of the institution.

noted, and we could easily see that he was more than peculiar; he had a pathological nervousness, he was inconsistent in decisions, he lacked solicitude for his troop, he was brutal towards the officers, which frightened us. We both returned from Bulgaria with the feeling that General Crăiniceanu should not be entrusted with any command, because he is absolutely incapable of fulfilling such a significant and delicate mission". (Duca, 1981, p. 27).

General Dumitru Iliescu, the Secretary General of the Ministry of War, was knocking at the gates of the position of Chief of the Great General Staff. He was in the most favourable position for this honourable post. He was the right hand of Prime Minister Brătianu and enjoyed his friendship, he had managed the preparation of the army for war, knowing in detail all the issues, including those of strategic planning, he had enough connections among politicians, primarily liberals. His *Însemnări/Notes* from 1914-1916 show that one of his main concerns in those years was to block the aspirations of generals in the top echelon of the armed forces to be appointed as Chiefs of the Great General Staff.

There were also numerous objections to his appointment. One of them, unusual, belongs to Gheorghe Dabija. At the beginning of March 1916, it was established the armed forces order of battle, which was to become operational once Romania entered the war. Gheorghe Dabija, at that time Commander of the 2nd Hunters Battalion, which guarded the Royal Palace, found out that General Dumitru Iliescu would lead the Great General Staff, either from the position of General Vasile Zottu Deputy or as direct chief of the institution. Such a prospect worried him, as neither of them had the qualities necessary for this high and decisive position. "I did not see General Zottu at all, Dabija noted, as the Chief of Staff for Operations. He was, of course, an educated man, perhaps a good officer in the Engineer Troops, but nothing more".

As for General Iliescu, he "was a very educated man, he had vast general knowledge, he was a good technician and mathematician, he was brilliantly intelligent, with a good memory, he could talk about varied subjects, lively and spiritually, having a vivid sense of humour. He was appreciated for the qualities of his soul, ready to owe, but not always to the value of the solicitor. So, he had multiple qualities as a soldier and a man, but I did not see him as a strategist at all".

Based on those assessments, which were based on a permanent contact with the would-be chiefs and a very good knowledge

of the situation of the Romanian armed forces and the command corps, Lieutenant Colonel Dabija tried to prevent the appointment. He requested an audience with General Iliescu to persuade him to give up his intention. During the audience, Dabija suggested that he should apply for the position of Minister of War, filled at that time by Ion Brătianu, Prime Minister. The suggestion was based on the consideration that, in his capacity as Secretary General, Iliescu was a factotum of the Ministry. The answer received was disappointing, General Iliescu being sharp: "But for what? I want to be the Chief of the Great General Staff, and the war against Austria-Hungary will go like butter. Can you imagine a hot knife dipped into butter? Know that this is how we will go to Buda-Pest".

Lieutenant Colonel Dabija tried to convince him that such a prospect was unlikely, as the German armed forces would intervene, which, even though they were exhausted (at that time, the bloody Battle of Verdun was in full swing), would not allow for the flank of the Austro-Hungarian armed forces to be reversed.

The arguments did not convince General Iliescu. He asked Dabija who would be the most entitled generals to access that position. He made the imprudence to name Alexandru Averescu and Constantin Christescu.

General Iliescu concluded that Lieutenant Colonel Dabija was part of a conspiracy designed to prevent him from achieving his goal. King Ferdinand had repeatedly asked Iliescu to go to Craiova, the Headquarters of the 1st Army Corps, to extinguish the older conflict with Averescu. According to Iliescu, Lieutenant Colonel Dabija was behind such a requirement. "Now I understand the matter, said the general, you have spoken to the Prince [Dabija was commanding the 2nd Hunters Battalion at that time, and Crown Prince Carol, having the rank of Captain, was the Commander of the 1st Company – A.N.], he spoke to the king and he was influenced by an intrigue".

The strong denials of Dabija, who told him that the initiative was purely personal, without any hidden thought, had no result, General Iliescu being convinced that he went behind his back. The result of his outrage was the removal of Lieutenant Colonel Dabija from the list of officers to possibly be promoted in rank on 1 April 1916 (Dabija, lb., pp. 354-357).



SOLUTION. DUMITRU ILIESCU – “NAPOLEON OF ROMANIA”

On 7 August 1916, Averescu met Nicolae Filipescu, who informed him “that Iliescu will not be the Chief of Staff. He himself replied that he was giving up. And this seems like a farce to me, but in any case, if not Iliescu, who will be? Zottu? Iliescu also told me at the ministry, some time ago, that he was not thinking of going to the G.G.H. I told him that he would do very well, but I knew for sure that it would be different and it was different”. (Biblioteca Națională a României, p. 239).

Indeed, General Iliescu won the competition, being the best placed for the position of Chief of the Great General Staff. However, it was a partial victory, as Brătianu, taking into account the opposition among the military as well as among some politicians, appointed him Deputy Chief, in the first phase. In reality, General Iliescu led the actions of the Romanian armed forces in the first months of the campaign, General Zottu remaining nominally head of the structure.

In historiography, there have been a lot of discussions about the Prime Minister’s decision to keep General Zottu in office and appoint General Iliescu as Deputy Chief of the Great General Staff (General Headquarters). Naturally, several hypotheses were issued. One of them was that such a situation allowed the Brătianu-Iliescu couple to totally control the situation. A second one derived from the difficult relations of the Romanian government with the belligerent camps and, in particular, with the Triple Alliance. General Zottu was allegedly suspected of having links with the Central Powers, and he was also on Gunther’s famous list including political and military leaders, journalists etc. who were massively financed (corrupted). Brătianu kept Zottu as he did not want to generate a new conflict with the Central Powers.

His personality was differently appreciated. Radu Rosetti considered him “well-intentioned, having a very developed sense of honour, as he proved by his suicide, after the Turtucaia disaster”. (Rosetti, lb., p. 587).

King Ferdinand found General Zottu inefficient in his position as Chief of the Great General Staff (Biblioteca Națională a României, p. 98). Nicolae Filipescu was of the same opinion, the Conservative leader calling him “Zottu’s dummy” (lb., p. 151).

General Iliescu’s performance as, first *de facto* and then *de jure*, Chief of the Great General Headquarters was far from meeting the requirements of the high position, although his entourage

congratulated him with the nickname “Napoleon” of Romania. Not having a thorough training as a staff officer, surrounded by a clientele that he cultivated during the campaign, maintaining the same lifestyle, which scandalised many in those hard times⁸, without a constant behaviour during hardships, “torn”, as I.G. Duca put it, by a part of the corps of generals and senior officers, faced with the adversity of some politicians⁹, General Iliescu failed.

Radu Rosetti, who supported his appointment as Chief of the Great General Headquarters, also came to regret the decision: “I have to say, wrote Rosetti, that very soon Iliescu showed that he was smart, educated, kind-hearted, he was a wonderful teacher, a valuable technician, and a good administrator of needs; however, he was neither a strategist nor a technician, as he was not at all fully acquainted with the execution of the staff service in war. For me, it was a great disappointment, the greater it became, the more illusions I had”. (Rosetti, lb., p. 588).

Therefore, his change from the position became inevitable, being replaced with General Constantin Prezan, which was a wise decision, even if it generated the dissatisfaction of some, among whom General Averescu stood out (Otu, 2009, pp. 103-106).

General Iliescu asked to remain in the country and command a large unit, but Brătianu sent him to Paris, as a representative of the Great General Headquarters, which accentuated the criticism of some confreres, who had proof that he was the Prime Minister’s protégé.

Some memoirists and historians blamed the failure of the 1916 Campaign on the mistakes of General Iliescu both during the neutrality period, being considered the main person responsible for training the armed forces, and during the unfortunate campaign of August-November 1916. In other words, they turned him into “Scapegoat”, which was a big exaggeration. Of course, he did not rise to the expectations, but the geopolitical and geostrategic situation in which

⁸ Among others, he continued to organise and take part in parties with his friends; moreover, he brought his mistress to Periș, where the Great General Headquarters was established.

⁹ One of the greatest critics of Dumitru Iliescu activity was Nicolae Filipescu. Constantin Argetoianu appreciated that Ionel Brătianu had employed his Secretary General to manipulate Filipescu, to moderate his public declarations in favour of immediately entering the war (According to Constantin Argetoianu, *op. cit.*, p. 373). Following Romania’s entering the war and the first failures, Nicolae Filipescu exploded with rage in relation to Dumitru Iliescu activity (According to Polizu-Micșunești, 1936, pp. 189, 239, 248,262, 264-265, 268).



General Iliescu’s performance as, first de facto and then de jure, Chief of the Great General Headquarters was far from meeting the requirements of the high position, although his entourage congratulated him with the nickname “Napoleon” of Romania. Not having a thorough training as a staff officer, surrounded by a clientele that he cultivated during the campaign, maintaining the same lifestyle, which scandalised many in those hard times, without a constant behaviour during hardships, “torn”, as I.G. Duca put it, by a part of the corps of generals and senior officers, faced with the adversity of some politicians, General Iliescu failed.



Romania found itself, caught between the two belligerent coalitions, the state of the Romanian economy, preponderantly agrarian, the great shortcomings in the armed forces, accumulated for decades, the Allies failure in meeting the obligations assumed by the Convention of 4/17 August 1916, the difficult relations with the Russian ally, the unfavourable moment of entering the conflict etc., all those made Romania a safe victim in front of the German armed forces and German allies. With or without Iliescu, the result was the same. Obviously, some episodes could have been avoided, such as the humiliating defeat at Turtucaia, but, overall, victory was very problematic.

CONCLUSIONS

The Great General Staff gradually increased its role and importance in all superior military leadership structures. In the years 1912-1916, it became an indispensable instrument in the preparation of the armed forces, in the prospect of Romania's entry into the "Great War". The position of Chief of the Great General Staff acquired an increasing prestige, being coveted by many generals, more or less entitled. Thus, a fierce competition was launched to occupy it, which consumed a lot of energy, which could be better directed towards raising the level of staff and troop training.

The decisive role in the designation of the occupant of the honorary chair belonged to the political factor, respectively to the ruling party and to the King, who was, according to the Constitution of 1866, "the head of the armed power". The choice did not necessarily take into account the meritocratic criteria, the education, training and qualities of the nominee, but other subjective aspects. It proves that, in Romania, at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, but not only, the "military" model and not the "militarist" one worked, to quote a phrase of Alfred Vagt.

According to Samuel Huntington, one of the important theorists of civil-military relations, the fundamental problem is the relationship between the professional military elite and the political power, between the military power group and the civilian authority group. Thus, the competitors for the position of Chief of the Great General Staff, well understanding this reality, made efforts to be in the grace of the political leaders in office, this being the essential condition for them to meet their goal.

During the Balkan crisis, Alexandru Averescu, well trained professionally, was close to Conservative circles, which facilitated his path to the high office, in which he tried to serve as well as possible. During the two years of neutrality (1914-1916), the solution chosen by the National Liberal Party, especially by Ion I.C. Brătianu, did not prove viable, General Vasile Zottu being only nominally the Chief of the Great General Staff.

The appointment of General Dumitru Iliescu, a friend of the Prime Minister, as Deputy Chief of the Great General Headquarters, was one with unfortunate implications on the conduct of the 1916 Campaign, without decisively influencing the outcome of the confrontations.

The election of capable military leaders thus fell under the political elite, and any mistake in this regard had dramatic consequences on the battlefield. The "Iliescu experiment" in the autumn of 1916 proved it abundantly. The same happened in France, with the "Robert Nivelle" solution (Dictionnaire de la Grande Guerre, 2008, pp. 741-743, 759-760).

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LEGISLATIVE MEASURES TAKEN DURING THE RULE OF ALEXANDRU IOAN I REGARDING THE ORGANISATION OF THE ROMANIAN MILITARY SYSTEM – CASE STUDY: PERMANENT ARMY AND TERRITORIAL ARMY –

Ion RÎȘNOVEANU, PhD

“Regele Ferdinand I” National Military Museum

In the current, highly unpredictable context, in which the great powers want to preserve their economic, political, cultural and military influences, and the regional powers seek to receive an as comfortable as possible place at the table of the powerful ones, there is still a dilemma for which military strategies do not have a definitive answer: territorial troops versus professional forces. The two concepts are found, in specific forms, in the Romanian military terminology, as well as in the legislation approved in order to modernise the Romanian military body ever since the time of Prince Alexandru Ioan I (Alexandru Ioan Cuza).

In the first years of the establishment of the modern Romanian Army, the political factors, but especially the military ones, with decision-making power, enacted the organisation of the Romanian armed power, introducing modern doctrinal concepts, starting, however, from the traditional military doctrine, according to which the national territory of the country is defended by the entire people. Thus, during the reign of Alexandru Ioan I, the main components of the Romanian Army were the permanent army, with its reserve forces, the territorial army, as well as the militias, which included, without being paid special importance, the city guard and the crowds.

Keywords: Romanian Army; permanent troops; territorial troops, recruitment; armed power;

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INTRODUCTION. ORGANISATION OF THE ARMIES OF THE TWO DANUBE PRINCIPALITIES DURING THE ORGANIC REGULATIONS PERIOD

The modernisation and adaptation of the Romanian military body to the economic, political and, especially, military context were basic concerns for Romanian political and military decision-makers. The need to build a strong army, able to face any challenges, internal and external ones, as well as to defend Romania's legitimate interests, both on land and at sea, was taken into account, regardless of the historical period and the political orientation. Thus, even from the time of the Organic Regulations reigns, major measures were taken regarding the development of the permanent army, but also the adaptation of the territorial military formations to the needs of that period.

In accordance with the provisions of the Romanian doctrine of defence of the territories of the Danube Principalities, the decision made was to recruit all men that could carry a weapon, in order both to stop a possible armed aggression and to maintain order within the territory (*Istoria militară a poporului român*, 1987, pp. 284).

After the end of the Romanian Revolution of 1848-1849, political and military decision-makers from the two Principalities came to the conclusion that the permanent troops, the main category of the two Romanian armies, had neither the human resources nor the necessary equipment to carry out the missions to defend their territories, in an extremely volatile international context, in which the divergences between the Great Powers, which sought to divide or, as the case may be, to redistribute the spheres of influence in Europe, especially in the Peninsula, grew more and more until they reached the phase of military conflict, especially in the Balkan area and at the mouths of the Danube (Ib., p. 288).

Therefore, in the second half of the 19th century, in the Romanian area, two theoretical concepts were developed, materialised, at the beginning, reluctantly, namely the *national guard* or the *civic guard*, as well as the *home guards*¹ *regiments*, the basis for the future territorial

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¹ In Romanian, *dorobanți*.

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MILITARY HISTORY



The double election of Colonel Alexandru Ioan I (Alexandru Ioan Cuza) as ruler of Moldavia and Wallachia, in January 1859, followed by an intense diplomatic campaign for its recognition by the Great Powers of Europe, marked the beginning of concrete actions taken by the Romanian political and military authorities in order to strengthen the new status of the United Principalities.

army. According to those who proposed these new structures in the army organisation, they had to be made up of men who could carry weapons, but were not part of the permanent army. Obviously, the aim was not to disband the permanent army, but to bring under arms all able-bodied men, capable of fighting and mobilisation, in order to create as much combat power as possible in case of war.

A first stage of the process of modernisation and reorganisation of the permanent army was represented by the period after the suppression of the Revolution of 1848-1849, when the conditions imposed by the Ottoman Empire, as a suzerain power, limited its powers to perform administrative, internal tasks and those regarding the cordon sanitaire. These missions were officially recognised by art. 43 of the Paris Convention of August 1858, which provided that “militias must reunite whenever internal security or border security is threatened”. (România la 1859, 1984, p. 288).

The need to strengthen the fighting capacity of the armies of the two Danube Principalities, at the beginning of the second half of the 19th century, determined the development and expansion of the attributions of territorial troops, which were meant to relieve the permanent army of some administrative tasks. These formations also had to receive proper military training to increase combat in the event of external aggression.

THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT REGARDING THE ROMANIAN ARMY ORGANISATION DURING THE RULE OF ALEXANDRU IOAN I. THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL CONCEPTS

The double election of Colonel Alexandru Ioan I (Alexandru Ioan Cuza) as ruler of Moldavia and Wallachia, in January 1859, followed by an intense diplomatic campaign for its recognition by the Great Powers of Europe, marked the beginning of concrete actions taken by the Romanian political and military authorities in order to strengthen the new status of the United Principalities.

Given that not all European powers agreed to the personal union of Colonel Cuza, it was necessary to take immediate measures to unify, reform and modernise the Romanian military body, the main tool for safeguarding the young Romanian state. Thus, the legislation and the existence, de facto and de jure, of a system of defence intended to ensure both the order within the borders and the protection

of legitimate interests in the event of an external attack were required, inter alia, by the existence prior to the 1859 Act, as well as the connections between the two fundamental structures of the Romanian military body, respectively the *permanent army* and the *territorial army*.

A first step was represented by the measures taken at the level of the Ministry of War to standardise the units and subunits of the two Danube Principalities, which would have implicitly led to the standardisation of the act of command and training both in Moldova and in Wallachia. In this respect, the *Order of the Day on the entire Army* no. 11 of 10 January 1860, signed by General Ioan Emanoil Florescu, as Minister of War, clearly stipulated the organisation of companies within a battalion in the organisation of a regiment, as follows: in Battalion 1, companies received numbers from 1 to 4, while in Battalion 2, the companies were numbered from 5 to 8. Also, companies 1 and 5 of each battalion were organised as subunits of grenadiers (*Monitorul Oastei*, 1861, no. 3, p. 36).

Given the volatility of the domestic and international context, in which the Great European Powers continued to raise economic, political and military claims on the territories of the Balkan Peninsula, Romanian military decision-makers reaffirmed the principle of the *armed nation* at the basis of the Romanian military system. It took into account the experience of the armed forces of the Great Powers which, at the end of the 19th century, adopted a military system that focused on the *permanent army* and a *reserve force* that could be mobilised as soon as possible. Also, in case of war, but also in peacetime, a *public force* acted to maintain order within the borders. And, last but not least, an important role was given to the *military establishments*, respectively to the Officers' School and to the cultural institutions which ensured a high degree of education of the officers (Id., no. 4, p. 63).

Good theorists, but also fine connoisseurs of the organisation of the military structures of the Great European Powers, the Romanian staff officers were aware of the importance of the permanent army. Thus, this institution, the most important structure of the national military body, provided the troops with “*the military training needed which cannot be obtained without it*” (Ib.). In order to modernise and strengthen the fighting capacity of the permanent army, in 1860, the Bucharest Electoral Assembly adopted the *Provisional Law on Army Recruitment*, ratified by the ruler, which introduced the obligation to fulfil military service by all citizens of the country, regardless of the social class to which they belonged (Id., 1860, no. 45, p. 773).



ROMANIAN
MILITARY
THINKING

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Another component of the Romanian military body, the second most important, was represented by the territorial troops. They consisted of troops working in shift, home guards and border guards, as well as gendarmes and servants and came to the attention of the ruler who, in 1860, considered that "the armed power of a country must be organised as in the old days, namely divided in regular army and militia".

In a speech for the inhabitants of Moldavia, Mihail Kogălniceanu, one of the most active promoters of the modernisation of Romania and, implicitly, of the Romanian Army, showed that, "... according to the Law of 25 July 1860, our army, like a true national army, will be made up of the sons of the country of all ranks, be they rich or poor; townspeople or villagers. From now on, recruitment has to be done by drawing lots, as it is done in all free countries, where justice is justice". (Ib.). Thus, through this normative act, young people were generally recruited through a somewhat cumbersome procedure, called *conscriptio*, more precisely annual calls by drawing lots. However, in order to complete the troop requirements for all corps, the enlistment of volunteers was encouraged. In this sense, on 15 February 1861, General Ioan Emanoil Florescu, Minister of War, signed the *Order of the Day on the entire Army no. 45*, by which the corps commanders could receive, "without referring to the Ministry, all the volunteers who present themselves to be enlisted in their Regiments, but guarding the conditions of nationality, skills and age set out in *Order of the Day no. 90 of 16 May the previous year*". (Id., *Monitorul Oastei*, 1861, no. 11, pp. 164; 175)².

This measure was taken in the conditions in which, at the order of the ruler, the modernisation of the military power represented a constant of the policy on national defence. That is why special attention was paid to the permanent army, around which all the other components of the Romanian military body were to be developed. Aware that the national will alone was not enough to modernise the army, Prince Alexandru Ioan I ordered the Minister of War, in December 1860, to supplement "...the cadres, take care of the equipment and, if necessary, go even above the numbers provided in the budget. Today, the country has its national flag, the Romanians will gather around it to defend it". (*Monitorul Oficial al Țării Românești*, 1860, no. 291, p. 1385).

Another component of the Romanian military body, the second most important, was represented by the *territorial troops*. They consisted of troops working in *shifts*, home guards and border guards, as well as gendarmes and *servants* and came to the attention of the ruler who, in 1860, considered that "the armed power of a country must be organised as in the old days, namely divided in regular army and militia" (*Monitorul Oastei*, 1860, no. 6, p. 81). Taking into account

² Another way to supplement corps strength was represented by the reengagement of those who already fulfilled the military service, being permitted for a period between two and four years.

this component of the Romanian Army, the military factors with decision-making power considered it necessary to generalise it throughout the United Principalities, especially since 1864, when the institution of *region servants in Moldova* was abolished. Thus, by Order no. 892 of 24 July 1864, in Moldova also there were organised the home guards troops, and by Order no. 893 of the same day, the bases of the border guard units were laid (Id., 1864, no. 18, pp. 351-354; 357).

The reorganisation and modernisation of the Romanian Army required, in addition to the human and material effort of the Romanian authorities, an approach that would enable the development of the Romanian military body in a favourable legislative framework. Therefore, aware of the importance of the laws, the Romanian staff officers, under the coordination of the Minister of War, actively participated in the drafting of the *Law for the organisation of armed power in Romania*, which was ratified by the ruler by High Decree no. 1680 of 27 November 1864 (Id., No. 27, p. 455). This was the most important legislative act adopted during the reign of Colonel Alexandru Ioan Cuza regarding the organisation of the Romanian Army and the crystallisation of a national defence doctrine, given that the Great European Powers made economic, political and military efforts to attract the young state of Romania in their sphere of influence.

It is interesting that, from the first articles of the law, references were made to the organisation of the Romanian defence system starting both from the tradition of the fight of the entire people and from the needs of an insecure domestic and international context, in which Romania was forced to create a strong army, always capable of defending the legitimate interests of the country. Thus, in chapter 1, *Basics of organisation*, art. 1, it is clearly specified that "The armed power in Romania comprises two elements: 1. The permanent army with its reserve force and 2. The militias composed of border guards, home guards and their reserve troops" (Ib.).

Art. 2 referred to the period in which the military service was fulfilled. Thus, in accordance with the provisions of the law, "All Romanians and those who became Romanians citizens, from the age of 20 to 50, are called to take up arms as follows: from the age of 20 to 26, in the standing army and militias, border guards and home guards". Also, art. 3 provided the way in which young people served under arms, maintaining the system of drawing lots that, although difficult, was considered effective, given that political decision-makers in Bucharest wanted to eliminate social inequalities and strengthen



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the military body through the participation of all citizens. Thus, according to this article, “all young people, in the year they have reached the age of 20, draw the lots for the numbers necessary for the annual quota and go to the permanent army, namely, four years in the permanent army, and two years in the reserve force” (Ib.). It is interesting that, in this law, the inhabitants of the border localities did not participate in the actual recruitment, because they served in the border guard units (Ib., pp. 455-456).

MISSIONS OF THE MILITIAS AND THE PERMANENT ARMY

A special place among the provisions of this law was occupied by the *militias*, to which the legislator dedicated the entire chapter III. Thus, art. 49 clearly stated that they were composed of *border guards* and *home guards*. Good connoisseurs of the military system, the Romanian staff officers proposed, and the two Chambers of the Parliament approved, that the inhabitants of the border communes should be part of the Border Guard Corps. As in the case of the permanent army, the border guards also fulfilled their military service for a period of six years, more precisely two years in the active service and four years in the reserve forces, as it results from art. 51 (Ib.).

As part of the militia, the home guards played a significant role in the Romanian military body. That is why, art. 52 provided that this corps should consist of “all young men aged 20-26 whom where not drawn by lots to serve in the permanent army” (Ib.). As in the case of the border guards, the military service was performed by home guards for a period of six years, respectively two years in active service and four years in reserve.

As the home guards generally carried out law enforcement missions throughout the country, they were given special attention in terms of organisation. Thus, in accordance with art. 53, “the home guards form as many squadrons as there are districts, the Staffs of the squadrons and battalions residing in the district capital” (Ib.). The law also established that “those young people with the means to own and maintain horses” would be part of the squadrons of mounted home guards. It is interesting that those home guards who “will be take up the duty to equip themselves with their means” would serve half the period of activity (Ib., P. 462).

The same article stipulated that, “in the event that, in the annual quota, there will not be enough young people with means to maintain horses, the communes will contribute to their purchase” (Ib.).

In the chapter *General provisions*, the legislator stipulated, in art. 58, that, “in extraordinary cases, the Government may call under arms, under a Royal Ordinance, persons aged 17-20 and 26-50 years also”. In art. 60, the Ministry of War wanted that, in case of concentration of troops, militia regiments and *assembled classes* could form Large Units with the strength of a brigade with regiments from the permanent army (Ib., pp. 462-463).

Law for the organisation of the armed power in Romania was followed, as it was natural, by the *Law for the Army recruitment*, promulgated by Alexandru Ioan I by the High Decree no. 1727 of 5 December 1864 (Ib., 1864, no. 28, pp. 474 ff.). In principle, the *Law for the Army recruitment* resumed the provisions of the *Law for the organisation of armed power in Romania* regarding the principles that formed the basis of the Romanian military doctrine from the second half of the 19th century, respectively the participation of the whole nation in the efforts to defend Romania. Also in the case of this legislative step, the legislator, starting from the point of view expressed by the Ministry of War, substantiated the compulsory military service for all Romanian men, the recruitment being done by *calls or enlistments of good will, according to the prescribed laws, except for extraordinary cases*. Also, art. 2 of this law provided that the fulfilment of the compulsory military service was conditioned by the possession of Romanian citizenship: *No one will be allowed to serve Romanian troops unless he is Romanian; any individual born in Romania by foreign parents will be subject to the duties imposed by this law, as soon as he is admitted to enjoy the rights given to him by his naturalisation. However, foreigners living in the country, and who will not be subject to foreign protection, will also be subject to recruitment* (Ib., P. 479).

Starting from the fact that the permanent army, the most important structure within the Romanian military body, had as main mission the defence of the national territory of Romania, the political and military decision-makers in Bucharest created new theoretical and practical concepts regarding the role the territorial army had to have, more precisely the militias, a secondary element in the national defence system. Thus, normally, these concepts had to be found in the related legislation, reason for which Alexandru Ioan I signed the High Order of the Day no. 286 of 15 February 1865, approving the *Regulation*



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Art. V of the Regulation on the service and training of the home guards in the active service of the state stipulated that the military training of the home guards was carried out in assembly centres, and the training “of those staying home is done on Sundays, in communes, only two hours”. The Ministry of War paid special attention to the ways in which the home guards, part of the territorial army, along with the border guards, were called under arms.

on the service and training of home guards in the active service of the state. Art. 1 of this Regulation is very interesting, namely *the service of home guards in operation lasts 10 days*”. Because, according to the *Law for the organisation of the armed power in Romania*, adopted in 1864, the service under arms of the *home guards* was six years, respectively two years in active service and four years in the reserve forces, the military decision-makers decided, by this order, that *“the service shift change day is on the 1st, 11th and 21st of each month”* and that the 20 days, as long as the home guards do not perform the service under arms, are considered a period in reserve (Id., 1865, no. 4 , pp. 116).

RECRUITMENT AND MILITARY TRAINING

Art. V of the *Regulation on the service and training of the home guards in the active service of the state* stipulated that the military training of the home guards was carried out in assembly centres, and the training *“of those staying home is done on Sundays, in communes, only two hours”* (Ib., p. 117). The Ministry of War paid special attention to the ways in which the home guards, part of the territorial army, along with the border guards, were called under arms. In this sense, on 15 February 1865, Alexandru Ioan I signed the *High Order of the Day no. 290*, approving the *Regulation for the call into service of pedestrian and mounted home guards*. In accordance with art. 1 of this *Regulation*, the required number of pedestrian and mounted home guards was to be established, as for the standing army, *“according to the needs of the state”*. After the drawing of the young people who were to fulfil their military service in the permanent army, the sub-prefect of each county drew up a new table, in which the young people left outside the main table were listed. Eight days after this, the sub-prefect displayed the new table in each locality, and after another three days, each young man was free to declare, in writing, to the mayor’s office, *“whether he wants to serve among pedestrian or mounted home guards”* (Ib, p. 119). It is also interesting that, in accordance with art. 11, the young people who had the possibility to equip themselves served a term reduced by half.

Very familiar with the economic and social realities of the rural environment, the Romanian staff officers found it appropriate to apply the most effective methods to explain to the young recruits that *“taking them into service is not a new task imposed on them”* (Ib.). In this regard, General Savel Manu, in his capacity as Minister of War,

sent a document to all district commanders, asking them to make all efforts necessary in *“making the law enforceable”* (Ib., 1865, No. 6, p. 148). By this order, the military decision-makers in the territory were asked to explain to the young people that *“the government and the Legislative Bodies, searching the most proper way to ensure Romania’s defence, found it necessary for all young people aged 20 to come under arms and thus they created the institution of the home guards”* (Ib.). In the same order, General Manu asked the commanders of the territorial troops to add that the young people *“owe it to the country to come today all the more in a hurry, because being its sole owners, they come in this way to guard and defend their own fields whenever danger occurs”* (Ib.). Next, the Minister of War ordered the young people to be convinced that, *“the law can be tough, but it is just”* (Ib., pp. 148-149).

In order to consolidate both the permanent army and the territorial troops, the civil and military authorities in Bucharest allocated, during this period, important sums from the budget. Thus, for the permanent army, in 1860, a budget of 21,350,437 lei was allocated, and, in 1865, the amount of 31,990,410 lei was allocated. It is worth noting that, during the same period, the numbers for irregular troops were extremely important, but much smaller. In 1860, this structure was allocated the amount of 5,229,296 lei, while in 1865, the authorities unblocked the amount of 6,533,832 lei (Popovici, 1902, p. 235).

Even in these conditions, the budgetary effort was important, in a turbulent period from an economic, political and military point of view, in which the Great European Powers looked with suspicion at the consolidation efforts of the young Romanian state.

Romania’s military power had a special significance during the reign of Alexandru Ioan I. If, in the first years, the Army of the United Principalities was insufficiently staffed, in 1865, the battalions and regiments that formed the permanent troops had 19,365 officers, non-commissioned officers and soldiers, as well as 3,459 horses, while irregular troops totalled 24,548 men and 7,930 horses (Ib., pp. 241-242).

TERRITORIAL TROOPS AND CROWDS

During 1865, the Ministry of War paid special attention to the legislation on the status of territorial troops, namely the home guards and border guards, as well as the missions they performed both in peacetime and at war. At the same time, special importance was paid to the reserve troops for the permanent army and for the territorial



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Another component of the Romanian military system was represented by the crowds, established by the Law on the organization of armed power in Romania, adopted in 1864, as the third element of the military body. Under these conditions, on 28 December 1865, by High Decree no. 1753, signed by Prince Alexandru Ioan I and countersigned by General Savel Manu, as Minister of War, the Regulation for the Call and Training of Crowds was adopted. In accordance with art. 1, the inhabitants aged between 17 and 50, not included in the other two elements of the armed power, were part of the crowds.

troops. Under these conditions, in March of the same year, the Regulation for the periodic calls for the army reserve was adopted (Monitorul Oastei, 1865, no. 7, p. 160). Since the beginning of this Regulation, more precisely in art. 1, it was shown that “the reserve of the permanent army is composed ... of the people who served four years” (lb.). Aware that, if necessary, the army command had to have the exact situation of the reservists, more precisely their number, the units in which they served, as well as the Territorial Division to which they belonged, the staff officers included, among the articles of the Regulation, the provision according to which those in reserve were “subjected to periodical exams ... every six months” (lb.).

In accordance with the need to know exactly the condition of the reservists, this normative act stipulated, at art. 17, the provision according to which “the reserve troops will not be able to change their residence until they have notified the commander of the deposit...” (lb., p. 163). By drafting this document, the Ministry of War proved, once again, that it was paying special attention to the military body meant, in accordance with the national military doctrine, to defend the legitimate interests of Romania.

Another component of the Romanian military system was represented by the crowds, established by the Law on the organization of armed power in Romania, adopted in 1864, as the third element of the military body. Under these conditions, on 28 December 1865, by High Decree no. 1753, signed by Prince Alexandru Ioan I and countersigned by General Savel Manu, as Minister of War, the Regulation for the Call and Training of Crowds was adopted (Id., 1866, no. 1, p. 2). In accordance with art. 1, the inhabitants aged between 17 and 50, not included in the other two elements of the armed power, were part of the crowds. They were to be instructed every Sunday, for three hours, “one of which will be aimed at target firing” (lb.), at the residences of the communes whose inhabitants were or in pre-established and arranged places (lb., p. 2). In accordance with art. 5, the training was carried out in accordance with the military regulations in force, with trainers “who served in the army as home guards or border guards, as officers, in their absence, as sergeants or corporals or as soldiers” (lb.), as it appears from the provisions of art. 6 (lb., p. 3). Also, art. 10 stated that “people aged between 26 and 32” were required to participate twice a year, in addition to this weekly training, in various exercises and inspections organised at the county residences. These training concentrations were to take place together with similar concentrations

of reserves, thus aiming at unifying and homogenising the combat training of all components of the national defence system (*Istoria militară a poporului român*, lb., p. 451).

CONCLUSIONS

In an extremely precarious international economic, political and military context, in which the great European powers wanted to split and, as the case may be, to rearrange the spheres of influence in Eastern and Central Europe, but especially in the Balkan Peninsula, the reign of Colonel Alexandru Ioan Cuza, although short and quite convulsive, represented one of the most important moments of defining and modernising the Romanian military body, as well as crystallising the national military defence doctrine. Through the legislative and organisational measures taken, the political and military decision-makers in Bucharest considered that the awakening of the military spirit is a necessary condition for “leading the nation towards a solid future, because, as it is known, only the military skills of our ancestors enable them to strongly support the rights and independence of the country” (*Monitorul Oficial al Moldovei*, 1860, p. 985). In conclusion, we can say that the reforms of Prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza generated profound transformations in Romanian society, thus laying the social, economic, political and cultural foundations of modern Romania.


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ROMANIAN
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