



THE EVOLUTION OF THE BORDERS OF ROMANIA IN THE CONTEXT OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUSTAINABLE SECURITY IN SOUTH-EAST EUROPE (1853-2018)

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At the Paris Peace Conference (1919-1920), the Allies attached a condition to the acknowledgement of the Unification of Bessarabia with Romania, namely the cession of the Quadrilateral in favour of Bulgaria, as it was also desired by former enemies in the war. However, the diplomacy in Bucharest imposed its point of view. Romania, conducting its foreign policy following the goal of "preserving the borders at the end of the First World War", adopted the approach promoted by France: the preservation of the territorial status quo.

Under the pressure from Nazi Germany, on 7 September 1940, the Treaty of Craiova was signed between Romania and Bulgaria. According to the provisions of the treaty, Romania ceded the southern part of Dobruja (the Quadrilateral), agreeing on population exchange. The regime in power in Romania was installed with the help of the brutal Soviet intervention in the period between 1944 and 1947. The Romanian national-communist deviation was not acknowledged as a real danger to the unity of the Soviet Bloc. The changes initiated in the USSR by Mikhail Gorbachev and the reforms in other states in Eastern Europe were denounced as a "right-wing deviation" as well as a betrayal of the interests of socialism. Following its integration in the North Atlantic Alliance and in the European Union, Romania has a fundamental strategic interest that Dobruja and the Wider Black Sea Region should represent a stable, democratic and prosperous area, closely connected to the European and Euro-Atlantic structures.

Keywords: Dobruja, battlefield, Paris Peace Congress, Quadrilateral, Euro-Atlantic security.



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INTRODUCTION

The confrontation between Romanian nationalism and Russian/Soviet expansionism was rooted in the early 19th century, in 1812, when Bessarabia was annexed by the Russian Empire. The development of sustainable security on the eastern border of Europe can be tracked throughout three centuries, having as milestones: the signing of the Treaty of Bucharest (1812) by Turkey and Russia, the annexation of Bessarabia by the Russian Empire; the Congress of Paris (1856), following which the south of Bessarabia and the mouths of the Danube River became part of the Romanian Principalities; the Congress of Berlin (1878), following which Russia took over the south of Bessarabia from Romania; the Paris Peace Conference (1919), recognising the unification of Bessarabia, Bukovina, Transylvania and the historical Dobruja with Romania; the Paris Peace Conference (1947), which strengthened the USSR right over Bessarabia, following the annexation in 1940 and 1944; the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in Warsaw; the European Union Association Agreement, document entering into force two years later. Romania presented the official application for EU membership in June 1995, and in December 1999, the European Council decided to begin accession negotiations with Romania, alongside other six states.

BETWEEN BESSARABIA AND QUADRILATERAL – THE NEW POLITICAL-TERRITORIAL CONFIGURATION OF ROMANIA

The Russian-Turkish War of 1877-1878 was the penultimate of the 12 wars waged between the Russian and the Ottoman Empires, secular rivals that fought for domination over the Black Sea, within four centuries, from 1568 to 1914. Following the last war, both empires collapsed and, as a result, the USSR and the Republic of Turkey appeared on the map. Romania entered the war of 1877 alongside Russia. The peace concluded in 1878, at the end of the war, known in Romanian historiography as the Romanian War of Independence,

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Through the intervention of the Great Powers, gathered in Berlin on 1/13 June 1878, where Ion C. Brătianu and Mihail Kogălniceanu were present as Romanian delegates, the Treaty of San Stefano was modified, and Romania had to surrender the counties in Bessarabia, being given, in compensation, the Danube Delta with the Snake Island and wider Dobruja, up to Silistra and south of Mangalia.

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General Ignatiev, the Tsar Assistant, before the conclusion of peace, came to Bucharest, on behalf of the Tsar, in an attempt to obtain the retrocession of Southern Bessarabia, Romanian land, in exchange for other compensations. Because Bucharest refused, Russia threatened to disarm the Romanian army. To this situation, Prince Carol replied: *“The Romanian army, which, in Plevna, under the eyes of the Tsar, fought so courageously, could be destroyed, but never disarmed”*. The father of Prince Carol of Romania, Karl Anton de Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, advised his youngest son to look forward and to realise what a huge profit Constanța, Tulcea and the Danube Delta would mean for the country, if investments in infrastructure are made: *“Stirring up national fanaticism as far as Bessarabia is concerned would be eventually ridiculous. To protest and to surrender is the wisest solution. The unproductive territory of Dobruja does not at all compensate for the loss of Bessarabia; however, Dobruja, together with Constanța, can be received, as the acquisition of this port at the Black Sea will be likely of significant importance for the future of Romania’s trade”*².

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¹ Mihai Eminescu stated that receiving Dobruja within the Romanian borders meant wasting huge public funds uselessly: *“We have already been told about the great wages the patriots are to establish for themselves; there have already appeared in newspapers plans of bridges over the Danube, canals between the Danube and the Black Sea, and there have already been attempts, marked by the fiction and under the pretext of creating an Eldorado, to divert the public opinion in favour of expenses that will be enormous”*. “Timpul” newspaper, 5 October 1878. *“When, finally, after 10 years, 15 years, we will have already spent hundreds of millions to make Dobruja productive, the Government of Bulgaria will find a pretext to claim Dobruja again and, ... if it is considered beneficial for Russia too, ... Dobruja will be taken far more easily than Bessarabia is taken today”*. “Timpul”, 2 August 1878.

² *Memoriile Regelui Carol I de un martor ocular*, part IV, volume XIII, București, Editura Erc Press, 2016.

On 1 October 1878, Russia took power over Bessarabia while the Romanian authorities withdrew. The Russian-Romanian Commission had the role to put the mentioned provisions into practice. On 14 November 1878, Dobruja's occupation by Romania began³. On 23 November 1878, the first Romanian administration was installed in Constanța, being led by Prefect Remus Opreanu.

In "Pressa" newspaper, year XI, no. 261, on 26 November 1878, it thus appeared the article "*Dobrogea sau România trans-danubiană/ Dobruja or Trans-Danube Romania*", presenting the advantages and disadvantages of losing Bessarabia in favour of Dobruja's return to motherland. The "*satisfactory bargain*" between Romanians and Russians brought within the borders a territory devastated by war and almost unknown in terms of "*origin, population and area*". It was the reason why some competent and authorised "*official explorations*" were conducted in Dobruja. Following them, it was found that Romania gained in terms of territory, losing in terms of population density and state institutions: "*It has actually resulted, from the exact topographical data, that there are 9,125 square kilometres in Romanian Bessarabia, 2,812 in the Danube Delta, and 12,180 in Dobruja. However, the value of a territory is not given by its area; therefore, if, actually, Romania is gaining about 4,500 kilometres as forced compensation, the mentioned 4,500 kilometres are unproductive swamps and salty lakes. And it is not all. Bessarabia is a prosperous country; its towns and villages are organised and there are public institutions; there are all the material means that are necessary for a proper administration. Dobruja, on the contrary, is a country devastated by war; there is neither organisation nor the means to establish it there: misery is at its highest level. In Medgidia, where there used to be 800 houses, only 40 remained. Besides, ash everywhere*"⁴.

³ Romanian military authorities received with ceremony in Tulcea, in „Pressa”, year XI, 1878 (23 November), no. 258, pp. 1-2. Apud Stoica Lascu, *Mărturii de epocă privind istoria Dobrogei (1878-1947)*, vol. I (1878-1916), Muzeul de Istorie Națională și Arheologie, Constanța, 1999, pp. 87-88; G. B., *Comisiunea Ruso-Română pentru predarea Basarabiei, cu ocaziunea anexării Dobrogei (1878)*, *Cele Trei Crișuri*, July, August, 1943, <https://www.techirghiol.com/comisiunea-ruso-romana-pentru-predarea-basarabiei-cu-ocaziunea-anexarii-dobrogei-1878>, retrieved on 24 September 2019.

⁴ *Dobrogea sau România trans-danubiană*, in "Pressa", year XI, no. 261, on 26 November 1878.



The delineation of the border in Southern Dobruja generated new tensions in the Romanian-Russian relations, the two sides being on the verge of confronting in Arab-Tabia, near Silistra. A large number of Russian troops were quartered in Tulcea, Sulina, Küstenge. It went so far that an order for the Russian commander in Silistra to attack was expected if the Romanian troops refused to withdraw. The conflict was resolved by the Romanian troops withdrawal from the area.

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“Pressa” correspondent transmitted: *“However, many dark spots emerge on the horizon [...], on the one hand, Sulina and Chiustenge, which still remain under the Russian military command, and, on the other hand, the problems arisen by the former Russian administration in Tulcea related to surrendering the telegraphs, barracks and other localities necessary for any public administration”*⁸. Mention should be made that the Russian troops left Dobruja province only in April 1879. The Prefect in Tulcea, Gh. M. Ghica, sent a telegram to the Ministry of Domestic Affairs reporting the departure of the last Russian troops⁹.

In early 20th century, it was sought to strengthen the large units, considering the missions they were to execute in the battlefields, under the circumstances of forces dispersion that resulted in adopting the measure to organically transfer all the field artillery to the divisions.

Capitalising on the favourable regional context, Bulgaria (independent since 1908), alongside Greece, Serbia and Montenegro, attacked the Ottoman Empire, each gaining large territories previously owned by the Ottomans. Dissatisfied with the received territories, Bulgaria attacked its former allies, triggering the Second Balkan War (1913). That was the moment when Romania intervened, and, following the Peace Treaty in Bucharest, it obtained the southern historical

⁵ The issue of delineating the border of Dobruja was at an impasse. The Russians did not accept that the Romanians could come close to Silistra, and the occupation of Arab-Tabia by the Romanian troops generated discontent in Sankt Petersburg.

⁶ Nicolae Iorga, *Istoria românilor*, vol. X, *Întregitorii*, Tipografia “Datina Românească”, București, 1939, p. 225.

⁷ Florin Constantiniu, *O istorie sinceră a poporului român*, Editura Univers Enciclopedic, București, 1997, p. 246.

⁸ *Intrarea ceremonială a trupelor române în Tulcea*, in “*Pressa*”, year XI, no. 259, 1878 (24 November), p. 1. Apud Stoica Lascu, *op. cit.*, pp. 89-90.

⁹ Nicolina Ursu, *Începuturile administrației românești în Dobrogea (1878-1880)*, in “*Analele Dobrogei*”, new series, year V, no. 1, 1999, Constanța, p. 96.

Dobrogea (the Quadrilateral). The region concerned was an important strategic objective for Romania, which was trying to secure the border of Dobruja, especially in the context of Bulgaria's growing territorial ambitions¹⁰.

Professor Ion N. Angelescu, PhD addressed the issue of the budget during the war and after its conclusion, noting that the economy was fuelled by loans only *“and, with each loan, we are far from the possibility of striking a budgetary balance. It should be put an end to this policy, otherwise a sure disaster is looming. This year's budget will be the last attempt of a financial policy that should end; it will provide the opportunity to become aware of many wounds that need healing as well as of the new perspective of future financial policy”*¹¹. In this regard, Ion N. Angelescu presented, before the Deputies Assembly, a General Report regarding the state budget project (1920-1921), requesting the deputies to vote for it, trusting that it was the first step in the consolidation of the Romanian state¹².

The Paris Peace Conference started on 5/18 January 1919, having as main goal to establish the new political-territorial configuration and to solve the complex economic-financial problems resulted following the First World War. There were dissensions between the Allies regarding the attitude that was to be adopted related to the Russian issue. The US President, W. Wilson, and the UK Prime Minister, D. Lloyd George, declared that Russia was the key of the global situation and that was why peace could not be sustainable if its 150 million inhabitants were in a state of chaotic confusion. The Americans as well as the British supported, in a first phase, the integrity of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire and the idea of establishing a Balkan federation.

¹⁰ Having an area of 7,700 km² and a population of 259,957 inhabitants, the Quadrilateral is often considered the cornerstone of Greater Romania. It consisted of two counties, and the Romanian element, amounting to 6,602 people, represented only 2.4% of the population. The majority was formed by Turks and Tatars, amounting to 48%, alongside the Bulgarians, representing 43% of the population in the newly acquired territory. The policy conducted by the authorities in Bucharest related to that territory included an afflux of Macedo-Romanians from the Balkans, especially from Macedonia and Greece, as well as of Romanians from different parts of the country, so that the Romanian element amounted to 14.75% in 1928 and to 29% in 1938 (108,404). Octavian Țicu, *Bătălia diplomatică pentru Basarabia (XIII): Afacerea “Cadrilaterul”*, 27 May 2019, [https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/b%C4%83t%C4%83lia-diplomatic%C4%83-pentru-basarabia-\(xiii\)-afacerea-cadrilaterul-/29965795.html](https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/b%C4%83t%C4%83lia-diplomatic%C4%83-pentru-basarabia-(xiii)-afacerea-cadrilaterul-/29965795.html), retrieved on 24 September 2019.

¹¹ Ion N. Angelescu, *Îndrumări în politica economică și financiară*, București, 1920, p. 18.

¹² *Ibidem*, pp. 8-18.



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The Allies conditioned the recognition of the Unification of Bessarabia with Romania by the cession of the Quadrilateral in favour of Bulgaria. The mentioned attitude was presented in the Commission on Romania telegram of 26 July 1919; the text requested the Secretary of State R. Lansing to present to President W. Wilson the decision of the Romanian Territorial Commission. The author of the telegram was the US diplomat Henry White (1850-1927), one of the signatories of the Treaty of Versailles.

The war ended with the Allies victory, and for Romania it followed a difficult peace conference. Bessarabia, Transylvania and Bukovina got united with the motherland without conditions and “*autonomy*”. The Romanian delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, led by Ionel I.C. Brătianu, requested the *in integrum* compliance with the pact concluded in 1916 between Romania and the Entente powers. Ionel Brătianu did not want to renounce anything related not only to the national, cultural and economic autonomy of the minorities in Romania but also to the Quadrilateral issue, that was required to be surrendered in exchange of the recognition of Bessarabia Unification. He considered the mentioned issues “*incompatible with our national highest interests and with the dignity of our country*”.

The Romanian issues were analysed within the sections related to the Dual Monarchy, the Balkans and Romania. There were 13 reports related to Romania, the commission recommending that “*Greater Romania*” should include the following territories: 1. all Russian Bessarabia, having a predominantly Romanian population; 2. The area of Bukovina populated by Romanians; 3. all Transylvania; 4. about 2/3 of Banat; 5. re-establishment, with a slight difference, of the Romanian-Bulgarian border existing after the Second Balkan War (1913)¹³.

To the regret of the Romanian delegation, the inconsistency of the Allies went even further, taking the form of a fierce confrontation during the meetings of the Supreme Council of 1-2 July 1919, when the issue of the eastern borders of Romania was discussed. The members of the Supreme Council manifested themselves in various forms against the Romanian Government, requesting the evacuation of the Romanian troops from Hungary and the continuation of the preparations for signing the Peace Treaty with Austria and the Minorities Treaty.

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¹³ Octavian Țicu, *Bătălia diplomatică pentru Basarabia (XI): Poziția Marilor Puteri*, 12 May, 2019, [https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/b%C4%83t%C4%83lia-diplomatic%C4%83-pentru-basarabia-\(xi\)-pozi%C8%9Bia-marilor-puteri/29937492.html](https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/b%C4%83t%C4%83lia-diplomatic%C4%83-pentru-basarabia-(xi)-pozi%C8%9Bia-marilor-puteri/29937492.html), retrieved on 24 September 2019.

of the Treaty of Versailles. White waited for President Wilson's instructions on those two views before the US position was presented to the Supreme Council, agreeing *"that no territory will be taken by the Conference from Russia before it has a government in charge of this issue"*.

The British and Italian delegates accepted the American point of view that the Bulgarian side of Dobrogea should be taken from Romania, but declared that they could not take a territory from a power with which the Allies were not at war. André Tardieu himself, the President of the Commission, declared to the Romanian delegation, as Ion Pelivan showed, that Romania had Bessarabia on the credit side and the signing of the treaty with Austria and a small concession to the Bulgarians in the Quadrilateral on the debit side. The position of the US delegation, but especially that of President Wilson, on the issue of territories in the Russian space changed radically following the Coolidge Memorandum, presented to the American Commission and approved by experts on 7 August 1919.

On 3 March 1920, the Supreme Council submitted to the Romanian Government the *"Decision of the Supreme Council on Bessarabia"*, which showed that there was no reason to delay the settlement of the Bessarabia issue. It was stated that the postponement of the decision by the Supreme Council on the mentioned issue was due to the lack of execution by the Romanian Government of the evacuation of Hungary. However, considering that the evacuation of Romanian troops from Hungary will not be delayed beyond the limit set by the inter-allied mission, the Supreme Council acknowledged the reunification of Bessarabia with Romania. It was to be specified in the legal form of a treaty when the Romanian troops would have evacuated Hungary permanently. The decision in question was also conditioned by the issue of signing a treaty with the Soviet Russia.

The Supreme Council engaged to provide support in the event the Soviet Russia would attack the legitimate borders of Romania, thus Romania having a more solid position during the following negotiations with Moscow¹⁴. At that time, in Romania it was fully acknowledged



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¹⁴ Octavian Țicu, *Recunoașterea internațională a Basarabiei (V): Decizia Consiliului Suprem Aliat din 3 martie 1920*, 8 July 2019, [https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/recunoa%C8%99terea-interna%C8%9Bional%C4%83-a-basarabiei-\(v\)-decizia-consiliului-suprem-aliat-din-3-martie-1920/30042706.html](https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/recunoa%C8%99terea-interna%C8%9Bional%C4%83-a-basarabiei-(v)-decizia-consiliului-suprem-aliat-din-3-martie-1920/30042706.html), retrieved on 7 September 2019.



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that idea that Bucharest could not conduct a policy that was different from that of the Great Allies towards the Soviet Russia. It was a gross mistake, having fatal consequences for the Soviet-Romanian relations, which was permanently occurred in the political environment in Romania in the interwar period.

Romania, guided in its foreign policy by the goal of *"preserving the borders existing at the end of the First World War"*, was in line with the policy promoted by France: to preserve the territorial status quo. Thus, on 17 January 1919, Take Ionescu made public his project to establish an alliance between Romania, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Yugoslavia and Poland, in order to preserve the territorial status quo. He brought to the attention of the European powers his plan for a defensive alliance, made up of five states, the reactions received being positive. In the negotiations between the representatives of these states, serious contradictions emerged between Poland and Czechoslovakia as well as between Yugoslavia and Greece, which resulted in the project failure. This idea disturbed Italy, which was, during the mentioned period, in a certain diplomatic strain in relation to France.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE MUNICH CONFERENCE

Romania's economic situation worsened after the Munich Conference in 1938. The danger of the disintegration of Czechoslovakia and the expansion of Germany led to the collapse of the collective security system: *"The Munich Conference gave a blow to the political balance system established in Central Europe by the Treaty of Versailles. The Little Entente, which stood in the way of German imperialism, collapsed"*¹⁵.

The Munich Conference, far from quenching Germany's claims, increased its audacity, conditions under which Romania's interest was to *"have its territorial integrity, political and economic independence respected and preserved"*¹⁶. With regard to the danger of German penetration in the political and economic space of Central and Eastern Europe, Romania was required, in the new political-economic situation, to have a respectable collaboration regarding the economic relations

¹⁵ Gheorghe Tașcă, *România în urma conferinței de la Munchen*, no. 11-12, 1938, Editura Analele Industrii și Comerțului, București, p. 4.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 16.



in the form of exchanges of products that Germany could buy from our market, such as oil, food and wood, receiving, instead, machines and manufactured products that were needed. As for territorial claims *“from wherever they come, we must respond by a categorical NO”*¹⁷, justifying that the attitude of our country is not and should not be regarded as a bravado or a stubbornness.

The Ministry of the Armed Forces Procurement was established following the Royal Decree no. 3559 on 14 October 1938¹⁸ being in charge of *“providing the armed forces with all the armament and equipment that was necessary for the national defence”*. The mentioned ministry was established in a period when the Romanian government, under the circumstances of the international situation worsening, accelerated the pace of the war production development and of the military preparations¹⁹. The aggravation of the international situation was also experienced by the Minister Victor Slăvescu and by his close friends. During a discussion between Minister Slăvescu and Malaxa, on 3 January 1939, denouncing the King’s defective foreign policy at a time when Germany waved the flag of revenge and sought pretexts to trigger the war, Slăvescu concluded: *“May God let us celebrate the New Year in 1940 under the same normal circumstances as this year!”*²⁰.

The signs of aggression were as obvious as possible and, as we know, they were evident in the summer of 1940, when Romania lost Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, the Quadrilateral and, for a few years, Transylvania. Mention should be made that one of the difficulties of the position was the person of King Carol II, an authoritarian monarch²¹, who established the royal dictatorship (1938-1940).

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¹⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 19.

¹⁸ *“Monitorul Oficial (Official Gazette)”* on 15 October 1938.

¹⁹ The minister had a task entailing great importance and responsibility, as King Carol II warned Victor Slăvescu during the swearing-in ceremony: *“Slăvescu, your task is a difficult one. It requires a lot of energy and dynamism. I trust you that you can fully accomplish it”*. Victor Slăvescu, *Note și însemnări zilnice*, București, 1996, p. 350.

²⁰ Victor Slăvescu, *op. cit.*, p. 335.

²¹ An example in this regard is the remark of King Carol II addressed to N. Petrescu-Comnen, appointed Sub-Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who tried to refuse the position: *“Today, when I just intend to declutter the country, depoliticising it, when there are no parliamentarians and no political parties, the role of each and every minister is to do his best in the area of responsibility. Therefore, you only have to deal with your department. I am responsible for the government policy related to the country and the history.”*, cf. Mircea Mușat, Ion Ardeleanu, *România după Marea Unire*, vol. II, part II, November 1933-September 1940, București, p. 813. Therefore, the role of a minister, in the King’s view, was that of a simple performer.



After the end of the Second World War, a new international social-political order emerged. It was the pressure of the communist ideology, timid at first, then quite brutal and categorical. The coming of communists to power was accompanied by a wave of arrests, to which almost all the elite of the intellectuals of the old society fell victim.

King Carol II often intervened in the policy of armament and combat assets procurement. The interventions were mainly aimed at meeting own material interests, the combat assets performance being less important. We consider here the bonuses offered by foreign companies, especially in terms of bonds packages so that the armament could be bought from them, to the detriment of other equally important companies and even in spite of poor performances. The war found the Romanian armed forces with an extremely wide variety of airplanes, armoured vehicles, artillery and means of transport, a variety that resulted in heavy difficulties in terms of providing spare parts, maintenance and supply with ammunition and other consumable items. Such a situation was found by Victor Slăvescu when he became minister of the armed forces procurement, a situation that had lasted for about eight years²², with the assistance of some decision-makers among the royal camarilla²³. In the eve of his appointment as a minister, within the ministry it was sensed *“a state of laziness and lack of coordination”*²⁴.

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²² In 1932, the Romanian military aviation was like *“a museum worthy of competing with a perfectly organised exhibition, in the aeronautics inventory being no less than 25 types of cells and more than 15 types of engines.”*, cf. Gheorghe Zaharia, Constantin Botoran, *Politica de apărare națională a României în contextul european interbelic, 1919-1939*, București, 1981, p. 141. For details relating to the armament trade see also Andrei Nicolescu, *Colaborarea româno-franceză în domeniul armamentului (1930-1936)* in *“Argesis”*, no. XIV, History series, Pitești, 2005, pp. 591-596. In fact, even Slăvescu noted that Ionel and Vintilă Brătianu neglected the armament issue, cf. Victor Slăvescu, *Note și însemnări zilnice, op. cit.*, p. 344, a more interesting statement considering the two mentioned persons were his party colleagues.

²³ The fall in disgrace, in 1934, of the future Marshal Ion Antonescu, a military attaché in London, was largely due to the protests against such royal armament business. Of course, at that time, there was no military procurement ministry.

²⁴ Victor Slăvescu, *op. cit.*, p. 316.

²⁵ Emil Răcilă, *Studii și documente privind Academia de Studii Economice. 1913-1993*, vol. II, București, 1994, p. 47.

fascist or Hitlerist organisation, had served foreign interests etc. In that regard, it was requested the establishment of a verification commission in each institution.

STEPS MADE BY ROMANIA TOWARDS DEMOCRACY

The signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in the capital of Poland laid the foundation of the North-Atlantic Alliance eastern counterpart²⁶. The Warsaw Treaty Organisation was, first and foremost, a response to the establishment of NATO (six years before), as well as the USSR reaction to the transformation of West Germany into an independent state and its NATO membership²⁷. Following NATO pattern, the Warsaw Pact gathered the armed forces of the signatory states under a single military command, initially represented by Marshal Ivan Konev, therefore dominated by the Soviet armed forces. Thus, in the armed forces of the member states, the armament was standardised, Soviet military manuals were introduced, joint training programmes as well as joint manoeuvres were organised, and, last but not least, uniforms inspired by the Soviet armed forces style were introduced²⁸.

The fall of the Berlin Wall was the signal for the separation of the Central and Eastern European countries from the Soviet Union and the transition to democracy. In Romania, the evolution of popular support for the European integration started from its rather aggressive rejection, in the early '90s, when the well-known slogan "We do not sell our country!" became popular. At that time, the "pro-Western" Romanian



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Following NATO pattern, the Warsaw Pact gathered the armed forces of the signatory states under a single military command, initially represented by Marshal Ivan Konev, therefore dominated by the Soviet armed forces. Thus, in the armed forces of the member states, the armament was standardised, Soviet military manuals were introduced, joint training programmes as well as joint manoeuvres were organised, and, last but not least, uniforms inspired by the Soviet armed forces style were introduced.

²⁶ The Treaty was signed by the Soviet Union and seven Eastern European countries: Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Romania, all of them represented in Warsaw by their prime ministers and foreign ministers. The only European communist country that was not present was Yugoslavia, whose relations with the Soviet Union were still tense, following the split in 1948.

²⁷ According to the Treaty, in the event one of the organisation member states was attacked, the other states had to provide immediate assistance to it; moreover, the member states had to consult regarding important international issues related to their common interests. Therefore, a Political Consultative Committee was established, consisting of the members of the secretariats of the member states communist parties.

²⁸ The Warsaw Pact was invoked in 1968, when the Soviet Union used the Pact troops (from Poland, East Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria) to invade Czechoslovakia in order to reinstate the control over the government in Prague. As an ironic twist, it is the city where fights were conducted between demonstrators and the Warsaw Pact troops in 1968, and where, in June 1991, it was organised the conference following which the Pact was officially dissolved.



The Romanians pro-European attitude, according to the periodical Euro-barometers, has been shared by an overwhelming majority, the population regarding the membership of the EU and NATO as a “miracle” solution to get out not only of the macrosocial crisis but also of the millions of individual crises experienced by large disadvantaged categories.

population represented a minority. Gradually, the group of supporters for the Romanian participation in the European project became larger, especially due to the acknowledgement of the advantages generated by such an integration²⁹.

The arguments of Romania's integration into NATO were the geostrategic advantages generated by the geographical position, on the one hand, and the conduct of our country, not only in the process of preparing NATO membership, but also at the regional and international level, on the other hand.

On 1 February 1993, Romania signed the Europe Agreement establishing an association between Romania, of the one part, and the European Economic Communities and their member states, of the other part. Subsequently, in June 1999, Romania adopted the National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis, and in December the same year, in Helsinki, the European Council decided the beginning of the accession negotiations with six candidate countries, Romania included. On 12-13 December 2002, the European Council in Copenhagen decided the accession of 10 new member states and adopted the road maps for Romania and Bulgaria.

Actually, the United Europe is a construct that is both diversified and stratified. Within this conglomerate that is called the European Union and that, by statute, aspires to socio-economic homogeneity and spiritual diversification, Romania intended to make a place with its entire available cultural and material capital, as well as with its still remaining shortcomings (juridical, moral, economic, political). Therefore, starting on 1 January 2007, Romania became a fully-fledged member state of the Union³⁰.

The Romanians pro-European attitude, according to the periodical Euro-barometers, has been shared by an overwhelming majority, the population regarding the membership of the EU and NATO as a “miracle” solution to get out not only of the macrosocial crisis but also of the millions of individual crises experienced by large disadvantaged categories³¹. The preservation and protection of resources, as one of the main requirements for the European space sustainable development,

²⁹ Ioana Petre, *România rurală și integrarea europeană*, in “*Calitatea vieții*”, XVIII, no. 3-4, 2007, București, pp. 241-252.

³⁰ *Ibidem*.

³¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 242-243.

have the role of countering the visible degradation of the environment, having effects – already manifest – such as floods, landslides, threats to the Danube Delta ecosystem etc³².

The definition of sustainable development entails the idea that its achievement becomes feasible only under the circumstances in which cooperation gets manifest among the members of the same generation, who exhibit tolerance, solidarity and mutual care; one by virtue of which one's good and well-being must in no way affect the happiness of another. In other words, the sustainable development project leads to the optimum of Vilfredo Pareto³³.

The experience gained on the road of sustainable development seems to entail the idea that the sense of equity cannot exclude the political area. The strategic importance of our country is given by its second place among the countries situated in the space between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea in terms of: size, demographic and economic potential; vicinity of the Black Sea; the position in an area that allows for strengthening the southern flank of NATO; the fact that Romania represents a stability factor in an area having a highly conflictual potential in the medium term.

CONCLUSIONS

The solutions and tools needed to implement sustainable development are not used now, at the beginning of the 21st century, for the first time. Even before the term was established, certain experience had already been gained. Today, this experience, to the extent that it is fruitful, is transmissible; it can be assimilated in different degrees

³² For further details, see B. Cotigaru, V. Petrescu, I. Gh. Roșca (coord.), *Reconstrucția durabilă. Principii și acțiuni*, Editura ASE, București, 2004 and I. Bădescu (coord.), *Viața și moartea în satul românesc*, Editura Mica Valahie, București, 2006.

³³ The Italian sociologist and economist Vilfredo Pareto declared himself in disagreement with the way in which equilibrium theorists determined the collective welfare as an arithmetic sum of the individual welfare. Considering that individual utilities cannot be summed to obtain the measure of collective welfare on the grounds that practically no interpersonal comparisons of the utilities can be made, because the utilities depend on the personal parameters of each, Pareto realised that the optimum, in turn, can be defined neither as a sum of the individual utilities nor outside the distribution of the revenues; that, if the income is given, welfare can only be relative. Starting from it, Pareto defined the optimum as that balance position from which it is impossible to improve one's situation without diminishing the welfare of another or others. Vilfredo Pareto, *Manuale di Economia Politica*, Padova-Cedam, Casa Editrice Datt. Antonio Milani, 1974, pp. 241-267.



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The definition of sustainable development entails the idea that its achievement becomes feasible only under the circumstances in which cooperation gets manifest among the members of the same generation, who exhibit tolerance, solidarity and mutual care; one by virtue of which one's good and well-being must in no way affect the happiness of another.



The evolution of the security environment, dynamic and complex, is characterised by the efforts made by South-Eastern and Central European states to integrate in the European and Euro-Atlantic structures as well as by the preoccupation of Russia to regain a decision-making role in the international issues, and by the increasing role played by the Asian countries in the global political life.

and proportions, depending on the socio-economic situation of each country, the technical and human potential available to implement sustainable development policies.

The evolution of the security environment, dynamic and complex, is characterised by the efforts made by South-Eastern and Central European states to integrate in the European and Euro-Atlantic structures as well as by the preoccupation of Russia to regain a decision-making role in the international issues, and by the increasing role played by the Asian countries in the global political life. To all the mentioned aspects the crises in Ukraine, in the Gulf area, and in Central Asia, as well as the effects of organised crime and poverty are added. There are created the conditions for the global stability and security to be increasingly influenced by the mentioned factors.

Romania's national security is projected and implemented by the Romanian state through its security policy – part of general policy –, conducted internally and externally. Our country military power resides in the combat power of the land forces, the air force and the naval forces. Practically, Romania's security is actualised through the implementation of the political, diplomatic, economic, cultural, ecological, humanitarian and, last but not least, military measures and actions by the responsible institutions in peacetime as well as in the event of an armed conflict³⁴.

Romania's security is closely connected to regional, European and global security and, under such circumstances, any approach to the existing issues can be taken only in the context in which it is seen as part of the European and Euro-Atlantic security system. The relation between the military power and the ways to achieve it (resources) and to manifest it (missions) should be as realistic as possible, in compliance with national interests, the legislation in force and the commitments made by Romania through treaties and other international agreements it is party to. Romania has become not only a security consumer but also a security provider, therefore there are a series of obligations and duties our country has to assume and fulfil. It is evident that, in order

³⁴ Dorin-Marinel Eparu, *Importanța puterii militare în asigurarea securității României (Importance of Military Power in Securing Romania)*, in *Impactul transformărilor socio-economice și tehnologice la nivel național, european și mondial*, no. 4/2015, vol. 4, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2661331, retrieved on 7 October 2019.

to fulfil the new duties, the Romanian Armed Forces will tailor to meet the Alliance military requirements, the reconfiguration process being indissolubly linked to that of NATO transformation³⁵.



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