



THE SITUATION OF THE ARMY AT ROMANIA'S RE-ENTRY INTO WAR ON 28 OCTOBER/10 NOVEMBER 1918

Silviu-Daniel NICULAE

PhD Candidate, "Carol I" National Defence University, Bucharest

The situation of the Romanian army on the eve of the second mobilisation resulted from the carrying out of the demobilisation imposed by the Peace Treaty of Bucharest signed on 24 April/7 May 1918. In other words, when mobilisation was declared, the operational status of all the higher commands, general services and military establishments of the Romanian army was the one corresponding to the last budget drawn up in peacetime, that is, from 1916. All these commands, services and establishments depended on the Ministry of War, in terms of both management and administration.

Keywords: First World War, re-entry into war, the situation of the Romanian army, the second mobilisation, carrying out of mobilisation.



THE GENERAL SITUATION OF THE ROMANIAN ARMY IN OCTOBER 1918

In detail, this situation of the army at Romania's re-entry into war was as follows:

1) *The order of battle.* At the decreeing of the 2nd mobilisation, the Romanian Army had all the superior commands, general services and military establishments, as "they were provided in the last budget in peacetime" (1916). All these commands, services and establishments depended on the Ministry of War, in terms of both management and administration. The large combat, tactical and strategic units of the army were 15 infantry divisions (1-15), grouped into 5 army corps (1-5) and 2 cavalry divisions (1-2). In addition to these large units, it also had special branches and troops, organised in special commands that depended directly on the Ministry of War, such as: heavy artillery, aeronautics, communication troops, border guards, gendarmes and naval forces¹.

2) *Deployment.* In the political and military situation in which Romania was at that time, when Muntenia, Oltenia and Dobrogea were still occupied by German-Austrian-Bulgarian troops, the whole army was deployed in the free territory of Moldova and in Basarabia. In Moldova, there were the commands, troops and services of the Army Corps 1 to 4. Army Corps 3 and 4 (only the part from Division 6 and Division 13) stayed in their normal peacetime deployment, and Army Corps 1, 2 and 3 (Division 5 and part of Division 6 and Division 13), whose usual peacetime deployment was in Muntenia and Oltenia, were temporary part of the units of Army Corps 4 and Army Corps 3. In Basarabia, there were the Army Corps 5 (Divisions 9, 10 and 15), which had the normal peace deployment in Dobrogea and in the eastern part of Muntenia, and Divisions 1 and 2 Cavalry².

At the decreeing of the 2nd mobilisation, the Romanian Army had all the superior commands, general services and military establishments, as "they were provided in the last budget in peacetime" (1916). All these commands, services and establishments depended on the Ministry of War, in terms of both management and administration.

¹ Romanian Military Archives/Arhivele Militare Române (AMR), *Great General Staff* Collection, file 131, p. 90.

² *Ibid*, p. 91.



3) *Organic structure.* The Army Corps consisted of: 3 Infantry Divisions and 1 Cavalry Brigade of 2 regiments. The organic structure of the divisions was different, from the point of view of the component infantry units, namely: Divisions 1-10 consisted of 2 infantry brigades, each brigade with 2 regiments (Regiments 1-40); in addition, each of these divisions had a battalion of mountain infantry (1-10 Mountain Infantry); Divisions 11-15 consisted of 4 infantry brigades, each brigade having 2 regiments (Regiments 41-80). The rest was the same for all divisions, with 1 artillery brigade composed of 1 regiment field guns and 1 howitzer regiment; 1 battalion of engineers.

❖ *Infantry.* Regiments 1-40 each had 3 battalions. The battalion consisted of 4 infantry companies, of which 1 training and 3 personnel and 1 machine gun company (4 pieces); battalions of regiments from Divisions 9 and 10 were composed of the same number of companies, except that 3 infantry companies had the war strength, and the 4th company was of personnel. Regiments 41-80 consisted of a single battalion, with 3 infantry companies, with a small number of troops and a machine-gun company (4 pieces). The Mountain Infantry battalions were each made up of 4 rifle companies and one machine gun company (8 pieces)³.

❖ *Artillery.* Field artillery regiments consisted of 3 divisions, each division having 3 batteries, of which 1 for training and 2 of personnel; a total of 9 batteries. The howitzer regiments consisted of 2 divisions, each division having 1 training battery and 1 personnel battery; in addition, a mortar trench battery; a total of 5 batteries. Artillery and howitzer regiments from Divisions 9 and 10 had the batteries with the war personnel. The mountain artillery regiments consisted of 2 divisions, each division having 2 personnel batteries and a training battery; a total of 6 batteries. The heavy artillery regiments consisted of 3 divisions, 2 of them having 3 batteries (1 training and 2 personnel), and the 3rd of 2 batteries (1 training and 1 personnel); a total of 8 batteries.

❖ *Cavalry. Cavalry Division.* Divisions 1 and 2 Cavalry consisted each of 3 brigades of 2 regiments, 6 regiments in total; in addition, 1 cavalry artillery division, 3 batteries each and 1 cyclists company. The Roșiori

³ *Ibid*, p. 92.



Regiments (1-11) and Călărași Regiment 3, which were part of the Divisions 1 and 2 Cavalry, consisted of 4 squadrons and one machine-gun group each, with 2/3 of the war strength. The Călărași Regiments and the Royal Escort Regiment, which were included in the organic structure of the Călărași brigades of the Army Corps, were each made up of 4 squadrons and 1 machine-gun group (4 pieces), apart from the Regiment 10 Călărași, which consisted of 2 divisions, both with reinforced strength and assigned to Divisions 9 and 10 in Basarabia⁴.

❖ *Special troops.* The divisional engineer battalions were each made up of 3 engineers companies, 1 telegraph company, 1 bridge company and 1 warehouse company; Battalion 2 Engineers had, in addition, 1 warehouse of tools. The fortress engineers' battalion consisted of 3 engineers companies, 2 staff companies and 1 warehouse company. The railway regiment consisted of 8 railway companies and 1 warehouse company. The pontoon regiment consisted of 2 battalions and a warehouse company. The river battalion had 2 training companies and 2 staff ones, and the river battalion had 3 training and 2 staff companies. The Specialty Battalion consisted of: 1 wireless telephone company, 1 projecting company, 1 technical company and 1 warehouse company. The car traction corps had: 1 company car drivers; 1 company driving trucks; 2 technical companies; 1 group of armored light trucks; 1 motorcycle company; 1 warehouse company; 1 warehouse of materials and gasoline.

❖ *Aeronautics.* a) The aviation corps had: 1 command; 1 deposit company; 3 aviation groups (1, 2, 3); 1 group training – schools (4); general aviation reserve (workshops and central warehouse). The aviation group consisted of 4 squadrons (2 reconnaissance; 1 fighter; 1 technique), each with 8 aircraft; in total 24 aircraft (except the technical squadron). b) The air station corps had 25 balloons⁵.

❖ *Border guards.* The Border Corps had 3 regiments (1, 2, 3). The Border Guards Regiment consisted of 3 guard battalions (Regiment 3 Border Guards had only 2 battalions) and 1 training battalion.

❖ *Rural gendarmes.* The corps of rural gendarmes consisted of 3 brigades of 2 regiments each. The regiments structure varied between 4 companies (Regiment 5) and 11 companies (Regiment 2).

The Călărași Regiments and the Royal Escort Regiment, which were included in the organic structure of the Călărași brigades of the Army Corps, were each made up of 4 squadrons and 1 machine-gun group (4 pieces), apart from the Regiment 10 Călărași, which consisted of 2 divisions, both with reinforced strength and assigned to Divisions 9 and 10 in Basarabia.

⁴ *Ibid*, p. 93.

⁵ *Ibid*, p. 94.



At the demobilisation of the army, according to the Peace Treaty in Bucharest (art. 4), Divisions 9 and 10 Infantry and Divisions 1 and 2 Cavalry, which were in Basarabia, had the strength reinforced (2/3 of the war personnel), and Divisions 1-8 had the reduced peacetime strength; finally, Divisions 11-15 had an even smaller number, which represented only 1/3 of the number of Divisions 1-8, because the regiments of these divisions had only one battalion.

The pedestrian gendarmes. The pedestrian gendarmes battalion consisted of 2 companies (1 in Iași and another in Bucharest) and 1 warehouse section.

❖ *The military navy* had: the Navy Command; the Danube Division; Sea Division; general warehouses; Navy Arsenal. The Danube Division had the monitors: “Alexandru Lahovary”, “Mihail Kogălniceanu”, “I.C. Brătianu” and “Lascăr Catargiu”. The Sea Division had only the “Elisabeta” cruiser.

4. *The strength.* At the demobilisation of the army, according to the Peace Treaty in Bucharest (art. 4), Divisions 9 and 10 Infantry and Divisions 1 and 2 Cavalry, which were in Basarabia, had the strength reinforced (2/3 of the war personnel), and Divisions 1-8 had the reduced peacetime strength; finally, Divisions 11-15 had an even smaller number, which represented only 1/3 of the number of Divisions 1-8, because the regiments of these divisions had only one battalion. From this situation, which is not different from the one the Romanian army had around the 2nd mobilisation, it follows that:

- a. the total actual number of the Romanian army was 163, 240 people;
- b. the combat strength of the whole army was: 180 battalions; 260 batteries; 98 squares⁶.

5. *The state of army preparation for war*

❖ *Training.* The number of troops was very small, due to the numerous assignments and deployments required by the guarding of depots of all kinds, agricultural works, cultivation of vegetable gardens, gathering of forages, a large number of animals in care, because of the demobilisation of the army. Thus, troops training was almost entirely suspended, except for specialists training, which was also quite diminished. The officers' training was also reduced; however, the army sought to complete the training of officers that returned from captivity. Normal training in the troop corps was planned to start on 1 November 1918, when agricultural works were completed.

❖ *Armament and ammunition.* According to the Focșani convention, from 1 March 1918, the artillery material of Divisions 11, 12, 13 was passed into the occupied territory; and in keeping with the Bucharest Treaty (art. 5) we were forced to send into the occupied territory “guns, machine guns, handguns, ammunition depots

⁶ *Ibid*, p. 95.

and carriages”, which became available through the elimination of the units and the personnel stipulated in the same treaty. With all these difficulties, the General Staff made all the efforts and managed to provide the necessary weapons and ammunition for possible mobilisation. Thus, the commission set up at the General Staff to plan the armament and ammunition to be sent into the occupied territory, according to Art.5 of the Bucharest Treaty and the convention concluded in Bucharest, on 15/28 August 1918, managed to send there weapons, machine guns, rifles and firearms that were old and not in service. Under these conditions, on the eve of the 2nd mobilisation, the Romanian army had a sufficient amount of armament and ammunition remaining in the free territory of Moldova, namely: 160 field batteries (75 Md. 1904, 75 French and 76.2 Russian) and 65 howitzers (105-150 gauge). This number of batteries was able to meet the needs of 18 divisions, considering the normal artillery supply of a division, 9 field cannon batteries and 3-4 howitzer batteries; 31 heavy batteries (120, 150 and 155 guns and 120 howitzers); 100 trench mortars of 58 m/m; 15 mountain batteries; machine guns (max. 6.5, St. Etienne and Hotsckiss of 8 m/m, English of 7.7 and Russian of 7.62), machine guns (Gladiator of 8 m/m and English of 7.7) and handguns were also sufficient for arming 18 divisions, with an average supply of 8 machine guns for a battalion and 6 machine guns for a company⁷.

The remaining ammunition in Moldova ensured: 7-10 days of fire, for weapons and machine guns; 4-7 days of fire, for machine guns; 5 1/2 days of fire for grenades; 9 days of fire, for field cannon; 10-14 days of fire, for field howitzers; 5-15 days of fire, for heavy artillery.

The quantity of available ammunition, although sufficient for beginning possible operations, nevertheless limited the duration of the probable operations, because we had neither the means nor the facilities necessary for their manufacture in the country, nor the possibility to obtain them from the allies, from whom we were completely isolated at that time. However, on the other hand, Romania, given the situation it was in, could mobilise only a maximum of 10 divisions. It followed that the Romanian army had sufficient armament and an average ammunition quantity of 15-20 days of fire, which fully justified the renewal of arms in these circumstances⁸.



ROMANIAN
MILITARY
THINKING

On the eve of the 2nd mobilisation, the Romanian army had a sufficient amount of armament and ammunition remaining in the free territory of Moldova, namely: 160 field batteries (75 Md. 1904, 75 French and 76.2 Russian) and 65 howitzers (105-150 gauge).

⁷ *Ibid*, p. 96.

⁸ *Ibid*, p. 97.



The quantities of subsistence found on the troops and in the warehouses of the Ministry of War were far from the supply needs of the army, in case of any mobilisation. In the country, however, there were supplies that could feed the army for at least a month; and their gathering in warehouses required 10-15 days.

❖ *Subsistences and equipment.* The economic state in which Moldova was after the Peace Treaty from Bucharest was signed created a very difficult situation in terms of meeting the food and clothing needs of the army. Industrial facilities were quite reduced and their production capacity was limited; and the resources of the territory were drained by the war and the overpopulation of Moldova. The Ministry of War and its supply bodies were not able to make available the equipment and subsistence necessary for the army that was under arms, to create deposits and reserves for mobilisation, because in this situation the supply of the army and the civilian population was made by the Ministry of Industry and the Supply Department, established at the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. The need to ensure the existence of the civilian population meant that part of the War Ministry's subsistence deposits, as well as part of the army's reserve feed, was passed on to the Supply Department, which distributed them to the civilian population. Under these circumstances, even the troops under arms were deprived of food and clothing⁹.

Subsistence. The quantities of subsistence found on the troops and in the warehouses of the Ministry of War were far from the supply needs of the army, in case of any mobilisation. In the country, however, there were supplies that could feed the army for at least a month; and their gathering in warehouses required 10-15 days.

❖ *Equipment.* The equipment available was quite insufficient, compared to the planned staff to mobilise (200,000 people). Among the main items were missing: 50% coats, 60% jackets, 40% pants, 15% boots (existing footwear was degraded), 10% shirts, 25% drawers.

❖ *The sanitary and pharmaceutical service.* Since the demobilisation of the army, most of the troops remained without doctors, because of the 149 corps troops, only 77 had military doctors, and the rest used civilian doctors. The inferior sanitary personnel were also insufficient for the peace strength, because during the campaign the people from the last 2 contingents, necessary for the health specialty, had not been assigned to the sanitary companies. The sanitary formations of the campaign had been completely abolished, with the demobilisation of the army, according to the Peace

⁹ *Ibid*, p. 98.



Treaty in Bucharest. The sanitary material had been collected from the troops, which had no place to keep it; but the classification of this material had not yet ended at the date of the 2nd mobilisation and because of this the endowment with sanitary material of the different formations encountered difficulties. The amount of existing sanitary material was plentiful, although part of the campaign sanitary material had been sent at different peace formations (hospitals, sanitariums). Part of the sanitary material such as: bags, tents, trolleys, canvas, towels, stoves was in the same state of degradation in which it remained at the demobilisation, their repair could not be carried out due to lack of funds, material and workshops¹⁰.

❖ *Veterinary service.* At the demobilisation of the army, besides the active military veterinary doctors, there were still a number of 70 reserve veterinarians, temporarily called into service, so at the 2nd mobilisation, the army still needed a number of 40 veterinarians. The training of horse nurses and horsemen was completed by the special school, which worked after the demobilisation of the army. Surgical and horsemanship material, as well as the vaccine required for mobilisation, were also completed.

❖ *Horse Service.* The number of army horses was very small because, besides the number of horses sent in Muntenia with the artillery equipment, the command of the German Army of Occupation forced us to sell another 3,557 horses, the best ones. Filling the number by import from Argentina could not be achieved until the second mobilisation. At this time, the infantry regiments, the howitzer and heavy artillery regiments had a number of horses that outweighed the budgetary effective; the field artillery and the cavalry regiments (they had about 100 horses by squadron) had also deficits in horses compared to the budgetary effective. In Moldova and Basarabia, however, there were the necessary means for completing the mobilisation effective of units and services belonging to the mobilisable divisions of Army Corps 3, 4 and 5. At the demobilisation of the army, a large number of horses remained, but they were extremely weak, due to the shortages in the winter of 1917/1918. For their care, the troop had neither people nor feed. The scab that had become chronic and their terrible physiological state had made

At the demobilisation of the army, besides the active military veterinary doctors, there were still a number of 70 reserve veterinarians, temporarily called into service, so at the 2nd mobilisation, the army still needed a number of 40 veterinarians.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, p. 99.



The measures taken by the government and the General Post Department to carry out the terms of the Bucharest Peace Treaty paralysed all the measures taken by the General Staff for the purpose of preparing the communications for war. For this reason, at the mobilisation, establishing and manning military offices were a difficult task, due to the lack of personnel, which had been evacuated to Bucharest.

them unusable. In order to be saved, they had been distributed free to the inhabitants, keeping only the strictly necessary ones at the units. But due to the lack of food in the summer of 1918 and because of the poor condition they were in at that time, many of the horses died and others were slaughtered at the slaughterhouse. So, in general, there was a lack of horses¹¹.

❖ *Communications.* When the army was demobilised, the entire telegraph-postal service was passed to the General Post, Telegraph and Telephone Department and the personnel and material had been evacuated to Bucharest, under German occupation, without the knowledge and advice of the General Staff. Direct telegraphic and telephone connections between General Staff and commands, the military telegraph-telephone offices from Iași, Vaslui, Bârlad, Tecuci, Galați, Bacău and Botoșani, as well as those of the Basarabia commandments had been abolished by the government. The wireless telephone service that had 4 goniometric positions (Iași, Chișinău, Bolgrad and Bălți) had also passed in September to the General Post, Telegraph and Telephone Department so that the specialities battalion remained without staff and personnel and unable to train new staff. There were also 4 pigeon stations, in Botoșani, Chișinău, Bălți and Bolgrad. Therefore, the measures taken by the government and the General Post Department to carry out the terms of the Bucharest Peace Treaty paralysed all the measures taken by the General Staff for the purpose of preparing the communications for war. For this reason, at the mobilisation, establishing and manning military offices were a difficult task, due to the lack of personnel, which had been evacuated to Bucharest; the repair of the lines destroyed by the German troops in retreat and the inclement weather was incomplete, due to the lack of material, which had also been evacuated to București¹².

❖ *Transport.* At the time mobilisation was declared, there were 817 locomotives in Moldova, of which only 163 were operational and about 14,000 wagons. Due to the small number of locomotives in operation, the possibilities for rail transport were rather limited. Repair of the damaged material could not be performed due to lack of raw materials, workshops and spare parts. The fuel situation was also precarious. The fuel reserve, proposed by the General Staff,

¹¹ *Ibid*, p. 100.

¹² *Ibid*, p. 101.

which had allocated for this purpose 4 battalions of workers, for the cutting of wood in different forests, had not been fully achieved, because although in the forests there were 90,000 m.c. (4,500 wagons) cut wood, the transport to the stations was not organised and the crisis persisted. In October 1918, the General Department of Railways obtained from the German Occupation Command 90 wagons of fuel daily, brought from the occupied territory. Under these conditions, at that time, the fuel supplies were only for 5-6 days and only for 8-9 liners daily.



THE CARRYING OUT OF MOBILISATION

1) The measures taken for the army to enter the war

The High Decree regarding the mobilisation of the army was given by King Ferdinand on 27 October 1918 in Iași and stated: *“Art. I. All the commands, army corps and services of the army are at war. The first day of mobilisation: 28 October 1918. Art. II. The war troops will be supplemented with people from the reinforcement, reserve and militias contingents, up to the 1894 contingent included”*.

In order to implement the High Decree, the General Staff gave the same order to all commands that the mobilisation would be executed according to the instructions given by the General Staff in July 1918. However, the rush with which the mobilisation had to be carried out, in order to help the Danube allied army in the operations of the Danube crossing, as well as the technical difficulties, caused the mobilisation directives to be changed even from the beginning. Thus, on the very first day of mobilisation – 28 October 1918 – the General Staff changed the first stipulations of these instructions, stipulating in the order that it stated that *“the people from reinforcement contingents will be called, i.e. the 1916-1912 contingent included, from Moldova. For the call of the reserve and militias contingents, orders will follow”*.

Regarding the call of the reserve officers, the General Staff also decided on 28 October 1918 that *“out of the inferior reserve officers only the youngest second lieutenants and lieutenants will be kept mobilised, needed to man the staff resulting from the table with personnel under arms and contingents 1916-1912”*¹³.

The High Decree regarding the mobilisation of the army was given by King Ferdinand on 27 October 1918 in Iași and stated: “Art. I. All the commands, army corps and services of the army are at war. The first day of mobilisation: 28 October 1918. Art. II. The war troops will be supplemented with people from the reinforcement, reserve and militias contingents, up to the 1894 contingent included”.

¹³ *Ibid*, p. 102.



The infantry had to mobilise the contingents 1912-1916 only for the infantry and mountain infantry regiments, which entered in the structure of the divisions.

Also on the first day of mobilisation, the General Headquarters specified the number of units to be mobilised and the number of personnel as follows: a) No longer mobilising: army headquarters; heavy artillery divisions; the units in group II¹⁴. Therefore, the following structures were to mobilise: Divisions 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 1 mountain infantry and 2 mountain infantry; 1 cavalry and 2 cavalry; army corps commands; mountain divisions; the air defence division; wireless telegraph stations; aeronautical groups; pontoon companies; sections of cars, ambulances, trucks; detachments of pedestrians and rural gendarmes. The border guard regiments were mobilised but without the establishment of the Border Division¹⁵.

b) The strenght

I. Troops. The infantry had to mobilise the contingents 1912-1916 only for the infantry and mountain infantry regiments, which entered in the structure of the divisions mentioned above. For infantry companies, the number of 100-120 people was established and for the machine-gun companies the number of 126 people. Company 4 from the battalion was dissolved, with its staff being completed the other companies in the battalion. The marching units were no longer organised.

The cavalry mobilised the regiments of cavalry and Regiment 3 Cavalry which entered in the structure of the 2 cavalry divisions, as well as a squadron of the regiments: 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 Cavalry, intended to form the divisional cavalry of the mobilised divisions. For both the cavalry divisions and the divisional cavalry, the number of about 100 people was fixed for a squadron. In order to complete the numbers, the 1915 and 1914 contingents were mobilised¹⁶.

Artillery. The artillery and howitzer regiments of the mobilised divisions called the 1908-1915 included contingents. The battery was still with 4 guns and 6 caissons. Mountain artillery and air defence mobilised the same contingents.

¹⁴ The instructions given by the General Staff on 1 July regarding the mobilisation of the army stipulated that it would be done in 2 large groups: Group I, comprising units and services, which given their normal deployment would mobilise in a relatively short time, namely: Divisions 6, 7, 8, 13, 14, which had the majority of reservists in Moldova; Divisions 9, 10 and 12 Cavalry, which were in Basarabia and had reinforced effectives; Divisions 1, 2 Mountain Infantry and Border Guards, which consisted of mountain infantry battalions (which actually had larger numbers than the infantry regiments) and border guards regiments (which almost had the mobilisation strength). Group II comprised the rest of the large units, army corps and services that were part of the army, whose reservists were in the occupied territory.

¹⁵ AMR, *Great General Staff* Collection, file 131, p. 103.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, p. 104.

Pioneer troops and communications. Battalions 6, 7, 8, 13 and 14 Engineers each mobilised: a company of engineers, a section of light bridges and 2 sections of telegraphy. Battalion 9 and 10 Engineers mobilised: one engineer company, one section of light bridges and one telegraph section. For the engineers and communications troops, the contingents 1915-1912 included were mobilised.

The aeronautics had to mobilise the 1915-1914 contingents and the rural gendarmes were to mobilise the 1912-1915 contingents.

II. Services

a) Ammunition columns

Each division mobilised a single column of ammunition, consisting of 3 semi-columns, one of them artillery, the second howitzer and the third infantry. The ammunition columns of Divisions 1 and 2 Mountain Infantry were mobilised by the artillery and howitzer regiments of Divisions 8 and 7 respectively. The people needed for the ammunition columns of Divisions 9 and 10 are given by the artillery and howitzer regiments of Divisions 8 and respectively 13.

b) Divisional ambulances

For each division, an ambulance unit was mobilised with a stretcher unit. The ambulance sections of Divisions 1 and 2 Mountain Infantry were mobilised by the Company 4 Sanitary. For the divisional ambulance units, the 1912-1915 contingents included were mobilised.

c) The divisional subsistence columns were each made up of: 1 column staff; 2 subsistence sections, mobilised by the train division of the Army Corps; 1 operating group, with cattle herd, formed by the care of the subsistence companies of the army corps. To complete the subsistence columns, the Divisions 3, 4 and 5 Train mobilised the people from 1912-1915 included contingents.

d) The divisional campaign bakeries were organised as follows: 1 staff bakery; 5 sections each with 2 ovens. To complete the effective, the subsistence companies 3, 4 and 5 mobilise people from the 1915-1912 included contingent.

Sedentary parties

Each mobilised troop corps must also form a sedentary part, consisting of the company (in the infantry), the squadron (in the cavalry) and the section (in the artillery) of storage. The commander of the warehouse unit was also the commander of the sedentary part.



ROMANIAN
MILITARY
THINKING

The aeronautics had to mobilise the 1915-1914 contingents and the rural gendarmes were to mobilise the 1912-1915 contingents.

Each mobilised troop corps must also form a sedentary part, consisting of the company (in the infantry), the squadron (in the cavalry) and the section (in the artillery) of storage. The commander of the warehouse unit was also the commander of the sedentary part.



The rest of the people, left from the active parts, over the effective established above, were to be used for the guarding of the various deposits and the management of the army corps. For the organisation of the sedentary parts commands, an order was to be given later¹⁷.

Horses. Meeting the needs of horses in units and services had to be done as follows: from the horses owned by the units, being kept by the inhabitants, only 2/3 of the number of those in a village, namely the best horses, had to be brought to the army corps; the remaining 1/3 were left in the preservation of the inhabitants. For the artillery regiments in the Bacău and Roman garrison, no more than 2,000 horses were brought from Basarabia, which had been provided in the instructions given for completing the necessary horses for the units in Group I. On 2/15 November, the General Staff, considering that, in this situation, the mobilised divisions no longer needed the complete divisional services, decided the following: 1) Ammunition columns were no longer organised. The divisions would therefore have available only the ammunition on the army corps and consequently the people belonging to these formations were discharged. 2) The ambulance sections no longer used the carriages and vans. They would only have the necessary personnel for hospitalisation and 2 sanitary trucks. The number of an ambulance unit organised on this basis was: 8 officers, 97 troops, 8 animals and 4 vehicles. 3) The subsistence columns were no longer organised but instead a division of 2-5 trucks was available for each division. 4) The campaign bakery mobilised only 6 ovens. The subsistence company provided the specialised personnel (bakers) and the respective train division provided the conductors. The train division also made available to each of the campaign bakeries 50 waggons full of horses or oxen. The number of campaign bakers was: 2 officers, 149 troops, 243 animals and 64 waggons¹⁸.

Mobilised units

From the total number of 15 infantry divisions and 2 cavalry divisions available to the Romanian army in peacetime, Romania could mobilise only: 5 divisions (6, 7, 8, 13 and 14) that were deployed in peacetime in the free territory of Moldova; 2 divisions (9 and 10) which, although had their peacetime deployment in the occupied

¹⁷ *Ibid*, p. 105.

¹⁸ *Ibid*, p. 106.

territory, nevertheless had reinforced troops, at the date of the mobilisation decree; 2 divisions of mountain infantry that were established at the mobilisation; 2 cavalry divisions. That is, a total of 9 infantry divisions and 2 cavalry divisions were mobilised, making more than half of the entire army's staff. Out of these large mobilised units, 2 infantry divisions (9 and 10) and the 2 cavalry divisions were located and immobilised in Basarabia, due to the political and military situation of this Romanian territory, therefore they were not available for operations in Transilvania or in the occupied territory. Also, Division 8, which operated in Bucovina. Therefore, only 6 infantry divisions (6, 7, 13, 14, 1 Mountain Infantry and 2 Mountain Infantry) were available for western operations¹⁹.

3) The way the mobilisation was carried out. The mobilisation of the large units proceeded as follows: the mobilisation of Division 6 was made with some difficulties and was delayed due to the fact that at the decreeing of mobilisation a part of the territory of this division, namely the one corresponding to the units with headquarters in Focșani, was occupied by the German troops. The delay was also caused by the fact that, at that time, all the units of Division 6, with the planned staff, were ordered to enter the occupied territory to ensure the order and to take control of the deposits left by the enemy. Operations to complete the established mobilisation personnel continued until the beginning of December 1918, when Division 6 received an order to be transported to Transilvania²⁰.

Division 7, having all the elements for mobilisation in the free territory, was able to mobilise in good conditions. With all the bad weather, the people responded to the call, so that at the dates prescribed by the mobilisation instructions, the troops and services of this division, except for the artillery, were ready to be formed, with the full number of people, horses and vehicles. However, due to the lack of horses, the artillery could not mobilise all the determined units, so that not all the batteries could be ready by the time when the division started operations in Transilvania. The division could mobilise, in the beginning, only 2 batteries from Regiment 4 Artillery, and the rest was completed later. With regard to artillery, Division 7 encountered the same difficulty as Division 6.



The mobilisation of Division 6 was made with some difficulties and was delayed due to the fact that at the decreeing of mobilisation a part of the territory of this division, namely the one corresponding to the units with headquarters in Focșani, was occupied by the German troops.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, p. 107.

²⁰ *Ibid*, p. 108.



When the mobilisation was declared, the situation of the units of Division 8 was as follows: Regiments 13 and 25 Infantry were in the garrisons of residence; Regiments 29 and 37 Infantry were in Bucovina, on the march to Cernăuți.

At the decreeing of mobilisation, divisions 9 and 10 were located in Basarabia and occupied sectors on the Nistru River. They had reinforced troops, approximately 10,000 troops in each division, which met the actual conditions set for the 2nd mobilisation.

When the mobilisation was declared, the situation of the units of Division 8 was as follows: Regiments 13 and 25 Infantry were in the garrisons of residence; Regiments 29 and 37 Infantry were in Bucovina, on the march to Cernăuți.

Regiment 12 Artillery and 17 Howitzers, each had a battery in Bucovina, organised by the entire available staff of the regiment, and the rest remained in the garrisons of residence, due to the lack of horses and harnesses. The army corps had in the garrisons of residence the assistant of the chief of staff with small personnel, which was insufficient to prepare and complete the mobilisation works. The command of the division was in the process of moving from Burdujeni to Cernăuți, far from the mobilisation residences of the subordinate units, which had to communicate their mobilisation orders and instructions and at the same time involved in the management of the operations in Bucovina. For these reasons, the mobilisation of Division 8 was made under difficult conditions²¹.

At the decreeing of mobilisation, divisions 9 and 10 were located in Basarabia and occupied sectors on the Nistru River. They had reinforced troops, approximately 10,000 troops in each division, which met the actual conditions set for the 2nd mobilisation.

The mobilisation of Division 13 and 14 could not be effectively executed because they had the majority of the mobilisation personnel in the contingents in the reserve element, so that the completion of the personnel became impossible only from the complementary contingents determined to be called. In addition to the insufficient number of troops, the following obstacles were added to mobilise these divisions: Division 13 had in the occupied territory 1/2 of the infantry regiments (Regiment 47/72 and Regiment 48/49) and the artillery regiments (23 Artillery and 28/3 Howitzers); the units of Division 14 had to organise and satisfy all the guard services of the penitentiaries throughout the territory of the Army Corps 4. Regarding the military and political situation, created by the conclusion of the general armistice, in day 4 of mobilisation, the General Staff decided that the regiments of these divisions that were to meet on the 8th day of mobilisation, remain in place in their garrisons and continue mobilisation. In fact, however, these divisions not taking part in the operations were no longer mobilised²².

²¹ *Ibid*, p. 109.

²² *Ibid*, p. 110.

Division 1 and 2 Mountain Infantry

These divisions were created at mobilisation, by transforming the Mountain Infantry battalions which entered in the organic composition of the infantry divisions at peace into regiments and grouping these regiments into the divisions of mountain infantry as follows: Division 1 Mountain Infantry consists of Regiment 1, 5, 4 and 6 Mountain Infantry, coming from the transformation of the battalions of mountain infantry with the same number, which belonged to Divisions 1, 2, 7 and 4 respectively; Division 2 Mountain Infantry consists of Regiments 2, 3, 9 and 10 Mountain Infantry, which came from the transformation of the battalions of mountain infantry with the same number, which belonged to Divisions 3, 5, 9 and 10 respectively. The completion of the mobilisation forces planned for the regiments of the mountain infantry divisions is made from the resources and with the help of the infantry divisions to which the respective battalions of mountain infantry had belonged organically. This procedure was determined, on the one hand, by the situation of the territory of the country largely occupied by the enemy troops, and on the other hand by the rush with which the mobilisation was to be carried out. The artillery of the hunting divisions was formed by putting together elements from the existing infantry divisions, namely: The Division 1 Mountain Infantry, which was the first to enter Transilvania, had only 1 battery from Regiment 11 Artillery.; and during the operations in Transilvania it was assigned a battery from Regiment 12 Artillery, Regiment 17 Howitzers and Regiment 1 Mountain Artillery; Division 2 Mountain Infantry, which later entered Transylvania, initially had 1 battery from Regiment 4 Artillery, Regiment 24 Artillery, Regiment 8 Howitzers and Regiment 2 Mountain Artillery²³.

At the mobilisation, the Divisions 1 and 2 Cavalry were located in Basarabia and had reinforced troops, approximately 3,000 troops for each division. The completion of the number of people was difficult because some of the demobilised people were in the occupied territory, especially those of the Division 2 Cavalry. But the greatest difficulties came from the lack of horses and their state of weakness, which made them largely unusable.



At the mobilisation, the Divisions 1 and 2 Cavalry were located in Basarabia and had reinforced troops, approximately 3,000 troops for each division.

²³ *Ibid*, p. 111.



4) Difficulties and weaknesses encountered

The duration of the mobilisation far exceeded the time prescribed by the mobilisation instructions, both because of the weather, since winter had already begun, the transport difficulties, but mainly because of the lack of materials. In particular, they lacked the equipment, the means for subsistence as well as the horses necessary for artillery and cavalry. The lack of horses was so great that the divisions could not meet their needs regarding horses, at the beginning of the mobilisation, except for only one or at most 2 batteries of each artillery or howitzer regiment. Regarding the transports, at the decreeing of mobilisation the railways were able to execute all the transports, also maintaining civil trains in circulation. As soon as the occupied territory became free, the transport crisis began to feel more and more accentuated, on the one hand, due to the lack of locomotives and materials, the lack of fuel, and on the other hand due to the damages done by the enemy in the occupied territory²⁴.

Despite all these material difficulties, the morale of the population both in the free territory and in the occupied territory, which now was freed, after almost 2 years of terror, changed for the better; the population responded immediately to the second call²⁵.

The 2nd mobilisation of the Romanian Army, as a whole, cannot be considered as a mobilisation itself because of the political and military situation. It was made only partially, both in the number of large units and as strength. Indeed, if by the time the 2nd mobilisation was decreed, both the military and the political situation required the re-entry of Romania into the war and therefore the mobilisation of all its forces, then after the conclusion of the general armistice, a general mobilisation itself was no longer justified and that is why the Romanian General Headquarters only proceeded to a reorganisation of the large units and to operations to increase and complete the number of personnel, in relation to the more or less threatening situation of the neighbours. This increase in personnel was required by imperative operational needs, namely: 1) Guaranteeing the Nistru border, against any action by Russian Bolshevik troops or bands. This was all the more important now after the end of the general armistice, when the Austro-German occupation troops in Ukraine withdrew into their homeland;

²⁴ *Ibid*, p. 112.

²⁵ *Ibid*, p. 113.

2) Occupying and enforcing order in Dobrogea where Bulgarian gangs terrorised the Romanian authorities and population; 3) Protecting the Romanian population in Transylvania against the crimes and robberies of the Hungarian regular and irregular armies as well as stopping the Hungarian provocations. In these conditions, the 2nd mobilisation – its preparation and declaration – can be considered as a mobilisation only in the initial phase, and the phase that follows after the conclusion of the general armistice should only be considered as an operation to increase the number of personnel²⁶.

This increase in personnel continued as long as the operational needs of Transylvania and Hungary required it until the achievement of our national and territorial aspirations.



BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. ***, Romanian Military Archives/Arhivele Militare Române (AMR), *Great General Staff* Collection.
2. Daniel Silviu Niculae, 1918. *Reintrarea României în Război*, Editura Mii de cărți, Bragadiru, 2018.

²⁶ For more details, see Daniel Silviu Niculae, 1918. *Reintrarea României în Război*, Editura Mii de cărți, Bragadiru, 2018.