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“Art. I – The official journal named “România Militară” is founded at the Great General Staff, starting 1 January 1898, in which all officers within the Armed Forces will find military studies, which interest their training.

Through the agency of this journal, all officers, belonging to all branches, who are in active duty, will be able to publish their personal papers and the ones that interest the Armed Forces”.

Carol – King of Romania
Issued in București on 8 December 1897
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The Romanian Armed Forces road to modernity started in 1859, once the United Principalities General Staff Corps, currently the Defence Staff, was established.

Soon after it, in 1864, a group of nine captains, graduates of the first series of the Officer Cadet School in Bucharest, took the initiative to develop a “military science, art and history journal” named “România Militară/Military Romania”.

The initiators of the publication – G. Slăniceanu (Captain, Chief of the Engineer Battalion), A. Gramont (Staff Captain), G. Borănescu (Engineer Captain), G. Anghelescu (Staff Captain), A. Anghelescu (Artillery Captain), E. Arion (Artillery Captain), E. Boteanu (Staff Captain), E. Pencovici (Staff Captain) and C. Barozzi (Engineer Captain) –, educated not only in Romania but also abroad, were inspired by the necessity to develop a substantial theoretical activity in the Romanian Army too.

The journal manifesto¹, included in the first issue, which appeared on 15 February 1864, contained innovative ideas and approaches that were meant to:

- contribute to the organisation of our military system the Legislative Chamber is about to decide upon soon;
- assemble and examine the Country old military institutions that had made for the glory of Romania for several centuries and ensured our existence;
- explore, in the absence of any military study, all the aspects related to the Army training, the most solid basis of the armed forces;
- get the Romanian Troops well-informed about the military events in the world;
- join efforts to work Concertedly and whole-heartedly to develop and strengthen the edifice that is meant to ensure the future of our country².

“România Militară” was an independent publication, under the aegis of the War Ministry, and it ceased to appear in 1866 as there were no sufficient funds and subscribers. The publication was resumed in 1891, about a quarter of a century later, also as the result of the initiative of a group of officers in the Great General Staff who intended to “reproduce the serious studies on the organisation, strategy and art of commanding troops under any circumstances”³. Shortly after it, by the Royal Decree no. 3663 issued on 8 December 1897, “România Militară” became the “Great General Staff official publication”.

¹ Din trecutul României Militare cu prilejul aniversării a 75 de ani de la apariția ei în viața armatei. 1864-1939, București, 1939, p. 31.
² Ibidem, p. 32.

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The concept of fake news, which has been recently included in the literature - although it had an important history before being acknowledged as such, the term designating the rumours and gossip associated with media personalities in late night shows, has already enjoyed constant attention, its meaning being associated with terms such as disinformation, propaganda or even deception (military deception). In relation to the latter concept, which is perceived as an umbrella term covering both denial and deception, well-known authors in the field of information operations consider denial and deception as military actions/operations per se: "denial hides the real and deception shows the fake", while propaganda and disinformation are products (Johnson Meyeraan, 2003, p. 4).

Therefore, it is natural to start placing the concept in the doctrinal apparatus in relation to the projection of information operations in the category of operations dubbed Military Deception (MILDEC), Cyber Network Operations (CNO) and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), as long as they operate with fake technology & weapons, fake retreats or other actions, fake information. Therefore, fake news should be understood as neither fully fake nor fully news, but insertions with an intentional informative role, which "incorporate, melt halves, if not quarters of truth and false, plausible and invented etc.”:

Under the umbrella of the phenomenon of "digital disinformation" or "disinformation 2.0" comes the mixture, in different doses, between true information (which can be verified) and false one.

In the new National Defence Strategy of the Country for the period 2020-2024, the concept of fake news is included in the category of "subtle and subversive" hostile actions defined as hybrid threats, to which the strategy attaches great importance in relation to a number of indicators of the concept of regional security evolution, including the aggressive behaviour of the Russian Federation, the possibility of adapting hybrid actions to technological developments and the increase in the complexity of risks, considering the new technologies for civil use employed in asymmetric and hybrid actions, the development of a series of measures and actions meant to contribute to enhancing societal resilience, including the launch of extensive security education programmes, the increase in internal capabilities to prevent and combat asymmetric and hybrid threats, the enhancement of the capacity to identify possible adaptations of hybrid offensive actions to new, as yet undeveloped technologies, by facilitating the implementation of the NATO-EU cooperation agenda in areas such as combating hybrid threats and strategic communication (to remain in our area of interest).

On the other hand, the White Paper on Defence (2020, p. 12) highlights the existence and manifestation of "hostile information actions, conducted both to influence social perception and affect public confidence in state institutions and to obtain necessary information to influence the decision-making process" as a threat to national security, entailing a consistent risk factor, which is why, in the set of modern defence capabilities to be developed, it is necessary to "create and develop specialised capabilities, at the level of the Armed Forces, to counter information aggression, destabilising propaganda and hybrid campaigns" (CAAp, 2020, p. 15), which can lead, over time, to increased levels of resilience to asymmetric and hybrid risks and threats.

The perspectives of the National Defence Strategy (2020) and of the White Paper on Defence (2020) are justified by the extensive studies conducted in the field of the narrow field of fake news in the military environment. For a clear theoretical approach, we should start from the communication/information architecture of the military organisation and, by extension, of the contemporary battlefield, with emphasis on the purposes of communication: information, keeping open communication channels, and influence. In relation to the mass media, classic and new, it is talked, first of all, about influence and only then about information, which is why the military action communication architecture entails two different types of infrastructure.

Specifically, we have in mind an information communication infrastructure, which is built on the fundamental principle of public relations – "Tell the Truth!" and whose main purpose is to increase the degree of trust between the military and the public.
organisation and its audiences, internally and externally (in this case, we are talking about the structures of public relations and media operations, MEDIA OPS, depending on how they are defined in different doctrinal apparatuses).

A second communication infrastructure would be that of influence, which aims to create the desired effects on the “will, understanding and capabilities of opponents, potential opponents and approved audiences” (AIP-3.10, 2015, p. 1-3; DOI, 2017, p. 52), which is achieved explicitly through information operations (INFO OPS) and through the entire range of subsumed operations/fields: psychological operations; presence, posture, profile/PPP; operation security; information security; deception/masking; electronic warfare; physical destruction; key leader engagement; computer network operations and civil-military cooperation (DOI, 2017, pp. 21-22).

The two communication infrastructures should not be concurrent, because under such conditions, the second, the influence infrastructure, would corrupt and reduce the level of the only guarantor of the functionality of the first infrastructure, the information infrastructure: trust. The information infrastructure presupposes the correct, complete and timely information of the target audiences and aims “to promote understanding and to obtain domestic and international public support for the military operations conducted by the Romanian Armed Forces, while ensuring the operations in preparation or in progress” (DOI, 2017: 52), while influence infrastructure, corrupting trust, contributes decisively to blocking any means of promoting trust and obtaining public support. Apparently, aiming for the information infrastructure, fake news, in the military environment, has as main target the information infrastructure itself, by creating mistrust, by cultivating subjective truth (post-truth), by focusing on personal emotions and beliefs at the expense of substantiation in relation to evidence.

This generalised hybrid framework therefore allows the use of coordinated information influence (through complex information operations, themselves hybrid in relation to the types of subsumed operations), implicitly through fake news, with the ultimate goal of weakening societal resilience and lowering trust in institutions. In relation to disinformation, the use of fake news as disinformation is not limited to the actions of disseminating information that is obviously false or altered, in relation to the truth, specific to new media (social networks), but represents the complex form of disinformation in which the truth is qualitatively altered, preserving certain features, in which the media complex can be understood as a hybrid media system. In such a weakened environment, through concerted information actions aimed at diminishing the trust and, implicitly, the information infrastructure of the organisation (alliance, state, military institution), it is created the predisposition to align with subjective, group, highly polarised and ideological truths, while evidence-based rational discourse is continually undermined, and objective truth is subordinated to contextual and consensual truths, in a disturbing flow of data that contributes to affiliation and communication in order to keep communication channels open, thus strengthening the affiliation with digital tribes.

The new soldier is the agent of influence (according to Kearns, 2019, p. 99) or the influencer, who, on the one hand, generates disturbance in relation to the establishment, traditional institutions, values and principles, using an “anti-system, anti-establishment, anti-policy, anti-expertise” rhetoric (Bârgăoanu, 2018, p. 153), and, on the other hand, regroups around the values of the new “digital tribe”, polarising and engaging strong ideological discourses that diverge from those of other groups. This soldier in the hybrid confrontation, who uses communication in order to influence, generates multiple effects by using a single weapon: information influence, which is illegitimate (and, implicitly, produces morally asymmetrical effects), considering that “Information influence breaks the rules […]; Information influence exploits vulnerabilities […]; Information influence deceives people […]” (Nothaft et al., 2019, p. 42). In the projection of the influencer actions in the information warfare virtual, hybrid, battlespace, this deception weapon covers a spectrum of interpretations that are difficult to prefigure.

The palpable problem of fake news is that, for a complex and efficient response, it requires a solid, consistent construct, which is atypical to these times of weakness, and the prevalence of networks in relation to hierarchies. Therefore, it is necessary, on the one hand, a consistent security culture, through a national project meant to develop and consolidate it, and, on the other hand, a training of the military to respond to the new type of soldier: the influencer, capable of using communication in order to achieve effects on those unprepared to respond appropriately. From this point of view, the reactive response – which is usually the product of strategic communication – is insufficient, as new avenues of influence diversify and benefit from the surprising opportunities provided by new technologies.

A form of hybrid confrontation thus occurs when the military can use the hard tools and, to a lesser extent, the soft tools, on the level on which they are attacked by information influence. Moreover, this fake news action produces effects on the information infrastructure of the military organisation and the state structure, discrediting the institutions and lowering the level of trust in them. The response can only come through the influence infrastructure, through a set of countermeasures that, coupled with a high level of security culture and the democratisation of hybrid confrontation, can lead to strong and lasting effects, relative to the contextual truths of “digital tribes”. In essence, the high level of security culture, obtained by democratising hybrid confrontation, allows the transformation of all, military or ordinary citizens, into agents of positive change: “(…) the democratisation of hybrid warfare gives us all opportunity to be agents of positive change” (Kearns, 2019, p. 120).
STRATEGIC RESILIENCE: FROM STABILITY AND PREVENTION TOWARDS PRO-ACTIVE ACTION AND DYNAMIC ADAPTABILITY

Professor Iulian CHIFU, PhD
“Carol I” National Defence University
Associate Professor – National University of Political Studies and Public Administration
President of the Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Centre, Bucharest

Strategic resilience is achievable at different stages and with different instruments. The most used ones in normal times of equilibrium are related to the capacity of regaining stability and maintaining the continuity of institutions, relations and expected objectives, at a strategic level. The new pandemic and the turbulent world with tectonic level of changes makes resilience enter in a new era where dynamic adaptability and pro-active action should be the needed instruments in order to acquire the suitable level of resilience at a strategic level. This could mean, however, to maintain just the core tasks and basic objectives of the defence and security systems and to have the ability to give up institutional physical premises as well as to adapt details, nuances, doctrines, embracing creativity, welcoming inventive solutions and building the capacity to reform during crises at the same time with the effort to meet public requirements and to fulfil current normal day by day missions.

Keywords: strategic resilience; dynamic adaptability; prevention; pro-active action; crisis management

INTRODUCTION.
PREVENTION AND STABILITY.
STRATEGIC RESILIENCE 1.0

The world as we know it and the capacity to deal with crises have been related to several concepts over time. The most important ones are linked to the capacity of prevention and the stability of the systems – especially in defence and security. Strategic resilience 1.0 is achievable, in those terms, as long as we protect the stability of existing institutions, the viability and effectiveness of existing relations and the status quo.

If we consider the existence of crises – sudden changes perceived by the decision-maker that induce the threat to basic values, a sense of urgency and uncertainty (Stern, 2014) and require intervention in order to bring back the system to a situation comparative to the one before the crises emerge (Chifu, 2019) –, resilience 1.0 is related to the possibility to prevent crises, to avoid their occurrence. Resilience is also linked to the possibility to manage crises, to raise the capacity of dealing with them and avoiding dramatic or irreversible, or even hard to recuperate effects and consequences (Chifu, Ramberg, 2007) of the crisis on the existing defence and security system at the strategic level. This means, first and foremost, preparedness and training, the strategic level, experience and knowledge, instruments and resources to act, once the crisis is installed. It means normative instruments (Sundelius, Bach, 2015) in place way before the crisis, reserves and capacities available in order to produce the necessary means in order to cope with the crisis (Chifu, Ramberg, Ibid.). Be it masks, ventilators or explosives and cartridges or bombs. We cannot forget the fact that, once a military crisis is declared, rules of the war apply (Durch, 2000) and embargo on military or double use means (SIPRI, 2020) are in place.

However, fighting for stability and preventing shocks are not always considered the best ways to manage crises (Stern, Ibid.). We need...
to learn and adapt to the evolution of the security environment and the mood of the societies. We need to maintain the support of the public and their contributions to the security of each state as well as to the budgets and activities of the military and the security institutions. And this requires a level of flexibility and adaptability, not the stubborn and conservative approach of those stunned in the project.

The thin line between defending the basic criteria and skills of an institution or an instrument and the need for moving to something more effective and adapted to the existing societies and security environment entails a decision of first importance, hard to take and difficult to establish (Boin, t’Hart, Stern, Sundelius, 2005). Therefore, we need both courage and vision from the decision-makers, creativity and skills from the planning divisions in order to realise when it is time to move on as well as pure and thorough knowledge in order to avoid changes for the sake of changes (Sundelius, Hansen, 2007) or prompt reforms without envisaging the real consequences and impact.

**PROACTIVE ACTION AND EARLY WARNING.**

**RESILIENCE 2.0**

Prevention and stability are the two most common reactions and trials in order to achieve resilience in the first place. But when moving ahead in time, this proves not to be enough, and we have to let go and move on with adaptability and controlled or managed changes. It is better to do that in an orderly way, planning, calculating the impact, and paying attention to the consequence management (Ekengren, Simons, 2011).

There are times when the pressure is too high and the need for reaction does not have the required time in order to have a well-conceived reform. Crises are about time pressure, time constraints and emotions (Olson, 2008), linked to the impact, so there is no time for the well thought changes. Side effects can be hard to manage (Chifu, Ibid.) and they can even create secondary crises (Ibid.), some even more important than the original ones that we hope to manage.

Under such circumstances, the best way is to act when needed, even during the crisis, but to make a thorough analysis of the effects and consequences (Svedin, 2011) after the crisis is over. The reaction to 9/11 events with the Patriot Act in the USA created a lot of side effects, public mistrust and fear of surveillance and breaches in the human rights (US Congress, 2001). The impact is perceived, even today, with the decrease in support for security and defence institutions and a lot of support and trust in figures like Snowden (Greenwald, 2014) or Assange (Assange, 2014) or even a high level of exposure of the public to information warfare and conspiracy theories (Simons, Chifu, 2016).

But the best way to deal with the crisis that require action, changes, revisions and maybe institutional reforms (Boin, McConnell, t’Hart, 2008) on the spot, during the hot period of such an event, is to never arrive there or to be prepared to take action in the spirit of abandoning stability per se but to safeguard the most important characteristics of the security and defence system in order to fulfil its responsibilities even in harsh times. For this purpose, Resilience 2.0 refers to pro-active action and early warning.

Prevention and reaction are instruments with limited capacity of dealing with crises. In an unpredictable environment, with high level of turbulence, prevention becomes very hard to achieve. We need more sophisticated instruments to do that, especially early warning systems (European Commission, 2001) in place able to catch the most sensitive and important changes in critical indicators that could show the arrival of a crisis (Gaub, 2017). Early warning systems concentrate a high level of knowledge and capacity of anticipation (Habegger, 2009) and they help knowing what is in front of us in due time and assist preparedness and improve the capacity of prevention.

From another point of view, pro-active action in itself goes beyond putting in place early warning systems. It is also a philosophy of the resilience 2.0 that refers to the capacity of acting way before the crisis impact is present. Once again, it is a tough job for the decision-makers to assume with courage the fact that they need to act, invest, develop skills and instruments (Schirch, 2013) and put capabilities in place before the crisis is perceived and acknowledged by everybody, by the public and the decision-makers.

This approach could raise important issues related to legal responsibility. That is why we need trust and laws that enable our decision-makers at the strategic level in security, defence and foreign
affairs to take pro-active action once they have the required hints and correct data that show the high possibility of an emerging crisis (Olson, Xue, 2012). But, without this level of earned and well-deserved trust, resilience 2.0 could not be achieved.

RESILIENCE IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETIES. THE THREE LEVELS OF COOPERATION AND LIMITATIONS

Terrorism and hybrid warfare are the type of threats to the security that require a different approach, adapted to our contemporary societies. In neither of those cases state institutions are enough to face those asymmetric threats and unconventional activities (Kuosa, 2012). Therefore, we need a three-level cooperation in order to create resilience at a due level and in order to cope, prevent and avoid the impact of such threats, as well as to achieve the liquidation of their consequences, once the events linked to the crisis emerge (Chifu, 2018, pp. 23-30). In contemporary societies, we need to put together the resources, skills and actions of the state and its responsible institutions, in an intergovernmental coordinated approach, with a responsible integrator for each type of crises already designated and a fair cooperation from all involved institutions – the society – meaning NGO’s, academics, private businesses (Simons, 2010) and the citizens, the individuals, who, by their awareness, voluntary contribution and civic spirit can support and complement the instruments of the security and defence system of one’s country (Chifu, Ibid.).

The cooperation between these three levels, in good faith and with shared responsibility, can bridge the gaps and limits that a state institutional level has in case of operations planned at an asymmetrical and hybrid level. This type of approach has already been proved in countries such as Switzerland where the contribution of the people and citizens to prevent any action that could have high impact is well known. But there are limits in dealing with the civil society and the citizens. And this cooperation – basically on volunteer bases and involving a high level of trust – entails a mutual understanding of roles and respect for each other’s responsibility. It also means a high level of trust and legitimacy of the decision-makers, leadership and an extreme professional excellence acknowledged by the population (Rich, 2007).

If there are breaches in the trust between the citizens and the state, the misrepresentation of the roles of some institutions from the security system or even abuses and malfunction related to those institutions, especially related to harming the citizens or breaching the trust in fulfilling the needed responsibility to the best benefit of the public, there will not be any society and citizens’ support for the state institutions. A full revision of the institutional system involved in security and defence is needed from this point of view, with the aim of retaining and improving the public support (Chifu, 2017-1, pp. 3-11). Fortunately, in Romania, the military establishment enjoys this high level of public trust and support (Avangarde Poll, 2020), but, even in this case, it should be improved and consolidated. Without this cooperation between the three levels of components of the society and the genuine care for each citizen and its security, there is no possibility to build resilience in contemporary societies. Especially, not against the hybrid threats that are about confronting the whole society with a large panoply of combined unconventional instruments (Chifu, 2017-2, pp. 13-22).

RESILIENCE 3.0. DYNAMIC ADAPTABILITY AND THE RESILIENCE OF THE FUTURE

We also have to realise the limits in preventing crises, in understanding the processes of the future and in building up the early warning systems. Each of the stages of such an endeavour requires and needs a high level of expertise and experience as well as the development of specific skills of the persons involved in the process. In turbulent times, with a complex international environment that changes dramatically, in short periods of time, surprise is there to stay, and both early warning and pro-active actions could not be enough for an acceptable level of resilience.

We need more. And this means a high level of capabilities in prospective studies, a high capacity to translate this into actionable
information for revising and adapting existing institutions. Last but not least, it also means a change of vision and a change of doctrine in order to create the dynamic adaptability of the institutions from the defence and security system at the strategic level, and even to set the stage for a suitable legal framework allowing even the perspective of reforming during crisis (Taleb, 2014).

Let us take each of the three components one by one. Prospective studies (Chifu, 2013, pp. 167-186) are a branch of the future studies that is already on the table and in the National Defence Strategy of Romania, including the provisions related to the need to prepare in this direction (The National Defence Strategy for the period 2020-2024, 2020, pp. 6,10). The Centre for Conflict Prevention and Early Warning is one of the institutions dealing with prospective studies and even building up a Romanian methodology (Chifu, 2013, Ibid.) in this field applied several times in the past seven years: twice in Ukraine crisis (Chifu, 2014; Chifu, Nantoi, Getmanchuck, 2015), once in drafting the future of the Wider Black Sea Region (Chifu, Bălaşaioiu, 2018), and once trying to make reason on the future of the international relations and global security considering the developments in technology and in social media (Chifu, Savu, 2020). I have also developed such a study in the interagency framework, at an institutional level, in 2014, during the Ukraine crisis. We need, for sure, an important support for the prospective studies and a capacity building effort in order to improve those studies and prepare the suitable personal, in order to get better results in prospective studies and more accurate scenarios for the future. The second pillar is about the actionable information extracted and drafted from these studies and used in the day-by-day planning activity and support for the decision-makers.

If we add the need for qualified specialists in decision-making in times of crisis, that would be counsellors of the decision-makers with responsibilities in the field, as mentioned in the proposals of a law advanced by us to the Minister of Defence and the Chief of Defence, according to an European project developed by the CPCEW with “Carol I” National Defence University last year (Combaterea propagandei externe ca politică publică, 2020), we have a solid basis in order to make it useful for the day-by-day work of our defence and security

institutions. The counsellors specialised in decision-making in crisis can act as integrators for the results and the implementation of the achievements of the prospective studies research.

Maybe the most important part of the effort is a change of vision and a change of doctrine in order to create the dynamic adaptability of the institutions from the defence and security system at the strategic level. It is not easy and it is the most dramatic element of a resilience 3.0 strategy for the future. This time we are not talking only about losing the “mantra of stability” of the institutions and relations inside the security and defence system towards adaptability and prevention, pro-active action and early warning. It is far more important and dramatic, and maybe a bridge too far...

REFORMING DURING CRISIS. FROM PHYSICAL INSTITUTIONS TO VIRTUAL ONES ABLE TO FULFIL THE TASKS AND SERVICES TO THE POPULATION

Dynamic adaptability is about accepting that even the institutions themselves are not untouchable by a solution during a crisis with a high level of dynamic. Our mindset should pass over not only stability but also the physical existence of some institutions. It means that, in the hierarchy of values and principles (Stern, Ibid.; Chifu, 2019) that we have to defend in times of turbulence, uncertainty and tumult of crisis, in the forefront should be placed fulfilling the requirements, tasks and responsibilities – security and defence services – for the population and individuals. Therefore, it is not the institution and its physical existence, or even its legal one, that mainly counts. In the framework of the future, we should accept that we would be able to have the ability and legal instruments in reforming during the crisis (Chifu, Ramberg, 2008). This means that the emphasis is no longer on the physical existence of an institution, but on its purpose, which has to be defended or securitized (Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 2010). We have to accept that even an institutional instrument can be dropped and replaced in order to safeguard the ability of fulfilling the legal tasks and assigned responsibility in security and defence. This means a sophisticated effort of planning in due time for the perspective of this institutional dissolution or transfer in the digital space. Capabilities, knowledge,
instruments, chain of command, accountability, democratic control, all should be adapted and replicated in this new framework or possibility to move and to act in the virtual space. Creativity and capacity to plan in this key is crucial in order to prepare for the resilience 3.0 of the future. And, by the way, this is what the security that puts in the forefront the individual citizen would mean. We already have these provisions in the National Defence Strategy (2020, Foreword) and this is the modern liberal approach to security and defence. And our institutions should reflect and propose the institutional, doctrinal and legal adaptation of today’s reality to this wishful evolution. For sure, a new culture of security is required, at the same time. And I am sure that our academic, research and institutional establishment can live up to the expectations in this area.

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RUSSIA’S DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN IN THE TIME OF COVID-19 PANDEMIC

Assoc. Prof. Adriana SAULIUC, PhD
Faculty of Communication Sciences and International Relations, “Titu Maiorescu” University, Bucharest
Senior Researcher, Conflict Prevention and Early Warning Center, Bucharest

The complicated period the states are facing, caused by the onset of the SARS CoV-2 pandemic, has produced changes in the behaviour of some countries, while others have kept their preferences for old practices. The Russian Federation is among those that have identified in recent developments on the world stage the opportunity to exploit the vulnerabilities its targets face, the aim being to obtain strategic advantages. Thus, from the campaign entitled “From Russia with Love” to the disinformation campaign, the European Union is in Moscow’s attention, which through its actions tries to create instability within the EU and to discredit the organisation through actions meant to make it look like a failed project.

Keywords: the Russian Federation; the European Union; disinformation; fake news; information warfare;

DISINFORMATION – RUSSIA’S POWERFUL WEAPON

Generally, disinformation refers to deliberate, often orchestrated, attempts to confuse or manipulate people through delivering dishonest information to them. Such an activity is very dangerous because it is used usually by countries in situations with significant stakes, so disinformation has in most of the cases well-organised and resourced actions at the base (UNESCO, 2018, p. 7). Today, in a profoundly technologised world, terms like fake news and disinformation can be perceived as a matter of relative novelty, and in the case of the first, indeed, we can say that it appeared more recently, people being aware of it with the deepening of digitalisation and the increasing use of the social networks. But disinformation is a tool used many years ago, being preferred to the detriment of military actions for the important advantages it can offer to the actor which uses it.

And if we are talking about disinformation, whether we are referring to the present or bygone times, we cannot exclude from the discussion one country, for two reasons: the occurrence of this type of action and the intense use of disinformation today, both situations having a common denominator: the Russian Federation, as de jure and de facto heir of the USSR. Bringing the Russian state in this discussion cannot be avoided, given that even the appearance of the term is related exclusively to the USSR. More accurately, that term came into use in the early 1960s, and became widespread in the 1980s, being based upon a Russian word: Dezinformatsiya. According to sources in the intelligence field, the term was invented by Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin after the World War II, while the 1952 Great Soviet Encyclopaedia explains the disinformation being the “dissemination (in the press, on the radio etc.) of false reports intended to mislead public opinion” (Taylor, 2016).

But the disappearance of the USSR in 1991, as a subject of international law, did not decrease the propensity of Russia, the heir of the Soviet Union, for this type of practice, especially as developments at the international level after the end of the Cold War rather claimed...
policies that ensured the strategic advantages targeted by states without using hard power actions.

For Russia, such a situation meant changing the actions that involved the use of force or the threat of the use of force with “more subtle” actions but with no less things to offer in terms of the advantages brought to Moscow. Therefore, through the use of disinformation, which is an action with deep roots in the Soviet practices, Moscow is taking advantage of the technology and digitalisation to strengthen its position and gain major strategic benefits without using force. Moreover, developments in recent years reveal that in the highly digitalised world in which we live, Moscow uses disinformation as a weapon aimed at enemies that Russia cannot dominate through hard power actions.

A DANGEROUS GLOBAL PANDEMIC – DISINFORMATION DURING THE CORONA TIMES

The pandemic the world is currently facing, the most challenging crisis since the World War II, as UN Secretary-General António Guterres warned recently, goes beyond the patterns of a medical crisis through the effects it has on all aspects of people’s lives: political, financial, demographic, economic, social and others. Moreover, if for the vast majority of the countries the pandemic is a very negative event, as can be seen in the case of the states severely affected by the novel Coronavirus, like the US, Italy, Spain, India and others, for actors such as Russia and China, the pandemic is an opportunity to gain, or at least attempting to gain, strategic advantages.

“FROM RUSSIA WITH LOVE” CAMPAIGN

Thus, although the pandemic came with major complications, for the Russian Federation included, the situation was perceived by Moscow as advantageous for Kremlin’s interests to increase its regional and international profile. This is how the “From Russia with love” campaign started, which was officially intended as an altruistic initiative to help countries in difficulty because of the pandemic, but which later revealed Russia’s less philanthropic purposes. The first target of this campaign was Italy. On 22 March, at Vladimir Putin’s request, the Russian Army began flying medical help to Italy. Sputnik posted on Twitter a few images with the following text: “‘From Russia with love’. With these stickers on the sides, Russia’s two military planes with experts and equipment take off from Chkalovsky airfield and are heading to Italy to assist in combating the Coronavirus pandemic. Photos courtesy of the Defense Ministry” (Euractiv, 2020). A manoeuvre which, in Italy’s situation, inevitably brought Moscow the reputation of a great saviour of a country which, despite belonging to the EU, flirted with the idea of developing good relations with the Kremlin, an idea that the Italian state has also put in practice in recent years. Inevitably, the aid delivered by the Russians was received in Italy with great enthusiasm. The Italian Defence Minister Lorenzo Guerini has officially thanked his Russian counterpart, Serghei Shoigu. Then, famous people in Italy praised Moscow for its support: the famous singer Pupo posted on his Facebook account a video in which he sang a famed Russian song ended with the phrase “I love you Russia. Thank you”, while a Russian newspaper wrote that Al Bano said that Italy would never forget Russia’s help (Luxmoore, 2020).

But beyond this situation and the image campaign carefully orchestrated by the Kremlin, Moscow’s actions can be included among the manoeuvres that transcend the humanitarian sphere, being found rather in the dimension of Russia’s foreign policy, at the intersection between strategic interests and the information warfare that Moscow maintains actively concerning the Western rivals.

THE “DIVIDE ET IMPERA” ACTIONS TARGET THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

So, beyond the altruistic aspect of the Moscow’s actions, which was inevitably perceived in a positive way given the situation in which Italy, for example, was in the spring of this year, there are clear elements that incriminate Russia for its real intentions hidden behind the support offered to some countries. In the case of the Italian state, for example, Moscow’s actions targeted two levels: the internal and the external. In the first case, playing the “saviour” role, the Kremlin intended to cultivate good relations with the Italian state both in terms of the political class and the population, in both cases with strategic gains for Russia. Thus, in a pragmatic interpretation, the support offered by Russia is not purely altruistic, but rather an action aimed at obtaining a relaxation from the EU of the measures taken against Moscow’s bellicose policy in the region. Italy, which had the misfortune to face a
regrettable period at the beginning of the pandemic, was not chosen out of the blue, given that the regime in Rome has preferred in recent years to have a close relationship with Moscow, to the detriment of its membership of the European Union, hence Russia’s decision to focus on the Italian state from this perspective.

Also, the Russian support to Italy is related to the Kremlin’s attempt to attract as much sympathy as possible from the Italian people but also from the political class, which considers that it is appropriate to maintain good relations with Russia, here being targeted especially the Lega Party, in the perspective of good results obtained in the next elections in Italy (Elyatt, 2020).

As for the external dimension targeted by Moscow, here things are inextricably linked to Italy’s EU membership, the Kremlin aiming to contribute to undermining the image of the European colossus in favour of its strategic interests. In other words, Russia aimed to highlight the failure of the European Union in identifying and implementing a rapid response to the major problems caused by the onset of the pandemic in some member countries, Italy being one of them. At the same time, Moscow relied on the fact that this support would help improve the image of the Russian Federation at the regional level, while Vladimir Putin benefited from unprecedented publicity both at the European level and domestically.

But beyond the surface elements, Russia’s move is directed against the European Union, Moscow’s goal being to make its position vulnerable and reduce its attractiveness concerning both its members and the states that have expressed their intention to become part of the great European family. In all cases, these are the Russian Federation wants to keep under its sphere of influence out of the blue, given that the regime in Rome has preferred in recent years to have a close relationship with Moscow, to the detriment of its membership of the European Union, hence Russia’s decision to focus on the Italian state from this perspective.

Therefore, the contextual elements in which the Kremlin offered to help Italy, as well as the pragmatic analysis of such an action, reveal that Moscow’s support rather has a strategic stake, meant to allow the Kremlin to return at the table of the great players by regaining the ability to expand its influence (Emmott, Osborne, 2020) at the regional level, to the detriment of the EU and NATO implicitly. At least in the case of the population of the Italian state, the Kremlin won a stage win, because its ability to act quickly, at a time when the European Union was struggling, delaying in identifying and implementing pandemic response options, favoured the rise of scepticism of the Italians and their dissatisfaction with the hardship with which Brussels sought its resources to support the EU member states (Togoh, 2020). Last but not least, the multifaceted nature of Russia’s actions in Italy was perceived as having a feature related to intelligence. The idea was contradicted by the Kremlin but interpreted as such by those who claimed that the presence of the Russian forces on the territory of an EU/NATO member state, even in non-military missions regarding equipment and medical items transfer, is an opportunity to collect information on the military structures of a country which is part of the North Atlantic Alliance (Cristiani, 2020).

Serbia’s situation should be read in the same key. The country is in the full process of negotiations with Brussels, yet, after receiving support from Beijing in the context of the pandemic, also asked Moscow for help. Thus, if in the case of Italy, the purpose of Moscow’s aid was to increase the dissatisfaction of the Italian population and the Euroscepticism, and gain support from the political class for the relaxation of the EU sanctions, as far as the relationship with Serbia is concerned, the Russian Federation’s aid in the context of the pandemic was linked to the Kremlin’s interest in strengthening the alliance with Belgrade, as well as inculcating the idea of the European Union’s inefficiency, in contrast to Russia’s ability to meet major challenges such as the SARS CoV-2 pandemic. Moreover, if Beijing used the “mask diplomacy”, supporting Serbia in a non-military domain, Russia took advantage of Belgrade’s opening for the Russian assistance, which had a military character from the beginning, Russian soldiers being integrated into the operations carried out by Serbia to fight the pandemic (Goble, 2020).

THE SARS COV-2 PANDEMIC CREATES A FERTILE ENVIRONMENT FOR THE RUSSIAN DISINFORMATION ACTIONS. EU COUNTER OPTIONS

Given the complexity of the situation and the people sensitivity to certain issues during a pandemic, Moscow understood that its pseudo-altruistic actions targeting certain Western states could be doubled by measures aimed at achieving its goals—weakening, including from within, the European Union by fuelling Euroscepticism in the
case of some member states populations, or from outside by reducing the attractiveness of the EU, in the case of the countries aiming at full membership – in all cases, the actions having a major impact on the European Union as well as NATO.

Thus, in addition to “Trojan Horse” actions, which have ensured access to the countries under Russian attention, the Kremlin has resorted to manoeuvres involving disinformation, dissemination of fake news to obtain the targeted strategic advantages, in particular the rise of Euroscepticism and dissatisfaction of member states’ citizens regarding the way Brussels was managing the pandemic crisis. And if in the case of Kremlin’s support for certain states one can see Moscow’s hurry to take action, to quickly capitalise on the advantages pursued, the same feature can be identified in the case of the disinformation campaign launched by Kremlin at the beginning of the pandemic, relying on the fact that its effects would amplify its actions.

Indeed, amid developments in the spring of this year, the pandemic has created a fertile ground for actions involving disinformation, and Moscow has taken full advantage of this complicated context, one of the main targets of the Russian state being the European Union.

The fact that the Russian Federation has rushed to take advantage of the international changes caused by the pandemic is revealed by the information published in the press in March last year, when Reuters mentioned an EU report dated 16 March 2020 and drafted by the European External Action Service (EEAS), which was about the Russian media aiming to launch a real campaign against the West to worsen the impact of the SARS CoV-2 pandemic, by generating panic and sowing distrust in those responsible for the crisis management. The accusations in the Western press were denied by the Kremlin, but they (re)opened a Pandora’s Box, as they add to the list of those already formulated by different actors regarding Moscow’ actions in this domain.

According to Reuters, the EU document talks about the fact that Moscow’s recent disinformation campaign is spreading fake news online in European languages such as English, Spanish, French, German and Italian, which indicates, without any other possible interpretation, the targets of the Kremlin’s actions, as well as contradictory, confusing and malicious reports, to complicate the situation of the European Union in formulating a coherent pandemic response. Thus, according to the EEAS (2020), “the overarching aim of Kremlin disinformation is to aggravate the public health crisis in Western countries... in line with the Kremlin’s broader strategy of attempting to subvert European societies”.

The same document writes that from 22 January until the time the document was drafted, the EU identified about 80 cases of disinformation about the new Coronavirus, Russian actions being identified to amplify Tehran’s accusations that SARS CoV-2 is a biological weapon developed by the United States (Emmott, Ibid.). Then, in June last year, in the context of the unusual allegations made by Brussels that “foreign actors and certain third countries, in particular Russia and China, have engaged in targeted influence operations and disinformation campaigns in the EU, its neighbourhood, and globally” (Deutsche Welle, June 2020), Brussels sounded the alarm over the massive wave of health hoaxes, false claims, scams, hate speeches and conspiracy theories about the SARS CoV-2 pandemic identified online, to which there coordinated attempts by third-country actors were added, actions which reveal, according to the document issued by the European Union, the intention to use and disseminate false or misleading information to cause damages for the targeted international actors (Ibid.).

So, although such actions are not new for the EU and the Western countries, the situation created by the health crisis amplified their effects, especially as a result of the way people understood to react to the Coronavirus pandemic, most of those dissatisfied with the way the governments or the authorities in Brussels acted being targets of the disinformation campaign initiated by the Kremlin. But the lack of novelty in the case of these actions does not contribute positively in identifying the best solutions to those problems, both because of the diversity of the nature of so-called aggressors, which can be states, organisations, individuals, as well as the networks they have created to achieve their goals, the false information dissemination mode and their targeting according to the specifics of the societies that such actions target. Moreover, the success of a disinformation campaign also depends on the legal capacity of the targeted states to formulate coherent responses to such threats, given that in many cases this is hampered by legislation, bureaucracy and even by the inability to understand, identify the problem and the pieces of evidence of the
impact it has on the society (Pamment, 2020).

But the European Union has understood that the mechanism behind disinformation, the dissemination of fake news and narratives can only be fought through coherent and pragmatic measures, able to respond as effectively as possible to one of the most problematic threats. Thus, in June 2020, Josep Borrell sounded the alarm that “disinformation in times of the Coronavirus can kill” thereby “we have a duty to protect our citizens by making them aware of false information, and expose the actors responsible for engaging in such practices” (European Commission, 2020). The European official also pointed out an extremely important aspect: “in today’s technology-driven world, where warriors wield keyboards rather than swords and targeted influence operations and disinformation campaigns are a recognised weapon of state and non-state actors, the European Union is increasing its activities and capacities in this fight” (Ibid.).

To this end, in the months since the pandemic began, the European Commission has stepped up the pressure on Twitter and Facebook, calling for support in stopping the flow of misleading content about the pandemic, virus, vaccine and alleged remedies (Bodoni, 2020). Moreover, in June last year, concrete steps were taken at the EU level in the fight against disinformation, which would contribute in a major manner at the creation of a stronger and more resilient Union, such as cooperation, transparency, distinguishing between illegal and harmful but not illegal content, raising public awareness regarding the problems in this dimension and implicitly of societal resilience, all measures that would contribute to the European Union’s fight against disinformation, with the use of two key components: the European Democracy Action Plan and the Digital Services Act (European Commission, Ibid.).

CONCLUSIONS

Humanity is currently going through one of the worst crises since the second world conflagration, the one generated by the SARS CoV-2 pandemic, which takes place in a highly globalised and interdependent world, thus having major effects beyond the medical field, affecting all aspects of people’s lives. However, if the consequences of the pandemic in the economic, financial, social, demographic etc. fields are self-evident, the security aspect reveals mutations due to the realities on the ground. Specifically, in the context of the level of the digitalisation that humanity has reached, the access to technology and information means accessible to modern people can be a useful tool for the international actors that are exploiting the pandemic to gain strategic advantages.

The Russian Federation is one of the most eloquent examples, in this case, its actions in recent months highlighting the Kremlin’s interest in exploiting the complicated situation caused by the pandemic in its favour and to the detriment of the European Union, the main target of the disinformation campaign initiated by Moscow. The campaign is hiding behind its actions to support the European countries that have encountered difficulties in managing the health crisis. Its main purpose is to exploit the EU’s vulnerabilities, as well as to amplify them both through actions carried out inside and outside the European Union. This is also an endeavour through which Moscow is trying to cut the losses suffered after the bellicose adventures in Europe since 2014, which limited Russia’s actions because of the sanctions adopted against it.

Yet, for the EU, Moscow’s deceptive activities were warnings that (re)confirmed that the Russian Federation was an actor with a different agenda while being an impetus for pragmatic decisions and measures meant to reduce the negative influence of the Russian Federation in the community space regarding the information warfare. At the same time, the Kremlin’s actions were an additional argument for Brussels in support of some measures aimed at increasing both resilience within the borders of the European Union and maintaining the attractiveness of the EU both for countries from outside its borders, but especially for its member states.

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A defence strategy for a European state that is both EU and NATO member should be in accordance with the security requirements of those organisations, while also in harmony with the domestic characteristics that define our country’s role within those organisations.

Europe 2020 strategy, adopted by the European Commission in 2010, is aimed at smart and sustainable growth, with an obvious focus on economic development, the concept being also applicable to security and defence.

NATO’s smart defence concept is rather limited to sharing capabilities, coordinating priorities and efforts in the military sphere, as it is the nature of the Alliance itself. But domestically, in implementing an ambitious National Defence Strategy, it should be considered the extended applicability of the concept of smart power, developed by Joseph Nye, which includes all areas of a country’s social, economic and military existence, in order to promote its security and interests.

Keywords: power; strategy; objectives; resources; globalisation;
Strategy is also a good opportunity for security institutions to review their own objectives, priorities, action strategies, in order to achieve those objectives and, why not, even reassess the required resources. This is also a good time to open new communication channels with the academic and R&D environment, in order for theorists and practitioners to productively “clash” ideas.

And although when the 2020-2024 National Defence Strategy was approved, a larger part of the Romanian civil society mainly noticed the bluntness of its references to the Russian Federation as an aggressive and disruptive neighbour, the document also refers to several other aspects that deserve at least similar, if not more attention, and we are required to raise awareness on those, too.

The 2020-2024 National Defence Strategy is a particularly ambitious programmatic document that manages to review a solid part of the issues facing the Romanian society, and not only our society, since some are transnational in nature. It even tries to anticipate some developments. It exposes the current security situation, the EU and NATO membership and the US Strategic Partnership as essential pillars in order to strengthen both our defence capabilities, as well as our domestic capacities. However, and this is the reason I insist on saying it is an actual security strategy, it does not overlook, but rather poignantly identifies the dangers lurking from a much wider array of risks than the military ones, from domestic ones such as those generated by faulty health or education systems, to cross-border threats, which mainly affect Western societies, such as rampant developments in information technology and communications, organised crime, drug and human trafficking, terrorism etc.

The accurate review of the risks and vulnerabilities we are confronted with, as well as the proper placing of Romania within its system of alliances actually consolidating our national power, are both correct and useful in order to increase awareness and to establish operational coherence. In fact, the concept of security strategy itself is not destined to expand on the included subjects, which are rather the object of various subsequent undertakings, including some for scientific systematisation. Security strategies represent rather a basis for an arborescent system, in which the strategy constitutes a starting point for the development of similar, more detailed documents for various fields that present significant risks. The basic security strategy is, therefore, the cornerstone of security, giving coherence in the approach of actionable priorities.

There are those who do not support the need for a strategy, at least concerning national security, and partly with real and solid arguments: no strategy can foresee the unpredictable, and the unpredictable –uncertainty – is among the few constants of our current times. The foremost security shock of our century, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, was not anticipated, there were no predefined measures to prevent it or to alleviate its impact, and the results are known. And “black swans” will continue to exist from the security perspective, regardless if they are generated by the “creativity” of frustrated, malcontent categories, or by unpredictable results – the perverse effects – of IT&C, or of other unknown or too little-known factors.

But strategic documents, beyond their limitations in foreseeing the unforeseeable and their obligations to establish measures to alleviate the potential risks it involves and build resilience, do consider a myriad of other risks that can and should be anticipated. We also have a duty to act in a concerted fashion in order to lessen those risks and to integrate our efforts among institutions, at a national and even international level, in order to patiently build enhanced resilience. Strategic documents are particularly necessary in this regard, because they set common objectives and courses of action for all those who can and will contribute to national security, and, in some particular regards, also to regional and continental security.

And because I have mentioned that the strategy can also be a good opportunity for civil society to reflect on security, it is important to note that, in our current security environment, no such document can solely address state institutions. It is imperative that the strategy should be followed by the identification of the means to fully cooperate with civil society and private businesses.

However, we should be aware that no strategic document by itself is a panacea for all our problems. Without a proper conversion of strategic guidance into actual measures and, moreover, into coherent and concerted actions at all levels of society, as well as within all alliances...
A POWERFUL ROMANIA

What is Power?

After the end of the Cold War, there were constant reconfigurations of power in international relations: from a bipolar world, in which the Soviet bloc confronted the Western one on various battlefields, except the military one, to the unipolar world thereafter, in which a single superpower, the United States of America, would gain dominance over several aspiring ones, to a potential global society with multiple power poles, in which the USA seems to continue to keep the military dominance, but in turn lose from the economic pull and even legitimacy, influence and credibility in favour of more and more aspiring contenders to the global super-power status.

So, what does Romania actually aspire to when it sets out to become a powerful state? To the super-power status? It seems highly unlikely, to be honest. To the regional economic power status? To military power? It all depends on what we understand by “power”.

In order to establish a common perspective on the term, a definition of the coveted status of power could be useful. The Romanian Explanatory Dictionary (2009) mentions the basic meaning of power as “being able, having capacity, merit, physical, moral, intellectual possibility to act, to achieve something”. Several other meanings are also mentioned, among which “physical strength”, as well as “effectiveness” and “authority, domination, reign” and even “influence”, “capability, potential”, therefore a sum of characteristics, some desirable for a constitutional, democratic state, a partner in international alliances and organisations, while others seem rather attractive to a different type of state. For example, influence can be desirable, regardless of the type of state, but it is not necessary power, same as strength, particularly military strength, does not necessarily bring power to its owner, at least not in this age in history. I also think the term “potential” cannot be excluded from analysis, although reality has proven on numerous occasions that having potential does not necessarily equal harnessing it.

And although there is no generally accepted definition of a state’s power in international relations, I think a good start for pinpointing the term is its first dictionary meaning, which directly relates owning power to being able to achieve the desired objectives. In other words, a powerful state is a state able to achieve its legitimate strategic objectives, ultimately materialised in the security, freedom, and welfare of its citizens.

However, as with the Strategy, which is only a theoretical document and needs to be enforceable and, moreover, enforced in order to prove its usefulness, from setting objectives to actually attaining them and to gaining the status of a powerful nation we need to take several successive, coherent steps, which are also conditioned by multiple factors, some of them subjective. This is wherein differences occur among various researchers interested in accurately defining power.

For example, Hannah Arendt, influential thinker of the previous century, assesses that “power springs up among men when they act together”, a notion which also applies to the state power concept, but insufficient to define it completely. First of all, we need to identify the manners in which people can be determined to act together, and, at state level, it seems pretty obvious that the highest potential to become real influencers, able to have an impact over all social areas and structures, belongs to those making the rules, namely state authorities. Able politicians, showing strategic thinking, vision, and potentially some charisma, are a must, but not sufficient to build and consolidate state power.

Does the fact that a state has a cohesive society, participative private businesses, and coherent state authorities that act in a concerted fashion guarantee its power? Is the cohesion of a military, political, economic or any other type of transnational alliance, even under directions from a strategic, visionary leadership, enough to ensure the achievement of its targeted objectives? It seems unlikely,
if another *sine qua non* prerequisite is not met: having the necessary resources.

But what constitutes a power resource nowadays? The human resource, in order to genuinely add value, needs education. And even educated people who do not believe in the ideas of the state or in the legitimacy of its purposes cannot have the good morale to generate maximum results, therefore other factors can influence the human resource, too.

Military power involves the need for weapons. Weapons currently mean technology with all due consequences, which are not completely advantageous to the owner. And technology is also based on the human resource’s creativity and education.

From an economic perspective, the power resources also have other connotations: on the one hand, the human resource is essential in this regard, too, from obvious reasons. On the other hand, a while ago, during the modern age, natural and military resources, when ideally combined, meant power. Currently, however, the stress shifts towards informational resources, without neglecting natural resources, of course, while also involving knowledge and creativity, which are useful in order to replicate or substitute them. In other words, the need for human resources is still prominent.

In order to draw closer to the theory of neo-liberalism founder, Joseph Nye Jr., “power is a state’s ability to achieve its targeted objectives with the available resources, through strategic thinking and visionary leadership, as well as through capitalisation on all contextual developments in the local and global society”.

To sum up, a state that owns resources, both material, such as natural or technological ones, and immaterial, such as ideas or social values, also needs strategies – the theory – and statesmen, the actors able to act on pre-defined strategies, to correctly asses the domestic and international context and to support active measures in order to achieve state objectives, at all levels: from military defence, to constructing a healthy economy, to an educated and productive civil society, to a safe environment for human development etc.

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**What is a Powerful State?**

I believe it would be utopian to imagine that one nation alone can have all the above-mentioned elements: all types of resources and the full capacity to convert them into strategic objectives, and that only such nation can become a truly powerful state.

Theoretically, the realist perspective assesses that a state’s power comes almost exclusively from its military force, as states in the international system are actors trying to keep their independence and security through force and coercion, in other words, through *hard* power.

Nye reminds readers on various occasions of Napoleon Bonaparte’s military and power strategy, since he was an advocate of the idea that “God is on the side of the big battalions”.

However, (post-)modern wars are no longer fought with big battalions, at least not in the literal meaning, and modern states’ power policies tend to be replaced, in the post-modern world, by a policy of cooperation.

Other theoreticians use a different terminology referring to states that base their power on military force and act on the international scene only considering “raison d’État”. Robert Cooper, for example, considers this type of state organisation as specific to the modern age, while post-modern states, exponents of a *new world order*.

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2 The post-modern world is only a part of the world we live in, in which, according to Robert Cooper’s theory, the post-modern states coexist with the modern and archaic ones.

3 An age which is not over, but coexists with the post-modern one.

4 Frequently mocked by contemporary thinkers as “the new world dis-order.”
and a notion particular to the European continent and project, are rather cooperative and partnership-based, showing “an advanced system of mutual involvement in domestic policies” (Cooper, 2007, p.53), a system of complex interdependencies wherein the distinctions between internal and external are blurred and military force is never the go to solution for resolving disputes6.

The neo-liberal notion, of which Joseph Nye is a prominent advocate, completes Cooper’s, assessing that, in international relations, a powerful state is a state with multiple interdependencies among multiple actors, some of which are even non-state actors, such as in the case of the alliances which define both our position on the international stage and our attitudes and measures in given situations.

In this complex context of network-type interdependencies, a powerful state is not necessarily the one holding the most and best weapons, but rather the one managing to promote its own agenda and to achieve the targeted strategic objectives without using force, through an attractive and persuasive narrative that does not coerce nor manipulate.

Nye does not deny the importance of military power for a state’s general capacity to achieve strategic objectives, but rather seems to not think of it as primordial, nor as a source of power, in itself, unless combined with other soft power variables.

For that reason, the use of hard power in the post-modern world is limited by other arguments, too: the human resource is limited, social ideologies no longer value military violence as a solution for conflict resolution, and the typology of conflicts also tends to make violence an aggravating factor, instead of an alleviating one.

6 Nevertheless, this last slightly idealistic vision tends to be more and more frequently contradicted by reality, as cohesion of the European project seems to weaken and it is undermined by discording interests – generally, economic ones, but also by emerging values such as the so-called illiberal ones, which are contrary to the democratic, founding ones.

The novelty Nye brings in the theory of power relations is a more adequate definition of post-modern power instruments, as defined by Cooper. Nye discusses power instruments as results of a mix of hard power, which is military power, and “carrots and sticks” policy, meaning coercion and financial stimulation, and achieving strategic objectives without force or coercion, through a certain power of attraction, of co-opting others in common projects and persuading them, without using manipulation or propaganda, to align their own agenda to one’s own through the force of the arguments, institutions, economy, civil society of the powerful state. All those latter concepts rally under the term of soft power (figure no. 2) (Ibid.).

Only an adequate mix of soft and hard power can make a truly powerful, smart state. The National Defence Strategy is a good starting point for Romania’s development towards the status of a powerful state. Some institutions thinking in cooperation have managed to achieve through this strategic document an almost photographic image of the domestic and external context. However, I appreciate that unless an appropriate manner to convert all types of resources Romania has – from the natural ones, to territorial, to population, technology, to NATO and EU membership itself – into strategic objectives, we will not be able to construct a smart, powerful state. For example, developing military capabilities for a NATO member state as Romania is logical only when correlated with similar actions of the Alliance partners as well as with modern technology. Acquiring frigates to ensure Black Sea security would be rather obsolete in our decade, given the defensive and surveillance possibilities ensured by state-of-the-art technologies.
The context in which states evolve is not always easy to read properly, in order to make anticipative decisions and to use only the minimum necessary resources. From a security perspective, the context is an extremely complex environment that incorporates many variables, from international relations, in which different entities relate based on different principles and not everyone follows the same rules, to domestic policy, which has determined more internal, violent conflicts in the last decade than traditional wars, and to state-of-the-art technology risks and benefits.

I consider that the endeavour to build a smart Romanian state is not utopian. To prove it, I believe Romania post 9/11 has proved to be a smart state, consistently following its strategic objectives, NATO and EU accession. Under those circumstances, Romania managed to considerably strengthen its defence capacity against one of the most serious threats of the decade, the terrorist threat. Through concerted actions by political decision-makers, the legislative, developing institutions, Romania defined a solid legal framework to prevent and counter terrorism. A cascade of laws and Supreme Council for National Defence decisions were enacted in a concerted fashion: from the national strategy to prevent and counter terrorism (2002), to the law regarding foreigners in Romania (2001), a law regarding the prevention and countering the financial and banking system’s use to finance terrorism (2002), the law on preventing and countering terrorism (2004), to the development of the national system for preventing and countering terrorism (2002) and of the national system for terrorist alert (2004). Some of those may only seem simple regulations and bureaucratic institutions or structures to some, but the result of their establishment and development and of their proper functioning was that the Romanian state achieved a much-coveted objective of securing its homeland and citizens from the terrorist threat, while also projecting regional security and helping secure other states, by sharing intelligence and capabilities.

The current National Defence Strategy may also prove a winning bet to strengthen our state power as well as regional security and balance, but only with actual measures of converting resources into power, at least similar to those made after 9/11: from updating legislation to coordination and cooperation among state institutions, with civil society and private businesses, to well-funded and timely procurement programmes that conclude before the necessary technologies become obsolete, and so on.

**TWO POWER RESOURCES**

An overview of all power resources, in all their complexity and with all their variables, would be a difficult enterprise. However, I would like to briefly dwell on two of those resources, which I consider to be of a significant influence over the world we live in, concerning both international relations and internal affairs.

**Globalisation**

Globalisation is the topic of many studies, discussions and research activities, far too numerous and with far too dissenting conclusions to overview at this point. But from a power and power relations perspective, globalisation is both a resource, and a game changer, an element which constantly alters order in international relations and not only. And I use the term “alter” purposefully, because the changes globalisation brings about are not always positive ones.

From an international power perspective, globalisation offers unprecedented possibilities to use soft power instruments. Products such as blue-jeans and Coca-Cola have done more, in some analysts’ opinion, for the end of the Cold War than decades of diplomacy and mutual military threats from the belligerents, even though, at that time, globalisation was only at the beginning.

Globalisation “inevitably leads to the transfer of power towards many different actors moving very dynamically in the international system, albeit state or non-state actors, meaning non-governmental organisations, private actors that are already particularly powerful” (Maior, 2014, p. 79). This continuous shift of power involves interdependencies at all levels, from the military to the security one, to diplomacy, society, and even religion.

The "global village" relational system is, as reminded, a network in which power constantly shifts between actors. The network nodes are significant variables in this system, because they tend to have...
Globalisation provided Romania with a new set of resources it did not have before: economic resources, cooperation, technology, military resources, environment preservation ones, education and so on. A good example of a resource stemmed from globalisation and from the new network organisation of international relations, based on joint objectives and interests, is the very opportunity we, as a state, had, to become members in select partnerships, which can support us in becoming power-nodes in international relations, for example as a NATO member state, in the particular instance of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the theory of network power-relations, any state able to mediate a conflict or that has open communication channels to the belligerent parties – as Romania is, through its historical tradition – has significant negotiation leverage, as well as influence and power. And membership in more such partnership networks, either military, economic, global or local ones, is a good manner of accumulating a form of power specific to the globalised world, because it gives states the possibility to promote their agendas in more various environments. Romania’s NATO and EU accession is, in this regard, both a good premise and an excellent resource for our country to acquire the status of a powerful state.

**INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND COMMUNICATIONS**

A field as dynamic as globalisation and one directly related to globalisation is that of technology, which currently undergoes rapid and radical development. It is so obvious that it becomes difficult to argue why IT&C is an invaluable resource for a state’s power. Emerging technologies such as 5G or 6G, artificial intelligence, the internet of things or big data analysis are essential both domestically, at society level, and from a security and military defence perspective. States, societies, individuals, national and trans-national organisations of all types, they all depend on IT&C for a wide array of activities, from those securing the most basic needs, to the most sophisticated ones. We all depend on IT&C resources for our financial or banking needs, for transportation, including for the transportation of energy and other resources.

Technology brings about unprecedented vulnerabilities that were unknown in other historical contexts. It exposes us to cyber-attacks, cyber spying, denial-of-service (DoS) attacks and so on. An expert report on the future NATO 2020 Strategic Concept places cyber-attacks as the third most significant risk to allied states, after ballistic and terrorist attacks.

IT&C technologies also support critical infrastructures, and they are increasingly vulnerable as the field develops, because they are more interdependent and cover wider areas. A legend circulating in the national intelligence community says a famous intelligence agency from a neighbouring state continues to produce all documents concerning its operations exclusively on paper, in order to protect them from technological vulnerabilities.

But the solution to alleviate those vulnerabilities does not seem to be in avoiding technology as, without it, opponents will always have the competitive advantage. This resource provides significant, unmissable opportunities, and the state-of-the-art technology’s competitive advantage, even if temporary – for an undeniable characteristic of the field is the rate of replacement and update – is unquestionable, particularly in the military sphere, for which it provides both defensive (critical infrastructures protection) and offensive (physical destruction or cyber warfare) capabilities.

Technology is an essential resource for a country’s soft power and a fundamental component of its hard power, because obviously there cannot be any performing armed forces unless they have sophisticated weaponry. Therefore, technology becomes an essential premise for a smart power and needs to be constantly allotted resources.

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4. A cyber-attack in which the perpetrators seek to make a network resource or an online service unavailable to its intended users, thus temporarily disrupting services of a host connected to the Internet.
for protection and further development. From a hard power perspective, state-of-the-art technology involves an optimal mix between IT&C specialists, who often come from the private business areas, hence the debate about the “privatisation of war”, and security specialists, generally coming from state coercing institutions. This resource also involves convergence between military and civilian technologies, while developing in a less than ideal space, with very few rules and systematisation, which is often a major hindrance for those working with technology.

In several contexts, the National Defence Strategy mentions risks and opportunities, which need to be considered from this point of view, as it should be, and in accordance to similar programmatic documents from other countries. Protecting critical IT&C infrastructures, building their resilience, the perspectives occurring from the use of new technologies such as cryptocurrency, blockchain, AI for objectives undermining security, such as those pertaining to organised crime, cyber-attacks from enemy state or non-state entities, are concerns included in the current strategy. A particular point from the IT&C development perspective and of interest for the military component of power Romania aims at is that concerning 5G technology. The fifth generation of wireless networks allows for data transfer at speeds three times higher than those of the previous generation.

Implementing 5G involves, in Romania as elsewhere, debates on espionage suspicions towards one of the largest suppliers of 5G equipment, a renowned Chinese company, but not enough is said and analysed about how it could greatly benefit military defence. The sheer speed of the technology allows for real-time data processing and transfer, which have undeniable advantages for the military and could result in a series of significant military applications. Among them, sensor border surveillance, artificial intelligence for data analysis, unmanned military vehicles storing data in cloud, automatization of logistical processes such as loading and unloading trucks, trains and/or military planes etc.

Figure no. 3 (Nye, Ibid.) suggests a summary of 5G advantages from a military perspective, emphasising its use for command and control, personnel training and protection of critical IT&C infrastructures.

Making use of IT&C capabilities and developing them have the potential of building our status as a powerful state and of creating new cyber capabilities. But this can only be feasible on certain conditions, of concerted and coherent action, with the consistent input of the private business area, which tends to absorb more responsibilities and has more resources to develop technology. And a first step in this direction, for Romania, would also involve better coordination between the National Defence Strategy and the National Cyber Security Strategy, which was approved in 2013.

Developments regarding the Integrated Information System, the National CYBERINT Centre’s capabilities, internet speed and its wide coverage, software development are just a few more arguments that Romania has the premises and resources to aspire to the status of powerful state.

INSTEAD OF CONCLUSIONS

Returning to Joseph Nye’s conclusions, power is not an absolute term, but one depending on context, “and in the context of transnational relations (such as climate change, illegal drugs, pandemics, and terrorism) power is diffuse and chaotically distributed”. The type of problems which are specific to the current age need cooperative solutions and Romania already has a number of instruments through which it is placed directly within the systems responsible to solve those problems, by its NATO and EU membership.
In this new National Defence Strategy, we have an anticipatory and complete image of the Romanian state’s security responsibilities, but we still need to make coherent and determined efforts at all institutional levels (in defence, public order and national security), as well as social and political ones. We need to give effect to a set of complex practical measures to respond to those security concerns, in order to consolidate our status as a smart power, but we are all aware this is not a simple endeavour, nor a walked road.

The fact that Romania has not had any strategic surprise until now and our country’s capacity to act pre-emptively in front of disruptive events entitle us to hope we are on the right path towards achieving this status. Should we, on the contrary, not be willing to go the extra mile in implementing actual practical measures, warning must be issued that, in this particular context, in which threats and risks are highly dynamic and closely interconnected, increasing uncertainty and implicitly decreasing prognosis capabilities, we risk generating new social vulnerabilities, particularly by affecting fundamental infrastructures and institutions, with effects that are difficult to assess and quantify.

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The retrograde, puritanical and belligerent ideologies may seem anachronistic, related to the specificity of the 21st century. The need for understanding the reality augmented by the emergence of new forms of manifestation in international relations is materialised by transposing novelty elements into strategic models specific to the current century. A concrete example is the use, within specialised circles, of the concept of "smart power", an intelligent combination of punitive actions with the ability of persuasion. This concept incorporates, in a unitary conception, aimed at identifying the optimal solution to ensure strategic success, the specific elements of soft and hard power.

Another aspect of everyday reality is the significant use of cyberspace as a means of facilitating the process of fulfilling the goals in different areas of activity, respectively at different levels of society. In this regard, in this paper, the role of the cyber environment in achieving the specific objectives of implementing the strategic concept of "smart power" will be addressed.

Keywords: strategic concept; smart power; soft power; hard power; cyberspace;

INTRODUCTION

The paradigm of current worldly existence encompasses several issues of interest that reveal the inconsistency of international relations. The uninterrupted evolution of the technological field has led (and leads) to the intercalation of spheres of power, the picture of dominant actors at regional or global level integrates more and more roles, and the international geopolitical scene is subject to an extensive process of transformation and continuous updating at the level of emerging technologies that provide individuals/groups with new sources of power.

The concept of power is a carefully debated topic since ancient times, the desire to have it representing a personal or collective goal that has been the basis of many conflicts throughout history. Interestingly, although intensely coveted, it has not belonged to anyone except for short periods, representing a real "philosopher's stone" of interpersonal relationships, regardless of the period to which the action relates. In this regard, the beginning of the current century is marked by a series of analyses of this concept, meant to shed light on the obscurity that characterised the global balance of power specific to the previous century. Thus, two master concepts have been developed in international literature: soft power and hard power. From the combination, in the recent period, in variable proportions, of elements specific to each of the two concepts, the notion of smart power resulted.

One of the many resources available to international actors that can be used to gain power, in its various forms, is cyberspace. Being a field characterised by a strong evolution in recent decades, as well as a complexity that generates new security challenges, locally, regionally and internationally, this resource facilitates the acquisition of a certain level of power, regarding certain areas of activity that, more often than not, generates a state of instability that can be materialised later by the appearance of different conflict situations.
In this regard, this paper aims to make a brief analysis of how the tools specific to the cyber environment can be and are used to achieve what today is considered to be a strategic model for the current century: smart power. The premise from which the proposed analysis starts is that cyberspace (especially the actions conducted here) facilitates, to an overwhelming extent, the emergence of new centres of power that, in other specific situations, can lead to intercalation of areas of influence and, implicitly, to new conflicts. Alternatively, a second premise, derived from the first, is that the puritanical and exclusive use of tools specific to soft or hard power does not reflect the everyday reality, requiring an intelligent combination of the two forms of power, augmented by the use of cyberspace as a propagation tool.

From a methodological point of view, the analysis method is the most used, followed in second place by the descriptive method, both being used in order to present the main aspects relevant to the subject of the paper. At the same time, the method of bibliographic study was used to identify the most relevant ideas for the central theme of the paper. At the same time, the method of bibliographic study was used to identify the most relevant ideas for the central theme of the paper. Last but not least, the case study method was used to reflect on the role that cyberspace plays in the existential forms of today’s society, on the one hand, as well as to identify a concrete example of the application of smart power through cyberspace on the population from a concrete geographical area and the analysis of the effects generated by this fact, on the other hand.

THE NEED FOR TRANSITION FROM “HARD” AND “SOFT” TO “SMART”

Centuries have been marked by the need of the people to ensure an optimal level (own and subjective) of power, leading to widespread recognition of their oppressive capacity. In this regard, history, since ancient times, offers a vast number of relevant examples that attest to the fact that, through force and punitive actions, a certain individual/group can impose its point of view in front of other individuals/groups against their will. The ability to impose the will of an actor in front of a “target” without its express will characterises the form of hard power.

Persuasion tools, actions that are part of the soft power concept (Nye, 1990, p. 167).

At a first glance, the two concepts seem to be interdependent but, in essence, they are interconnected and complement each other, so that the final objectives are successfully met. The exhaustive use of hard power-specific tools does not guarantee success or hegemony at various levels of daily activity, whether military or civilian. On the other hand, soft power is a continuation of hard power, an extension with which the application of force can determine the expected result. It is hard to imagine that the resources and tools specific to soft power can be used alone, without benefiting from a strong boost given by the hard power.

A good example of the above-mentioned fact is the United States of America. In recent decades, much of the world’s population has embraced elements of the culture specific to the United States of America, which has generated what is known as the so-called “American dream”. This emerging culture has become prolific in many parts of the world, but especially on the European continent, as a result of the spread of a large number of symbols through movies, songs, clothing styles, food brands etc. In this way, the soft power of the USA has registered an overwhelming increase on different levels, but it is unlikely that these elements can cause a major change in the daily life of a potential US opponent. Even if these cultural resources can become tools of persuasion, in certain contextual situations, they cannot cause major changes in the opponent’s decision-making spectrum.

Moreover, soft power is a dichotomous element formed by resources specific to the cultural field, on the one hand, and to the ideological sphere, on the other hand. By manoeuvring in the range of human sensations and perceptions, unexpected results can be achieved, even dangerous ones if they are not carefully analysed.

Soft power is a dichotomous element formed by resources specific to the cultural field, on the one hand, and to the ideological sphere, on the other hand. By manoeuvring in the range of human sensations and perceptions, unexpected results can be achieved, even dangerous ones if they are not carefully analysed.
certain premises that favour different behaviours of some actors that, analysed from different angles, do not constitute examples to follow in international relations. In the post-Cold War period, a large number of states have turned to the democratic values specific to the West, their population seeing in the USA a model to follow, wanting to vote, to be able to express themselves freely, to have the right to an opinion etc. At the same time, at the economic level, the USA managed to introduce in the collective mentality the concept of the free market, which took root and developed exponentially mainly in the European space. All the mentioned elements contribute to the formation of what is called soft power.

Although these aspects can change and shape the destinies of some state actors (countries such as Turkey, with a different set of values and cultural-moral beliefs, have adhered to the Western vision) or non-state ones, without the existence of the hard power would not have been possible the existence of the soft one. The predominant use of soft power in recent decades has led to the emergence of hybrid actions whose results have generated surprises at the strategic level. The main weapon specific to soft power – the use of the Internet and social media – has become, these days, a kind of boomerang, being currently used by other actors against its originators. Thus, the beginning of the third decade of the current century is marked by a reorientation of the main actors, be they state, non-state or supra-state, towards elements specific to hard power.

The current reality shows us that the importance of hard power is starting to grow again. The coming to power of iconic leaders revealed their desire for power, especially for the quantifiable, measurable and controllable one. So, worldwide, the geopolitical situation is marked by the existence of three major centres of hard power: the USA, China and Russia. Through economic and financial coercive instruments, the USA demonstrates its level of power both over state actors such as North Korea, China, Russia and Iran, and over non-state actors (by using punitive laws in the economic field by which it issues sanctions against companies from different countries that have trade relations with different groups or third countries that act against the US desideratum). On the other hand, the Beijing leadership has shown, over the last decade, a growing desire to use hard power on state actors such as the United States of America or Taiwan. Last but not least, Russia is a concrete example of the use of hard instruments to achieve its own goals, by using military force in the Syrian campaign and changing the fate of the country’s civil war according to the vision of the Moscow leadership.

At the same time, there are countries whose hard power is relatively small but which, in terms of beliefs, declared (and undeclared) objectives, interests and capabilities, can create conflict situations with surprising results both regionally and globally. In the Far East, North Korea remains a noteworthy player, as its leader seems willing to take a wide range of actions so that the country does not have to make concessions on its ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programme. Closer to the European continent, in the immediate vicinity of Romania, another important player, Turkey, displays its capacity and desire to use hard power in order to achieve its objectives, especially those related to both energy resources, in front of state actors such as Greece and Cyprus, as well as cultural ones, in front of non-state actors (such as the group called PKK – Kurdistan Workers’ Party).

Between soft and hard power, in addition to their defining aspects, there are several features that, in some places, make a possible interconnection of these two concepts and the tools needed to apply them in the spectrum of current reality. First, the purpose of hard power is to obtain a high level of persuasion of the opponent by coercion, by using military capabilities or by threatening to use them; on the other hand, soft power has impregnated strong cognitive-affective specificities, seeking to shape perceptions, sensations, attitudes, by using a complex persuasive apparatus. At the same time, the actions specific to hard power generate a series of long-term effects that can affect the internal situation within, for example, a state actor, while soft power is implemented subtly, gradually, generating inner movements in the cognitive-emotional spectrum of targeted groups.

Concluding the ideas presented above, although soft power was perceived as a new tactic, mainly by state and supra-state actors, to achieve their own goals without the use of brute force and large-scale conflicts, reality shows that hard power is still used by various states or groups in overwhelming proportions, and this fact does not seem to be changed soon. In the recent past, the western
part of the world has shown that hard power is the main factor that ensures, in the short and medium-term, the success of operations. An example of the above-mentioned idea is represented by the missions carried out by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation in Afghanistan, which, given the level and specificity of threats in the theatre of operations, have generated the need to use force against the Taliban. Taking into account the past of the Afghan territory, which can be considered a crematorium of occupational ambitions specific to the great powers, it is very unlikely that the problems in this country will be solved by using soft power. Therefore, a possible solution for solving security problems on the international agenda is to combine the two types of power intelligently, leading to the so-called smart power (Raimzhanova, 2015, p. 14).

The need for transition from the separate use of specific hard and soft power tools to their use in a unitary, intelligent conception, specific to the 21st century, is based on the following aspects:

- Concerning the exclusive use of hard power, it is difficult to achieve, given the high level of technology that major players have managed to achieve. Although the fear of using nuclear weapons in the context of a world war remains an element of foreign policy preferred by countries having nuclear warheads to the detriment of those that do not, their use is very unlikely due to the retaliation to which the aggressor state could be subjected. On the other hand, the excessive modernisation of the world’s armed forces is a reality that began about a decade ago, when the Russian Federation announced the start of a comprehensive programme to modernise the armed forces, when the People’s Republic of China began equipping the armed forces with modern technical elements, when the United States of America publicly recognised the emergence of a new confrontational environment – cyberspace – and the need to improve military structures in the context of conducting operations in the new operational domain. Moreover, other state or non-state actors have embarked on a race to modernise and renew military equipment, to provide combat and combat support elements, which settles the idea that hard power is at the heart of actions leading to achieving the proposed goals. However, even the most modern armed forces have encountered problems in the conflicts that marked the beginning of the current century (the USA in Iraq, NATO in Afghanistan, the Russian Federation in the conflict against Georgia in 2008) against states with limited material resources, technical assets and personnel.

- Concerning the exclusive use of soft power, the process of implementing actions leading to the achievement of certain strategic level objectives is a long one, which involves a considerable effort and great finesse, in several directions of action, and which does not always generate the expected effects. Secondly, for the results of the actions to be directly proportional to the level of expectations, it is necessary to exert a considerable financial effort to support the steps taken. At the same time, the tools specific to soft power must be used on each of the three component categories: cultural, political and foreign policy development (Yavuzaslan, Kymes, Cetin, Murat, 2016, p. 7). Culture is the primary element around which the main effort must be concentrated, being a particularly valuable resource that can determine the impact the persuasive actions of an actor can have on the target or can generate a level of resilience of the target population to any specific tool of the soft power used by one group against another.

- Summing up the above, the current reality finds the world in a continuous turmoil and power struggle, in which various actors have embarked on an indefinite race to stop the hegemony of the United States of America, which began at the end of the period specific to the Cold War. In this regard, there is a possibility that the current global geopolitical configuration will change, the balance of power tilting more and more to one side or the other, depending on the new technological discoveries in various fields, the doctrinal and legislative changes that generate new sources of power, the appearance/disappearance/reappearance in other forms of different non-state actors and their temporary introduction at the negotiating table etc. Therefore, as the new specific conflicts demonstrate, the solitary application of the elements specific to hard power does not guarantee the achievement of success and the achievement of objectives, being necessary the application with much tact, responsibility and knowledge of soft power tools.

The combination of the two forms of power in a unitary, complex and intelligent conception can generate special effects that will lead to the achievement of success with the minimum use of violence.
and the reduction of the loss of financial, human and material resources. An example in this regard, which surprised the whole world, from ordinary people to the best trained politico-military analysts, is the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by the Russian Federation since 2014. This manoeuvre is a paradigm of how, by intelligently and combined application of tools specific to soft (with a sufficiently long period before the onset of physical actions) and hard power, it is possible to achieve particularly important geostrategic successes.

**THE IMPORTANCE OF USING CYBERSPACE AS A SOFT AND HARD POWER AMPLIFYING TOOL**

Cyberspace is the environment “created by the interconnection of millions of computers by a global network such as the Internet; made as a layered construction, in which the physical elements allow a logical interconnection framework; which allows the processing, manipulation, exploitation, augmentation of information and human-information interaction; activated through intermediation and institutional organisation; characterised by decentralisation and interaction between actors, constituencies and interests”. (Choucri, 2013, p. 4).

In this regard, cyberspace represents the interaction between people, technology and the processes that take place within these systems. Of these three elements, the actions specific to soft power are performed against the human component, by using manipulation and disinformation techniques related to the particularities of the target groups.

Mass manipulation is a desideratum of different actors on the world geopolitical scene, which can be achieved by using tools specific to cyberspace, in general, and to social media, in particular. The specificity of the cyber environment to allow the processing and manipulation of information, corroborated with the intention of the actors to misinform or manipulate the masses, can lead to a combination of these elements depending on the purpose.

Contemporary society is characterised by the excessive use of technologies that allow connecting with other people through social media. This aspect undoubtedly leads to an excessive connection of the person with the virtual environment which, sometimes, can be altered by other people by injecting false news, on the one hand, or by hyperbolising different elements, which can lead either to manipulation or to misinformation (between which there is a close connection), on the other hand.

The arbitrary actions performed in cyberspace represent the engine of the “aggregate” that supports the soft power. One such example is represented by the actions performed by the leadership in states where the communist sentiment is the main axis of development of society. Over the last decades, these types of leadership have registered, from the way of thinking and subjugating the population, two evolutionary stages. In the first stage, characterised by a strong influence of the desire to have elements specific to hard power, the population either had no access to information at all, or the information content was so strongly filtered and censored that the state leadership had total control over its population. Over time, the evolving explosion of technology has generated a continuous influx of high-performance communication systems, as well as the emergence of new types of social platforms through which a rich and varied information content could be transmitted. The second evolutionary stage is represented by the notification of the potential manipulation of the population, both their own and the conventional adversary, through socialisation platforms and social media. In this way, the leadership of these states managed to obtain a high level of soft power, which they corroborated with the specific tools of hard power used until then.

Moreover, cyberspace has several features that increase the importance of its use as a means of implementing the concept of soft power. To influence the masses, cyberspace is used as a vector of perpetuation in which, through different technologies, actions that can reverberate and cause different effects in other operational environments are performed, on the one hand, but which have also the ability to shape perceptions, sensations and beliefs, on the other hand. The interconnectivity that characterises the devices that use this global network is a particularly important feature, because a certain type of informational content is created/modified within the cyberspace and then provided to a varied number of users. At the same time, another peculiarity of cyberspace is its stratification. At its base are human beings, who establish both the technological framework and the information core, while also representing the beneficiaries...
of this resource. The second layer is represented by the physical elements that form the existential framework of cyberspace, consisting of both the technological part (equipment, devices, transmission media – cables, optical fibre etc.) and the logical one (the strings of bits in the form of which information is stored). The third layer is represented by the informational content, in different forms of processing and storage (Kuehl, 2009, pp. 7-8). The last two layers are the way of injecting the informational content with fragments whose destination is the manipulation/misinformation of those who form the basis of the cyber pyramid. Through the use of these persuasion tools intelligently, continuously and directly proportional to the level of resilience of the target groups, aiming at achieving well-established objectives, a high level of the triumph of the beliefs and desires of cyber actors over the target groups is ensured.

On the other hand, when cyberspace is seen as the environment of confrontation between different state, non-state or supra-state actors, it is a tool specific to hard power. Characterised by a concomitant evolution of physical and logical infrastructure with threats, risks and vulnerabilities to it, cyberspace has become the operational environment ruled by people, in which interactions between them generate different conflicts that can lead, depending on the objectives, to cyber-attacks, espionage, sabotage, subversion etc. By exploiting existing vulnerabilities both physically and logically, the human component generates and implements aspects specific to hard power, including both the human side (internal attacks, insider, human error, social engineering) and hardware (actions against electronic circuits, implementation of viruses leading to overheating, respectively equipment failure) as well as software (viruses, worms, operating scripts etc.).

More often than not, these actions are part of an integrated, complex and varied conception, which can take the form of cyber warfare. Everyday reality shows that cyberspace actions carried out by one state against other states are no longer a novelty, with many such attacks taking place every day, mainly because the physical distance between them, which requires hours/days of travel and early detection of the attack, decreases to the level of seconds, in most cases being almost impossible/very difficult to identify an ongoing attack, block it and initiate an appropriate response. This can also be seen in the fact that states, as main actors on the cyber scene, invest a wide range of resources (financial, human, temporal) to ensure a sufficient level of protection, related to current cyber threats as well as to create a wide range of offensive options, both for deterrence and for countermeasures in the event of imminent cyber-attacks. In this regard, “after years of defence, governments are creating their offensive capabilities to attack … All of this is part of a secret, hidden arms race in which countries spend billions of dollars to create new armies and digital weapon stocks” (Ranger, 2014, p. 11). The examples of the last decade of using cyber actions in order to achieve certain military or politico-military objectives are the reason why it is quite conclusive that humanity is facing a new technological revolution at the centre of which is cyberspace, which will provide sufficient resources to shape the way future conflicts unfold, on the one hand, and to provide the various cyber actors with a level of hard, soft or smart power related to their investments, on the other hand.

THE RELATION BETWEEN CYBERSPACE AND SMART POWER – CASE STUDY –

The need for transition from anachronistic forms of power to “intelligent” power, respectively its application in current fields of activity that determine different effects in the sphere of international relations, is a desideratum that converges with the desire of different actors of micro or macro level to play an important role on the world stage.

For example, the People’s Republic of China currently has some of the best-developed levers for sharing hardware and software tools in order to achieve integrated control over the informational content to which the population has access (Figure no. 1).

As it can be seen in figure no. 1, the specific elements of soft power are interconnected with those of hard power, in a unitary design, capable of ensuring a high level of control over the population. From the perspective of hard power-specific tools, it can be seen a wide range of actions that are directed against the population, actions that target a wide range of fields of activity: economic, political, technological, etc. Adjacently, direct control over the population can be determined
by the use of soft power-specific tools, by outlining educational and cultural models that lead to the exercise of a permanent, subconscious and indirect control over the target groups. This indirect control, as a form of soft power, can generate long-term changes at the cognitive level that can outline a psychological profile based on certain framework ideologies and norms established following the vision of actors using tools specific to this type of power, a profile that materialises in everyday reality through self-censorship actions both individually and on information that is not directly controlled by the competent authorities. At the same time, a level of self-censorship that ensures a degree of acute receptivity can generate a direct control over the people around the individual target of the indirect control from the incipient phase, generating a cascade effect characteristic to the soft power.

As a consequence of the fact that cyberspace is the result of evolving stages in technology, the main ways in which Beijing’s leadership uses censorship as the first control tool specific to hard power are the Great Firewall – a protocol that prevents people from accessing the foreign websites, the Golden Shield – a system used to monitor how the population uses cyberspace and access/post content, respectively the Keyword Blocking System – used to block informational content in which certain keywords are previously selected by system administrators, both at the network and the application level (Mongillo, 2016, pp. 162-163).

Moreover, the Beijing administration announced, in 2014, the implementation of a population scoring system based on which each person is scored according to their daily behaviour and, depending on the score at a given time, has part of various rewards and facilities, in case of a high score, or is punished/withdrawn from rights, in case of a low score. A low score leads to the inability of certain individuals to access different organisational levels, to borrow different amounts of money from the bank, or to buy train/plane tickets for business class. At the same time, a low score of parents can lead to a ban on enrolling children in certain schools (Kshetri, 2020, p. 17).

Concluding the above, there is a tendency of the Chinese authorities to ensure the highest possible level of control over the population, probably to ensure the highest level of resilience.
of the Chinese people to any alleged external interference in the internal activities of the Chinese state. This control represents an intelligent combination of punitive and rewarding actions, specific to both hard power (in a higher percentage) and soft power, which, used together in a form as close as possible to the particularities of the current world situation, generates what is called smart power.

It should be noted that, even in this case, one of the vectors for the propagation of different forms of power over the targeted groups is cyberspace. In the case presented above, the fifth operational environment is in the form of three valences:

- channel for the distribution of specific soft power actions – through social platforms, online news channels, instant messaging tools, through which messages with subliminal content are distributed, which at the subconscious level can cause sensory, perceptual or cognitive changes;
- distribution channel for specific hard power actions – by hiring a complex of virtual resources in order to restrict users’ access to some facilities;
- platform for analysing the behaviour of users in the cyber and real space, to provide complex, complete and accurate data on the character of individuals, depending on which punitive or rewarding tools are applied, both in the virtual and real environment.

The Beijing administration’s desire to have the highest possible level of power is not limited only to domestic action, the strategic umbrella of cyberspace covering vast areas of activity in different parts of the world. This desire is anchored, on the one hand, in China’s aspiration to become a superpower in various fields such as the military, economics and politics, and to turn Chinese organisations into international actors at least as important as those from the United States of America.

The Role of Cyberspace in the Application of the Smart Power Concept

of internal social order and the continuity of the leadership regime, conditions the way actions are undertaken domestically, as well as the way of involvement in global initiatives revolving around cyberspace (Bozhkov, 2020, pp. 1-3).

CONCLUSIONS

In the current period, cyberspace is a reality augmented by the impetuous desire of individuals to anchor in virtual space characterised by a lack of borders and, implicitly, a limitation of constraints (at least legal) specific to physical reality. The peculiarities derived from the way of constituting the cyberspace, which lead to the provision of cyber identities different from the real ones, facilitate the appearance of centres of power that, in certain situations, can converge towards the execution of a series of cyber actions with potentially harmful effects on areas of activity such as political, military, economic, social, technological ones. Unlike other operational environments, the virtual confrontation space is the place where weakly equipped actors in real space acquire exceptional forms of power in the cyber environment that, in a geopolitical context, have the ability to strategically capture and overturn a potential conflict in direct proportion to the effort made by the initiators in their favour.

These forms of power, as a whole, represent only the temporary supremacy of an actor, conditioned by the level of financial, technological and expert involvement, within a certain field of interest. Hard power is a desideratum aimed at being fulfilled since ancient times, often being confused with the concept of power itself. On the other hand, focused on the cognitive-affective component, the soft power is conditioned by the gradual performance of manipulative, persuasive actions, which will generate long-term effects and which will facilitate the achievement of the expected result. Analysed separately, the two forms of power can lead to a partial and temporary hegemony in certain areas, generating various, complex and persistent effects. However, the various conflict situations specific to the current century have shown that the single application of the instruments specific to these two types of power has not fully led to the achievement of the proposed objectives, involving a large number of varied resources.
On the other hand, the reality of the last decade has objectively transposed in geopolitics and strategy textbooks the fact that the common use of tools specific to soft and hard power, at certain temporal moments specific to the conflict situation generated by various political, economic, territorial and other objectives, has overwhelmingly guaranteed success. The sharing of elements specific to the two types of power is called smart power. And within this form of power, as well as within the component forms of power, cyberspace has an overwhelming role, having various functions that facilitate the consolidation of the power level at a certain time and generating various effects whose final result is materialised, in case of a conflict situation, in increasing the chances of ensuring success.

In conclusion, the first part of the current century is characterised by a growing need to identify the possibilities of ensuring a level of intelligent power that will propel national interests in the sphere of actions under the auspices of success. Currently, the implementation and continuous development of the fifth operational environment, represented by the cyberspace, favours the emergence of new centres of power whose objectives can be interspersed in different areas of interest and lead to new conflict situations, both in the real environment, as well as in the virtual one. Last but not least, the cyber environment is the modern vector of designing the conditions necessary to be met in order to obtain a level of smart power related to the specificity of the challenges of today’s reality.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:
To date, the potential for addressing hybrid threats through a strong security culture remains underdeveloped, while the nation-wide responses are still lacking clarity and comprehensiveness.

The present paper presents the link between a wide range of emerging threats that are currently challenging countries and institutions and the potential of mitigating such issues through security culture while building and consolidating a resilient national system. Continuously under the threshold of formally declaring warfare, hybrid threats have been demonstrating the futility of responses implicating only institutions with responsibilities in the fields of security and defence.

Subsequently, we argue that cultivating measures, procedures and good practices for boosting security culture through a whole-of-government approach would ensure a useful framework for tackling such challenges, while also aiming for a joint civilian-military response. The hybrid toolbox needs to be pre-empted by active and passive measures, the ability of societies and institutions to bounce back from shocks being sustained by both resilience and robust measures that would enhance civil and military preparedness.

By assessing the rise of hybrid threats and their position in the Russian strategic thinking and comparing the Western doctrines mirroring these challenges, we obtain an overview on the differences in concept and operations further fostering a useful framework.

The thinking behind this type of confrontation has stemmed from the use of guerrilla tactics in the online environment: neutralising the technical-tactical advantage of the opponent, neutralizing the support of the population for military forces, traditional allies or even the government of the target state.

Participants become both state and non-state political actors (individuals or organisations that have significant political influence but are not particularly allies of a state).

The difference between the two forms of power is described as it follows: “hard power requires compliance-based mainly on tangible power means the co-optation of others in the efforts of a state, soft power means the use of force or the coercive capacity of a state, soft power cultivates compliance through a variety of policies, qualities and actions, indirectly and through non-coercive measures” (Gallarotti, 2011, pp. 10-11).

The integrated use of these facets of the concept of power has been called smart power. It is seen as “an approach that emphasises the need for a strong military presence, but which invests heavily in alliances, partnerships and institutions at all levels, to extend one’s influence and legitimize one’s actions” (Armitage, 2007, p. 7).
GERASIMOV DOCTRINE

Russian General Valery Gerasimov’s article, “The value of science is in perspective: new challenges call for a rethinking of forms and methods of conducting combat operations” brings “hybrid threats” among the major concerns of the Western world and is interpreted as proposing a new Russian approach to a confrontation which combines conventional and unconventional warfare with aspects of national power, often referred to as “hybrid warfare”.

The US government defines unconventional warfare as “activities conducted to assist a resistance movement or insurgency in coercing, disrupting or overthrowing a government or occupying force, operating through or with the help of the underground, auxiliary or guerrilla forces in a forbidden area”. (Public Law 114-92, 2015, Sec. 1097, (d)).

Other concepts used by Gerasimov were “the new generation war”, characterised by the erosion of the demarcation lines between the state of war and the state of peace and “non-linear war”: “a means to reach desired strategic orientation and geopolitical outcomes primarily using non-military approaches” (Morris, 2015).

Gerasimov came to these conclusions by researching how the West is waging war, relying less on traditional invasions such as Iraq in 2003 and more on the 2011 intervention in Libya, the events of the Arab Spring and the “colour revolutions”. In his view, the West was a pioneer in indirect approaches to war, using political subversion, propaganda and social networks, along with economic measures such as sanctions. Humanitarian interventions, the use of Western special forces, funding for “democratic” movements and the deployment of mercenaries were all features of an American doctrine of indirect war, emphasising that there is a four-to-one ratio between non-military and military measures in modern conflict, but he was talking about how the West shapes the battlefield before the intervention.

But Gerasimov was not the first to notice this. George F. Kennan put forward a similar argument in his 1948 memoir on the organisation of political warfare: “Political warfare is the employment of all means at the command of the nation to achieve its national goals. ... They range from such abrupt actions as political alliances, economic measures and «white» propaganda to covert operations, such as the support of «friendly» foreign elements, «black» psychological warfare and even the encouragement of underground resistance in hostile states” (Kennan, 1948, pp. 1-2).

Three major theories have been identified, addressing the understanding of information warfare: the “insurrectionary warfare” proposed by Evgheni Messner, the “net-centric warfare”, the vision of Aleksandr Dugin and the “information warfare”, developed by Igor Panarin.

Messner’s vision of the international politico-military context was strongly influenced by the conflict between the great victories of World War II, Russia and the United States. He notes that after 1945, Trotsky’s explanation of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk – “neither war nor peace” – applies globally. He also interpreted the “proxy wars” during the Cold War as part of a more general picture. For these reasons, Messner foresaw the need for a new kind of war, given that the “classic” became impossible to fight.

One of the distinctive features of the insurrectionary warfare is the increasing importance of the psychological/informational dimension. The main purpose of the war became not to capture the physical territory of the enemy, but to conquer minds and hearts by weakening official narratives. The confusion and discomfort of the target population have become objective, and the main tools for doing so are propaganda and agitation.

Messner observes two main features of information warfare: “propaganda by the word” and “propaganda by the deed”. If the first includes the official discourse of the authorities and forms of cultural-artistic manifestations, the second includes successful deeds, achieved in a timely manner – “an idea gains credibility when it is supported by military, political, social, diplomatic and economic achievements”. So it is not only what is said, written, published, disseminated, but also what is done: “In times of psychological warfare, neither victory in battle nor territorial gains are objective in themselves: their main value lies in their psychological effects”. Therefore, the need for congruence between word and deed: on the one hand, discourse must be seconded by concrete action; on the other hand, the actions must be brought to the public’s attention through a tailor-made speech. (Freedman, 2017, p. 68 et seq.).
Propaganda “should not be defensive, justifying; instead, it should actively stimulate the emotions and thoughts of our soldiers, combatants and non-combatants” (Freedman, 2017, p. 68). Such actions will be doomed to failure if their discourse does not adapt to the context. A careful study of the cultural context and the national or regional specificities of the target populations can provide the answer to these problems. The concealment of propaganda is an essential condition: “Both defensive and offensive propaganda is doomed to failure if it looks like propaganda” (Fridman, 2017, p. 68).

The other two Russian theorists, Dugin and Panarin, academics and mentors, stand out by the fact that they were themselves participants in the information warfare, as opinion leaders. Panarin offers the basic tools of the information struggle, which he divides into secret and non-secret categories. These include propaganda, institutional intelligence, monitoring and analysis, organisational component (coordination and direction channels), secret agents with influence in the media, and other combined channels, including special forces of operations (sabotage operations carried out under foreign flag). The stages of the information operations management process would be the following: (1) forecasting and planning, (2) organisation and stimulation, (3) feedback, (4) operation regulation, (5) performance monitoring.

Aleksandr Dugin proposes the term “network-centric warfare”: which means the creation of a new military information infrastructure involving interactive elements and rapid means of communication. The “Eurasian network” would provide asymmetrical response to the “net-centric challenge in the United State”. The missions will be carried out by “a special group of senior officials, the best mission-oriented staff of the Russian secret services, intellectuals, scientists, political scientists and the body of patriotic journalists and cultural activists must be created for this purpose”. The model of the “Eurasian network”, as opposed to the “Atlantic network”, is expected to combine the basic elements of American postmodernism and the net-centric approach with the Russian reality.

This approach could be successful, provided that the Russian armed forces, secret services, political institutions, information and communication systems, etc. are “postmodernised”. An internet warfare can only be won if the country uses network resources, and they must be adapted to Russia’s reality and objectives and efficient technologies, according to Dugin’s diagnosis.

The recent information warfare and network warfare of Russian origin should be seen as a product of traditional political technologies that have been used for years and represent the legacy of USSR. Contemporary Russian information geopolitics is based on the Soviet understanding of psychological warfare and reminiscent mental stereotypes. Propaganda remains the key tool of the information warfare. Its distinctive features are language (the language of emotions and prejudices but not facts), content (respect for official Kremlin propaganda) and function (discrediting the opponent). But we do not know whether the specifically Russian tools of information warfare will be effective in a possible ideological crusade against the West. Messages issued for this purpose are unbelievable and easy to verify in the age of new technologies. Moreover, the ideas offered are not attractive. However, if propaganda tends to fail in the West, ideological news based on misinformation finds fertile ground in the East.

THE INFORMATION WARFARE

The specific terminology of “information warfare” appeared in the early 1990s, but at least two distinct meanings can be distinguished in its understanding: a) disruptive measures for systems based on information flows and b) influencing perceptions by affecting the content of information, the first being oriented towards technical aspects, the second on knowledge (Freedman, 2019, p. 311).

There are several definitions of information warfare proposed by Whitehead, some of them accepted by the US military and some of the independent sources, the most complex and comprehensive being:

- Information warfare consists of “actions carried out in the information environment in order to prohibit, exploit, alter, destroy or ensure the viability of the information. The goal is to ensure the informational advantage”. (Whitehead, 1999, pp. 4-5).

This type of war has the following main characteristics: low costs, difficult to define traditional boundaries, increased role of perception management, a challenge for strategic information management, formidable problems for tactical warning and attack assessment,
difficulty in building and supporting coalitions, country vulnerability (Molander et al, pp. 15-16). According to these characteristics, the delimitations proposed by the traditional concept of war are becoming more and more difficult: Who is a combatant and who is not? Who attacks and when? Are armistices and the at least temporary cessation of hostile actions possible? Moreover, the consequences of non-state political actors’ involvement in the conflict can have serious consequences for society as a whole: an affected private entity can lead to a loss of public confidence, unemployment and, ultimately, social unrest.

Information warfare can take more or less subtle forms. Internet access turns the civilian population into participants in this war, which is not only subject to propaganda shootings but it also, in some courts, becomes a vector for the dissemination of this information. If initially false information could be countered by truth and evidence, this method works much less in a social world populated by trolls and robots (Fukuyama, 2017).

Fake news phenomena are exploited by media institutions purchased or financed in a non-transparent way. The rise of artificial intelligence technologies has made it possible to use deep fakes, video recordings in which a person’s face is replaced with that of a political or social leader, the messages issued by them are altered or even “built” from pieces of speech arranged in such a way that they support positions which the presented leader would not have normally expressed. Propaganda is emotionally charged and is based on the aggressor’s interest, to change the collective feeling towards the aggressor’s intentions and goals (Nate, Rățiu, 2017, p. 2).

In the information warfare, opponents are hidden and efforts to destroy their anonymity are often doomed to failure. An example of an information attack is Operation “Grizzly Steppe”: the US intelligence community learned that GRU had access to the Democratic National Committee’s IT resources from July 2015 to July 2016. RC


doomed to failure. An example of an information attack is Operation “Grizzly Steppe”: the US intelligence community learned that GRU had access to the Democratic National Committee’s IT resources from July 2015 to July 2016. Russian intelligence services were able to extract large amounts of data from Democratic National Committee computers, then transmitted by Guccifer 2.0 to Wikileaks.com and DCLeaks.com. The events were followed by a massive psychological operation aimed at discrediting Hillary Clinton, a candidate in the US presidential election and, especially, eroding confidence in the institutions of the United States (Rugge, 2018, pp. 4-5).

SECURITY CULTURE, A TOOL TO FIGHT AGAINST THE INFORMATION WARFARE

Security culture is a model of basic assumptions, values, norms, rules, symbols and beliefs that influence the perception of challenges, opportunities and/or threats and how to feel and think about security, behaviour and activities of active social actors, individual or collective, connected in a variety of ways (Piwowarski, 2017, pp. 17-19).

Emerged in September 1977, the concept of “security culture” evolved from a limited understanding in the military or strategic field to its application throughout society. Kai Roer provides an inclusive definition of security culture: “The ideas, habits, and social behaviours of an individual or group that help them be free from threats and dangers” (Roer, 2015, p. 14) According to him, security culture consists of three fundamental elements: technologies, policies and competencies; technologies are tangible and intangible (mental models, standards and know-how) (Roer, 2015, p. 19).

Among the Romanian researchers, Lungu et al provide a definition that broadens the scope of the concept: “Security culture is the result of social interactions that take place in groups, organizations, communities concerned with social security issues, learning processes and knowledge accumulation, in accordance with the human needs of protection, safety, shelter. The security culture is adaptive, develops in relation to the evolution of society and is transmitted between generations through various forms of written and oral communication, as well as through practices to support security values” (Lungu, 2018).

The Security Culture Barometer, published in 2018, reveals that Romanians are rather interested in a conspiratorial side of the information they take from the news, caused by the lack of critical thinking in certain strata of society. This can intensify the fake news phenomena, which can reach as many people as possible (INSCOP, 2018, p. 44).

According to the same study, there are no significant differences between populations in urban and rural areas of residence, nor between different age groups, gender or depending on the historical
region in which they live, when it comes to social categories sensitive to conspiracy tendencies.

A study on the digital behaviour of Romanians, published in 2018, shows how they underestimate the power of false news and inaccurate information. Over 50% of respondents said that their opinions are to a small or medium degree influenced by inaccurate information, but the high rate of those who did not answer this question (18%) leads to the conclusion that the issue of how to trust the news modelling opinions and actions is not considered at all by many Romanians (Bârgăoanu, Radu, 2018).

The main and most effective methods of a counterattack are awareness and education. The responsibility for both lies with both the citizen and the state institutions. “Cyber-hygiene” will not protect the country from advanced and persistent attacks, hybrid scenarios or a state-of-the-art war, but it is an easy and relatively inexpensive way to allocate few financial and technological resources to deal with serious threats. By cultivating the critical spirit, a society will be able to build effective barriers against fake news, education reducing the echo chamber effect of social media (Rugge, 2018, pp. 6-7).

Adherence to the basic principles of democracy: decisional transparency, openness and the rule of law create a political environment in which the interference of foreign entities in democratic processes can be easily observed and countered. Instead, a climate of public hostility to the ideological opponents of political power will erode the legitimacy of democratic institutions.

Former CIA Director Michael V. Hayden said that Russia’s involvement in the US presidential election was the political equivalent of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, an unprecedented vulnerability. Therefore, the State has the task to strengthen governance and response mechanisms at the institutional level, but also to build alliances with those who are subject to the same threats at the cultural, political and military levels.

Institutional efforts will be in vain without citizens having adequate tools to filter information. The information warfare exploits social cleavages, erodes citizens’ trust in institutions, decision-makers, international organisations, but also in the measures taken by them to ensure their security. The manipulation of information by hostile state and non-state actors can be countered by a solid security culture.

The whole-of-society approach accepts that security risks are a threat to society as a whole and any member can become a vulnerability in the absence of a security culture. State institutions can develop and promote a culture of security among citizens through transparency and awareness-raising. Citizens can develop mental hygiene skills by developing critical thinking and by accessing the information resources provided by the state.

At the programmatic level, in Romania, the term “security culture” appears in the “Guide of the National Strategy for the defence of the country for the period 2015-2019”, adopted by the Supreme Council of National Defence. According to it, security culture represents “the totality of values, norms, attitudes or actions that determine the understanding and assimilation at the level of society of the concept of security and its derivatives (national security, international security, collective security, insecurity, security policy, etc.) (Administrația Prezidențială, 2015, p. 7).

The Romanian state sees the security culture as a condition of social normalcy and the citizen in a double role: beneficiary and generator of security. The ways for the development of security culture are stimulating the public interest in security culture, placing security education courses in the formal education process, training programs accessible to the general public, identifying public experts as promoters of awareness programmes etc. (ibid, p. 14).

The “National Defence Strategy 2020-2024” continues the vision of the previous document, adopted in 2015, but elaborates on some aspects and introduces complementary concepts to the security culture. According to the document, Romania must become “a resilient state, able to adequately relate to the unpredictability and scale of developments in the security environment. This requires a strong state, a state that is aware of the need to develop its own rapid and efficient response mechanisms and, inherently, a solidly sized security culture – including among its citizens”.
The cited document places a major emphasis on the interdependence between the culture of security and resilience, but also on the creation of a "culture of prevention, through the active and continuous preparation of the population to react to a major emergency" (ibid, p. 37). The effort to achieve them will be "coordinated at the strategic level, based on a single implementation plan", horizontally, through the cooperation of institutions gathered in working groups.

CONCLUSIONS

Below the threshold of an official declaration of war, hybrid threats have demonstrated the futility of responses involving only institutions with responsibilities in the field of security and defence. The continuous state of "siege" requires the assumption of an alert conscience of the whole society, being essential the training, education and culture in fields that are no longer found in conventional trenches, but homes and institutions.

Following the effects of hybrid threats on state cohesion and societal security, this article emphasises the importance of citizen participation in state security through the development of a strong individual security culture. It is based, first of all, on the promotion of the core values of democratic societies, represented by transparency, openness and consolidation of the rule of law, as well as on alliances between different categories or threatened entities, being able to be achieved both by practical methods and by solutions to make truthful information viral, which would lead to a general increase in the level of digital literacy.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

TURKISH MOVIES IN FORMER OTTOMAN TERRITORIES: PROPAGANDA OR JUST AN EFFICIENT SOFT POWER IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY?

University Lecturer Ecaterina-Elena MAȚOI, PhD
Faculty of Security and Defense, “Carol I” National Defense University, Bucharest

Diana-Monica CONSTANTIN
Student, Faculty of Security and Defense, “Carol I” National Defense University, Bucharest

The spread of propaganda by state or non-state actors through movies started almost a century ago. At the same time, the procedures used in movie production diversified and became more specialised, hence nowadays, a special product among the ones made for media channels attracts the eye of specialists in the field of influential communication: Turkish movie series focusing on former Ottoman Empire’s glorious past. Many such series have succeeded in conquering the audience from the Arab Peninsula and other parts of the world, particularly the series “Diriliş: Ertuğrul”. This movie series, expanding on the legend of 8th century Muslim Oghuz Turks from Anatolia fighting against Christian Byzantines, crusaders and Mongols, was banned in Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt, but enjoys high popularity in other countries. Current research aims to analyse essential elements from the above-mentioned movie series that might significantly influence public opinions and sentiments of population from the Arab countries that banned it, in order to answer the question from title.

Keywords: Central Asia; dizi soft power; propaganda; Ottoman Empire;

PRELEGOMENA

Motto: “Celebrating historic triumphs is a favourite pastime for many Turks. Tales of how Turkic peoples emerged from Central Asia, crossed the steppes to Anatolia, established the Ottoman Empire and ruled for centuries over large swathes of Europe and Asia are the subject of countless legends, poems and books”. (Kinzer)

Since their arrival in Asia Minor (Anatolia), consolidated through the Malazgirt victory from 1071, the Turks came under the attention of historians, diplomats and politicians around the world. The Malazgirt (Manzikert) battle is a cornerstone in the history of nowadays Turkey; in this sense, the official news agency of Turkish government, Anadolu, was announcing in 2019: “The President of Turkey marked on Sunday 948 years passing from Malazgirt battle, a historical victory for the Turks in Anatolia, almost a millennia ago” (Anadolu Ajansi). This battle opposed the Byzantine Empire and Seljuk forces led by Alp Arslan on the 26 August, which ended in the Seljuk victory and capture of Byzantine king Romanus IV Diogene (EHISTORY).

Except an obvious relevance for the history of Turks, the Seljuk victory had geopolitical and geo-economic consequences in neighbouring areas, but also in further regions, since these events led to a “realignment of power and commerce in Europe, that favoured exploration of the NEW WORLD by Spain and Portugal” (Ibid.). Since this moment, the Turks remained at the top of history due to their “martial power and organisational superiority”, as Nuri Eren described them in her book (1963, p. 1) more than 50 years ago.

At the beginning of 20th century, the Ottomans/Turks were subjected to a high historical pressure “due to their exposed weakness”, whereas today, at the beginning of 21st century, Turkey resurges as an ambitious regional power, but also as one that cannot forget its heritage from a glorious empire stretching across three continents.
also “hearts” of many peoples, especially the ones from the former Ottoman territories, yet not limited to them (Karakaya, 2020).

Taking into consideration the background mentioned above, this research aims to analyse the context in which “voices” (The New Arab, 2020) appeared in the Middle East, claiming that Turkey is utilizing its entertainment industry – with a soft power role – in order to enhance and promote the “Ottoman narrative” in states like Egypt, United Arab Emirates or Saudi Arabia, through dizisi movie series (Bhutto). The sense of “soft power” as term utilized further in this research, is the classical one developed initially by Joseph Nye from Harvard University in 1990, to describe “the capacity to attract and co-opt rather than constrain, use force or provide money as persuasion means”.

Nowadays, the term mentioned above is complementarily used to describe the change in or influence on public opinion through channels “less transparent and lobby of powerful political and non-political organisations” (English Dictionary).

Relevant to this research is the fact that the period 1996-2019 is associated with a strong revival of Turkish cinematography, as one of the answers to Turkey’s drastic transformation after the Cold War, period in which movie producers, in both art and commercial movie industries, returned to themes related to membership, identity and memory (Culture Trip). This new type of national cinematography, oriented towards winning back the internal traditional public, crossed the country’s borders and attracted international audience.

A brief historical retrospective on this industry indicates that it became one of the most prolific industries across the globe (Bhutto, Ibid.), experiencing a sustained growth during previous decade, as it can be noticed from the diagram presented below. According to Statista, the number of productions tripled in only 9 years (Statista). On this background, the dizisi movie series were banned by some state actors from the Middle East region (France 24), as some researchers consider this type of movies to be propaganda instruments (Çevik, 2019).

Peter Golden stated that the origins of Turkic tribes are not very clear; for a long period, it was asserted that their name was taken from the clans that had a common ancestor, presented to the world through tribal genealogies (Golden, 1992, p. 6). Furthermore, clear instantiations of the model for name introduction cannot be found until these populations were influenced by the Islam or the Mongols. At this point, the tribal, political or dynastic names probably appeared: Selçuk, Nogay, Osmanli, Cagatay (Ibid.). Although there is no consensus with respect to the etymology of the noun “Türk”, according to Fuat Bozkurt the noun türk comes from the Chinese term t’ou-kiue of the 6th century, but this transliteration can be traced to the term turküt from Turkish language, meaning powerful (Bozkurt, 2014). Subsequently, the term was associated with further attributes like maturity, youth, courageous, tough. Nevertheless, another hypothesis presents the term türük as derived from tür, itself interpretable as law, cultural standard and tradition. Hence, there is a possibility to have had the term türük utilised to characterise people that respected customs and traditions (Ibid.).

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1 According to Arzu Ozturkmen, PhD, who teaches oral history at the Boğaziçi University in Istanbul, “What Turkey produces for television are not soap operas, or telenovelas, or period dramas: they are dizisi” (A/N).
The Origin of Turks: from the Altai Mountains to the Middle East

The Turks inherited nomads from the Altai Mountains, eastward from Eurasian steps and southward from Yenisei River and Baikal Lake, from regions that are part of Outer Mongolia. Their primitive and mobile civilisation was based on tribal organisation, customs and social sanctions without formal government organs and laws specific to more advanced societies (Shaw, 1976, pp. 1-2). Their way of living consisted of raising cattle and predatory raids against rival tribes around their camp. The leader was called khan, while his main task was to spot pastures, organise and supervise military activities, but not to preside over internal affairs of the tribe. From a religious point of view, they venerated natural elements through a series of totems considered to have special powers, mediated by shamans, a sort of priests that had the ability to control spirits (Ibid., p. 2).

The changing political, military and climatic conditions in the Altai region sent successive waves of nomad populations against civilisations established at the step’s borders. The nomads that migrated towards South and West, i.e. Eastern Europe, Middle East and Central Asia were later known as Oghuz among them, and generally as Turkmen or Turks for those who were attacked by them (Ibid.).

In an initial phase of history, the tribes and communities from the Middle East were protected naturally by Hindu Kush, Elborz and Caucasus mountain ranges against the Central Asian nomad tribes, but the natural deference weakened between Hindu Kush and Aral Sea, in the region called Transoxiana (Encyclopaedia Judaica Encyclopedia)², the land beyond Oxus, in which a road of the nomads passed from their step directly to the region where is nowadays Iran. This became the focal point for major nomad penetrations from Western Asia (Shaw, Ibid., p. 2), a part of the invading populations being assimilated by cultures and civilisations situated at the borders of the Middle East, defending these territories against following waves of migration. This assimilation phase occurred for a few centuries, as long as Middle East’s defence line was under the rule of Abbasid Dynasty from Baghdad, i.e. from 7th century to the beginning of 11th century (Ibid., pp. 2-3).

² According to Encyclopedia.com, “it is an ancient region of Central Asia, located between the Oxus and Jaxartes rivers, known to the Arabs as Ma-Waran-Nahr “across the river”. In the medieval period, it was divided into several provinces, one being Khwarazm, with the two capitals Khiva and Urgench, and another Soghd, with the two capitals Samark and and Bukhara”.

The first and most popular Turkish entity of all times was the GökTürk Empire (552-744), that from its very beginning was divided in two parts, both under the suzerainty of leaders from North of China (Ibid.). Although it did not meet the criteria for a classical state entity – neither precise frontiers nor clear laws, and its leaders did not have a permanent residency – the empire was stretching from the Black Sea, along Asia and northern borders of Mongolia and China, to the Pacific Ocean. An important aspect related to this first empire of the Turks consists of evidence on contacts with civilizations situated southwards, from which they overtook state organization and the dynasty concept. The first Turkish inscriptions found along the Orhon and Yenisei Rivers from Central Asia are also dating back to this period (Ibid.).

With time, the nomad Turkish tribes converted to Islam during 8th and 9th centuries, and in 10th century, one of these tribes, i.e. the Seljuks, became an important power within the Islamic world and adopted a lifestyle characterised by Islamic orthodoxy, a central administration and taxing. In order to pacify other nomad Turkic tribes, the Seljuks guided the Oghuz towards the Eastern part of Byzantine Empire, in Anatolia. Among the pacified tribes, the one from which Osman Gazi (1259-1326) came and founded the Ottoman dynasty would distinguish itself (Sanssal). He started to expand his control within Byzantine Empire and Asia Minor, moving the capital to Bursa in 1326. This is the nucleus around which the later Ottoman Empire will be formed, extending its influence in the South-East of Europe, Middle East, North African coast and the heart of Central Asia, an entity that lasted until the beginning of 20th century (Ibid.).

Turkey, as it is known today, was created in the aftermath of the First World War, on 29th of October 1923, by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. In the period to come, Turkey experienced a process of western laicisation through the reforms of Atatürk, that included among others the interruption of religious and other types of titles, closure of Islamic venues, replacement of the Islamic law with a civil code inspired from that of Switzerland and a criminal code inspired from that of Italy (britannica.com). Similarly, these series of reforms led to recognition of equality between genders, full political rights for women, but also the replacement of the Turkish Ottoman alphabet with a new Turkish alphabet derived from the Latin one, etc. (Ibid.) In the decades to come, after the forced secularisation of what had remained from the former
Social Identity and Propaganda

When identity and its basic concepts are discussed, it should be taken into account that a person is focusing on answers to questions like "Who are you" or "What does it mean to be you?". Similarly, the identity is connected to essential values that shape choices, reflect who we are and what we appreciate, and relevant for current research, the tendency of most persons to adopt values of their parents or those of dominating cultures (Heshmat, 2014).

A very important vision on what identity represents and how this is capitalised on in our times belongs to James Feron from USA's Stanford University. He claims that the term "identity", in the sense used during the 20th century, derived mainly from Erik Erikson's writings from the 1950s and that dictionaries did not manage, at that time, to catch the real sense of this modern word. Consequently, in the introduction of his work, Fearon underlines that there are two possible senses associated to the term "identity": a social category defined by membership rules and characteristics attributed, or by expected behaviours. Furthermore, Fearon asserts in the same work that identity can help in understanding political actions and explains why identities are often perceived as a social construct (Fearon, 1999).

Social Identity Theory

The social identity theory is considered one of the greatest contributions of Henri Tajfel to psychology. According to Tajfel, social identity is the feeling of a person based on membership to a group. In 1979, he stated that groups such as social class, family or football team that each person associates herself/himself with would be important sources of pride and self-respect. This is a consequence of the fact that groups offer a feeling of identity, membership to the social world. Therefore, the world is divided in "them" and "us", based on a social classification process (McLeod). This theory was developed in Tajfel's work on the effects of perception's emphasis, due to his interest in social psychology vis-à-vis bias, discrimination, conflicts within groups and social change. The theory was initially proposed by Tajfel and developed further with the help of his colleagues from Bristol University, Michael Biling, John C. Turner, Michael Hogg, but also other researchers (Boncu).

Mass Manipulation and Propaganda

In 1928, Edward L. Bernays published the work “Propaganda”, in which he defines conscious manipulation of masses as an important element in democratic societies and states about those who employ this mechanism of society that they act as an invisible government that truly rules a country (Bernays, 1928, p. 9). This can be achieved, according to Bernays, at the beginning of 20th century through written press, telegraph, radio and wirelessly, these means being very rapid at that time for spreading ideas (Ibid., p. 12). Certainly, if the paper was written nowadays, Bernays would have added the television and internet to the means enumerated above. Concerning the term “propaganda”, this is used to define the more or less systematic effort to manipulate the beliefs of target audience, their attitudes, gestures or actions through symbols like clothes, music, monuments, trends or symbols. The ones that practice propaganda generally have a precise goal and deliberately select arguments, facts or symbols in order to present them favourably – often by hiding the truth and distorting relevant facts, in order to ensure the desired effect upon subjects of propaganda (Smith, 2020).

The use of this term dates back to 1622, in connection to the work Congregatio de Propaganda Fide – The Congregation for Propagation of Faith, an organisation of Roman Catholic cardinals founded in 1622 meant to ensure the continuity of religious activities and missions in various environments (Orsy, 2019). The first propaganda operation from modern times led officially by the government of a state took place in 1916 during 28th US president, Woodrow Wilson (White House). Wilson’s administration set up a government propaganda commission, that according to Noam Chomsky, managed to transform a pacifist population in one willing to involve in conflict and defeat the enemy in order to save the world in just 6 months (Chomsky, 1991, p. 5). Among those that actively involved in President Wilson’s project was John Dewey, philosopher, psychologist, reformer of education and supporter of social reform (Hildebrand, 2018).
The Impact of Propaganda through Social Media Networks

The technological progress achieved in recent years, especially in the field of telecommunications, rapidly transformed the capacity and opportunities of state and non-state actors to influence, society, television and social media being the main and most promising means for this purpose. One of the most relevant examples in this sense is the recent case of fraudulent Facebook data usage by Cambridge Analytica during 2016 US elections period. This case, according to Sergei Tchakhotin – an expert in study of Nazi propaganda, brings back old discussions on propaganda and its capacity to enter the minds of masses (Nahon-Serfaty, 2019), and although many decades passed since the two world wars, there are still methods available to inoculate emotions, but this time through social media networks. Hence, Cambridge Analytica developed a methodology that allowed it to establish psychological profiles for Facebook users and, by touching “emotional buttons”, to modify political preferences and behaviour of users (Ibid.). Today, governments, corporations or political parties have the capacity to process unlimited data and establish algorithms that distribute messages and images in order to penetrate more and more divided public segments.

Statistical data indicates that nowadays, across the globe, each person watches on average 3 hours of TV/video content daily (Watson, 2019) and approximately 78,000 hours in the entire life (Anderer et al., 2019). This data underlines the importance of movie production globally and their potential to transmit messages with which state and non-state entities aim to target population segments according to certain particularities.

TURKISH MOVIE SERIES – PROPAGANDA INSTRUMENT OR JUST AN EFFICIENT SOFT POWER IN TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY?

Beginning with 2010, the narrative according to which Ottoman history was characterised by extravagance, conquests and power games became one of the most popular and watched themes from Turkish entertainment production. This popularity is explained by Burak Oztecin from Istanbul’s Bilgi University as a consequence of crisis times, especially when history can play a significant role in shaping identities: “the recent interest for Ottoman stories and narrations is not something baseless, or outside context – on the contrary, it has a historic base”, he declared for Meenakshi Ravi, The Listening Post (Al Jazeera, 2020).

Additionally, Dr. Arzu Ozturkmen, history professor at Boğaziçi University from Istanbul, states that dizi Turkish productions are not soap operas, but a special type of movies with unique narratives and attractive music, that became very popular in recent years (The Guardian, 2019). This type of movies evolved between 1990 and 2000 in a semi-structured manner, with characteristics of a story naturally transposed, with almost real-time dialogue, taking place slowly. Musical, textual and visual rich diversity distinguished the dizi from a classical soap opera, the former exhibiting a special, authentic narrative flux (Özturkmen, 2018).

Dizi productions contributed to a consolidation of Turkey’s image in the Middle East, but also to economic gains from abroad; for example, they generated $ 350 million revenue in 2017, when compared to only $ 10 million in 2008 through exports of the same type of productions (Grater, 2017). The massive increase in revenue coming from these movie series reflects the demand from international audiences, that enjoy fictions produced in Turkey. This country produced the highest number of such series rated as best productions watched outside own borders: 23 Turkish series were identified among top ten most watched programs from 11 foreign countries (Erşen, 2017).

Consequently, approximately 25% of fiction movie series imported by 78 countries were Turkish, Russian Federation occupying the second place with 15%, followed by the USA with 7%, Brazil and Mexico sharing the same place with 6% each (Ibid.).

Turkish External Policy under Adaletve Kalkınma Partisi (AKParti) at the beginning of 21st century

In order to analyse the Turkish “soft power”, the new era and the transformational process that took place for decades in Turkish foreign policy should be analysed. Some researchers assert that starting with Turgut Özal’s administration, Turkey began to implement a series of soft power policies in the Middle East, Central Asia, Balkans and Caucasus respectively (Nuroğlu, 2020). Nevertheless, after his death, the liberalization process and transformation of external policy did not continue until Adaletve Kalkınma Partisi (AKParti) reached power
in Turkey, the “soft power” discourse served AK Parti’s agenda at various levels. Emphasizing on Turkey’s role as leader across the Middle East, and the Muslim world in general, the governing party managed to reaffirm itself on the internal political scene. Therefore, external policy under AK Parti was focused on a vision pursuing improvement of relations with neighbours, or privileging the former Ottoman space. The political and economic engagement in Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Iran or Syria enhanced significantly Turkey’s position in this region (Ozpek, Demirag, 2014). Nevertheless, the most efficient method to transmit Ottoman values proved to be the popular dizi, that slowly conquered audiences from the Arab world through historical narratives that underline unity, religion and values.

The Impact of Turkish Movies in Arab-Muslim Space

In the Middle East, Turkish movies series are facing certain Arab governments’ opposition, due to concerns related to their potential cultural impact upon population. Although there are barriers in place, like differences between Turkish and Arabic languages, the demand for Turkish productions increased in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan (Gulfnews) and Iraq (Erşen, 2017), more types of productions being demanded: historical, drama or entertainment. They are transmitted either through Arab satellite channels or through subscription based online services that allow customers to watch the productions without commercials or even without internet connection (offline) after downloading, like Netflix.

Diriliş: Ertuğrul – or the Turkish equivalent of “Game of Thrones”

Diriliş: Ertuğrul is one of the most known Turkish movie series, situated today on place 3 in the top Internet Movies Data Base (IMDb) for Turkish series by popularity (IMDb, Tv Series). This series won the Best Director Award at the Golden Butterfly Awards 2018. The 150/170 original episodes (for Netflix they were resized and turned into 448) directed by Metin Gülnay and based on texts written by Mehmet Bozdag present the rise of the Ottoman Empire, amid tribal conflicts and both internal and external conspiracies against it. After a closer look, the values that are glorified become obvious: bravery, courage, but also the cordiality and tenderness experienced by heroes as part of an extended family – the tribe – while the main character, Ertuğrul, interpreted by the stoic but charismatic player Engin Altan Düzyatan is the typical model of virtue. Social order described in the Kayi tribe is par excellence patriarchal, but one in which the women that take care of the tribe are also very good fighters and even leaders of community. The lack of erotic scenes is obvious, while the passionate love is expressed in short philosophical explosions, in which other’s virtues are exalted, and the worries when one is missing for unknown reason spread in the extended family (Firstpost).

Initially, the series was transmitted through state television in Turkey between 2014 and 2019. Outside Turkey, the production is described on one hand as cultural propaganda, while on the other as similar to a HBO blockbuster; the series consists of 5 seasons.
recorded in the period 2014-2019, that emphasise the heritage of the country’s founding dynasty, on the cultural values and unity specific to this culture, with a resounding success at home, and in the Arab-Muslim space, the series being doubled in literary Arabic by actors like Rashid Assaf and Mona Wassef, two well-known Syrian movie players. The use of internet in promoting the series was a real success as well, Al-Noor website providing the English subtitles for Youtube.com, the series being further transmitted by other platforms. In 2017 alone, the series was watched by 200 million people, Saudi Arabia topping this classification with 600,000 visualisations (Bassiouni, 2020). The fact that historical subjects are approached in such super-productions, in Turkey but also in certain Arab countries, are financed by large media corporations, that themselves receive state help. Consequently, the political messages that are sometimes perceived in some scenes from dizi movies make these series to look like part of propaganda campaigns of some regional state actors, that compete with other regional actors (Ibid.).

Diriliş: Ertuğrul – Soft Power, Propaganda or Just a Movie Series?

The reactions of Arab authorities came initially late, with respect to the impact that subtitled Turkish series can have on population, but as the interest for the series raised, across more population segments, the reactions started to appear. One of the methods used to counter the success of Ertugrul in Arab countries, was the propagation of another series, i.e. Kingdoms of Fire on the pan-Arab broadcasting channels. This action aimed at countering the cultural conquest that Turkey had achieved through Diriliş: Ertuğrul. Through Kingdoms of Fire, the positive image of the Ottoman Empire projected in Diriliş: Ertuğrul should have been removed, as this empire was instantiating an era of pan-Islamic unity (Sheraz, 2020).

Egypt was one of the countries declaring that Turkey is attempting to create “an area of influence” in the Middle East, by employing soft power means, to attract Arab population. The declaration of Egypt’s Dar Al-Iftaa, The Global Fatwa Index, an organisations concerned with issuing fatwas related cult of life and related aspects, declared, according to Al-Monitor, that the “It aims to revive the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East and regain sovereignty over Arab countries which were previously under Ottoman rule”, hence the paper claims further that the Turkish series should be banned in this country, suggesting that the series hides political and material purposes (Middle East Monitor).

After Egypt, two further states prohibited watching the series, UAE and Saudi Arabia. They also claimed that the topics addressed in the series had a political and historical loading and represent a threat, as Turkey attempts to raise its credibility in the Arab regions (Eyüpoğlu, 2020).

But the recognition that Turkey enjoys internationally nowadays is not only due to the speech of President Erdogan or AK Parti, but also organizations like TIKA. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Turkey began to consolidate relations with former Turkic republics from the Union. In a first step, TIKA was founded during 1992 as an international agency for technical assistance within the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and then moved under direct authority of the prime-minister in 1999 (Akilli, Çelenk, 2018). Through Tika, Turkey started to initiate actions based on opportunities in the former Soviet territory. Nowadays, TIKA carries out development and assistance projects in over 140 countries on five continents, becoming one of Turkey’s motors nationally and internationally. Many TIK projects have significantly contributed to a positive recognition of Turkey throughout the world (Ibid.).

CONCLUSIONS

Propaganda as a method in fulfilling hidden objectives, that engages special, symbolic themes in order to convince population segments, has been employed under different forms from ancient times, and represented an efficient instrument for influencing identities of communities or ethno-religious minorities in foreign countries or cultures. Movies became an instrument of choice in this sense starting with the beginning of 20th century.

The ways in which it promotes and implements foreign policy, no matter the instruments used, the timing, i.e. beginning of 21st century and the geopolitical context in which the instruments are employed represent just a favourable environment for suitable policies.

Therefore, despite the efforts by some countries to ban the Turkish movie series Diriliş: Ertuğrul on national land channels or via satellite, the production enjoyed success on the internet, managing to consistently appear on social media platforms. The portrayal of Ertuğrul posted on Facebook pages of more young Arab speakers is a testimony
in this sense, while the death of character Bamsi Alp’s son from a different movie provoked strong reactions, like the one of a young Kuwaiti posting “condolences on behalf of Kaya clan, may Bams’s son soul rest in peace” (Bassiouni, 2020).

Hence, it is difficult to answer the question posed in the title. First and foremost, claiming that dizi Turkish series are propaganda instruments without considering the actual economic gains presented in more sources would be superficial. Equally, the enormous success of these productions in the Arab-Muslim/Muslim is facilitated by geographical proximity, a common history for a relatively long period and last but not least, sharing of certain common values deriving from the Qur’an. Hence, we come back to the question from title: are they propaganda, or just a form of soft power taken to the rank of smart power? Or a little bit of everything?

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Turkish Movies in Former Ottoman Territories: Propaganda or Just an Efficient Soft Power in Turkish Foreign Policy?

INTRODUCTION – THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE RESILIENCE CAPACITY IN THE CONTEMPORARY SOCIETAL ENVIRONMENT

Periodically, modern states define their own national strategies for defending the country in terms of legislation and the changes that have occurred in the security and safety conditions for fulfilling their institutional roles. The contemporary societal environment is strongly characterised by the presence of a permanent and specific array of threats and vulnerabilities that the decision-making factors of the societal fields (political/diplomatic, military, economic, social, critical infrastructural, informational and environmental) have to face and to counteract with solutions (NATO’s Military Concept for Defence against Terrorism, 2005). A crisis situation, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, has the particularity of manifesting itself both in the spatial and temporal coordinates and especially in the figures of societal indicators. By societal indicators we mean mainly the status parameters that define the existence and the proper functioning of a society as a whole, such as: the territorial area, the number of citizens, the forms of organising the communities and their institutionalised structures, the system of facilities for providing essential goods and services, the system of public order, national defence and security/PONDS, the relations and the typology of relations with other states, the nature and the level of transactions between them, the cultural-historical background of assertion as a state and internationally recognised entity, other such state identity landmarks. The state of security and safety of a nation can be expressed by means of societal indicators and their quantifiable values. Reaching certain boundary values of the societal indicators, previously identified or not identified, may lead to a situation where one or more societal domains becomes incapable to function properly, also known as a crisis situation for that particular domain.
One of the essential characteristics of a crisis is the impossibility of predicting and efficiently countering the effects through which it manifests itself (Chifu, 2019, p. 16). In this regard, in order to solve the problem, a series of concepts specific to each societal field have emerged, so as to guarantee the existence and the proper functioning of the community or society in question. The development of the resilience capacity of a state entity lies in taking over the concept of preserving or returning to the physical, technical and functional properties of some objects found in nature, which, after experiencing a shock and undergoing changes in the properties that define them, regain through their own efforts their physical, technical and functional characteristics that they had before the above-mentioned shock. The absolute resilience of the object in question is proven by completely restoring its physical, technical and functional characteristics after experiencing the shock. Similar to an object in nature that has suffered a specific shock and proves a resilience capacity by returning to its properties, exclusively through its own efforts, each societal field can manifest a certain capacity for resilience. Therefore, the resilience of a societal field is its ability to return through its own efforts to the pre-shock state.

The resilience of an entity can be explained by the model of a physical object and we choose to exemplify through a first experiment, that with a sponge that has certain properties of size, shape and colour. In situation A, the sponge experiences a shock by a sudden mechanical action, under the incidence of a blow with a hammer. In situation B, the same sponge undergoes a sudden thermal shock, under the incidence of being exposed to an open flame device. After analysing the two situations, A and B, it results that the same item subjected to shocks shows different resilience depending on the nature of the aggression factor. To develop the subject of resilience, we continue with another experiment, by which we subject the same sponge to the conditions of situations A and B, but we change the means of applying the shocks. This time, to express a proactive behaviour, in experiment A, we cover the sample with a resistant metal case before applying the mechanical shock and in experiment B we place a heat-resistant foil on the item before subjecting it to the flame.

Briefly, under a combined aspect, the inter-relating societal domains, just like the physical objects, show different resilience capacities depending on the context and on the aggression factors, thus mutually influencing each other according to their individual operational characteristics. Therefore, we find out that the manifestation of the effects of some crisis situations will differ depending on the specific capacities of the domains, and even more, on the nature of the relations between them. One of the important observations we can identify refers to the militant nature specific to each societal domain, in the sense that the entities belonging to the domains are designed to interact with the external environment according to their specific physical, technical and functional characteristics.
As shown in figure 1, each interconnected societal domain interacts with its reference environment and, at the same time, establishes node-type relationships and network connections with the other societal domains (Ibid.). The dimensions and the geometries made for such a network are in permanent dynamics, influenced by the number, characteristics and intensity of the aggression factors, either internal or external to each societal field. In the situation of the COVID-19 pandemic, the aggression factors are not limited only to the manifestation of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, which is of course the main factor responsible for the pandemic. Due to the network connections between the societal domains and the geometry of the inputs and outputs based on the relations between them, the societal domains become more widely and more subtly affected (Barabasi, 2017, pp. 3-25).

In order to decode the effects following the manifestation of the pandemic situations on each societal field, it is necessary to use those concepts of security and safety specific to the societal domains that employ the notion of aggressor or enemy, as in the military societal field. The concept of security centred on the notion of enemy is specific to the operative art of the military field. But the operative art does not contain the integrated term of resilience and therefore we can speculate such a situation by conducting the transfer of know-how between the societal fields, especially for solving the crisis situation against the background of the COVID-19 pandemic. Integrating the term resilience in the operative art implies developing those threat scenarios specific to the societal field of critical infrastructures. Based on the threat scenarios, the protection of the critical infrastructures is achieved by adopting a proactive behaviour and, implicitly, by adopting the notion, transformations of the mechanism of producing situation estimates can occur1. (Leaua, Ardeleanu, 2014, pp. 145-148).

Due to the complexity and multitude of connections made between the societal domains, the contemporary societal environment becomes one of the most difficult environments to decode (Stanciu, 2016, pp. 28-35). The development of the resilience capacity in a societal field becomes dependent on the development of the resilience capacity of all the other societal domains with which it is interconnected, a fact achievable by applying the operative art in the perspective of military action planning, based on four main directions:

- understanding the operational problem in a societal context;
- comprehensively and systemically understanding the roles of the decision-makers specific to the societal domains;
- developing the joint network operational approach in order to find and implement the solutions for solving the crisis situation;
- redefining the operational problem, in case the changes occurred in the situation require it.

By adopting the suggestion to develop the resilience capacity in the contemporary societal environment within the operative art, we overlap at least two societal domains: the military domain and the critical infrastructure one.

**UNDERSTANDING THE OPERATIONAL PROBLEM IN THE CONTEXT OF THE BROAD SOCIETAL ENVIRONMENT**

The description of the connections of the network nodes of the societal domains in a permanent dynamic represents the decoding of the contemporary societal environment that is the foundation for understanding the operational problem in the societal context (Stephen, 1990). Military action planning under crisis conditions, similar to the COVID-19 pandemic, cannot be limited to fulfilling the direct purpose of the military actions in a military conflict. This is further supported by the fact that the basic rules and concepts guide the use of military force and cover the full range of operations in peacetime, in crisis situations and in war (F.T.-1, 2017, p. 5). In a comprehensive approach, according to NATO, all institutions responsible for managing a crisis must have a common understanding of the desired objectives and the end state. It entails a unitary projection of the common resilience capacity based on the inter-institutional connections. Due to the dynamics of the relationships established (figure no. 1), the development of the common resilience capacity cannot be the sum of all the resilience capacities of the interconnected societal domains. The concept of resilience in the societal field of critical infrastructures consists in the unitary expression of the values of the descriptive parameters for the provision of the quotas of products and services essential to life, under those safety and security conditions required for each critical infrastructure (Roman, 2018).

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1 A situation estimate is a notion belonging to the operational art.
For example, we will relate the understanding of the operational problem in the societal context to only two areas: the military domain and the critical infrastructural one (Directive 114/2008). It opens a new perspective of military action planning, similar to the COVID-19 pandemic situation, where, by applying the concept of NASCRO (NATO non-Article 5 crisis response operations), a particular importance is placed on collaborative planning of operations. Due to the complexity of the contemporary crises, the planning of actions within the societal domains cannot be fully consistent for all domains. The manifestation of the proactive behaviour and the establishment of the boundary values for the development of the resilience capacities within the societal domains can determine destructive actions on the other societal domains based on the mutually interdependent links. Thus, the development of a collaborative culture in designing the resilience capacities between the societal domains can be achieved by applying the operative art in the analysis and the reconfiguration of the network connections according to the model shown in figure no. 2.

Due to the fact that the measures and the degree of their implementation within each societal field are not expressed, in case of a negative event with major societal impact or of the manifestation of an extended crisis situation, such as the model of analysis for determining the geometry of the relations between the societal domains (figure no. 2), the mentioned solution is not enough. Within the process of designing the security and safety systems specific to the field of critical infrastructures, they become explicit by nominating the boundary values obtained following the development of their resilience capabilities. In comparison, in the military field, there are nominations regarding the value and weight of the criteria for comparing the courses of action that underlie the war games. The conceptual overlap of developing the resilience capabilities in the context of the war games in an effort to find viable solutions to counter the actions of an enemy or the effects of an ongoing crisis brings forward the need for a new perspective on the military action planning.

The comprehensive understanding of the societal operational environment is the key to determine the network connections and the nature of these connections, which is why, when substantiating them, the military planners express and explain the military concepts in terms that are intelligible to the civilian partners in the field of critical infrastructure protection and other societal fields, and, in their turn, the latter do the same with their military partners. The advantage of such an approach of relating between the societal domains produces a continuous analysis of the societal operational environment in which the real consequences of the military actions but also of the other actors contributing to the implementation of the whole process of counteracting the effects of the ongoing crisis are thoroughly evaluated (Moștoflei, Alexandrescu, Bogzeanu, 2009, pp. 3-7). Based on the network connections according to the analysis shown in figure no. 2, the links between actions and effects can be anticipated and identified, especially the second and third order effects, which analysed in the evaluation points established in the operation planning, lead to a new flow of actions and real effects corrected and correlated with the results of the development of the resilience capacities of the involved societal domains. The comprehensive understanding of the societal operational environment in the above-mentioned manner based on the links shown in figure no. 2 can be considered one of the mandatory measures for all decision-making forums at the level of each societal field. When formulating landmarks in the national defence strategy of NATO and EU states, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerabilities call for consensus action based on a flexible multidimensional concept and a broad systemic perspective, in which the risks associated with the effects of the crisis are jointly approached.
DEVELOPING THE NETWORK OPERATIONAL APPROACH FOR PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTING SOLUTIONS TO SOLVE A CRISIS SITUATION

The efforts of the specialists in the field of security and safety in maintaining or recovering the physical, technical and functional properties of the societal domains or their components consist in providing estimates regarding the future evolution of the negative situations having a destructive impact. One of the relevant solutions to this request may be to develop a joint network operational approach. The joint network operational approach, in the variant of developing the resilience capacity in the contemporary societal environment can be organised in several stages, as follows:

- conducting the analysis of the critical factors, namely the centralisation of the boundary values of the descriptive parameters of state and functioning for each societal field separately;
- developing the design of the connections between the societal domains and respectively between their components, based on the dependencies between their inputs and outputs (the totality of the provided goods and services);
- developing individually the threat scenarios within each societal field based on the identified aggression factors and the known vulnerabilities of our own assets;
- jointly developing the threat scenarios for the interconnected societal domains according to the diagrams of relations (figure no. 1);
- planning and implementing the individual and common measures designed to prevent the materialisation of the negative situations having a destructive impact (manifestation of proactive behaviour);
- planning and implementing the individual and common protocols and procedures designed to limit and neutralise the effects and consequences of 1st, 2nd and 3rd level in case of occurrence of negative situations having a destructive impact (manifestation of reactive behaviour);
- checking and validating all projects regarding the network architecture, modifying its geometry when the societal environment conditions change or whenever the situation requires it.

When we developed the joint network operational approach algorithm, we started from planning the analysis of the operational environment specific to the military action planning where we introduced the principles of designing security and safety systems specific to the critical infrastructures in order to develop their resilience capacities. As pointed out at the beginning of this paper, it is important to understand the resilience of a societal field. We exemplified it by approaching the societal field similarly to an object in nature, in which case the assertion of an entity’s resilience is directly related to the physical, technical and functional characteristics of the subject, to its exclusive possibilities, to the nature of the aggression factor and the duration of its action, to the context of the occurrence of the shock and last but not least to the influence of the measures taken due to the proactive behaviour of the subject.

Implementing the solutions to a crisis situation is the most difficult and, at the same time, the most expensive stage. It is determined by the fact that crisis situations require a fully developed approach, namely complex systems of analysis (Wade, 2016). Because of the unpredictability of the enemy or aggression factor and of the environmental conditions that are continuously dynamic, the operational design is recommended as the most appropriate working method. The operational design approach is a challenge to establish that authority invested in choosing the optimal course of action. At state level, the governing political institutions establish the key policy of the way of managing the resources that support the solutions to counteract the effects and consequences of a crisis situation. Based on the resource management policy of any kind, they give new configurations to the network and therefore new network connections are established or others are permanently or temporarily suspended.

In the context of transforming the network connections (figure no. 3), it results that the operational design has a double role in choosing the solutions to counteract the effects of a crisis.

Firstly, by operational design we express the current situation and the direction of evolution of the societal environment, by the nature of the connections between the societal domains. The second role of the operational design is that of a tool to correct the direction...
of the evolution of the general situation by intervening in each societal field and by transforming the links between the societal domains. One of the important observations is that a crisis, just like a “living organism”, will behave according to a certain pattern, as a decision-making body that pursues its own goals similar to the actions of an enemy decoded through the operative art. Therefore, a crisis situation such as the COVID-19 pandemic can be effectively counteracted if the laws of its manifestation are known, a fact of which the specialists in the field of security and safety of societal fields are not ignorant (Seiple). This explains the solution to isolate in case of the pandemic to prevent the spread of the virus and not to counteract it by applying a vaccine that does not restrict the freedom of social interaction.

The problem that the operative art uncovers following the development of resilience in the contemporary societal environment from the perspective of military action planning is to highlight the fragility of the links between the societal domains and to proceed to their consolidation through corrective measures taken by the decision-making forums. In other words, knowing the values of the descriptive parameters for each societal field, respectively the nature of the connections between them, we can identify the directions of manifestation of an ongoing crisis or to detect the formation of new crises, of another nature, much deeper and much more dangerous for the society. The operationalisation of the planning work regarding the inter-institutional links between the societal domains based on the situation estimates (a notion which is specific to military action planning) substantially contributes to the decision-making at the level of each responsible body, which represents the decisive point in creating the operational network approach. In this regard, the practical implementation of the theoretical apparatus in the area of military action planning involves the design and development of a collaborative network between the decision-making forums based on the model of the connections between the societal domains, similar to the functioning of the alert platforms specific to critical infrastructure. The advantage of the operationalisation that we have suggested is the establishment of the necessary conditions for the development of the estimates regarding the crisis situations and the initiation of the measures of preventing and counteracting them.

The development of the joint network operational approach can be the starting point in the elaboration and implementation of the solutions for solving a crisis situation. This is possible according to the model of the critical infrastructure protection procedures, applicable in the COVID-19 pandemic situation. Thus, in order to restore the operating conditions within the projected parameters, each societal domain affected by the pandemic will trigger its own procedures for developing resilience and implicitly determine a change in the geometry of the network connections between all societal domains. Changing the geometry of the network connections that we have previously mentioned can be one of the causes of the initiation of new crisis situations, much more unpredictable and more difficult.
to manage. The joint network operational approach, as in the case of military action planning, involves the formulation of solutions based on the model of courses of action specific to war games. Identifying and managing the sets of descriptive parameters for each societal field according to the model of critical infrastructure protection for developing resilience contributes to accurately describing the position of each societal field in the network of influences (figure no. 1). Following the overlap of the theoretical literature of the societal domains – military and critical infrastructure -, new determinations regarding the development of the resilience capabilities occur. In other words, there is a risk that, following the development of the resilience capabilities in one societal field, they will be the starting point for new crisis situations for the other societal domains. In this context, new perspectives of theoretical assimilation with practical applicability emerge regarding the background of the risk management problem for each societal field.

INSTEAD OF CONCLUSIONS – HYBRID WARFARE

Because of the difficulties in identifying, understanding and explaining the problems specific to the contemporary social environment, the specialists in the field of social security have resorted to the use of the phrase hybrid warfare (Lehaci, 2019, pp. 78-84). Although the term hybrid warfare seems fashionable and widely used, it remains difficult to understand it thoroughly and even more difficult to formulate perspectives for resolving a crisis situation in a contemporary societal context. As we have demonstrated throughout this paper, the justification of the nature of the influences between the societal domains can be made according to the relationships that can be described by the model of the network interactions. In this way, the phrase “hybrid warfare” can be defined as “that accumulation of actions directed in a planned way towards producing direct or indirect intentional effects on the connections in the societal network, by disparately affecting two or more of the societal domains, having a major direct or 2nd or 3rd degree impact” (Ibid.). The disparate impact on the societal domains can occur through low intensity and indefinite duration actions in order to fulfill some goals that are difficult to identify and without the need to trigger the development of the resilience of the targeted domains. According to the model of the critical infrastructure protection, based on the boundary values (minimum or maximum) necessary for activating the measures of developing the resilience capacity, it becomes impossible to identify and prove the deliberate attack on the social network connections. Instead, by applying the operative art, estimates can be formulated on the statuses expressed and interpreted by approximating the values of the descriptive parameters to the boundary values area. By combining specific methods of critical infrastructure protection with elements of the operational art in the field of military action planning, a new perspective can be obtained on the nature of the hybrid warfare, but also on the crisis phenomenon such as the COVID-19 pandemic. In this way, the analysis of the number but especially of the map of the affected areas, depending on the intensity of the damage, can lead to formulating predictions and developing courses of action based on the situation estimates in order to identify the “behaviour of the enemy” and its objectives. By overlapping the impact plans expressed according to the links between the contaminated areas and the plans of the network connections between the societal domains, a pertinent picture of the future situations or the new crisis situations different in nature than the pandemic will result. The impact plans may be specific to the interconnected societal domains: political/diplomatic, military, economic, social, critically infrastructural, informational and environmental, and the nature of the hybrid warfare may focus on one of the forms of interaction of two of the societal domains.

The combination of the elements of the mechanisms for developing the resilience specific to each network societal field represents the emergence of new directions regarding the possibility of preventing and counteracting a crisis. The efforts of the security specialists will migrate around the weaknesses of each societal domain, to the weak nodes of the network connections established based on the influences between the societal domains (figure no. 3). Therefore, we can anticipate the possibility of designing that tool for analysing and predicting the future directions of manifestation of an ongoing crisis and even more, the development of a possible treatment scheme based on the improvement of the specific critical situations through doses of compensating the impact on each societal field involved.
However, hybrid warfare remains one of the mysteries of modern society, a powerful challenge for analysts, planners, and security decision-makers. Following the operationalisation of the situation estimates (implemented from the operative art) within the threat scenarios (critical infrastructure protection) we consider that new working and intervention tools will be developed for the military action planning in the context of developing resilience in the contemporary societal environment.

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ADAPTATION OF MILITARY CAPABILITIES TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT – CURRENT AFFAIRS AND PERSPECTIVES

Colonel Associate Professor Constantin GRIGORAȘ, PhD
"Nicolae Bălcescu" Land Forces Academy, Sibiu

The realities of the contemporary operational environment, which, given the nature of the actors, conditions and circumstances, manifest themselves in a well-defined space, directly and fundamentally influence decisions and the use of military capabilities. Identifying the key features of the operational environment, understanding and anticipating the evolutionary trends of these features are essential conditions for military planners to design successful military operations that respect the principle of sufficient use of military force. The continuous changes in the operational environment require a reaction both in terms of concept, but, especially, in terms of action, to adapt the military capabilities and, implicitly, the operational concepts to the new challenges. In this context, shortening the duration of the adaptation of strategies, doctrines, tactics, techniques and procedures used in military actions to the maximum becomes imperative and must be at the same time anticipatory, and employing scientific tools to achieve an appropriate correlation between the structure of forces and missions is an unequivocal necessity.

Keywords: operational environment; operational concepts; planning; military operations; military capabilities;

INTRODUCTION

The challenges of the current operational environment, particularly complex in terms of the many variables and subvariables that characterise it, generate major conceptual and actional changes in terms of the use of military forces to resolve conflicts. This phenomenon requires a tailored reaction not only in terms of technology but especially in terms of military leadership that must promote the most effective solutions that can counteract even the technological advantage of the opponent.

The international security environment is constantly changing. New threats to the Euro-Atlantic area appear more and more frequently, and the North Atlantic Alliance, the European Union, the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation for Europe, as well as other organisations whose main responsibility is to defend security and create a stable security environment, are constantly fighting these threats.

Ensuring the success of this fight can be achieved by understanding the increasingly complex operational environment amid profound changes in the political, social, and economic environment of the recent decades and against the background of the advanced technologies that create new challenges for all forces with responsibilities in the field of defence and of national, regional and global security. The current operational environment appears increasingly ambiguous and more complex than ever, and the traditional military methods of training and action require a new approach.

The characteristics of the operational environment, generated by many interconnected variables and subvariables, which also include the relationships and interactions between them, greatly influence the manner of conducting military actions and are therefore a key element of analysis for military planners.

Stemming from the analysis of conflicts in recent decades, the trends in the current operational environment determine a new approach...
to the development of military capabilities, of the process of planning, organising and conducting military actions, and of the ways to achieve victory in the new circumstances imposed by the realities of the battlefield.

This article is intended as a starting point for elucidating the complexity of current and short-term challenges, to enable the development of the skills needed to counter the identified threats and achieve the right combination of capability systems and force training. Such a system must be well adapted to the operational environment in which the forces operate and should respond to their real needs.

The future operational environment requires operational adaptation by the military. Agile and innovative leaders must be trained to lead the full spectrum of military operations. Knowing the characteristics of the future operational environment and understanding how it evolves is the foundation for developing appropriate capabilities and training programmes. Success is guaranteed by the construction and operationalisation of forces capable of acting in any environment, which is very difficult to achieve.

Success is for those who possess the skills to act, react and adapt at high speed and with creativity. Enemies learn quickly and can change, although sometimes accidentally and incompletely, which makes it difficult to fight “new” skills. Opponents will continue to be adapted in terms of using all available power sources at their disposal. This is why it is very important to correctly and deeply understand the challenges generated by the operational environment, to counter new threats. We must find the most effective solutions for the correct design/sizing of military capabilities that will be engaged in conflict or for the maximum exploitation of the available ones, in a unified conception and by adopting an appropriate leadership to cope with the new threats.

Against this backdrop, the training of agile and innovative leaders, able to adapt tactics, techniques and procedures to the requirements of the contemporary operational environment, becomes a priority that will find its essence in appropriate training programs. Success on the battlefield must be consolidated by developing military capabilities in line with the new missions.

The current tactical actions highlight the special importance in the relationship field-characteristics-requirements and the need for a continuous adaptation to the challenges of the operational environment of confrontation. Complex missions require the action structures to have real and multiple possibilities for a real action autonomy, continuous improvement aimed at versatility, manœuvrevability, high pace of action, combined or modular capacity, mobility with a status similar to elite units, that can be used both in modern confrontations and in territorial clashes. Increased cohesion of tactical structures and their combat effectiveness are the effects of advanced technologies that support the endowment of small but very mobile troops with all the means necessary to carry out combat missions placed in the reference spectrum of modern operational environment independently and in isolation.

THE IMPORTANCE OF ANALYSING THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT IN DESIGNING MILITARY ACTIONS

The international security environment is constantly changing, and the current operational environment presents significantly more dangerous and far-reaching challenges for the military than those encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan. Major regional powers such as Russia, China, Iran and North Korea are actively seeking strategic advantage. These nations and other adversaries can limit US freedom of action in air, land, sea, space and cyberspace and reduce the Americans’ influence in critical areas of the world (Grigoraş, 2017, p. 7).

To achieve effective preparedness for military action in response to the challenges of the beginning of the millennium, the fundamental nature of planning and planning needs to be analysed in depth.
Therefore, the planner must have a multilateral understanding of the objectives of the operational environment and the characteristics of the planning process, as well as the object and features of the final planning products.

The Allied Joint Publication AJP-5 (Allied Common Doctrine for Operational Planning) defines operational planning as “Strategic, operational and/or tactical planning of military operations for the design, conduct and support of major campaigns and operations”. According to the AJP-5, there are eight basic stages of the OPP during which the commander and his staff develop the operational plan for conducting a military operation. Step 1 – Initiate the planning process and step 2 – Sampling and mission analysis is the most common periods in which the ODC is intentionally used. In these two steps, as part of the entire planning process, operational design takes place (NATO Standardization Office, May 2019, p. 63).

Operational design is a creative process, during which the basic idea of the commander (vision) is created – how the operation will be carried out, what military conditions must be created in the operational area to achieve strategic objectives, how these activities must be organized over time, space and purpose for achieving these conditions and what military capabilities and resources can be used to create these conditions. The core of this operational design process is the creative implementation of tools that are most often referred to as operational project concepts (ODCs).

The operational design allows the commander and staff to observe the situation in the operating environment from several perspectives. It allows the creation of a strategy of ideas to operate changes in the current situation in terms of achieving the desired end state. This cannot be done without a deep knowledge of the operational environment of conflict.

The operational environment is the combination of conditions, circumstances and influences that will determine the use of military forces and help the unit commander make decisions.

An operational environment consists of numerous interconnected variables and subvariables that will also include the relationships and interactions between them. Operational variables include not only the military aspect of an operational environment but also the influence the population has on it.

Commanders at all levels have their operational environments for operations specific to areas of responsibility. An operational environment for any specific operation comprises more than the interacting variables that exist in a given physical area. It also involves interconnected influences from a global or regional perspective (e.g. politics and economy) that affect the conditions under which operations take place there. Thus, each operational environment of a commander is part of the operational environment of a senior commander.

Military planners describe the conditions of an operational environment in terms of operational variables. Operational variables are those aspects of an operational environment, both military and non-military, that may differ from one operational area to another and may affect military operations. Operational variables describe not only the military aspects of an operational environment but also the influence of the population on it.

Today’s advanced technologies have a significant impact on the operational environment, as all of the above-mentioned factors are subject to attack by physical, cyber, and electronic means or a combination of any or all. In this context, adaptability is very important, because with the evolution of technology, military capabilities that operate according to an “old model” no longer correspond to the characteristics of the operational environment, which is constantly changing.

Operational environments include considerations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare. At the strategic level, leaders develop an idea or set of ideas for using the tools of national power (diplomatic, informational, military and economic) in a synchronized and integrated way to achieve national goals. The operational level links the tactical deployment of forces at national and international level and military-strategic objectives, with an emphasis on the design, planning and execution of operations using operational art. The tactical level of war involves the orderly engagement of forces concerning the adversary. These three levels help commanders to make a logical arrangement of forces, allocate resources and assign tasks based
on strategic objectives and coherent information about the conditions in their operational environment.

Broad trends such as globalisation, urbanisation, technological progress and underdeveloped countries are factors influencing the operational environment. These trends can create instability and nurture an environment of persistent conflict.

Persistent conflict is the prolonged confrontation between the state, the non-state and individual actors willing to use violence to achieve political and ideological goals. In such an operational environment, commanders must seek and exploit opportunities for success. To take advantage of opportunities, commanders must have a good understanding of the dynamic nature of each operational environment. Previous experience in a similar operation is not sufficient to guarantee the success of a future mission in a different operational environment.

Understanding how threats in different areas of state power manifest themselves helps commanders to identify (or create), seize, and exploit their opportunities during a military operation. Modern information technology makes the informational environment, which includes cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum, indispensable for military operations. The information environment is used by people, organisations and systems that collect, process, disseminate or act on information. It is an essential part of any operational environment and will be disputed and challenged during operations. All actors in the information environment – enemies, friends, hostile or neutral - are vulnerable to physical, psychological, cyber or electronic attacks.

There are no two identical operational environments. An operational environment consists of several relationships and interactions between interdependent variables. How entities and conditions interact in an operational environment is often difficult to understand and requires an ongoing analysis.

An operational environment is constantly evolving due to the complexity of human interaction and the way people learn and adapt. People’s actions alter that environment. Some changes are anticipated, while others are not. Some changes are immediate and obvious, while other changes evolve or are extremely difficult to detect.

The complex and dynamic nature of an operational environment makes it difficult to determine the cause-and-effect relationship and contributes to friction and uncertainty that are inherent in military operations. Commanders must constantly evaluate their operational environments and re-evaluate their assumptions.

The operational environment evolves as each operation progresses. Army leaders use operational variables to analyse and understand a specific operational environment and use mission variables to focus on specific elements during mission analysis.

For each operation, threats are a fundamental part of the operational environment. A threat is any combination of actors, entities or forces that have the capacity and intention to negatively influence military forces or national interests. Threats may include individuals, organised or unorganised groups of people, paramilitary or military forces, nation-states or national alliances. Commanders and personnel must understand how current and potential threats affect their organization, equipment, and training and engagement of forces. They need to constantly identify, monitor and assess threats as they adapt and change over time.

Generally, different actors in any operational area can be qualified as enemies, adversaries, neutrals or friends. An enemy is an entity identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorised. An enemy is also called a combatant and is treated as such under the law of war. Enemies will use advanced technologies (cyber attacks), as well as simple, dual-use technologies (such as improvised explosive devices). An adversary is an entity recognised as potentially hostile and against which the use of force may be foreseen. In combat operations, a neutral is an identity applied to an entity whose characteristics, behaviour, origin, or nationality indicate that it is neither a friendly nor an opposing force. Finally, a friend is a contact positively identified as a friend to support their efforts. Field operations often prove complex because an enemy, an adversary, a neutral or friendly mix is difficult to identify and distinguish from each other.

The term hybrid threat encompasses the complexity of operational environments, the multitude of actors involved, and the ambiguity between traditional elements of conflict. A hybrid threat is a diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces or unified criminal elements to achieve mutually beneficial effects. Hybrid threats combine traditional forces governed by law,
military tradition and the habit of unregulated forces acting without constraint on the use of violence. These may involve nation-states or non-state actors, such as criminal and terrorist organisations that use sophisticated capabilities traditionally associated with states. Hybrid threats are most effective when exploiting legislative constraints, lack of capacity and lack of situational awareness.

Peer threats can use resources in many areas to create lethal and non-lethal effects of operational significance throughout the operational environment. Peer-to-peer effects attempt to delay the deployment of forces and cause significant damage at multiple levels in a short time to achieve their objectives before the forces reach full operational capability.

METHODS OF ANALYSIS OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

For a coherent analysis of the operational environment, we should start from the statement that conflicting actors are included in a wide range, starting from the regular configuration of the force, belonging to a state and reaching non-state actors, governmental or non-governmental organisations that act to meet their objectives. By adding different terrorist organisations and/or organised crime, we get a comprehensive picture of the military action environment. Thus, it can be considered that the operational environment is an arena in which operational objectives are achieved not only by force but also by how quickly and effectively the military force can establish and maintain a stable condition. All actors, allies or enemies, state or non-state, regardless of their technological or military capabilities, will probably use all the political, economic, informational and/or military tools at their disposal to achieve the desired objectives.

Given all these factors, the most important issue that sparks the interest of military specialists is generated by finding effective solutions to achieve success in such a context.

The analysis of recent conflicts has led to a reality that is not to the liking of many: technological superiority over the enemy no longer creates the decisive advantage and, as such, victory cannot be achieved remotely by simply pressing the buttons.

This reality has been well known for almost two decades. A current problem, however, is the persistence of the same situations in which we are still looking for solutions to materialise effective actions against a formless enemy, which acts without respecting the rules, principles or methods written in any manual, against an enemy that gives a new dimension to the VUCA quartet that describes the characteristics of the current operational environment. Returning to the previous picture, among other issues, it was concluded that force, through its most valuable component – human resources – must be rebuilt to provide at least a consistent response and not a proactive action. Hence the need to develop methods that place in the boots of a fighter a human resource whose training meets the requirements that ensure success. The first activity carried out in such an approach is the analysis of the operational environment. The last is the full training of the force to be launched into action. Between these, there is a whole process of operational planning, with all the necessary sequences that ensure the efficient use of the resources.

All are important, all require effort, and all converge towards one point: achieving the goal with minimal effort. In terms of operational environment analysis and force training, probably the most effective method is to build models that, the closer to reality, the more useful the platform that is offered to the user, and the better the framework that allows users to carry both actions with remarkable results.

The analysis of the operational environment and the strategies of the participating actors includes a series of specific problems determined by the nature of their characteristics. An important issue is the control over the determination of results and the identification of conclusions.

Constantin GRIGORAŞ

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The analysis of the operational environment and the strategies of the participating actors includes a series of specific problems determined by the nature of their characteristics. An important issue is the control over the determination of results and the identification of conclusions. It can be said that identifying the conclusions of the analysis of a system characterised by the above-mentioned nonlinearities can be done by intuitive methods. Nonetheless, a simple presentation of the amount of the processed information to cover all possibilities for the future system configurations invalidates any attempt to base intuitive analysis. This creates the need to develop a method based on a mechanism capable of functioning efficiently despite uncertain and unquantifiable data and to provide concrete results, usable in the later stages of the study. The solution is provided by the method of morphological analysis.
“In essence, GMA (General Morphological Analysis) is a method for identifying and investigating the total set of possible relationships or ‘configurations’ contained in a complex of problems” (Zwicky, 1969). The method of morphological analysis was invented in the 1940s by the Swiss astrophysicist Fritz Zwicky for the US Army and developed in the 1960s at the California Institute of Technology as a method of structuring and investigating a complete set of relationships that are established within the complex, multidimensional and non-quantifiable problems. He used the method in various subfields, such as classification in astrophysics, the development of rocket propulsion systems, or aspects of the movement and colonisation of outer space (this method is said to have been the basis for the design of the Polaris mission). Once again, GMA was developed in the 1990s by Tom Ritchey of the Swedish Defence Investigation Agency to be implemented in studies on long-term defence planning and civil protection.

The method of morphological analysis is a participatory and iterative process, which involves a series of consultations carried out between groups of experts in the field or fields that include all the problems of the analysed system. As indicated by the name (morphology – morphos – form) the method is based on the decomposition of the analysed system into subsystems, as independent components, and on the analysis of all relations between them, based on the logical processes that determine internal compatibility.

The method begins by formulating the problem to analyse and identify the relevant elements. In this first stage, the main areas or operational variables (size, dimensions, etc.) that outline the operational environment are identified and defined. Operational variables are general characteristics of the operational environment, both military and civilian, which may differ from one area to another and decisively affect military operations. They describe not only the military aspects of the operational environment but also the impact of other factors on it. Typically, military planners analyse the operational environment using six interrelated operational variables (PMESII): political, military, economic, social, informational, and infrastructure. Two more can be added here: the physical environment and time.

Each of these operational variables (PMESII-MT) has a set of operational sub-variables.

In addition to the fact that they are criteria for the analysis of the operational environment, the operational variables describe to commanders the context in which military operations take place. Understanding these variables helps commanders assess how the military instrument of national power complements other instruments. A comprehensive analysis of variables usually takes place at the level of joint operations. In the analysis of the operational environment, commanders constantly consider the dynamics of these variables to have an articulated picture of the operational situation.

The political variable describes the distribution of political responsibility and power at all levels of government and takes into account the factors that define a society’s identity (culture, history, demography and religion). The population attributes different degrees of legitimacy to local and international political structures and processes. Political authorities and powers, formed formally (officials or officials of the political party) or informally (tribes, ethnic groups or other centres of power) or hidden political powers strongly influence the situation in the operational environment.

There are many sources of motivation in politics. These may include the charismatic leadership style or actions of internal security institutions and even of religious, ethnic or economic communities. Political parties or opposition groups can also influence the situation.

Understanding the political implications requires the analysis of all relevant, political, economic, military, religious, cultural partnerships, etc. This analysis preserves the presence and importance of external organisations and other groups, including groups united by a common cause. Examples include private security organisations, transnational corporations and NGOs providing humanitarian assistance.

The political sphere also addresses the effect of the will as an intangible primary factor. This factor motivates participants to sacrifice themselves to achieve their goals. Understanding what motivates key groups (political, military, insurgents, etc.) helps commanders to understand their goals and their desire to sacrifice to achieve their goals. Another benefit of understanding the mechanisms that strengthen existing individuals and groups in the operational environment...
groups to support or undermine the existing order. Many factors can stimulate or discourage individuals and groups from changing the economic status quo, such as technical knowledge and education; capital flow; investment; price fluctuations; debt; financial instruments; protection of property rights; the existence of the black market and the underground economy.

Thus, it can be emphasised that the economic variable defines the economic system in the area of operations as a whole, the degree of economic development and the distribution of the living standard of the population. Indicators for measuring the potential benefits and costs of influencing the political and economic order in the area could intensify how commanders understand the dynamics of the social and behavioural situation of allies, enemy, neutral and local entities.

The social variable describes aspects such as the structuring of society, the judicial and legislative system, social and humanitarian policies, religion, etc. Society is defined as the population of members who are subject to the same political authority, occupy a common territory and share a common culture and a sense of belonging to the same group. Society is not monolithic but includes different social structures that involve relationships, often extremely complex, established between institutions, organisations and groups of people in a cluster system.

Culture includes common beliefs, values, customs and traditions that individuals and groups adhere in order to integrate into society. Culture is the system of habits passed down from generation to generation, which is transmitted from one generation to the next. It includes the values of a country, the norms of society, the way of life of a country, the traditions of a country, etc. Society is defined as the population of members who are subject to the same political authority, occupy a common territory and share a common culture and a sense of belonging to the same group. Society is not monolithic but includes different social structures that involve relationships, often extremely complex, established between institutions, organisations and groups of people in a cluster system.

An important aspect in this field addresses the fact that, in the international context, the economic development of state actors sometimes differs substantially. These differences significantly influence policy options, including decisions by individual or indigenous leaders.
and reduce misunderstandings. It can improve the commander’s perspective on individual and group intentions and increase the effectiveness of military action.

The information variable quantifies the information field that is defined as the group of individuals, organisations, and systems (information, communication, and media) that collect, process, disseminate, and/or use information. The information environment gives participating actors access to information systems and the ability to use data and information to achieve their goals. Commanders use information activities to understand and shape the operational environment.

The media significantly influence the information that shapes the operational environment. Television and the Internet can broadcast real-time images of military action around the world. Media coverage can influence political decisions, as well as public opinion (domestic and international). Opponents often use media to facilitate the achievement of goals by controlling and manipulating how audiences perceive the content of a situation and/or its context. They often try to create partisan views that are antagonistic to a particular cause, offering a twisted interpretation of events.

The infrastructure variable refers to the facilities, services and installations the society requires to operate. These facilities and services include communication systems, water and electricity distribution facilities, transport infrastructure, irrigation and land reclamation, hospitals, schools, logistics station facilities, etc. Degraded infrastructure affects the entire operational environment. At the highest level, the infrastructure includes sophisticated technological capabilities that make it possible to carry out research and development activities, with the additional application of the results for civilian and military purposes.

It is important to note that not all segments of society perceive infrastructure changes in the same way. Improvements seen by some as beneficial can be perceived as a threat by others. For example, the introduction of mobile networks and the Internet can help a local economy, but it can offend influential and conservative local leaders who believe it allows access to indecent material. Therefore, actions affecting infrastructure require a detailed analysis of possible effects, especially in the social field.

To conclude, upon receiving a mission, military leaders analyze information about mission operational variables during mission analysis. They use mission variables to improve their understanding of the situation. Mission variables consist of the following factors: mission, enemy, terrain and weather, available troops and support, available time, and civilian considerations (METT-TC). The incorporation of the analysis of operational variables with METT-TC ensures that military planners take into account the best available information about the mission.

MODELLING THE PROCESS OF SELECTING MILITARY CAPABILITIES

Nowadays, we notice that the word “capabilities” appears very often in the discourse of politicians when they discuss defence issues, in the summaries of military analysts when they refer to the military commitments that our country has assumed or in the language of the military, where it tends to replace the term “capacities” more and more often, even if a clear definition of the term, which would explain its entire dimension, has not yet appeared in the Explanatory Dictionary of the Romanian language. This means that the word “capabilities” is often used without a clear understanding of the content it expresses.

Elements related to capability were addressed at the Washington and Prague Summits. In these contexts, military capability represents “the ability to achieve a specific objective in time of war” and includes the structure of forces, equipment, response level, and training and sustainability.

In the American military thinking, the concept of capability is defined as “The ability to achieve a specified wartime objective (win a war or battle, destroy a target set)”. From here we understand that through abilities we obtain effects, respectively the fulfilment of the mission, the winning of the battle/war.
As mentioned in the previous sections, the characteristics of the operational environment greatly influence the conception of military actions and implicitly the level of development and the use of military capabilities to achieve success. In this context, the continuous adaptation of military capabilities to changes in the operational environment is an essential requirement that military planners must take into account.

The content of the transformation of capabilities, specific to the military institution, aims to move from one status to another, and differs qualitatively and/or quantitatively in areas such as the basis of establishment and organisation of the institution, the architecture of training programs and tasks (missions), the system of fighting means, structures, philosophy and leadership processes, organisational culture, resource policy and especially human resources – with emphasis on quality, competence, attitudes, motivations, behaviour and action efficiency, an image that the institution intends to promote nationally and internationally (Grigoraș, 2011, p. 137).

In order to evaluate the capabilities of an armament system, military strategists used various assessment models, models that sometimes reached special complexities, evaluating up to 200 parameters for an armament category. With the increase in complexity, the costs for maintaining the database up to date have increased and the number of somewhat subjective parameters has inherently augmented, such as those parameters that appreciate the military in relation to the doctrine of the country that uses it, with the operating capacity of personnel (physical abilities, the degree of professional training, the capacity of endurance to effort and stress, etc.) or with the particularities of the season and the landscape of the probable area of action (Ibid, p. 130).

The priority of the units nominated for missions outside the national territory is the development of military capabilities in close correlation with the particularities of the mission which involves: technology; structure; technical tactics and procedures appropriate to the operational requirements and the realization of the instruction according to the specific standards of these missions in the theatres of operations, focused mainly on the increase of the capacity of action.

As it can be seen, the last step is to model and analyse the force structure as a result of the previous steps, to determine if it is correctly sized, if it meets the operational requirements of the confrontation environment and missions that can be performed at an acceptable level, framed in the strategic and doctrinal framework adopted by each state and according to the statute of each in a multinational context.
Operational research uses different models, depending on the complexity of the problem being studied, the data available and the goals set for the research. Among the methods used must be listed: statistical methods, methods of modelling through strategic games and experimental methods. All these methods can be used both independently and in combination (Grad, Stoian, Kovacs, Dumitru, 2000, p. 8).

In broad terms, modelling designates the representation of a system or process through another system, called a model, which preserves the relevant characteristics of the original and is easier to study (Bălașceanu, 2005, p. 7). The fundamental element of modelling theory is the model, which is defined as a theoretical or material system that enables the indirect study of the properties and transformations of another, more complex system, with which the first system presents an analogy (According to DEX, 1996, p. 644). The purpose of modelling is to obtain relevant conclusions about the original, based on the study of the model, which can be done analytically and experimentally.

The definition of the model used by NATO (NATO, August 1998, p. 89) was inspired by that used by the US military according to which the model is, “a representation of a system, entity, phenomenon or process. The software models of the specific entities are composed of algorithms and data”. The algorithm is an established set of well-defined and unambiguous rules and processes for solving a problem in a finite number of steps while the data are properties of an entity that are expressed by parameterised, discrete values that describe its attributes.

In order to model a certain system (process), the aim is to find relationships that meet certain conditions:

- to have a sufficiently accurate approximation of the real system by the adopted model;
- to have a full concordance between the elements of the process and those of the model;
- the possibility of decomposing the complex system into subsystems, which in turn are associated with their models;
- the time variation domain should be the same in the analysed process and its model.

The experimental study of a model is also called simulation and is preferred in situations where a study by the analytical method is impossible or too laborious. The model of the system or process thus studied is called the simulation model. However, all models offer the advantage of providing an evaluation method that can be integrated into decision-making algorithms, both politically, in terms of military leadership and technology. In these conditions, it is essential to know in detail both the modelled system and the model used, as well as the fact that the model must be seen within the limits of what it offers factually (numerical values) and intuitively (interpretation of values).

The main result of the analytical study of the model thus simplified consists in the optimisation of the operation plans. However, it must be completed with the re-evaluation of the optimal solution, by simulating it with the help of the initial detailed model of the operation. Last but not least, the increase in the degree of generality of the model imposed the introduction of some coefficients that would ensure the compatibility of some models that have as subject different categories of military technique.

CONCLUSIONS

I believe that the analysis of the operational environment is one of the basic activities in the process of planning military actions. The growing degree of global interactions will strongly influence future threats. Access to advanced technologies, together with the possibility of owning and using weapons of mass destruction, will increase the number of “actors” with sufficient military potential to change regional power balances.

The evolution of changes in the operational environment is complex and dynamic. That is why the future can no longer be very well anticipated based on experiences, as the future will no longer be an extension of the present. The changes take place exponentially and recursively, which attracts rapid and profound changes, to which military capabilities must be adapted.

It is essential to understand these general trends, as they help the decision-maker to implement coordinated actions at the national level in response to these changes. Global trends could lead to tensions, instability and even conflict. Regardless of the objective pursued,
the opponent in the future operational environment will be highly adaptable, being able to use a wide range of technological means, equipment and procedures, combined with conventional weapons and improvised means.

In the future, national military forces or Alliance forces will continue to work in an increasingly complex environment, which will present progressively more diverse and unexpected challenges. Therefore, it is necessary to formulate forecasts and opinions about the configuration of the operational environment of the future and regarding the threats that may arise in this context. These projections of future conflicts allow military planners to better understand the context in which the forces will operate and establish clear directions and concepts for the development of the military capabilities of the armed forces of the future.

Modelling is a universal process, applicable in virtually any field of knowledge. Creating a model of an object or event is not very difficult, but creating a model of the whole world in which all objects and events are consistently represented requires special mental and creative effort. Most people began modelling by creating representations of systems that were inconsistent or inefficient. Through learning procedures from their own mistakes, they mastered techniques superior to those they had previously used.

The main purpose of modelling is to come up with easy-to-use representations to describe the systems they embody in a manner with great mathematical consistency. One explanation for this would be that coming up with easy-to-use representations ensures a high degree of user perception.

The decision-maker bases their actions or decisions on the conclusions drawn from the analysis of the problem. If the deduction of the conclusions were contested and if the important variables were abstracted, then the solution of the model would serve as an effective solution to the problem.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:
THE IMPACT OF MULTI-DOMAIN OPERATION ON THE MILITARY STRATEGY

Major (N) Alexandru-Lucian CUCINSCHI, PhD Candidate
“Carol I” National Defence University, Bucharest

INTRODUCTION

At present, few aspects are known to the general public regarding the multi-domain operation. The fact that it is becoming more and more popular and it is gaining some ground in the face of the joint operation arouses the interest of the military and civilians involved in the national or allied defence system.

Although it can be intuited, at first sight, that it comes with a higher degree of centralisation than the joint operation, as well as a much greater freedom of action (by using the concept of “mission command”), the details of how this type of operation will revolutionise the planning and conduct of military actions are quite unclear, mainly due to the fact that this type of operation is not yet put into practice.

Given that the military has identified the multi-domain operation as a solution to current threats in the geopolitical environment without taking into account the current military strategy, expecting policy makers to decide its implementation (Watling, Roper, 2019, p. 23), I consider that, through a qualitative analysis (focused on understanding the phenomenon), it can be made the connection between the multi-domain operation and what the military strategy represents, in order to translate military concerns into the current national reality.

Thus, in the first chapter I will present the relevant aspects related to the way in which the multi-domain operation manifested itself in its incipient forms, the reasons why the joint operation is no longer considered sufficient, taking into account the new threats and changes that this type of operation begins to inflict in the strategic environment.

In the second chapter I will highlight the links that are established between the operational level (the level at which the multi-domain operation takes place) and the tactical and strategic levels, as well as the new perceptions on military strategy.

Through the mentioned conclusions, I intend to draw a parallel between what is currently happening in Romania and the multi-domain operation.
PECULIARITIES OF MULTI-DOMAIN OPERATION IN THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

The multi-domain battle has emerged based on the idea that disruptive technologies will change the nature of war. It is trying to repeat the course of the ground-to-air combat, which has long been considered a successful model for conducting military action, developing as a concept in itself, before force structures can implement it. (Townsend, 2018).

However, the alignment of the multi-domain battle with the strategic direction in which the missions, the emerging operational environment, technological advancement, enemy anticipation, threats and enemy capabilities are presented (Ibid.) must materialise as soon as possible to have a comprehensive picture of the interdependencies that exists between concrete situations in the geopolitical environment and the multi-domain battle.

The multi-domain operation materialised as a continuation of the multi-domain battle concept, with the publication of TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028, in 2018. The authorship of the concept is attributed to the US Land Forces but it continued to be developed, and subsequently adopted by other military forces services as well as at the political-military level, through an inter-institutional approach, being considered, by some experts, even a “conceptual successor of the joint warfare” (Spears, 2019).

With the changing paradigm of war, in the sense of the diverse types of threats to the US security, they had to adopt a series of military, doctrinal and organisational measures so as not to lose the initiative in the global geopolitical and geostrategic environment.

Thus, the separation of US and allied forces in time, space and function, to be defeated by engaging them using multiple dimensions of defence, in all domains (TRADOC, Ibid., p. iii) (air, sea, land, cyber and outer space), is seen as the main threat to current US policy that is based on the ability to project power on the American continent and integrate the actions of the united force globally (Ibid.). If the enemy succeeds in this separation, the strategic depth is lost, this being the one that gives the joint operation the necessary operational advantage, materialised by the support of the offensive. (Ibid.).

The Impact of Multi-Domain Operation on the Military Strategy

The solution identified by the USA to the threat represented by stratified confrontation, adopted mainly by Russia and China through the use of long-range systems, combined with non-lethal means of aggression, capable of shaping the operational environment, especially before the conflict (Watling, Roper, 2019, p. iii), is the “rapid and continuous integration of all domains of warfare” (Ibid.), which means, in fact, the conduct of multi-domain operations.

The fact that Russia and China continue to improve the concept of use as well as the means for A2/AD (Anti-Access/Area Denial) made the joint operation not keep pace with the new concepts used by the opponent, it being limited to sequencing the naval and air superiority, in predictable variants, based on hitting the enemy with aviation and navy, subsequently resorting to defeat through the land forces (Ibid.). Unlike the joint operation, the multi-domain operation has as main purpose to discourage the opponent from creating favourable conditions for the development of the conflict in advantageous terms, through joint operations.

However, this solution (multi-domain operations), which the USA intends to implement in competition with global players, close in military and economic value, comes with a number of needs to build new capabilities or to recalibrate and strengthen those already existing.

In this regard, the USA intends to improve the ability of the Allies to respond to the increasingly complex challenges posed by Russia and China; preparing the operational environment by establishing bases on the territory of the allies, prepositioning equipment and supplies, ensuring all necessary access rights and carrying out information collection activities; ensuring the necessary authority and permissions for the rapid transition from competition to conflict; improving the capacity to conduct multi-domain operations in urban areas, by developing tactics and capabilities that lead to increased accuracy, speed and timing of lethal and non-lethal effects; facilitating the visualisation of a fight in all areas by commanders, by using the capabilities of the staff of the units they lead, together with those existing at different levels, to be engaged in the place considered decisive; making available to the commander of the combined force of formations capable of fighting in all domains, capable of engaging certain vulnerabilities in the systems and forces deployed in several layers (defensive and offensive) of Russia and China (Ibid.)
It should also be mentioned that the multi-domain operation refers, in addition to the clearly delimited aspects of being conventional, to the unconventional aspects, this being in fact one of the reasons why it has distanced itself doctrinally and conceptually from the joint operation.

Examples of multi-domain operations and joint operations can facilitate the understanding of the differences between the two: a joint action of the Marines and Land Forces in a ground attack is considered a joint operation but cannot be considered a multi-domain operation, and an action of an anti-submarine ship together with the anti-submarine aviation of its staff, may be considered a multi-domain operation but may not be considered a joint operation (Spears, 2019).

It should be emphasized that there are, in the opinion of many specialists, advantages that position the multi-domain operation above what until now was the main form of planning and conducting military actions – the joint operation. According to these critics, the joint operation is considered to start with deconfliction and is often reduced to this, while the multi-domain operation crosses the barrier of cooperation and targets selective interdependence, pushing the integration between the armed forces services from operational level to tactical (Ibid.).

In addition, the multi-domain operation does not require preposition commands for each service, which is limited to conventional geography, which gives it an advantage in terms of protection and flexibility of the command-and-control system.

Although there are a number of arguments that place the multi-domain operation above the combined operation, in terms of efficiency, there are also many voices arguing that the multi-domain operation is in fact an extension of the joint operation (Clare, 2020), which, in my opinion, is not very far from the truth, but it must be borne in mind that the vast majority of revolutionary concepts started from something with which they could be compared, in order to have a reference and to be understood.

For example, the multi-domain operation is based on asymmetry, as does the joint operation, the difference is that the asymmetry of the joint operation is given by the services, while, in the case of multi-domain operation, it is given by the possibility of action in the five domains, resulting in a greater number of asymmetric employment opportunities. In this respect, asymmetry represents the possibility of employing two services (in the case of joint operation) to exploit the vulnerabilities of one service when exposed to the action of a type of capability it is not prepared to respond. In the case of multi-domain operation, the five domains allow for more asymmetric employment opportunities compared to the joint operation.

The problem that I appreciate will arise in the near future is related to the complexity of these possibilities and how to implement them, because, as a rule, during a high-intensity conflict (war) there is a tendency to simplify plans and actions, to be able to respond in a timely manner to threats that may differ greatly from those considered at the beginning of the conflict. As a result, I consider that we can talk about a multi-domain operation, especially in crisis situations and at the beginning of the war, after which the joint operation, with all its disadvantages, is very likely to play a central role.

Another aspect that represents a challenge for the USA as the initiator of the concept of multi-domain operation is its implementation both at national level and especially within NATO. Thus, the differences between the level of equipment with capabilities as well as the different policies (Ibid.) will be a challenge for a long time.

Despite all these problems, to which are added the difficulties in disseminating information between the 29 members states, the multi-domain operation may be the answer to countering A2AD (Ibid.). It is very possible that this could represent the revival of NATO and ensure a timely response to the challenges posed by potential adversaries.

For example, the United Kingdom renamed, in 2019, the command of the joint force in the strategic command of Great Britain, thus becoming responsible for the development of capabilities in the five areas (land, air, maritime, space and cyber). (Ibid.).

From what is presented, it appears that the multi-domain operation can also be approached through intermediate variants, which do not fully reflect this concept but which can make the transition easier. Thus, the multi-domain operation represents in fact the environments in which services operate (the joint operation) to which the space and the cyber environment are added.
for each service to be responsible for the specific environment along with space and cyberspace, as it is currently the situation in the UK Air Force (Ibid.). Another option would be for the space and cyberspace to be managed by a structure located at a higher level than the joint force command (strategic inter-institutional level) and services to lead the fight only in their specific environment, being part of the joint operation.

Regardless the variant considered optimal for the implementation of the multi-domain operation, the connection between this type of operation and the military strategy is vital not only for the coherence of military actions but also for their link to the other national, multinational and allied bodies having responsibilities in the field of security.

Therefore, I consider that thought flexibility is necessary, in terms of what military strategy was, is, and will be, through the prism of multi-domain operation, so that the above-mentioned connection could be achieved.

**THE EVOLUTION OF THE MILITARY STRATEGY AND ITS CONNECTION WITH THE OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL LEVEL**

Strategy can be defined from different perspectives, as a component part of military art, along with operational and tactical art, as a way of connecting power sources with power factors and interests, as well as a plan to achieve a goal.

We note that the definition of strategy has “evolved” according to the instruments of power that were predominant in a certain historical period. Thus, throughout history, strategy has been defined having as a reference the military instrument of power, therefore, in terms of engaging the opponent with military means. In this regard, the most well-known definitions of strategy present it as “the art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to achieve national political objectives through the use of force or the threat of its use” (Freedictionary.com).

Subsequently, with the decrease in the share of the military instrument as a means of imposing foreign policy and the increase in the share of political, economic and diplomatic instruments, strategy began to be approached in terms of each instrument of power, that being the reason why, as a means of connecting power sources with power factors and national interests, strategy can be applied from the highest (political) level to the level of any political, military, commercial organisation, in terms of the factor considered relevant to that organisation.

As a result, at present, the definition of strategy in terms of the military instrument has undergone some changes in approach, which no longer places the armed forces at the centre, being supported by the other instruments of power. The idea that war is considered the last resort in resolving disputes is now being challenged. Thus, even Clausewitz’s famous statement that “war is only a continuation of politics by other means” (Clausewitz, 1982, p. 18) can be extended, given the new connotations of the term “war” (economic, information).

One such definition, which captures exactly the nature of military strategy today, is set out in Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States: “Strategy is a prudent idea or set of ideas for engaging national power in a synchronized and integrated manner in order to meet the objectives of the theater of operations and the multinational ones” (2017, p. 1-7).

Although, as I have presented, the share of the military instrument has decreased, especially after the end of the Cold War, at present the military instrument is, in my opinion, a guarantor of the other instruments of state power. Thus, the military instrument finds its applicability, within strategies, at all levels, starting with the political level and reaching the subsidiary levels, in which the economic, military, information and diplomatic instruments coexist.

In this regard, a comprehensive approach to the mentioned idea is that of Lucian Scipanov in the article Possible Solutions for Achieving a National Security Strategy – Identifying the Place of the Maritime Strategy: “At the politico-military level, strategy covers much more than the military aspect. In different situations, strategy covers the fields of security (security strategy), the field of defence (defence strategy), the military field (military strategy), the maritime field (maritime strategy)” (Scipanov, 2020, p. 69).

Regarding the connection of the strategy with the operative art and tactics, an approach, which I consider realistic from the point
of view of the interdependencies between the factors influencing the conduct of actions, in this case, by the Naval Forces, is that of Hughes Wayne, in the paper “Naval Tactics and Their Influence on Strategy”. He argues that strategy must be based on the capabilities available, so decisions on how to approach a particular strategy must be based on tactics appropriate to the forces available. The “bottom-up” approach means the substantiation of the military strategy based on the correlation of effective tactics that can be adopted by the available forces. (Hughes, 1986, p. 2).

This approach contradicts US political-military practices that support the “top-down” theory, in which national policies define military strategy and are based on the fact that available forces will be able to implement it. In the author’s view, this is only appropriate if it is necessary to identify the need for forces to guide the acquisition process, which requires a long time and a strategy that cannot be put into practice at present. (Ibid.).

The author’s perspective on the link between tactics and strategy is summarised in the following statement: “If the forces are inadequate then a strategy that is partially bluffing may be necessary, but it is important for everyone to understand that the strategy itself cannot be thus, its part, which is a bluff, cannot be forgotten and leads to self-deception” (Ibid.), which we consider should give us food for thought when we decide to correlate tactics with strategy.

We can clearly understand through this approach that it is important to realistically identify the vulnerabilities that are inherent in the actions of a certain service and not to consider it irrelevant that the missions outlined can only be partially fulfilled.

I have presented this approach in order to draw a parallel with the multi-domain operation, given that it is a new concept and few issues have been debated and presented in public works.

Thus, the multi-domain operation, identified as the solution to the current threats to the USA and its allies, is, in my opinion, as in the previous case, a bottom-up approach.

As it can be understood, the vast majority of the capabilities needed to develop the multi-domain operation exist or are under construction, the problem is to achieve the necessary synergy so that they deliver the expected strategic effects. Meeting this goal will require a realistic plan and adequate funding of the armed forces, without which, no matter how good the intentions are, the expected effect cannot be produced.

Another aspect related to the incorporation of the multi-domain operation by the military strategy is represented by the need for high class education of the military, which can give it a comprehensive character and the necessary flexibility.

Moreover, in order to be coherent, multi-domain operations must also be based on appropriate tactics and largely on advanced technology and preferably artificial intelligence. However, I believe that they cannot replace the tactics practiced and confirmed over time by the services but they can use their capabilities as needed.

CONCLUSIONS

The multi-domain operation is, as I have mentioned, a concept of the US Land Forces that finds its role in the US military strategy, not necessarily directly but more through a similarity to the joint operation. For Romania, the fact that the strategic partner has chosen to adopt this type of operation largely dictates the way in which the national defence strategy of the country and the military strategy are conceived. Thus, it can be seen that in the National Defence Strategy for the period 2020-2024, the emphasis is on cooperation with the strategic partner (USA) and NATO as well as on own defence policies (Armed Forces 2040 Concept).

Romania’s pressing problem is represented, at the moment, by the lack of capabilities. It follows that the implementation of multi-domain operations, in the case of Romania, will require a fairly long period, not a classic “top-down” or “bottom-up” approach but everything starts from them “down” and “up” (from operational level to tactics and strategy).

However, on closer inspection, it can be seen that what is currently happening in Romania, militarily, is, in fact, a gradual and perhaps very little observable implementation of the multi-domain operation.

Thus, by providing with equipment directly purchased from the USA (equipment taken into account by them as part of systems compatible with the multi-domain operation), such as Patriot surface-to-air missile systems, F-16 aircraft and, in perspective, the NSM (Naval Strike Missile) coastal missile batteries, we are in line...
with the US proposed pattern, by which partner states considered vital for the application of the multi-domain operation (and which are willing to grant the necessary permissions to use national C4ISR systems by the USA) are supported in the procurement of capabilities.

However, I consider that we should not neglect the steps that have been taken to achieve a joint force capable of responding to all own security needs, given our country’s position at the NATO periphery.

On the other hand, we cannot ignore the evolution in the military field. By using the multi-domain operation, we are not only part of counteracting Russia’s actions but we are also in line with the new global trends in the use of the armed forces.

It should also be mentioned that, as currently presented, the multi-domain operation is a means of achieving a very sophisticated “conventional” asymmetry, but which can only be achieved through major investments in capability development. The question is whether the political decision-maker is willing to take on this transformation and whether there will be continuity in its implementation even when public opinion is influenced by misinformation.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY:**

EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE IN MILITARY LEADERSHIP

Colonel (r) (N) Professor Ion CHIORCEA, PhD
“Mircea cel Bătrân” Naval Academy, Constanța

Colonel (N) Iațu CIORANU, PhD Student
“Carol I” National Defence University, Bucharest

In military structures, the leader has always been at the forefront of organising and carrying out specific actions with the aim of increasing the organisation’s efficiency and effectiveness. Thus, the military organisation’s efficiency and effectiveness are the effects of leaders’ ability to react to disturbances, ensuring optimal orientation of those in command, and finding optimal answers to the questions “how” and “what” is to be done so that the best organisational course of action could be achieved.

In this article we consider it appropriate to analyse emotional intelligence, how it influences military leadership, how an optimal affective environment influences the military actions, and to answer the question: Do military leaders need emotional intelligence?

Keywords: military leadership; emotional intelligence; efficiency; effectiveness; personal development;

INTRODUCTION

Emotional intelligence is one of the areas of intelligence that emerged relatively recently in the organisational field. However, it has been studied intensely especially from the perspective of the impact it can have on the behaviour of the individual in most diverse situations.

Perhaps the best argument for the need to develop emotional intelligence is provided by Lisa Nowak, an American astronaut. Her profession is very demanding as the selection criteria involve tremendous expertise in science and engineering, but also high physical and mental qualities for piloting. Lisa Nowak had a master’s degree in aeronautical engineering and studied postgraduate astrophysics at the US Naval Academy. She flew air tours for the US Navy for more than five years, and in 1996 she was selected to become an astronaut. She had also a very high Intelligence Quotient (IQ). In 2007, however, after discovering that her boyfriend was in a relationship with another woman, Lisa decided to meet her, having a vague plan to kidnap her. She tried to implement the plan, but she had a nervous breakdown, which led to her arrest (Manson).

It is especially important to be able to understand why intelligent people like Lisa often really do stupid things, deciphering emotional intelligence being a step in this attempt. Although the field of emotional intelligence is still very controversial, its importance cannot be disputed because it is recognised that for being successful it is not enough to have a high level of academic intelligence. It is obvious that there are people who have not been exceptionally good in school or do not excel through syllogisms at present, but perform in their fields of activity, being respected and loved by others. So intellectual and technical capabilities play an important role, they make success in leadership possible, but the probability of success seems to be grounded on emotional intelligence.
**HISTORICAL LANDMARKS**

The term *intelligence* comes from the Latin “intelligentia” and represents “the ability to understand phenomena, things etc. easily and well, based on previous experience” (Romanian Explanatory Dictionary – DEX), the term understanding having also, according to the explanatory dictionary, the sense of establishing relationships between people.

Over time there have been numerous approaches to the term, with the French philosopher Descartes succeeding in the definition closest to modern understanding of intelligence. He defined intelligence as “the means to acquire a perfect science of an infinite number of things” (Sîrbu, 2019).

There were times when people expressing their emotions were often marginalised perhaps because the term we use today, emotional intelligence, would have been considered an oxymoron. Moreover, those who expressed their emotions were considered mentally ill and underwent therapy to suppress their emotionality. It was not until the early 1960s that some researchers agreed that emotions could guide thinking and actions and turn attention to solving problems (Caruso, Salovey, 2012, pp. 34-47).

The term *intelligence* offers a dual approach, on the one hand, as a process of assimilation and interpretation of data and information with the aim of optimal adaptations and, on the other hand, as skills, qualities, through which efficiency and effectiveness are ensured.

Initially, intelligence was approached from the perspective of its cognitive aspects, but over time there were views that this approach was not sufficient to determine the ability to adapt effectively to the environment. Thus, over time, several typologies of intelligence have been developed.

In 1983, Howard Gardner introduced the concept of *multiple intelligence*, arguing that not only logical-mathematical intelligence is important, but also interpersonal and intrapersonal intelligence. He introduced the Multiple Intelligences model, which is presented in table no. 1.

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1 Howard Gardner, American psychologist and author, known for his multiple intelligence theory.

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**Emotional Intelligence in Military Leadership**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>MEANING</th>
<th>ACTIVITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Visual/spatial intelligence</td>
<td>Ability to visually perceive what surrounds us</td>
<td>Building, reading, writing, painting, interpreting some images</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verbal/linguistic intelligence</td>
<td>Ability to use words and speak</td>
<td>Listening, speaking, writing, punning, explaining concepts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logical-mathematical intelligence</td>
<td>Ability to use reason, logic and numbers</td>
<td>Solving problems, working with certain abstract concepts, mathematical calculations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Body/kinaesthetic intelligence</td>
<td>Ability to control body movements, ability to work with different objects</td>
<td>Dance, sport, body language, theatre, mime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhythmic/musical intelligence</td>
<td>Ability to produce and appreciate music</td>
<td>Whistling, singing, using musical instruments, composing songs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpersonal intelligence</td>
<td>Ability to understand and relate with others</td>
<td>Listening, using empathy, advising teamwork, observing moods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intrapersonal intelligence</td>
<td>Ability to self-reflect and be self-aware</td>
<td>Self-assessment, knowledge of one’s own powers and weaknesses, self-discovery</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 1: Multiple Intelligences Model (Ibid., p. 629)*

Part of these types of intelligence, interpersonal intelligence and intrapersonal intelligence, could be elements of what would later be called emotional intelligence.

Emotional intelligence is a concept that was born in the United States in 1990, in an article written by Peter Salovey. He found that the ability to identify own or other feelings as well as to solve problems with emotional implications differs from person to person. John Mayer and Peter Salovey presented emotional intelligence as a two-way combination of thought and feelings and supported the thesis that IQ does not guarantee success in life.

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2 Peter Salovey is an American social psychologist and current President of Yale University, one of the first pioneers and leading researchers in emotional intelligence.
Daniel Goleman took up this thesis and, in 1995, after his own analysis and investigation, published the book “Emotional Intelligence”, which had a strong impact on leadership. Thus, skills and attitudes that until then were not considered causally related to the success of a leader, became essential evidence of a developed emotional intelligence.

Daniel Goleman continued his research in the field by trying to identify a link between emotional intelligence and performance in the workplace, introducing the term specific skills.

The results of the study coordinated by Daniel Goleman were published in the Harvard Business Review, highlighting an obvious link between understanding, acceptance and emotion management skills and the concept of leadership.

EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE
IN ORGANISATIONAL LEADERSHIP

After John Mayer and Peter Salovey conceptualised and measured the elements of emotional intelligence as a skill, as a personality characteristic, influenced by both mood and social factors, and after Daniel Goleman pointed out that “emotional skills are meta-skills, which determines how well we can use the talents we have, including pure intelligence” (Goleman, 2001, p. 75), followed a general concern about the emotional intelligence composition.

Thus, it was established that when addressing the issue of emotional intelligence, the following types of skills should be considered: recognition of one’s own affective situation; learning how affective situations can be used; recognising the emotional situations of others; addressing the affective situation of others.

Thus, we can understand both our own and others emotional situations, the effects of these situations on our own behaviour and how emotional intelligence can influence our way of relating within an organisation, in society in general, depending on its level, contributing to success or hindering it.

We are generally talking about four components, as areas of emotional intelligence, divided into two groups (A and B) depending on the type of adjacent skills (Ibid.):

A. Personal skills – used to take care of ourselves:
   a. self-knowledge:
      - emotional self-knowledge: identifying one’s own emotions and understanding their impact;
      - correct self-evaluation: awareness of one’s own strengths and limitations;
      - self-confidence: correct appreciation of one’s own value and abilities;
   b. self-control:
      - emotional self-control – controlling one’s emotions;
      - transparency – the manifestation of an honest, trustworthy behaviour;
      - adaptability – adaptation to the new, the ability to overcome obstacles;
      - ambition – continuous concern to improve performance;
      - initiative – the quality to undertake something new at one’s own urging and to capitalise on opportunities;
      - optimism – the ability to look confidently to the future.

B. Social skills – used to manage human relationships.
   a. social consciousness:
      - empathy – identifying and deciphering the feelings of other people, concern for their interests;
      - organisational awareness – interpretation of trends, decisions and policies at organisational level;
      - solicitude – knowing and anticipating the wishes of subordinates;
   b. relationship management:
      - inspired leadership – guidance and motivation for a clear vision;
      - influence – the ability to act persuasively;
      - training others – developing the skills of other people through guidance and harnessing feedback;

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8 Daniel Jay Goleman is an American writer, psychologist and journalist specialised in psychology and neuroscience. He is the author of over 10 books on psychology, education, science, environmental crises and leadership. He has been nominated twice for the Pulitzer Prize.
- catalysing changes – mobilising subordinates in a new direction;
- conflict management – settling disputes;
- team spirit and collaboration – team cooperation and strengthening.

The components of emotional intelligence are in continuous inter-conditioning with each other, the ability to use one of them being closely related to one, several or all other elements. Thus, self-regulation is influenced by the level of self-awareness, those who can easily identify their feelings are able to manifest empathy, and without self-awareness people cannot have motivation. Also, having social skills is certainly a condition to have developed all other components of emotional intelligence.

Moreover, Goleman, in an attempt to clarify these issues, examines the extent to which people manage to transfer potential into professional performance, introducing the concept of emotional competence, based on both personal skills (self-awareness, self-control and motivation), as well as on social skills (empathy, sociability).

In the current context, characterised by an unprecedented technological evolution, a tendency of organisational constraint and an increase in individual responsibilities, qualities such as those presented above are increasingly important. Thus, personal development and educating the emotional intelligence of leaders need to be a priority.

This priority is also explained by the fact that one of the main tasks of a leader is to induce positive feelings to those he leads. From this perspective, the emotional side of the leader is crucial in optimising the other dimensions of leadership.

If there is a need for change, regardless of its complexity, the leader’s reaction becomes very important from the perspective of the emotional orientation of the group. The leader’s reaction helps the group to decipher and react optimally emotionally to the events that have occurred. Whether we are talking about panic, nervousness, irritability or optimism, these situations will inevitably be transmitted to the whole group.

In antithesis to emotionally intelligent leaders there are emotionally “toxic” leaders. There are those leaders who can negatively influence the affective climate within the group. They are frequently angry, irritated or anxious. They transmit these feelings and, each time they interact they affect negatively the dynamics of the group, without even being aware of this fact.

So, the leaders’ emotions can instil into the group either anger, panic, apathy, or involvement, pride, optimism. Regardless of the leaders’ visibility, their attitude influences the affective climate within the management team, which will lead to affecting the emotional condition throughout the subordinate structure.

The leaders emotionally impact the group to such an extent because they are the first to express their opinion, and the other people frequently discuss their point of view, they speak and are listened to the most. Moreover, their nonverbal language is quickly received and interpreted by other people because group members trust the leaders and shape their own emotional reactions based on leaders’ emotional reaction.

Consequently, the leader’s ability to recognise and control own affective situations and to recognise and address the affective situations of others has a major impact on the group’s results, in terms of influencing actions both quantitatively and qualitatively.

Therefore, the efficiency of the leader and the group is directly proportional to the ability not only of the leader but also of the group members to manage the relationships with the others.

**EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE IN THE MILITARY ENVIRONMENT**

Emotional intelligence has a decisive role in leadership, the management of emotions determining the optimisation of the other dimensions. Even more important is the role of emotional intelligence in military leadership.

In military structures, the leader has always been at the forefront of organising and conducting specific actions, aiming to increase the level of efficiency and effectiveness of these actions. Military efficiency and effectiveness are the effect of leaders’ ability to react to disruptions, ensuring the optimal orientation of subordinates.
Until recently, in peacetime, the military relied on good managers to fulfil their mission, identifying the need for competent leaders to exercise genuine leadership only in time of war.

In the current security context, in which visions, foresight, critical and creative thinking are increasingly important, the need for effective leadership is identified also in peacetime. In this regard, the US Army Leadership Advisory Manual provides clear insights into the training of military leaders and states that effective leadership is the key to military success, both during training and in combat (FM 22-101, 1985, pp. 12-31).

What is effective leadership?

Starting from the fact that the main purpose of the military forces is to “guarantee the sovereignty, independence and unity of the state, the territorial integrity of the country and constitutional democracy” (Romanian Constitution, 2003), the analysis of the completion of the tasks received and of their opportunity and impact is increasingly important in the current security context. In other words, how and, most importantly, what the armed forces execute become essential questions.

Military success has always been based on achieving objectives, but it has also been influenced by budgetary aspects and resource management, which have been increasingly brought to the fore in recent times. That is why we consider it appropriate to analyse the concepts of efficiency and effectiveness, also considering the general tendency to use them at random.

Although they “seem” to be synonymous at first sight, efficiency is the result of “performing or functioning in the best possible manner with the least waste of time and effort” (Inside Squared), while effectiveness is “the degree to which objectives are achieved and the extent to which the problems concerned are solved” (Business Dictionary).

Unlike efficiency, effectiveness is determined without reference to costs and, while efficiency means “doing things right”, effectiveness means “doing the right things” (Ibid.). Thus, efficiency must be seen as part of effectiveness.

We can therefore say that effectiveness focuses mainly on the objective, while efficiency focuses on resource optimisation. One way to clarify this issue could be to analyse a strategy from a perspective of efficiency and effectiveness. For this we will analyse France’s strategy in the interwar period, which was aimed at preventing a surprise attack by Germany.

The Maginot Line, the second largest permanent system of man-made fortifications, was a clear example of military defence policy and doctrines of the period. Named in honour of Andre Maginot⁴, the Maginot Line consisted of a series of permanent fortifications, built with the ultimate goal of defending France’s borders from possible attacks from Germany and Italy. Thus, after the end of the First World War, when the East of France was occupied almost continuously by enemy forces, the French began to wonder what they should do to be able to defend their territory in the future, starting from the fact that some generals considered the Treaty of Versailles to be an armistice and that the war would resume (Greelane, 2018).

Consequently, the Maginot Line, planned in 1920 and built ten years later, had the main goal of stopping a ground invasion at the borders, until the French Armed Forces completed the mobilisation. It was, in fact, a linear fortification, composed of an uninterrupted series of forts and casemates. The forts were arranged at a maximum distance of 15 kilometres from each other, depending on the configuration of the terrain, and between the forts numerous casemates were built, which supplemented their mouths of fire. The forts and casemates were linked by a series of trenches, and the ground in front of the fortifications was provided with anti-tank mines and barbed wire networks. These arrangements were built after the actual completion of the Maginot Line, being concrete structures, with the role of supplementing the main line of fortifications, where the land did not allow building a satisfactory number of casemates and forts, having the role of repelling attacks concentrated in weak points of the line. In total, the fortification consisted of 22 field fortifications, 36 forts, 311 casemates, 78 infantry shelters, 14 observation points and over 4,000 concrete blocks where soldiers were housed. The Maginot Line was built between 1930 and 1936 and it was constantly improved

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⁴ Andre Maginot, French Minister of Defence during 1931-1932.
until the date of the German attack on France in May 1940 (Parlog, 2003).

The efficiency of the line resulted from the ingenuity of the construction. No unit in the line-up was positioned to fight in isolation, and any German attack would face the entire firing range of the Maginot Line. In reality, however, Germany, aware of the impenetrability of the line, ordered the invasion of France through the Netherlands.

In addition, the dynamics of the fighting forced the French strategists to decide that the troops and armaments serving the Maginot Line should be sent to the front line. The fortifications were then occupied by both the Germans and the Allied troops who made important bases in it.

In conclusion, by looking at the value of the Maginot Line in terms of defence potential, we can highlight the effectiveness of this, but given that reality exceeded the original forecast, the French strategy proved ineffective.

In addition, if we analyse the concept of targeting, we can offer another explanation regarding the difference between the two terms, namely: it is efficient to hit a ship, but if, after an efficient targeting, we can hit the right ship, we can affirm that we acted effectively.

Starting from the difference between efficiency and effectiveness, Peter Ferdinand Drucker⁶ presented, as early as 1954, the difference between management and leadership, stating: “Management does things right ... leadership means to do the right thing” (Maciariello, Drucker, 2016, pp. 27-28).

Supporting the same idea, in 1985, W. Bennis⁴ states: “managers do things right and leaders do the right things” (Rost, 1993, p. 165).

In other words, managers answer how and when questions, focusing on efficiency, while leaders seek answers to what and why questions, which are increasingly difficult to obtain taking into account the particularities and trends of the security environment, and they are oriented towards efficiency, focusing on effectiveness. In conclusion, using a simple syllogism, the desire to optimise leadership can be achieved by efficient leaders.

In addition, looking at the National Defence Strategy of the Country, 2020-2024, according to which “Membership of the European Union and NATO as well as the Strategic Partnership with the USA are the foundations of Romania’s foreign policy and the trajectory on which the Romanian state has consciously and irreversibly committed itself” (p.8), the process of identifying the optimal answers to the questions how and when, and, particularly, the questions what and why represent an important challenge, the development of leadership becoming thus paramount. Therefore, the need for effective leaders stems from the increasing condition of uncertainty that characterises the military organisation during the performance of its constituent mission.

In this context, the continuing training of military personnel, in general, and of those entrusted with the responsibility to lead, in particular, is a priority of major significance. In this continuing training, the personal and emotional development of the armed forces personnel becomes a necessity.

While the importance of leadership skills in the military is evident, we have not identified empirical evidence on ways to cultivate emotional intelligence in the military environment. FM 22-100 emphasises that leaders need to be mature, able to control their emotions and remain as unperturbed as possible in the face of danger (p. 35). Without using the term “emotional intelligence”, the handbook presents the traits

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⁴ Peter Ferdinand Drucker (1909-2005) was an Austrian-born American management consultant and author, whose writings contributed to the philosophical and practical foundations of the modern business corporation.

⁵ Warren Gamaliel Bennis (1925-2014) was an American scholar, organisational consultant and author, widely regarded as a pioneer of the contemporary field of leadership studies.
of emotional intelligence, inducing the fact that emotionally balanced leaders can cope with any situation and can emotionally guide others (Ibid., pp. 35-41). The problem is that the manual does not present how to develop these skills.

ADP 6-22, Army leadership and the profession does not introduce the concept of emotional intelligence either, but it presents in detail the attributes of the military leader, according to the model presented in figure no. 2, some of them being skills specific to emotional intelligence (p. VII).

Moreover, the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) of the US War College, a structure that dedicates all its research to adapting the college curriculum, although it has made a very important contribution to the development of military leadership, has not included emotional intelligence on its agenda. In 2016, however, in the study Emotional Intelligence and Self-Effectiveness of Military Leaders conducted at Brandman University, Kelly A. Hudson demonstrated strong correlations between emotional intelligence and the effectiveness of military personnel. Moreover, on 6 June 2019, the GLOBALSEC Bratislava 2019 Forum, co-sponsored by NATO, took place in Slovakia. Within the forum, the first cyber crisis simulation workshop was called “Disruptive Dilemmas”. The workshop proposed a series of interactive stress tests covering a wide range of topics, from the use of information in refugee crisis management to cybersecurity challenges and the use of cyber potentials in the fight against misinformation. An important conclusion in this workshop was that cybersecurity crises resolution requires both cognitive and emotional intelligence skills (GLOBALSEC 2019). Thus, the importance of emotional intelligence in military leadership starts to be seen.

CONCLUSIONS

Many of the attributes of good leaders can be considered as skills specific to people with high emotional intelligence quotient, skills that ensure success in the workplace and that can be developed through continuing training.

We therefore consider that a good leader is the one who also develops his emotional intelligence skills, because, always, real leaders appeal to emotions. They know how to identify and manage both their own and other people emotions, thus providing a balanced affective framework, optimising the impact of their own actions and manifestations, ensuring the success of the led structure.

Consequently, the training and development of these skills become essential actions in the process of having a type of leadership that allows optimal reactions to the challenges specific to the future security context. Moreover, it would be beneficial to introduce a selection criterion specific to emotional intelligence, because both its level and its potential for development are especially important.

In addition, tracking the emotional evolution of personnel will allow to maintain the emotional balance of military personnel.
and minimise the stress caused by traumatic events, in order to eliminate possible disorders specific to post-traumatic stress.

Therefore, military leaders need to have emotional intelligence, complementary to the other attributes characteristic to leadership. This will ensure the optimal framework for carrying out efficient and effective actions and identifying the answers to the questions how and what in order to meet the organisational goals.

It thus becomes obvious that the development of emotional intelligence should appear on the first page of the agenda of the Romanian military system, in addition to professional training, personal development becoming increasingly important.

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The Covid-19 pandemic has scientifically proven negative effects in the world industry, which are reflected in declining sales, downsizing productive activities and rising unemployment. The allocation of 2% of the Gross Domestic Product for the defence field, as well as the programmes developed at EU and NATO level, provide the companies from the national defence industry with the possibility to adapt their product range to the procurement programmes developed by the Romanian Armed Forces.

Another opportunity for companies in the national defence industry to seize is the use of funds available at EU level, including for research and development, as well as partnerships with large companies in the Euro-Atlantic area. In order to overcome the economic crisis generated by the COVID-19 pandemic, efficient cooperation is needed between state and private entities within the national defence industry and the line ministries, especially with the Ministry of National Defence and the Ministry of Economy.

Keywords: defence industry; COVID-19; Romanian Armed Forces; crisis; military products;

INTRODUCTION

Globally, the arms market is one of the most profitable markets, with a total turnover of hundreds of billions of USD, the development opportunities being very high, including for the Romanian industry, in the context of increasing globalisation and global business dynamism.

At the same time, the arms market is experiencing a strong dynamic generated by the appearance of new relevant players in emerging markets as well as by the recalibration and strategic reorientation of defence policies of certain states, in the sense of allocating substantial funds for the purchase of modern weapons and defence systems adapted to hybrid warfare, characterised by non-linearity and a high degree of uncertainty.

Today, the international armament market is dominated by large manufacturers that “dictate”, from an economic and strategic point of view, the evolutionary trends of modern military systems, by continuously adapting products to the paradigm of modern warfare. In order to achieve this strategic objective, significant amounts, in the order of billions of USD, are invested annually in research and development, requiring measures for the continuous modernisation of existing military equipment and for the creation of new products to meet the dynamic needs of the market, in particular to meet the operational requirements of the armed forces, which are the beneficiaries of these military products and technologies.

The COVID-19 pandemic requires, under the current conditions, the supplementation of the allocated funds dedicated to the research-development field, in order to maintain the current markets or even to gain new markets. This aspect is particularly important considering the expected decrease in defence budgets, amid declining GDP.

A very attractive area for large producers is represented by emerging areas, such as the Middle East, most states in this region...
Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on the National Defence Industry

In order to really support the Romanian profile industry, whose industrial objectives are located mainly in mono-industrial areas, concrete proposals are necessary for the development of the domestic profile market, which would lead to increasing the predictability of foreign markets suitable to absorb the products made by the Romanian defence industry.

**MAIN CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ROMANIAN DEFENCE MARKET**

The analysis of the local market reveals certain defining characteristics that determine the profitability and sustainability of this sector of strategic interest (Boulegue, 2020), namely:

- it is a mainly state-controlled industry, with the majority of companies operating in this field concentrated at the level of the ROMARM SA National Company, which is in coordination with the Ministry of Economy;
- chronic lack of investment and state/political control have turned it into an economically inefficient industry, against the background of a revision in making decisions based solely on economic analysis;
- the absence of any assumed political restructuring/development programme through a systemic approach to the national defence industry that uses strengths and mitigates the consequences of systemic vulnerabilities identified at the level of this strategic sector;
- lack of coupling the national defence industry to the national defence doctrine and to the procurement programmes carried out at the level of the Ministry of National Defence;
- an autarchic industry, mainly focused on maintenance and export of primary products with no high added value and encompassing technologies from the '80s;
- an industry absent from the global economic circuit and high-tech supply chains; the national defence industry has a timid exporter presence in certain marginal markets and only for primary, unsophisticated products, which incorporate outdated technologies;

having large budgets dedicated to the acquisition of modern military equipment. These large defence budgets are due to the security situation characterised by the existing conflict states in this area, which have major potential to degenerate.

In this context, an analysis of Romanian military equipment exports reveals a considerable decrease in export operations to the Middle East, while increasing to North America, especially the USA, and to EU member states. In this way, a traditional Romanian market from the '90s was lost, simultaneously with the accentuated decrease in the exports on the market of the African states, aspect that substantially affected the trade balance in this strategic field.

Another current feature of the domestic market is the production of weapons that incorporate technologies that no longer correspond to current trends in the world market, this being a direct consequence of the lack of investment in research and development. The lack of appetite in investing in innovation, contradicts the current global trend, dominated by the "proliferation" of knowledge management, especially in this niche, highly specialised field, in which the focus is on American, European and Asian consortia.

Innovation in the arms market is becoming essential in the context of the fierce competition generated by the overall increase in the percentage of GDP that states invest in the defence industry.

Romania’s status as a member state of NATO and the European Union allows companies on the Romanian arms market to conclude strategic partnerships with relevant consortia in states belonging to these international structures, which will lead to the integration and adaptation of domestic products in the defence systems developed by the most important actors in the world.

In order to really support the Romanian profile industry, whose industrial objectives are located mainly in mono-industrial areas, concrete proposals are necessary for the development of the domestic profile market, which would lead to increasing the predictability of foreign markets suitable to absorb the products made by the Romanian defence industry.
The success of defence industries in countries such as the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Israel, Sweden, Spain or Norway demonstrates that autarchy is no longer an economic and sustainable long-term solution and that the state/government cannot control the entire supply chain.

The central element that determines the maintenance of the national defence industry, although declared a strategic sector, at this stage of return, is the autarchic governmental approach of this sector in the recital of ensuring self-sufficiency, security of supply, and the security of supply of the Romanian armed forces with basic products (Darling, 2020). From the analysis of global markets, the attempts to achieve self-sufficiency and total independence in the national defence industry and to ensure, at the same time, a competitive and sophisticated industry, have not been successful. Where this approach applies (developing countries, subjects of current and immediate security threats), the budgetary cost of keeping the industry functional is significant, this industrial sector being unprofitable.

The success of defence industries in countries such as the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Israel, Sweden, Spain or Norway demonstrates that autarchy is no longer an economic and sustainable long-term solution and that the state/government cannot control the entire supply chain.

• an industry characterised by circumstantial, opportunistic development, offset, and procurement policy of the Ministry of National Defence (in most situations of concluded military procurement programmes, local industry playing only the role of marginal service to provide maintenance);
• technological development is not adapted to current research and development processes at international level;
• oversized personnel, including situations of political “capture” by granting management and execution functions on the basis of subjective criteria;
• reduced integration into dual-use economic circuits, including through poor cooperation between state and private industries;
• redundancy and duplication with products available on the global market at lower costs.

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Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on the National Defence Industry

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INFLUENCE OF COVID-19 PANDEMIC ON INTERNATIONAL DEFENCE INDUSTRY

Changing government priorities generated by the pandemic crisis produced by COVID-19 may lead to a reduction in budgets for military procurement programmes. Most governments allocate about 2% of GDP annually to the defence sector. Given the pandemic generated by COVID-19, there is a risk that some states will significantly reduce the budget allocated to the defence industry in order to increase the budgets for health care systems, considering the need to expand hospitals, as well as the purchase of medical equipment and services. They are objective factors in the management of the COVID-19 pandemic, given that there are poor medical systems in some states that are unable to cope with this unprecedented global medical crisis.

In this context, governments are obliged to increase social expenditure and reprioritise budgetary expenditure in the light of the problems related to the medical crisis at the level of society. Additional pressure is exerted by citizens, who, during this period, feel vulnerable and would like for most of the available funds to be used effectively to manage the pandemic crisis generated by COVID-19. (“International Military Cooperation Supports Covid-19 Response”, 2020).

To cope with the unforeseen costs of the COVID-19 pandemic, governments will use the resources initially allocated to develop the defence industry to manage the medical crisis. This leads to a considerable reduction in the defence budget, with direct effects on the procurement policy and, by implication, a decrease in the financial resources allocated to the defence industry.

In this context, in the event of the loss or even postponement of important government programmes and contracts, it is necessary for companies within the defence industry to identify innovative solutions for overcoming the crisis. A potential solution is to adapt the productive range and produce the products and equipment needed by the civil industry. If the COVID-19 pandemic may constitute an opportunity for the defence industry to adapt production to the area of high-performance medical equipment (e.g., the production of ventilators for Intensive Care Units).
The main problems identified at the level of the defence industry, against the background of the COVID-19 pandemic are:

- maintaining specialised manpower, while reducing orders for military products and equipment;
- delay in payments to suppliers of raw materials, subassemblies and utilities, with direct effects in terms of their economic sustainability;
- the level of government aid needed to overcome the crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic;
- reducing the budgets allocated to research and development in favour of paying current expenditure (e.g., wages, payment of utilities and raw materials), with the risk of not being technologically competitive;
- relocation of production facilities, against the background of increased operational expenditure, with effects in terms of the loss of specialised human resources;
- confidence levels of investors.

Last but not least, another important problem is “the decrease in stock market shares in large companies in the market. For example, from 10 February 2020 to date, Lockheed Martin shares have decreased by 28%, Leonardo – 55%, Thales – 33% and Fincantieri – 32%. Statistically, the shares of the biggest players in the international arms market are selling at the lowest price in five years”. (Tirpak, 2020)

These consequences, considered secondary, are worrying against the background in which receipts from secondary markets do not significantly affect the revenues of companies. Companies intending to issue new actions to finance capital investments were obliged to stop this project in view of the unfavourable developments in stock markets. In this context, the development plans of the companies have been reassessed in order to abandon or delay certain investments aimed at the development of these economic entities.

Furthermore, against the background of the steady and significant decline in shares, it is possible that a relevant part of them may be acquired by entities in certain countries (e.g., the Russian Federation, China) which do not have an interest in the development of the defence industry in the Euro-Atlantic countries. In this context, it is necessary for governments to intervene to prevent this process, which ultimately has the role of bankrupting productive entities, and their market to be taken over by companies from emerging areas, especially in the Asian area.

For governments to intervene to prevent this process, which ultimately has the role of bankrupting productive entities, and their market to be taken over by companies from emerging areas, especially in the Asian area. An international actor interested in affecting or bankrupting productive entities in the Euro-Atlantic area is the Russian Federation, which will seek to take a majority stake in strong companies in the countries of interest.

**IMPACT OF PANDEMIC CRISIS ON THE ROMANIAN DEFENCE INDUSTRY**

At the time of the COVID-19 crisis, Romania was already in a difficult fiscal situation, facing an excessive budget deficit, increasing public financial exposure, a substantial reduction in private and direct public investment, a heightened political and strategic inconsistency, becoming a victim of populism, amid the chronic dysfunction in other important economic and social sectors.

In Romania, the topic of tools and opportunities that may be able to ensure improved effects and overcoming the economic crisis is currently being discussed through active economic measures, including in the field of defence industry. In Romania, however, the path from debate to public policy and assumed and applied strategy is traditionally long and arduous, requiring more pragmatism in addressing strategic economic issues.

One of the instruments seen as a factor of Romania’s economic recovery is reindustrialisation. Therefore, in Romania, we expect to witness political positions that will argue the allocation of resources for “reshaping” the national defence industry under state control, as a tool to improve the effects of the economic crisis. (Dick, 2020).

To include reindustrialisation in the range of instruments suitable for overcoming the post-COVID-19 crisis is a welcome step, but it requires a new conceptualisation and approach, adapted to the 21st century, and not a restructuring and allocation of public resources devoid of strategic vision and objectives of economic efficiency, as it has happened so far. All the more, we do not have to follow the examples of other states where industrial/economic standardisation trends are expected, as a guarantee of a return from the crisis and an increase in the capacity to respond to future crises.
The process of restructuring the national defence industry to ensure its efficiency and sustainability must be carried out based on the alliances of which Romania is a member. Here we consider the efficiency of the national armed forces, in the context of the ability to wage war in a coalition.

A possible first counter-argument to this geopolitical “postulate” would be that such an approach would cause a greater dependence of the local defence industry and the Romanian armed forces on external factors (supply security), which would implicitly adversely affect national security. However, as I have shown above, the absolutisation of the sovereignty of this national industry inevitably leads to economic autarchy and the elimination of this industry from the global supply circuit and from high tech processes.

Ultimately, the Romanian armed forces will end up making purchases exclusively from the major international contractors, without any Romanian participation. For this reason, Romania’s strategic partnership with the United States of America (global leader in the field of military industry) and its EU membership are essential. The Romanian political factor must understand that there is no defence industry that is not dependent on external suppliers. The important thing is that the national defence industry is integrated into this supply chain.

Maintaining the industry autonomous, autarchic, state-controlled would require exceptionally large financial funds that the Romanian state does not have and would lead to the maintenance of an industrial base for primary, unsophisticated military products. On the contrary, it is precisely this situation that would ultimately affect the very capacity of the armed forces and, therefore, the national security.

At present, we can say that the state maintains the national defence industry regardless of its economic viability, developing and producing uncompetitive weapons that can be imported at much lower costs and providing only redundant and generally low-skilled jobs.

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The current legislation relevant to the national defence industry contains tools and provides rights to the competent authorities that would allow a fundamental reconfiguration of this strategic industrial sector (The National Defence Industry Act includes references to privatisation, the use of European funds, industrial cooperation in associative formulas, public private partnerships, cross-border partnerships, cooperation with the private sector).

In addition to a possible fine-tuning of the existing legislative framework, the fundamental restructuring of the Romanian defence industry, in order to ensure a sustainable industry for the 21st century, can take the form of a National Reform Programme, politically assumed across the widest possible spectrum and rigorously implemented (i.e., precise deadlines, responsible persons/authorities etc.), as a fundamental element of strengthening national security.

Another opportunity offered by the COVID-19 pandemic to defence industry is to produce specialised equipment for the medical sector. A major advantage of defence companies is the existence of high-precision technological equipment that allows production flows to be adapted for the manufacture of high-performance products.

In this context, Virgil Popescu, Minister of Economy, Energy and Business Environment, “welcomed the involvement of the national defence industry in the effort necessary to prevent and combat COVID-19”. He stated that “we have already seen that Romanian single-patient isolation and transport units can be produced, and ROMARM will soon start producing masks. Now, two other companies in the national defence industry specialised in optics, one with private capital, Pro-Optica, and another with majority state capital, in the portfolio of the Ministry of Economy, Optical Romanian – IOR, have joined their efforts to produce a thermal scanner in our country. I welcome these public-private partnerships that lead to the development of value-added products”. (Pachiu, 2020).

The product, 100% Romanian design, is developed by Pro-Optica, a private company, and launched in manufacturing at IOR, a company in the portfolio of the Ministry of Economy, Energy and Business Environment, with a military certificate issued by the Medico-Military Scientific Research Centre. Moreover, during this pandemic period, the first 100% Romanian conception single-patient isolation and transport
units were made, produced by the researchers within the Ministry of National Defence, and the Minister of Economy announced that the ROMARM weapons factory would produce protection masks.

POSSIBLE SCENARIOS FOR THE DEFENCE INDUSTRY

“The effects of COVID-19 on the defence industry are still to be fully understood. The impact will predominantly be on the supply chain. There are several major points of interest that could have an impact on geopolitical relations and a cascading effect on the wider defence industry, specifically with regard to supply chains and competition”. (“2020 Global Defence Outlook – Growing Impact of COVID-19”).

If a vaccine for Covid-19 is identified within a few months, the impact of Covid-19 on the defence industry will be minimal. In this situation, only certain one-off contracts may be affected, the cancellation of certain events in the defence industry (e.g., international trade fairs/exhibitions) or the improvement of certain defence industry programmes. In this situation, the defence industry as a whole will not be substantially affected and may recover within a reasonable period of time.

If the production of a viable vaccine against SARS-CoV-2 lasts longer than expected and the development of the disease worldwide is not kept under control, the budget for the defence industry will be substantially reduced, which leads to damage to defence companies.

In both scenarios outlined above there is no magic solution, each company in the defence industry being obliged to adjust its own budgets, the conditions under which it operates in the profile market, the production chain/suppliers, and other economic and social factors.

A third possible scenario is the habit of living with this virus that causes COVID-19, in the same way that mankind has lived for thousands of years with other active viruses. In this scenario, it is unviable to pursue an endless suppression strategy, and governments and businesses will have to identify solutions to survive and redress the economic situation.

Regardless of the type of scenario, certain aspects have been identified that company managers need to consider, namely:

- the current global uncertainty generated by COVID-19 will lead to rethinking existing risk plans at the level of high-profile companies;

• strategies should not focus primarily on growth, but should include more judicious resource planning and substitution of certain materials;
• the production principles should be based on maximising efficiency, while reducing production costs, by maintaining the most profitable products on the market;
• the need for technological interventions in the production chain to increase automation and the use of automated systems for the delivery of resources/components/subsystems.

Security industry companies have quickly adapted their production for delivery to the medical system ventilators for ICU, to treat the most serious cases of COVID-19, as well as means of protection (e.g., protective masks). In this respect, we exemplify by the case of UK companies – BAE SYSTEMS and BABCOCK. Thus, a significant number of contractors have adapted their modern production capabilities (e.g., 3D printers) to produce protective materials against COVID-19.

Also, in order to avoid the liquidity crisis in the production chain, large defence companies, which have significant funds, have accelerated payments to suppliers. For example, L3 HARRIS TECHNOLOGIES invested 100 million USD in accelerated payments to small providers to enable them to keep their productive activities in times of crisis.

Moreover, in April 2020, Lockheed Martin provided 156 million USD in accelerated payments to vulnerable equipment suppliers, with 10 million USD donated to the US healthcare system.

CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion, I am of the opinion that the development, modernisation, increasing sustainability and integration of national defence industry into the global economy simultaneously with the efficiency of the armed forces procurement programmes, would involve the implementation of the following processes:

1. **Carry out an independent audit of the defence industry** in order to identify the vulnerabilities of this sector, the subsectors with viable potential and the non-viable/redundant ones, those with potential integration in cross-border supply chains and efficient compatibility with the procurement programme of the Romanian armed forces, ensuring security of supply, tools and ways of restructuring
the defence industry with minimal costs in order to stimulate industrial cooperation and technology transfer, structures and financial resources necessary to support viable subsectors that will continue their activity, the need for legislative and governmental measures etc.

2. **Launch a Defence Industry Restructuring Programme** based on audit findings and taking into account criteria such as: integration into the global supply chain, compatibility for dual civil-military use, ensuring technology transfer, state control by veto and not by ownership, geographical industrial clusters and the conclusion of industrial alliances for local technology transfer with Western partners;

3. **Adopt new legislation** to define the essential security interest and stimulate the development of targeted local industrial cooperation programmes with a multiplier effect for the achievement of competitive and sustainable industrial capacities.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY:**


INTRODUCTION

Since 2008, the global economic crisis has influenced the defence budget allocations in most NATO member states. The reduction in defence spending, as a measure to combat the effects of the crisis, continued between 2010-2014 and had a negative impact on the commitment of member states to allocate at least 2% of the GDP to the defence sector. Since 2015, the economic situation has started to recover and the defence budgets have been increased again. In the case of Romania, in 2015, the parliamentary parties signed an agreement to allocate a minimum of 2% of GDP for the budget of the Ministry of National Defence, starting with 2017 and to maintain it for the next ten years. This political agreement has been an important step in the process of implementing defence programmes and increasing the operational capacity of the Romanian Armed Forces.

Four years after signing this agreement, we are facing again a possible future financial crisis. The drastic measures that have been imposed against the spread of the virus Covid-19 globally have also resulted in a slowdown of the economic growth. According to the scenarios presented by economists during this period, the economic effects could include recessions in the United States, but also in the European Union (Orlik, Rush, Cousin, Hong, 2020). In the case of the financial crisis of 2008, one of the measures taken for economic recovery was to reduce the military spending, and this affected the process of equipping and modernising the armed forces on the medium and long term. Thus, the multi-annual planning of equipment programmes could not be implemented and the procurement projects were postponed or cancelled. Based on the premise that a new economic recession will have a similar effect on the defence budget, we consider it necessary to propose methods or solutions by which the cost reduction process will have as few negative effects on defence resources as possible.
This article presents the cost-effectiveness analysis concept, one of the tools that help the planners to use the investment resources efficiently in projects whose benefits are not easily measurable in monetary terms. The cost-effectiveness analysis compares the cost and effectiveness per unit of a program, in order to determine whether the value of an intervention justifies its costs. It also provides measurements to classify and compare similar interventions or projects, whose results are similar (The World Bank). The implementation of this analysis model can be used as a planning, documentation and decision support tool. For its application, we will consider the field of defence as a product that is necessary for the public environment but whose outcome is not of a monetary nature. The purpose of this article is thus the general presentation of the concept of cost-effectiveness analysis as a method of identifying, in an unstable financial context, the defence acquisitions programs that are really necessary and effective.

COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS CONCEPT

The concept of cost-effectiveness analysis, together with cost-benefit analysis, systems analysis, policy analysis, operational research, management science, as well as other disciplines aim to provide a constructive direction in the decision-making process. The term cost-effectiveness was not conceptualised and it was not perceived as an organised activity in the economic literature until after the Second World War (Quade, 1971, p. 1).

In 1960, Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean proposed, in “The Economics of Defence in the Nuclear Era”, an application of economic theory to the problems in the military defence sector, being among the first authors to address the concept of “economics of defence” (Hitch, McKean, 1960). Within the Rand Corporation¹ organisation, the two authors drew up several studies and reports on the administration of the state budget and the expenditures made in time of war and peace, but also on their consequences on economic growth. According to the two authors, setting the budget for defence is a responsibility that often has to be assumed in difficult conditions and circumstances. Although in the 1960s the researchers did not yet refer to the concept of cost-effectiveness analysis, Hitch and McKean devoted several pages to the concept of efficiency used in military decisions. According to them, the allocation and efficient use of resources is no longer just an issue studied in economic theory, but also applies to military spending. Decisions taken in this area can be assessed as effective when the purpose of ensuring the highest possible level of security and defence is met under a limited budget (Ibid, p. 107). The above-mentioned paper presents an approach that we found in most recent works on cost-effectiveness analysis: quantitative analysis and calculation are less important in the process of military planning; it is essential to compare all available alternatives in terms of the objectives and the costs which it involves and to select the best one (using an appropriate economic criterion) (Ibid, p. 118). The elements of an economic analysis in the military field are thus the following: objectives, alternatives, costs or resources, the model or the representation of reality and the selection criteria.

We found a first definition of the concept in the work of Edward Schaumberg Quade, a researcher and mathematician at Rand Corporation. In 1965, he placed the term cost-effectiveness analysis in a military context and suggested that this type of analysis involves a comparison between different directions of action, which can be perceived in terms of cost and effectiveness in achieving a desired goal. The purpose of this comparison is to minimise the cost implications of a mission’s requirements (which cannot be measured in monetary terms), or, on the contrary, to maximise performance, subject to budgetary constraint (Ibid). Quade’s approach is trying to find answers to questions such as: which aircraft should be repaired at the warehouse rather than at the base; what are the possible characteristics of a strategic bomber and whether or not it should be developed; whether the air force should replace the US land forces in Europe, etc. (Ibid). According to the author, in the sector of defence planning, the decisions made by experts working individually or in committees can largely depend on one’s judgment and intuition. The particularity of the cost-effectiveness analysis consists in the fact

¹ RAND Corporation (Research and Development) is an American non-profit global policy think tank created in 1948 by Douglas Aircraft Company to offer research and analysis to the United States Armed Forces.
Using Cost-Effectiveness Analysis as a Helpful Tool in the Process of Reducing Costs in Defense Programmes

In relation to its costs, but cost-effectiveness analysis is mainly applied when to the benefits cannot be attributed a monetary value.

Both types of analysis are very often used in the evaluation process of investment projects implemented with European funding (Ministry of European Funds, 2012). Cost-effectiveness analysis is usually applied in projects whose benefits are not valued in monetary terms, being often a characteristic of the programs in the field of health, education or environmental protection programs. Although the bibliography is limited in terms of describing this analysis model, we can list the following key aspects that are being evaluated in the European projects: time horizon, discount rate, types of costs, updated value of cost, incremental/approach, cost-effectiveness (Ibid, p. 9). The time horizon can represent both the projected duration of the investment and the economic life of the investment and its components (Ibid); the discount rate refers to the change in the value of money as it is invested over time (Ibid); identifying the types of costs involves evaluating the costs of investment, operation, maintenance, but also fix and variable costs (Ibid, p. 11); the updated value of the costs determines the additional costs generated by the extension of the time horizon of the alternatives (Ibid); incremental analysis is needed where alternative projects are competing and mutually exclusive, with the aim of classifying projects and choosing the most cost-effective one (Ibid, p. 12); the cost-effectiveness ratio represents "the result of dividing the current value of the total costs by the effects / benefits expressed in physical terms" (Ibid).

Following the above considerations, we can note that cost-effectiveness analysis is a suitable method for analysing defence investment programs because it can be used in selecting a project that brings benefits with the lowest costs to society (this being an important aspect in times of economic instability) and allows the efficient use of resources in sectors where the benefits cannot be easily capitalised from a monetary point of view.

that it allows the systematic and efficient combination of the judgment and intuition of the experts from several fields, and the result transcends the individual level (Ibid, p. 2). The analysis operates with a model, which can be a mathematical equation, a computer program or a scenario, and this involves a communication process and allows participants in the process to make judgments in a concrete context and receive feedback or other opinions.

Similar to Hitch and McKean’s conception, according to Quade, the method of cost-effectiveness analysis involves five elements: goals, alternatives, costs, model, criterion (Quade, p. 5). The first and perhaps most important part of the analysis is to set the goals. The examination of defence strategies, the comparison and choice of equipment and technologies are carried out in order to achieve these goals. The alternatives are the means by which these goals can be achieved. For the analysis to produce concrete results, these alternatives must have the same specific functions. Costs can be both monetary values (differences between purchase and operating prices), but can also be calculated as future opportunities or avoidable damages. The model means a representation of the real world, the purpose of which is to predict the costs of each alternative and the way each alternative can achieve the goal. The criterion is the rule by which the alternatives are classified and by which the most favourable option is chosen.

In the set of tools for better regulation proposed by the European Commission, cost-effectiveness analysis is included in the series of analytical methods to compare options or evaluate performance, together with cost-benefit analysis, multicriteria analysis or SWOT analysis. Cost-effectiveness analysis and cost-benefit analysis are two approaches to cost analysis in project evaluation processes. Although connected, they have distinct purposes and are operated in different ways. The first compares the costs of alternatives that produce similar results, while the cost-benefit analysis quantifies in monetary terms the costs and benefits of a project (Johnson, 2014). Both methods evaluate the monetary value of a project, program or policy. Cost-benefit analysis is more often used, but cost-effectiveness analysis has gained notoriety in recent years, and in some cases can be more intuitive. Both are used to assess the benefits of an intervention...
EXAMPLE OF COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS
APPLICABILITY

The following example represents the applicability of a cost-effectiveness analysis in one of the major defence procurement programs in the United States: the C-17 Globemaster II military transport aircraft. Although it is one of the most popular and widely used military transport aircraft, the program was about to be cancelled in the early 1990s. The decisions made at that time are an eloquent example of analysis methods in major procurement decisions. The research conducted by the Institute of Defence Analysis of the US Department of Defence reveals the methodology applied in making these decisions (Greer, 2010). In 1982, the Department of Defence conducted several assessments to determine the needs of the U.S. Air Force. In 1983, DoD considered the option to procure 210 C-17 aircraft, this number being reduced to 120 in 1990, for financial reasons. Initial cost and risk assessments proved to be incorrect. The tests performed did not demonstrate the reliability, expected performance and costs for the development of the C-17 continued to increase. This put the Department of Defense in a position to choose one of the options: continue the C-17 programme, despite increased costs and low performance, cancel the C-17 program and extend the life of the C-141, or find other solutions (Ibid, p. 3). The spending for this program has been postponed until the completion of a study in 1994.

Following the cost-effectiveness analysis conducted by the Institute of Defense Analysis, the development program for 120 C-17 aircraft was approved. The methodology used consisted of the following steps:

- identification of alternatives (to replace the C-141 aircraft fleet);
- setting requirements for the aircraft transportation (criteria and attributes);
- estimating the effectiveness of each alternative in military transport missions;
- estimating the total cost of ownership for each alternative;
- preparing cost and effectiveness information to facilitate decision-making;
- performing sensitivity analyses, as needed (Ibid, p. 5).

The final conclusions of the report showed that the performance and costs of the C-17 alternative classified it as the preferred military air carrier, being more resistant to air constraints than the C-5 alternative and being superior in efficiency and cost to the C-141. The next alternative in the ranking was a combined program with C-17 aircraft and other modified commercial aircraft. This solution proved to be very attractive in terms of costs, but its effectiveness seemed to be compromised.

The analysis applied in this case was necessary not only for making a decision on army development programs. The open process facilitated the transparency of decisions and the objectivity of analysts, with all parties involved being able to observe the evolution of results and recommend different approaches. At the same time, the analysis highlighted the similarities between the two preferred alternatives that have been considered for implementation, encouraging competition and having beneficial effects on costs and the government budget.

THE RELEVANCE OF COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS FOR THE ACQUISITION PROGRAMS IN THE ROMANIAN MILITARY ORGANISATION

In most European countries and NATO members, the governments’ efforts to counter the effects of the 2008 financial crisis have conditioned the ministries to apply spending cuts. In the case of Romania as well, the defence budget has been affected, and the investment projects have been successively postponed. In the context of forecasting a new crisis, the lessons learned and the identification and selection of the procedures to make the cost-cutting process more efficient, should be applied so that the army equipment process is no longer interrupted or postponed.

We believe that the application of the cost-effectiveness analysis can be a helpful tool in the decision process regarding the alternatives to develop defence acquisitions programs. This type of analysis also allows the comparison and classification of projects according to the costs required to achieve the objectives.

A major feature of cost-effectiveness analysis is that only programs with similar objectives can be compared. The strategic objective...
of the defence policy for the period 2020-2023 is the modernisation and adaptation of the Romanian Army to the risks and challenges specific to the current geopolitical context, as well as strengthening Romania’s relevant strategic partner profile within NATO, EU and US (Document-sinteză). We have thus identified three levels at which this tool can be applied: the general goals analysis, the analysis of goals of the specific investment projects, the analysis of the procurement method (classical or other alternatives). The general analysis is performed around the common objective of equipping the Romanian Army with modern equipment, capable to face the current challenges. A premise in this case is that, in the efforts to prioritize the equipment programs, we must take into account those characteristics that can lead to the achievement of this goal. The acquisitions programs of new and modern defence equipment could be more efficient than maintenance or modernisation programmes. At the project level, cost-effectiveness analysis must be performed for each military sector.

Currently, according to the Armament General Directorate, the priority equipment programs in the preparation phase are:

- **C4ISTAR capabilities**;
- **Integrated surface-to-air missile system**;
- **Revitalization and modernisation of IAR 99 aircraft**;
- **UAS (Unmanned Aerial Systems)**;
- **Portable anti-aircraft missile system with short and very short range**.

The investment of resources could be optimised by periodically performing analysis for the programs in the preparation phase, so that, in the case of the old postponed or interrupted programs, to determine whether the alternative of their continuation is advantageous or if other solutions could be found, depending of the evolution of the results. For example, the SHORAD-VSHORAD air defence systems have been on the priority list of the Ministry of National Defence since 2009. Cost-effectiveness analysis for this program, but also for other programs in preparation for many years, could determine the aspects that make the acquisition process difficult and could lead decision-makers to look at viable alternatives. At this level, the analysis will be performed following the goals of each sector and the equipment needs specific to each type of force. With regard to the procurement method, its effectiveness should be established by comparing the traditional procurement method or using a public-private partnership.

The budget allocations for the Ministry of National Defence must be determined according to the National Political Agreement to increase the funding for defence. This agreement states that the budget should be increased to 2% of GDP and maintained at this level for at least 10 years. In these conditions and starting from the assumption that the budgets will be affected again by the economic crisis, the efficient investment of resources is a first step in supporting and implementing viable equipment programmes.

We consider that conducting such an analysis on a major equipment program and publishing its reports or conclusions would have many advantages: setting a precedent and improving decision-making, stimulating decision-makers to create debates, receive recommendations and inform about the evolution of results, transparency and increasing the level of trust in procurement processes, encouraging competitiveness.

**CONCLUSIONS**

The type of analysis presented in this article can be performed, as in the example of the mentioned program for the American Air Force, by multidisciplinary teams of experts. By presenting studies and techniques and bringing to attention alternative methods of evaluating and choosing options, we can draw new directions on future programs in the field of military equipment.

In the decision-making process, aiming to spend the resources in the most efficient way possible, the monetary value of various programs will be frequently compared. Sometimes, such comparisons can be based on limited information, and one of the advantages of cost-effectiveness analysis is to create an informative and evidence-based context. Together with careful planning, adequate resources and transparency, this method of analysis can be a very helpful tool in preparing and making a decision (Johnson, Ibid).

In a long-term perspective, in addition to the classic equipping programs, we should look also to the necessity of developing...
some programmes capable to address new types of challenges, for example UAV capabilities or the implementation of artificial intelligence. The documentation of the alternatives, establishing and planning the resources, together with analysis and transparency in the decision-making process, would represent an innovative approach and a focus on achieving efficient equipment programs and efficient investment of resources, which can be so often limited.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:
This paper starts from the premise that, although the problems of intergenerational relations in contemporary organisations are numerous, many of them can be improved if military leaders know the way of communication to which subordinates respond positively and the motivation techniques that best suit different generations.

Regardless of the formal organisation, continuing vocational training activities in the military system have a greater impact and are more effective if they allow the people involved to have flexible approaches and if they combine face-to-face training with the widespread use of information technology and communication.

Keywords: generational differences; continuing professional training; value systems; learning styles; professional motivation;

INTRODUCTION

A generation is defined from a psycho-sociological point of view by the attitudes, experiences and preferences common to a segment of the population, which develops in the context of the social and economic events that individuals experience in a certain period of time. Generational cohorts (Nisen, 2013) are usually associated with the intervals of individuals’ birth years, and the social and economic influences that create popular culture are experienced by all people in a generation. However, both culture and gender differences play an important role in how these influences are reflected in the life of each individual. Therefore, experts believe that generalisations at the level of a generation go beyond cultural and gender differences. Beyond the psycho-social characteristics, each of the generational cohorts has distinct features, due to both previous experiences, life and career stages in which they are, and the professional environment.

Psychologists find that “each generation is influenced by complex, widespread, forces and phenomena (parents, colleagues, media, critical economic and social events, popular culture etc.), which create common value systems, through which people who grow up in different times are different” (Twenge, 2012). These generations are best known as the Baby Boomers Generation (born 1943–1960), Generation X (born 1961–1981), Generation Y/Millennials (born 1982–2004), and Generation Z (the year of birth is defined differently by researchers, but it is generally about those born after 2005). The current workforce is provided mainly from the former three generations, the latter being still in school.

The leaders of contemporary organisations face a series of challenges created by the accentuated intergenerational differences between subordinates. The literature mentions the conditions that can
ensure their success in leadership and can help leaders meet future challenges:

- Trying to understand each generational cohort and to adapt to the differences in attitudes, values and behaviours of each;
- Cultivating leadership styles receptive to generational features, in order to influence all members of the organisation;
- Developing the ability to be more focused on the strengths while also considering the weaknesses of each generation, especially in terms of their relationship with technological progress;
- Promoting a high level of tolerance, in order to avoid intergenerational conflicts and to be able to build successful teams;
- Capitalising on intergenerational differences in terms of mutually compensating the shortcomings and improving the activity of the entire team.

Due to the lower retirement age than in other professions, the military organisation is renewed faster than civilian organisations, and the relations between the generations that meet here have their own dynamics.

GENERATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN ATTITUDE AT WORK

It is interesting to note that each generation has its own work-related beliefs. A series of studies published by the Centre for Ethical Resources (2010) show that “Baby Boomers” understand hard work as many hours spent at working place and consider that they have a long-term commitment to the organisation that hired them, while “Generation X” is much more concerned with finding the balance between personal and professional life.

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Starting from the characteristics mentioned above, which essentially define the generations, it is expected that not only the employed staff, but also the leaders of different ages, belonging to different generations, will have distinct approaches regarding their activity in the organisation. In one of his studies, Yeaton (2008) warns managers that a new approach to professional motivation strategies is needed to be used to motivate younger generations. It has been found that the ways managers traditionally used to motivate their subordinates (such as offering an increase in salary or a promotion in the professional hierarchy in exchange for allocating additional tasks and laborious projects) are no longer effective.

Although it is often heard, the statement that the younger generation does not work as much as the older ones is still debatable. Rather, it is about the differences between the indicators that various generations use when describing and appreciating work, given that professional requirements and tasks change over time. For example, people in the Boomer Generation have often been characterised as process-oriented, while younger generations are seen as focused on the product, on the results, no matter where and when the task is performed.

By comparatively analysing the attitude of people from different generations towards continuing training and professional development, the conclusions can be summarised as in table no. 1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Attitudes towards education and professional development</th>
<th>Generation Baby Boomers</th>
<th>Generation X</th>
<th>Generation Y (Millennials)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Continuing education activities contribute to fulfilling the organisation’s objectives, but are also a way to promote individuals within the organisation and gain additional benefits.</td>
<td>Continuing education improves the versatility of individuals in the labour market and it is considered an investment for the future. People are not necessarily loyal to the organisations that have given them opportunities for professional development.</td>
<td>People are willing to take professional risks. They do not mind making mistakes, considering that these are learning opportunities. Professional development is achieved mainly through non-formal and informal activities.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The ways managers traditionally used to motivate their subordinates (such as offering an increase in salary or a promotion in the professional hierarchy in exchange for allocating additional tasks and laborious projects) are no longer effective.
ASPECTS OF THE CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL TRAINING OF THE MILITARY PERSONNEL BELONGING TO GENERATION Y (MILLENNIALS)

Regarding the members of the military organisation, in most cases, there is a “multi-generational organisational environment”, which provides both advantages and disadvantages in terms of organisational management and leadership. Today, more than ever, rapid technological developments have created a considerable gap in the knowledge and skills of the different generations that intertwine within organisations. Therefore, for military leaders at various levels, the recognition, acceptance and effective management of this reality have become difficult issues. At the same time, for members of the military organisation, training and practice to meet the ever-changing high-level professional requirements is essentially linked to the process of continuing vocational training and self-education.

In general, adult education and continuing education programmes in a socio-professional context start from the real problems that professional life raises. In the case of children and adolescents’ education, it is the teachers who decide what will be learned. Teachers establish the contents of the training, based on experience and predictions related to the future requirements of society, so that children and young people learn “for the future”. By contrast, in the case of adult education, they have an important say in the content addressed in their own continuing vocational training process, as they usually learn “for the present”, in order to be able to overcome real problems, for which they do not have sufficient knowledge or skills. Therefore, education cannot be imposed on adults, but they will get involved on their own initiative, insofar as the training programme meets their real needs.

In order to organise effective programmes of continuing professional development, adapted to the contemporary requirements, many researchers state that professional trainers should create new strategies for carrying out these activities, to suit certain groups of students belonging to different generations. As online learning (based on web technology) is a key way for the professional development of employees in almost any field, many studies examine how training can be improved by delivering interactive content on the web.

The transition from face-to-face training to virtual training is difficult for many organisations, one of the reasons being that trainers face the difficulty of remotely creating interactive and engaging experiences for participants. Despite the difficulties, however, the military organisation is boldly moving towards web-based learning, after significantly increasing its efforts and investments in the technology needed to train personnel in the virtual environment.

Numerous studies on human resources in contemporary organisations show that the Millennials have some different features from the previous generation in terms of attitudes and behaviours relevant to the workplace. Among the characteristics of Millennials and the factors that are of great importance to them, the following can be mentioned (Kultalahti, 2015): concern for permanent learning and constant improvement of knowledge and abilities, preference for challenging, interesting and new tasks, importance given to social relationships at the workplace and to the boss, the desire for flexibility in terms of work schedule and the need to balance work and personal life.

Generation Y (Millenials) place more importance on learning, are proud of their professional knowledge and skills, and want both professional prestige and important status in the workplace. Millennials are often characterised as ambitious and eager to achieve success and recognition. Managers who lead Millennials have noticed that they are motivated by immediate rewards, such as promotion, diverse benefits or financial rewards for results. (Gursoy et al. 2008).

Having as a term of comparison the older generations, we can say that Generation Y is more efficient in certain aspects, such as multitasking, reaction to visual stimulus and selection of information. At the same time, they feel less comfortable regarding face-to-face interactions and they are not very good at deciphering nonverbal cues (Bansal, 2017). Some studies suggest that, in order to meet the expectations of Millennials, organisations should focus on maintaining a relaxed and interesting atmosphere at work and it would also be
effective to give people the opportunity to communicate and collaborate through text and voice messages with their colleagues (Rai, 2012).

Following research, Holyoke and Larson (2009) conclude that Millennials do not have full control and responsibility regarding their success or failure in training/learning activities to the same extent as older generations. Millennials leave it to the instructor to ensure and maintain their motivation to learn. Concerning learning activity motivation, Millennials have the lowest level of all the generations that are currently professionally active. If learning performance is strongly influenced by the motivation of young employees, as suggested by Lim, Lee and Nam (2007), this can have strong implications for the effectiveness of online training with Millennials. Despite these shortcomings, it cannot be said about Millennials that they are difficult to be taught, on the contrary. In a study on the effectiveness of online trainings organised by various professional organisations with employees belonging to different generations, Lim and his collaborators (2007) found that the level of computer skills have a good impact on eLearning performance, and Millennials have the highest self-efficacy in computer use of all generations (Oblinger&Oblinger, 2005). Therefore, from this point of view, millennials are most likely to be continuously trained and perfected, especially through the use of digital technology.

Among the most valuable qualities that can be attributed to Millennials from the perspective of professional activities are the following:

- They are skilled in the use of high technology, feel comfortable and adapt quickly to the latest technology, and from this point of view they are valuable resources for organisations.
- They are open, receptive, tolerant of social, racial, religious diversity, which helps them integrate into multinational organisations.
- They understand the phenomena of the global market, living in this context; interact and maintain connections with people around the world, are perfect consumers on the global market.

Generational Differences regarding Attitudes towards Professional Training in the Military

- They have high self-esteem and they are independent; parents told them that they are special and that they can do whatever they set out to do, so that they have a positive attitude at work, such as “I can do”, which is very valuable for the organisation.
- They have a particular sense of security and they are ambitious, try to do things as efficiently as possible and are willing to accept challenges and try new things.

The organisations capable of seeing beyond the prejudices and negative exaggeration around Generation Y should be satisfied and capitalise on the many talents that this generation can offer in the workplace for the present, but also for the future.

LEARNING STYLES PREFERRED BY STUDENTS BELONGING TO DIFFERENT GENERATIONS

It is not possible to describe the learning activity of adults using a single model or theory, due to the different worldviews that each individual will have. Despite it, there is value in understanding the antecedent components of adult learning. Although there are many theories and some of them overlap, it is important for human resources specialists to develop a diversified theory of adult learning that considers the differences between learners in an organisation (Minter, 2011). The learning style offers the possibility to individualise the learning based on the style preferences of the learners.

Different generations have different preferred learning styles. The differences are also manifested in terms of how to acquire professional competences specific to different professions (called technical skills or “hard skills”) and social competences (called transversal skills or "soft skills").
valued by the older generations and is becoming less relevant nowadays for employees and employers in the private labour market.

In a study published in 2007, J.J. Deal developed a hierarchy of five preferred methods by people of different generations to acquire the soft and hard skills needed in the professional environment. The resulting hierarchy is presented in Table no. 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preferred methods for acquiring professional (technical) skills – “hard skills”</th>
<th>Generation Baby Boomers</th>
<th>Generation X</th>
<th>Generation Y (Millennials)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>– Face-to-face course;</td>
<td>– In the workplace;</td>
<td>– In the workplace;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– In the workplace;</td>
<td>– Face-to-face course;</td>
<td>– Face-to-face course;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Learning from manuals and specialised textbooks;</td>
<td>– Learning from manuals and specialised textbooks;</td>
<td>– Learning from manuals and specialised textbooks;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Reading books and various sources;</td>
<td>– Reading books and various sources;</td>
<td>– Reading books and various sources;</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preferred methods for acquiring transversal (social) skills – “soft skills”</th>
<th>Generation Baby Boomers</th>
<th>Generation X</th>
<th>Generation Y (Millennials)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>– In the workplace;</td>
<td>– In the workplace;</td>
<td>– In the workplace;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Group discussions;</td>
<td>– Individual coaching;</td>
<td>– Interactions with colleagues and feedback;</td>
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<tr>
<td>– Individual coaching;</td>
<td>– Interactions with colleagues and feedback;</td>
<td>– Group discussions;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Face-to-face training in the classroom;</td>
<td>– Assessment and feedback;</td>
<td>– Individual coaching;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>– Interactions with colleagues and feedback.</td>
<td>– Group discussions.</td>
<td>– Assessment and feedback.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As it can be seen from the list of preferred learning methods, coaching and mentoring should be reconsidered, as Millennials are eager for guidance and supervision. Defined as the relationship of voluntary development that exists between a person with more experience and a person with less experience, characterised by mutual trust and respect, mentoring contributes substantially to personal and professional development. In the military organisation, mentoring should not be limited to the context of a commander-subordinate relationship, even if many mentoring programmes have taken a formal character, contrary to the desire of Millennials to have informal and less hierarchical relationships. One possible solution is to promote so-called “development networks” or “mentoring constellations”. These mentoring relationships “are based on the involvement of several short-term mentors, peer mentors, and the value of mentoring groups and online support communities” (Gandhi & Johnson, 2016).

The human resource that belongs to the Generation Baby Boomers and Generation X is being replaced quite quickly by the Millennials. Organisers and trainers of continuing education programmes need to change their course teaching strategies and methods to best meet the learning potential and learning styles of Millennials, as they are the most numerous employees, even in the military organisation. Although most people prefer to learn soft skills in the workplace, when formal training is needed, it is better to use several teaching methods at the same time to make it possible the meeting of the needs of the majority of participants. When aiming to develop soft skills, trainers should consider possible preferences depending on the age of the participants. On the other hand, as people of different generations have similar preferences in terms of how to develop hard skills, in this case it is not necessary to differentiate between training methods for people of different ages.

In the research on strategies for engaging adult learners in learning, Price (2009, 2011) presented some of the conclusions regarding the characteristics of ideal learning environments for Millennials, the preferred types of tasks and ways of assessment, as well as the characteristics of the ideal teacher/trainer in their opinion. The author mentioned above emphasises the importance of applying, during the training and professional development courses, in the practice of the instructive activities carried out with the Millennial employees, the rules called “five Rs”, as follows:

- a. Reorganisation: Teaching strategies need to be restructured according to the efficiency they have proven through scientific...
Millennials prefer to be constantly involved in the activity, and if not interested, they quickly lose their attention and turn to something else. Research shows that Millennials react very well to active learning methods, different to a traditional course format, based solely on lectures. The main components of their ideal learning environment – fewer lectures, the use of multimedia, collaboration with colleagues – are part of the category of techniques that studies have proven effective. “The culture of this generation has been flooded with multimedia and everyone has a very high level of multitasking, so often sitting and listening to a talking head is not attractive enough for them” (Novotney, 2010). Millennials seem to be more exploratory learners and more attracted to the experimental side, so they could really benefit from the individualisation and personalisation of work tasks, homework.

b. Relevance: Millennials do not usually appreciate information for the sake of information. “One of the biggest challenges for trainers is to connect course content to current culture and make learning outcomes and activities relevant to millennial learners and their future” (Price, 2011). Trainers need to clearly explain why the course content is important, because Millennials have grown up using Google to find out anything they want to know, so they do not usually value information for the sake of information. As a result, the role of the trainer changes, from disseminating information to helping participants apply information in solving real-life, personal or professional problems.

c. Rationality: Unlike Generation Boomers or Generation X, who were raised in a more authoritarian manner, in which the chain of command is more easily accepted, Generation Y (Millennials) have been raised in a non-authoritarian manner and they are more likely to follow course rules when teachers provide a rational justification for them.

d. Relaxation: Millennials prefer a relaxed, less formal learning environment with minimal pressure, more freedom to complete tasks, and also more freedom for personal expression and creativity, in which they can interact informally with the instructor and with each other.

Trainers working with adults from the Millennial Generation should create a collaborative, warm, empathetic, “no wrong answer” learning environment.

e. Relationship: Millennials received more parental attention in childhood than previous generations, and they expect educators to be very interested in them. Therefore, they greatly appreciate teachers who show them the same interest and they are more willing to make efforts to achieve good learning outcomes when instructors relate to them on a personal level.

CONCLUSIONS

As web-based learning is more and more approachable and grows in popularity in the continuing education programmes offered by various organisations, trainers are responsible for creating effective learning programmes. To reach this goal, probably web-based learning will be more effective if the generational diversity of participants is taken into consideration, paying particular attention to the preferences of the Millennial Generation, due to their growing number in contemporary organisations.

Giving up nuances and subtleties, in order to harmonise the relationships at the workplace and to improve the quality of educational programmes, it can be said that Generation Y (Millennials) needs trainings dedicated to developing communication skills, and older generations should learn how to communicate with Millennials in a way in which they will respond positively.

On the other hand, no one should expect the military to completely reorganise to suit its Millennials. It could also be effective to use the power of feedback as an important tool for education, leadership and influence. Millennials are accustomed to receiving frequent feedback from those in leadership positions. They want to be recognised for superior performance, but they also need criticism when necessary. They are often unskilled in communication and instead they want to be given feedback and suggestions. They should be encouraged to contribute, as millennials need more feedback than the regular formal performance appraisal provides. Informal and frequent discussions can be much more effective in influencing and guiding Millennials.
A better understanding of the attitudes of different generations provides important conditions for adjusting the practices of continuing training, which will help the training and professional development of all members of the organisation and the organisation itself.

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