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OF THE GREAT GENERAL STAFF



"Art. I – The official journal named "România Militară" is founded at the Great General Staff, starting 1 January 1898, in which all officers within the Armed Forces will find military studies, which interest their training.

Through the agency of this journal, all officers, belonging to all branches, who are in active duty, will be able to publish their personal papers and the ones that interest the Armed Forces".

Carol – King of Romania
Issued in București on 8 December 1897



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A LEGACY SINCE 1864

The Romanian Armed Forces road to modernity started in 1859, once the United Principalities General Staff Corps, currently the Defence Staff, was established.

Soon after it, in 1864, a group of nine captains, graduates of the first series of the Officer Cadet School in Bucharest, took the initiative to develop a "military science, art and history journal" named "România Militară/Military Romania".

The initiators of the publication – **G. Slăniceanu** (Captain, Chief of the Engineer Battalion), **A. Gramont** (Staff Captain), **G. Borănescu** (Engineer Captain), **G. Angheliescu** (Staff Captain), **A. Angheliescu** (Artillery Captain), **E. Arion** (Artillery Captain), **E. Boteanu** (Staff Captain), **E. Pencovici** (Staff Captain) and **C. Barozzi** (Engineer Captain) –, educated not only in Romania but also abroad, were inspired by the necessity to develop a substantial theoretical activity in the Romanian Army too.

The journal manifesto¹, included in the first issue, which appeared on 15 February 1864, contained innovative ideas and approaches that were meant to:

“- contribute to the organisation of our military system the Legislative Chamber is about to decide upon soon;

- assemble and examine the Country old military institutions that had made for the glory of Romania for several centuries and ensured our existence;

- explore, in the absence of any military study, all the aspects related to the Army training, the most solid basis of the armed forces;

- get the Romanian Troops well-informed about the military events in the world;

- join efforts to work concertedly and whole-heartedly to develop and strengthen the edifice that is meant to ensure the future of our country”².

“România Militară” was an independent publication, under the aegis of the War Ministry, and it ceased to appear in 1866 as there were no sufficient funds and subscribers. The publication was resumed in 1891, about a quarter of a century later, also as the result of the initiative of a group of officers in the Great General Staff who intended to “reproduce the serious studies on the organisation, strategy and art of commanding troops under any circumstances”³. Shortly after it, by the Royal Decree no. 3663 issued on 8 December 1897, “România Militară” became the “Great General Staff official publication”.



¹ Din trecutul României Militare cu prilejul aniversării a 75 de ani de la apariția ei în viața armatei. 1864-1939, București, 1939, p. 31.

² Ibidem, p. 32.

³ România Militară, no. 1, 1981, p. 6.

English version by Diana Cristiana LUPU.



C. Barozzi
(Engineer Captain)



E. Pencovici
(Staff Captain)



E. Boteanu
(Staff Captain)



G. Borănescu
(Engineer Captain)



G. Angheliescu
(Staff Captain)



G. Slăniceanu
(Captain, Chief
of the Engineer
Battalion)



E. Arion
(Artillery Captain)



A. Angheliescu
(Artillery Captain)



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THE ROMANIAN ARMED FORCES – KEY ACTOR IN THE CENTURY OF MOST IMPORTANT NATIONAL TRANSFORMATIONS –

Lieutenant General Dr Adrian TONEA

Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff



English version by Diana Cristiana LUPU.

No. 1-2/2018

6

2018 is an emotionally charged year for all Romanians, irrespective of living in the country or abroad, irrespective of the historical region they belong to, and irrespective of their religious convictions. The fact that today we can talk about a present and future of Romania is the direct consequence of traditions and reputations built over time, and especially in the past century, with the contribution of all relevant actors: the people representing the Romanian society as a whole, alongside all national or private institutions, regardless of their field of competence.

The Romanian Armed Forces have been one of the most dynamic and active actors in the Romanian nation development process. The lessons learned during the course of a century represent the foundation on which the present is based and the future of one of the elite institutions of our country – the Romanian Armed Forces – is built.

Even though the physical time will not be different from other years, in psychological terms, an anniversary like this has the role of coalescing people and energies to mark an important stage in the evolution of the Romanians, as a people, as well as of Romania as a national and independent state.

The end of the 19th century, the entire 20th century, and the first two decades of the 21st century represent, for our national history, a period during which Romania has accomplished a series of historic desiderata: full independence, nation-state unity, the status of a free and democratic nation, the integration in the greatest economic, political and social union – the European Union, as well as the membership of the most important political-military alliance – NATO. During the same period, the Romanian society has emancipated, the institutions proper to a modern state have been established and consolidated, and the armed forces have become one of the most credible and reliable institutions of the Romanian state.

In the mentioned historical interval, the modern, independent and reunited within its basic borders Romania has been achieved, in stages, through sustained efforts and numerous sacrifices. All areas of society – economic, social, political, cultural and military have undergone essential and overall transformations, logically subsumed under those in Europe and worldwide, resulting in Romania being included in the international relations of the time.

Naturally, as the state has been strengthened and the Romanian political-strategic goals have been outlined – the achievement of independence, the accomplishment of national unity, and the consolidation of democracy –, the Romanian armed forces, one of the oldest organisations and holders of valuable traditions in our history, have

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EDITORIAL

adapted to meet the realities of the time, demonstrating that they are a representative institution of the Romanian people, permanently serving the nation.

The unification of the Romanian Principalities, Moldova and Wallachia, in 1859, and the achievement of Romania's independence, in 1877, brought to the forefront of the Romanian society the desiderata of liberating the national territories from the domination of the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires, and of reuniting those territories with Romania to form a national, unique and independent state. The actions conducted by the Romanian state governing bodies in order to meet the national goals could not have been possible without the Romanian Armed Forces support. Only by relying on this instrument of power was the political class able to address and sustain the national interests with dignity in the international contexts proper to the bloodiest century in the history of humanity, a century dominated, during its early years, by the intensification of the contradictions between the great powers, which resulted in the two world wars in which Romania could not remain neutral.

By virtue of the reality and in accordance with Romania's national interests, the Romanian armed forces were those that put the political decisions into practice, sacrificing for the survival, sustainment and consolidation of the Romanian state, even though the national military policy had and continues to have a profoundly defensive character.

The war for liberation and national reunification between 1916 and 1919 marked maybe the most important stage in the definition of the Romanian armed forces as an institution of national importance. The Great Unification in 1918, based on the sacrifice of almost one million national heroes and acknowledged by the international treaties signed in 1919-1920, mainly resulted in Romania becoming one of the unitary and independent states in Europe.

*T*hroughout history, objective causes – generated especially by the social-economic development of the country in certain moments –, as well as subjective ones, predominantly related to the international context and the treaties to which Romania was party, prevented the Romanian armed forces from fully becoming what they desired and could be. Nevertheless, starting from the lessons learned during the War of Independence in 1877-1878, continuing with the ones learned from the two world conflagrations and, more recently, participating alongside the partners in NATO in the complex process meant to provide security at the Alliance level, the Romanian Armed Forces have always been a point of balance, the heart of the Romanian nation itself. Constructively adopting the innovative ideas of military thinking at European and global level specific to each period, the Romanian Armed Forces have become, in time, in the perception of public opinion, the promoter of values such as integrity, devotion, rigour, responsibility or excellence.

A dynamic body, permanently undergoing transformation and adapting, the military system has made impressive qualitative leaps in each stage of its existence,

in terms of not only doctrinal conception evolution but also organisation and functioning. As servicemen we are aware that the security environment has always been unpredictable, and the modernisation of our military capabilities is a proof of adaptation. Nevertheless, we also have the responsibility to anticipate.

*C*urrently, we can state that a well-articulated military system, based on the principles of the North Atlantic Alliance functioning, namely collective defence, cooperative security and crisis management, is in place and in the process of streamlining. Within this system, new and modern elements, in full accordance with the trends in the development of universal military art, are integrated and adapted to the traditional elements, accumulated and tested in practice during the battles conducted by the Romanians for their liberty and unity.

Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina are the most relevant examples for the way in which the troops belonging to the Romanian armed forces make considerable efforts to support and actively participate in the reassurance and deterrence measures taken at NATO level. The troops belonging to all three services – land, air and naval –, logistically supported and coordinated by the Defence Staff jointly cooperate, at national and international level, to accomplish the assigned missions. Thus, the Romanian armed forces demonstrate that they have adapted to the new international context, contributing to strengthening the role played by Romania as a credible security provider, through participating in missions under the aegis of NATO and the EU.

All the mentioned achievements would not be possible without the total involvement of each and every serviceman, and without a coherent strategy meant to tailor the Romanian armed forces to meet the current requirements in all aspects: technical, organisational and doctrinal.

*T*o conclude, I would emphasise the fact that, throughout time, the awareness of the important role played by the armed forces, the military system as a whole, to defend the national territory integrity and to achieve the Romanians national unity has made possible a constant consensus among the Romanian society economic, social and political forces with regard to the necessity to consolidate the Romanian state military power.

The anniversary of the Great Unification centenary should be a moment of reflection for all those directly or indirectly involved in the military system development process. An anniversary does not represent a significant change in the history of a nation, but it should mark the 100-year evolution since a turning point in history as it was the year 1918.

It should be emphasised that transition entails commitment, passion, renunciation and sacrifices as well as understanding. Trust and respect, whether individual, collective, institutional or national, are achieved only through sustained efforts, sacrifices, as well as vision and correctly oriented strategies.

NON-LINEAR WARFARE VS. HYBRID WARFARE

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This article aims to bring the concept of "hybrid warfare" into focus by interpreting some of its defining elements from the perspective of the Russian armed forces. The fact that this term is used differently in Russia than it is used in the West should bring about insightful debates. We can understand our opponent by analysing them through their concepts and not through certain terms that sound all-encompassing and intriguing for us. More importantly, this kind of warfare is given certain meanings that have nothing to do with Russian military thinking on this subject. The "little green man", besides winning in a first conflict, the purely military one, in the Crimea, is about to win the ideological one, because most military actions today have a "hybrid" feature. The defining elements of the Russian concept are interpreted and exemplified so that the well-informed reader should understand the difference and the essence of the concept.

Keywords: hybrid warfare, asymmetric warfare, deep operations, reflexive control, active measures.

Opening Considerations

Many military analysts use the term "hybrid warfare" to characterise what happened in Ukraine in 2014. The concept was coined by Frank Hoffman, a former US officer with a long career in the Navy and researcher at the Center for Strategic Research at the National Defense University in Washington, DC, as a "range of different modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder"¹. Moreover, Hoffman determined that hybrid warfare "can be conducted by both states and a variety of non-state actors"².

The concept has quickly found a level of acceptance within NATO, becoming the subject of numerous articles, studies and conferences. Specialised publications in Russia³ present the concept as being of a Western nature, with no connection to Russian military theory and practice⁴, and consider it only a new way of expressing a military action, in keeping with the current circumstances. The articles on this topic show that many of the hybrid warfare analyses do not attain the desired essence and consistency⁵ and that this concept fails to capture the specific, political and information manipulation employed by Russia in support of its objectives.

There is a need for a concept that is better tailored to the range of actions behind this type of war when describing Russia's military capabilities, perhaps one present in Russian military thinking

Hybrid warfare – "range of different modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder".

Hybrid warfare - "can be conducted by both states and a variety of non-state actors".

¹ Frank G. Hoffman, *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies Arlington, 2007, pp. 7-8.

² *Ibid.*

³ Damien Van Puyvelde, *Hybrid War – Does It Even Exist?*, in *NATO Review* (2015), retrieved on 26.10.2017, <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2015/Also-in-2015/hybrid-modern-future-warfare-russia-ukraine/EN/>.

⁴ Andrew Korybko, *Hybrid Wars: The Indirect Adaptive Approach to Regime Change*, Project of the Institute for Strategic Studies and Predictions, People's Friendship University of Russia, Moscow, 2015, pp. 9-10.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 68-69.



In Russian specialised literature, the hybrid war is considered to be an "indirect war", Russia being the one that has to face the hybrid war triggered by the Western powers.

The key word that describes the hybrid war as perceived by the Western world is "variety" (of means), while the key word to describe the non-linear war paradigm from the Russian point of view is "penetration/breakthrough".

and not one expressing a purely Western vision. It is believed that General Valery Gerasimov conceived some elements of this type of war⁶ in 2013. The debates between those who considered the vision of the Chief of the Russian General Staff as a general, descriptive vision of the operational environment or as an intelligent means of communication of a doctrinal concept resulted in articles in some of the most diverse publications, the concept of "hybrid warfare" gaining all-encompassing new meanings. The term used by the Russians is "non-linear warfare" and is in fact an attempt to catch up with the realities of the modern war the USA, for example, has faced for more than a decade in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere⁷. On the other hand, in the Russian specialised literature, the hybrid war is considered to be an "indirect war", Russia being the one that has to face the hybrid war triggered by the Western powers. By comparing the views expressed in various specialised journals in the West, where there is a true "invasion" of articles on hybrid war, with Russian military leaders' statements on how to conduct a future war, we conclude that the way Russia and the West understand the concept is different. The key word that describes the hybrid war as perceived by the Western world is "variety" (of means), while the key word to describe the non-linear war paradigm from the Russian point of view is "penetration/breakthrough".

What can help is the understanding of the fact that certain elements that are considered new are based on old concepts, updated for the 21st century. Specifically, the key elements of General Gerasimov's doctrine are derived from the concepts of deep operations, active measures and the theory of reflexive control, concepts developed during the Cold War and improved, updated for the 21st century.

Deep Operations

Georgii Isserson, one of the supporters of deep operations theory, considered an outstanding contributor to military art, along with other prominent military thinkers of the Soviet era, such as Mikhail Tukhachevsky

⁶ Chief of the Russian Armed Forces General Staff and first Deputy Defence Minister, appointed by President Vladimir Putin in 2012.

⁷ M. Kofman, M. Rojanski, *A Closer Look at Russia Hybrid War*, Kennan Cable, Wilson Center. no. 7, 2015.

and Vladimir Triandafilov, inspired General Gerasimov and, through their theories, made the doctrine developed by him very consistent. Deep operations were based on the idea that the most effective way to defeat an enemy was to launch simultaneous blows throughout the entire depth of their operational defence⁸.

Unlike Western military thinking, the theory of deep operations does not focus on identifying a single centre of gravity and then directing the entire effort on destroying it. Deep operations, in the Russian understanding of the term, involve attacking a variety of targets whose neutralisation or destruction can ensure success in the operation⁹. The breakthrough enables the mobile forces to penetrate deep into the enemy defence tactical or operational disposition, thus succeeding in annihilating disposition elements and encircling forces, resulting in their collapse or prolongation of isolation, while mobile forces could advance towards achieving certain strategic objectives¹⁰. Over time, this form of manoeuvre has become an important doctrine that underpinned the way in which the Russian armed forces have been organised.

As part of the ongoing military modernisation process, Russia attaches great importance to the development of its aeronautical and airborne forces. This provides Russia with quick deployment capabilities that can intimidate the countries near its borders, and in the event of a conventional conflict, it can exploit the success of land forces by attacking the depth of the enemy territory¹¹. The 2014 edition of the *Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation* requires more effective coordination of state resources to adapt the armed forces to the new concepts of action. In a paragraph describing the operational environment, it is stated that "... the integrated employment of military force and political, economic, information and other non-military measures" and "... exerting simultaneous pressure on

⁸ Charles Pickar, *Tactical Deep Battle: The Missing Link*, Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1991, pp. 4-12.

⁹ Department of the Army, *FM 100-2-1, The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics*, Washington, 1984, pp. 2-1 – 2-12. Not once is the term "centre of gravity" mentioned when referring to Soviet operational and tactical doctrine.

¹⁰ Charles Pickar, *op. cit.*, pp. 10, 37.

¹¹ Can Kasapoglu, *Russia's Renewed Military Thinking: Non-Linear Warfare and Reflexive Control*, Research Paper no. 121, NATO Defence College, Rome, 2015, pp. 8-9.



Deep operations, in the Russian understanding of the term, involve attacking a variety of targets whose neutralisation or destruction can ensure success in the operation.

As part of the ongoing military modernisation process, Russia attaches great importance to the development of its aeronautical and airborne forces.



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the enemy throughout the enemy's territory in the global information space, airspace, and outer space, on land and sea" are features of the modern war¹². The *Russian National Security Strategy* addresses the ways to achieve a unitary approach by the government, to both discouragement and national security, and social mobilisation¹³. The emphasis on deep operations in Russia's military reform process and the integration of the government in this process can also have an offensive effect. Russia's recent military actions show that it is ready to strike an opponent in many ways, simultaneously, using the diplomatic, information, military and economic national power tools, following the theory of deep operations. Moreover, the new concept of waging military actions seeks to place less emphasis on the involvement of the armed forces in the first phase, their role being only to complete an action taken by other means.

As an example of how this concept was implemented, in the initial phase of the 2008 Russian-Georgian war, Russia launched a series of coordinated actions aimed at paralysing Georgia and forcing it to abandon its policy of moving closer to NATO. By diplomatic means, Russia tried to compromise Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili, encouraged protests against the government, established direct contacts with unrecognised governments in Ossetia and Abkhazia and lifted the sanctions that banned arms exports to these regions¹⁴. At the same time, in the information environment, Russia spread allegations of Georgian "atrocities" in South Ossetia and let everybody know that their troops present in the area were in a peacekeeping mission¹⁵. At the economic level, Russia imposed sanctions on Georgia on energy, trade and finance as a form of retaliation for its closeness to NATO¹⁶. Shortly before the hostilities began, Russia organised a

¹² Russian Federation, *Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation*, Government of the Russian Federation, Moscow, 2014, paragraphs 15, 43-44, 48-51, and 52-53.

¹³ Olga Oliker, *Unpacking Russia's New National Security Strategy*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 7 January 2016, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/unpacking-russias-new-national-security-strategy>, retrieved on 23.10.2016.

¹⁴ Ariel Cohen, Robert Hamilton, *The Russian Military and the Georgia War: Lessons and Implications*, ERAP Monograph, Strategic Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2011, p. 15.

¹⁵ *Ibid*, pp. 15-16.

¹⁶ Randall Newnham, *Georgia on my Mind? Russian Sanctions and the End of the 'Rose Revolution'*, in *Journal of Eurasian Studies* (6/2015).

military exercise of high proportions to intimidate Georgia, as well as to prepare the armed forces for invasion¹⁷.

The operation led by Russia in Georgia had elements of the new concept of deep operations, such as: striking military objectives of operative and strategic importance, undermining President Saakashvili's authority, disrupting Georgia's connections with South Ossetia and Abkhazia, affecting the reputation of the state at the international level, reducing economic activity etc. By striking these targets across Georgia's entire strategic depth, Russia managed to weaken the state to the point where, when the conventional Russian forces entered the country, Georgia's political will collapsed just as it was expected according to deep operations theory. The means used by the Russian Federation seem to be conventional in a certain way; in the Russian-Georgian conflict in 2008, cyber warfare and irregular forces were used extensively¹⁸. The use of such forces and some "tricks" did not represent anything new to Russia, these means originating in another concept inherited from the Soviet Union period, called "active measures".

Active Measures

The concept of "active measures" describes many of the non-military and asymmetric methods referred to when the term "hybrid warfare" is brought up. From the Russian perspective, active measures are undercover and deception operations in support of Russian foreign policy. They are different from intelligence or counter-intelligence activities and traditional diplomatic and information activities. The purpose of active measures is to influence the public opinion or the actions of individuals, governments or a target group. The definitions given by the Western world to active measures show that they are a form of political warfare led by intelligence and security agencies to influence the course of world events. Active measures range from media manipulation to special actions that involve different levels of violence and can include misinformation, propaganda, falsification of

¹⁷ Ariel Cohen, Robert Hamilton, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-18, 23-27.

¹⁸ *Ibid*, pp. 26-28, 44-49.



From the Russian perspective, active measures are undercover and deception operations in support of Russian foreign policy.

The purpose of active measures is to influence the public opinion or the actions of individuals, governments or a target group.

official documents, assassination, and political influence¹⁹. Although the concept has been developed to support the spread of communism through unconventional means, it is currently used by Russia to promote its interests. The fact that the Russian Federation denies the use of irregular forces, cyber warfare, diaspora, manipulation of political parties and “*think tanks*” through the media are all contemporary manifestations of an old Soviet concept. Although the collapse of the Soviet Union meant that the use of such tactics was suspended, the habits left behind continued to survive in the Russian security services and they were internally and externally exploited by President Vladimir Putin²⁰.

Active measures are now used in Russia to defend Putin’s regime, and internationally as a means of pursuing military, political and economic interests. There is significant evidence that Russia has used active measures in Ukraine, particularly in the eastern region. Russian personnel specialised in influence actions travelled to Ukraine to exacerbate ethnic Russians’ discontent and to undermine law and order, which led to Ukraine being provoked to respond, which was in fact the aim of the initiator²¹. That response was then used to trigger the actions of irregular forces consisting of the Pan-Slavic Russians, the so-called “*patriots*”, pro-Russian local parties, Cossacks and adventurers/mercenaries, all of them armed and supplied by Russian security agencies, and forces for special operations²². All this time, Russia denied any involvement, but supported these groups with weapons and other logistics equipment, as well as by conducting direct conventional military actions²³.

¹⁹ United States Department of Defense, *Terms and Definitions of Interest for Counterintelligence Professionals*, Public Intelligence (9.06.2014), pp. 4-5.

²⁰ Andrew Wilson, *Russian Active Measures: Modernized Tradition*, in *The Institute for Statecraft*, 3.01.2016, retrieved on 26.10.2017, <http://www.statecraft.org.uk/research/russian-active-measures-modernised-tradition>

²¹ Andrew Roth, *From Russia, ‘Tourists’ Stir the Protests*, in *The New York Times*, 3.03.2014, retrieved on 26.10.2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/04/world/europe/russias-hand-can-be-seen-in-the-protests.html>

²² Andrew Higgins, *Armed Men Seize Police Station in Eastern Ukraine City*, in *The New York Times*, 12.04.2014, retrieved on 26.10.2017, <http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/13/world/europe/ukraine.html>;

²³ Galeotti, *‘Hybrid War’ and ‘Little Green Men’: How Does It Works and How It Doesn’t*, retrieved on 26.10.2017, <http://www.e-ir.info/2015/04/16/hybrid-war-and-little-green-men-how-it-works-and-how-it-doesnt/>

Thus, the situation in Eastern Ukraine had all the features of active measures: the internal political manipulation of a sovereign state, the use of violence through proxy forces, information manipulation, all being coordinates meant to ensure the achievement of political objectives, namely the separation of a major region of the state. In addition to the use of violence, active measures consisted of media manipulation, disinformation and propaganda. Unlike Russia’s actions in Crimea, the situation in Eastern Ukraine did not lead to a quick victory. Moreover, the conflict is sunk into a stalemate and has led to the imposition of economic sanctions, a NATO analysis of response options for possible similar actions by Russia in the vicinity of its borders, and the increase in military assistance to Ukraine and Eastern European countries²⁴. However, by controlling the insurgency, Russia maintains the conflict frozen and can wait for the right moment to resume the initiative.

Reflexive Control

Reflexive control is a behavioural theory that links certain information elements and is defined as “... *a means of conveying to a partner or an opponent specially prepared information to incline him to voluntarily make the predetermined decision desired by the initiator of the action*”²⁵. Reflexive control is a well-designed military theory that emerged in the 1960s, evolving into an interdisciplinary concept²⁶.

The term “*reflexive*” within this theory refers to a behavioural pattern built to understand the decision-making process of a particular target. If an actor understands the behavioural pattern of their target, the said actor can manipulate the plans, conceptions, and way the fight is carried by that target²⁷. The objectives of reflexive control in the behavioural theory have emphasised the obtaining of a certain decision or attitude connected with truth, morality or reason²⁸.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ Timothy L. Thomas, *Russia’s Reflexive Control Theory and the Military*, in *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, 17: 237–256, 2004, p. 237.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 237, 238-243.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 241-243.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 250. This is a major difference between reflexive control and the Western perception regarding the concept of perception management, given that perception management takes into account trust and ethics.

Reflexive control
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Russia's use of reflexive control during the annexation of Crimea undermined Western politicians' ability to confront Russia on its actions, as a result of the Russian analysts' exploitation of the understanding of the decision-making process in the West.

Russia's use of the reflexive control can be noticed in the information operations of 2014, with the annexation of the Crimea. Russia's primary information purpose seemed to be to create a profound state of confusion and doubt at the international level, even to the level of convincing the foreign audience that all news and reports in the region were suspicious²⁹. This reduced any possible response from both NATO and the US, as information "pollution" weakened public opinion, a key element that would have helped Western politicians to decide the move towards firm actions. Although there was clear evidence that the "green men" from Crimea were Russian soldiers, the ethics of Western journalists compelled them, however, to take into account the statements issued by Russian officials in which such information was denied, to watch newspapers and news broadcast stations controlled by them; the situation strengthened the "legitimacy" of the fake news of some so-called rebellious locals in the Crimea, and created enough uncertainty to weaken the determination of Western politicians. If we also add the "cyber soldiers army" that translated fake comments, we can understand what Russia wanted to convey and that it fully succeeded in that³⁰. While the public in Western democracies struggled to understand the confused and contradictory messages deliberately transmitted from the Crimean region, Russia meticulously influenced the decision-makers in Ukraine. As the tensions increased, the Russian Federation armed forces rapidly organised an exercise at the border with Ukraine, distracting Ukraine's attention from the Crimean issue to a threat to the very existence of the state that induced long-standing fears within the Ukrainian nation³¹. At the same time, Russia used the deep media attack (especially television) in the Russian-Ukrainian ethnic communities to fuel the support for the Crimean annexation

²⁹ Keir Giles, *Russia's 'New' Tools for Confronting the West: Continuity and Innovation in Moscow's Exercise of Power*, Research Paper, The Royal Institute of International Affairs Chatham House, London, 2016, retrieved on 26.10.2017, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/russias-new-tools-confronting-west>

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ Adrian Croft, *NATO Says Russia Has Big Force at Ukraine's Border, Worries over Transdnistria*, Reuters, 23 March 2014, retrieved on 26.10.2017, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-nato/nato-says-russia-has-big-force-at-ukraines-border-worries-over-transdnistria-idUSBREA2M0EG20140323>;

referendum³². These combinations of information pressure paralysed the Kiev government, preventing an effective and firm response to the problem of occupying Crimean facilities³³.

Far from being a perception management exercise, Russia's use of reflexive control during the annexation of Crimea undermined Western politicians' ability to confront Russia on its actions, as a result of the Russian analysts' exploitation of the understanding of the decision-making process in the West. Meanwhile, in Crimea, Russia created the conditions for an illegal referendum that provided a legal basis for the annexation of the region, directed certain messages towards the Russian-Ukrainian ethnicities, and increased the fear of the Ukrainians over a possible invasion. The final result consisted of the decisions (or non-decisions) that supported Russia's objectives.

Conclusions

Russia's actions, both in Georgia and in Ukraine, can be understood in terms of certain concepts that originate in the Soviet period, namely: deep operations, active measures and reflexive control. While deep operations provide Russian decision-makers with a framework to integrate diplomatic, information, military and economic power tools in an offensive form, active measures provide them with ambiguous and negative means to pursue their goals. At the same time, reflexive control theory uses a wide range of options of information operations and explains how a particular goal must be put into practice for the mission to be fulfilled. Knowing how your opponent acts is essential in a conflict. Military leaders should analyse more carefully the fact that the Russian armed forces do not focus on only one centre of gravity of the opponent. They set more military targets (centres of gravity) in the enemy's depth, which become priority targets and which, when destroyed, ultimately make the whole operation successful, contrary to the Western belief of setting a single centre of gravity for their own troops. In order to understand Russia's current course

³² Bret Perry, *Non-Linear Warfare in Ukraine: The Critical Role of Information Operations and Special Operations*, in *Small Wars Journal* (14.10.2015), retrieved on 26.10.2017, <http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/non-linear-warfare-in-ukraine-the-critical-role-of-information-operations-and-special-opera>.

³³ Galeotti, *loc.cit.*



Military leaders should analyse more carefully the fact that the Russian armed forces do not focus on only one centre of gravity of the opponent.

As Russia continues to pursue its goals on the international stage, it is possible to bring with it the development of the concepts used during the Cold War to promote its interests.



of action, it is necessary to thoroughly study the concepts presented in the article, thus making it easier to understand the concept of an action, the intention and their purpose. Furthermore, an orientation of education and training also towards certain aspects of recognising and counteracting the effects of such an approach by a potential opponent can provide a certain advantage on the battlefield.

As Russia continues to pursue its goals on the international stage, it is possible to bring with it the development of the concepts used during the *Cold War* to promote its interests. Many of these concepts have a long history, but they are well suited to this century, and they can provide Russia with the forms and methods needed to overcome its opponents and put itself in advantageous positions. After years of operations guided towards internal counterinsurgency, Russia's re-emergence as a global opponent is not welcomed by the armed forces in the West, which have been provoked repeatedly and have understood that the Russian military have made remarkable progress both in terms of organising their armed forces and in terms of the way of leading military actions, which was unquestionably proved by their intervention in Syria. It would be regrettable for the West not to understand the implications of Russia's return as a global actor.

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CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARCHITECTURAL MODEL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, COMPUTERS, INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE AND RECONNAISSANCE/ C4ISR CAPABILITIES IN THE ROMANIAN ARMED FORCES

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The authors present the architectural approach to C4ISR capabilities development, showing that it is beneficial not only for decision-making process but also for implementation management. In essence, the development model based on architectures ensures the capabilities development coherence, facilitates integrated and correlated planning, enables iterative developments – evolution and not revolution, supports the correspondence between the capabilities implementation in the medium and long term and the short-term projects, reinforces the correlation between planning and available financial resources, and ensures coherence in joint operations requirements planning and interoperability with allied systems, being thus also beneficial for users.

Keywords: communications and information systems, C4ISR architectures, capabilities, management, enterprise architecture artefacts.

Motto:

“An architecture is ‹the structure of components, their relationships, and the principles and guidelines governing their design and evolution over time›”.

C4ISR Architecture Framework Version 2.0,
United States Department of Defence¹

Introduction

The regional and global security environment is currently marked by instability, aspect that can be exemplified by the nature and type of potentially disruptive factors. In this context, the need to prepare a proper response to maintain balance in the military field, in the information age, a response based on awareness and deterrence, is increasingly pregnant. One of the prerequisites for achieving such a strategic advantage, in not only allied but also national context, is the development of adequate command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. As part of these capabilities, the development of an integrated communications and information/CIS system that is robust, secured, standardised, interoperable at the level of the similar allied and coalition federation of systems², having a strong military integration characteristic, able to ensure interagency cooperation and leadership at national level is more than just a desideratum, namely an ongoing project that is essential for the security dimension and the country's defence capability. The armed forces communications and information system is defined through the personnel that operate it, the set of norms and procedures that allow for its achievement and functioning, as well as the equipment that is necessary for planning, organising and providing the necessary support for command and control, as a component of C4ISR³ capabilities.

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¹ *The C4ISR Architecture Framework: History, Status, and Plans for Evolution*, P. Kathie Sowell, The MITRE Corporation McLean, Virginia, www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=AD1014841, retrieved on 15.04.2018.

² In compliance with NATO *Federated Mission Networking* concept.

³ *Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.*

Modern weapon systems benefit from C4ISR elements that allow the integration and transmission of the information received from sensors through own communications and information system to support command and control. *Figure 1* graphically and generically presents the relation between the C4ISR (C2, CIS, ISR) functional components and the weapon system.



Figure 1: Relation between C4ISR functional components and weapon systems

The pieces of information received from the weapon system sensors are integrated at the C4ISR system command point, providing a common operational picture that can be disseminated to both the upper echelon and the users who have contributed to the generation of this picture.

To develop and implement these capabilities, a specific architectural framework is needed to establish requirements based on operational needs, to provide guidance and guarantees of interoperability and continuity in procurement policies, based on multiannual programming and budgeting. It is also necessary to integrate existing capabilities while implementing new technologies in the field of communications, information technology and cyber defence as well as in the one of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance in support of command and control, in peace, crisis and at war.

Courses of Action for the Development of C4ISR Capabilities

In the process of architecture development, the multidisciplinary approach in defining a capability is considered in all the aspects conceptually acknowledged in the North Atlantic Alliance, having the

acronym *DOTMLPFI*⁴ in the US Armed Forces. The following lines of effort are taken into account when a C4ISR capability development process is initiated:

- **Doctrine:** the concept of use in the operational environment, for example emphasising deployability and mobility or, on the contrary, the use of early warning capabilities in static environment, emphasising connectivity and information transfer requirements between the component used in the static planning environment and the execution one.
- **Organisation:** the way the system is organised, the operational nodes and the information flows for a combatant operational entity; the strategic component, at joint operational level, at tactical level, for divisions, brigades, battalions/similar in the air, naval, special operations, cyber defence, logistic support, CIS support and other components.
- **Training:** the way the C4ISR capabilities users are trained in terms of maintaining technical functionality, creating, maintaining and relating data bases, managing information, using basic services and applications ensured by functional services/FS having defined management roles within operational entities. This line of effort should take into account the introduction of new training forms related to the achievement and use of architectures, as well the continuation through individual advanced programmes. Simultaneously, it is necessary to train units through national and international exercises in common, workshops, training sessions dedicated to the use of such capabilities etc.
- **Materiel:** the C4ISR equipment necessary for the action of forces so that all the components, sensors, systems, infrastructure, services and physical elements ensuring maintenance could function effectively during the entire life cycle.
- **Leadership and education:** the preparation of political-military leaders to conduct fight, from the team commander to the chief of defence and political-military decision-makers; the professional development adapted to the use of the architectural model and architectural artefacts in planning, implementing and using C4ISR capabilities.

⁴ Acronym used by US DoD, see <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DOTMLPFI> (retrieved on 15.04.2018), adopted by NATO in the form introduced by Allied Command Transformation – *DOTMLPFI: Doctrine, Organisation, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Interoperability* as a general framework for the definition of a military capability.



- Personnel: the availability of qualified personnel to use such capabilities, from the technical, procedural and operational perspective, not only in peacetime, for training, monitoring and early warning, but also in crisis situations or at war.
- Facilities: they define the specific installations, related utilities, production industrial installations and centres meant to the achievement of C4ISR components through own effort. The auxiliary equipment that allows for the transportation, deployment and utilisation, irrespective of terrain conditions and weather, of the technical systems that define the capabilities destined to meet the operational requirements related to deployability, functioning, manoeuvrability, information protection etc. to support C4ISR capabilities (tents, air-conditioning and filter-ventilation systems, uninterruptable power supplies, containers, loading/unloading equipment, specific pieces of furniture enabling the use of communications and IT equipment, CBRN protection systems, physical security and access control, dedicated transportation platforms etc.) are also considered facilities.
- Interoperability: it refers to the ability to act jointly, in operational terms, within the coalition, in NATO operations or EU missions; it is achieved through continuous and coordinated effort that is aimed at both the implementation of the technical systems and the preparation, from the operational and procedural perspective, to their use in common. As far as C4ISR capabilities are concerned, interoperability is obtained when nations ensure such capabilities, through own procurement programmes. Once interconnected, following the principles of the mission-specific *Federated Mission Networking/FMN*⁵, they should function in almost real time, transparent for users, irrespective of the manufacturer, not only in planning but also in execution, with previous testing by verifying and validating the ability to ensure the command and control support as well as to participate in mission/operation.

C4ISR capabilities development and implementation should be achieved starting from the comprehensive process of defence

⁵ *Federated Mission Networking*, NATO concept, to which Romania is affiliated, relating to achieving CIS interoperability at Allied and partner level in the event of deployment for a specific mission.

planning, and the conceptual development, experimentation and definition of the capability requirements based on present and future operational needs. In this regard, an integrated and collaborative approach is necessary, including the military planners in the field of operations, intelligence, communications, information technology and information security, the communities of functional services users, as well as the defence industry, based on an architectural framework agreed and understood by all the actors involved.

The relevant experiences in the coalition or NATO operational environment have led to the substantiation and consolidation of the architectural approach in achieving military capabilities, in general, and C4ISR capabilities, in particular, this effort lying at the basis of developing some specific projects (e.g. the new NATO headquarters communications and information system, *Afghanistan Mission Network*, *Federated Mission Networking* etc.).

Why C4ISR Architectures?

An architectural model can be considered an instrument that allows for the development of a standardised working framework based on specific methodologies resulting in planning documents based on architectural artefacts/views to be used in the process of equipping the armed forces with C4ISR systems. The architecture-based approach is a complex and comprehensive process that needs dedicated resources, aspect that may result in resistance to change. These are the reasons why the architectural model should be implemented gradually, based on successive iterations, and not as a “*big-bang*” type process, which would only amplify the resistance to cultural and procedural change in the military organisation.

The goal of C4ISR architectural approach is to enhance existing capabilities and to provide the premises for the development of new ones. It is achieved through facilitating the identification and synthesising the operational needs, their transformation in requirements, the achievement of the technical systems, based on interoperability and networking standards, economic efficiency, operational effectiveness and close correlation to achieve other integrated capabilities /systems of weapons: strategic, joint and tactical for land, air, naval, special operations, logistic forces etc.



C4ISR capabilities development and implementation should be achieved starting from the comprehensive process of defence planning, and the conceptual development, experimentation and definition of the capability requirements based on present and future operational needs.

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At the North Atlantic Alliance level the C4ISR development architectural model, NATO C3 System Architecture Framework/NAF v.2, was implemented to develop new architectures able to ensure interoperability for all entities of NATO Command Structure – NCS, being recommended to the nations that generate the operational entities in NATO Force Structure – NFS.

Historical Aspects of the Architectural Model Implementation for the C4ISR Capabilities Development

The US Department of Defense initiated the process of C4ISR capabilities development in 1995⁶, when the Deputy Secretary of Defense called for engaging in a collective effort, at the level of the entire US military system, to define and develop, more efficient means and processes correlated to this type of capabilities, which better meet the needs of combat troops at all echelons. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence – ASD/C3I was entrusted with the task of managing the development of the first version of the C4ISR architectural framework for the US Armed Forces, and succeeded in achieving it in June 1996, due to the activity conducted within the C4ISR Integration Working Group⁷ that was especially established for the mentioned purpose. The approach entailed the creation of three perspectives on a C4ISR system, which were interconnected, having an operational dimension (the beneficiary perspective), a system dimension (the system designer perspective), and a technical dimension (the system developer perspective). The goal of the approach was to establish a common language for the three organisational entities involved in a C4ISR system achievement and utilisation. Subsequently, the model was extended to the development of other types of capabilities at the level of the Department of Defense (DODAF – *Department of Defense Architecture Framework*), as well as at the level of other US governmental and civilian institutions.

Starting from this experience, the UK introduced the model MODAF – *Ministry of Defence Architecture Framework* to develop capabilities in support of the concept of NEC – *Network Enabled Capabilities*, which add new perspectives to the US model as follows: strategic vision, focus on services and procurement.

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⁶ *Using the C4ISR Architecture Framework as a Tool to Facilitate VV&A for Simulation Systems within the Military Application Domain*, Andreas Tolk, Ph.D., Virginia Modeling Analysis and Simulation Center, College of Engineering and Technology, see <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/9551/baca3a42151b822c64b3bbfbf9710ce1ad5a.pdf>, retrieved on 15.04.2018.

⁷ *C4ISR Integration Task Force/ITF*.

Other countries such as Canada, Italy, Australia, France, Sweden adopted either the architectural framework to develop own systems in national variant or already implemented models.

Moreover, at the level of some EU institutions, own architecture frameworks were implemented, based on civilian (TOGAF) or military (NAF) architecture frameworks such as *European Space Agency Architecture Framework – ESAAF*.

The concept of architectural approach was developed to ensure coherence in planning, organising and optimising the process meant to achieve and develop large and complex systems. The architectural model ensures a common language for beneficiaries, planners, developers, as well as for the communities responsible for the procurement of technical systems in support of the activities in the military organisation.

The implementation of this concept was initiated in 2004, at the level of the Alliance command structure, by the nations developing certain programmatic documents to ensure interoperability in procedural, systemic and technical fields.

Currently, NATO recommends the architectural approach at national level, regulated for the Alliance by *a policy and a directive regarding NATO enterprise architecture*, as well as by *NATO Architecture Framework – NAF v.4*. Moreover, steps have been made to implement NAF v.4 as a NATO standard. This architecture development framework is aligned with the civilian architecture model introduced by *The Open Group Architecture Framework – TOGAF*⁸. In *figure 2* it is represented a diagram to exemplify the stages in the development of an architecture and its management during the life cycle.

In this context, during 2015, at the level of the Ministry of National Defence, it was initiated a process meant to conceptually sanction and plan the development framework for C4ISR systems, based on the architectural model.

In 2017, from the perspective of C4ISR capabilities integrated approach under all *DOTMPLFI* aspects, the national process increased in scope and complexity by involving the decision-makers at all hierarchical levels of the armed forces as well as those responsible for these capabilities regulation, planning, achievement,

⁸ *The Open Group Architecture Framework (TOGAF)* is a general architecture framework for the organisational model /enterprise for designing, planning, implementing and governing the information technology architectures. It is mainly based on modularity, standardisation and existing technological products that have already proved useful and efficient, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Open_Group_Architecture_Framework, retrieved on 15.04.2018.



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


Figure 2: Architectural development methodology TOGAF

implementation, organisation, operation and maintenance during their life cycle.

The greatest challenges that have been noticed so far refer to the definition of the process of architectural approach to national capabilities needs, the alignment of this process with the processes of defence planning, requirement formulation, as well as with the defence procurement management. Moreover, it is essential to establish an organisational leadership, management and execution framework for the architectural artefacts meant to support the development and effective use of C4ISR capabilities.

Architectural Approach to C4ISR Capabilities

To ensure success in designing and implementing the architectural approach model in military capabilities development, C4ISR should be treated both in the aggregate, at the level of the organisation as a whole, and as a series of interrelated capabilities not only in the technical field but also in all the aspects that define them.

According to NATO experts and in compliance with the provisions of policy for architectures in the field of C3 – consultation, command and control, architectures are hierarchised on three levels as follows:

- Enterprise Architecture – EA, overview of the whole organisation containing pieces of information that are common to many components;
- Capability Architecture – CA, a set of components correlated and managed under all the aspects of a capability – DOTMLPFI;
- Project Architecture – PA, capabilities are implemented through many projects.

Thus, *enterprise architecture* will define many *capability architectures* that, in turn, could subordinate many *project architectures*. In the case of enterprise architecture, the focus is on the pieces of information that are common to many capability architectures, such as catalogue information.

Moreover, each architecture, be it enterprise, capability or project, is constituted on several domains: Business Architecture, Information Architecture, Application Architecture, and Technology Architecture.

The architectural perspective three levels and four domains are interrelated, correlated with the management areas of interest – portfolio⁹, procurement programme or project, each of them being a driver for the level of detail desired in the process of architecture development. Successively, enterprise architecture is an analysis and traceability factor for capability architectures that, in turn, represent the input data to project architectures. As far as architectural perspective is concerned (business, information, application and technology) the same successive instantiation process is preserved, each domain being in turn a driver for the other domains.

The third dimension of the architectural perspective is the temporal one, in which the current/operational architecture, the future/target

⁹ *Portfolio* – represents the transformation initiatives in an organisation, in their aggregate; it can include a variable number of programmes, independent projects and other initiatives meant to ensure the transformation congruency, NATO C3 Enterprise Architecture Policy.

In the field of C3 – consultation, command and control, architectures are hierarchised on three levels as follows: Enterprise Architecture, Capability Architecture, Project Architecture.

architecture as well as the transition architecture between the previously mentioned stages are described.

We consider that architectures can be developed following a spiral approach so that *DOTMLPFI* described capabilities initially focus on certain domains, depending on the desired level of detail, the other levels being developed iteratively, in different versions.

The architectural approach objectives are as follows:

- to translate a strategic transformation vision and its implementing strategy in the performance of specific activities and the processes that support them;
- to support the effective and efficient development of interoperable capabilities at the level of the military organisation;
- to reuse these capabilities in national, allied and federalised context;
- to be a vector for the governance/leadership and management activities at the level of portfolio, programme and project in the military organisation.

From the architectural development objectives emerge the principles that lie at the basis of the C4ISR capabilities development process in the military organisation. Thus, the development strategy is defined by:

- identifying the capability requirements;
- defining the capabilities, and their dependencies, prioritisation and synchronisation;
- implementing a type of management focused on the capabilities life cycle.

The execution of the implementation strategy is achieved by:

- ensuring coherence in the resource planning, requirement formulation and defence procurement management processes;
- synchronising the capability development process with the defence planning process;
- facilitating the capabilities implementation in stages and projects, in accordance with the strategic objectives and the achievement of synergy between projects;
- defining agnostic artefacts from the manufacturers perspective.

By architectural approach the following are ensured:

- standardised deliverables – architectural artefacts in compliance with NATO architecture framework;

- reusability and traceability of architectural artefacts content by using NATO C3 Taxonomy¹⁰ and NATO interoperability standards and profiles described in NATO Interoperability Standards and Profiles – NSIP¹¹;
- utilisation of a standard methodology and alignment with TOGAF;
- development and dissemination of architectural artefacts using specific software, and establishment of an architecture library;
- initiation of change, based on the change in requirements and impact analysis only;
- development of C4ISR capabilities considering budgetary predictability, medium and long-term sustainability by multiannual planning, the correlation of the architectural approach process with resource planning, requirement formulation and defence procurement management processes, the architectural approach being treated as a capability (structures, personnel, training, processes, hardware and software tools).

Mention should be made that in order to develop an architecture, it is necessary to train experts for all levels of expertise, not only for the technical one. In this context, training in the field of architecture development is required for future C4ISR architects at the level of organisation/military structure, programme managers, segment architects (the segment representing those experts responsible for the architectures at integrated capability level), project architects, experts responsible for specific capabilities development, cyber security included. The education and training of the experts in architecture development, not only in the operational processes and information products, but also in C4ISR computer applications and technological planning, depending on the requirements identified at the level of military structures, remain the attribute of the beneficiary structures at operational and strategic echelons. To guarantee success in this endeavour it is also useful to identify the synergy between projects so that the execution coordination, monitor and assessment can be achieved on sets of projects at the level of one capability. The architectural approach needs a “*sponsor*” having a high level of decision to supervise all these efforts and to ensure the correlation between C4ISR development and the procurement programmes

¹⁰ *Architecture for the Norwegian Defence*, see <https://www.ffi.no/no/07-02558.pdf>, retrieved on 18.04.2018.

¹¹ See https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/NATO_Interoperability_Standards_and_Profiles, retrieved on 18.04.2018.



It is necessary to focus more on the pieces of information an architecture should contain and less on the architectural visions/perspectives.

The aspects related to cyber defence and service management and control – SMC should be considered from the very beginning of a C4ISR capability approach.

funded by the Ministry of National Defence major programmes. We mention that it is necessary to focus more on the pieces of information an architecture should contain and less on the architectural visions/perspectives. The aspects related to cyber defence and service management and control – SMC should be considered from the very beginning of a C4ISR capability approach. The establishment of a governance/command and control mechanism for the implementation of the architectural approach is essential to create the prerequisite of success in the field.

The authors recommend the following steps to be made to ensure success in the collective endeavour to implement the architectural model in the armed forces:

- identification and organisation of courses on architectural approach as follows:
 - in the short term, TOGAF accredited courses to train experts in the architecture development methodology;
 - supplementary, in the medium and long term, NAF dedicated courses, depending on the audience, as follows: introductory and information courses for general audience, basic courses for experts that need to interpret/read architectures, advanced courses for experts that have responsibilities in architecture development;
- attendance at the specialised training courses in architecture development;
- allocation of funds for training in the field of architectures;
- identification of mechanisms to coordinate/manage the achievement of C4ISR capabilities based on architectures;
- creation of an as realistic as possible command and control instrument to achieve architectures as the basis of C4ISR capabilities development in the Romanian Armed Forces;
- identification of solutions to cooperate with industry in order to ensure the necessary support in the effort to achieve architectures at the capability/project level by beneficiary structures;
- creation of mechanisms to correlate the architecture governance processes with the procurement and programme/project management processes by responsible structures in the armed forces;
- achievement of an architecture library to store all the architectural artefacts developed in the Romanian Armed Forces and the acquisition of an architecture development software instrument.

Conclusions

To conclude, we can state that the architectural approach to C4ISR capabilities development is beneficial on many levels, starting with the decision substantiation and decision-making, through implementation and execution management, as well as from the perspective of these capabilities beneficiaries/users. In essence, the development model based on architectures ensures the capabilities development coherence, facilitates integrated and correlated planning, enables iterative developments – evolution and not revolution, supports the correspondence between the capabilities implementation in the medium and long term and the short-term projects, reinforces the correlation between planning and available financial resources, and ensures coherence in joint operations requirements planning and interoperability with allied systems.

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ENHANCING RESILIENCE AGAINST HYBRID THREATS - DEFINITIONS, APPROACHES AND PERSPECTIVES -

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The obvious trends in the diversification and overlap between military and non-military, transnational, unconventional, asymmetric and hybrid threats, abundant nowadays in the security environment, determine the intensification of NATO and EU efforts to increase the resilience of member states through integrated, comprehensive approaches to managing different types of crises, including their extreme manifestations - wars.

From this perspective, both NATO and EU core documents underline the interdependence between the allied general capacity of common defence and the resilience of their member states. For this reason, NATO and EU are acting in tandem by urging member states to adopt the necessary measures to protect critical infrastructures exposed to hybrid threats, which can occur simultaneously in peacetime in several areas - energy, transport, communications, finance and banking, cyber, space technologies, healthcare, education etc.

Keywords: resilience, critical infrastructures, asymmetric threats, hybrid threats, hybrid warfare.

Introduction

Resilience is a topic that has been increasingly debated in the context of the existing interdependencies related to the development of the allied and partner states resilience, as a way to counter hybrid threats. In this regard, good governance and the capability of the institutions having responsibilities in the field of security and defence to synchronise their efforts at national, NATO and EU level are key aspects.

Resilience versus Hybrid Threats. Definitions

To clarify the relationship between hybrid threats and the states and societies resilience when facing them, more precisely the measures adopted by NATO and the EU as well as by the member states independently to counter hybrid threats, some definitions are necessary. Although they are not unitary, they emphasise some of the most important characteristics of hybrid threats and resilience. The present article provides several acknowledged definitions of hybrid threats and resilience, as they are excerpted from NATO, EU, and the US Department of Defence official documents.

Hybrid threat was defined by NATO, in February 2010, following the suggestion of a working group on doctrines and operational concepts development. According to the definition, a hybrid threat *"is one posed by any current or potential adversary, including state, non-state entities and terrorists, with the ability, whether demonstrated or likely, to simultaneously employ conventional and unconventional means adaptively, in pursuit of their objectives"*¹.

Another allied definition is present in the NATO Wales Summit Declaration, 2014, according to which hybrid threat *"employs a wide range of overt and covert military, paramilitary, and civilian measures in a highly integrated design"*².

A hybrid threat "is one posed by any current or potential adversary, including state, non-state entities and terrorists, with the ability, whether demonstrated or likely, to simultaneously employ conventional and unconventional means adaptively, in pursuit of their objectives".

Hybrid threat "employs a wide range of overt and covert military, paramilitary, and civilian measures in a highly integrated design".

¹ US Government Accountability Office, *Hybrid Warfare: Briefing to the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities*, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, GAO-10-1036R, Washington, 10 September 2010, p. 15, see <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-1036R>.

² *Wales Summit Declaration*, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales, 5 September 2014, para. 13, see http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm?mode=pressrelease.



Massive disinformation campaigns, using social media to control the political narrative or to radicalise, recruit and direct proxy actors can be vehicles for hybrid threats³.

The EU official documents also contain several definitions of hybrid threats. Among them, we present the definition included in the *EU Operational Protocol for Countering Hybrid Threats*, issued by the European Commission on 7 July 2016, due to its comprehensive character. According to this definition, “*hybrid threats can be characterised as a mixture of coercive and subversive activity, conventional and unconventional methods (i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, technological, information), which can be used in a coordinated manner by state or non-state actors to achieve specific objectives while remaining below the threshold of open organised hostilities. There is usually an emphasis on exploiting the vulnerabilities of the target and on generating ambiguity with the intention to hinder decision-making processes. Massive disinformation campaigns, using social media to control the political narrative or to radicalise, recruit and direct proxy actors can be vehicles for hybrid threats*”³.

One of the most explicit definitions of resilience is provided in the *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, published by the US Department of Defence. Applied to the military field but not limited to it, resilience is described as “*the ability of an architecture to support the functions necessary for mission success with higher probability, shorter periods of reduced capability, and across a wider range of scenarios, conditions, and threats, in spite of hostile action or adverse conditions. Resilience may leverage cross-domain or alternative government, commercial or international capabilities*”⁴.

The consolidation of the military as well as diplomatic, economic and information capability of the EU member states and state institutions, the assurance of critical infrastructure protection, and the enhancement of communities and societies cohesion represent essential preconditions for managing the crisis situations generated by attacks and threats of any type, hybrid ones included. The mentioned preconditions are synonymous, in the EU documents, with resilience, defined as the “*capacity to withstand stress and recover, strengthened, from challenges*”⁵.

From the broader perspective of NATO and EU documents, resilience is equivalent to the ability of a state and its institutions, as well as

³ *EU Operational Protocol for Countering Hybrid Threats – EU Playbook*, European Commission, Brussels, 7 July 2016, p. 4.

⁴ *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, US Department of Defense, August 2017, p. 199.

⁵ *Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats – A European Union Response*, European Commission, Brussels, 6 April 2016, p. 6.



From the broader perspective of NATO and EU documents, resilience is equivalent to the ability of a state and its institutions, as well as of the society in the aggregate, to withstand crises of different types and armed attacks, and to recover by focusing and judiciously using all the power resources – economic, diplomatic, information, military, through the joint effort of the institutions that have responsibilities in the respective fields.

of the society in the aggregate, to withstand crises of different types and armed attacks, and to recover by focusing and judiciously using all the power resources – economic, diplomatic, information, military, through the joint effort of the institutions that have responsibilities in the respective fields.

Therefore, resilience means more than the military capability, as it entails all the resources of the state that are available at a given moment and the ability of the state to capitalise on them, the training and resilience of civilian institutions, communities and societies in general, as well as their ability to effectively support the armed forces actions.

Mention should be made that all the components on which the resilience of a state, its institutions and society rely are interdependent and mutually empowering.

The North Atlantic Alliance Perspective

The term resilience is mentioned in NATO official documents in the context of the requirements related to the development of the individual defence capability of each and every allied state, the direct contribution to the enhancement of the collective defence capability and, implicitly, the Alliance deterrence capability.

From NATO perspective, strengthening the resilience of the allied states provides them with multiple possibilities to counter different types of threats in the security environment, including the hybrid threats that have been increasingly theorised lately.

Resilience becomes the foundation of the allied states individual and collective defence capability, in compliance with Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which stipulates that: “*the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack*”⁶.

In the context of the requirements related to reviewing the Alliance doctrinal framework as well as to enhancing the procedures to counter hybrid threats, the development of the allied states resilience is not limited to their capacity to resist armed attacks. Thus, in NATO view, presented in different documents, policies, doctrines and official declarations, the development of the allied states resilience should also consider the enhancement of their capacity to adequately manage crisis situations determined by natural disasters, denial

⁶ *The North Atlantic Treaty*, Washington, 4 April 1949, Article 3, see https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm.

or limitation of the population access to vital resources (food, water, medicines) following the alteration of the functioning of some critical infrastructure – communication, transportation, financial, energy, medical and other networks.

In this regard, the *Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation “Active Engagement, Modern Defence”*, adopted at the NATO Lisbon Summit in 2010, stipulates that greater international efforts are necessary to “ensure their resilience against attack or disruption”⁷ related to communications, transportation, international trade and energy security.

The importance of countering hybrid threats, namely of developing the resilience of the states confronted with such threats, is reflected by their mentioning in the NATO Wales and Warsaw Summits Declarations as well as by the analysis of the conflict hybridity in NATO official documents.

Against the background of the international crisis generated by the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the extension of the conflict in the secessionist regions Donetsk and Luhansk, which self-proclaimed people’s republics, at the Wales Summit in September 2014, the Allies stated their determination to display “endurance and resilience”⁸, reaffirming once more the principles of NATO policy – “indivisibility of Allied security and prevention, detection, resilience, recovery and defence”⁹.

The way the measures decided to be taken by the Allies at the Wales Summit in order to enhance the collective defence capability and to consolidate the allied and partner states resilience was assessed by the heads of state and government attending the Warsaw Summit. The Declaration of the NATO Summit in the capital of Poland reflects both the concerns of the allied state leaders and the solutions suggested by them to counter hybrid threats through measures meant to strengthen the allied and partner states resilience. These measures are aimed at enhancing interoperability in the military field as well as at the increase in the ability to prevent, act, respond and manage the consequences of any type of armed attacks, terrorist and cyber attacks, hostile

⁷ *Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation “Active Engagement, Modern Defence”*, adopted by Heads of State and Government in Lisbon, Portugal, 19 - 20 November 2010, para 13.

⁸ *Wales Summit Declaration*, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Wales, United Kingdom, 5 September 2014, para 23.

⁹ *Ibidem*, para 72.

actions and external pressures exerted in the political, economic and information field.

These measures are implemented through both joint efforts, at the Alliance level, and individually, by each member state meeting the commitments made. In this regard, the Warsaw Summit Declaration states that “each Ally will honour its responsibility to improve its resilience and ability to respond quickly and effectively to cyber attacks, including in hybrid contexts”¹⁰.

Moreover, the Warsaw Summit Declaration emphasises the Allies commitment to act in order “to enhance resilience and to maintain and further develop the individual and collective capacity to resist any form of armed attack. Civil preparedness is a central pillar of Allies’ resilience and a critical enabler for Alliance collective defence. While this remains a national responsibility, NATO can support Allies in assessing and, upon request, enhancing their civil preparedness”¹¹.

The Warsaw Summit Declaration mentions the necessity for the civil preparedness by meeting the *NATO Baseline Requirements for National Resilience*, which are based on the continuity of government, the continuity of essential services, the security of critical civilian infrastructure, and the support to armed forces with civilian means so that they can accomplish their missions.

In this regard, the Warsaw Summit Declaration appreciates as extremely useful the *Resilience Guidelines*, adopted by the defence ministers in Allied states in June 2016. The document identifies seven domains – guidelines, in which the Allied states should take coherent steps to strengthen own resilience and implicitly the Allied one as follows:

- 1) Ensuring continuity of government and of essential government services, i.e. the ability to make decisions, to rapidly communicate them and to impose their timely implementation in crisis situations;
- 2) Ensuring resilient energy supplies as well as developing contingency plans and alternative energy networks, both internal and cross-border ones;
- 3) Ensuring the ability to effectively manage the uncontrolled movement of people without altering the freedom of movement and the deployment of NATO forces;

¹⁰ *Warsaw Summit Communiqué*, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw, 09 July 2016, para 71.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, para 73.



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Collective defence, common security indivisibility, NATO member states cohesion and solidarity are fundamental principles of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

4) Ensuring the food and water resources for the population, and their safe management, without exposing them to the risks of destruction and sabotage;

5) Ensuring the ability to manage the consequences of mass casualties, to have viable civilian healthcare systems in crisis situations as well as the necessary resources in sufficient quantities and stored in safe conditions;

6) Ensuring the civilian communication systems resilience – the communication systems and the computer networks should be optimally functional in crisis situations, having reserve capabilities, equipment and resources;

7) Ensuring transport systems resilience – ensuring the rapid movement of NATO forces on the territory of Allied states, including by safely using the civilian transport systems in crisis situations.

The above-mentioned guidelines were reiterated during the NATO Warsaw Summit, being included in a distinct public document, adopted on 8 July 2016 by the heads of state and government participating in the Allies meeting. Called *Commitment to Enhance Resilience*, the document emphasises the Allied states determination to maintain and develop the individual and collective capability to resist any type of armed attack: *“In this context, we are today making a commitment to continue to enhance our resilience against the full spectrum of threats, including hybrid threats, from any direction. Resilience is an essential basis for credible deterrence and defence and effective fulfilment of the Alliance’s core tasks”*¹².

Collective defence, common security indivisibility, NATO member states cohesion and solidarity are fundamental principles of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, whose relevance is emphasised by the *Commitment to Enhance Resilience*, in the context of the actions undertaken by the Alliance to tailor to meet the requirements generated by the new types of threats, military and non-military ones. The document states that *“being resilient against these challenges requires Allies to maintain and protect critical civilian capabilities, alongside and in support of military capabilities, and to work across the whole of government and with the private sector”*¹³.

¹² *Commitment to Enhance Resilience*, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw, 08 July 2016, Press Release (2016) 118, para 1, see https://www.nato.int/cps/su/natohq/official_texts_133180.htm.

¹³ *Ibidem*, para 3.



NATO member states are required to meet their commitments to strengthen national resilience by ensuring the functionality and security of critical infrastructure – communications and transport, energy, cyber and financial systems, protection of access to vital resources, food and water, investment in military industry development, defence capabilities and Allies armed forces interoperability, as well as other aspects.

As well as in the NATO Warsaw Summit Declaration, the *Commitment to Enhance Resilience* states that *“civil preparedness is above all a national responsibility”*¹⁴. In this regard, NATO member states are required to meet their commitments to strengthen national resilience by ensuring the functionality and security of critical infrastructure – communications and transport, energy, cyber and financial systems, protection of access to vital resources, food and water, investment in military industry development, defence capabilities and Allies armed forces interoperability, as well as other aspects.

Mention should be made that the resilience material dimension is as important as its non-material one – shared Euro-Atlantic values, described as follows: *“The foundation of our resilience lies in our shared commitment to the principles of individual liberty, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. By taking the necessary steps today to enhance our resilience, we reaffirm our unwavering commitment to defend our populations and our territory against any threat, and to uphold these values”*¹⁵.

Strengthening the Alliance and its member states resilience is approached in the *Commitment to Enhance Resilience* as well as in the *Warsaw Summit Declaration* from the perspective of the development of the cooperation and partnership relations with the European Union, with other multinational organisations that have responsibilities in preserving security at international and/or regional level (UN, OSCE etc), with partner states any other entities. In this regard, the Warsaw Summit Declaration states that *“while retaining the ability to respond to crises beyond our borders, NATO will continue to pursue cooperative security through partnership with relevant countries and other international organisations, and investing in capacity building and training efforts enabling countries to enhance their resilience and to provide for their own security”*¹⁶. In this context, the declaration mentions the particular cases of Georgia and Ukraine, whose resilience should be strengthened so that they can meet a broad range of threats, hybrid ones included.

The strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, the topic of the *NATO – EU Joint Declaration*, issued in Warsaw on 8 July 2016, includes among the dimensions of cooperation between the two organisations *“countering hybrid threats, enhancing resilience, defence capability*

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, para 4.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, para 9.

¹⁶ *Op. cit.*, *Warsaw Summit Communiqué*, para 83.



The strategic partnership between NATO and the EU includes among the dimensions of cooperation between the two organisations “countering hybrid threats, enhancing resilience, defence capability building, cyber defence, maritime security, and exercises”.

building, cyber defence, maritime security, and exercises”¹⁷. Signed by the NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, and the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, the NATO – EU Joint Declaration emphasises the importance of the strategic partnership between the two organisations, which was initiated in 2002, based on the Joint Declaration on European Security and Defence Policy.

NATO and EU common values and interests are confirmed by the membership of the majority of member states (22) of the two organisations, solid premises of the successful partnership between them, which strengthens the resistance structure and increases the relevance in international relations.

As an expression of the two organisations complementarity, the *NATO-EU Joint Declaration* states the need for enhancing the procedures “to boost our ability to counter hybrid threats, including by bolstering resilience, working together on analysis, prevention, and early detection, through timely information sharing and, to the extent possible, intelligence sharing between staffs; and cooperating on strategic communication and response”¹⁸.

NATO-EU Joint Declaration reiterates the importance of cooperation between the two organisations. It is considered a strategic priority, being essential for countering hybrid threats, managing the problems related to migrants and refugees, maritime cooperation, ensuring cyber security, developing defence industry and research in the field of advanced military technologies and coherent, complementary and interoperable defence capabilities. Moreover, the *Declaration* states NATO and EU concerns for increasing the joint reaction capability by adopting measures meant to boost cooperation during planning, missions, operations, training activities, including by organising parallel and coordinated exercises to test the procedures to respond to hybrid threats.

By *NATO-EU Joint Declaration* member states reaffirm their shared values and interests as well as the availability to act in accordance with the principles enshrined in the UN Charter to preserve peace in the world, providing mutual enhanced security guarantees related to their territory independence, sovereignty, and integrity.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, para 122.

¹⁸ *Joint Declaration* by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Warsaw, 8 July 2016.

The European Union Perspective

Within the European Union there is a similar, high, interest in strengthening the member states resilience as a way to counter threats of any type, including hybrid ones. The interests have got materialised in the adoption of a set of documents analysing the hybridity of current conflicts, the implications on the EU member states security, as well as the ways to enhance their resilience when faced with hybrid threats. Among the EU documents, the most relevant ones are the *Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats* (adopted on 6 April 2016) and the *EU Operational Protocol for Countering Hybrid Threats* (adopted on 14 November 2016), both subsumed under the *EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy* (adopted on 28 June 2016).

The *Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats – a European Union Response* represents a valuable theoretical contribution to the definition of hybrid threats and to the identification of the methods to counter them. Moreover, the *Joint Framework* contributes to the definition of resilience and its importance in countering hybrid threats. The value of the *Joint Framework* is doubled by its practical-applicative character, which explicitly results from the establishment of 22 *operational actions* to counter hybrid threats. The implementation of these operational actions, grouped in four categories – *improving awareness, building resilience, preventing, responding to crisis and recovering, as well as strengthening EU cooperation with NATO and other partner organisations*, provides the European Union and the member states with the necessary instruments to counter hybrid threats, mainly by strengthening resilience when faced with such threats.

Strengthening the EU as well as member and partner states resilience is exhaustively treated in the *Joint Framework*, the operational actions consisting in suggestions and measures meant to contribute to reducing the member and partner states as well as human communities, societies in their aggregate, vulnerabilities when faced with hybrid threats. The operational actions include measures that are recommended to member and partner states to protect critical infrastructure (energy, transport, telecommunications, financial-banking, cyber, space networks, supply chains, environment etc.) as well as to protect human communities, whose cohesion can be affected by the divisive propaganda conducted by hostile state and non-state entities, fake news, threats and terrorist acts.



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The operational actions meant to *improve awareness* are aimed at enhancing strategic communication, establishing a centre of excellence for countering hybrid threats, and facilitating the information exchange between the member states through the information fusion cell related to hybrid threats in the Information Sharing and Analysis Centre within the European External Action Service.

The operational actions meant to *build resilience* refer to the adoption of measures to protect critical infrastructure (economic, energy, transport, health, food security etc.), as well as measures to prevent the vulnerable members in the European societies from radicalising, to combat violent extremism and the negative social phenomena at the root of severe interethnic incidents and terrorist attacks.

The operational actions meant to *prevent, respond to crisis and recover* contribute to the definition and exercise of the procedures employed in the event a member state is confronted with a severe crisis (natural disaster, ecological catastrophe, terrorist attack), which entails the application of the *solidarity clause* (in compliance with art. 222 of the *Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – TFEU*) or is the victim of an armed attack, which entails the application of the *mutual defence clause* (in compliance with art. 42 para 7 of the *Treaty of European Union – TEU*).

To exemplify, we mention the operational actions no. 3 and no. 4 in the *Joint Framework*, which recommend the EU member states to establish a centre of excellence for countering hybrid threats, suggestion materialised in October 2017. The missions of the centre include research activities related to the ways third parties implement hybrid strategies as well as the development of concepts, procedures and technologies “to help member states to strengthen resilience”¹⁹. This way the centre activity will contribute to “aligning EU and national policies, doctrines and concepts, and to ensuring that decision-making can take account of the complexities and ambiguities associated with hybrid threats”²⁰.

The importance of resilience in the equation of countering hybrid threats is revealed by the *Joint Framework* as follows: “To effectively counter hybrid threats, the potential vulnerabilities of key infrastructures, supply chains and society must be addressed. By drawing on the EU

¹⁹ *Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats – a European Union Response*, p. 5.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 6.

*instruments and policies, infrastructure at the EU level can become more resilient”*²¹.

Strengthening the EU and member states defence capacity plays an important part among the measures related to operational actions in the *Joint Framework*. In this regard, the European Defence Agency is about to play an important role in the EU military capabilities, mainly by developing new technologies, combat systems and military equipment, and by including them in the action plans in the field of European defence. This process is facilitated by the initiation of *Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO)* in 2017, which represents an important stage to meet the goals of the *EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy*. Through *PESCO* member states will contribute to strengthening the EU security and defence dimension complementary to that of NATO, harmonising priorities and military capabilities development projects, while avoiding duplication of objectives and misallocation of resources.

Moreover, the *Joint Framework* acknowledges the importance of cooperation with NATO to strengthen the EU resilience, considering the development of NATO-EU joint responses based on information exchange, expertise and good practices, to counter hybrid and cyber threats in peacetime as well as in crisis and war.

The *EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy* contains numerous references – 34, in different contexts – to the importance of enhancing the member and partner states resilience as an essential condition for ensuring a stable security environment in the European and Euro-Atlantic area.

In the EU’s view, resilience is a broad concept that includes not only the state and its institutions with their potential and functionality, but also all the people, their communities and cohesion, the society in its aggregate. Hence the distinction the *Global Strategy* makes between the state resilience and the society resilience, as equally important parts of the same whole in a relation of complementarity and reciprocal conditioning.

The *Global Strategy* mentions that the European Union “will strengthen its democracies resilience”²², as both a confirmation of the shared values and a way to promote its credibility and influence abroad.

²¹ *Ibidem*, p. 6.

²² *Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy*, European Council, Brussels, June 2016, p. 8.



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The 17 military and civilian missions that are currently conducted by the EU demonstrate the differentiated and/or simultaneous employment, on a case-by-case basis, of measures specific to the concepts of *soft power* and *hard power*, which are considered complementary by the *Global Strategy*.

Resilience, understood as the *“ability of states and societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and external crises”*²³ best serves the EU and its partners vital interests, democracy, as well as the international environment security, stability and prosperity. All these aspects result in the EU supporting as a *“strategic priority”*²⁴ the development of resilience in the states and societies beyond its near vicinity, situated in a vast geographical area, from Central Asia, in the east, to Central Africa, in the south, a goal of its common policies – foreign, security and defence ones.

In the EU's view, *“a resilient society featuring democracy, trust in institutions, and sustainable development lies at the heart of a resilient state”*²⁵. Therefore, the member and partner states resilience when faced with hybrid threats takes into consideration the states democratic organisation, having as main characteristics *“respect for and promotion of human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law”*²⁶, encompassing *“justice, solidarity, equality, non-discrimination, pluralism, and respect for diversity”*²⁷.

The *Global Strategy* emphasises the importance of strengthening the member and partner states resilience as the optimal way to counter hybrid threats by adopting a broad set of measures. Among them there are measures meant to protect critical infrastructure (energy, transport networks, space activities), financial systems, as well as the systems meant to ensure the population healthcare, food security, cybersecurity, protection of industrial capacities and economic resources, as well as of the environment.

Moreover, the *Global Strategy* recommends the adoption of measures able to result in enhancing education and preventing the vulnerable members of the society from radicalising, as well as in combating violent extremism and negative social phenomena that often lead to severe interethnic incidents and terrorist attacks.

²³ *Ibidem*, p. 23.

²⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 25.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 24.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 15.

²⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 15.



The EU common security and defence policy pays special attention to strengthening the trans-Atlantic relations, not only with the states in North America but also with the ones in South America.

As an attestation of NATO and EU common concerns for identifying the hybrid features of contemporary conflicts, we note the recent inauguration of the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, on 2 October 2017, in Helsinki.

The EU common security and defence policy pays special attention to strengthening the trans-Atlantic relations, not only with the states in North America but also with the ones in South America. The special partnership relation, through NATO, with the USA and Canada contributes to strengthening the EU resilience as well as to enhancing the way international relations are conducted and conflicts that directly or indirectly affect the Euro-Atlantic community interests are managed. Considered the most cohesive military alliance in the world, NATO has demonstrated, during the almost 70 years that have passed since its establishment, on April 1949, that it is a real guarantee of the peace and security of the Allies, most of them being also EU member states.

The majority of European states dual membership of NATO and the EU emphasises the shared values and interests on which the two organisations coherence and cohesion are based. Considering it, the *Global Strategy* states that *“the EU will deepen its partnership with NATO through coordinated defence capability development, parallel and synchronised exercises, and mutually reinforcing actions to build the capacities of our partners, counter hybrid and cyber threats, and promote maritime security”*²⁸.

As an attestation of NATO and EU common concerns for identifying the hybrid features of contemporary conflicts, we note the recent inauguration of the *European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats*, on 2 October 2017, in Helsinki, in the presence of the EU High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, and the Secretary General of NATO, Jens Stoltenberg. The mission of the Centre is to gain and provide expertise for the member states to consolidate individual and collective resilience by developing the military and civilian capabilities in order to counter the hybrid threats to the European security.

Conclusions

The comprehensive approaches theorised at the level of NATO and the EU are reflected in Romania by the concept of *wider national security*, its main features and implementation mechanisms being described in the *National Defence Strategy 2015-2019, A Strong Romania within Europe and the World*. The document emphasises the importance of the synchronisation and complementarity of the actions

²⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 37.



of all the national defence system components, subsumed under the dimensions of *defence, public order, intelligence, counter-intelligence and security, diplomacy, crisis situations management, education, health and demography*.

Such a wider approach to national security results in the transformation of the conceptual framework and the revision of the interagency cooperation procedures as well as in the coordination of the military and civilian components of the national security system. Moreover, it is considered to test, verify and enhance the procedures related to the cooperation of the national security system components with the similar structures in the allied and partner states within NATO and EU mutual assistance and collective defence mechanisms. The employment of these procedures during the national (*Histria '15*) and multinational (*Noble Jump '17, Saber Guardian '17*) strategic exercises directly contributes to the development of national, allied and partner states resilience, in the event they face hybrid threats.

According to the *National Defence Strategy*, the coordination and integration of the activities conducted by the ministries and agencies having responsibilities in the field of national defence, public order and national security are essential for the development of “*interoperability of the state institutions that should act in the event of asymmetric and hybrid threats*”²⁹.

Acting in a coordinated manner with the other components of the national security system, the Ministry of National Defence assumes an important role in the implementation of the *wider national security* concept.

The principles and the lines of action established in the *National Defence Strategy 2015-2019* are reflected in the subsequent documents, developed by the Ministry of National Defence in compliance with *Law no. 203/2015 on Defence Planning – the Defence White Paper 2017* and the *Military Strategy of Romania – Modern Armed Forces for a Powerful Romania within Europe and around the World*, adopted by the Government on 28 September 2016. Both documents support the complex, multidimensional and interagency approach to ensuring *wider national security* in the context of capitalising on the advantages deriving from Romania’s membership of both NATO and the EU, as well as from consolidating its strategic partnerships, especially with the USA.

²⁹ *National Defence Strategy 2015 - 2019*, Presidential Administration - Romania, 2015, art. 29, p. 11.

The fulfilment of the activities in the Ministry of National Defence area of responsibility benefits from the consistent support provided by the *National Political Agreement on Increasing Defence Spending* and by the *Programme regarding the Romanian Armed Forces Transformation, Development and Procurement up to 2026*. Moreover, the measures taken by the Romanian state authorities to strengthen resilience and to materialise the concept of *wider national security* are correlated with NATO *strategic adaptation measures*.

At national level, the enhancement of the Romanian state resilience is a direct consequence of the increase in the Romanian Armed Forces services operational capability. For this purpose, several major procurement programmes have been completed or are in progress. Among them, the following can be mentioned: short and medium-range transport military aircraft for courier missions *C 27J Spartan*, the Romanian Air Force multirole fighter *F-16 Fighting Falcon*, surface-to-air missile systems *Hawk XXI* and *Patriot*, armoured personnel carrier *8x8 Piranha IIIC*, multifunctional corvettes for the Romanian Naval Forces and electronic warfare equipment.

A significant contribution to strengthening national resilience is represented by updating and harmonising the national legislative framework, by developing strategies, and by implementing regulatory measures regarding critical infrastructure protection, strategic reserve assurance, mobilisation and requisitions, national economy and industry as well as the territory and population preparedness for defence.

As for the *strategic adaptation measures*, adopted by the Allies in July 2016 at the NATO Warsaw Summit, Romania supports the process of establishing both the components through which it gets materialised – *enhanced Forward Presence (eFP)* and *tailored Forward Presence (tFP)*. To the *enhanced Forward Presence*, the Romanian Armed Forces contribute an air defence detachment, consisting of 120 troops, equipped with *Oerlikon* (35 mm) anti-aircraft gun. On 15 March 2017, the Romanian detachment became part of the NATO battlegroup established in Poland, on a rotational basis, under the US command, in order to deter possible hostile actions against the states in the north-eastern area of the Alliance.

Moreover, the Romanian Armed Forces contribute to the readiness of NATO command and control structures established on the territory of our country – *Multinational Division South-East Headquarters, NATO*



At national level, the enhancement of the Romanian state resilience is a direct consequence of the increase in the Romanian Armed Forces services operational capability.

A significant contribution to strengthening national resilience is represented by updating and harmonising the national legislative framework.



Force Integration Unit in Bucharest and *NATO Multinational Brigade* in Craiova, elements of NATO tailored Forward Presence in the south-eastern part of the Alliance, in the Black Sea area.

As for the national resilience in European context, there can be mentioned Romania's support for the implementation of the goals of the *EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy*, our country participating in Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), approved by the Supreme Council of National Defence on 17 October 2017. This decision will lead to the enhancement of cooperation in the field of security and defence among the states participating in *PESCO*, contributing to strengthening their resilience to face different types of threats. The Romanian authorities support for *PESCO* initiative demonstrates the ability of the national security system to coordinate its activity with the EU and member states institutions, thus preparing Romania to take over the rotating Presidency of the Council of the European Union in the first semester of 2019.

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“MILITARY DOCTRINE” CONCEPT – EVOLUTION AND DEVELOPMENT WITHIN THE ROMANIAN MILITARY SYSTEM

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The authors review the main military doctrinal landmarks throughout the history of the Romanians. Moreover, the emergence and development of the concept of military doctrine in the Romanian Armed Forces are analysed. In conclusion, it is shown that the doctrinal system cannot be static, its evolution being characterised by the influences of the new trends in the military art and practice and by the changes in the international environment, the armed forces having to update their military doctrines to keep up with the unpredictability of conflicts that may degenerate into wars. In essence, military doctrines show the way armed forces think, their experiences, and their training to adapt to changing operational conditions.

Keywords: military doctrine, military concept, armed forces, national defence, collective defence.

Motto

“...The doctrinal conceptual framework in general should ensure achieving the strategic objectives and reaching the end state projected by the political-military decision-makers in the national defence planning process, while at the same time allow to maximise the efficiency and effectiveness of the use of the military instrument, integrated with the other state power instruments and, on the basis of the relevant decision-making mechanisms, alongside the Alliance and partner’s power instruments¹”.

Military doctrine (UK) is a subject that has not received the attention it deserves despite the fundamental importance it has in determining how armed forces think, what experience is carried forward, how they currently fight, train and adapt to changing operational conditions and look to the future. The purpose of a doctrine is to provide a cohesive body of thinking to approach the business of war².

Military thinking, as a set of concepts, theories and tendencies that address the military phenomenon at a given time, emerged and developed in close and direct connection with the practical necessities of preparing and conducting the wars our people and then the Romanian national state had to carry out.

Doctrinal Landmarks in the Middle Ages

The Romanian Middle Ages, especially the 14th and 16th centuries, represented an eloquent epoch in the development of military practice and thinking, as well as in the strong affirmation of military principles, concepts and experience, which proved their long-standing character for a long time. The battles waged under the leadership of the great voivodes and leaders of the armies of the people – Basarab I, Mircea cel Bătrân, Vlad Țepeș, Ștefan cel Mare și Sfânt, Ioan Vodă cel Viteaz, Mihai Viteazul

¹ *Romanian Armed Forces Doctrine*, issued in 2012.

² Dr Paul Latawaski – researcher, Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst, UK.



The military history of the Romanian people highlights the fact that in the Middle Ages military practice was more advanced than theoretical developments, which does not mean that the latter ones were lacking.

and others have remained vivid in the memory of our nation, especially as they marked important moments in the fight against foreign domination, defending the identity of the Romanian people.

Analysing the battles and the victories of the Romanian armies in the Middle Ages under the leadership of the illustrious military commanders, Nicolae Bălcescu concluded that *“...all these warfare geniuses, who always fought one against ten, had to know some sound principles of military art, which was to defeat a greater power with a smaller power”*³.

The military history of the Romanian people highlights the fact that in the Middle Ages military practice was more advanced than theoretical developments, which does not mean that the latter ones were lacking. There are a few written documents preserved from that time. However, a number of sources demonstrate the high level of military thinking, doctrinal ideas, theses and concepts existing at that time. Among them, *Învățăturile lui Neagoe Basarab către fiul său Theodosie (The Teachings of Neagoe Basarab to His Son Theodosie)*, written at the beginning of the 16th century, can be mentioned. A complex work, *“masterpiece of literature, politics, philosophy and eloquence”*, as it was appreciated by B.P. Hașdeu, it is also a treatise on military doctrine, strategy and tactics, a very important book for the knowledge of military thinking and practice in the more distant past of the Romanian people. Important aspects that come out of *Învățăturile [...]* refer to the use of peaceful means to avoid war, to shelter the population, to mobilise the army, also containing other valuable ideas relating to the exercise of army leadership, the place of the commander in battle, the importance of morale, and the fact that war must be carried out with the greatest force, until the invader's defeat and his expulsion from the country.

The works of Nicolae Olahus, Grigore Ureche, Miron Costin, of leaders as Despot Vodă and Dimitrie Cantemir, of the counsellor Niculae Cantacuzino also contain numerous references to the wars waged by the Romanians, to the military victories obtained, to the military organisation, to the methods and the fighting procedures, weapons

³ Nicolae Bălcescu, *Scrieri militare alese*, Editura Militară, București, 1957, p. 90.



The necessity of a military doctrine in our country was highlighted in the middle part of the last century by the ideologists of the 1848 Revolution and of the Unification age.

etc. Such works have played a remarkable role in the knowledge and perpetuation of our people's struggles, military thinking and practice, and doctrinal permanencies. From the study of this period results the persistent doctrinal preoccupation to establish and put into practice, in the military operations, a series of important principles subsequently validated by the military science.

The Phanariot reign, established by the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the 18th century, abolished for more than a hundred years (1715-1821) the ancestral military organisation. Starting the second half of the 18th century, through petitions addressed to the great powers, the establishment of a national military body was a cause to fight for. The re-establishment of the national reigns in 1822 as the result of the 1821 Revolution led by Tudor Vladimirescu, and the Akkerman Convention (1826), between Russia and Turkey, represented the premises of this desideratum. The conclusion of the Treaty of Adrianople led to the establishment of *“guards of armed soldiers”*, which were strictly necessary for conducting limited internal missions such as: quarantine service, border security, maintaining order in cities and villages, enforcing laws. Subsequently, the mentioned decisions were sanctioned by the Organic Regulations of 1830.

The Emergence of the Concept of “Military Doctrine” in the Romanian Armed Forces

The concept of military doctrine has affirmed in our country for over a century and a half, representing a traditional, significant element of the Romanian spiritual heritage. The necessity of a *military doctrine* in our country was highlighted in the middle part of the last century by the ideologists of the 1848 Revolution and of the Unification age.

The transformations in the country's economic and social-political life created the framework for the development and modernisation of the Romanian military body, contributing decisively to the crystallisation of an original concept in the field of homeland defence, namely the official military doctrine. The development of the doctrinal guidelines started from the fundamental political and strategic objective for the Romanian nation – the achievement of state independence –, which required the unification of all the popular forces on all levels, including in the military field.

The beginnings of the development of an official Romanian military doctrine can be dated in the period of Alexandru Ioan Cuza reign.



At the basis of the Romanian doctrinal edifice, during this period, it was the fundamental concept of the “armed nation”, as a kind of military retaliation, in the event of an outside aggression.

Even in the interwar period, some authors distinguished between military science, which deals with the development of theoretical principles of war, and military art, which is the task of applying these principles in the armed confrontation.

The beginnings of the development of an official Romanian military doctrine can be dated in the period of Alexandru Ioan Cuza reign. The evolution of the Romanian military doctrine from the Unification to the achievement of independence was marked by two stages: the first one between 1859-1866, corresponding to the reign of Alexandru Ioan Cuza, and the second, between 1866-1877, after Prince Carol became the leader of the Romanian state.

In the first stage, it was initiated and achieved the organisation and development of the Romanian military power on new modern basis, and there were created the necessary conditions for conducting a systematic activity in the army. The military reform carried out by the *Law on the Organisation of the Armed Forces in Romania* in November 1864 helped to increase the defence capability of the country, to modernise its military body. The main orientations of the official *Romanian military doctrine* were based on the initiatives promoted during that stage, and they were verified or sanctioned during the War of Independence.

An important role in the development of the *conception of defending the modern Romanian state* was played by Prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza, a prominent political, military and diplomatic figure of the time. The set of measures taken during the reign of Cuza represented a remarkable contribution to substantiating the theses, ideas and general principles of a *national military doctrine*.

The next stage, 1866-1877, was characterised by the preoccupation of the state administration for the consolidation of the national armed power, the main feature of that stage being represented by the improvement of the organisational and fundamental framework of the armed force, materialised in the new military system adopted in 1868 by the new *Law on the Organisation of the Armed Power*. At the basis of the Romanian doctrinal edifice, during this period, it was the fundamental concept of the “armed nation”, as a kind of military retaliation, in the event of an outside aggression.

In 1869, in his paper *Considerații asupra tacticii infanteriei și conferințe militare/Reflection on Infantry Tactics and Military Conferences*, Colonel Ioan Logadi used the term doctrine, saying: “Our army’s mechanism in various circumstances presents complications and the need to stop it is too obvious. We need to simplify and coordinate

the rules to meet the unity of doctrine, and simplify and order means to meet the unity of execution”⁴.

In his work, *Tactica. Teorii și aplicațiuni/Tactics. Theories and Applications*, Lieutenant Alexandru Averescu, who later became Marshal, associated the military doctrine with “*the knowledge that is indispensable for us to take an active and intelligent part in all phases of the war*”; “*...the military doctrine shows us the most rational way to follow in gathering the various elements of the state*”⁵.

The experience of the War of Independence and the participation of some Romanian officers in the education programmes organised by renowned military academies in Europe (France, Germany, Italy and Belgium) represented the starting point for military scientific research in the field of military art and some other fields. The consideration of the links between military theory and military art represented a qualitative leap in the evolution of Romanian military science. Even in the interwar period, some authors distinguished between military science, which deals with the development of theoretical principles of war, and military art, which is the task of applying these principles in the armed confrontation. A characteristic of the evolution of Romanian military thinking during that period was the diversification of concerns, the variety of themes approached and the assertion of some theorists such as Mircea Tomescu, Constantin Hîrjeu, Ioan Sichițiu etc., who studied and got specialised in distinct fields of military science.

Interesting and valuable from a theoretical point of view are the studies of Constantin Hîrjeu devoted to the military doctrine. General Hîrjeu said that “*the most disciplined troops cannot be led to victory if leaders are deprived of the science of leading them, namely the true military science, according to the time and social state in which we find ourselves, namely the military doctrine*”⁶.

Conscious of the universality of military science, Romanian researchers did not confine themselves to studying their own war and tried to also learn lessons from the military conflicts of the time: the Anglo-Bur

⁴ *Istoria gândirii militare românești*, Editura Militară, București, 1974, p. 106.

⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁶ Constantin Hîrjeu, *Rostul cuvintelor: disciplină, doctrină, inițiativă*, Tipografia Socec, București, 1907, p. 5.





A solution to the complex problems of the Romanian Armed Forces was the adoption of the French doctrine, in 1924, aspect fully reflected in the Romanian military science and doctrine.

The transformations in the summer of 1940, when Romania entered the sphere of influence of Germany, put their mark on the entire Romanian society and implicitly on military science.

War⁷ (1899-1902), the Russian-Japanese War (1904-1905) the Balkan War (1912) etc. The concerns of military theorists about the general aspects of war and military doctrine were at the moment responsive to the need to solve the problems of army organisation, training of forces and leadership structures, specific to the national defence and theoretical development, based on scientific knowledge and principles, and not on empirical ones.

Thus, it began another stage of the evolution of Romanian military thinking, in which it was considered that the conditions of own independent creations were established, remaining to address only the aspect of adaptation to the new requirements.

Developments and Trends in the Period 1918-1947

By making the Romanian unitary national state in 1918 the geopolitical and geostrategic position of Romania and, implicitly, the way of approaching the national defence changed. The defence of Great Romania was considerably distinct from the pre-war period, which required intense theoretical activity to quickly find the most appropriate solutions. Thus, events such as the making of the Romanian unitary national state, the experience of the First World War, the technical progress, as well as the positive evolution of the Romanian society generated the obvious progress of the native military science. A solution to the complex problems of the Romanian Armed Forces was the adoption of the French doctrine, in 1924, aspect fully reflected in the Romanian military science and doctrine.

In the Romanian military theoretical activity there were problems regarding the principles and ways of defending Romania as well as the theme of the national military doctrine. Captain Mircea Tomescu, in his work *Știința militară și doctrina militară/Military Science and Military Doctrine*, published in 1937, just grasped the universality of military science and the particularity of national military doctrine. The latter was considered a particular case of the correct application of military science theories to the national specificity. Thus, the existence of a national military doctrine and not of one inspired by a foreign model was militated for.

⁷ War of the Burs - conflict between the British Empire and the Burs (Dutch colonists in South Africa).



The fact that Romania changed sides, on 23 August 1944, fighting alongside the Allies, the Soviet occupation, and the establishment of communist society resulted in a regression in the autochthonous military science.

In the years 1948-1965, the study of military science and art was influenced by the Soviet military doctrine, marked by the ideological conception of the proletarian dictatorship and proletarian internationalism, and by Romania's delay in addressing the planning, organisation and preparation of national defence at strategic level.

The transformations in the summer of 1940, when Romania entered the sphere of influence of Germany, put their mark on the entire Romanian society and implicitly on military science. Elements of the German doctrine quickly emerged by translating and applying German regulations and instructions in the training of our forces. The Second World War diminished the theoretical activity, but the scientific activity of some officers such as Ion Manolescu, Radu Rosetti, Axente Sever Baci, Mircea Tomescu etc. tried to find out lessons from the campaigns of the first part of the war and apply them in the following operations.

The fact that Romania changed sides, on 23 August 1944, fighting alongside the Allies, the Soviet occupation, and the establishment of communist society resulted in a regression in the autochthonous military science. In spite of the sharp increase in Soviet influences on the whole policy, military science managed to retain its originality, the developed studies aiming at directing the military doctrine to the Romanian specific values.

In the first years after the Second World War, in spite of the strong Soviet influences on the entire Romanian policy, including the military, a number of military theorists stressed the need for our country to keep its own military doctrine, original, tailored to the country's concrete conditions. Within the Great General Staff, in other military command structures or military education structures, studies and syntheses were conducted that directed the military doctrine to maintain the appropriate defence capability: *Ideii directoare pentru pregătirea armatei/Guidelines for Army Training – 1946, Orientări spre o nouă doctrină/Guidelines for a New Doctrine – 1947*. In the latter study, disseminated in the Great General Staff, concrete solutions were proposed to counteract the extremely difficult military conditions imposed on Romania by the 1947 Peace Treaty. General Mihail Lascăr, the Minister of National Defence in 1947, in his work, *Metoda științifică și arta militară/The Scientific Method and Military Art*, wrote: "The complexity of modern reality does not allow us to follow another road but to build a Romanian military doctrine to use the most stringent and surprising scientific method"⁸.

⁸ *Permanențe istorice în doctrina militară românească*, Editura Militară, București, 1988, p. 247.



Military doctrine, like any other social domain, was not protected from a certain influence of the party ideology, but in its essence the military doctrine responded not only to party directives but also to the national interest and supreme state rationale: the defence of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Romania.

Under the Logic of the Warsaw Treaty

The attempts of the patriotic theorists to assert their own military doctrine, anchored in Romanian realities and in fundamental national interests, were opposed by the pro-Soviet factors that provoked a tough response, which was part of the series of more virulent attacks launched especially since 1946. The forms of action against the patriotic doctrines were diverse, ranging from disciplinary measures to the most refined ones, influenced by means of propaganda and argumentation, through articles or “scientific” works that provided the solution of adopting the doctrine of the victorious Soviet army. This situation caused a serious diminution, for a period of 15-20 years, of the preoccupations for the development of a national military doctrine according to the specific conditions of Romania. As a result, in the years 1948-1965, the study of military science and art was influenced by the Soviet military doctrine, marked by the ideological conception of the proletarian dictatorship and proletarian internationalism, and by Romania’s delay in addressing the planning, organisation and preparation of national defence at strategic level.

Romania’s distancing from the USSR, starting in 1964, allowed the resumption of the national military doctrine issue. There appeared scientific reference papers, such as *Pagini din gândirea militară românească/Pages of Romanian Military Thinking*, a collection of anthological texts from the studies that emerged between the two world wars, or the work of Colonel Corneliu Soare, *Cu privire la izvoarele tăriei forțelor armate/About the Sources of the Armed Forces Strength*, in which the author made an important remark that synthesised a truth that could finally be said after nearly twenty years of Soviet domination, without the fear of political or other reprisals: “The military doctrine takes into account the country’s specific features, capitalises on national traditions and the capabilities of the national armed forces”⁹. A year later, the idea was complemented by the same theorist: “The military doctrine completes the general specific principles with the knowledge of the specific features without which an army would lack individuality, its personality”¹⁰.

⁹ Colonel Corneliu Soare, *Cu privire la izvoarele tăriei forțelor armate*, Editura Militară, București, 1967, p. 166.

¹⁰ Colonel Corneliu Soare, *Corelația dialectică dintre știința militară și doctrina militară*, in *Probleme de artă militară*, Editura Militară, București, 1969, p. 34.

As a result, towards the end of the seventh and the beginning of the eighth decade, a strong trend in stimulating the scientific and creative spirit was established, a significant role in this respect being held by the Ministry of National Defence in collaboration with various national scientific forums. Therefore, there were established the theses that lay at the basis of a concept of military doctrine, which, although not totally detached from the ideas of Moscow, Romania being a member of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, was an important step in the development of military science research and in the corresponding doctrinal development, with national specificity, as far as it was possible at that time.

The establishment of the Centre for Studies and Research in History and Military Theory in 1969, the stimulation of the development of new doctrinal works, the impulse of the theoretical activity in the Great General Staff, in the Military Academy as well as in other military institutions revived the doctrinal research and led to the reaffirmation of the Romanian character of the doctrine and the emergence of high value doctrinal ideas and principles, such as: *the idea of a national defence system, the thesis of the inalienable right of the Romanian constitutional bodies to decide in the defence field, the principle of prohibiting the acceptance or recognition of any action of a foreign state or any situation of any kind, including the general capitulation or occupation of the national territory, which in time of peace or war would bring any harm to the sovereignty, national independence and territorial integrity of the country, or which would weaken in any way the ability to defend the country*. Other theses and ideas initiated in the past century or in the interwar period were: *the defence of the country by the entire nation, the need for a strong defence industry, the preparation of the population, the economy and the territory for defence etc.* Of course, military doctrine, like any other social domain, was not protected from a certain influence of the party ideology, but in its essence the military doctrine responded not only to party directives but also to the national interest and supreme state rationale: the defence of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Romania. It is worth mentioning some works from that time that contributed to the revival of the Romanian military thinking, such as: *Probleme filosofice ale științei militare/Philosophical Problems*





of *Military Science*, a study published in several volumes, since 1971, under the coordination of General Corneliu Soare, *Teorii militare contemporane/Contemporary Military Theories, Istoria gândirii militare românești/History of the Romanian Military Thinking* (1983), preceded by two important volumes of selected texts, under the title *Pagini din gândirea militară românească/Pages of the Romanian Military Thinking*.

Paradigm Shift after 1989

The Romanian Revolution of December 1989, establishing the new values of democracy and market economy, generated the proper change of the place and role of the military body in the process of building the new society and rethinking the doctrinal framework of the country's defence in line with the new international conditions. Thus, the first signal of remodelling the military doctrine appears at the seminar on military doctrines under the aegis of the Conference for European Security and Cooperation (Vienna 1990). In the communication entitled "Romanian Military Doctrine", the concept of military doctrine was defined as "the unitary concept adopted by the state in the issues related to the organisation, training, technical equipment and use of the armed forces and the population in order to defend the country in accordance with the national interests, conditions and particularities"¹¹.

Subsequently, in 1991, the Supreme Defence Council approved the *Romanian Defence Doctrine*, where the new concept was defined as "... being the system of principles and essential orientations adopted by the Romanian state regarding the organisation, equipment, training, technical equipment and the use of forces and means available to the society for the purpose of national defence". The **important doctrinal idea** of the mentioned document was that, until the building of a viable European security system, Romania must first ensure its national defence through its own forces.

Starting in 2000, the fundamental document that guides the activity of the Romanian Armed Forces for the following years, and which

¹¹ Vasile Ionel, *Doctrina militară a României*, in *Gândirea militară românească* Journal, no. 1, 1990, pp. 5-10.

includes the fundamental options regarding the accomplishment by military means and ways of the defence policy of the Romanian state is the *Military Strategy of Romania* adopted by the Decision of the Romanian Government. The document promoted strategic concepts such as *credible defensive capacity, restructuring and modernisation, intensified operational partnership, gradual integration*, thus the Romanian Armed Forces had to be prepared for crisis management and collective defence missions at regional level. It is worth noting that, for the first time, the armed forces mission was extended to regional level.

The unprecedented exacerbation of terrorist threats and other transnational risks has forced the diversification of the ways and procedures of preserving the fundamental interests that have led to an interpenetration of national security elements with regional or global security ones, capable of ensuring stability and security through interagency cooperation at national or international level. From this perspective, Romania's security and defence policy, a NATO member state since 29 March 2004 and a European Union member state since January 2007, has been part of the Euro-Atlantic security policy. The Romanian Armed Forces, through membership of NATO and the EU, have gradually changed the approach from the one focused on *national defence* to the one focused on *collective defence*, a turning point from a doctrinal point of view, because the participation in collective defence and in the missions in the area of responsibility of NATO and the EU has also involved the participation in expeditionary operations. Thus, the whole existing conceptual system – military strategies, doctrines, textbooks and regulations – although providing us with prerequisites for a common approach to that of the Alliance, was intended to be adapted and perfected for services (Land Forces, Air Force, Naval Forces) so that rapid and effective military operations or actions could be conducted in a joint and multinational framework.

Once joining NATO command and force structures, starting in 2007, the military doctrinal framework had to be adapted to the specifics of the military actions conducted in the international environment, in allied context. Thus, during the period 2008-2012, the national joint military doctrines, developed by the structures of the General Staff, as well as by those of the services, included actions of the Romanian



29 March 2004 – The Romanian Armed Forces, through membership of NATO and the EU, have gradually changed the approach from the one focused on national defence to the one focused on collective defence.

During the period 2008-2012, the national joint military doctrines, developed by the structures of the General Staff, as well as by those of the services, included actions of the Romanian armed forces in the joint military and multinational operations, peace support or crisis response ones, and identified solutions for achieving interoperability with the armies of allied and partner states.



HIERARCHISATION OF NATIONAL OPERATIONAL MILITARY DOCTRINES AND CORRELATION WITH ALLIED MILITARY PUBLICATIONS




Figure 2: National Military Doctrines and Manuals Hierarchisation



Permanently, because of the developments at regional and global level, the Armed Forces are determined to update their military doctrines to keep up with the unpredictability of conflicts that may degenerate into wars. In this respect, the concepts developed in strategic documents or in NATO planning directives, which, through the implications generated up to the member nations strategic level theorisation, contribute to achieving the interoperability of the forces and to guaranteeing the success of their actions.

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CHARACTERISTICS OF CONTEMPORARY CONFLICTS AND OF CONFLICT-PRONE ACTIONS. HYBRID WARFARE

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The author considers that hybrid warfare is a system of social, military and non-military actions conducted in a discrete operational environment having as final result the dissolution of statehood. Thus, in post-war age, the most efficient strategy to defeat undesirable state sovereignty has proved to be its destructuring, be it peaceful or violent, from the inside, through different discrete social actions, followed, on a case by case basis, by restoring social order through military actions. Thus, the role of military structures has gradually changed, entailing the change in organisation and training, from the role of the main force to destroy the enemy to the one of the force specialised in managing post-conflict social states.

Keywords: hybrid warfare; power; post-conflict societies; military and non-military actions.

Introduction

Since ancient times people have lived, worked, hunted, built and loved, fought and died in communities. At the beginning in hoards and extended families, then in settlements and fortresses, culminating with the state and supra-state organisation, united and divided at the same time by language, traditions and beliefs. It has been because of the different interests resulting in the possession or domination-driven behaviour of individuals and groups. Contradictory interests have generated divergences, conflicts or even armed confrontations

Globalisation, which entails the dilution of statehood and the heterogeneity of social-political-cultural organisations, including the unrestricted promotion of international actors power interests, has generated, in turn, mutations in the world order and the balance of power. The disappearance of the *Iron Curtain*, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the communist system resulted, at that time, in maintaining a single state superpower. Moreover, certain supra-state powers have emerged, dominating the world order in different ways. Following a period characterised by the role of hegemon assumed by the United States of America, the early 21st century was marked by spectacular changes in the global arena because of China and Russia as emerging powers.

International Actors Power and Interests

The power and interests of state, supra-state, para-state – political, economic and social actors are essential elements of social-political organisation that galvanise not only international relations but also intercommunity and interconfessional relations, nationally and transnationally, contributing to the establishment of *world order* and *hierarchy*.

The word *power* has many meanings as follows: “...a natural or special ability to do something; a physical strength or effect of something; the position of having political control of a country or government...”¹.

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¹ Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English online, see <https://www.ldoceonline.com/dictionary/power>

In the relations between international actors it is necessary to achieve and maintain a balance of power. However, the complexity of the current geopolitical context and the instability of the system of relations between states do not provide the balance of power with the needed stability.

The term *power* is associated with complementary aspects in the same range with “*ideas of authority, force and violence (physical/symbolic) ... and the social relation of command/subjection*”². Throughout history, *power* has been the factor of social survival or, in other words, the imposition of a common will, dictate and force. Thus, in international relations the term is used as “*...the ability to force the other to do something that he/she would abstain from doing otherwise*”³.

In social context, “*power is an essential element of human existence, and we will be aware of power existence and manifestation in all the areas of social life, from interpersonal relations, through economic transactions, up to religion and political disputes*”⁴. Power is the central point or the nodal element of any social system analysis or point of view relating to the ability to perform complex tasks in the detriment of or constrained by other systems⁵.

In the inter-state relations, power should be used with discernment, mainly considering the compliance with international law principles and norms. In the defence staff activity or at the level of political-military analysis structures, complex measures relating to assessing the adversary *centre of gravity* will be of high interest, placing emphasis on strengths, vulnerabilities, requirements and critical conditions⁶.

In the relations between international actors it is necessary to achieve and maintain a *balance of power* as “*it is only the power quantity and nothing else that determines the rank, raising it*”⁷. However, the complexity of the current geopolitical context and the instability of the system of relations between states do not provide the balance of power with the needed stability.

Interest is considered to be “*an activity that you enjoy doing or a subject that you enjoy studying or the things that bring advantages to someone or something...*”⁸. The complex picture of the interdependencies

² Gheorghe Teodorescu, *Putere, autoritate și comunicare politică*, Editura Nemira, București, 2000, p. 13.

³ Petre Duțu, Cristina Bogzeanu, *Interesele naționale și folosirea instrumentelor de putere națională pentru promovarea și apărarea acestora. Cazul României*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare “Carol I”, București, 2010, p. 32.

⁴ Matteo Pallaver, *Power and Its Form: Hard, Soft, Smart*, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, 2011, p. 12.

⁵ Al.-Ciprian Bogdan, Vasile Bogdan, *Contracararea afectării teroriste la adresa intereselor NATO și Uniunii Europene*, Editura Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, București, 2017, p. 43.

⁶ United States of America, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operation Planning, JP 5-0*, 11 August 2011, p. III-26.

⁷ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Voința de putere*, Editura Aion, Oradea, 1999, p. 553.

⁸ Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, see <https://www.ldoceonline.com/dictionary/interest>

between states, of the intense dynamics on the world political stage may result in conflict situations. They may be followed by crisis-specific manifestations, confrontations or even the social-political-cultural phenomenon called *war*⁹.

Interests are promoted by the desire for power, which is essential in their analysis. Moreover, it should be noted that the desire for power may be analysed gradually¹⁰. The desire for power may be instinctual or planned, being violently promoted depending on the major needs of international actors. In all situations, interests will be promoted indiscriminately, roughly, sometimes wildly¹¹.

The efforts related to power projection and interest promotion will employ different components: *Hard, Soft* or *Smart Power*.

Use of the Terms *Hard, Soft* and *Smart Power*

According to the previously presented aspects power is considered as compelling the opponents having modest possibilities to manifest in political, economic, military or other domains to meet the will of the more powerful ones. The possibilities to impose servitude behaviour on the weaker *actor* (state) are related to the use of the terms *Hard, Soft* and *Smart Power*. In other words, power is the ability to impose the result or the desired end state on someone¹². The *Hard* and *Soft* types are appreciated as being pure forms to apply power.

Hard Power is considered to be the ability of an international actor to “*meet the goals through coercive or threatening actions*”¹³. The existence and dimension of the efforts to manifest power are correlated with physical-geographical realities. Thus, the *Hard Power* generation and affirmation belonging to states may include criteria such as: size, area and nature of the target territory, dimension and capabilities of military power, range of strategic, economic and financial resources¹⁴. The demonstration of *Hard Power* is realistically materialised in the *war* phenomenon, considered by Clausewitz as being the continuation of policy by other means¹⁵.

⁹ Al.-Ciprian Bogdan, Vasile Bogdan, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

¹⁰ Friedrich Nietzsche, *op. cit.*, p. 412.

¹¹ Al.-Ciprian Bogdan, Vasile Bogdan, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-51.

¹² Joseph S.Jr. Nye, *The Changing Nature of World Power*, Political Science Quarterly, 105, pp. 178-179.

¹³ Aigerim Raimzhanova, *Power in IR: Hard, Soft, and Smart*, Institute for Cultural Diplomacy and the University of Bucharest, December 2015, p. 6

¹⁴ Matteo Pallaver, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

¹⁵ Carl von Clausewitz, *Despre război*, Editura Militară, București, 1976, p. 32.

The efforts related to power projection and interest promotion will employ different components: *Hard, Soft* or *Smart Power*.

Hard Power is considered to be the ability of an international actor to “*meet the goals through coercive or threatening actions*”.



Despite the progress made by both international organisations with global or regional vocation and major alliances, military aggression has been the major threat to world peace.

Soft Power is significantly different from the Hard type, eliminating the use of force and coercion from the range of manifestations meant to ensure domination.

The existence and role of this type of possibilities to impose will in the acknowledgement of the state actors status in the world balance of power are indubitable realities characteristic of mankind throughout time.

As it is known, the power relations between the political-social organisations have contributed to the creation or collapse of empires, to the establishment or change of world order and to the acknowledgement of the nature of the relations between modern states.

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In accordance with *Soft Power*, the possibilities that lead to the legitimization of certain moral approaches and the wide acceptance of the circulated statements will be considered. Thus, the support provided by progressive policies, prestigious personalities, cultural actions, acknowledged institutions, political values and other aspects will be taken into account¹⁷.

In the *Soft Power* pyramid, suggested by Aigerim Raimzhanova¹⁸, the highest level may be represented by *agents* such as national states, nongovernmental organisations, private sector, different networks, individuals having the power to influence, civil society, multinational corporations, hybrid structures etc.

The *spheres* or *pillars* are at the medium level, comprising domains such as foreign policy, media technology, domestic policy, science and education, history and culture, trade, sport, tourism, natural environment, religion as well as other domains.

The basic level contains *instruments*, also called "*vehicles*", that transmit *Soft Power* contents: multinational or internal legal framework, major policies, agreed documents (agreements, memoranda, conventions), major events (Olympic Games, different championships, exhibitions, symposiums, visits), publications, cooperation agreements (bilateral, trilateral, multilateral)¹⁹.

¹⁶ Iulian Fota, *România în NATO și UE. Gestionarea globalizării și relansarea modernizării*, Editura ANI "Mihai Viteazul", București, 2013, p. 169.

¹⁷ Matteo Pallaver, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

¹⁸ Aigerim Raimzhanova, *Power in IR: Hard, Soft, and Smart*, *op. cit.*, see http://www.culturaldiplomacy.org/academy/content/pdf/participant-papers/2015-12_annual/Power-In-IR-By-Raimzhanova,-A.pdf

¹⁹ Aigerim Raimzhanova, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-11.



Smart Power is given by the "ability to combine hard and soft power in a success strategy"²⁰. In this regard, a dynamic balance should be struck between the *hard power* specific implications – centric military conceptions and *soft power* – public and specialised public policies, all being in tandem with the unanimously accepted diplomatic tact²¹.

In practice, *Smart Power* entails changing the paradigm related to imposing the will to meet goals. *Smart Power* enforces certain strategies having an adequate content, claiming the use of basic specific resources, the identification of and support for the complex approach, through a set of instruments able to integrate *Soft* and *Hard Power* in a unitary, efficient picture.

More precisely, it is not sufficient to establish a powerful armed forces structure being also necessary to establish a robust system of alliances, partnerships and institutions covering all geopolitical areas and interest levels, able to extend cooperation and to legitimate the joint effort and the force vision²².

Smart Power is the natural result of the new 21st threats and of the current international context challenges, considering the rapid and unpredictable changes. According to the official declarations of the Obama Administration, the USA is the only country that possesses and is able to use this type of power, appreciated as extremely effective.

We add the fact that *Smart Power* is considered, especially by US experts, as being the "*smart*" power able to re-establish, maintain and enforce the US hegemony in a turbulent world that wants rapid and radical changes. Concretely, the new US smart power strategy entails considerable efforts to be made in South and Central Asia, withdrawal from the Middle East, and redefinition of the US role in Europe²³.

The recent approach relating to *Global Peace Operations Initiative – GPOI*, totalling a strength of 75,000 operators, comes to support the creation of effective cooperation instruments, alliances, partnerships and institutions, all having synergistic implications for the world peace²⁴.

²⁰ Joseph S.Jr. Nye, *Ermitage, RL, A Smarter, More Secure America*, CSIS Commission on Smart Power, Washington, 2007, p. 6.

²¹ Christopher A. Gonzales, *Internalizing Full Spectrum Operations Doctrine in the US Army*, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 2011, p. 26.

²² Matteo Pallaver, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

²³ Maya Kandel, Maud Quessard-Salvaing, *American Smart Power Strategies. Redefining Leadership in a Post-American World*, Paris, ÉTUDE DE L'IRSEM 32, September 2014, see www.defense.gouv.fr/.../etude%2032%20smart%20power%20etats-unis%20web.pdf, retrieved on 10 November 2017

²⁴ Christopher A. Gonzales, *op. cit.*, pp. 26-27.

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Types of Contemporary Armed Conflicts

The world diversity and the globalisation effects generate a multitude of interdependent situations that can be transposed, in a bilateral or multilateral form, in harmonious (acceptance) states, disharmony, differenda or even specific conflicting situations. In turn, the state of conflict can comprise differenda or conflict-prone situations having different nature. Thus, symmetrical, asymmetrical or hybrid confrontations can be activated, depending on the international context, the power ratio in different geopolitical areas, the armed effort capacity and especially the actors in confrontation.

Symmetrical confrontation is the relatively predictable way to conduct the armed effort. According to LDCE, symmetry is “the quality that a situation has when two events or actions seem to be balanced or equal in some way”²⁵.

At strategic level, symmetry is the main characteristic of confrontation that has accompanied the military history of humanity for most of its periods. The specific of symmetry is the army against army form of armed confrontation, the combat potential of the actors being relatively equal. The *Centres of Gravity* – CoG are also similar, defined by the strength of the two armies. In most of the cases, defeating an army meant taking the power over the opponent actor.

Practically, symmetrical confrontation imposes only lines of operation, the lines of effort being absent or consisting in implications that are peripheral to the armed conflict. In such a case, there is a direct confrontation between the centres of gravity by activating the lines of operation.

The nature, procedures and development of the armed effort are relatively predictable. To the attitude of attack or advance adopted by a belligerent party (offensive) corresponds the other party form of stationing (defence). Likewise, if actor A moves the forces (dynamic form), actor B can defend from a strengthened position or in ambush (static forms). The uniqueness of the entities in confrontation determines forms of predictability or reciprocity relating to the countering measures adopted by the adversary. The aggregate effects of the conducted actions will be directed towards the destruction of the opponent capacity of effort.

The victorious state adjudicates the territories and possessions of the defeated one, often without the possibility of subsequent confrontations resulting in changes of the end state.

²⁵ Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, see <https://www.ldoceonline.com/dictionary/symmetry>




Figure 1: Symmetrical confrontation

Source: Alexandru-Ciprian Bogdan, Vasile Bogdan, *Contraacarea afecării teroriste la adresa intereselor NATO și Uniunii Europene*, Editura CTEA, București, 2017, p. 52.

The extensive use of *Hard Power* is specific to symmetrical confrontation. In this type of confrontation non-military actions are not well represented, the military effort being omnipresent and decisive. As forms of manifestation, depending on the historical period, the weapon and technology development, the goals and scope of operations, the following can be mentioned: attack, offensive, defence, siege, fight for positions, encirclement, withdrawal, chase, airborne troops combat, seaborne troops combat and their countering.

Relating to possible examples, mention should be made that humanity, since the beginning of its social organisation up to the end of the Second World War, was characterised by the preponderant existence of such type of confrontation: the wars in Ancient history, those in the Middle Ages, then those in the Modern Age up to 1945 contained symmetrical forms of confrontation.

Asymmetrical confrontation is known to be relatively opposed to the symmetrical variant. Asymmetry is characterised by the lack in or non-compliance with rules, and it is adopted *in extremis*, when the actors in confrontation have a totally disproportionate military potential. It exists or it is sought by commanders at tactical level in symmetrical confrontations alike, especially in order to break the balance or to achieve surprise or the superiority necessary for the offensive. At tactical level, asymmetry is the essential condition for winning victory.

At strategic level, the essence of asymmetrical confrontation is to strike the adversary by surprise and preponderantly in the sectors

where vulnerabilities have been identified²⁶. Starting from the fact that direct, face-to-face, fight is not possible or it is not recommended, the weaker actor has to resort to indirect confrontation, partial and narrower in scope, avoiding the enemy centre/centres of gravity with ability. Such type of confrontation requires the partial and temporary activation of certain lines of operation or effort, depending on the weaker actor possibilities and advantages.

Mention should be made that *“asymmetric warfare is mostly covert war, waged at low intensity by guerrilla groups, religious cults, drug cartels and even special force components of regular armed forces”*²⁷.

It is important to note that, following surprise, which is often based on setting, scope and/or timing and aggregate effects as far as actions are concerned, the vulnerable actor causes wear and tear, demoralising the stronger actor. Thus, skilfully and patiently, it is possible for the weaker actor to win final victory. The lines of operation are fragmented while the lines of effort are absent or they have implications that are peripheral to the armed conflict. It cannot be a confrontation between the centres of gravity.

Therefore, the adversary vulnerabilities are preponderantly sought for and targeted to channel the weaker actor efforts. The armed effort nature, techniques, procedures and application will be absolutely not compliant with rules being thus unpredictable.

The actor having a weaker potential, through repeated strikes executed by surprise, will try to maintain initiative, causing loss to the opponent, inducing a permanent state of uncertainty, fatigue and fear, lack of trust in the possibility to take the initiative and defeat the omnipresent but invisible opponent²⁸. To meet the set strategic goals numerous segments of population will be attracted to conflict.

In the context of current confrontations, the international law prohibits the execution of military strikes (by the actor having robust potential) on civilian targets. Otherwise, the clandestine action is employed, asymmetry entailing strikes from the civilian to the military environment; engaging, striking, incapacitating and destroying the powerful opponent military targets.

Practically, all the procedures and methods that may result in diminishing the adversary superior potential and in destroying the will to fight. It is evident that the mentioned approach to fight is out

²⁶ Al.-Ciprian Bogdan, Vasile Bogdan, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

²⁷ Ajey Lele, *Asymmetric Warfare: A State vs Non-State Conflict*, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, India, Oasis, No. 20 – Julio.Dicembre 2014, p. 101.

²⁸ Al.-Ciprian Bogdan, Vasile Bogdan, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-53.




Figure 2: Asymmetrical confrontation

Source: Alexandru-Ciprian Bogdan, Vasile Bogdan, *Contrațararea afecțării teroriste la adresa intereselor NATO și Uniunii Europene*, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

of the framework provided by international law and it is in conflict with the rules and traditions of waging war. The adversary continues to be important, preponderantly in the case of the international actor having a higher military potential.

It should be acknowledged the fact that non-military actions play the decisive role in winning victory. Asymmetrical forms of confrontation have been always employed, throughout history, when it was necessary to overcome the handicap of having a clearly disadvantageous combat potential. Kenneth F. McKenzie has identified such types of threats or possible threats that can be activated in the current geopolitical context as follows: nuclear, biological, chemical threats, certain components of Info Ops or deriving from the analysis of some threat-prone operational concepts²⁹. If, normally, the current asymmetrical confrontation can include three or four of the threats, the trend is that all the forms identified by McKenzie could be involved in the future asymmetrical warfare.

There are extremely numerous examples in this regard. The Old Testament mentions the well-known fight between David and giant Goliath. A stone, symbol of asymmetrical action, gracefully thrown at a vulnerable point of the giant, contributed to winning victory in the biblical confrontation³⁰.

²⁹ Kenneth McKenzie, *The Revenge of the Melians: Asymmetric Warfare Threats and Next*, Odr. McNair Paper, No. 62, p. 19.

³⁰ Toni Pfeanner, *Asymmetrical Warfare from the Perspective of Humanitarian Law and Humanitarian Action*, *International Review of Red Cross*, Vol. 87. No. 857, March 2005, p. 149.

At strategic level, the essence of asymmetrical confrontation is to strike the adversary by surprise and preponderantly in the sectors where vulnerabilities have been identified.

The actor having a weaker potential, through repeated strikes executed by surprise, will try to maintain initiative, causing loss to the opponent, inducing a permanent state of uncertainty, fatigue and fear, lack of trust in the possibility to take the initiative and defeat the omnipresent but invisible opponent.



Asymmetrical forms of confrontation have been always employed, throughout history, when it was necessary to overcome the handicap of having a clearly disadvantageous combat potential.

The Trojan horse, the asymmetrical action planned by Ulysses, infiltrated a group of Achaean fighters inside the walls of Troy. They opened the gates of the fortress at night, making it possible for it to be conquered by deceit.

Alexander the Great, the leader of a small army in the Battle of Gaugamela or the “Camels House” (1 October 331 BC), won a brilliant victory in an asymmetrical confrontation, by surprisingly oblique movement, action inconsistent with the rules of the time, being used for the first time even the centric effects, defined much later (even Alexander was the spearhead of the decisive attack on Darius place of displacement)³¹.

The greatest empire in the world, Genghis Khan’s Mongol Empire, was built through the victorious fights, won by the brilliant commander who channelled the crushing strikes (especially those executed by the dread Kheshig³²) and timely identified the weaknesses in the enemy disposition, based on the intelligence efforts and on his own commander genius³³.

On the night of 16-17 June 1472, about 3 hours after the evening, an army of 700-1,000 mountain fighters disguised as Turks and led by Vlad the Impaler who knew the language and customs of the Turks launched a night attack targeting the tent of the Ottoman sultan to kill him. In the general nocturnal skirmish, the Turks butchered themselves. Losses of about 30,000-35,000 people were caused to the Turks, the sultan escaping due to the fact that he was not present in his own tent³⁴.

During the Pacific Battle, in order to bypass the destructive strikes of US dreadnoughts, the Japanese developed the *Type 93* torpedo having a medium range of 20,000 yards, the maximum range of torpedoes at that time being 10,000 yards, and a speed of 45 knots/hour. Launched during the night, Japanese torpedoes caused massive damage, the case of *USS Minneapolis* heavy cruiser being evident³⁵. Among the different

³¹ Jeremy Black, *Șaptezeci de mari bătălii ale tuturor timpurilor*, Editura Aquila, București, 2006, p. 31.

³² Kheshig – elite structures having a constant strength of 10,000 troops, selected from the best and most courageous, highly trained and best equipped, totally devoted to the Mongolian leader troops, appointed to defend the Emperor of Mongolia in any situation. In decisive moments, part of the structure (or even the entire structure) performed absolutely implacable strikes on the vulnerable sectors bringing victory to the Mongols.

³³ Francis Dvornik, *Origins of Intelligence Services*, New Brunswick, Rutgers, University Press, pp. 277-290.

³⁴ Constantin Giurescu, *Istoria românilor*, vol. II, Editura All, București, 2013, p. 39.

³⁵ Clinton J. Ancker III, Michael D. Burke, *Doctrine for Asymmetric Warfare*, Military Review, July-August 2003, pp. 18-19.



The advantages of asymmetrical confrontation, mainly enjoyed by the actor having modest possibilities, caused discomfort to the states having significant potential resources in the major areas of confrontation. Therefore, the hybrid form of confrontation emerged to meet the interests of actors having different possibilities of engagement in conflict-prone areas.

asymmetrical forms the following can be mentioned: harassment, night attack, ambush, improvised explosive devices, covert mining, flooding of low areas, wave generation, terrorism, assassinations, poisoning of vital resources (air, water, environment), guerrilla, people’s war.

The advantages of asymmetrical confrontation, mainly enjoyed by the actor having modest possibilities, caused discomfort to the states having significant potential resources in the major areas of confrontation. Therefore, the hybrid form of confrontation emerged to meet the interests of actors having different possibilities of engagement in conflict-prone areas.

Hybrid confrontation is, practically, the oldest and most spread type of confrontation. It is only the scope that makes the difference and brings it to the attention of the public opinion. The term *hybrid* signifies “something that consists of or comes from a mixture of two or more other things”³⁶. Hybrid confrontation is a form of confrontation that has been theorised by experts in polemology relatively recently. It has been more frequently used by military analysts and the media especially after the annexation of Crimea by Russia, in 2014³⁷.

In the Romanian literature, the syntagm *hybrid warfare* has been recently used in studies in relation to actions and/or operations entailing a mix of symmetrical, asymmetrical and irregular forms in manners and proportions imposed by the operational framework requirements³⁸. Quite exact predictive theorisations of the concept, without being labelled as such, surely based on the observation of recent political-military events in our country, the Balkans and the Republic of Moldova, can be found in autochthonous specialised papers starting in 2001. Army Corps General (at that time) Eugen Bădălan, who later became Chief of the General Staff, states with the confidence of career military: “Thus we will witness a leap from the *«military warfare»* to the *«political warfare»*. It will entail using military actions only in a limited manner, when it is highly necessary, seeking not only to cause destructions but also, and especially, to produce a psychological effect on the adversary population, namely to discourage, to alter the will to fight, to erode trust in winning victory, to withdraw support for own armed forces. The following are preponderant: exercising political-economic pressures (...);

³⁶ Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, see <https://www.ldoceonline.com/dictionary/hybrid>

³⁷ Erik Richborn-Kjennerud, Patrick Cullen, *What is Hybrid Warfare?*, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo, 2016, p. 1.

³⁸ Eugen Bădălan (coord.), *Concepte strategice și operative de actualitate*, Editura Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, București, 2014, pp. 16-17.




Figure 3: Hybrid confrontation

Source: Alexandru-Ciprian Bogdan, Vasile Bogdan, *Contracararea afecării teroriste la adresa intereselor NATO și Uniunii Europene*, op. cit., p. 55.

appealing to the UN intervention (...); orchestrating some coups d'état supported from the exterior etc., these actions representing the main content of the operations belonging to the so-called 'grey area' (low-intensity conflict), which articulate, in a flexible concept, terrorism and diversion, psychological manipulation, civil violence, insurgency, border collisions etc. They will be accompanied by an 'external manoeuvre' in the international arena, which can become, because of its effects, more important than the direct operation"³⁹. Practically, the Romanian General defines and describes hybrid warfare without labelling it as such, conceptualising in advance the future syntagm *hybrid warfare*.

In Western literature, the term has been used after 2002, when W. J. Nemeth published his thesis⁴⁰.

Concretely, hybrid confrontation extends the possibilities to aggregate symmetrical and asymmetrical efforts, combining a multitude of forms belonging to unrestricted warfare, conventional warfare, limited warfare, economic warfare, confrontations for energy resources, cyber confrontations, and proxy warfare.

³⁹ Eugen Bădălan, *Securitatea României, actualitate și perspectivă. Un punct de vedere*, Editura Militară, București, 2001, p. 99.

⁴⁰ William J. Németh, *Future War and Chechnya: A Case for Hybrid Warfare*, Monterey CA, Naval Postgraduate School, 2002.

All the mentioned forms can be used in complex and versatile manners alongside diverse capabilities (criminal, financial, informational, economic), employing aggressive and depreciating propaganda against the opponent, as well as extended forms of insurgency, terrorism and ad-hoc conflict, which are necessary to achieve the desired end state⁴¹.

Mention should be made that the decisive role in meeting the goals of the war is played by non-military means⁴², *lines of effort* or *operations* conceived in a synergistic manner resulting in the society stability weakening, governance dissolution and armed forces capability severely altering.

In hybrid confrontation, the decisive role in meeting the end state is played by the non-military actions that are higher in intensity than the military effort, having more important results⁴³. The goal of the actions conducted in the target state is the statehood failure.

CONCLUSIONS

Asymmetry exists since ancient times. Examples in this regard are David and Goliath, barbarous hords that attacked Rome, the fall of Troy and Ulysses trickery, the attack in Târgoviște, led by Vlad the Impaler against the superior Turkish army, up to Afghan mujahedeen. Asymmetry is the strategy employed by the more vulnerable actor. Today it is used by states having reduced potential or non-state actors. In both cases, the actor having low military potential seeks forms, moments and procedures to act capitalising on the adversary vulnerabilities. The initiative belongs to the most vulnerable actor that can enjoy the population sympathy and support.

Globalisation allows the actors having high military potential to manifest in a relatively similar manner, by conceiving and adopting some strategies related to waging war, following the patterns adopted by the vulnerable actor but using means and resources in accordance with really available capabilities or even innovating in the field, extending the area of non-military interventionism in almost all domains of social-economic and cultural life. This is *hybrid warfare*.

⁴¹ Iulian Chifu, *Război hibrid, Lawfare, război informațional. Războaiele viitorului*, p. 200, in International Scientific Conference Strategies XXI, Editura U.N.Ap. "Carol I", București, 11-12 June 2015.

⁴² Zdeněk Kříž, Zinaida Bechná, Peter Števkov, *Hybrid Warfare: Its Concept, Potential and How to Fight It*, p. 10, in *Hybrid Warfare: A New Phenomenon in Europe's Security Environment* (2nd edition), Praha, Ostrava, Jagello 2000 for NATO Information Centre in Prague, 2016.

⁴³ Al.-Ciprian Bogdan, Vasile Bogdan, op. cit., p. 54.

Concretely, hybrid confrontation extends the possibilities to aggregate symmetrical and asymmetrical efforts, combining a multitude of forms belonging to unrestricted warfare, conventional warfare, limited warfare, economic warfare, confrontations for energy resources, cyber confrontations, and proxy warfare.



In hybrid confrontation the initiative belongs to the powerful actor. In order to sidestep international law and mislead the public, on the one hand, as well as the vigilance of the target state, on the other hand, such actor dissimulates and undermines the organisational capacity and institutional efficiency from the opponent centre of gravity, by using some clandestine forces and some unconventional techniques and means. Successively, society, governance and then armed forces are mainly attacked.

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In the attacks on the society the negative aspects of life and labour conditions are emphasised, the deficiencies in communication, the public services vulnerabilities, the fault lines in society, the ethnic or religious animosities, the historical misunderstandings as well as other vulnerabilities are capitalised on. Following the polarisation of human groups, the definition of hotbeds and the inflammation of opinions, experts without insignia belonging to the powerful actor intelligence structures or special operations forces control the destructive non-military developments so that eventually regular military forces can intervene to provide counselling for the new social and political-economic stability or to support the ethnic/religious radicalised groups. Modern state infusion technologies used by militias/belligerent groups cause great problems for the target states structures and conventional armed forces. The defeat of armed structures, the failure in governance, the instability in the target territory eventually result in the dissolution of statehood. The assailant actor will arrogate the role of saviour or pacifist or will portray as victim or conflict mediator, while vehemently preaching the non-interference in the internal affairs of the assaulted state.

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CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE TRANSFORMATION OF MODERN WARFARE AND THE NATURE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE PARADIGM OF THE COMPLEXITY OF INFORMATION AGE

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The aim of this article is to identify and analyse how the complexity of the 21st century Information Age transforms war, regarded as a violent behaviour of states at the level of the international system, and extends the classical typology of use of military power through military operations. Thus, a comparison is made between the two forms of warfare, traditional and asymmetrical (irregular), taking into account a homogeneous set of criteria: the actors involved, the strategic objectives, the status of civilians and the way of concluding the war.

As regards the nature of military operations, we identify the augmentation of the classic set of combat and stability operations with that of crisis response operations, limited by contingency, military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence operations.

This article represents a partial dissemination of the results obtained in the 3rd report of the doctoral programme at the Doctoral School of "Carol I" National Defence University to support the thesis entitled "Operational management determinations specific to the modern war based on the complexity theory".

Keywords: traditional warfare, asymmetric warfare, irregular warfare, military operations.

Introduction

The modern technologies as well as the new patterns of social networking of individuals and institutions continuously transform the international security environment. Of course, the evolution of this environment shows a consistency phased mainly on the historical moments of the development of humanity – Antiquity, Middle Ages, Renaissance, industrial revolution, capitalism – with a slow progression at generation level. The most important feature of the 21st century is the accelerated pace at which technological and social innovation take place, radically changing the relations of power between states in only a few decades.

It is therefore necessary for the way in which the war is led to evolve in the sense of tailoring to meet the realities and the projection of the international security environment. At the doctrinal level, the new warfare is described by the theories regarding the military operations that are way more complex than their previous versions, which are specific to the era of industrialisation.

The Modern Warfare Dichotomy: Traditional and Irregular (Asymmetric) Warfare

War is a universal phenomenon whose form or purpose is defined by the society that initiates it. Although its nature is immutable, *leading to the extreme use of violence*, according to von Clausewitz, the way of conducting the war, the warfare, is constantly changing, being transformed by the society and technology. This distinction between the *nature* of the war and *the way* in which it is conducted is essential to define the framework in which future wars will be waged. Thus, the theorists can come up with solutions regarding the force structure, how this is trained, and, last but not least, how to conduct military campaigns and operations.

Essentially, we can identify two forms of warfare: the traditional one and the asymmetrical or irregular warfare, the difference being given by the strategic objective of each form. But while the war involves both offensive and defensive operations, it also includes the duality

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of both traditional and asymmetric forms of warfare. Combining them is possible depending on the strategies and capabilities of combatants.

The traditional form of war means the violent struggle for supremacy between the regular armed forces of certain nation states or coalitions/alliances of nation states. The origins of this form are found in the Peace Treaties of Westphalia (1648), which enshrined the legitimacy and monopoly of the nation state over the use of force. The focal strategic objective of this typology is to impose the will of a state on the opposing nation state(s).

Traditional wars are conducted through military operations that are directed against enemy armed forces with the ultimate goal of influencing the opponent's political leadership. These military operations mainly involve conventional and special forces operating in all five areas of the battlespace (land, air, sea, space and information, cyberspace included).

The victory in the traditional war means defeating the enemy's military forces, destroying its material and motivational ability to fight in a war and temporarily or permanently occupying the enemy territory. In order to achieve these objectives, *offensive, defensive* and *stability* military operations are planned and carried out, which target the enemy CoGs (Centres of Gravity).

So we can consider that the traditional way of conducting the war is based on manoeuvre and firepower with the purpose of achieving the operative military objectives and, finally, the strategic political ones.

Another feature of traditional war, documented and established in fact by the rules of international law, concerns the status of civilians in the context of military operations. Thus, the civilian population in an area of operations should be regarded as non-belligerent. From this perspective, minimising the losses of any kind of civilian population is a fundamental objective in designing military operations.

The end result of such a form of war is often very clear, the conflict ending with the victory of one party over the other.

Unlike the traditional form, the *irregular war* is characterised by military violence between nation states and non-state actors. In this model, the strategic objectives are the *legitimacy* and *control* over a relevant territory and population in that area. The term *irregular* means precisely the non-Westphalian context of the conflict and the centre of gravity at strategic level is gaining the support of the civilian population.

From a historical point of view, the *irregular war* was not a form of warfare per se, because the resistance (insurgency) movements taking place in various wars (the resistance movements in Spain during the Napoleonic Wars 1803-1815 or the resistance movement in the Second World War) had limited means and therefore limited, strategically irrelevant objectives, consisting mainly in harassing the occupying forces. Therefore, the military operations aimed at neutralising these forces took place only tactically, locally, complementarily to the traditional battle operations from the areas of operation. These operations did not have a doctrinal basis as counterinsurgency operations do today. They only aimed at the physical destruction of insurgents and at intimidating the civilian population to support the insurgency.

Today, due to the globalisation and the commercial character of high-tech products (communications, data processing, intelligence, surveillance and data capture), non-state actors have access to financial resources and modern weapon systems, including weapons of mass destruction. Due to these transformations, a non-state opponent, less powerful by definition, gets the opportunity to challenge and question the legitimacy of the military force held by an internationally recognised government.

By extending the class of the asymmetric enemy through including the state actors with military capabilities that are disproportionately smaller than those of the powerful states, they can initiate asymmetric and indirect actions across the entire (military, information, economic or diplomatic) range, leading to the erosion of the power and will of the opposing powerful state. The weaker state opponent chooses to avoid direct confrontation with the enemy military force by attacking isolated military or non-military targets in order to influence and control the population of the more powerful state.

Mention should be made that, as far as asymmetric conflicts are concerned, the military operations cannot lead exclusively and directly to the achievement of the political objectives related to the desired end-state. To achieve the success in such case, it is necessary to involve all of the instruments of national power (military, diplomatic, economic and information ones).

The opponents who use asymmetric means try to prolong the conflicts in an attempt to weaken the enemy state's will to fight, as well as to determine the local population to accept them.



The irregular war means military violence between nation states and non-state actors, with the single or combined use of the following: hybrid war, insurgency, terrorism, misinformation, propaganda and organised crime (kidnappings, drug trafficking).



The irregular warfare means the single or combined use of the following: hybrid war, insurgency, terrorism, misinformation, propaganda and organised crime (kidnappings, drug trafficking). In addition, the access to technologies, including the military ones, enables them to possess modern weapon systems, implement C2 systems and support networks, all of which being traditionally characteristic to regular military forces. These conditions favouring the asymmetric opponent are amplified by a better tactical knowledge of the battlefield and by the ability to dissimulate among the civilian population.

In order to manage this type of warfare, the doctrine of the legitimate military force must be based on a mix of offensive, defensive, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, stability, security and reconstruction operations. The method and proportion of combining these operations depend on a multitude of factors among which we can mention the capabilities and nature of the irregular enemy.

In addition to the approach centred on population and network (dense interconnected entities), specific to irregular warfare, we can also notice the change in the methodology for setting and prioritising targets. In the traditional paradigm, the main targets are the enemy's forces and military objectives, sometimes the industrial-strategic ones. Instead, the new model is based on identifying, tracking and hitting relevant combatants at the individual level, as demonstrated by the systematic US actions to surgically strike and annihilate al-Qaeda and Daesh (ISIS) leaders.

In our analysis, we consider that the way to end the war represents the ultimate difference between the two models. Thus, in the Westphalian perspective, a conflict is ended in an organised framework, according to legal norms, through the negotiation and acceptance of the terms of peace, followed by the orderly demobilisation and repatriation of combatants. Unfortunately, irregular warfare does not conform to this pattern, the recent and prolonged experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan, of more than 15 years, not offering or failing to foresee a reasonable outcome to be theorised and codified by the rules of international law.

The Modern Warfare Modelling through Military Operations

In the context of the use of the instruments of national power, the military leverage is engaged through military operations. These are the actions by which military missions are carried out at the strategic, operational and tactical level, aimed at achieving the objectives at all levels of war.



Essentially, an operation is a sequence of tactical actions to achieve a common goal and includes movement, supply, attack, defence and manoeuvre. Subsequently, a major operation represents a series of tactical actions such as battles, engagements and strikes carried out in a coordinated manner in time and space by combat forces to accomplish strategic and operational goals in an area of operations. When the objectives exceed one single major operation, military campaigns are planned, bringing together a number of major interrelated operations. Thus, campaigns are the largest and most complex military operations.

From the point of view of the missions, tasks and activities that need to be accomplished, a wide range of military operations can be mentioned: *stability* (maintaining or restoring the security environment, providing essential government services, rebuilding emergency and humanitarian support infrastructure), *defence and support* (supporting the state administrative authorities in cases of emergency, disaster or imposing/restoring public order), *humanitarian assistance outside the national territory* (at the request of international organisations for relief in case of natural disasters, endemic hunger or other crises), *recovery* (search, localisation, identification and recovery of persons or critical equipment in isolated or hard-to-reach areas), *non-combatants evacuation* (evacuation of own nationals from conflict areas outside the national territory and repatriation), *peace operations* (peace imposing, peacekeeping, reconciliation, reconstruction and transition to legitimate governance), *countering weapons of mass destruction* (to prevent the design, development, possession, proliferation, use and effects of weapons of mass destruction), *defence of national territory* (defence of sovereignty, integrity of national territory, population and critical infrastructure), *combating terrorism* (counterterrorism and antiterrorism measures to reduce vulnerabilities to a potential attack), *counterinsurgency* (targeting military and civilian objectives to defeat insurgency and to manage the dissatisfaction among local populations) and *security*¹.

The use of military forces in such a variety of operations shows the evolution of the concept of using military power in a security environment dominated by complexity and uncertainty. Complexity is determined by the nature of the threats as well as by the multitude of organisational, governmental and non-governmental entities that have specific tasks.

¹ US Joint Chiefs of Staffs, Joint Publication 3-0 – *Joint Operations*, 17 January 2017, p V-2, retrieved on 07.12.2017, https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_0.pdf.



Therefore, in the 21st century, military forces do not act singularly and as a matter of priority, assuming command and control over other instruments of state power or capabilities. On the contrary, the design of current operations recognises the pre-eminence of the political leadership and of the policy objectives at the strategic level, and turns them into military objectives at the operational level, during operations planning (operational art and operational design) and translates them into real actions at the tactical level. If, at the strategic level, the interaction between the military and the political (civil) leadership is evident and has historical origins determined by the separation of the powers in the modern state, the cooperation between civilians and militaries becomes increasingly intense at the operational and tactical levels.

The current military operations, unlike those carried out just three decades ago, are marked by the unprecedented involvement at the tactical level of non-military actors. Civilian contractors have real tasks in providing and delivering services/products that used to be provided exclusively by military logistics structures. Civilian contractors provide security services for military bases, facilities or transports. In addition, most of the missions and assignments that do not involve combat activities are carried out in cooperation with civil authorities and representatives of various non-governmental organisations.

Another feature of military operations lies in their *linear* or *non-linear* character. In linear operations, each commander conducts and guides combat actions against enemy forces in a combined manner, and synchronised with nearest units. In this type of operation, space and time coordination of own forces (alliance, multinational coalition) acting in the same area of operations is essential. The relative positioning of own units favours concentration of forces and ensures their increased security. Subsequently, the lines of communication (LOCs) linking support bases and combat forces can be developed and defended. Protected LOCs increase the force strength and ensure freedom of movement. In general, the linear organisation of the area of operations is suitable for certain operations or their specific phases. For example, when the enemy arrays its forces on echelons organised in depth or when they seek to concentrate and synchronise the forces. The lack of detailed and reliable information about the enemy's forces and intentions is a determinant factor for planning certain linear operations. Ground operations in World War II are recent examples of linear operations.

For non-linear operations, the forces' objectives do not (geographically) dependent on those of the nearby forces in terms of space. This type of operations focuses on creating specific effects on multiple decisive points. Non-linear operations involve the initiation of simultaneous operations on multiple lines (LOO – Line of Operation). Simultaneously, they aim to disintegrate the enemy's C2 system and create the conditions for own forces to take initiative. Under these operations, the logistic support functions are accomplished by moving assets together with combat forces or by airlift. If, for linear operations, the areas of operations largely bypass the areas populated by non-combatants, non-linear operations must also take into account the civilian population. In this context, the non-combatants and the fluidity, inherent in this type of operations, require surgical strikes planning and execution. Commanders must be able to act against multiple targets, execute agile and rapid manoeuvres against several critical points of the enemy through accurate and focused strikes. For force protection, commanders must always be aware of the operational (own and enemy) situation, have credible and timely information, and use mobility and freedom of action to the detriment of mass (concentration) of forces. Mention should be made that the emphasis in non-linear operations is placed on communications, information, mobility, innovation and less on logistic support.

Another classification of military operations, based on the nature of the strategic objectives to be achieved, points out three main categories:

- *military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence;*
- *crisis response and limited contingency operations;*
- *major operations.*

This classification describes the whole range of military activities and operations that make the gradual transition from the relative peace, previous to the conflict, to the conflict itself.

Military engagement, security cooperation and deterrence operations are aimed at developing regional awareness, establishing functional relationships with partners, shaping the operational environment, and maintaining the tensions between the parties involved (nations, ethnic/religious populations) below the level of declared armed conflict. Deterrence actions are aimed at preventing the enemy's conflict escalation by posing a credible threat to their actions and causing the decision-maker to consider a peaceful settlement of the disputes. This first category includes military assistance, security assistance, humanitarian assistance, counterinsurgency, counter-drug



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operations as well as operations for countering weapons of mass destruction.

Crisis response operations and limited contingency operations can be distinct or independent operations, in which case they are small-scale, limited duration operations and are carried out usually at tactical level. However, they can also be part of major operations, in which case the objectives are at strategic level. In both cases, force protection requires the planning of combat operations.

The objective of major military combat operations is to defeat the enemy, conclude hostilities and restore peace. Major operations and military campaigns involve the combination of *offensive*, *defensive* and *stability* operations through a 6-phase process: *shape* the operational environment, *deter* the enemy, *seize* the initiative, *dominate* the enemy, stabilise the *environment* and *enable* civil authorities.

Conclusions

The complexity and fluidity of the security environment in the 21st century has changed deeply the nature and diversity of vulnerabilities, risks and threats with which the states are faced. Therefore, they have to adapt the way of using the instruments of national power and thus the engagement of the military power, in keeping with the specifics of the new challenges.

The access to modern communications and military technologies as well as to internationally spread financial resources provides non-state actors or less powerful states with the opportunity to challenge the authority of powerful states. Thus, past insurgencies have transformed in the concept of irregular warfare, which encompasses the three major challenges to global security and the Westphalian international system: hybrid warfare, insurgency and terrorism. The reality of irregular warfare widens the nature of traditional military operations (offensive, defence and stability) to include counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, security and reconstruction.

The use of military power is decided by the political decision-maker and has the role of turning the desired end state into military objectives that are achieved through military operations and campaigns. In the paradigm of operations and campaigns carried out until the beginning of this century, the engagement of instruments of national power was mainly sequential, depending on the success or failure of the precedent campaign.

This restrictive and strictly specialised use of military power was also reflected in the first five strategic concepts of the North Atlantic Alliance, which focused exclusively on collective defence, in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty (1949). Since the Washington Summit in 1999, *crisis management* has become a core task, transforming the very nature of the exclusively military objectives of the Alliance, thus recognising the complexity of the security environment.

Consequently, in order to provide an appropriate response to these developments, military scholars adapt the old topics and develop new ones regarding military operations. Thus, they distinguish between classical, linear operations, and the current ones, characterised by the non-linearity of forces distribution and action. Of course, not all of the proposed concepts are new. For example, the current *swarming* doctrine has its origins in the German *blitzkrieg*, yet, the current technologies and new theories of forces and means network organisation are what make the difference and represent the elements of innovation.

In this article, we have analysed several classifications of current military operations in terms of their missions, objectives and character. At the same time, we have taken a closer look at the increasing role of the non-military actors, who have a constant presence at all levels of planning and carrying out military operations, including the tactical one.

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MILITARY AND CIVILIAN REQUIREMENTS IN PLANNING DEFENCE OBJECTIVES IN URBAN SETTLEMENTS

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The author shows that one of the direct results of global terrorism is undoubtedly the militarisation of urban space. It is emphasised the fact that not only topographic conditions are important in locating military objectives today, but also a combination of physical and cybernetic elements required for military interoperability. The urbanisation of warfare is a concept that is redefined in terms of forms of violence and effects on the citizen. Urban vulnerabilities are identified both in poor and degraded settlements and in highly technological cities such as smart cities. The author concludes that there will be no sustainable urbanisation without a new form of spatial planning, taking into account aspects such as environment, urban violence, poverty, migration as well as new technologies.

Keywords: civil-military planning; smart city; military operations in urban areas; spatial planning; defence.

Introduction

Post-conflict, support, stability, or humanitarian aid activities are becoming more and more expensive, extending over longer periods of time. These activities may occur before, during or after other military actions. Given that future military operations will also be conducted in the urban environment, we consider it is necessary to rethink the activity of structures such as CIMIC or PSYOPS. The cost and time allocated to civilian-military operations, which are aimed at reducing the impact of military operations on civilians, can be reduced by the permanent civilian-military cooperation of the actors involved in city governance and planning. In this respect, the *spatial planning*¹ process should be in line with the civil and military requirements needed to develop the city defence capability.

The Role of Cities in Military Defence Strategies and Concepts

Ensuring the security of the citizens living in cities cannot be achieved only by building walls, which are understood as a very clearly defined physical limit. Various cities have been established for military purposes. Affected by the advance of the military technology, the military role of cities has undergone numerous transformations. “All the advantages that defenders held until the end of the Middle Ages would evaporate during the fifteenth century. The element that would change the world was the cannon. [...] The first victim of the cannon was the tower, which gradually lost its height, until it was down to the wall by the end of the fifteenth century”². The progress of artillery and aviation has changed the ways of defence, and the nuclear war and the diversification of the types of wars have increased the vulnerability of cities in front of new threats.

The cost and time allocated to civilian-military operations, which are aimed at reducing the impact of military operations on civilians, can be reduced by the permanent civilian-military cooperation of the actors involved in city governance and planning.

¹ The European Spatial Planning Compendium defines *spatial planning* as “public policies and actions to influence the future distribution of space activities and the links between them”. See *** European Commission, Regional Development Studies, *The EU Compendium of Spatial Planning Systems and Policies*, Luxemburg, 1997, p.156.

² Valentin Capotescu, *Orașul ideal. Influența arhitecturii militare asupra urbanismului*, Editura Brumar, Timișoara, 2010, pp. 14-15.



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In the past decades, the military targets have been located outside the cities to avoid civilian and military activities interfering and to benefit from terrains that can be arranged according to the military requirements.

Some *military objectives*³ in recent history have replicated the city's model of composition, with the same purpose of ensuring security. Today, the needs of the population are more numerous, they respond to a higher living standard, and there is a tendency to satisfy them simultaneously. In this context, ensuring the city's security has become more and more problematic, with increasing interdependencies of the different functions of cities around the world.

In the past decades, the military targets have been located outside the cities to avoid civilian and military activities interfering and to benefit from terrains that can be arranged according to the military requirements. But sometimes, through its expansion, the city encompasses these military objectives, and integrates them in the urban agglomeration, but not without inconveniences. They are linked to either the crowded traffic, high land prices or long-distance journeys by military employees on their way from work to home.

In this regard, we note that the US military bases tend to concentrate their activities on a campus that meets the needs of the military work, as well as provides accommodation and living conditions for the families of the military system employees. These bases are established in places that simulate the existing relationships in the cities, creating the military function on another spatial scale, which the cities as a whole have physically abandoned. The mutations that have taken place in the evolution of cities can often change the former function of the cities. For example, the fortified cities were located on the roads traversed by the invaders, on the roads between the mountains or on the great passes. However, the roads of the great war invasions were also used for commerce in times of peace. In this respect, the principle of multi-purpose function and use of urban localities must be preserved, adapted and applied in the contemporary era. The diversification trend is natural in order to meet the growing and varied needs of the population.

Today, not only the topographic conditions are important in locating the military objectives, but also the accumulation of elements from the combination of physical and cybernetic rules required for military interoperability.

³ According to Article 52 (2) of *Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 on the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflict*, military objectives are "limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage". This definition has been used, over time, in international textbooks and laws on how to wage war.

Civilian Requirements in Planning the Urban Objectives for Defence

The accentuated urbanisation is a current trend that is directly related to the sustainability policies provided by the complementary approach to innovative technologies (platforms associated with civil requirements in planning the urban objectives for defence, modern infrastructure, means of energy revitalisation, discovery and use of new resources etc.) and the exigencies of the users – urban population integrated into a modern day-specific life. This innovative trend has set up the concept of a *smart city* where advanced innovation is widely employed to ensure a socio-economic renaissance of the EU states by appealing to a new digital economy. *"The concept of [smart city A.N.] is not static: there is no consensus or a generally accepted definition for smart city, but it rather expresses a process or a series of stages through which cities become more <habitable> and resilient, therefore, able to respond more quickly to new challenges"*.⁴

We consider that the *smart city* should allow planning *defence objectives*⁵, taking into account the following requirements:

- existence of a coherent network of sensors inserted into infrastructure (streets, buildings etc.);
- connection to the Internet will be the core element in coordinating and monitoring city life;
- control and prevention of crime to ensure the security of the citizen will be achieved with the help of the surveillance cameras and drones;
- harmonisation of civil and military legislation in order to preserve a democratic regime and avoid possible authoritarian skirmishes;
- re-calibration of critical infrastructure, thus benefiting citizens from the permanent provision of resources (water, energy, food, transport) and a necessary monitoring process (e.g. monitoring of climate change and the effects of pollution on city life).

Thus, by considering the peacetime location of the defence system elements, which by their nature, location, destination and use increase the security level of a smart city, it is possible to achieve increased

⁴ ***, British Government, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), *Smart Cities: Background Paper*, London, 2013, p. 7. Source: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/249423/bis-13-1217-smart-city-market-opportunities-uk.pdf, retrieved on 01.05.2018.

⁵ We propose defining *defense objectives* as *components of the defense system, which by their nature, location, destination and use increase the security level of a territory.*





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By considering the peacetime location of the defence system elements it is possible to achieve increased technical efficiency, increased response speed to threats, together with saving means and resources.

technical efficiency, increased response speed to threats, together with saving means and resources. In this way, smart cities can be better than the classic city model. The unresolved problem of this type of human settlement is one that targets the population and how it will act in relation to the operating system that provides the interface in the daily life process and in the decision-making modelling.

In the smart city, the urban interface is commonly imagined as a screen.

A report from 2011 of the Institute for Development and Social Initiatives “Viitorul”⁶ predicts that advanced technology elements will provide “the environmental interfaces that reduce the complex data flows to one or two simple indicators and ensure the quality of everyday urban life without aggravating our daily lives”⁷. A “real-time city model can provide the possibility of an interface with the citizens – a form of <my city> – which in turn allows citizens to act as a feedback to the local government proposals, being a real change in the configuration and the mission of the organisation”⁸. Therefore, the custom data flows of the city are interpreted as actionable information that makes our cities more comprehensible, efficient and acceptable.

Military Requirements in Planning the Urban Objectives for Defence

The direct result of the emergence of global terrorism was, without any doubt, the militarisation of the urban space. The conviction that the increase in security is for the benefit of all citizens, as well as of the public, semipublic and private space, has determined that the urban space becomes more and more controlled and subjected to some forms of surveillance that visibly interfere with the citizen, but it also manifests in the invisible life, in relation to the inhabited space. The state of “under siege” city can be interpreted both from the perspective of the constant threat of terrorist attacks and through measures to combat potential threats that have led to developments towards the

⁶ An independent think tank established in 1993, conducting research in the field of economy, social policy, EU policies, regional development, security risks and foreign policy (A.N.).

⁷ Anthony Townsend, Rachel Maguire, Mike Liebhold, Mathias Crawford, *A Planet Of Civic Laboratories: The Future Of Cities, Information, and Inclusion*, Institute For The Future + Rockefeller Foundation, 2010.

⁸ See Arup, *Melbourne Smart City* (2010), 24, http://www.cityofsound.com/files/c40_melbourne_report_final_email.pdf



The democratic aspect of the urban space has changed, and the control of the citizens seems to have become a necessity.

The military actions conducted in the cities are difficult to systematise and, especially in the context of the specific millennium war, they cannot find effective ways of solving both the problem of defence and the physical and psychological protection of citizens.

idea of a city as a potential battlefield. The democratic aspect of the urban space has changed, and the control of the citizens seems to have become a necessity. Worldwide, the security architecture opts for a defensive space, included in “violent geographies” identifiable anywhere in the world. This new reality has led to initiatives to resolve conflicts or to restore peace, and has resulted in space transformation processes that have deeply affected urban tissue.

While the legacy of the old wars is still unresolved, the physical manifestations of the 21st century conflicts have become part of the everyday life in cities around the world, transforming the urban space into a new war theatre. The Berlin Wall, an emblematic reminiscence of the Cold War and of the 20th century conflicts, was physically eliminated almost overnight, but its non-physical traces have remained till today. Similarly, in Belfast, the peace process began by reconciliation, but the relics disappear so slowly, that they produce a true spatial idiosyncrasy. Reflecting on the policy of eliminating all the “interface barriers” built in Belfast, securing the separation and spatial limitation of conflicts appears to be an absolutely necessary system. The approach to the Belfast peace walls as well as other obstacles in the interface with urban tissue entails the architecture extending its effects beyond the strictly spatial domain into both psychological and virtual space.

The military actions conducted in the cities are difficult to systematise and, especially in the context of the specific millennium war, they cannot find effective ways of solving both the problem of defence and the physical and psychological protection of citizens. The battlefield involves various structures existing in the urban environment, from social segments, structures, organisations, including multinationals, people, media, civil society etc. with such diverse beliefs, positions, interests⁹, a fact that creates great difficulties in organising and conducting military actions. From the perspective of mass psychology, it is clear that militant actions of this type will face different attitudes, from accepting and supporting to opposition. For example, in the case of ordering general mobilisation and the application of property requisitions from the civilian population, the legitimacy of such decisions could be debated. The idea of armed conflict strongly marks

⁹ Grigore Alexandrescu, et. al., *Fizionomia acțiunilor militare*, National Defence University, Centre for Defence and Security Strategic Studies, p. 5, see http://cssas.unap.ro/ro/pdf_studii/fizionomia_actiunilor_militare.pdf, retrieved on 3.03.2018.



We suggest the implementation of a new concept, namely smart offensive city, having as prerogatives defence, civil population defence in the event of armed attack, as well as prevention of such violent events in urban environment.

Ensuring the effective defence of the smart city through the permanent presence of the active offensive component would discourage enemy attacks and preserve the state of peace in the locality.

the psychology of the masses, and thus the military operations of defending the locality could be challenged.

These problems arise in the context of the current *defensive smart city* status. Therefore, we suggest the implementation of a new concept, namely *smart offensive city*, having as prerogatives defence, civil population defence in the event of armed attack, as well as prevention of such violent events in urban environment. These aspects do not entail the elimination of the concept of peace, but seek to substantiate the appropriate response to a potential state of war, considering the preventive aspects relating to the destruction by the enemy. The study of the *defensive city* history can provide arguments for our suggestion to change the status of this type of settlement, by assuming the *offensive and preventive character* in relation to potential external and internal threats. Moreover, the study of the urban tissue evolution emphasises the virtues and vulnerabilities of the *defensive city*, even the revolutionary hypostasis of the smart city. The limits and facilities that are specific to the smart city in the state of war represent a necessary reference point in the articulation of the concept of *smart offensive city*, which is far from any bellicose connotation.

Therefore, ensuring the effective defence of the smart city through the permanent presence of the active offensive component would discourage enemy attacks and preserve the state of peace in the locality. In order for this to materialise, the city's *smart* dimension should be extremely well-designed, with the role of intimidating enemy actions. Thus, it is applied the meaning of the expression: *the most effective defence action is the attack*. It should not have a violent aspect but it should be preventive in order to minimise the violent effects on the civilian population by focusing on enhancing the deterrent effects on the enemy. We consider that, by capitalising on the virtues of the smart city, the solutions to materialise such type of confrontation are based on the components of the electronic warfare. Thus, the friend-foe dichotomy, specific to the classical war, will be replaced with the perpetual protection of the population by eliminating the *front line* concept that separates, as we know, the two conflicting categories: the *attackers* and the *attacked*.

The diversification of the enemy typology, in the context of the escalation of the conflicts generated by terrorist actions, also brings to



The smart city could, through its offensive dimension, support military action planners, thus protecting the civilian population.

The third millennium war is based on a confrontation between civilisations, some of them anachronistic, and others visionary, built on the evolutionary matrix of mankind.

attention the idea of the communications globalisation, which entails the free circulation of information. Although it seems to be a virtue of the modern world, linked to the high degree of civilisation, this free circulation of information is one of the modernity's vulnerabilities.

Therefore, several military requirements for planning urban defence objectives in the smart city are:

- transition from the concept of *defensive city* to the one of *smart offensive city*;
- shape and enhancement of the city's *smart* dimension having the role of intimidating enemy actions;
- replacement of the friend-foe dichotomy, specific to classical warfare, with the idea of ensuring the permanent protection of the population;
- flexible structures and infrastructures that, under certain conditions, allow multiple use for either civilian or military purposes (by all services);
- dissimulation of military buildings in urban tissue, using innovative materials, thus reducing the possible negative psychological impact of their presence on the civilian population.

ISIS has been shown to be in conflict with so many countries across the globe without deploying full armies in their territories, but through individual combat missions or small groups of attackers, usually infiltrated among civilian populations in major cities. A war of the whole world with a terrorist group, which results in material and human losses as well as in affecting the urban population psychology, has created a space of terror especially among the population in large cities. The smart city could, through its *offensive* dimension, support military action planners, thus protecting the civilian population. *"The confrontation environment will be heavily affected by actions aimed at exploitation, deterioration, annihilation or destruction of information and the information functions of the opponent, protection against such actions, and achievement of the conditions for conducting own information warfare"*¹⁰. In this way, the principles of humanitarian law are also complied with, in clear contradiction with terrorist attackers who act in the area, their struggle being governed by principles that are usually enshrined in religious fanaticism.

In fact, we consider that the third millennium war is based on a

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 6



confrontation between civilisations, some of them anachronistic, and others visionary, built on the evolutionary matrix of mankind. We can also talk here about differences in political culture, the impact of the information domination, and the exercise of control and decision-making under the conditions of the information warfare.

Conclusions

As a phenomenon supported by technology, excessive urbanisation will lead in the near future to agglomerations of population, favouring not only the individual's dependence on advanced technology but also the migration of the labour force from the poor areas to the highly developed ones. This phenomenon will carry along the composite mentalities, the cultural and religious beliefs, more often than not underlying the terrorist actions conducted in the context of an identifiable identity crisis in the countries of adoption. The urbanisation of warfare is a concept that is redefined in terms of forms of violence and its effects on the citizen. The urban vulnerabilities are identified both in settlements defined by poverty, by administrative anachronisms, and also in highly-developed cities within the *smart city* concept area.

We consider that, in the future, there will be no sustainable urbanisation and safer cities, without a new form of *spatial planning*. This should take into account phenomena such as: natural environment degradation and climate change, multiplication of terrorist attacks in cities, and increasing urban violence, disparities between different cities around the world, poverty, migration, emergence and development of new technologies and so on. Therefore, the appeal to the solution of the military operation in the urban environment will require to rethink the urban spatial planning, the placement of military objectives and critical infrastructures within cities. Moreover, it will be necessary to enhance the surveillance and reconnaissance means in order to obtain a continuous visibility on the battlefield and control of the action space.

The urbanisation of warfare is a concept that is redefined in terms of forms of violence and its effects on the citizen.

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SOCIAL MEDIA IMPACT ON THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

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Major changes have dominated the scene of international relations following the end of the Cold War, underlined by the rapid development of technology and consequently of information and communication means. Literally all aspects related to everyday life are determined by a series of operations carried out exclusively with the help of technology. This rapid global development trend has generated several opportunities for international security, but it is equally true that these new possibilities of progress in different fields have delivered a series of new risks and threats. The threats and opportunities delivered by the massive use of Social Media platforms hold nowadays an important role in this context. Consequently, this article aims to shape the paradigms of the current security environment, presenting the Social Media mechanism by outlining the opportunities and threats it might deliver.

Keywords: Social Media, globalisation, security, international relations theories.

The Effects of Globalisation on the Security Environment

The globalisation, an irreversible phenomenon, has undoubtedly placed its mark on the security environment. There has been a series of debates about the effects of globalisation, and even about the existence of this phenomenon. Anthony Giddens, sociologist, differentiated those who have argued on the subject, in his work published in the late 1990s, *The Fugitive World: How Globalization Reshapes our Lives*, in sceptics and radicals¹. While sceptics believe that the phenomenon of globalisation did not even affect the main area that was supposed to be affected, the economy, the radicals are at the opposite pole, saying that globalisation has had such an impact that both the nation-state and the leaders faced a considerable decrease in their power and influence to the detriment of economic nature interest. These types of interests have come to dominate the international scene².

While affirming his affinity for the radicals' view, Giddens believes that both currents are wrong, due to the limitations they have imposed in carrying out the analysis of this phenomenon. *"Both groups see the phenomenon almost solely in economic terms. This is a mistake. Globalization is political, technological and cultural, as well as economic. It has been influenced above all by developments in systems of communication dating back only to the late 1960s"*³. Not only does he define globalisation as a phenomenon with an impact on all society's sectors, but Giddens emphasises that the most important engine that set up this process was the development of systems of communications.

These changes began to take place on the international relations scene with the fall of the *Iron Curtain* and thus with the end of the *Cold War*, reaching a climax at the beginning of the 21st century. Once the Soviet bloc collapsed, a series of other threats to global security emerged, with the international political scene being far from proceeding to the pacifist

Globalization is political, technological and cultural, as well as economic. It has been influenced above all by developments in systems of communication.

¹ Anthony Giddens, *Runaway World*, Routledge, New York, 2003 p. 8.

² *Ibid*, p. 8.

³ *Ibid*, p. 10.



There are theorists who believe that the 21st century begins in the late 1990s. [...] the 9/11 attacks are the first major event of the 21st century.

system that was associated with the disappearance of Communism. There are theorists who believe that the 21st century begins in the late 1990s⁴. It is an assumption justified by the magnitude and importance of the events that took place in those years; nevertheless, there are voices that consider the 9/11 attacks the first major event of the 21st century. The attacks coordinated by the Al Qaeda terrorist network are one of those major events that, although they have taken place in a single state, have definitely redefined the perception that both state and non-state actors had related to the risks and threats to international security and the security concept itself. *“In the weeks following the September 11 terrorist attack, it became clear that traditional military tools and operations would have limited efficacy against the United States’ new enemy”*⁵. It is the event that marks the emergence of a new type of conflict where information will be one of the main resources. *“Asymmetric threats by rogue networks required a new form of war, and information would be the weapon by which this new war might be won”*⁶.

In this context, the concept of security, central concept in the field of international relation theory, is redefined. Stephen Walt, a prominent representative of realism in international relations, fully aware of the emergence of non-military threats and the evolution of research in the field by the Copenhagen School, believes though that security studies should focus on military nature threats. The theorist justifies his reasoning by saying that extending the concept would destroy his consistency⁷. Neo-realist Kenneth Waltz also argues that military threats have not disappeared and that people tend too easily to eliminate the possibility of an armed conflict. *“Every time peace breaks out, people pop up to proclaim that realism is dead”*⁸. Kenneth Waltz believes that international space has not undergone a fundamental change once the USSR collapsed, the world order being simply rearranged after its disappearance; essentially, the actors

Stephen Walt believes that security studies should focus on military nature threats.

⁴ Barry Buzan, *New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century*, in *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), vol. 67, no. 3, 1991, p. 432.

⁵ Lee S. Strickland, *Fighting with Information*, in *Information Management Journal* 36, no. 4, 2002, p. 27.

⁶ *Ibid*, p. 27.

⁷ Stephen Walt, *The Renaissance of Security Studies*, in *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 35, no. 2, 1991, p. 213

⁸ Kenneth Waltz, *Structural Realism after the Cold War*, in *International Security*, vol. 25, no. 1, 2000, p. 36.

have remained the same and the interests have been maintained⁹. Thus, from this point of view, security still concerns aspects related to political-military issues.

The representatives of the Copenhagen School have a different perspective, highlighting the importance of integrating new sectors alongside the military one into the security paradigm. According to this vision, security has the form of a puzzle where the pieces are the military, political, economic, social and environmental sectors. *“Wars are no longer territorial; they are now ideational, fought largely over issues of religion, politics, race, or ethnicity. They are battles for the mind, not for places or things – a war fought only for oil, for example, would bring worldwide condemnation unless couched in some other rationale. Thus, communication is a growing part of the arsenal of war and increasingly essential to peace”*¹⁰. We use the term puzzle and not the one of pillars of security, for example, because, as we have mentioned before, all of these sectors are interdependent. Poverty or environmental problems can cause major political crises, migration, which could easily degenerate into terrorism or organised crime.

Barry Buzan, an exponential researcher of the Copenhagen School, gave one of the clearest definitions of security: *“Security is taken to be about the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change which they see as hostile. The bottom line of security is survival, but it also reasonably includes a substantial range of concerns about the conditions of existence”*¹¹. But if security implies a lack of threats, there is a need for full knowledge of the risks and threats an entity faces, considering that globalisation has generated, at the same time, both new security opportunities and new types of threats. The absence of a military conflict, the so-called traditional threat to national and international security, no longer defines security.

To sum up, the political, social and economic spheres determine the new threats globalisation brought and also the redefinition of the security concept. Threats to international security can also arise from environmental issues. Last but not least, threats come from

⁹ *Ibid*, p. 36.

¹⁰ Ray Hiebert, *The Battle for the Mind: War and Peace in the Era of Mass Communication*, in *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly* 89, no. 1, 2012: 131-133, p. 132.

¹¹ Barry Buzan, *op. cit.*, p. 432.



Kenneth Waltz – “Every time peace breaks out, people pop up to proclaim that realism is dead”.

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The cyber domain is defined by the US as the fifth space, in addition to earth, water, air and space.

cyber space, a space that is totally lacking the traditional geographical barriers. *“The new tools for today’s war are information and information technology”¹².*

Social Media Features

If we could define and draw the main features of the current security environment quite easily, by resorting to theoreticians of international relations, understanding the sub-domain called Cyber Security is proving to be more difficult. Even though it has become a more and more common and carefully analysed concept, it remains quite unclear due to the many implications it carries. The cyber domain is defined by the US as the fifth space, in addition to earth, water, air and space. The integration of cyberspace into this set-up gives a measure of the importance it has gained in the economy of security issues. In 2016, the German newspaper *Bild* quotes Jens Stoltenberg, the NATO Secretary General. He says in a newspaper interview that a massive cyber attack against a member state could trigger a collective response from the organisation. *“A severe cyber attack may be classified as a case for the alliance. Then NATO can and must react”¹³.*

This cyber space is, in fact, a space that cannot be determined physically and consists of everything that the complexity of computerised systems implies. Similarities to physical space are given by the fact that this virtual environment is also populated by a series of objects such as folders, files, documents, text messages, audio, video or images, and so on, while the main difference is given by the ability to entirely explore the cyber space without the need for physical space travel. Social Media is only a small part of this cyberspace. Although Social Media is just a little mechanism of what the overall cyber environment means, knowing how these communication and information dissemination mechanisms work properly can play an important role in security-related activities.

Social Media has become an omnipresent component of our everyday lives, either if it is personal or professional, so it is increasingly evident that these tools are no longer simple forms of entertainment. *“Social Media will increasingly affect global security in Using Social*

¹² Lee S. Strickland, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

¹³ Published by Reuters in *Massive Cyber Attack Could Trigger NATO Response: Stoltenberg*, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyber-nato-idUSKCN0Z12NE>.

Media for Global Security positive, negative and ambiguous ways”¹⁴. In terms of Social Media perceptions, this is different for every generation. At the beginning of this boom, young people have proven to be more open to these means of communication and information. Although social media channels have become increasingly popular among all age groups, it is still the young people who lend more credit to their mechanisms, being their primary means of information in comparison to the press, radio or television. Thus, we can assert with certainty that Social Media represents an opportunity to reach the younger generation. Smartly exploited, social networks can turn into an important resource, not at all costly, to increase the level of youth security culture. The lack of interest in security issues can be overpassed by their constant presence online, and of the online in their activities.

Thus, the main feature of social networks is being an information carrier. Information can be related to events, activities, hobbies, professional areas, and so on, but there is an increase in the use of social networks in case of special events. We are not referring to an increase in the number of users, but to the multiplication of the content spread online by users considered as being passive (those users who have social accounts but use them strictly for information or to keep in touch with friends or colleagues). As a result, Social Media users are not only informing themselves online but also forwarding the received information, either in the form they have received or altered. One of the major differences in how the user is referring to the traditional media versus the online media is given by the fact that while the traditional media consumer is a simple receiver, the internet user is both a data receiver and a content creator.

We live in the age of information, and this status quo is determined, in fact, by the proliferation of information technology. *“The information age is the proliferation of information technology”¹⁵.* This proliferation of technology, in itself, and not just information, marked the fundamental and irreversible change of communication mechanisms in all its plans. Media rules changed in an irreversible way. *“Proliferation and accessibility have played havoc with old rules of the media game*

¹⁴ Ravi Gupta, Hugh Brooks, *Using Social Media for Global Security*, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., Indianapolis, Indiana, 2013, p. 13.

¹⁵ Richard Crowell, *War in the Information Age: A Primer for Cyberspace Operations in 21st Century Warfare*, Naval War College, 2010, p. 3.



Ravi Gupta and Hugh Brooks – “Social Media will increasingly affect global security in Using Social Media for Global Security positive, negative and ambiguous ways”.

Smartly exploited, social networks can turn into an important resource, not at all costly, to increase the level of youth security culture.



[...] while the traditional media consumer is a simple receiver, the internet user is both a data receiver and a content creator.

*in at least two important areas, gatekeeping and agenda setting*¹⁶. The message delivered by the traditional media was a filtered message. Several people, representing various interests, of press trusts, sponsors, or supporters, selected both the information that was sent and how the message was built. In this context, the agenda of the day was set. It is very true that the media did not determine how the subjects were perceived, but certainly set the topics that were made public *“not what to think, but what to think about”*. With the boom of the internet and the emergence of social networks, this mechanism of operation is no longer feasible.

Traditional media is also losing relevance to communicators, not just to users, and the need to adapt to new media increases. However, strategic communication through Social Media tools is a challenge. Because it is a means of communication available to anyone, those who manage official pages tend to approach a style like that adopted on private pages without having a clearly defined communication strategy that targets a range of objectives and based on punctual communication campaigns following a chronology of action.

As illustrated in previous analyses of the online environment, this is characterised by its own population, which includes billions of *“citizens”*. The difference between this state of the online and a state bounded by conventional borders is also due to the lack of that authority that regulates and monitors at the same time the proper functioning of all elements. Through an unlimited freedom of expression, governed by no ethical or legal rules, freedom of action without any liability, Internet users can assume multiple identities. The internet can be considered the founder of the most democratic state of the world. However, the freedom and permissiveness driven by the multiple mechanisms of the online environment determine the migration of social networks from opportunities to vulnerabilities in terms of security issues. Nicholas Shalcross characterised Social Media through a comparison with a two-edged sword¹⁷.

Using social media channels enables a less formal communication through more familiar language, but the presence in the social media environment poses a challenge in terms of fast communication. If through the traditional media the answer to a particular topic

¹⁶ William B. Caldwell, Lieutenant General U.S. Army, Dennis Murphy, Anton Menning, *Learning to Leverage New Media*, in *Military Review*, May – June 2009, p. 3.

¹⁷ Nicholas J. Shallcross, Major, *USA Social Media and Information Operations in the 21st Century*, 14 August 2015, working paper, August 2015, Air Force Institute of Technology, p. 11.

can come from preparing a press release or a press conference, Social Media requires a quick response. In the age of the Web, individuals are no longer waiting for the official communiqués presented at the most important daily news journal, but they are looking for the reaction of public figures or institutions by accessing their Facebook or Twitter pages and waiting for a prompt response. Even if the message through social networks has to be considerably shorter, the digital revolution we are going through requires that the reaction appear instantaneously in the online environment, and will be doubled by a detailed presentation through a press release. The presence in the online environment is an educational tool, and if it is used correctly, it can lead to an increased interest in security culture. In addition, it is desirable that the initiator of the communication on a particular topic should be the institution directly involved in the subject in question and not the journalists. Perry pointed out *“...if you aren’t there to communicate your message, someone else will do it for you”*¹⁸. It is important to emphasise the fact that specialists are needed in this area as well. Although it seems at the fingertips of any individual, we will recall repeatedly that the use of social media mechanisms, both as a communication channel and as a tool of information, for professional purposes, requires the expertise of some specialists. We need specialists because we need a communication strategy. Setting goals for online communication is mandatory, chaotic communication is not effective, and can even end up being a waste for those structures that use it. As we have already mentioned, Social Media is a means of brand communication, hence users tend to associate the image of the brand with the profile created in the social networks. The opening is also directly proportional to how the online interaction goes. Mayfield refers to an article presented at a Social Media Hub organised by the US Department of State. The article entitled *“Eight Ways to Destroy Your Social Media Strategy”*, saying that number one mistake is to claim that you do not need a strategy¹⁹.

With the development of the internet and mass access to this resource, geographical barriers have disappeared when it comes to communication and information dissemination. Consequently, security structures need to adapt to this revolution. Social Media is a dynamic tool, and its understanding and use requires constant interest.

¹⁸ Gary Perry, *“Reinterpreting the Role of the Hacker in the Cyber-Security Paradigm”*, Order No. 3685073, Northcentral University, 2015, p. 64.

¹⁹ Thomas Mayfield, *A Commander’s Strategy for Social Media*, in *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 60, 2011, p. 81.



Through unlimited freedom of expression [...] and freedom of action without any liability, Internet users can assume multiple identities and the internet can be considered the founder of the most democratic state of the world. [...] yet, the freedom and permissiveness driven by the multiple mechanisms of the online environment determine the migration of social networks from opportunities to vulnerabilities in terms of security issues.



Setting goals for online communication is mandatory, chaotic communication is not effective, and can even end up being a waste for those structures that use it.

[...] the omnipresence of social networking should lead military leaders to also focus on these tools to ensure a full understanding of the nature of future conflicts.

In this respect, Thomas Mayfield argues that the omnipresence of social networking should lead military leaders to also focus on these tools to ensure a full understanding of the nature of future conflicts. However, in order to get the most out of these tools, there is a need for an in-depth understanding of how it works. Because these channels are reachable to anyone with access to the Internet, their complexity is often underestimated. *“Social Media has rapidly transformed into a term that means anything to anyone, and so it means nothing to anyone”*²⁰. That is why military or civilian personnel working in security structures should be trained on the valences that networks they could behave. It is also necessary to address how these channels should be used for personal interest. Therefore, in order to avoid leakage of personal information, security system leaders need to consider training and educating employees in online communication. *“Social Media should awaken the interest of the commander and key members of his team, who should be formalized into a concrete program that assigns repudiations to this team members. “Social Media is fast becoming a term that means everything to everyone, and thus does not mean anything anymore”*²¹. That is why military or civilian personnel working in security structures should be trained. It is also necessary to address how these channels should be used for personal interest. Therefore, in order to avoid leakage of personal information, security system leaders need to consider training and educating employees in online communication. *“That is to say, social media should have the support and interest of the commander and key members of his staff and should be formalized into a program with responsibilities assigned to members of the commander’s staff”*²².

We have already witnessed hostile actors engaging the social media mechanism in malicious acts. ISIS can be easily considered a prototype of malicious use of Social Media. The organisation used it for multiple purposes from propaganda to recruitment and even financing their activities. Furthermore, an even higher interest around the challenges and threats that social media bring was triggered by the debates around the US elections. The suspicions regarding Russia’s involvement in the US elections placed the *fake news* phenomenon on top of the agenda of both states and international organisations. The gravity of the facts was underlined by the fact that the US Congress summoned

²⁰ *Ibid*, p. 80.

²¹ Ravi Gupta, Hugh Brooks, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

²² Thomas Mayfield, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

the technology giants Facebook, Twitter and Google to explain what actually happened during the elections, why the companies were not able to identify this threat and how they intend to address these aspects in the future for avoiding similar situations.

However, these examples, maybe one of the most debated and analysed aspects of the dangers social media deliver constantly, are only two of the threats generated by the proliferation of social media platforms. Then again, the focus and attention these arouse is of course justified by the complexity and large-scale implications they provoke. Nevertheless, the use of social media can bring challenges that are not so obvious, for they are hidden under the mechanism of every day usage of a platform for personal interest. There is an obvious lack of education related to these matters. We are a long way from a fully digitally alphabetised generation and one of the main challenges is the fact that we all seem to consider that we know and understand everything related to social media mechanism and algorithms. The simplicity of using these instruments of communication and information is a double-edged sword. Users are usually taking for granted all these technological innovations by assuming that they are aware of all the features their online activity present. And the most relevant argument is the easiness of sharing will type of information. From photos with our homes and families to images and check-ins at our workplaces. First of all, we can endanger our family, while leaking, without having knowledge of it, sensitive information related to our work. If, in the case of private companies, this could lead to commercial loses, as far as military structures are concerned, the worst-case scenario might deliver life losses.

One of these features is *geo-tagging*. All smart phones have embedded GPS, a feature that it has proven itself to be a double-edged sword. One might think that this is a nice way to show one’s friends, what they have been up to, the places they might have visited, recommendations, via social media platforms. All these check-ins form a location digital fingerprint that can be easily exploited by malicious actors in identifying patterns of our day-to-day life, from places we visit to daily habits we have. Either users are fully aware of the challenges delivered by check-in activity or they chose to ignore these aspects, the check-in is not the main threat in terms of geo-tagging. One might consider that now when users choose to check-in, they are well-aware of the fact that they disclose their location. However, how many users think about making public their location while posting a photo? Linked to camera, the pictures we publish contain all the location coordinates.



Thomas Mayfield – *“Social media should have the support and interest of the commander and key members of his staff and should be formalized into a program with responsibilities assigned to members of the commander’s staff”.*



Hence, once the picture is made public, a tech savvy can place you on a map in no time. *Someone with the right software and the wrong motivation could download the photo and extract the coordinates from the metadata*²³.

Then again, one can think of himself as being extremely cautious in terms of his social media activity. However, even if you have a very restricted profile, available for limited connections only, persons that you already know in real life and whom cannot represent a threat, hackers could easily overtake a profile and extract information through phishing schemes. These social engineering mechanisms have become extremely handy to malicious entities. Consequently, one should never conduct their online activity by giving the benefit of a doubt to other users' intentions. One of the most notorious cases where geo-tagging feature was maliciously instrumented happened in 2007. Four US Army Apache H-64 helicopters were destroyed in Iraq because of geo-tagging the militaries through the pictures they posted via Facebook.

Due to Social Media, its main characteristics and the lack of knowledge, a user can be exposed to a various number of threats: identity theft, phishing, malware, clickjacking. Geo-tagging is just an example of issues related to the use of Social Media that could degenerate into real threats, either for military personnel and their families, or for military activities.

Conclusions

We have noticed that the major changes that dominated the scene of international relations at the end of the Cold War were emphasised by the rapid development of technology and media. Virtually all aspects of everyday life are determined by a series of operations made exclusively with the help of technology. From online courses, to shopping or even large-scale financial transactions, from video chatting with family or friends, miles away from tele- or video conferencing between reputed business people or important political leaders. It is true that this rapid global development trend has generated several opportunities for international security, but it is equally true that these new possibilities to progress in all areas have brought out new risks and threats. In this context, Social Media platforms rank high among these threats and risks. Consequently, there is a need to educate and train both masses and employees of security structures about the

²³ Cheryl Rodewig, *Geotagging Poses Security Risks*, 7 March 2012.

functioning mechanisms of the social networks, in terms of a good exploitation of these resources for effective communication and avoidance of possible security breaches.

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THE USE OF AIR POWER AGAINST TERRORISM

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In a world characterised by complex geostrategic changes, emergence of a power vacuum in Asia and Africa, and spread of global computerisation, the scourge of terrorism has developed more than ever. Moreover, these terrorist actions began to manifest in the form of large-scale armed struggle, as it happened with the Islamic State group. In this context, the world's states agreed to an international American-led response, in the form of the war on terror. An important role in supporting counterterrorism actions at global level is held by capabilities specific to air power.

Keywords: air power, war, terrorism, counterterrorism, aircraft.

"Our war on terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated"¹.

Excerpt of the 20 September 2001 address by President George W. Bush to a Joint Session of Congress

Introduction

Terrorism is a phenomenon that has emerged at the same time with human society and has remained a constant of it. What has changed over the centuries is represented by the tools to put it into practice. However, currently, in the Information Age, it acquires global features and the distance between the place terrorist actions are planned/ commanded and where they occur is no longer important.

Terrorism is defined almost in the same way, in all global doctrines and textbooks, as *"the deliberate creation of a sense of fear, usually by the use or threat of use of symbolic acts of physical violence, to influence the political behaviour of a given target group"*². In other words, terrorism is the use of physical or psychological violence against individuals or the use of force to attack certain properties to influence the behaviour of individuals, organisations, or even governments, in order to fulfil their own political, religious or ideological goals.

The National Defense Strategy describes terrorism as a *"persistent threat, having forms of manifestation very difficult to foresee and counter"*³, stating that in order to be successful in combating this scourge, the networks of recruitment and financing of terrorist activities must be identified and de-structured.

Until the attacks of 11 September 2001 against the US, the response to any terrorist actions had been precise. Starting with this moment,

Terrorism is the use of physical or psychological violence against individuals or the use of force to attack certain properties to influence the behaviour of individuals, organisations, or even governments, in order to fulfil their own political, religious or ideological goals.

¹ Elsadig Elsheikh, Basima Sisemore, Natalia Ramirez Lee, *Legalizing Othering. The United States of Islamophobia*, Haas Institute, Berkeley, 2017, p. 17.

² Peter R. Neumann, M.L.R. Smith, *Strategic Terrorism – The Framework and its Fallacies*, in *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, London, vol. 28, no. 4, 2005, p. 344.

³ *National Defence Strategy. 2015-2019*, București, 2015, p. 15.



In this context, air power, through its combat capabilities, is an important component of state power that can successfully support actions to prevent, deter and combat terrorism.

we can observe, for the first time in history, a turning point in how to respond to such actions – the concept of War on Terror.

Joint Publication 3-07.2 – Antiterrorism specifies from the outset that terrorists “represent a major threat to national security”⁴ and interests of states, both on its own territory and outside it. Therefore, this doctrine states that counter-terrorism should address both forms of struggle, defensive (also called *antiterrorism*) and offensive (called *counter-terrorism*).

The techniques used by terrorists to achieve the proposed goals may be on a small scale, such as assassination, arson, piracy, hostage-taking and human abduction, especially aircraft hijacking, or on a larger scale, such as bombings, raids, ambushes. All these actions could be observed during the actions in Afghanistan and the civil war in Syria.

The White Paper on Defence, an important programmatic document through which the defence is planned in accordance with the *National Defence Strategy*, provides guidance for the development of certain capabilities that will enable, among other things, combating terrorism in peacetime.

In this context, air power, through its combat capabilities, is an important component of state power that can successfully support actions to prevent, deter and combat terrorism.

Air power is often defined as “the ability to use airspace for military purposes”⁵. However, given the limited capacity of terrorist groups to operate in the airspace, in order to understand the undertaking of the present essay, the definition given by *British Air and Space Power Doctrine* is much more appropriate, namely air and space power is “the ability to project power from the air and space to influence the behaviour of people or the course of events”⁶.

Air power must not be confused with the air forces of a state, including both military and civilian air assets.

⁴ *Joint Publication 3-07.2 – Antiterrorism*, 2014, p. vii, [http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/jp-doctrine/IP3_07.2\(10\).pdf](http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/jp-doctrine/IP3_07.2(10).pdf), retrieved on 24.05.2018.

⁵ *F.A.-1 – Doctrina pentru operații a Forțelor Aeriene*, București, 2017, p. 13.

⁶ *British Air and Space Power Doctrine*, AP3000, ed. 4, Centre for Air Power Studies, MOD 2009, p. 7.

The Importance of Air Power in the War on Terror

Under the current circumstances, in which terrorist groups carry out a wide range of actions, from political, precise, non-violent ones to military, large (often spread on more than one state), is the air power useful to combat terrorism?

One of the features of terrorist actions is that planners choose their place, timing and the modus operandi of the attack, avoiding direct combat. They can “hit anytime, anywhere and by any means”⁷ in order to create generalised panic and induce a sense of insecurity. Thus, these actions become difficult to anticipate by the forces responsible for combating them. Therefore, when there is information about the location of certain terrorist suspects or about larger attacks on certain targets, it must be acted upon quickly.

Currently, the response to terrorist action no longer has to be momentary, but must be planned in time, with permanent action, in which air power acts almost like in any other type of conflict.

In his article, *Terrorism*, Paul Rogers, professor and consultant to the Oxford Research Group (ORH), writes that there are three approaches that have to be considered in the fight against terrorism, namely⁸:

- Traditional counter-terrorism – which is rooted in security, intelligence and policing and seeks to protect citizens within a state.
- The use of military action against paramilitary terrorist groups, especially when they have physical locations as a basis for action or training. Also, if such terrorist groups are sponsored by certain states, those states may themselves be targeted by military attacks.
- Finding the underlying motivations of terrorist groups that benefit from broad popular support. This approach shows that there is the possibility of accepting a third party for conducting negotiations, acceptable to both parties involved in the conflict.

Air power’s characteristics: rapidity (in terms of reaction and speed), flexibility, great range, useful load are advantages that the other components of military power do not possess. Therefore, just as in the classic war, air power is an important component of military

⁷ Marius Dobre, *Terorismul – amenințare la adresa securității naționale*, in *Revista Infosfera*, nr. 3/2017, București, p. 12.

⁸ Paul Rogers, *Terrorism*, in *Security Studies – An Introduction*, edited by Paul D. Williams, Ed. Routledge, New York, 2008, p. 176.



Currently, the response to terrorist action no longer has to be momentary, but must be planned in time, with permanent action, in which air power acts almost like in any other type of conflict.



power in terms of the second approach outlined above, as well as in the War on Terror, being an useful and indispensable tool for this type of war.

Air power is used in counter-terrorist actions rather than in defensive, anti-terrorist actions, where security services, intelligence and police forces play a major role. This is somewhat normal, because the aircraft are, by definition, offensive weapons. Counter-terrorist actions are being carried out to “neutralize terrorists, their organizations and networks”⁹ to render them incapable of using of coercion, in all its forms.

Moreover, the aircraft, weapons specific to air power, with or without human pilot on board, are useful means of combating terrorists, and their vulnerability compared to troop movement/ other means of combat in the field in this type of military action is much smaller. Depending on the means, air power can act from its own territory, anywhere in the world. In this way, cruise missiles have recently become the favourite weapon of military decision-makers against terrorist group facilities, as has been shown in the conflicts in Libya and Syria.

As far as counter-terrorism is concerned, the Air Force, as a basic component of the air power, performs all three general types of activities specified in *Joint Publication 3-26 Counterterrorism*, namely:

- Advise and assist activities to improve other nation’s ability to fight against terrorism.
- Overseas activities – including offence, defence defensive, and stability operations;
- Support of civil authorities, including support to prepare, protect, prevent and respond to terrorist attacks and domestic incidents targeting these authorities.

In addition, the same doctrine specifies that the armed forces and, implicitly, the air power, as one of the components of military power, take action at all levels of the armed fight against terrorism, as follows: at strategic level – global counter-terrorism campaigns, at operational level – theatre counter-terrorism campaigns and at the tactical level – battles and engagements, small unit and crew actions¹⁰.

Therefore, we can see that air power is particularly useful in combating terrorist groups organised following a military model

⁹ *Joint Publication 3-26 – Counterterrorism*, Washington, 2014, p. vii.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, p. V-2.

and acting as such, such as the Islamic State or al-Qaeda. Air power capabilities involved in counterterrorist actions provide, above all, global mobility for special operations forces, air superiority and direct support for the forces in the area of action, as well as the ability to carry out precision air strikes against terrorist network infrastructure.

Helicopters are generally used against small terrorist groups operating on cells, in order to achieve rapid mobility, surveillance and fire support through on-board snipers as well as UAVs. This type of air assets are usually found in the structure of information services of any state, which have a very important role in fighting against this scourge.

Missions Carried Out by the Fighting Means Specific to Air Power in Countering Terrorism

Air power has an important contribution to the counter-terrorism offensive through the following missions:

a) *Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance – ISR*¹¹. The purpose of this mission is to provide accurate information about potential activities or the location of certain individuals or terrorist groups, needed to plan rapid and decisive responses. In this type of missions, unmanned aircraft (UAVs) are especially used, due to the long time they can stay in the air, the undetected action as well as the low operating costs. Thus, for example, in June 2006, MQ-1B Predators UAVs carried out permanent surveillance missions of al-Qaeda leader in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarkawi, for 600 hours¹². This would have been difficult, if not impossible, by other means.

b) *Strike actions*. Given the small reaction time available for annihilating a terrorist threat (a person, a group of people, even paramilitary groups), the air power is the one that can provide the means necessary for this purpose. With the development of Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs), they were given a double role: the missions specific to ISR and the launch of ammunition to eliminate the identified threats. Due to the small time difference between the moment of identifying the threat and its annihilation, compared to the much longer time required to reach the area by aircraft with human

¹¹ F.A.-1, *Doctrina pentru operații a Forțelor Aeriene*, București, 2017, p. 41.

¹² Arthur Holland Michel, Dan Gettinger, *The Drone Revolution Revisited: An Assessment of Military Unmanned Systems in 2016*, Center for the Study of the Drone at Bard College, New York, 2016, p. 16.



Air power is particularly useful in combating terrorist groups organised following a military model and acting as such, such as the Islamic State or al-Qaeda.



pilot on board and the low probability of target identification by them, UCAVs are preferred in such missions.

A study conducted by a Turkish Air Force officer, Fatih Sen, entitled *Analysis of the Use of Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles in Conjunction with Manned Aircraft to Counter Active Terrorists in Rough Terrain*, highlights the fact that, although F-16s have a higher firepower, because of the big distance necessary for laying out of the infrastructure required for their operation and the time required to identify the target (usually more than 25 minutes), it is preferable to use UCAVs. According to the author, they have advanced weaponry, which, combined with the little reaction time, make them very effective in preventing the accomplishment of terrorists' plans¹³.

Also, given the advantages outlined in a) and b), the US Air Force acquired a total of 290 Predator B / Reaper MQ-9 systems by the end of 2015¹⁴.

c) *Air Mobility Missions*. Air power consists of a wide range of transport aircraft, both vertical landing or stationary (such as helicopters or airplanes with vertical take-off/landing) and transport airplanes of different sizes, representing special capabilities in achieving transportation, manoeuvring and infiltration/extraction of troops that have the mission of eliminating terrorist threats, as well as transporting materials for their benefit, precisely because of the speed of reaction and the fact that it can reach any point, irrespective of the geographical characteristics of the terrain.

In this type of missions, helicopters are especially used, because they are useful in actions against small, isolated terrorist groups, as well as against large groups that take actions specific to the armed fight, both in urban environment and open field.

Such a mission is the one in which al-Qaeda leader, Osama bin Laden, was annihilated on 2 May 2011, during an raid on his compound of a group of special operations forces shipped to the target with 2 MH-60 Black Hawks helicopters, infiltrated there and departed after the mission¹⁵.

¹³ Sen, Fatih, *Analysis of the Use of Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles in Conjunction with Manned Aircraft to Counter Active Terrorists in Rough Terrain*, Monterey, California, 2015, p. 7.

¹⁴ Arthur Holland Michel, Dan Gettinger, *The Drone Revolution Revisited: An Assessment of Military Unmanned Systems in 2016*, Center for the Study of the Drone at Bard College, New York, 2016, p. 16.

¹⁵ Beth Van Schaack, *The Killing of Osama Bin Laden & Anwar Al-Aulaqi: Uncharted Legal Territory*, Santa Clara University, 2012, p. 4.

d) *Close air support missions*. This type of mission is used to support troops engaged in fighting with terrorist groups, in order to annihilate or reject attacks. The most used means are bombing and ground attack aircraft, as well as helicopters. In Afghanistan, for example, although at some point there were three times more F-16 aircraft than A-10 aircraft, the latter carried out more than 50% of all CAS missions¹⁶.

e) *Psychological missions*. The air force can take part in such actions by issuing radio broadcasts and throwing out leaflets or other documents in isolated areas, which are under the influence of terrorist groups and hardly accessible to other forces. These actions aim at eroding the influence and power of terrorists, as well as decreasing the number of people who can be recruited for terrorist purposes.

The *show of force* actions are also included in this type of missions. These missions are designed to discourage potential terrorist actions. Often the mere presence of aircraft, with or without a human pilot onboard, correlated with their previous actions prevent terrorists from putting their plans into practice.

f) *Missions to maintain airspace control*. Although terrorist groups do not have combat means to attack friendly forces, they can hijack civil aircraft for the purpose of terrorist attacks, the attacks of 11 September 2001 being a well-known example in this respect. After these events, NATO implemented the *Renegade* concept, which ensures maintaining fighter aircrafts in a high combat state capable of intervening to eliminate such threats.

Conclusions

The extraordinary evolution of terrorism in recent years at global level has led to major changes in the state's action against this scourge in order to eradicate it and ensure the security of its own citizens. At the moment, against the backdrop of the Asian and African social crises, and the immigration phenomenon, no state in Europe can be considered safe from terrorist actions. This is because people who are considered immigrants "*hide criminals, terrorists, and extremists*"¹⁷ sent for the purpose of carrying out terrorist actions.

¹⁶ John Matsumura, John Gordon IV, Randall Steeb, *Defining an Approach for Future Close Air Support Capability*, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California, 2017, p. 11.

¹⁷ Dr. Mihail Orzeață, *Migrații internaționale – între compasiune și ostilitate*, in *Gândirea militară românească*, no. 3-4/2017, București, p. 48.



Often, the mere presence of aircraft, with or without a human pilot onboard, correlated with their previous actions prevent terrorists from putting their plans into practice.



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UAVs, UCAVs, cruise missiles, tactical aircraft and helicopters, due to their features such as high autonomy, flexibility, speed, firepower, range, in conjunction with intelligent weapons and communication systems that provide secure transmission of data in real-time are useful and often unique means in the fight against terrorist targets.

Therefore, *air power* is an important tool of the military power that supports global action against terrorism. This is also due to the fact that the means of manifestation of air power (aircraft) can be boosted on aircraft carriers and deployed near the territories where terrorist groups are based/are operating. They can provide real-time information through ISR missions, global troop mobility, ability to accurately reach the assigned targets, provide close air support to own troops engaged in combat operations, psychological actions to help erode influence and power of terrorists and, in some cases, control of the state airspace and in the area of interest.

To conclude, air power is and will remain a viable option against this type of threat for a long time now.

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CLAUSEWITZIANISM AND POST-CLAUSEWITZIANISM. ABOUT THE NEED FOR A PARADIGM SHIFT WITHIN THE ROMANIAN MILITARY THINKING (V)

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*This paper aims at analysing the role of General Clausewitz's theory within the strategic and doctrinal projection of the last two centuries, and focuses on the Romanian military thinking in the final part of the study. In essence, the nature of war has remained unchanged, even if substantial changes have taken place in terms of the means of warfare. Given this reality, theorists who joined the Clausewitzian paradigm tried to expand the horizons of this paradigm beyond its limits; consequently, different current Clausewitzian perspectives of his followers are more or less dissonant with the current security context. For an accurate argumentation of an appropriate positioning of the Romanian military thinking, we proposed an episodic structuring of the entire issue, covering Clausewitz's work, the emergence of his ideas, the anti-Clausewitzian positioning, and the benchmarks of the Romanian military thinking related to Clausewitzian values. This episode, entitled *The Reflection of Clausewitz's work in Gândirea militară românească*, aims at describing how the work of Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, has been reflected in the past 20 years of the most prestigious Romanian journal of military science and security studies, *Gândirea militară românească*.*

Keywords: Clausewitz, On war, absolute war, Clausewitzian paradigm, post-Clausewitzianism, anti-Clausewitzianism, Romanian military thinking.

5. The representation of Clausewitz's work in *Gândirea militară românească*

5.1 The need for the study. In the previous episode, we concluded that the Euro-Atlantic post-Clausewitzian reality at the beginning of the last decade of the last century encountered a Romanian society modelled around neo-Clausewitzian centres of thought, which continued to maintain or even widen the gap in relation to the natural doctrinal alignment with the projection of the North Atlantic Alliance. Once the debates on NATO membership started, after several steps taken (from the invitation of Secretary General Manfred Wörner in July 1990 to Bucureşti until the turning point of the Madrid summit in 1997, then, until the permission for the use of the national airspace by allied aircraft and national territory by Czech and Polish contingents in 1999, until the Prague summit in 2002, which also meant receiving the invitation for accession), Romania designed a similar action at the level of the doctrinal interoperability. Basically, in the 14 years of steps taken with a view to the accession, as well as in the 14 years after Romania became a fully-fledged NATO member state, the Romanian thinking continued to function around the centres of (neo)Clausewitzian thinking while the Romanian doctrine aligned with the Alliance's (post)Clausewitzian values and principles.

This gap has narrowed for the past years, yet, it has continued to maintain a certain distance in the Romanian military thinking.

In my previous article, I concluded that, essentially, Romanian military thinking is an a-Clausewitzian thinking, with no ideology in relation to Clausewitzian and neo-Clausewitzian lines of strength and, definitely, far from the dispute launched by those who contest Clausewitzianism. Yet, this distance, as Academician Mircea Maliţa states, is not generated by the deliberate action to maintain distance towards Clausewitzian ideas, but by the fact that *"there are no signs*

Basically, in the 14 years of steps taken with a view to the accession, as well as in the 14 years after Romania became a fully-fledged NATO member state, the Romanian thinking continued to function around the centres of (neo) Clausewitzian thinking while the Romanian doctrine aligned with the Alliance's (post) Clausewitzian values and principles.

that Clausewitz's work was examined"¹. Such a statement calls into real question two possibilities: either the Romanian military thinking is deliberately far from Clausewitzian values and Academician Mircea Malița is wrong or the Academician is right, and the Romanian military thinking has developed at a certain distance from the study of Clausewitz's fundamental study, while keeping Clausewitzian benchmarks of the doctrine from the Communist period of the Romanian state as milestones.

5.2. On war in the past 20 years of *Gândirea militară românească*.

Mircea Malița's statement is the reason why I have chosen to conduct a quantitative-qualitative research, by investigating the past 20 years of the most significant journal of military science and security studies, *Gândirea militară românească*, in order to identify how thorough the iconic work of Prussian General von Clausewitz, *On War*, has been consulted, and to understand what the clusters of Clausewitzian theoretical content that have had the most effects on the Romanian military thinking are. In this respect, I have examined 114 issues of the journal, between 1/1998 and 3-4/2017 (including a special issue, no. 5/1999, dedicated to the journal's 140th anniversary), a total of tens of thousands of pages and 2,083 articles. My research does not include sections such as "Editorial", "International Connections", "Military Journalist Universe", "Editorial Events", "GMR Interviews", "GMR News" etc., which cannot reflect directly the proximity of the authors' ideas in relation to Clausewitzian thinking.

Out of the 2,083 articles analysed, only 69 are articles in which their authors refer to Clausewitz's work, including the fourth previous episodes of this study (the only one in the pages of *Gândirea militară românească* of the past 20 years that is dedicated to Clausewitzian thinking and related paradigms). In the 69 articles, 23 references are explicitly formulated in the report with the subtitle 24 of the work's foreword, *What is war?: "war is merely the continuation of policy by other means"*². The most curious thing is that, over the past twenty

¹ Mircea Malița, *O privire asupra fizionomiei războiului rece*, in *Revista de istorie militară*, no. 2, 2007.

² Carl von Clausewitz, *Despre război*. General Carl von Clausewitz's posthumous work. Foreword, notes and scientific examination of the texts by Major General Dr Corneliu Soare, Editura Militară, București, 1982, p. 67.

years, in none of these articles, Clausewitz's line has not been correctly quoted after the Romanian edition of 1982, which benefited from the introductory study, notes and scientific examination of the text by the most famous Romanian exegete of the Prussian thinker, Major General Dr Corneliu Soare.

In terms of topics, the references from the analysed articles also take into account uncertainty (4), Clausewitzian triad (3), friction (3), centre of gravity (3), changing nature of the war (3), complexity of the war (2) or the defeat of the enemy army without combat (2), respectively, in only one situation, the general themes that the General of the Prussian touched upon in his work *On War*: supply, doctrine, tactics/strategy relations, violence, absolute war, intelligence, armed fight, chance, ratio of forces etc.

The three parts, organised on 4-2-2 books, each consisting of between 6 and 30 chapters, are unequally reflected in *Gândirea militară românească*: the clear references to the complete Romanian edition of 1982 are 32 (but we must leave aside 12 of them, from the previous episodes of our study), in 20 articles (more precisely 16, without the 4 previous ones), namely 24 of the 743 pages of the edition (in fact, 22 of the pages comprised in the work as such, pp. 53-743, while two of the references concern the introductory study signed by General Soare).

Out of the 30 quotations, 27 refer to the first part of Clausewitz's work, while only one refers to the second one and two to the third one, the situation in terms of books being the following: book I – 20 quotations (chapter 1 – 16; chapter 2 – 2; chapter 3 – 2); book II – 4 (chapter 1 – 3; chapter 3 – 1); book III – 2 (chapter 6 – 1; chapter 8 – 1); book IV – 1 (chapter 11 – 1); book VI – 1 (chapter 24 – 1), respectively book VIII – 2 (chapter 6 – 2).

It is important to analyse the themes (topics) of these books and chapters in which the quoted pages are included, in order to qualitatively confront with the topics targeted by quotation from the thematic point of view. In this respect, I believe that *table 1* speaks for itself.

Part	Book	Title	Chapter	Title	Quoted pages	Frequency of quotation
I	I	On the nature of war	1	What is war?	53	1
					54	1(0)
					55	1(0)
					59-60	1
					64	1
					67	7(5)
	68	1(0)				
	69	3(1)				
	2	Purpose and means in war	70	1		
			75	1(0)		
3	Military genius	84	1(0)			
		95	1(0)			
II	On the theory of war	1	Art of war	110	2(1)	
				115	1	
				133	1(0)	
3	Art of war or science of war	6	Boldness	178	1	
				178	1	
III	On strategy in general	8	Superiority of numbers	183	1	
				183	1	
IV	Engagement	11	The battle	246	1	
II	VI	Defensive battle	24	Flank positions	465	1
III	VIII	War plans	6A	The effect of the political aim on the military objective	609	1
					6B	War is an instrument of policy

Table 1: Frequency of quotation³ of *On war* in *Gândirea militară românească* (1998-2017)

This analysis certifies the previously studied issues. The thematic projection entails the focus on the general political-war relations, the most frequently quoted page being 67, which includes subchapter “24. War is merely a continuation of politics by other means”, which is most often referred to: “We see, therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy, but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse carried on with other means. What remains peculiar to war is simply the peculiar nature of its means. War, in general, and the commander in any specific instance, is entitled to require that the trend and designs of policy shall not be inconsistent with these means. That, of course, is no small demand; but, however much it may affect the political aims in a given case, it will never do more than modify them.

³ In brackets, I documented the frequency of quoting without references from the previous episodes of our study.

*The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose*⁴.

To have a clearer view of the focus of the references in terms of the general aspects (Book I, “*On the nature of war*”, chapter 1, “*What is war?*”) that concern the relations policy/war, I have designed a *chart*, illustrative of the focus of the representation by quotation of only 10 of the 125 chapters of Clausewitz’s work, especially the first one, which totalises more than half of the number of quotations:




Figure 1: Frequency of quotations of the chapters of *On war* in *Gândirea militară românească* (1998-2017)

Obviously, the way Clausewitz’s work has been read in these past 20 years differs from the way General Helmuth von Moltke read it in the second half of the nineteenth century, who used the introductory book as a general pretext for positioning, using the other books as an instrument in planning and conducting military actions. However, a balanced reading would have assumed at least another reflection of chapters 2-8 of the first book or of the second, third or eighth books, just as in the (re)reading of neo-Clausewitzians. Still, ultimately, it is not this frequency of quoting the 22 pages of the 690 of “*On war*” that is relevant in relation to the projection of our research but, above all, the fact that, in the texts analysed, many references have been made to paraphrased ideas or to the principles of Clausewitzian paradigm without explicit reference to the source.

5.3. General references. Readings of the English editions. In the analysed texts, 31 references out of the 69 articles mentioning the Prussian General work have no citation, and other two serve as a motto. As far as the themes are concerned, the references without citation reflect the relations policy/war (18), the relations tactics/strategy, complexity of war, influence of physics in defining concepts (friction,

⁴ Carl von Clausewitz, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

centre of gravity), defeating enemy armed forces without fight, Clausewitzian triad, chance, uncertainty, violence, military formations, absolute war, supply during war etc. If one were to put together the explicitly formulated references to the pages of the first chapter of the first book, focused around the idea of war seen as a continuation of policy with other means, we would see that those that referred to the same idea, 34 out of 69 (direct or indirect ones), would be aimed at the same aspect, which entailed the transformation of Clausewitzian ideas into ideology through the vectors analysed in the previous episodes: Helmuth von Moltke, then Vladimir Ilyich Lenin and Adolf Hitler. In the interpretation of the representatives of political realism, the focus shifts radically, and the understanding of the relations between the political and military levels, although remaining fundamental, is detailed in a consistent reading of Clausewitz's work, in keeping with the context of its creation. Still, 34 references to the relation policy/war in the 69 articles do not represent the complete result.

A great number of the authors are familiarised with the English version of Carl von Clausewitz's work. Thus, in 20 of the 69 articles, the authors quote English versions of the book, especially the 1976 and 1993 editions, translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, published at Princeton University Press. It is remarkable that, following the reading of the English editions, the relation policy/war is not so frequently cited (only four times), while other topics of neo-Clausewitzian debates (which were not frequently mentioned following the reading of the Romanian version) are pointed out: doctrine, Clausewitzian triad, uncertainty, chance, friction, centre of gravity, limiter war, real war/ideal war relation, war seen as the absence of peace etc.

One possible explanation would be that the Romanian translation of the Clausewitzian opus, made by P. Năvodaru after the edition published by Ferdinand Dümmler in Berlin between 1832-1834, also taking into account *"the research undertaken so far on this work"*⁵, does not draw attention to these themes of the debate, those that have been the subject of the analysis of the neo-Clausewitzians or post-Clausewitzians. However, considering that many of these references are indirect, by means of works signed by various researchers (especially Americans) and others are incomplete or refer to English-language editions difficult to examine, such as the 1873 one, for example, in almost a third of the cases (very few) referring to the work of the Prussian general over the 2,083 articles analysed, partially

⁵ *Ibid*, p. 767.

and focused, through references from other works written in English. However, the reference to the most cited edition (1982) or other editions in Romanian⁶ would have been necessary for a rigorous design of the authors' positioning in relation to the Clausewitzian paradigm.

Returning to the subject of our analysis, the direct or indirect references to the policy/war relations, we find that, in the 69 articles referring to Clausewitz's work, 16 directly address this issue by citing the Romanian editions, 4 quote English editions, and 18 provide indirect references, irrespective of the source. All in all, 38 references from the 65 articles analysed (with the exception of the previous episodes of the current article) focus on the issue of policy/war relations (which is summed up in the established formula *"war is merely a continuation of politics by other means"*). To highlight the (partial) reading grid of the Clausewitzian opus, the graphic expression of this projection speaks for itself:



Figure 2: Thematic projection of the quotation of the Clausewitzian work in *Gândirea militară românească* (1998-2017)

It is surprising that the relations between policy and war slightly changed during the writing of the opus. In *Drafts* for the 3rd part, especially in some chapters from the 8th book (incomplete, due to the unexpected death of the Prussian thinker in 1831), Carl von Clausewitz redefined those relations and positioned himself critically towards his entire work. Understanding the possibility of categorical interpretations, dogmatism and these concepts losing validity, Carl von Clausewitz reviewed his own projection. He proposed reinterpreting the war as a hybrid phenomenon (curiously, those who are currently studying the hybrid warfare phenomenon do start from

⁶ The articles in question also refer to the edition published in 1968 at Editura Academiei Militare, but there is also a 2000 edition, published at Editura Antet, a duplication of the former one, with the same translation by P. Năvodaru and the same notes of General Corneliu Soare.



Understanding the possibility of categorical interpretations, dogmatisation and these concepts losing validity, Carl von Clausewitz reviewed his own projection. He proposed reinterpreting the war as a hybrid phenomenon [...].

the Clausewitzian positioning): “(...) *the real war is not a consistent extreme-oriented endeavour, as it should be according to its notion, but a **hybrid** (author’s emphasis) phenomenon, a contradiction in itself; thus, it cannot obey its own laws, but it must be considered as part of a whole – and this whole is policy*”⁷, in the organic sense of its manifestation, respectively: “*If we reflect on the nature of real war, and call to mind what has been said in the third chapter of this book, that **every war should be viewed above all things according to the probability of its character and its leading features, as they are to be deduced from the political forces and proportions, and that often, indeed, we may safely affirm, in our days, almost always, war is to be regarded as an organic whole** (author’s emphasis), from which the single branches are not to be separated, in which, therefore, every individual activity flows into the whole and also has its origin in the idea of this whole; then it becomes certain and palpable to us that the superior standpoint for the conduct of the war, from which its leading lines must proceed, can be no other than that of policy*”⁸.

Such a perspective radically alters, through Clausewitz’s intervention itself, the initial positioning, of a (political) substitutable complex through another, more violent (war), namely by using other means. War is understood as part of a whole (policy), an extension of a “*social milieu*” as a functional hybrid organism, within a superior organic complex, which is the politically coordinated state. Summing up Clausewitz’s work in the representation of the past twenty years in *Gândirea militară românească* to policy/war relation which, most certainly, is not the case, is more than surprising. Even more surprising is finding out that, in fact, this reading grid was given by General von Moltke in the second half of the nineteenth century, with the mention that his reading was complete, including the books considered inaccurate: Book 4 “*The Engagement*”, Book 5 “*Military Forces*”, Book VI “*Defence*” and Book VII “*The Attack*”: “*During the Franco-Prussian War, in his famous clash with Bismarck, Moltke formulated the general staff’s claim to a shared authority. In this he gave expression to the relationship between the political and military leadership that was embedded in the political structure of the Second Reich*”⁹.

Even though the neo-Clausewitzian grid of the articles analysed in the past 20 years of the *Gândirea militară românească* is coherent and the perspective of thinkers such as Gheorghe Văduva or Mihail Orzeață

⁷ Carl von Clausewitz, *op. cit.*, p. 611.

⁸ *Ibid*, p. 613.

⁹ Azar Gat, *A History of Military Thought. From the Enlightenment to the Cold War*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 251.

is complex and consistent with the answer of political realism during the *Cold War* to Liddel Hart’s projection, the other articles involve only a superficial receiving, sometimes required by the very theme and context of the research.

5.4. Conclusions. Analysing quantitatively and qualitatively the content of the articles that refer to the work of Prussian General Carl von Clausewitz published over the past twenty years by the oldest and most prestigious publication of military science and security studies from Romania, *Gândirea militară românească*, I have found out, first of all, that the work *On war* is reflected in rather low proportions (or simply by reference) in the articles. A total of 69 articles out of 2,083, which were the subject of analysis in the articles, means 3.31% of the total (a value far below personal expectations).

Moreover, out of the total of these articles, nearly two thirds summarise the work of the Prussian thinker to the formula he had abandoned in his last years: “*war is merely a continuation of politics by other means*”, in favour of an organic understanding of the war. Although it is obvious that Clausewitz’s work is difficult to understand (as its philosophical foundations were based on concepts still unclear)¹⁰, sticking only to the relation policy/war is simplifying and generalist. The natural conclusion of this analysis of the 69 articles signed in time by 60 authors, which will probably be extended to a qualitative level (with explicit reference to the context of their research), is that, unfortunately, Academician Mircea Malița was right in the sense that *On war* is not very examined and therefore it does not produce a demarcation of the nature of the positioning, maintaining the Romanian military thinking in a rather neutral area, with no ideology in relation to the lines of force of the two paradigms in confrontation for at least seventy years.

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¹⁰ Azar Gat offers the following approach to the categorical positions regarding the interpretation of Clausewitz’s work: “*In a sense, Clausewitz could never have been wrong or less than profound because no one could be quite sure that he understood the true meaning of Clausewitz’s ideas*”.



DO WE STILL NEED PARATROOPERS?

Colonel (r.) Dr Mircea TĂNASE

The author addresses the topic of special operations in the context of the future war, trying to find out whether special operations forces are enough for dealing with the current threats to national, regional and global security and whether classical structures/branches such as paratroopers are still needed.

First, he defines the concept of special operations and elaborates on some issues regarding this topic. Then, he writes about special operations units in various countries, emphasising the role of paratrooper units.

In the end of the article, the author touches upon the Special Operations Forces in the Romanian Armed Forces and the role of paratroopers in special operations.

Keywords: future war, conventional forces, special operation forces, paratroopers.

The future war will most likely be part of an impressive diversity of actions and reactions, designed and unfolded in a multidimensional space, defined by the following characteristics: they do not come in a classical armed form; they can also occur in peacetime; they do not comply with the distinction between peace and war; they have an obviously secret character; most of the time, they are part of the competition between big powers and economic blocs etc.

Separatist wars, ethnic-religious violence, border disputes, civil unrest and terrorist attacks are just a few of the possible scenarios, with *many small wars* that will force planners to pay special attention to military stability and support operations and to seek to use more and more other types of forces, capable of meeting future challenges.

Therefore, there is the perception that structures such as the Special Operations Forces (SOF), Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) or cyber or military intelligence specialists will be instrumental in this kind of asymmetric conflicts, thereby reducing the relevance and necessity of classical structures/branches, such as paratroopers, manned aircraft, or mechanised infantry.

Opening Considerations

Classical, conventional war will be gradually replaced by the unconventional, atypical and asymmetric war, having global dimension and scope, a war on terror, in which military operations have been transferred to the territory of the enemy, their accomplices or supporters, at the same time with increasing the alert state and internal protection.

Special small-scale actions, carried out by military forces in peacetime, during crisis and conflicts, in order to achieve strategic goals and objectives, have the purpose of preventing, deterring, limiting or eliminating conflict smaller scale and intensity situations, such as and providing support to civilian authorities in situations of internal crisis. They entail *military engagement in peacetime*, in a multinational framework, with the purpose of shaping the security environment, but they can also be triggered by the emergence of certain crises/threats, in which situation they are *response actions*.

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Special operations are defined as small scale, clandestine, undercover, or overt operations of an unorthodox and frequently high-risk nature, undertaken to achieve significant political and military objectives in support of foreign policy.

These operations can include components of both *combat* and *non-combat* operations carried out in peacetime, during crisis, and at war. In this respect, there are enough situations that, by their very nature, can acquire warlike features, including combat actions with the use of military capabilities to achieve the set goals.

An efficient show of force proves the ability to carry out the mission and support it. In such actions, troops are usually deployed to show the ability to use force in a non-threatening manner – training exercises demonstrating the ability to intervene and act – while also having the ability to carry out combat actions, in a very short time.

From this point of view, Special Operations Forces/SOF are a requirement for the force structures of the military body, being a necessary tool to respond quickly, accurately, punctually and with minimal resources to the current threats to national, regional and global security. But are they enough? Here is a question we will try to answer. And, at the same time, we will try to find an answer to the question in the title of this article.

Special operations are defined as *small scale, clandestine, undercover, or overt operations of an unorthodox and frequently high-risk nature, undertaken to achieve significant political and military objectives in support of foreign policy*¹. Therefore, they differ from conventional operations in terms of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets².

Specialised doctrines define the typology of special operations, their missions, ways of use, modus operandi, training and procurement requirements etc. We will mention only a few of them, highlighting the need for specific training as elements/structures that must be parachuted into the enemy's disposition, thus trying to emphasise the close connection they must establish with the paratroopers/airborne/air assault troops.

In fact, paratrooper forces are, by definition, the only specialised component of the armed forces capable of carrying out large-scale

¹ M. Tugwell, D. Charters, *Special Operations and the Threats to United States Interests in the 1980s*, F.R. Barnett, B. Hugh Tovar & R.H. Shultz (eds); *Special Operations in US Strategy*, National Defense University Press, Washington DC, 1984, p. 35 (apud Doru Constantin Tocilă, *Eficiențizarea acțiunilor desfășurate de structurile specializate pentru operații speciale din Forțele Terestre*, doctoral thesis, "Carol I" National Defence University, București, 2009).

² Cf. US Joint Chiefs of Staff, *JP 3-05: Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*, Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 2003, p. I-1 (apud Doru Constantin Tocilă, *op. cit.*).

missions involving long-range airlift and delivering assets and troops by parachute. Their specificity is given by the ability to quickly enter the enemy's disposition at great distances, by air, fixed-wing aircraft, parachute or landing, and by the specific possibilities of carrying out deep operations³.

Regarding the modus operandi, special operations can be carried out directly or indirectly. In the range of direct actions, led against an enemy by engaging specialised forces in combat, we can mention the missions of gaining and controlling command and liaison points, airfields, major communications nodes, and industrial facilities. Indirectly, they can be noticed through organising, training and supporting indigenous forces in unconventional military actions or military forces of the host nation, within specific assistance and support missions for that particular host nation. *Psychological Operations (PSYOPS)* are also included in this category, being operations that are carried out in order to influence the enemy military forces or the local population.

During the war, the *SOF* could also be used for operational air landing or as a mobile manoeuvre group in the depth of the enemy disposition, for the accomplishment of targeted missions, such as the destruction of important installations or vital elements, disorganisation of leadership, liberation of hostages or prisoners, actions specific to psychological warfare; possible capture of political-military dignitaries⁴.

These forces, however, should not replace conventional, larger and less mobile forces, but need to be selected for actions in which their capabilities act as force multipliers. In addition, it is necessary to consider the inability of the conventional forces of some countries to settle domestic issues (secession, ethnic turmoil, terrorist attacks, extended crises of violence, proliferation of organised crime etc.) and the fact that they are not flexible, they do not have skilled staff available nor appropriate combat technique, causing major material destruction in their own country. These are only a few aspects regarding the importance of and the need for organising, developing and employing special forces to carry out specific operations to solve these crises, involving the use of highly professional staff.

³ Colonel Gheorghe Mateescu, *Materializarea manevrei pe verticală în operațiile forțelor terestre (operațiile aeroperțate)*, Editura Școlii de Aplicație pentru Parașutiști, Buzău, 2003, pp. 18-19.

⁴ Gheorghe Toma, Lucian Stăncilă, Costică Țenu, *Arta operativă între contrarii*, Editura A.Î.S.M., București, 2001, p. 65.



Paratrooper forces are, by definition, the only specialised component of the armed forces capable of carrying out large-scale missions involving long-range airlift and delivering assets and troops by parachute.

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As a rule, combat units of forces meant for special operations within the land forces in most NATO member states are special destination subunits, designed for deep reconnaissance (front-level), specialising in the fight against terrorism and "Commando"-, or "Rangers"-type.

Arguments for Modernity

A brief review of the force structure of special operations forces in some modern armed forces reconfirms our belief that there is a close correlation between them and the air landing troops, and furthermore, it reveals the genesis of these forces and the "parental" support that airborne/air landing troops continue to provide a naughty and non-conformist "child" with.

As a rule, combat units of forces meant for special operations within the land forces in most NATO member states are special destination subunits, designed for deep reconnaissance (front-level), specialising in the fight against terrorism and "Commando"-, or "Rangers"-type. Other armed forces use battalions of air landing troops for the same purpose, which can be used in special operations to carry out missions to conquer and maintain command and liaison points, airfields, communications nodes, and industrial facilities.

Special operation forces include detachments for deep reconnaissance, assault-diversion, air landing-assault, special destination etc. The air landing-assault detachments, established on the basis of air landing troops and marine corps units, are designed to destroy fixed, powerful targets belonging to the enemy, gain control over lines of communication, alignments or isolated areas. Special destination detachments are prepared for actions deep in the enemy territory, being capable of fulfilling various reconnaissance, diversion and mining missions, using both partisan movement and insurrectional methods.

In the **United Kingdom**, after the Falklands War, the issue of the establishment of elite units capable of intervening rapidly anywhere around the world came up. The 5th Airmobile Brigade is a structure of this kind, seen as the main possibility of projecting the UK force and spearhead of the land forces, some of its units being used in the Gulf War, in 1991.

At the same time, for special operations, the British use three more independent regiments from the *Special Air Service/SAS* as well as four training centres (reconnaissance, special training, paratroopers, addition and preparation). A regiment can form up to 50 reconnaissance-diversion detachments (8-16 soldiers) to act on enemy territory and at a big distance (typically in groups of 4 military specialists in reconnaissance-diversion, radio links and medical assurance). For some missions, women soldiers can also be used⁵.

⁵ A. Mihailov, *Forțele de operații speciale din țările europene membre ale NATO*, in *Zarubeznoe Voennoe Obozrenie*, Russia, no. 7, July 1996, pp. 6-11.

Within its armed forces, **Belgium** has a paratroopers regiment-commando which can be used jointly in wartime to ensure the combat actions of NATO's united armed forces groups, or in platoon-, company- and battalion-size formations for carrying out reconnaissance and tactical missions in the depth of enemy territory⁶.

In **Denmark**, for reconnaissance and diversion missions, they use the reconnaissance company of the army corps and a special marine corps company⁷.

After the events in Rwanda, in 1994⁸, when the problem of the allies evacuating own citizens came up, **Germany** felt compelled to create its own special forces, being interested in other countries' views on their use, especially the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Italy. The German Special Forces Commando (*Kommando Spezialkräfte/KSK*) were set up under the German Land Forces in April 1996, within the 25th Airborne Brigade, deployed at Calw (south of Frankfurt). The *Bundeswehr* has the first capabilities to perform evacuation operations of limited value, under the leading of the national command. The increase in the strength of response forces in times of crisis, especially with paratroopers, will be a rule, and airlift will be carried out with aircraft belonging to the military air or land forces⁹.

In **France**, at the Land Forces, there are Reconnaissance and Deep Action Commandos (*Commando de renseignement et d'action dans la profondeur/CRAP*), where paratroopers have a well-defined role and furthermore, we may add that they are the backbone of these special forces. Among the regiments in the Foreign Legion, the most specialised is the 2nd Foreign Paratrooper Regiment of the 11th Parachute Division, included in the Rapid Action Force. The 13th Parachute Dragoon Regiment, the best unit of the French land forces, is ready to infiltrate up to 150 kilometres of troops through parachuting or helicopters, with light vehicles or motorcycles to gather information from the enemy distribution. It is considered to have the best reconnaissance patrols in the world, which participated in the Gulf War (1991). Moreover,

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ In Rwanda, in 1994, there was probably the bloodiest genocide of the 20th century – over 800,000 (1,000,000, according to other sources) Tutsis were slaughtered by their rivals, the Hutus.

⁹ Vasile Soare, *Forțele speciale – comandouri aeropurtate în acțiune*, Editura Ziuva, București, 2002, p. 336.



the 1st Reconnaissance Regiment from the 11th Paratrooper Division and the Commando, Reconnaissance, and Deep Action formations are genuine special operations units involved in obtaining information¹⁰.

The main objective of the *Special Operations Command (SOC)*, established in 1992 and placed under direct command of the Chief of the General Staff of the French Armed Forces, is to bring together the special units belonging to the different services. *SOC* plans, prepares and fulfils any special operation. Its missions are neutralisation, influence, military assistance and operational support. These are exactly the specialised skills of *SOC*, being actions of reconnaissance behind enemy lines, protection of military and civil dignitaries in the theatre of operations, infiltration and extraction, rescue of downed pilots, liaison or order maintaining missions, target acquisition with laser designator.

Within the *SOC*, the Navy commando units are specialised to carry out missions to secure the landing beaches, parachuting in the sea to infiltrate, recognise and destroy targets at sea and on land, fight against piracy, submarine operations. Within the Air Parachute Commando no. 10 (APC-10), there is an elite unit, called APC-40, specialised in laser illumination of bombing targets, recognising and arranging airport areas, landing or parachuting areas, collecting environmental information and conducting psychological operations. APC-10 members stood out in 1997, when 106 civilians were evacuated from Albanian beaches, as the crowd tried to storm helicopters. The 1st Marine Infantry Parachute Regiment (*1st RPIMa*) regroups all special forces in the land forces (in France both paratroopers and marine infantry are part of the land forces structure), with missions such as: information collection, typical neutralisation actions, military or operational assistance of the forces of the countries linked by specific agreements with France. The *Air Force's Special Operations Division (DOS)* is dependent on both *SOC* and the Air Force Protection. It specialises in night flights, parachutes from high or low altitude to infiltrate and supply the helicopters and provide the necessary *SOC* equipment¹¹.

At the same time, other special units are included in France's security forces: the Parachute Intervention Squadron of the National Gendarmerie (*PISNG*), the National Gendarmerie Intervention Group

¹⁰ V. Alventosa, *Forțele de operații speciale din Franța*, in *Defensa*, Spain, no. 182, June 1993, pp. 34-42.

¹¹ Șerban Iclănzan, *O structură de elită a armatei franceze – Comandamentul Operațiunilor Speciale*, in *Spirit militar modern*, no. 3/1999, p. 47.

(*NGIG*) and the Security Group for the Presidency of the Republic (SGPR), which are also trained for parachuting missions.

The **Italian** Rapid Intervention Force also includes the *Folgore* Paratrooper Brigade, the 1st *Tuscania* Carabinieri Paratrooper Battalion, the 2nd *Tarquini* Paratrooper Battalion, the 5th *El Almain* Paratrooper Battalion, the 9th Col Moschin Assault Paratrooper Battalion, the 185th *Viterbo* Paratroopers Field Artillery Group, the 26th *ALE Giove* Cavalry Group, a logistics battalion and an engineering paratroopers company. At the same time, for reconnaissance and diversion actions in the operational and tactical depth of enemy territory, the Italian land troops can use assault battalions and paratroopers-on-skis platoons from the mountain brigades of rangers corps, a special destination battalion from the *Folgore* Parachute Brigade, an independent battalion of the military maritime forces¹².

Israel has five paratroopers brigades, two of them completely manned, one brigade has 50% of the necessary troops and two are units of cadres. The well-organised and rapid system of deploying and supplementing troops upon mobilisation ensures the prompt enhancement of the paratrooper reserve units. Parachute troops use, as much as possible, local weapons and supplies, which are supplemented with equipment procured from different countries, or captured materials and weapons. From time to time, information is released about a special sub-unit within the Israeli Armed Forces paratrooper units, named the "*General Staff Reconnaissance Unit 269*", which carried out the Entebbe anti-terrorist assault in June 1976¹³.

In the former **Yugoslavia**, the 63rd Paratrooper Brigade, based in Nis, was used in the mid-1990s in military missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Slovenia. After the collapse of Yugoslavia and the reorganisation of its armed forces, the special units were grouped into the Special Operations Corps consisting of the 63rd *Sky Otters* Parachute Brigade and the 72nd *SPECOPS Mighty Hawks* Brigade (used in the fight against terror), subordinate to the Armed Forces General Staff. In May 1999, the Special Forces Corps was founded, based in Pancevo, which, besides the two large units mentioned above, also includes the Guard Motorised Brigade in Belgrade. Used in Kosovo to counter the process of secession against the Yugoslav state, as well as in other missions

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ In June 1976, an Air France A-300 Airbus passenger plane, with 253 passengers onboard, was hijacked by a group of German terrorists and flown to the Entebbe airport in Uganda. The antiterrorist operation, led by General Dan Shomron, a famed paratrooper, was a great success for Israeli special forces.

to fight actions directed against the Serb population, the unit was decorated by Slobodan Milosevic with the Order of *National Hero*, other orders and medals being received by the unit and by its troops over the years for the missions accomplished¹⁴.

In **Portugal**, *commando* subunits are found with the land forces and the naval infantry. **Norway**, **Greece** and **Turkey** also have consistent units and subunits for reconnaissance-diversion missions.

In **Spain**, the first independent special operations companies were set up in 1962, when the history of its own *Green Berets* began. In preparation for specific missions, particular attention is paid to parachute training, as a primary process to infiltrate into the depth of the enemy territory¹⁵.

The former **USSR** was extremely interested in the creation of special, politically loyal troops, capable of acting independently behind the enemy lines to support the vast *liberator*-based Communist-led ideological offensive for which peace and/or war had long since ceased to be considered totally distinct states.

All that Russia did was take over and give a complete makeover to these structures, which are essentially intended for the same range of special missions. The representative element of the Russian special forces remained the *SPETZNAZ* units and paratrooper units. In fact, *SPETZNAZ*¹⁶ are the only troops in the armed forces of the former member states of the Warsaw Treaty recognised by Western specialists as *elite*.

The first consequence of the critical need for troops capable of carrying out a wide range of unconventional battalion- or brigade-level actions behind the enemy lines was the increase in the number of airborne divisions (VDVs¹⁷) and the creation of air assault brigades and airborne naval infantry. The *SPETZNAZ* troops differed from the other Soviet airborne forces because they were intended to carry out undercover missions and had specialised training in several areas: intelligence gathering, long distance reconnaissance patrols, kidnappings, airborne raids, and specific interventions abroad, partisan fight support, sabotage, assassinations and others.

Immediately after the Second World War, the USSR dismantled its special forces, the entire range of diversion operations being assigned

¹⁴ Alin Spănu, *Brigada 63 Parașutiști din armata Republicii Serbia și Muntenegru*, in *Parașutiștii* magazine, no. 21(30)/2006.

¹⁵ Locotenent Ion Căndea, *Beretele verzi spaniole*, in *Spirit militar modern*, no. 5/1999. pp. 53-55.

¹⁶ *Spetsialnaya Naznacheniya* – special purpose detachments.

¹⁷ *Vozdujno Desantnoie Voiska*.

to conventional airborne units. Towards the end of the 1950s, special forces structures were re-established within state (KGB) or military (GRU) intelligence structures.

SPETZNAZ units usually wear paratrooper uniforms and are deployed in the same garrisons as other airborne or air assault units, and the naval ones together with naval infantry units¹⁸. The *SPETZNAZ* Brigade consists of a command and staff subunit, 3-4 paratrooper battalions, support and assurance sub-units. As far as the maritime fleet is concerned, a *SPETZNAZ* brigade consists, in addition to the staff, support and assurance structures, a paratrooper battalion, a minesweeper group and 2-3 combat diver battalions.

Russian military experts believe that, in addition to special operations, operations in the depth of the enemy territory have always existed and were, in turn, special, unusual and sometimes decisive for the battle. Airborne (air landing) troops, as a result of their high availability and rapid reaction capability, are still a particularly effective and flexible means used in these operations. They can also be used where land troops (especially tanks) cannot be used or cannot be engaged in action because of the environment. Often, they are used to conquer important battlefields in advance and maintain them in order to create the appropriate conditions for land troop intervention¹⁹.

Large-scale use of air assault and air landing formation as well as mobile groups and raid detachments, including helicopters, to disrupt enemy logistics, command systems, reconnaissance, supply, and to conquer major objectives until the main forces are close is one of the prerequisites for the efficiency of all forms and procedures large operational units in armed conflicts and local wars²⁰.

US Special Forces are made up of small military units with special training and equipment. Whether they bear the *Green Beret*, *Rangers*, *Delta Force*, or *SEAL* insignia, they are capable of infiltrating into enemy territory by land, water or air and carrying out a wide range of operations, most of which are secret. The SOF national command is ensured through special operations commands responsible for training and equipment.

¹⁸ Mihai Floca, *Forțele de elită ale lumii*, Editura Militară, București, 1999, p. 76.

¹⁹ D. Haag, *Noi dimensiuni ale operațiilor. Operațiile în adâncime*, in *Europäische Sicherheit*, no. 3, March 1998, pp. 25-29.

²⁰ V. Maganov, *Forme și procedee de întrebuițare a grupărilor de trupe (forțe) în conflictele armate și în războaiele locale*, in *Voennaia Misl*, Russia, no. 2, March-April 1996, pp. 20-25.



The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)²¹ integrates three major elements: *US Army Special Operations Command/USASOC*, *US Naval Special Warfare Command/NAVSPECWARCOM* and *US Air Force Special Operations Command/AFSOC*²² alongside their support means. These units can be used both in peacetime, in crisis situations in specific missions, and during wartime, in strategic, operational or tactical missions, including: unconventional warfare, direct actions, special reconnaissance, civil affairs, counterterrorism, defence of US facilities abroad, information operations.

US military command considers that the SOF are the most active military tool used to enhance its political and military influence abroad. The US SOF strength is over 40,000 troops, out of which 25,000 regular armed forces and 18,000 reserve forces.

At the same time, US military experts believe that airborne forces are a proper option for achieving certain missions within the range of special operations. After using the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions in Operation *Desert Storm* in Iraq, in 1991, the USA engaged these structures in all areas worldwide in which they intervened to maintain peace, fight terrorism and carry out humanitarian actions. Their use in humanitarian actions in Rwanda and Somalia, imposing and maintaining peace in Haiti, in the former Yugoslavia, Iraq and Afghanistan, disaster relief in the USA – Hurricanes *Andrew* (1992) and *Katrina* (2005) – have once again shown that, although major airborne operations are out of date, airborne troops, adapted to new types of conflict, can still be particularly effective in settling the crises the humankind is currently facing and will still probably face in the future.

Known as America's *Guard of Honor*, the 82nd Airborne Division is still recognised as one of the most powerful forces of the US military arsenal, considering that no other military structure can respond more quickly and efficiently than it can to any conflict worldwide.

According to US military experts, the role of the airborne division is to plan, coordinate, and carry out a rapid, combined and forced entry into operation, alone or as part of a joint force, in the depth and breadth of the battlefield. It is the only large unit that has the

²¹ Command headquartered at Mac Dill Air Force Base, Florida. It was founded on 16.04.1987 (see maior Silvia Toma, *Forțele pentru Operații Speciale în contextul militar modern. Rolul și importanța acestora în secolul XXI*, term paper, "Carol I" National Defence University, București, 2010).

²² Founded in May 1990, on the structure of the Twenty-Third Air Force within the Military Airlift Command (see maior Silvia Toma, *op. cit.*).

ability to engage by parachuting in order to accomplish its goals. The main advantages of airborne operations are: a rapid response shortly after being notified; the possibility to bypass all land or sea obstacles; the ability to surprise; the possibility to bring important forces to key points. The missions of airborne forces may be strategic, operational or tactical ones. They can be used as combat or deterrent forces due to the recognised strategic mobility, simply putting them on high alert being a show of force²³.

Airborne forces can fulfil three types of operations: occupying and maintaining control of targets up to the junction with land forces, area denial (harassing and disorganising enemy actions) and airborne raids (generally short tactical or strategic operations to destroy enemy installations or positions, capture personnel, disorganise their command and logistics). In the range of special operations, airborne forces can be used to collect intelligence from the enemy territory, carry out raids on commands, launching facilities, communication routes, administrative and logistic facilities, occupy and maintain mandatory crossing points, strengthen surrounded land forces, cover the flanks, disrupt enemy's connection with their reserves, exploit the effects of chemical and nuclear weapons, create a feeling of insecurity behind the enemy disposition. They can also carry out operations in the whole range of small-scale conflicts: support for insurgency or counterinsurgency, peacekeeping operations, unexpected peacetime operations, and the fight against terrorism. Appropriately supported by combat and logistic support forces, airborne troops can conduct operations against any enemy²⁴.

Special Operations Forces in the Romanian Armed Forces

The widening of the conventional and unconventional risk spectrum, as well as the diversification of the typology of crises and conflicts led the Romanian armed forces command to create, alongside classical forces, structures assigned to carry out special missions in times of peace and during crisis situations.

In the Romanian military literature, the *SOF* are the *specialised component of the armed forces capable of rapid, discreet and timely intervention in the areas of maximum risk, during peacetime, in crisis and conflict situations, and are assigned to defend the fundamental*

²³ F. M. 96-20, *Airborne Operations*, USA, pp. 8-10.

²⁴ *Ibid.*



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SOF are the specialised component of the armed forces capable of rapid, discreet and timely intervention in the areas of maximum risk, during peacetime, in crisis and conflict situations, and are assigned to defend the fundamental interests of the Romanian state, independently or in cooperation with the other military services.

*interests of the Romanian state, independently or in cooperation with the other military services*²⁵.

The SOF is not new to the Romanian Armed Forces (which had in its composition structures of special forces known under other names, such as in-depth reconnaissance structures, paratrooper-commandos structures, special missions/operations structures). Let us mention only the special mission platoon of the first paratrooper company set up in the Romanian Armed Forces on 10 June 1941, led by the famous Captain Mihail Țanțu, the reconnaissance groups launched in the enemy disposition by parachuting from the reconnaissance battalions, as well as the special missions/operations battalions within the Parachute Troops Command, whose concepts of establishment, selection, training and use have undergone ample changes, in line with the new and complex challenges brought about by the evolution of the security environment and the need to modernise the armed forces.

Establishing/rebuilding the special forces, starting with 2003 – first a battalion, then a regiment and then a brigade, at the same time with a command structure within the General Staff, this action being supported by Alliance partners (particularly the American one), which provided the required support and will, of course, continue to do so – did not come out of nowhere, but, in our opinion – supported by historical arguments – followed its natural course in the Romanian Armed Forces.

In the current context, given the structure of our armed forces and the experience of other armed forces, as well as the objectives/missions to be accomplished by these forces, I consider that there is no need for an over-dimensioning of these forces, nor for an undervaluation of these forces, so that they will be able to fulfil their set goals.

A large number of troops coming from structures of paratroopers and in-depth reconnaissance by parachuting dismantled through the armed forces restructuring (required by the need to align with NATO standards) wanted to remain active in special destination units and opted for the new special forces structures. They have, of course, been subjected to difficult selections in which physical qualities (strength and physical abilities), as well as psychological qualities (intelligence, courage, resolve, trust, motivation, rapid thinking and decision-making, teamwork capacity etc.) are decisive. The experience gained in their previous structures was, of course, a serious asset and a real advantage for the newly established ones.

²⁵ *Doctrina acțiunilor înrunitate ale forțelor armate*, București, 2001, art. 62.

Paratroopers in the Equation of Special Operations

The specialised military literature provides us with a complex view of how political interests and objectives delimit the types of actions, while taking into account the degree of use of the armed force.

Considering the tendency of international actors to impose their will by resorting to asymmetric conflicts, the countries concerned or international organisations must adapt their actions in keeping with the intensity and techniques used to generate and maintain these conflicts.

Thus, the following types of stability and support operations can be mentioned: freedom of navigation and flight; assistance to a nation; counterterrorism; weapon control; sanctions imposing; limited goal strikes and raids; military support for the fight against drugs; military support to civil authorities; non-combatant evacuation; shows of force; protection of navigation; search-rescue-evacuation; peace support. These operations can include both *combat* and *non-combat* actions carried out in peacetime, during crisis situations and at war. In this respect, there are enough situations that, by their very nature, can acquire warlike features, including combat actions with the use of military capabilities to achieve the set goals²⁶.

An effective show of force proves the ability to carry out the mission and support it. In such actions, troops are usually deployed to display force in a non-threatening manner – training exercises demonstrating the ability to intervene and act – while showing the opportunity to carry out combat actions in a very short time.

Imposition of sanctions and *shows of force* are usually done by combining land operations with air and naval ones. They are characterised by great manoeuvrability of the participating forces, demonstrating both the ability to deploy forces and the ability to plan, conduct and carry out operations specific to the armed fight. These operations are usually non-linear and carried out in high-instability environments, requiring the concentration of large quantities of forces and means with great mobility and training that is complementary to general and specialised military training. Their complexity affects the participating structures both physically and mentally, as well as the ability to adapt the modus operandi to face some limit situations, in compliance with the rules of engagement from the mandate

²⁶ *Doctrina pentru Operațiunile Întrunite Multinaționale*, Statul Major General, București, 2001, pp. 15-17.



According to NATO standards, special operations are those military operations that, due to their nature, cannot be carried out by conventional forces.

of the force. The success is connected to the use of elite forces with the ability to quickly deploy on the ground – a key element in such operations – and the ability to improve while carrying out combat missions.

Given that the paratrooper structures fall into the category of these elite forces of the National Defence System and that, due to the nature of the possibilities of their use in military operations, they have great manoeuvrability, we believe that they can successfully participate, in a multinational framework, in peacetime stability, during crisis situations, at war or post-conflict situations, for imposition of sanctions and for shows of force. An important element of the operational capacity that supports the paratroopers' use in such operations is the short reaction time required for the deployment of force. However, this requires the provision of adequate logistic support, first in order to ensure airlift and parachuting means, then for the logistic support of the operation and the extraction of the force from the area of operations.

As for the anti- and counter-terrorism actions led by a military (classical or special) force, depending on its capabilities (organisation, procurement and training), these fall into the category of *forceful actions*, usually being carried out for: detection, through the intelligence sensors grid and special forces, of the centres and training bases of terrorist organisations and networks; military strikes, especially with the aviation, missiles and special forces on terrorist infrastructures; participation in terrorist networks and terrorist sites search and destruction operations in border areas; special operations against terrorism.

According to NATO standards, special operations are those military operations that, due to their nature, cannot be carried out by conventional forces. In the context in which their establishment, procurement, training and specialisation prove to be quite difficult and they do not yet have all the required capabilities, we deem it necessary that there are other force structures besides them, capable of reacting effectively to the specifics of such actions and participate in counterterrorism, stability and support operations. Thus, given their experience and training, and with the proper equipment, parachute troops will be able to become one of the most effective capabilities to respond to the challenges of present and future military conflicts, capable of successfully fulfilling all this range of missions in the Joint Special Operations area.

Special Operation Forces and Paratroopers in the Romanian Armed Forces, between Complementarity and Antagonism

The first Special Operations Brigade of the Romanian Armed Forces was established back in 2011. Its structure was enhanced, by including, alongside the special operations battalion set up in 2003, the two paratrooper battalions that survived the restructuring of the armed forces. These facts acknowledge the importance of these structures and the desire of decision-makers to capitalise on their already-acquired potential in order to fulfil a wide range of missions in numerous special operations. However, we must not overlook the fact that this transfer of potential was made at the expense of parachute troops, somehow pulled from the stage, despite a rich tradition and an indisputable training and capacity to perform missions inaccessible to other forces.

Thus, let us not forget that, in order to support the airborne feature of the land forces, the parachutist structures can be included, if necessary, in their operational subordination, for putting the vertical manoeuvre into practice. Therefore, although, in the near future, the emphasis will be placed on a new structural and operational reconfiguration of the SOF, in which the former parachutist units, remodelled for the accomplishment of the missions of this kind, have been integrated, the need to ensure/create the capabilities necessary for the land forces to carry out the vertical manoeuvre, still valid and necessary in the equation of the combined operations, must not be overlooked.

The opinion shared at some point by certain decision-makers – amid the fear of allocating the resources needed to reconfigure a paratroopers battalion or, why not, of ignoring the specificity of the airborne missions – according to which special operation battalions may also be used as airborne force in support of land forces, if necessary, is wrong. Especially since these battalions have been reconfigured and equipped in keeping with the standards of special operations, thus being left without the operational feature of the airborne troops.

Bearing this in mind, it is only through the reconstruction, procurement and proper training of a paratroopers structure specially designed to provide vertical manoeuvre that one can meet such a manoeuvring requirement, still present in modern operations, even if with other characteristics for the airborne operation than we were



The first Special Operations Brigade of the Romanian Armed Forces was established back in 2011.



used to. The recent reintroduction of the 495th Infantry Battalion “Captain Ștefan Șoverth” to paratrooper battalion status can be regarded as a natural and responsible return to normality.

The availability of paratrooper fighters to act both in airborne operations and, when necessary, in some of the missions specific to special operations, entitles us to appreciate that one needs to reconsider the attitude towards these structures, in the sense of rebuilding, developing and capitalising on the existing potential and creating the conditions for achieving the capabilities needed to complete the entire range of missions assigned.

For this purpose, one must intensify the efforts to identify and procure the newest weapons types and state-of-the-art combat technique, compatible with the one of similar structures belonging to the other armed forces of the NATO member states, able to provide our paratroopers structures with the possibility of asserting our high level training and increased response capacity when carrying out specific missions. Moreover, one must adopt certain formulas of organisation, subordination (during peacetime, in crisis situations and at war) and training procedures meant to provide them with increased flexibility, reaction speed and manoeuvre capacity and which, at the same time, meet the requirement of ensuring compatibility with similar structures from the armed forces of other NATO member states.

Conclusion

Just as the use of drones does not exclude the operation of manned aircraft if one seeks to have credible air force, so the special operations forces cannot replace the entire range of missions that can be accomplished by paratroopers.

The decision-makers who will decide on the way the military capabilities are to be engaged and used in future military operations will have to take into account the fact that paratrooper forces represent an extremely versatile capability, with unique skills within the Romanian Armed Forces. They will also be a source of selection for special operations forces, reconnaissance and military intelligence. Last but not least, parachute training, in addition to providing the ability to penetrate the disposition through this technique, contributes to the formation of well-motivated and highly effective fighters. In this respect, the practice of other NATO member states can be an enlightening example and a way forward.

In conclusion, it can be said that, alongside the other services, paratrooper forces can provide Romania with an important basis for asserting its position as a prominent actor in the North Atlantic Alliance for managing regional crises and fighting terrorism.

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[...] special operations forces cannot replace the entire range of missions that can be accomplished by paratroopers.

Although, in the near future, the emphasis will be placed on a new structural and operational reconfiguration of the SOF, [...] the need to ensure/create the capabilities necessary for the land forces to carry out the vertical manoeuvre, still valid and necessary in the equation of the combined operations, must not be overlooked.

THE ROLE OF MASS MEDIA IN ARMED CONFRONTATIONS

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The author considers that the role of mass media in armed confrontations is complex and debated especially among those who work in the field of communication and public relations, as well as among political and military decision-makers, the debates being generated by different interests and responsibilities. Moreover, throughout history, because of the media’s power of influencing people in wartime, politicians imposed restrictions on freedom of speech in the mass media, phenomenon known as censorship. Currently, the internet and social media have become the most important challenges for politicians and military commanders during wartime. In addition, mass media is one of the most important and powerful weapon the military commanders have in their arsenal, influencing the way of waging war.

Keywords: media as weapon, censorship, press freedom in war, fake news, manipulation, disinformation.

Introduction

Communication, is “a weapon, maybe the most powerful one, to condition and mystify the human being”¹, according to Paul Dobrescu, and the language “constitutes the main headquarters of social conflicts”², according to academician Solomon Marcus.

Cyberspace both unites and separates us, as it is not only the place where the spirit is liberated from the constraints of the physical body³, but also the “deceitful” and permanently monitored space where “people feel as they were in jail”⁴. Apparently, we are free from constraints but we voluntarily subject ourselves to permanent monitoring by cameras placed in public spaces and means of transport, by reconnaissance and detection satellites, by credit cards and access codes – at work, in banks, in houses, through the internet and mobile networks etc., moving in a directed way on the new “communication avenues” – data bases, computer networks (internet, intranet) etc.⁵.

The role of mass media in society has been very important not only in peacetime but also during armed confrontations. Some authors have attached an exaggerated role to mass media in the life of human communities. In this context, Danny Schechter considers that “we no longer live in a traditional democracy but rather a media-crazy, a land in which media drives politics and promotes the military”⁶, and journalist

Apparently, we are free from constraints but we voluntarily subject ourselves to permanent monitoring by means of technology.

¹ Paul Dobrescu, *Un despot modern – opinia publică*, in *Revista română de comunicare și relații publice*, no. 2-3/2000, p. 15.

² Ioan Drăgan, *Opinia publică, comunicarea de masă și propaganda*, Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, București, 1980, p. 8.

³ Margaret Wertheim, *The Pearly Gates of Cyberspace*, in Nan Elin – editor, *Architecture of Fear*, Princetown Architectural Press, New York, 1997, p. 296, apud Zygmunt Bauman, *Globalizarea și efectele ei sociale*, Editura Antet, București, 2002, p. 24.

⁴ Steven Flusty, *Building Paranoia*, apud Zygmunt Bauman, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

⁵ Mihail Orzeață, *The Impact of Globalization on Interpersonal and Cross-Communitarian Communication*, in *International Journal of Communication Research*, vol. 3, no 3, July-September 2013, “Apollonia” University, Iași, pp. 272-278, see <http://www.ijcr.eu/articole/148-IJCR-2013tipo.76-83.pdf>.

⁶ Danny Schechter, *Embedded, Weapons of Mass Deception: How the Media Failed to Cover the War on Iraq*, Prometheus, 2003.



Michael Wolf describes the political system in the USA as a “subset of our media system”, saying that “political parties are primarily media organisations”⁷.

Mass Media as a Weapon

The important role played by mass media in democratic societies has made some experts call it “watchdog journalism”⁸ and even the “fourth estate”⁹. Aware of the influencing power of the mass media, politicians and not only have used it to manipulate people by propaganda, misinformation¹⁰, deception, omission etc. The mass media dualism has brought another appellation, namely *double-edged*

⁷ Alexander M. Dake, *The Media: Weapons of Mass Deception. An Interview with Danny Schechter*, Paraview, 2004, see <http://www.paraview.com/features/schechter.htm>, retrieved on 14.02.2018.

⁸ Shane Eisenman, *Watchdog Journalism: Function and Future*, Columbia University, 1 April 1996, see <http://www.ce.columbia.edu/~shane/words/watchdog.htm>, retrieved on 15.01.2018 (“The media today can be seen as having four major responsibilities or functions. These are to persuade or present opinion, to inform, to entertain, and to regulate. Not least among these is the regulatory function of the media. The practice of this function, called watchdog journalism, is a style of writing or broadcast aimed at identifying a current societal problem, either hidden or overt, and offering opinion on necessary action. This style is intended to incite the readers into taking direct steps to change the agents or factors controlling the situation or issue. Yet, sometimes overlook in application of watchdog journalism is the <institution> of the media itself. Explicitly stated, watchdog journalism has had in the past, and continues in modern times to have a positive influence on the lives of civilians throughout the world. Inevitably, however, the regulator needs to be regulated”).

⁹ Sheila S. Coronel, *The Role of the Media in Deepening Democracy*, UN Panel, see <http://unpan.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan010194.pdf>, p. 4, retrieved on 15.01.2018 (“In the early 1700, the French political philosopher Montesquieu, raging against secret accusations delivered by Palace courtiers to the French King, prescribed publicly as the cure for the abuse of power. English and American thinkers later in that century would agree with Montesquieu, recognising the importance of the press in making officials aware of the public’s discontent and allowing governments to rectify their errors. Since then, the press has been widely proclaimed as the <Fourth Estate>, a coequal branch of government that provides the check and balance without which governments cannot be effective”).

¹⁰ Jim Naureckas, *Gulf War Coverage. The Worst Censorship Was at Home*, FAIR, April 1991, see <https://fair.org/extra/gulf-war-coverage/>, retrieved on 06.01.2018 [Newsday’s Susan Sachs (3/1/91) reported how the Pentagon intentionally placed false estimates of Iraqi defenses in the U.S. press: “There was a great disinformation campaign surrounding this war”, one senior commander boasted. “We’ve known for weeks that the lines weren’t that formidable”), Gen. Walter Boomer told Sachs: “But we wanted to let Iraqis think we still thought they were big”).

sword¹¹, explained by Călin Hentea as the quality to be “both a mirror of the masses will and a propaganda vehicle directed at the masses”¹². More recently, Michael Aydinian labelled the mass media as “weapon of mass distraction”¹³, considering the mass media capacity to distract the public attention and orient it towards the aspects “commanded” by those who sponsor it or by those who are interested in generating a certain public perception.

Siham Rashid, Director of the Public Relations Department, the Palestinian Counselling Centre, states that “The media has helped blur the reality of the situation [about the Arab-Israeli conflicts, A.N.] through the misuse of terminology and even worse, by distorting basic facts regarding the core of the conflict – which are colonialism, racism, and severely uneven distribution and lack of balance in power relations. The international media has the ability to affect change and it is a potent weapon and a resource that should not be underestimated”¹⁴.

The dual role of the mass media has been employed by politicians and military commanders as a “resonance box”¹⁵ during their actions meant to psychologically influence (manipulate) the public opinion and the adversary. It is the reason why Napoleon I appreciated that “Four hostile newspapers are more feared than one thousand bayonets”¹⁶.

¹¹ Courtney Radsch, *Double-Edged Sword: Social Media’s Subversive Potential*, in *The Huffington Post*, 25 May 2011, see http://www.huffingtonpost.com/courtney-c-radsch/doubleedged-sword-social_b_826354.html, retrieved on 14.01.2018. (“... social media coupled with internet and mobile technology has proved to be a powerful challenge to the political status quo. Over the past month, activists in Tunisia and Egypt used social media to successfully challenge the reign of authoritarian presidents whose decades in power had left little room for political participation and whose economic policies failed to provide for the needs of their people. Throughout the MENA region protests are organising mass protests via social media, including in Bahrain, Yemen, and Morocco. But when such efforts are not linked into the broader activist community or public they are bound to fail, like a Facebook protest for Syria that fizzled because it was inauthentic. China tried to block information about Egypt from its citizens by filtering out internet content about the uprisings, but with the fall of two regimes in less than a month this is a losing battle. Tunisia inspired Egyptians and Egypt will inspire the world...”).

¹² Călin Hentea, *Propagandă și operații informaționale în crizele și conflictele post război rece*, Doctoral Thesis, Editura U.N.Ap., București, 2008, pp. 52-53.

¹³ Michael Aydinian, *Flat Earth Theory is Just Another Example of How the Media Is a Weapon of Mass Distraction*, GMMuk.com, 28 November 2017, see <http://gmmuk.com/flat-earth-theory-is-just-another-example-of-how-the-media-is-a-weapon-of-mass-distraction/>, retrieved on 15.02.2018.

¹⁴ Siham Rashid, *The Role of the International Media in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict*, The Electronic Intifada, 31 October 2003, see <https://electronicintifada.net/content/role-international-media-palestinian-israeli-conflict/4853>, retrieved on 27.12.2017.

¹⁵ Vladimir Volkoff, *Tratat de dezinformare*, Editura Antet, pp. 163, 180.

¹⁶ Sultan M. Hali, Gp. Capt, *The Role of Media in War*, Defence Journal, Illinois 1997, USA, see <http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/aug/role-media-war.htm>, retrieved on 14.10.2017.



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The emergence of television and the internet, having in view their influencing force, convinced Vladimir Volkoff to consider television as the Olympus, and the internet as the Walhalla, estimating that, in future confrontations, *“the fight for supremacy over the internet”*¹⁷ will be one of the fiercest. Assessing its influencing force, Sultan M. Hali appreciates that *“the mass-media is one of the most powerful weapons in the panoply of military commanders”*¹⁸, opinion that contradicts former Chinese leader Mao Zedong, who considered the rifle as power generator (*“Power emerges from the rifle’s pipe”*¹⁹), fact that indicates a significant conceptual change in the conduct of military actions. The focus in modern armed confrontations has been moved from the destructive component to *“non-violent”* ones, such as political, financial, economic, psychological, cyber and cultural actions. This change, within which the mass media have a significant contribution, through their role of vehicle of psychological influence (*“visual warfare”*²⁰), has been called by some political and military experts the *“decline of war”* in postmodern age, as well as a *“war transformation process”*²¹.

Currently, warfare has been attached a new component, called *“digital warfare”*, which greatly influences the population, as it transmits images directly from the area of confrontation²². To the conduct of

Currently, warfare has been attached a new component, called *“digital warfare”*, which greatly influences the population, as it transmits images directly from the area of confrontation.

¹⁷ James F. Dunnigan, *Noua amenințare mondială: cyberterrorismul*, Editura Curtea Veche, București, 2010, p. 20.

¹⁸ Sultan M. Hali, Gp. Capt, *op. cit.*

¹⁹ Maurice Meisner, *Mao Tzedun, profil politic și intelectual*, Editura Historia, București, 2008, p. 90.

²⁰ Matthew Felling, *Terrorists’ Visual Warfare Uses the Media as Weapon*, The Christian Science Monitor, 4 August 2004, see <https://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0804/p09s02-coop.html>, retrieved on 15.02.2018 (*With America handing over sovereignty to the Iraqi people a month ago, one phase of the war is behind us. But if recent developments are any indicator, we’ve entered a murkier, more troubling arena in the war on terror: visual warfare. Videotaped executions, from that of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl, to another purported to be that of Army reservist Matt Maupin, to that of a Turkish hostage on Sunday, are barbaric killings that terrorise the eyes and minds of Americans and everyone worldwide.*).

²¹ Wendy Lynch, Bill Bravman, *Modern Warfare: An Overview for World History Teachers*, World History Connected, Illinois University, USA, see <http://worldhistoryconnected.press.illinois.edu/2.2/bravman.html>, retrieved on 14.10.2017.

²² Adi Kuntsman, Rebecca L. Stein, *Another War Zone, Social Media in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, Middle East Research and Information Project, September 2010, see <http://www.merip.org/mero/interventions/another-war-zone>, retrieved on 23.12.2017. (*“It is now nearly a truism to note that digital media is fundamentally changing the terrain of politics, due to its reach and speed, and its function in the lives of civilian populations and states alike...The emerging forms of digital warfare -- the stealth bombings of hackers, the passionate arguments in talkbacks and on Facebook, the visual battlefield of videos and photographs -- can be seen as mirroring or even intensifying warfare on the ground, fuelling hatred and reaffirming state power”*).

this type of warfare social media has a significant contribution²³, fact proved during the *“Arab Spring”* as well as in the wars in Syria and Ukraine.

Practically, according to Anup Shah, there are two fronts in any armed confrontation: armed fight and the fight for human minds²⁴. In the second main component of warfare, the mass media is a *“weapon that does not kill”* (Călin Hentea), but multiplies the force (Sultan M. Hali) by propaganda²⁵, manipulation and psychological influence²⁶. This truth has been rapidly understood by terrorists and extremists, who use the social media and the television interest in audience to promote their messages²⁷ thus helping them to increase their notoriety and meet the goal of terrorist and extremist organisations to induce fear in the majority of target communities.

²³ Michael Erbschloe, *Social Media Warfare: Equal Weapons for All*, CRC Press, Taylor and Francis Group, see <https://www.crcpress.com/Social-Media-Warfare-Equal-Weapons-for-All/Erbschloe/p/book/9781138036024>, retrieved on 15.10.2017 (*“Social media applications can be weaponized with very little skill. Social media warfare has become a burden that nation states, government agencies, and corporations need to face. To address the social media warfare threat in a reasonable manner that reduces uncertainty requires dedication and attention over a very long-term”*).

²⁴ Anup Shah, *War, Propaganda and the Media*, Global Issues, 31 March 2005, see <http://www.globalissues.org/article/157/war-propaganda-and-the-media>, retrieved on 06.10.2017.

²⁵ Johnnie Manzarra & Jonathon Bruck, *War & Peace: Media and War, Media’s Use of Propaganda to Persuade People’s Attitude, Beliefs and Behaviors*, Stanford University, USA, see https://web.stanford.edu/class/e297c/war_peace/media/hpropaganda.html, retrieved on 04.10.2017 (*“Modern propaganda uses all the media available to spread its message, including: press, radio, television, film, computers, fax machines, posters, meetings, door-to-door canvassing, handbills, buttons, billboards, speeches, flags, street names, monuments, coins, stamps, books, plays, comic strips, poetry, music, sporting events, cultural events, company reports, libraries, and awards and prizes.....those who control and have access to media have access to and potential control of public opinion”*).

²⁶ George Packer, *Knowing the Enemy*, The New Yorker, 18 December 2006, p. 60 (*“If bin Laden didn’t have access to global media, satellite communications and the Internet, he’d just be a cranky guy in a cave”*).

²⁷ Eilis O’Hanlon, *Turning Mass Media into a Weapon of War*, 29 November 2015, in *The Independent*, see <https://www.independent.ie/entertainment/radio/turning-mass-media-into-a-weapon-of-war-34243208.html>, retrieved on 13.02.2018 (*“In one recent month alone, Islamic State produced more than 900 videos in a number of different languages. Her conclusion, based on research into the internet activities of 227 convicted terrorists, was that the world wide web is an <enabler> of extremism rather than a core component of how it operates; but it’s hard to be reassured when considering how easily the tools of enlightenment can be corrupted into weapons of mass murder”*).

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Mass Media between “Jingoism”²⁸ and “Yellow Press”²⁹

In general, the mass media in the states participating in armed confrontations has renounced objectivity and equidistance becoming partisan (jingoist, nationalist) to enhance the morale in the own fighters and population as well as to influence adversaries through propaganda, manipulation, disinformation and intoxication in order to decrease the morale in the enemy fighters and population so that they cannot support war efforts³⁰.

The role of the mass media in armed confrontations is complex and debated especially among those who work in the field of communication and public relations, as well as among political and military decision-makers. The debates start from the different interests and responsibilities of the two above-mentioned “camps”. Journalists want total freedom, they do not want rules and restrictions, while military commanders want to have control over all the actions and activities conducted in the area of responsibility³¹. In this regard, former chief of public relations in the US Land Forces, Major General Patrick Brady, states: “*Journalists will say that war is too important to be left to generals. Reporting of war is too important to be left to reporters. Soldiers need to get involved in this*”³².

²⁸ Jonathan Crowther, *Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English*, fifth edition, Oxford University Press, U.K., 1995, p. 639 (“*Jingoism = extreme and unreasonable belief that one’s country is best together with an aggressive attitude towards other countries*”).

²⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 1387 (“*Yellow press = newspapers that deliberately include material that is exciting or shocking in order to attract readers*”).

³⁰ *British Propaganda... Boy, They Sure Needed It!*, Wordpress.com, 20 January 2011, see <https://worldwaripropaganda.wordpress.com/2011/01/20/british-propaganda-boy-they-sure-needed-it/>, retrieved on 10.10.2017 (“*Articles were also written to solidify British nationalism and portray the enemy as horrible as they could. These articles usually spoke about British success [and enemy failures] in an emphasised way that they blocked out anything that showed the British army in the negative sense. The government supplied the media with this information with rules for them to follow as well. Atrocities that the German army had made and was reported by the British were fuel and ammunition for the newspapers. In one newspaper, the headline flashed <Belgium Child’s Hands Cut Off by Germans>. Others ranted [in a good way] about how the British won in some fights. They did not release any information concerning their future intents or current battle positions nor requested that the newspaper editors include any severe amount of British losses onto any article. Demoralising the enemy and gaining support from the people were the only goals that the British government had in this propaganda escapade*”).

³¹ Sultan M. Hali, Gp. Capt, *The Role of Media in War*, Defence Journal, Illinois, 1997, USA, see <http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/aug/role-media-war.htm>, retrieved on 14.10.2017.

³² *Ibidem*.

Journalists claims to have total freedom are determined by their desire to provide the general public with pieces of information about the events they consider relevant and, in particular situations, by their own interest in gaining notoriety, as well as by the demand of editors and mass media company owners to increase audience and, implicitly, profit³³.

On their part, military commanders fear that the press release of data and information about certain events and people may benefit the adversary that can estimate the actions that are to be conducted, thus reducing up to elimination the possibility to surprise the enemy. Another fear of military commanders and political decision-makers derives from the risk to decrease the population support for the military actions because of own losses and especially of the great number of casualties among the civilians in the areas of operations³⁴. The military forces provide arguments in favour of their point of view related to the events in past confrontations. The conduct and outcome of the Vietnam War were greatly influenced by the way the mass media reported the most important events related to it. War reporters were free to move anywhere they wanted to take photos, to film and report what they considered relevant for the USA and the world. The horrors of war, brought into the houses of the Americans through television and filmed reports, resulted in the population opposition to the continuation of their country involvement in that armed confrontation. The end of the Vietnam War is known to have been “labelled” by the mass media as defeat, despite the fact that the USA contributed to the conclusion of peace without winning the war. The assessment of the journalists performance during that war was made

³³ Agner Fog, *The Supposed and the Real Role of Mass Media in Modern Democracy*, Working Paper, 20 May 2004, last updated 2013-07-03 p. 1. (“*...fierce economic competition forces the media to produce entertaining stories that appeal to people’s emotions. Preferred topics include danger, crime, and disaster, which the media select in ways that make the audience perceive the world as more dangerous than it is. This influences the democratic process significantly in the direction of authoritarianism and intolerance...*”).

³⁴ Eric V. Larson, Bogdan Savych, *MISFORTUNES OF WAR. Press and Public Reactions to Civilian Deaths in Wartime*, RAND, Santa Monica, California, 2006, see <http://www.rand.org/paf>, retrieved on 19.03.2018, p. iii. (“*Concern in U.S. military and policymaking circles about civilian casualties and collateral damage in U.S. military operations appears to have increased since the end of the Cold War. In part, this concern appears to be based upon beliefs about the reactions of U.S. and foreign press and publics in response to these incidents, especially the belief that incidents of civilian deaths reduce public support for military operations*”).



The conduct and outcome of the Vietnam War were greatly influenced by the way the mass media reported the most important events related to it.

Journalists want total freedom, they do not want rules and restrictions, while military commanders want to have control over all the actions and activities conducted in the area of responsibility.



The way the pieces of news about the events in the First World War were related dissatisfied the combatants (especially the soldiers, NCOs and lower-rank officers) belonging to both camps, who decided to edit their own newspapers, known in the literature as “trench newspapers” or “soldier newspapers”.

by 100 US generals that participated in the armed confrontations in Vietnam, through a survey conducted by Douglas Kinnard. The result of the survey is relevant to describe the “*relation*” that partially existed and that is still existing between military commanders and journalists: 92 percent of the interviewed generals appreciated the way journalists reported the conduct of the Vietnam War as “*irresponsible*”, while 96 percent considered the mass media attitude as “*sensational and counterproductive*”³⁵.

Mass Media between Freedom of Expression and Censorship

During the armed confrontations all states have instituted censorship over the mass media to prevent the leakage of classified information and protect the population from the horrors of war³⁶.

During the First World War, for example, the UK Parliament issued a law to impose journalists not to publish in newspapers photos presenting own fighters killed or to release information about the losses (they were inserted in reports as “*strategic withdrawals*” or “*withdrawals to gain terrain*”³⁷). Those who did not respect the restrictions risked being sanctioned by imprisonment³⁸.

The way the pieces of news about the events in the First World War were related dissatisfied the combatants (especially the soldiers, NCOs and lower-rank officers) belonging to both camps, who decided to edit their own newspapers, known in the literature as “*trench*”

³⁵ James Q. Wilson, *The Press at War*, in *City Journal*, Autumn, USA, see <https://www.city-journal.org/html/press-war-12968.html>, retrieved on 14.10.2017 (“When Douglas Kinnard questioned more than 100 American generals who served in Vietnam, 92 percent said that newspaper coverage was often irresponsible or disruptive, and 96 percent said that television coverage on balance lacked context and was sensational or counterproductive”).

³⁶ Alexandra Șerban, *Cu o sută de ani în urmă. Povestea ziarului “Adevărul” din 15 august 1916*, announcing Romania entered the First World War, 15 August 2016, in *Adevărul*, see http://adevarul.ro/cultura/istorie/cu-suta-ani-urma-povestea-ziarului-adeverul-15-august-1916-anunta-intrarea-romaniei-razboi-mondial-1_57b0fe875ab6550cb8c3d701/index.html, retrieved on 16.10.2017 (“It was the first day of war. King Ferdinand issued the war proclamation and general mobilisation started. The state of siege was set up and the Minister of Public Instruction, I.G. Duca, announced the establishment of censorship”).

³⁷ Editor, *War of Words – The Amazing History of Trench Newspapers*, *The Military History Now*, 11 July 2013, see <http://militaryhistorynow.com/2013/07/11/war-of-words-the-amazing-history-of-trench-newspapers/>, retrieved on 20.10.2017 (“a retreating army ceases to gain ground”).

³⁸ Roy Greenslade, *First World War: How State and Press Kept Truth Off the Front Page*, in *The Guardian*, 27 July 2014, last updated 31 May 2017, see <https://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/jul/27/first-world-war-state-press-reporting>, retrieved on 17.10.2017 (“Threatening journalists with arrest seems unthinkable now – but that was just one of the obstacles they faced at the start of WW 1”).

newspapers” or “*soldier newspapers*”³⁹. Most of those “*newspapers*” were manuscripts on notebooks or pieces of paper, but there were also newspapers edited by former journalists or incorporated intellectuals⁴⁰, who used printers that were abandoned by the owners of the printing offices in the areas of operations. The trench newspapers were also subject to censorship by military commanders who feared defeatism and a possible negative influence on the morale of the fighters⁴¹.

During the *Cold War*, censorship was very strict in communist states:

- the mass media was totally controlled by the state;
- the uncomfortable truths were either silenced or changed and adapted so that they could not affect the single party and its leaders;
- in most states the cult of personality was exercised, texts were published in praise of the single party and its achievements, capitalism that exploited the people was blamed, and workers in capitalist states were urged to get united (“*Proletarians from all states get united!*”⁴²) etc.;
- dissidents were rapidly annihilated either physically (suppressed, referred to forced labour camps or jails) or in the media (a history about a betrayal or a serious violation of laws was fabricated)⁴³ etc.;

³⁹ Robert L. Nelson, *Soldier Newspapers*, International Encyclopaedia of the First World War 1914-1918, last updated 8 October 2014, see https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/soldier_newspapers, retrieved on 05.11.2017 (“Soldier newspapers are a massive, yet little used primary source of the First World War. They were read and written by the almost universally literate men at or near the front in the French, British, and German armies. Although they were shaped by both official censorship as well as powerful self-censorship, these newspapers were popular”).

⁴⁰ Robert L. Nelson, *ibidem* (“In the French newspapers, one third of the editors were other ranks while two thirds were officers and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs). The prewar occupation of sixty French editors is also known. From that group, sixteen were artists or authors, thirteen worked in journalism, five were lawyers and four were teachers. The ranks of 180 German newspaper staff who could be identified were: thirty-four lower ranks, with the rest ranging from NCOs to officers. Of the 100 identified prewar occupations of German editors, thirty-two were in the publishing business, eighteen were artists and ten were teachers”).

⁴¹ Editor, *War of Words – The Amazing History of Trench Newspapers*, *ibidem* (“Army commanders monitored and sometimes even censored the quasi-subversive papers, but ultimately recognised them as morale boosters and stopped short of shutting them down”).

⁴² Patryk Babiracki, *To Fight the New Cold War, We Must Forget the Old One*, *New Eastern Europe*, 27 September 2017, see <http://neweasterneurope.eu/2017/09/27/to-fight-the-new-cold-war-americans-must-forget-the-old-one/>, retrieved on 17.12.2017. (“During the Cold War, despite its coherence and consistency, the Soviet revolutionary message was struggling to get through to the unconvinced masses around the globe”).

⁴³ R. Eden Martin, *Collecting Mandelstam*, *The Caxtonian*, November 2006 (“During the Stalinist era, any piece of writing was potentially dangerous and harshly punished. Osip Mandelstam, a Russian poet who recited a poem criticising Stalin in a small gathering in 1933, spent the next three years in internal exile before dying on his way to a Siberian prison camp. Other writers, such as Isaak Babel and Boris Pilnyak, were condemned to death and shot by the NKVD”).



rarely were they expelled, often following the requests of organisations such as *Amnesty International*, *Doctors without Borders*, *International Red Cross* etc.;

- the harsh censorship in the USSR contributed to the development of subversive and passive yet uncoordinated resistance, which edited newspapers, books or manifests under the name “samizdat” (edited, A.N.), in which authors wrote using a penname or anonymously; the circulation of publications was restricted (limited to trust people), and the content of the articles, pamphlets and books was against the regime or signalled irregularities, injustices, media lies etc., without intending to topple the communist regime⁴⁴ (under “samizdat”, Natalia Gorbanevskaya published “*The Chronicles of Current Events*”); the “samizdat” movement was completed by “tamizdat” (tam = there, literature written by dissidents, edited in the West and introduced via contraband in the states of the communist bloc, mainly in the USSR⁴⁵) and “magnitizdat” (tapes recorded in the West and smuggled into the USSR and other communist states⁴⁶).

Censorship and self-censorship have operated following the rules imposed by political decision-makers and the commanders in the theatres of operation. During the first Gulf War, when the famous “CNN

⁴⁴ *Creating an Underground Press: Samizdat in the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc*, TAVAANA.ORG, see <https://tavaana.org/en/content/creating-underground-press-samizdat-soviet-union-and-eastern-bloc>, retrieved on 17.12.2017 (“These underground publications, known as samizdat, became famous for skirting strict government censorship and spreading news, literature, and even music across countries and borders. Although reaching a limited readership, samizdat became an essential channel for uncensored communication among Soviet intellectuals and between them and the outside world”).

⁴⁵ Peter Finn, *The Plot Thickens*, *The Washington Post*, 27 January 2007 (“Samizdat writers took advantage of this attention, sending their work abroad to be published in large quantities and funnelled back into the Eastern bloc in a process known as samizdat, or <published over there>. Gorbanevskaya’s *Chronicle of Current Events*, for example, was translated into English by Amnesty International and published by that organisation until 1984. Works such as *The Gulag Archipelago*, while unpublished in the Soviet Union, were also translated into English and other languages and found large audiences in the United States and Western Europe”).

⁴⁶ *Creating an Underground Press: Samizdat in the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc*, TAVAANA.ORG, see <https://tavaana.org/en/content/creating-underground-press-samizdat-soviet-union-and-eastern-bloc>, retrieved on 17.12.2017 (“While samizdat refers specifically to written works, other forms of underground media actually enjoyed a wider audience in the Soviet Union. This is particularly true of magnitizdat, unauthorised recordings typified by popular <bards> like Bulat Okudzhava, Vladimir Vysotskii, and Aleksandr Galich”).

effect” (live reports from war) was employed, US military commanders imposed censorship, explaining journalists that the measure was intended to protect the US military forces as well as the journalists lives, because “our enemies watch CNN programmes”⁴⁷. Practically, what was supposed to be live television were recorded broadcasts that were disseminated after being seen and approved by military censors. “Violations of the above rules could result in arrest, detention, revocation of press credentials, and expulsion from the combat zone”⁴⁸.

Currently, censorship is “practically impossible”⁴⁹, according to some experts, not only because the rapid advance of the technology available to journalists and citizens, but also as a result of armed forces confrontations monitoring by the UN and other governmental and nongovernmental representatives.

Conclusions

The mass media has been an important pillar of democracy⁵⁰, despite all the restrictions imposed by some political leaders in not only totalitarian but also democratic states.

⁴⁷ *Press Freedom vs. Military Censorship*, Constitutional Rights Foundation, see <http://www.crf-usa.org/america-responds-to-terrorism/press-freedom-versus-military-censorship.html>, retrieved on 15.10.2017 (“The Pentagon explained that these rules protected American troops, military operations, and the journalists themselves. One high Navy official, Rear Admiral John Bitoff, remarked: “There is a clear and present danger in today’s instant-communications age, which may put our troops at risk. Our enemies are watching CNN-TV”).

⁴⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁹ Philip M. Taylor, *The War and the Media*, Keynote Address at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst, 1995, apud Sultan M. Hali, Gp. Capt, *The Role of Media in War*, in *Defence Journal*, Illinois 1997, USA, see <http://www.defencejournal.com/2000/aug/role-media-war.htm>, retrieved on 14.10.2017 (“The capability of the news media to photograph a battle area during time of war and thereby reveal the location of one’s own ground units, ships and airbases could be very detrimental to the national security. This makes censorship virtually impossible A British television crew tried to transmit news to London without the knowledge of the PR specialists. Their transmission was intercepted by an airborne AWACs electronic warfare aircraft and they were promptly arrested for this breach of security”).

⁵⁰ *Commissioner Reding Welcomes New European Charter on Freedom of the Press*, Brussels, 9 June 2009, last updated 19 February 2018, see http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-09-891_en.htm?locale=en, retrieved on 04.05.2018 (“European Charter on Freedom of the Press, Article 1: Freedom of the press is essential to a democratic society. To uphold and protect it, and to respect its diversity and its political, social and cultural missions, is the mandate of all governments”).

The mass media has become a redoubtable weapon in conventional and especially unconventional armed confrontations, in spite of the censorship imposed by combatant forces.

Although the freedom of speech holds an important place in the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*⁵¹, a document adopted by most states in the world, censorship still exists⁵².

The mass media has become a redoubtable weapon in conventional and especially unconventional armed confrontations, in spite of the censorship imposed by combatant forces.

The distortion of the content of messages by the mass media, through “fake news”⁵³ misinformation, intoxication, under-information, over-information or manipulation⁵⁴, can result both in generating some crisis and in their mitigation, through a constructive approach⁵⁵.

The deontological code for the journalist profession all over the world praises honesty, objectivity, impartiality and accuracy in relation to the information released to the public. However, there are still journalists who understand to exercise their profession declining

⁵¹ George J. Andreopoulos, *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, 1948, Encyclopedia Britannica, see <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Universal-Declaration-of-Human-Rights>, retrieved on 04.05.2018.

⁵² John M. Cunningham, *A Brief History of Press Freedom*, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 05/03/2018, see <https://www.britannica.com/story/250-years-of-press-freedom>, retrieved on 04.05.2018 (“While many countries have come to understand freedom of expression as a common good – indeed, it is one of the rights enumerated in the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* – state censorship and regulation of the press have not entirely disappeared”).

⁵³ *Explained: What Is Fake News?*, webwise.ie, see <https://www.webwise.ie/teachers/what-is-fake-news/>, retrieved on 04.05.2018 (**Fake news is news, stories or hoaxes created to deliberately misinform or deceive readers.** Usually, these stories are created to either influence people’s views, push a political agenda or cause confusion and can often be a profitable business for online publishers. Fake news stories can deceive people by looking like trusted websites or using similar names and web addresses to reputable news organisations. According to Martina Chapman (Media Literacy Expert), there are three elements to fake news; <Mistrust, misinformation and manipulation>.), see also Andrei Manolescu, *Adevărul din spatele minciunilor – Interview with Marian VOICU*, in *Dilema veche*, no. 715, 2-8 November 2017, see <http://dilemaveche.ro/sectiune/tema-saptamanii/articol/adevarul-din-spatele-minciunilor-interviu-cu-marian-voicu>, retrieved on 05.05.2018 (“European External Action Service led by Commissioner Federica Mogherini established a special department in which are appointed 12 journalists from many EU member states, who collect pieces of news from all over Europe as well as from the United States of America and publish them in an electronic journal that can be read by everyone, containing concrete cases of dismantled fake news”).

⁵⁴ Sonia Cristina Stan, *Manipularea prin presă*, Editura Humanitas, București, 2004, pp. 41-60 (“Manipulation through mass media can be achieved employing numerous techniques, from the information content to the layout and the use of images – that can be consistent with the text or contradict it –, from using some keywords to faking some images, as well as using a certain type of commentary that reflects the intention of the journalist or the media trust owner”).

⁵⁵ Solomon Marcus, *Comunicarea internațională ca sursă de conflicte noi*, in the volume *Despre pace și război în era nucleară*, Editura Politică, București, 1985, p. 137, apud Nicolae Rotaru, *Criză și dialog*, Editura Rao, 2003, p. 300.

their responsibility to take into account the outcomes of the press release, considering that “*The job of the press is not to worry about the consequences of its coverage but to tell the truth (...). As much as those of us in the press would like to be popular and loved, it is more important that we are accurate and fair (...). and let the chips fall where they may*”⁵⁶.

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⁵⁶ Raphael Cohen-Almagor, *Media Coverage of Acts of Terrorism: Troubling Episodes and Suggested Guidelines*, Canadian Journal of Communication, vol. 30, no. 3, 2005, see <http://www.cjc-online.ca/index.php/journal/article/view/1579/1734>, retrieved on 21.01.2016.

AT THE EASTERN BORDER OF THE VERSAILLES SECURITY SYSTEM – MILESTONES OF THE POLITICAL-DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY RELATIONS BETWEEN ROMANIA AND POLAND BETWEEN 1919 AND 1932 –

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During the interwar period, the common factor of the relations between Romania and Poland was represented by their major interest in countering an unprovoked attack from Soviet Russia – USSR. Meanwhile, the rich medieval tradition, the cultural, political and spiritual interferences provided the basis of the mutual relations between the two countries.

Romanian-Polish relations were supported and encouraged by France, which was interested in achieving and maintaining a “cordon sanitaire” against the Bolshevik/Soviet threat. They were influenced by political and diplomatic leaders of the two countries, in Poland, Marshal Józef Pilsudski, and in Romania, King Ferdinand, Queen Mary and Nicolae Iorga. Romania and Poland evolved into a complex and sensitive geopolitical space, that of Central and Eastern Europe, acting politically, diplomatically and military to build relationships based on mutual recognition of borders and support from France and the United Kingdom.

Keywords: traditions, common interests, alliance, cooperation, solidarity.

Motto:

“From the Baltic to the Black Sea, the Alliance of the hearts is represented by one people under two flags”.

Marshal Józef Pilsudski, Sinaia, 15 September 1922

„A common Romanian-Polish front. This is the only way to ensure our very existence, and that of the borders, which we gained with so much effort and sacrifice and now seek to consolidate and guarantee”.

Nicolae Iorga, Front Româno-polon, in “Neamul românesc”, no. 117, 6 June 1919

Placed in the Ponto-Baltic region, a buffer zone where the Eastern or Western interests of the Great Powers intersected over time, Romania and Poland have had a relatively common historical destiny.

Introduction

Placed in the Ponto-Baltic region, a buffer zone where the Eastern or Western interests of the Great Powers intersected over time, Romania and Poland have had a relatively common historical destiny.

Bilateral relations have a long-standing tradition, the Polish chronicles attesting their existence in the last three decades of the 14th century. Among the Romanian regions, the one that had extensive ties with Poland was Moldavia. Thus, relations of vassalage, equality and alliance existed throughout the centuries between the Kingdom of Poland and Moldavia. Moldavian Princes preferred Polish suzerainty because it manifested as a *typical feudal lordship*, with clearly established rights and duties on both parties¹.

Good neighbourly ties favoured Romanian-Polish economic relations, which was reflected in the alliance treaties signed in 1495, 1499 and 1510, in the trade-related paragraphs included in them². The relations with Moldavia were influenced by the fact that Poland was interested in having access to the Black Sea for trade purposes³.

¹ Details in Constantin Rezachievici, *Legături și influențe reciproce între poloni și români din Evul Mediu până la 1795*, in vol. “*Polonezi și români pe drumul cunoașterii reciproce*”, The Union of Poles in Romania, Suceava, 2002, p. 7.

² Ion Constantin, *Din istoria Poloniei și a relațiilor româno-polone*, Editura Biblioteca Bucureștilor, 2005, p. 158.

³ Daniel Hrenciuc, *Cu ochii la Răsărit. Relațiile româno-polone în perioada interbelică (1919-1939)*, Editura Tipo Moldova, Iași, 2012, p. 26.



In the 18th century, Poland was one of the main gates to ancient Latin culture for Romanians.

The great Moldavian chroniclers, Grigore Ureche and Miron Costin, studied Polish and Latin in Poland, at Bar.

Moreover, in the 18th century, Poland was one of the main gates to ancient Latin culture for Romanians. The cultural and institutional influences of the Latin Western world entered the extra-Carpathian Romanian Principalities from Catholic Poland, rather than from Transylvania, under Hungarian ruling at the time⁴.

One of the areas in which the Polish influence was particularly visible was historiography. The great Moldavian chroniclers, Grigore Ureche and Miron Costin, studied Polish and Latin in Poland, at Bar. The knowledge of these languages enabled them to have access to writings belonging to great Polish historians: Jan Dlugosz, Martin Kromer, Martin and Joachim Bielski, Paul Piaecki, Martin Paszkowski, Matthew Strykowski etc.⁵. Meanwhile, the works published in Krakow by Dlugosz, Kromer, Bielski or Jacob Górski mentioned a lot of information about Romanians, due to their Latin origin⁶.

Thus, Grigore Ureche also used the *Polish Chronicle* by Joachim Bielski in his work, besides the Moldavian Chronicle. In turn, Miron Costin, a constant advocate for good Moldavian-Polish relations, stated that the alliance between the two countries would lead to Moldova's liberation from Ottoman occupation and to the elimination of the Turkish danger for Poland⁷.

In order to inform the Polish side about the situation in the Romanian Principalities and to persuade the Polish king to assist them against the Turks, Miron Costin wrote in 1677, in Iași, *Chronicle of the Land of Moldavia and Wallachia (Polish Chronicle)*, in Polish, and, in 1684, in Doszow, *The Polish Verse History of Moldavia and Wallachia (The Polish Poem)*, dedicated to Jan III Sobieski, his protector. Given their importance, Miron Costin's writings spread beyond the limits of the Romanian culture and placed the Moldavian chronicler in Polish literary history among the Polish writers of the 18th century⁸.

Nicolae Costin continued his father's work and used Polish sources, especially Strykowski's chronicle and campaigns, for strengthening the Polish-Romanian relations. Nicolae Costin wrote Poland's first overall

⁴ Constantin Rezachevici, *Istoria popoarelor vecine și neamul românesc în Evul Mediu*, Editura Albatros, 1998, p. 45. See also Garabet Ibrăileanu, *Spiritul critic în cultura românească*, Editura Junimea, Iași, 1970, p. 28.

⁵ Ion Constantin, *op. cit.*, p. 158.

⁶ Mihai Mitu, *Cracovia și relațiile culturale româno-polone*, in vol. "Cracovia. Pagini de cultură europeană", Editura Paideia, Bucharest, 2002, p. 242.

⁷ Ion Constantin, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

⁸ *Ibid.*



The revolutionary year of 1848 was an important moment of the Romanian-Polish collaboration.

Although the Polish and Romanian revolutionaries did not sustain each other, the joint actions undertaken led to greater closeness between the two nations.

description in Romanian, with lots of information about the origin and creation of the Polish state, the church, cities and customs of the Polish people⁹.

The close spiritual ties between Moldavians and Poles would be continued in the 18th century and early 19th century by Tadeu Hașdeu (1769-1835), who wrote interesting works in Polish, a heritage that enriched the Polish Enlightenment¹⁰.

The revolutionary year of 1848 was an important moment of the Romanian-Polish collaboration, the Romanian revolutionary leaders maintaining relations both with the conservative wing of the Polish emigration, headed by Prince Adam Czartoryski, official representative of Poland in France and England, and with Polish Democrats without interfering in conflicts between them¹¹. Although the Polish and Romanian revolutionaries did not sustain each other, the joint actions undertaken led to greater closeness between the two nations¹².

After the defeat of the 1848-1849 revolution, the ties between Poles and Romanians who emigrated in Paris, London and Constantinople remained close, aiming to coordinate the actions of the Romanian, Poles and Hungarians revolutionaries to trigger a new revolution¹³.

The movement for the Unification of the Romanian Principalities was also supported by the Polish people, relevant in this respect being the favourable articles published in 1859 by novelist Józef Ignacy Kraszewski in "Gazeta Warszawska"¹⁴.

A significant moment for the development of the relations between the Romanian state and the Polish emigration was represented by the political, military and diplomatic support given by Prince Alexandru Ioan Cuza to all the Polish refugees after the defeat of the Polish uprising of 1863¹⁵.

In the second part of the 19th century and the first decade of the 20th century, the evolution of Romanian and Polish national ideologies

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 160.

¹¹ Nicolae Mares, *Republica Populară Polonă*, Editura Enciclopedică, București, 1972, p. 122.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 124-125.

¹³ Daniel Hrenciuc, Florin Pintescu, *Istoria și tradițiile minorității poloneze*, Union of the Poles in Romania, Suceava, 2004, p. 60. See also Veniamin Ciobanu, *Problema românească și cea polonă în primul deceniu și jumătate al secolului al XIX-lea*, in vol. "Polonia și România – de la vecinătatea istorică la parteneriatul european", Suceava, 2009, pp. 136-142.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

¹⁵ Florin Anghel, *Construirea sistemului "Cordon sanitaire". Relații româno-polone 1919-1926*, Second edition, Editura Cetatea de Scaun, Târgoviște, 2008, p. 27.



was identical and joint projects such as independence, sovereignty and the creation of national unitary state stimulated and accelerated this closeness. The outbreak of the First World War, collapse of empires in Central and Eastern Europe, political will of political and military leaders for future cooperation, establishment of the joint border, and diplomatic and military mutual support led to the opening of one of the most interesting pages in the long-lasting Romanian-Polish relationship, at the end of 1918 and the beginning of 1919¹⁶.

Poland *Restituta* and Unified Romania – Common Destinies in the New Era of their Historical Evolution

At the end of the First World War, Romania and Poland, fighting alongside the Entente, achieved their national ideal almost simultaneously: the Polish state – after the three territorial divides in the 18th century and a persistent diplomatic and military struggle – regained its independence and sovereignty on 11 November 1918¹⁷ and the Romanian state achieved its national unity on 1 December 1918, following the liberation and reunification of the historical provinces which had been occupied by neighbouring empires until then. Thus, Romania and Poland became neighbours again, sharing a common symbolic border, representative of the destiny that transformed the two countries into a barrier between Bolshevik Communism and Europe. In the years 1918-1921, the latter was increasingly concerned with the new ideology created by Lenin in the context of the revolutionary turmoil.

On 11 December 1918, Józef Pilsudski notified the Romanian executive about the independent and sovereign existence of Poland and reassured us that he intended to establish friendly relations with Romania¹⁸.

In turn, the government in București responded, on 4 January 1919, that Romanians “were thrilled to witness Europe restoring Poland

¹⁶ *Ibid*, p. 28.

¹⁷ Joseph Rothschild, *East Central Europe between Two World Wars. History of East Central Europe. Volume IX*, University of Washington Press, Seattle, London, 1974, p. 27.

¹⁸ Milică Moldoveanu, *Polonia*, in vol. “*Afirmarea statelor naționale independente unitare din centrul și sud-estul Europei*”, 1821-1923, Editura Academiei Române, București, 1979, p. 225.

in its rights and independence. An injustice of the past was repaired”¹⁹. On 17 January 1919, Romania officially recognised the independence of Poland.

The subsequent developments required the participation of the Romanian Armed Forces in liberating the southeast of Galicia²⁰, claimed equally by the Ukrainians and the Poles. Military cooperation preceded the mutual support of the Romanian and Polish delegations at the 1919-1920 Paris Peace Conference²¹.

Romania and Poland borders recognition by the Peace Conference boosted their status internationally and integrated them properly in Europe’s new geopolitical architecture.

Diplomatic relations between the two countries were established at an interim level of representation on 9 February 1919. On 16 July 1919, the Romanian Council of Ministers decided to set up the Romanian legation in Warsaw, headed by an extraordinary envoy and plenipotentiary minister. Alexander Florescu was appointed in this position. The missions were elevated to the rank of embassy in May 1938²².

Throughout the interwar period, the diplomatic missions were genuine link channels and instruments that contributed to a better understanding between the two countries and promoted mutual interests²³.

Since 1919, the Romanian-Polish relations experienced positive development in the political, military, economic, commercial, cultural and human domains, regardless of the fluctuations of the decision-makers in Warsaw and București²⁴.

¹⁹ Michal Keller, *Colaborarea polono-română în anii '20 ai secolului XX*, in “*Polonis*”, no. 6 (96), June 2002, p. 19. Malgorzata Willaume, *La Roumanie des Anées 1919-1926*, in vol. “*Romanian and Polish Peoples in East-Central Europe (17th centuries)*”, edited by Veniamin Ciobanu, Iași, Editura Junimea, 2003, p. 112.

²⁰ Dumitru Seserman, *Divizia 8 Infanterie în Pocuția. Mai 1919 – August 1929*, in “*Buletinul Universității Naționale de Apărare*”, București, 3/2004, p. 31.

²¹ Details in Daniel Hrenciuc, *România și Polonia 1918-1931. Relații politice, diplomatice și militare*, Editura Septentrion, Rădăuți, 2003, pp. 23-76.

²² Details in Nicolae Dascălu, *Relații româno-polone în perioada interbelică (1919-1939)*, Editura Academiei Române, București, 1991, pp. 13-18.

²³ *Ibid*, pp. 18-28. On 17 December 1929, Romania and Poland signed a Consular Convention, under which Romanian consulates were established, until to 1933, in Warsaw, Lwów, Poznan and Danzing (Gdansk). In July 1934, it was decided that Romanian honorary consulates would be established in Łódź, Wilno, Katowice and Gdynia, therefore, in the fall of 1934, there were eight Romanian diplomatic offices in Poland. For its part, in addition to the General Consulate in București, Poland established consulates in Constanța, Brăila, Galați, Chișinău, Cernăuți and Cluj.

²⁴ Ion Constantin, *op. cit.*, p. 164.



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During the Polish-Soviet crisis of 1919-1920, Romania accepted and supported the human Polish military transit on its national territory.

Between 1920 and 1921, in the post-Versailles international context, the first regional defensive ties were established with the participation of the countries situated in Central and Southeastern Europe: Little Entente – formed by Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania – and the Romanian-Polish alliance.

At first, relationships were strictly determined by several major objectives: the recognition of the borders of the two countries by the Great Powers, a defensive policy in Eastern Europe and a common defence against a potential attack from the Red Army. The efforts of the diplomats from București and Warsaw were focused on the “*construction of a cordon sanitaire*”, a defensive political system capable of facing the threats of Soviet (Union) Russia and Germany²⁵.

Researcher Wladyslaw Stępnik was the first Polish historian who emphasised unequivocally the favourable attitude shown by Romania on the critical situation in Poland during 1919-1921. At the same time, new aspects could be identified in the reports sent from București by the first extraordinary envoy and plenipotentiary minister, Polish Count Aleksander Skrzyński, future head of the Polish diplomacy (1925-1926) and Chairman of the Council of Ministers²⁶. With his remarkable political vision, Aleksander Skrzyński never hesitated to convince decision-makers in Warsaw about the importance of close relations with Romania²⁷.

The diplomacy of the two countries held an extensive programme of high-level negotiations and consultations together with mutual political and military support. During the Polish-Soviet crisis of 1919-1920, Romania accepted and supported the human Polish military transit on its national territory²⁸.

Leading personalities of the public life from the two countries contributed to creating and strengthening the bilateral relationship. Among the architects of this process, there were: Romanian King Ferdinand and Queen Maria, Nicolae Iorga, Ion I.C. Brătianu, Take Ionescu, General Alexandru Averescu, diplomats Alexandru Florescu and Alexander Iakovaki (first diplomatic representatives in Poland) and Polish Marshal Józef Piłsudski, Ignacy Jan Paderewski, Prince Eustachy Sapieha, Foreign Minister of Poland, Count Aleksander Skrzyński, Marian Seyda²⁹.

²⁵ Florin Anghel, *op. cit.*, pp. 76-94.

²⁶ Nicolae Mareș, *Alianța româno-polonă. Între destrămarea și solidaritate (1938-1939)*, Editura Biblioteca Bucureștilor, București, 2010, p. 19.

²⁷ Nicolae Mareș, *Raporturile româno-polone în perioada interbelică într-o lumină nouă*, in “*Dacia Literară*” no. 70, 2007, pp. 47-48. In one of his reports sent from Warsaw, Aleksander Skrzyński underlined “*the 1919 military aid from Romania in the Pokuttia region, its restitution to Poland, the transfer of emigrants from Russia, of ammunition and weapons when Poland was surrounded from everywhere, the grain supplies, which were four times cheaper than from the USA and so necessary that Prime Minister Witos told me their delivery was a matter of life and death.*” (Nicolae Mareș, *Alianța româno-polonă...*, p. 26).

²⁸ Florin Anghel, Dumitru Preda, Introduction to vol. “*România – Polonia. Relații diplomatice, vol. I. 1918-1939*”, Editura Univers Enciclopedic, București, 2003, p. XVI.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

Reason and Pragmatism. Common Regional Interests Reflected in the Political and Bilateral Military Agreements during 1921-1932

Between 1920 and 1921, in the post-Versailles international context, the first regional defensive ties were established with the participation of the countries situated in Central and Southeastern Europe: Little Entente – formed by Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania – and the Romanian-Polish alliance. The four governments were determined to find common solutions that guaranteed the preservation of national borders. Resembling the League of Nations, the new political groups aimed, beside the antirevisionist objectives, to establish a balance in the relations with the Great Powers³⁰.

In August 1920, Foreign Minister Take Ionescu made a trip to the capitals of the Great Allied Powers to present the objectives for the creation of an “*Eastern alliance of the five new nations that would stop Germany’s advance: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Serbia and Greece*”³¹ and thus to establish a new balance of forces in Central Europe. After the Western stage of his trip, Take Ionescu went to Warsaw hoping for an amicable settlement of Czech-Polish disputes. The discussions showed that, due to the existing territorial problems with Czechoslovakia (the controversy over the region Cieszyn/Teschen, claimed both by Poland and Czechoslovakia), decision-makers in Warsaw did not want Poland to enter the Little Entente, but were in favour of an alliance with Romania in order “*to guarantee future peace treaties that could be signed with the Soviets*”³².

According to Aleksander Skrzyński’s assessments, Polish diplomacy realised that Poland “*would be like an isolated, continental island located in a hostile environment*”³³ without an alliance with Romania.

Take Ionescu’s words about the martyr role played by Poland in the world and the historical importance of winning the battle against the Bolsheviks on Vistula on 15 August 1920 resonated in the hearts of the Polish people³⁴. This battle was the result of Józef Piłsudski’s tactical and strategic genius. Through a Napoleonic inspired manoeuvre,

³⁰ Mihai Retegan, *În balanța forțelor. Alianțe militare interbelice*, Editura Semne, București, 1997, p. 29.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 30. C. Xenii, *Take Ionescu, 1858-1922*, București, 1932, p. 465.

³² Eliza Campus, *Mica Înțelegere*, Editura Științifică, București, 1968, p. 52.

³³ Nicolae Dascălu, *Relații româno-polone în perioada interbelică (1919-1939)*, Editura Academiei Române, București, 1991, p. 30.

³⁴ Nicolae Mareș, *Alianța româno-polonă...*, p. 23.



According to Aleksander Skrzyński’s assessments, Polish diplomacy realised that Poland “would be like an isolated, continental island located in a hostile environment” without an alliance with Romania.



France had a major interest in the region, viewing the states in this area as a possible stronghold against potential German eastward expansions and the Soviet westward expansion.

he surprised and rejected the Soviet troops in front of Warsaw, thus protecting Poland and Europe from Communism³⁵. The Poles' victory, called *"the miracle on the Vistula"*, was described by Lord Viscount D'Abernon, in a personal hierarchy, as *"the eighteenth battle in world history"*³⁶, together with the Victory at Tours (732), obtained by Christians against Muslims or the French Victory on the Marne (1914) against the Germans³⁷. France watched carefully Romanian-Polish relations, because it was interested in an alliance between the two states as a counterweight to the Berlin-Moscow axis. Immediately after the Peace of Versailles, Jacques Bainville, a French publicist, warn about the danger of this axis, arguing that the decisions made in Paris linked Germany to Russia, although the Germans and the Russians did not love each other, but they needed to be together in order to destroy Poland and divide it again³⁸. That is why, during the December 1920 meetings between Marshal Ferdinand Foch and Romanian General Alexander Gorski regarding the Romanian Armed Forces mobilisation in case of an unprovoked attack, the Marshal stressed *"the need for a defensive convention with Poland"*³⁹.

France had a major interest in the region, viewing the states in this area as a possible stronghold against potential German eastward expansions and the Soviet westward expansion. As a result, in the 20s and early 30s of the 20th century, Paris sought to build a *"cordon sanitaire"* comprised of countries favourable to the status quo through agreements signed with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Greece and Turkey⁴⁰.

³⁵ Peter D. Stachura, *Poland, 1918-1945. An Interpretative and Documentary History of the Second Republic*, Routledge, London, p. 33.

³⁶ Viscont D'Abernon, *A optsprezecea bătălie decisivă din istoria lumii. Lângă Varşovia, în anul 1920*, publisher Arthur Dobiecki, Varşovia, Bucureşti, 1934, pp. 78-80.

³⁷ Daniel Hrenciuc, *Cu ochii la Răsărit...*, p. 145.

³⁸ Emilian Bold, Ilie Seftiuc, *Pactul Ribbentrop-Molotov și implicațiile internaționale*, Casa Editorială Demiurg Plus, Iași, 2010, p. 11. *"Germany, after its defeat – writes Bainville – naturally had to want the alliance of Russia, but that would not have been a sufficient reason for it to be certain of obtaining it. Poland seems to have been invented to hasten the reconciliation"*. (Jacques Bainville, *Les conséquences politiques de la Paix*, 1940, Paris, pp. 163-164. Grigore Gafencu, a very talented journalist and an exceptional diplomat, Romania's future foreign minister (21 December 1938 – 30 May 1940) warned, even since 1922, in *"Revista vremii"*, **"as long as Bolshevism exists, Russia will seek to undermine Europe with its subversive propaganda, supporting Germany in all its attempts and efforts to attain retaliation."** [emphasis added] Grigore Gafencu, *Criza europeană și politica României*, in *"Revista vremii"*, 21 May 1922.

³⁹ Mihai Retegan, *op.cit.*, p. 31.

⁴⁰ Vladimir Tismăneanu, *Reinventarea politicului. Europa Răsăriteană de la Stalin la Havel*, Editura Polirom, Iași, 2007, p. 38.



Adam Michnik concluded that the *"cordon sanitaire"* policy was supported by the citizens of Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia, because of the Soviet threat awareness⁴¹.

Paris support for these countries transformed France into the main guarantor and protector of the Versailles rule in Eastern Europe and the Balkans at that time⁴².

To set the details of the military cooperation, a Polish military commission headed by General Stanislaw Haller arrived in Bucureşti in January 1921. The guidelines developed by the Romanian Government on that occasion had a strong defensive focus, as they took into consideration only an unprovoked aggression. Negotiations advanced rapidly and, by the end of January 1921, General Dumitru Strătilescu was made in charge of drafting the military convention⁴³.

On 3 March 1921, in Bucureşti, *the Defensive Alliance Convention between Romania and Poland (photo 1)*⁴⁴ was signed, by the two foreign ministers, Prince Eustachy Sapieha and Take Ionescu. They also signed a Military Convention.

It was the first interwar agreement in which a state guaranteed another state's borders, a significant, if not defining aspect for the foreign policy of the two countries. The document comprised eight articles and three secret protocols.

The defensive nature of the alliance was defined in Article 1: *"Poland and Romania commit to help each other in the event that one of them should be attacked, without provocation, at their current oriental borders"*⁴⁵. Due to the complexity




Photo 1: First page of Defensive Alliance Convention between Poland and Romania. The Defensive Alliance Convention between Romania and Poland was signed, in Bucureşti, on 3 March 1921.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² Benjamin Miller, *State națiuni și mari puteri*, Editura Tipo Moldova, Iași, 2011, p. 303.

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ Foreign Affairs Minister Archives/Arhivele Ministerului Afacerilor Externe (cited as A.M.A.E.), *Archive 71/Polonia. Relații cu România. 1920-1944*, vol. 62, p. 14.

⁴⁵ Nicolae Dașcovici, *Interesele și drepturile României în texte de drept internațional public*, Iași, 1936, p. 109. Wladislaw Stepniak, *Dyplomacja Polska na Balkanach, 1919-1926*, Warszawa, 1998, p. 116.



The Defensive Alliance between Romania and Poland was the axis around which the inter-war relations between the two countries developed.

of the international situation, Protocol A stipulated that none of the “two parties will enter into an alliance with any of the Central Powers without the other’s consent”⁴⁶. The purpose of Protocol B – the Convention, which was “to be kept secret as long as the Polish-Soviet peace treaty was not signed”⁴⁷ – was to prevent any demand from France or England to place the two countries against Soviet Russia, and mostly not to arouse any suspicion in Moscow. As far as Protocol C is concerned, it stipulated the need to study the means by which the Little Entente could be concluded between the five parties “so as to give mutual guarantees against any aggression and assist in maintaining those treaties or some of them”⁴⁸.

The Military Convention, part of the Political Convention, signed by Generals Tadeusz Rozwadowski and Constantin Christescu, Chiefs of the two General Staffs, set an initial set of measures to be taken in the event that the two states faced separate or simultaneous aggression from the East⁴⁹. It was stipulated that, for each country and depending on the scale of the aggression, the number of operational troops was to be: 14 infantry divisions (normal-type, four infantry regiments and two artillery regiments) and two cavalry divisions, which had to be enrolled in 18-24 days after the general mobilisation was declared. In the exercise of command, the Romanian point of view prevailed: each one of the two armed forces would under own command; if the strategic situation required that a military unit was to operate in the other’s area, they were placed under the command of the latter⁵⁰.

A brief analysis of the Convention revealed its military defensive style. The hypothesis considered was that the two countries could form the “object and not the subject to any aggression”⁵¹.

The Defensive Alliance between Romania and Poland was the axis around which the inter-war relations between the two countries developed. The Defensive Alliance Convention, signed on 3 March 1921, based on political and strategic grounds, was added new features every five years (1926, 1931 and 1936), then converted into

⁴⁶ Dumitru Tuțu, *Alianțe militare ale României (1921-1939)*, in “Probleme de politică externă a României. 1918-1940”, București, 1977, p. 112.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ *România în anii celui de-al Doilea Război Mondial*, vol. 1, Editura Militară, București, 1989, p. 84.

⁴⁹ Oscar Halecki, *History of Poland*, London, Routledge Kegan Paul and Hurley, 1983, pp. 7-15.

⁵⁰ Mihai Retegan, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

the *Guarantee Treaty* in 1926, remaining in force until the dramatic circumstances of the fall of 1939⁵².

According to the Military Convention, in order to determine the conditions and possibilities of cooperation between the two allied armed forces, the need for a close and constant contact between the Romanian and Polish General Staffs was outlined from the beginning, as shown particularly in the correspondence and the conferences that took place in the two capitals⁵³.

From the very beginning, the work of the military delegations to these conferences resulted in a series of special studies, which, based on their contents, are convincing evidence regarding the purpose of the alliance⁵⁴.

The first study was submitted to the two General Staffs on 21 September 1922. This project included Romanian-Polish operations in four hypotheses of action of the Russian troops and obviously the response of the Romanian and Polish troops⁵⁵. Moreover, this study set the dividing line between the two armed forces: Svaniec on Nistru River, Grozinei, Rohozna (North of Cernăuți), Lencăuți on Prut River, Storojineț on Siret River, Ciudin, Straja on Suceava⁵⁶. All these locations belonged to Romania and the Romanian territory at the north of this line was defended by Polish forces reinforced by a Romanian detachment⁵⁷.

The Romanian and Polish Chiefs of General Staff signed this study, also approving *Study no. 2* which set the way in which the two armed

⁵² Ion Constantin, *op. cit.*, p. 167. Along with the political and military agreements, Romania and Poland signed a series of agreements, including the Arbitration Treaty of 24 October 1929 by which the two countries pledged to submit to arbitration any dispute that could not be settled through diplomatic means. Another bilateral document was the Convention on mutual aid and legal protection in civil matters, signed in București on 19 December 1929 together with a final protocol which guaranteed legal protection to goods and people from the other state in the same manner as for own citizens (Nicolae Dascălu, *Relații româno-polone în perioada interbelică...*, pp. 54-55). Moreover, on 26 March 1930, the Convention on extradition of criminals and legal assistance in criminal matters was signed and, in May 1935, two important documents were adopted regarding common boundary delimitation: the Convention on the conservation and restoration of border landmarks and the Final Act of the Romanian-Polish boundary delimitation (Nicolae Dascălu, *op. cit.*, p. 55).

⁵³ Marian Popescu, *Alianța politică și militară româno-polonă în perioada interbelică*, in “*Omagiu istoricului Gheorghe Buzatu*”, coord. Horia Dumitrescu, Editura EMPRO, Focșani, 1999, p. 420.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ Romanian National Military Archives/Arhivele Militare Naționale Române (cited as A.M.N.R.), *Marele Stat Major, Secția a 3-a Operații* Collection, file no. 1120, f. 4-6.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ Marian Popescu, *op. cit.*, p. 421.



The constant concern of both General Staffs regarding the enemy from the East would be reflected in subsequent years in the exchanges of views, discussions and conferences, which would lead to the preparation of studies that contained various hypotheses on Romanian and Polish troops actions in case of Red Army attacks.



←Photo 2: Study 1, Hypothesis A (A.M.N.R., Marele Stat Major, Secția a 3-a Operații Collection, file no. 1120, p. 4).

➔Russia attacks Romania with its main force. The Romanian Army will resist the enemy attack on the Dniester and the obstacles parallel with the Dniester. Poland's main intervention force will attack on the Smerinka line or southwards.

↑Russia attacks Poland – with the main force, southward to the Pripet. - The Polish army retreats, pivoting on the left wing; the Romanian main force attacks on the Smerinka-Berdicew line or westwards.

↓Photo 4: Study 1, Hypotheses C and D (A.M.N.R., Marele Stat Major, Secția a 3-a Operații Collection, file no. 1120, p. 6).



←Hypothesis C
Russians attack Poland North to Pripet, with the main force; the Romanian main force will attack on the Smerinka-Berdicew line.
Hypothesis D
Russians attack Poland and Romania at the same time; the allied troops will assist each other in keeping with the situation and the available troops.




↑Photo 3: Study 1, Hypothesis B (A.M.N.R., Marele Stat Major, Secția a 3-a Operații Collection, file no. 1120, p. 6).

↓Photo 5: Study 4, Hypothesis – Main Russian attack to the south of Pripet – if the main attack takes place towards Lwow or northwards (A.M.N.R., Marele Stat Major, Secția a 3-a Operații Collection, file no. 1120, p. 7).



↑Photo 6: Study 4, Hypothesis – Main Russian attack to the north of Pripet (A.M.N.R., Marele Stat Major, Secția a 3-a Operații Collection, file no. 1120, p. 8).

↓Photo 8: Study 5, Forces and concentration areas (A.M.N.R., Marele Stat Major, Secția a 3-a Operații Collection, file no. 1120, p. 11).



↑Photo 7: Study 4, Hypothesis – Main Russian attack to the south of Pripet – a surprise action paves the way for the main attack (A.M.N.R., Marele Stat Major, Secția a 3-a Operații Collection, file no. 1120, p. 9).

↓Photo 9: Study 5, Hypothesis 1 – Main Russian attack in Northern Basarabia (A.M.N.R., Marele Stat Major, Secția a 3-a Operații Collection, file no. 1120, p. 13).





The Russian surprise attack breaches the concentration area of the Romanian Army and the reinforced cover counterattack does not succeed in clearing the concentration area

↑Photo 10: Study 5, Hypothesis 2 – Main Russian attack in Southern Basarabia (A.M.N.R., Marele Stat Major, Secția a 3-a Operații Collection, file no. 1120, p. 18).

↓Photo 12: Study 6, Hypothesis 1, version 1 – Polish-Romanian forces have destroyed the enemy secondary group (A.M.N.R., Marele Stat Major, Secția a 3-a Operații Collection, file no. 1120, p. 26).



◀The Polish-Romanian main force attack against the Northern flank or the back of the enemy main group from Southern Basarabia, in connection with the front attack to be launched by Romanian troops in Southern Basarabia



↑Photo 11: Study 5, Hypothesis 3 – Main Russian attack in Southern Basarabia (A.M.N.R., Marele Stat Major, Secția a 3-a Operații Collection, file no. 1120, p. 22).

↓Photo 13: A.M.N.R., Marele Stat Major, Secția a 3-a Operații Collection, file no. 1120, p. 36).



forces worked. Through this document, the two armed forces agreed that each of them would send missions or liaison officers and covered topics such as rail transit and mutual naval bases⁵⁸.

The constant concern of both General Staffs regarding the enemy from the East would be reflected in subsequent years in the exchanges of views, discussions and conferences, which would lead to the preparation of the *Studies No. 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7*, which contained various hypotheses on Romanian and Polish troops actions in case of Red Army attacks⁵⁹.

These actions revealed that the main threat to Romania and Poland in the interwar period was the Soviet Union. The Kremlin consistently issued revisionist claims on Basarabia, on the one hand, and Eastern Galicia, on the other hand⁶⁰.

The alliance with Poland had a special importance for Romania, because it was one of the few guarantees of its border on the Nistru River. Soviet Russia did not participate in the Paris Peace Conference (1919-1920) and challenged the union of Basarabia with Romania throughout the interwar period. The Act of 27 March/9 April 1918 in Chișinău received international recognition by the Treaty of Paris of 28 October 1920, being signed by France, Britain, Italy and Japan and ratified early on by the first three states. Japan, interested in certain economic advantages in relations with the Soviet Union, refused to ratify the Paris Treaty⁶¹.

For Romania, the alliance with Poland meant not only that it secured its Eastern border, but also an important support in the alliance system designed to guarantee territorial integrity of Unified Romania⁶².

In turn, Poland had strategic and military essential interests, seeking to secure its eastern borders, combat expanding of pro-Russia influence in the Balkans, improve Romanian-Hungarian relations and raise Romania's awareness as far as Poland's relations with neighbouring Great Powers were concerned, especially by blocking

For Romania, the alliance with Poland meant not only that it secured its Eastern border, but also an important support in the alliance system designed to guarantee territorial integrity of Unified Romania.

⁵⁸ *Ibid*, p. 422.

⁵⁹ *Ibid*, pp. 423-440. A.M.N.R., Marele Stat Major, Secția a 3-a Operații Collection, file no. 1120, f. 7-46.

⁶⁰ Ion Constantin, *op. cit.*, p. 167.

⁶¹ Petre Otu, *Relațiile româno-polone în anii 1939-1940. Sprijinul acordat de statul și poporul român refugiaților militari polonezi*, in vol. "Polonezi în România după anul 1939. Studii și comunicări", Muzeul Olteniei, Craiova, 1996, p. 16.

⁶² Ion Constantin, *op. cit.*, p. 167. Alexandru Oșca, *Constituirea alianțelor politico-militare ale României în perioada 1920-1933*, in vol. "România Mare în ecuația păcii și a războiului (1919-1947)", coord. Gh. Buzatu, Horia Dumitrescu, Casa Editorială Demiurg, Iași, 2009, p. 174.



Starting with 1921, after both countries gained international recognition of the borders and the Convention was signed, bilateral and military relations were boosted with beneficial results, especially in trade and transit.

German influence⁶³. In Warsaw, the alliance was seen as a “*guarantee of maintaining ties with Western Europe if the Polish seaside was blocked as a result of a wide armed conflict with Germany*”⁶⁴.

With the consolidation of the alliance, particular attention was paid to obtain information about the enemy, to analyse them and thus to timely inform those responsible in order to sustain political and military decisions⁶⁵. To this end, a fruitful collaboration was initiated between the special services of Poland and Romania in the exchange of intelligence, documentation, counteracting and neutralising Soviet espionage on the territory of the two countries⁶⁶.

After 1921, after both countries gained international recognition of the borders and the Convention was signed, bilateral and military relations were boosted with beneficial results, especially in trade and transit, from the Baltic Sea, the Danube and the Sea Black to and from the Balkans, Middle East and the Mediterranean⁶⁷.

The interest in developing bilateral economic relations led to the establishment of friendship associations, such as The Polish-Romanian Society in Warsaw, founded in 22 January 1926. During the inauguration, the Plenipotentiary Minister of Poland to București, Józef Wielowieyski, highlighted the constant solidarity of interests that united the two countries: “*Romania and Poland are a single economic and political front and their defence depends on the steadiness of the links uniting them*”. Regarding economic issues, the Polish diplomat stressed that just as the Romanian ports on the Danube and Constanța are “*a natural outlet of Polish trade to the Middle East, so is Danzig (Gdańsk) the port that makes it possible for Romanian goods to reach the Baltic Sea*”. At the same time, Józef Wielowieyski denied that “*Russia is the only outlet market for Poland*”, claiming the opposite, showing that Polish industry “*did not sell goods to Russia itself, but especially to Armenia, Georgia and Anatolia. The road to this land does not go through Russia; the nearest route passes through Galați and Trebizond (Trabzon – Turkish port at the Black Sea, A/N), therefore*

⁶³ Marek K. Kaminski, Michal J. Zacharis, *Politya zagraniczna Rzeczypospolitej Polkiej 1918-1939*, Wydawnictwo LTW, Warsaw, 1998, p. 64; Wlasyław Stepniak, *Dyplomacja polska na Balkanach 1918-1926*, Naczelna Dyrekcja Archiwów Państwowych, Warsaw, 1998, p. 79.

⁶⁴ Henryk Bulhak, Antoni Zielinski, *Pologne et Roumanie 1918-1939*, in “*Acta Poloniae Historica*”, 41, 1980, pp. 177-179.

⁶⁵ Marian Chiriac Popescu, *Relațiile militare româno-polone în perioada interbelică (1918-1939)*, Editura Sigma, București, 2001, p. 23.

⁶⁶ Andrzej Peponski, *Wywiad Polski na ZSRR 1921-1939*, Wydawnictwo Bellona, Warszawska Oficyna Wydawnicza “Gryf”, Warsaw, 1996, pp. 187-197.

⁶⁷ Florin Anghel, Dumitru Preda, *op. cit.*, p. XVI.



Photo 14: Marshal Pilsudski in Sinaia, in September 1922, amid Romania's Royal Family

Romania, and not Russia, is the indispensable bridge to the Orient for Poland's trade”⁶⁸.

Frequent high-level contacts had an outstanding contribution to developing bilateral relations. In addition to mutual information and permanent consultation, they have made it possible for the joint views and action to be harmonised, especially in matters regarding cooperation and security in Central and Eastern Europe.

Marshal Józef Piłsudski, the main architect of the rebirth of Poland, was a popular guest of the Romanian Royal Family. A great admirer of the Romanian lands, the Marshal contributed decisively to the strengthening of the relations between the two countries. As head of the Polish state, he visited Romania several times (1922, 1928, 1931, 1932), boosting some of the military cooperation joint projects⁶⁹. At one point, he suggested that a dynastic union between Poland and Romania was a feasible possibility⁷⁰.

During his visit in Romania, in Sinaia, in September 1922, Marshal Piłsudski delivered an impressive and meaningful speech on the geopolitical position and the relations between the two countries, highlighting the following: “***the link between Poland the Romania is that both countries came out of the throes of the Great World War, Romania – united and Poland – resurrected. Both are a living proof***

⁶⁸ A.M.A.E., 71/Polonia. *Relații cu România. 1920-1944* Collection, vol. 52, f. 233. Ion Constantin, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

⁶⁹ Central National Historical Archives/Arhivele Naționale Istorice Centrale, *Președinția Consiliului de Miniștri* Collection, dosar no. 2/ 1922, f. 12. Daniel Hrenciuc, *Cu ochii la Răsărit...*, pp. 203-212, 263-274.

⁷⁰ A.M.A.E., 71/Polonia. *Relații cu România. 1920-1944* Collection, vol. 52, f. 124.



Photo 15: Marshal Pilsudski on the steps of the Military Museum in București, during a visit in 1928. Flanked by General Angelescu, Romanian Minister of War (on his left) and Jan Szebek, Polish Ambassador in București (on his right, in suit).



of the victory of justice and equity. The similarity of pathways brought together by this shared past logically results in a common way to be pursued forward, because it embodies the common fate of our peoples, linked by their both needs and interests, and by the shared concern about freedom, justice and peace [...] From the Baltic to the Black Sea, the Alliance of the hearts is represented by one people under two flags⁷¹.

Between 19 August and 3 October 1928, Marshal Józef Piłsudski paid another visit to Romania⁷². He stayed in Târgoviște, in the villa of Dr. Lucjan Skupiewski (great grandfather of late President Lech Kaczyński and his twin brother, Jarosław Kaczyński). On this journey, Marshal Piłsudski was accompanied by Ludwig Włodzimierz, Poland's military attaché in București, and his daughters, eleven-year-old Wanda, and eight-year-old Jagoda⁷³.

Between 11 and 28 October 1931, Marshal Józef Piłsudski visited Romania again. On 11 October 1931, he arrived in Techirghiol⁷⁴, Constanța,

⁷¹ Florin Anghel, Dumitru Preda, *op. cit.*, p. XV. Nicolae Măreș, *Aspecte inedite privind raporturile polono-române în perioada 1919-1921, în baza unor cercetări recente în arhivele poloneze*, in vol. *În lumea relațiilor polono-române. Materialele simpozionului*, Suceava, Union of the Poles in Romania, 2005, p. 167. Henryk Walczak, *Stanowiska Rumunii wobec Polski W Świetle referatów informacyjnych Naczelnych Władz Wojskowych RP (1920-1921)*, in vol. *În lumea relațiilor polono-române. Materialele simpozionului*, Suceava, Union of the Poles in Romania, 2005, pp. 169-176.

⁷² A.M.N.R., *Ministerul de Război, Secretariatul General* Collection, file no. 4415, f. 7-32.

⁷³ Daniel Hrenciuc, *Cu ochii la Răsărit...*, pp. 263-267.

⁷⁴ Waclaw Jedrzejewicz, Janus Cisek, *Kalendarium życia Józefa Piłsudskiego, 1867-1935*, Wydawnictwo Literackie, Tom III, Warszawa, 1998, p. 273.



Photo 16: Marshal Piłsudski in Sinaia, accompanied by Jan Szebek, the Polish ambassador to București (first from the left) and Lieutenant Colonel Roman Michalowski, military attaché (14 October 1931)

for a visit organised by Dr Lucjan Skupiewski⁷⁵. On 13 October 1931, Marshal Piłsudski met Queen Marie and Prince Nicholas in București, on which occasion he was named honorary commander of the 16th Infantry Regiment, deployed at the Fălticeni garrison⁷⁶.

Marshal Józef Piłsudski visited Romania between 2 and 13 March 1932. On 2 March 1932, he met Nicolae Iorga, President of the Council of Ministers, in Buzău, and from there went to Constanța and then Egypt onboard "Romania". On 13 April 1932, he returned from Egypt, and on 14 April he held certain official meetings in București with King Carol II, Prime Minister Nicolae Iorga and other military and civilian Romanian officials⁷⁷.

Later on, he visited the 16th Regiment Infantry, where he was warmly greeted by officials, troops and other participants at the activity. During the reception, a brass band played the song "First Brigade" (the Hymn of the 1st Brigade of the Polish Legions, commanded by Piłsudski during the First World War). The speech delivered in honour of the Polish high official said: "Marshal, the officers and troops of "Baia" 16th Infantry Regiment, proud of the honour of being under your Excellency command, assure you of their utmost commitment and solemnly promise you that they will always be worthy of this honour. We nurture the purest and most beautiful feelings of respect and devotion to Your Excellency. All hail to Marshal Józef Piłsudski, our beloved chief"⁷⁸. Józef Piłsudski was deeply impressed and moved by the attire

⁷⁵ Waclaw Jedrzejewicz, *op. cit.*, p. 298.

⁷⁶ Daniel Hrenciuc, *op. cit.*, p. 270.

⁷⁷ Waclaw Jedrzejewicz, *op. cit.*, p. 305.

⁷⁸ A.M.N.R., *Ministerul de Război, Secretariatul General* Collection, file no. 4415, f. 73.



Photo 17: Pilsudski, welcomed in Gara de Nord in București, upon returning from Egypt and on his way to Poland, in April 1932. Captain Mieczysław Lepecki is in the doorway of the train, Dr Lucjan Jan Skupiewski on the left, and Captain Dereck, deputy military attaché in Romania, on the right.



and attitude of the troops, as well as by the whole atmosphere during the visit⁷⁹.

On 22 April 1932, Marshal Józef Piłsudski returned to Poland. That was his last trip abroad⁸⁰.

In turn, the Romanian sovereigns conducted several visits to Poland, starting with June 1923. Ever since the end of the First World War, Queen Maria and King Ferdinand advocated the need for getting close to Poland, starting from establishing a common border, continuing with signing a political and military alliance and developing economic and cultural relations⁸¹.

During this period, fruitful relations were established and developed between diplomatic representatives in București and Warsaw, lawmakers from both countries, businessmen, scientific personalities, and among young people from different branches and professions⁸². One of the most active and devoted friends of Poland was the great scholar and historian Nicolae Iorga.

The Great War was not over yet, Romania was in a dramatic situation and Poland showed no obvious signs of revival when Nicolae Iorga started an unprecedented press campaign for Poland in “*Neamul*

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, f. 76.

⁸⁰ Waclaw Jedrzejewicz, *op. cit.*, p. 305. Grigore Nandriș, *Viața mareșalului Józef Piłsudski, Cernăuți*, Editura Tinerilor Profesioniști, 1935, p. 16. See also Florin Anghel, *Revoluția morală. Regimul sanitar din Polonia. 1926-1930*, Târgoviște, Cetatea de Scaun, 2008, pp. 57-58.

⁸¹ Ion Constantin, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

⁸² *Ibid.*

românesc”, during the Iași refuge that took place in the terrible winter 1917-1918. Iorga’s initiative was comparable with what was going on in American, British or French newspapers, in terms of consistency and goals. It consisted of a series of articles dedicated to the history of Poland with the stated purpose of advocating, in every possible way, the regaining of this state’s independence⁸³.

First, he carried out a comprehensive review of key moments in Poland’s history – from the glorious Middle Ages to the revolutions of the nineteenth century – Nicolae Iorga warmly welcoming the rebirth of the Polish state. Then, through a prediction bordering on geniality, he advocated a common Warsaw-București front in “*The New Europe*”⁸⁴. On the eve of the signing of the Versailles Peace Treaty, he called for the need for “*a common front*”. According to this theory, the Romanian state needed a link with its Northern neighbour “*because this is the only way to ensure us our very existence, and that of the borders, which we gained with so much effort and sacrifice and now seek to consolidate and guarantee*”⁸⁵.

On 26 June 1924, Nicolae Iorga published a highly suggestive article, in one of the most prestigious publications from Krakow, “*Przegląd Współczesny*”, arguing that the traditions of the two countries had common interests that could lie at the basis of future Romanian-Polish relations⁸⁶.

On 10 June 1924, in “*Reczpospolita*”, the most prestigious newspaper in Warsaw, Nicolae Iorga outlined his scientific and policy theory regarding the bilateral alliance. In the end of the article, the Romanian scholar highlighted that “*there is not a more enduring policy than that imposed by necessity [...] Romania’s alliance with Poland is a bulwark for all threats to it and it is one of the major factors of civilisation of our time*”⁸⁷.

At that time, Polish media also covered positively the signing of the alliance with Romania, considered to be deriving from the community of interests of the two countries. Certain opinions in favour of this alliance were published in “*Journal de Polone*”, on 10 June 1924, “*Dziennik Bydgoszki*”, on 24 June 1924, “*Reczpospolita*” on 10 June 1924⁸⁸.

⁸³ Florin Anghel, *Construirea sistemului “Cordon sanitaire”...*, p. 31.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

⁸⁵ N. Iorga, *Front româno-polon*, in “*Neamul românesc*”, no. 73, 30 March 1919.

⁸⁶ *Idem*, *Polska a Rumunia. Wspomnienia z przeszłości wskazania na przyszłość*, in “*Przegląd Współczesny*”, Krakow, no. 26, June 1924.

⁸⁷ *Idem*, *Sojusz Polska a Rumunia*, in “*Reczpospolita*”, 10 June 1924. A.M.A.E., 71/Polonia. *Relații cu România. 1920-1944* Collection, vol. 52, f. 124.

⁸⁸ A.M.A.E., 71/Polonia. *Relații cu România. 1920-1944* Collection, vol. 52, f. 196.



[...] “there is not a more enduring policy than that imposed by necessity [...] Romania’s alliance with Poland is a bulwark for all threats to it and it is one of the major factors of civilisation of our time” (Nicolae Iorga).



The dramatic unfolding of the events fully justified the need for the alliance, as the Soviet danger threatened not only Poland and Romania, but, as it turned out later, also the whole of Europe.

At the same time, the newspaper “Messenger Polonais” on 20 October 1925 considered that **“beyond their common destinies, given their geographical location, Romania and Poland are called upon to complement one another. Although their area of action is different, their interests are never opposed”**⁸⁹ [emphasis added].

Nicolae Iorga’s determined belief that cultural relations should be given a much more important role, to build a true bridge between the two peoples, was implemented in the time he was President of the Council of Ministers (18 April 1931 – 31 May 1932), against the backdrop of the global crisis that began in 1929. The newly established *Romanian-Polish Cultural Association* in Poznan, founded in 1931⁹⁰, and the *Polish-Romanian League* from Lwów⁹¹ were backed financially by the Romanian government and supported by Romanian intellectuals.

Beyond the special relationship established between the two founders – Marshal Józef Piłsudski and Nicolae Iorga – the latter was the one who boosted and developed effectively the relationship between the two countries and peoples based on cultural, historical and civilisation models, immediately after Poland gained its independence and until his death, on 27 November 1940⁹².

From the political and military perspective, the alliance between Romania and Poland was primarily driven by the need to counter an attack by the Red Army. Soviet aggression could not be prevented, it happened separately against both countries, initially against Poland, which, defeated by Nazi Germany, did not have any possibility to defend itself, and then, about a year later, against Romania, which was completely isolated and unable to defend its borders threatened from all directions.

The dramatic unfolding of the events fully justified the need for the alliance, the Soviet danger threatening not only Poland and Romania, but, as it turned out later, also the whole of Europe.

In conclusion, we can say that, in the interwar period and especially during the period under review, Romanian-Polish relations bore the unmistakable mark of the political and diplomatic figures who led Poland and Romania. In Poland, it was Marshal Józef Piłsudski, founder of the independent Polish state, a charismatic and highly complex

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁹⁰ *Idem*, vol. 62, f. 38.

⁹¹ *Idem*, vol. 54, f. 80-86. Among the members of the organisation affiliated to the University of Lviv, we can mention the exceptional Romanian historians George Duzinchievici, Ilie Corfus, P.P. Panaitescu and the linguist Grigore Nandriș.

⁹² Florin Anghel, *op. cit.*, p. 36.



personality, often compared, due to the originality of his methods of ruling the state, with prominent personalities of world history such as Oliver Cromwell, George Washington, Napoleon Bonaparte or Charles de Gaulle⁹³. As far as Romania is concerned, the history of Romanian-Polish interwar relations will record King Ferdinand, Queen Maria and scholar Nicolae Iorga in its pantheon.

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⁹³ Josef Korbel, *Poland between East and West. Soviet and German Diplomacy toward 1919-1933*, Princeton, New Jersey University Press, 1965, p. 19.

DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OVER THE SECURITY SECTOR - COMPARATIVE VIEW OF THE EUROPEAN MODEL AND ITS APPLICATION IN ROMANIA

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In the democratic societies of European or Euro-Atlantic tradition, the principle according to which sovereignty belongs to the people, and that it is exercised through its elected representatives, means that the people, through their representatives, must also exercise an effective control over the security sector. For this reason, the European and Euro-Atlantic democratic tradition has established certain mechanisms of control. Their general features, as they are presented in the official acts of international organisations and in the specialised doctrine, and their concrete application, in the Romanian Constitution or in the acts regulating its application, are analysed in the article.

Keywords: democracy, security sector, control, civil-military relationship, Romanian Constitution.

Introductory Considerations

Since ancient times, one of the essential functions of state-like political entities has been to watch the security of their members. In fact, if we stick to the classics, one of the reasons why societies chose to organise in the form of state was to provide security against threats from the outside (other societies) or the inside (members of their own society that did not respect its norms). Certainly, more recent research has diluted this vision and we can say today that it is possible that the phenomenon of conflicts between human societies may have emerged just after their sedentarisation and the constitution of the first states.

Irrespective of the view of things, it is certain that states have always allocated significant resources to their defence, which resulted in the establishment of security sectors (initially represented only by the army, to which subsequently the public order and intelligence/counterintelligence structures were added).

The process of state democratisation, which began in the United Kingdom through the *Magna Charta Libertatum*, and later with the Glorious Revolution, and on the European continent, along with the Age of Enlightenment, the French Revolution and the processes it triggered over the 19th and 20th centuries, resulted in the visible improvement in the democratic character of European states as well as in the democratic control over the security sector. Practically, it is not surprising, as it was natural that the idea that people should have the final say about their destiny must also apply to the security sector, especially after the lessons offered in this regard by the First and subsequently by the Second World War.

In fact, former French Prime Minister Georges Clémenceau said that “*war is too serious to be left to the military*”, and what he intended to say in essence was that “*in a democracy, elected representatives of the people have the supreme power, and that no state sector must evade their control. A state without parliamentary control in the security sector and especially in the military sector must, at best,*

The process of state democratisation, which began in the United Kingdom through the Magna Charta Libertatum, and later with the Glorious Revolution, and on the European continent, along with the Age of Enlightenment, the French Revolution and the processes it triggered over the 19th and 20th centuries, resulted in the visible improvement in the democratic character of European states as well as in the democratic control over the security sector.



While the security sector prefers to limit civil interference in its activities, given the high level of competence and technical knowledge that is necessary for its proper functioning, plus the specific information that is difficult to reach for civilians, the politicians tend to limit the influence of military actors in their own decisions.

be considered an incomplete democracy or a democracy in the process of developing”¹.

Moreover, always having in mind the imperative of preserving the democratic character of states, as expressed by Robert A. Dahl, “the fundamental and most persistent problem in politics is to avoid autocracy”². In this regard, given that the components of the security sector are, by their nature, institutions of power, and are ultimately capable of undermining the democratic nature of the state in which they are found, the concern of modern societies to establish certain limitations of their power through control mechanisms that ensure that the state power is still held by the people and exercised by its elected representatives appears as natural.

In this context, the specialised doctrine considers that the emergence of this control is the result of an inherent tension between the security sector and the political level, both parties thus preferring a certain distance or separation between them, being reluctant to intrusions in their areas of competence. Specifically, while the security sector prefers to limit civil interference in its activities, given the high level of competence and technical knowledge that is necessary for its proper functioning, plus the specific information that is difficult to reach for civilians, the politicians tend to limit the influence of military actors in their own decisions. However, if the distance between the two sectors is complete, none of them achieves their goals (while in the case of total confusion the democratic mechanisms are violated), and it is obvious that the security and defence of a state is a shared responsibility that requires cooperation and not just control over strategic, organisational, operational and social issues³.

In general terms, the relationship patterns between the civil and security sectors are subsumed, according to the above-mentioned author, under four general types. The first describes a constructive cooperation between the civilian and security sectors, where both partners have an equal status, which is considered the ideal framework. The second model involves excessive control of the civilian power over the armed forces, while the following example refers

¹ Hans Born, Philipp Fluri, Anders B. Johnsson, *Controlul parlamentar al sectorului de securitate. Principii, mecanisme si practici*, study published by the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces – DCAF, 2003.

² *Ibidem*.

³ Florence Gaub, *Civil-military Relations in the MENA: between Fragility and Resilience*, Chaillot Papers No. 139, October 2016, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2016, p. 9, see www.iss.europa.eu, retrieved on 14.04.2018.

to the preponderance of the armed forces over the civilian power (the garrison-state). In the latter case, the armed forces can intervene openly in politics, a situation that the author calls *Pretorian state*⁴.

Democratic Control over the Security Sector. General Aspects

As stated above, the civil and military partners have the same status in the first model of civil-military relations, but this does not mean the absence of democratic control over the security sector. We use the notion of democratic control instead of civil control, because its essence is not related to being exercised by a civil power, which may be either authoritative or even dictatorial, as it is the case in so many situations in Russia, Asia, the Middle East, Africa, or sometimes Latin America, but to the existence of a genuine democratic framework in which the representatives of the people, freely and fairly elected, exercise this control only within the limits imposed by the Constitution and the norms with a lower legal force with respect to it. The control we have referred to can be exercised through a wide variety of means, most of which are relatively common to states in the Euro-Atlantic political culture area.

Synthesising the literature, they can be summarised as follows: the executive exercises direct control through the central, regional or local level of the Government, determines the budget, the general action lines and the priorities of the security sector. The legislative power exercises the parliamentary control not only through the laws that define and regulate the security sector and its powers but also by adopting the appropriate budget (we add that the legislator also exercises this control through specific means such as the work of the committees or even the special investigation commissions for specific cases). The judiciary monitors the security sector and punishes the abuses through civil or criminal proceedings, as appropriate. Finally, two institutional actors play a key role in controlling the implementation of the national security policy and budget – the Ombudsman and the Court of Auditors. Also, beyond the Parliament, Justice and Executive, civil society has an important contribution to the formulation and implementation of security policy, while the media contributes by informing the public about the intentions and actions of state actors⁵.

⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 10.

⁵ Hans Born, Philipp Fluri, Anders B. Johnsson, *op.cit.*



The importance of democratic control over the security sector is considered so great in the Euro-Atlantic area that the former Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the predecessor of the current Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, developed a Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, adopted in Budapest in 1994.

Indeed, the importance of democratic control over the security sector is considered so great in the Euro-Atlantic area that the former Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the predecessor of the current Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, developed a *Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security*, adopted in Budapest in 1994. Through the above-mentioned *Code*, the CSCE/OSCE member states state that they regard democratic control over military, paramilitary, internal security and intelligence as an indispensable element of stability and security. In addition, they undertake to deepen the integration of their armed forces with civil society as an important expression of democracy. Each participating state will ensure, according to the *Code*, that this control is exercised by constitutional authorities with democratic legitimacy, while ensuring that these authorities fulfil (in real and correct terms, we infer) their constitutional and legal duties. Also, the roles and missions of the defence and security forces must be clearly defined, and states must ensure that they act only within the constitutional framework that defines their mission. As regards the budgetary issues, states assume that all security-related expenditure is subject to legislative approval, ensuring transparency and access to information⁶.

States further underline the equal positions of the political and security sectors and ensure that their members benefit from the unlimited opportunity to exercise their civil rights, ensuring that the armed forces as such are politically neutral⁷.

In addition, Member States assume the task to implement and maintain the necessary measures to guard against the accidental or unauthorised use of military means and will not tolerate or support forces which are not subject to any control exercised by the constitutional authorities. In fact, the rights and obligations of armed forces personnel should be contained in laws or other relevant documents, according to the same document⁸.

The *Code of Conduct* also states the need for individuals in the armed forces to be responsible for the unlawful exercise of their authority or for issuing orders that violate national and international regulations, in which case subordinates are not relieved of liability when executing orders (illegal ones, we would add) received from superiors⁹.

⁶ *Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security*, adopted at the 91st Plenary Meeting of the Special Committee of the CSCE Forum for Security Cooperation in Budapest on 3 December 1994 (FSC/Journal No. 94), see www.osce.org, retrieved on 21.01.2018.

⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁹ *Ibidem*.



Moreover, NATO (which, for the admission of the new members, requires from them, amongst other things, the establishment of democratic and civilian control over the armed forces¹⁰) as well as the European Union (which, among the criteria taken into account for the admission of new Member States, lists the “*existence of stable and democratic institutions, the rule of law, respect for human and minority rights and their protection*”¹¹) makes democratic control over the security sector an imperative and extends the sphere of the states that apply its principles through their simple attraction exercised over the countries of the Eastern Europe.

The mentioned aspects are, of course, only the main coordinates of the democratic control over the security sector, established with a maximum degree of generality, but the aforementioned concept also implies a wide variety of concrete means, which are addressed in what follows.

So, in our view, among all the mechanisms of democratic control over the security sector, the most relevant is the one exercised by national Parliaments. We say this because, in a democratic regime, the institution that can be considered to be the holder of democratic legitimacy is the Parliament, made up of representatives of the people, in the proportions resulted from their vote.

Moreover, the national Parliaments have the role of legislative bodies (and, in some cases, constituent assemblies). This is their first and main function since the establishment of this institution to date, and we could say that virtually all Parliaments of the Euro-Atlantic countries demonstrate it.

Aspects Specific to Romania regarding the Democratic Framework and the Security Sector

In Romania, according to the Constitution, the *Parliament adopts constitutional laws, organic laws and ordinary laws*. Organic laws, the same Constitution specifies, can rule, among other things, the organisation of the Government and the Supreme Council of National Defence, the regime of the state of partial or total mobilisation

¹⁰ “*Democratic reforms will be encouraged and supported, including the achievement of democratic and civilian control over the military*” - NATO Handbook, 50th Anniversary Edition, NATO Bureau of Information and Press, 1110 Brussels, Belgium, 1999, p. 84.

¹¹ Augustina Dumitrașcu; Roxana-Mariana Popescu, *Dreptul Uniunii Europene – Sinteză și aplicații*, Editura Universul Juridic, București, 2015, p.176.



In a logical and chronological order, the people constitute, through their will, a Constituent Assembly, which develops a draft Constitution, in which the role and attributions of the civilian and security sectors are stated.

of the armed forces and of the state of war, the state of siege, the state of emergency¹² and so on.

In addition, and in close connection with what we have already mentioned, the Constitution provides in Article 118 (after establishing that the Armed Forces are subordinated exclusively to the will of the people, in order to guarantee the sovereignty, independence and unity of the state, the territorial integrity of the country and the constitutional democracy, and that, under **the terms of the law** and the international treaties to which Romania is a party, the armed forces contribute to collective defence in the military alliance systems and participate in actions to maintain or restore peace), expressly that the structure of the national defence system, the preparation of the population, economy and territory for defence, as well as the status of military personnel shall be established by an **organic law**, which shall apply accordingly to the other components of the armed forces established according to the law. Moreover, the same article also states that foreign troops can enter the territory of Romania or station, conduct operations or transit it **only under the conditions of the law** or the international treaties to which Romania is a party¹³.

In conclusion, in a logical and chronological order, the people constitute, through their will, a Constituent Assembly, which develops a draft Constitution, in which the role and attributions of the civilian and security sectors are stated. The people vote for that Constitution and, from that moment, within its limits and according to the methods set by it, the elected representatives of the people, assembled in Parliament, exercise the democratic control in general over the executive and especially over the security sector.

Returning to the general discussion, we state that, according to the literature¹⁴, the parliamentary control over the security sector depends on the “*power of the Parliament in relation to the Government and with the security services*”, thereby understanding “*the ability to influence the options and behaviour of the Government according to the collective will of the people expressed in Parliament*” or, in other words, “*the ability to control the application of public policies, legislation, decisions and budgets as approved by the Parliament*”, regardless of what normative acts it results from. The same authors identify in this respect a series of conditions of legal and practical nature for the exercise of

¹² *Constituția României*, art. 73.

¹³ *Ibidem*, art. 118.

¹⁴ Hans Born, Philipp Fluri, Anders B. Johnsson, *op.cit.*



A Constitution (or an equivalent document) “provides the main legal basis for parliamentary oversight of the security sector.”

an effective parliamentary control: the existence of “*clearly defined constitutional and legal powers*”, of “*current practices*”, of “*resources and competence*”, as well as the existence of “*political will*”¹⁵.

In general terms, a Constitution (or an equivalent document) “*provides the main legal basis for parliamentary oversight of the security sector. Although constitutions differ from one country to another according to the cultural, historical, economic, political and social background, most constitutions stipulate that the executive (e.g. the President, the Prime Minister, the Defence Minister etc.) is responsible for the security services [and he] answers to the Parliament*”¹⁶.

The importance of the constitutional sanctioning of this control lies in the fact that, in general, the Constitutions are at the top of the hierarchy of the legal acts of their own states, and they “*cannot be easily changed; in general, such a reform requires a qualified majority in Parliament. That is why the Constitution is an effective tool to protect Parliament’s attributions in this sensitive area. These tasks can be strengthened by specific legislation and by parliamentary rules and procedures. In addition, social norms and practices of political accountability and parliamentary control are being developed over time*”¹⁷.

Speaking about the parliamentary control over the executive, according to the Romanian Constitution, it is stated that the Government responds, politically, only to Parliament for its entire activity¹⁸.

In order to exercise this control, the Constitution states that the Government and the other bodies of the public administration, within the parliamentary control of their activity, are obliged to present the information and documents required by the Chamber of Deputies, the Senate or the parliamentary committees through their presidents¹⁹.

In addition, the Government and each of its members have the obligation to answer to the questions or to the interpellations made by deputies or senators, under the conditions laid down by the Rules of Procedure of the two Chambers of Parliament²⁰.

Of course, the ways of exercising the parliamentary control that we have discussed about are multiple. In Romania, they are, in a general enumeration, the questions, the interpellations, the simple motions,

¹⁵ *Ibidem*.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*.

¹⁸ *Constituția României*, art. 109.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, art. 111.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, art. 112.



The ways of exercising the parliamentary control that we have discussed about are multiple. In Romania, they are, in a general enumeration, the questions, the interpellations, the simple motions, the no-confidence motions, to which are added the parliamentary debates.

The most severe way to exercise the parliamentary control over the Government and indirectly over the security sector is the no-confidence motion.

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In addition to the constitutional provisions, the Chamber of Deputies' Rules of Procedure, for example, provide that each MP may formulate written questions or ask oral questions to the Government, ministers or other leaders of the public administration bodies, asking for an oral answer, written answer or both written and oral answer. The question is a simple request to respond if a fact is true, if information is accurate, if the Government and the other public administration bodies understand to communicate to the Chamber the information and documents required by the Chamber of Deputies or the standing committees or if the Government intends to take a decision on a determined problem²¹.

At the same time, the interpellation consists of a request addressed to the Government by a parliamentary group or by one or more deputies, asking for explanations relating to the Government's policy on important issues of its internal or external activity. The Government and each of its members are required to respond to interpellations within a maximum period of two weeks. For good reasons the Chamber may grant a new term²².

Similar provisions are also found in the Senate's Rules of Procedure.

A more severe instrument is enshrined in the Constitution of Romania at art. 112, which states that the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate may adopt a simple motion in which they express their position on an internal or external policy issue or, as the case may be, on a question that has been the subject of an interpellation²³.

According to the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, simple motions do not attract legal sanctions for the minister against whom they are headed, but they can be said to have political effects, materialised in specific mechanisms.

The most severe way to exercise the parliamentary control over the Government and indirectly over the security sector is the no-confidence motion. Stated in art. 113 of the Constitution, this refers to the case in which the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, in a joint sitting, withdraw the confidence given to the Government by adopting a no-confidence motion, with the vote of the majority of the deputies and senators²⁴.

²¹ Regulamentul Camerei Deputaților, art. 165.

²² *Ibidem*, art. 168.

²³ Constituția României, art. 112.

²⁴ *Ibidem*.



Practically, the withdrawal of the Parliament's confidence granted to the Government, through a no-confidence motion (that can be seen as mirroring the confidence vote), leads to its dismissal, which makes it impossible to exercise its powers in the field of national security.

In addition, a number of committees are operating within national Parliaments. In the case of the Chamber of Deputies, its Committees, defined as working bodies set up to carry out the tasks provided by the law and the Rules of Procedure, have the main role of preparing the working documents for the plenary proceedings of the Chamber and of exercising parliamentary control²⁵. Within the Chamber of Deputies there are standing committees, listed by the Rules of Procedure, and inquiry committees can be set up, according to the provisions of the same Rules, to elucidate some extraordinary aspects of the political, juridical, social, economic etc. life. The Defence, Public Order and National Security Committee is responsible for matters pertaining to the security sector.

Moreover, the specialised doctrine considers that *“in terms of security/defence issues, ad-hoc inquiry commissions have a specific importance and their advantages are numerous [mentioning that] their mere existence can be considered primarily by the public as a positive political signal; can be an appropriate tool for examining in detail certain sensitive security issues related to the security sector; may allow a more accurate assessment of Government policy on specific security issues and may propose, where appropriate, remedial or reorientation methods that are more likely to be accepted by Parliament and the Government”*²⁶.

In our opinion, the committees, whether they are permanent or special, play a particularly important role in parliamentary work, even if this role is not always visible. Within the committees, the most dynamic political struggle takes place between the representatives of the parliamentary parties that, unlike the plenary debates, are, by the nature of their membership in that committee, particularly interested in the areas under discussion, specialised or routinised in them, and often benefit from the input of the invited guests who are direct representatives of the areas or professional categories at stake, which often can have a greater influence on a draft law or measures that follow a report from the special commissions or over the plenary session's activity and results.

²⁵ Regulamentul Camerei Deputaților, art. 39.

²⁶ Hans Born, Philipp Fluri, Anders B. Johnsson, *op.cit.*



Among the most important means of parliamentary control over the executive is the adoption of the budget.

Apart from these or, in most cases, in parallel with them, parliamentary debates can be held, which have the merit of offering “the opportunity to exchange points of view and gather essential information about actions and intentions of the Government. In general terms, [according to the doctrine] Parliamentary debates on security policy and security issues may arise (...) following the presentation by the executive of the draft annual defence budget, following the official and unofficial statements of the line ministers, such as the Minister of Defence or the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in connection with the re-examination of national defence, with the presentation of the White Paper on Defence or any other major document related to national defence, in connection to government programs usually made public immediately after the elections or to any specific issue that calls for parliamentary debates, such as a scandal, serious security or disaster suspicion”²⁷.

Among the most important means of parliamentary control over the executive is the adoption of the budget. As stated in the literature, “since the time of the first assemblies of the states in Western Europe, parliaments have asked for a say in public policy issues, using the argument: < No taxation without representation>. As the institutions of the security sector consume a substantial part of the state budget, it is essential that Parliament monitors the efficient use of the limited resources of the state”²⁸.

Of course, parliamentary control over the security sector is not without challenges. In this respect, in an opinion from the doctrine it is stated that “state secret laws may prevent efforts to increase transparency in this sector. Especially in emerging democracies or in conflict countries, state secret laws may limit or endanger the parliamentary control of the security sector; this is mainly due to the absence of laws on freedom of information. The security sector is a very complex field, with parliamentarians overseeing issues related to arms procurement, arms control, and military training. Not all MPs have the knowledge and competence to deal effectively with these issues. Also, parliamentary mandate is limited in time, and access to expertise may be lacking. The focus on international security cooperation can affect the democratic transparency and legitimacy of a country’s national

²⁷ Ibidem.

²⁸ Ibidem.



Apart from Parliament, other national authorities, such as the Government and the President, also exercise part of the democratic control over the security sector under the conditions laid down in the Constitution and the laws drawn up for its implementation.

security policy if it leads to the exclusion of lawmakers from the process. It is therefore crucial for Parliament to be able to contribute, be able to participate and be able to follow the debates and decisions in the international arena”²⁹.

Apart from Parliament, other national authorities, such as the Government and the President, also exercise part of the democratic control over the security sector under the conditions laid down in the Constitution and the laws drawn up for its implementation.

The role of the Government, in this context, as stated in art. 102 of the Constitution is to ensure the realisation of the internal and external policy of the country and to exercise the general management of the public administration³⁰, from which it follows that the security and defence policy is implemented including (but not only) under the authority of the Government. In exercising these functions, the Government, in accordance with Article 108 of the Constitution, adopts decisions and ordinances. It is composed, according to art. 116 of the Constitution, by Ministries, subordinated to the Government, and other specialised bodies, subordinated to the Government, ministries or as autonomous administrative authorities. Of course, the entities subordinated to the Government include the Ministries within the security sector and, subordinated to them, certain specific structures are able to operate.

In addition to the possibility to initiate draft laws subject to parliamentary procedures, the Government may adopt, as stated above, Emergency Ordinances, in the cases specified by the Constitution, Ordinances and Decisions, the latter for the implementation of laws, and all these acts can also concern the security sector.

Further on, a very important role in the democratic control over the security sector is exercised by the President, who, according to art. 80 of the Constitution, is the guarantor of the national independence, unity and territorial integrity of the country. He, as art. 92 of the same Constitution states, “is the commander of the armed forces and acts as chairman of the Supreme Council of National Defence”. Moreover, “he may declare, with the prior approval of Parliament, the partial or total mobilisation of the armed forces. Only in exceptional cases, the President’s decision shall be subject to Parliament’s approval,

²⁹ Ibidem.

³⁰ Constituția României, art. 102,108 and 116.



As for the Supreme Council of National Defence, Article 119 of the Constitution specifies that it “shall unitarily organise and coordinate the activities concerning the country’s defence and security, its participation in international security keeping, and in collective defence in military alliance systems, as well as in peace keeping or restoring missions”.

no later than 5 days after its adoption”. Also, in case of armed aggression directed against the country, the President of Romania takes measures to reject the aggression and immediately informs the Parliament by means of a message. If the Parliament is not in session, it is convened lawfully within 24 hours after the start of the aggression. In addition, according to art. 93 para (1), “the President of Romania shall establish, according to the law, the state of siege or the state of emergency in the entire country or in some administrative units and shall request the Parliament to approve the adopted measure within 5 days from its taking”. It should not be overlooked that art.94 of the Constitution stipulates that the President of Romania “confers decorations and titles of honour, grants degrees of marshal, general and admiral, appoints in public positions, under the conditions stipulated by law and grants individual pardon”³¹.

As for the Supreme Council of National Defence, Article 119 of the Constitution specifies that it “shall unitarily organise and coordinate the activities concerning the country’s defence and security, its participation in international security keeping, and in collective defence in military alliance systems, as well as in peace keeping or restoring missions”³².

It should be noted that, in the context of their role in interpreting and enforcing the rule of law, the courts and the criminal investigating authorities exercise their own control over the activity of the security sector or any other legal subject.

Conclusions

From all of the above, we conclude that in the states of Euro-Atlantic political and juridical tradition, democratic control over the security sector is the attribute of an institutional system, established mainly at constitutional level, but also in normative acts of a lower level than the Constitutions, in which the legislative power, which is the main beneficiary of democratic legitimacy, participates, both directly and indirectly (through the control exercised over other powers) but also by the executive power (bicephalous in our country, represented by the Government and the President), the judiciary, and other special bodies. The purpose of this whole system is to ensure that the security sector

³¹ *Ibidem*, art. 80-94.

³² *Ibidem*, art. 119.

can function effectively, but only within the limits that are inherent to the democratic nature of the state, the supreme desideratum of the Euro-Atlantic political space.

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HISTORY OF USING BALLISTIC AND CRUISE MISSILES

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The author considers that the possibility of using ballistic missiles by state and non-state actors has currently become an important threat, especially given the great number of potential possessors of weapons of mass destruction (states having dictatorial regimes as well as international terrorist organisations). Therefore, important steps should be taken, at political-diplomatic level, a long time before the outbreak of an armed conflict in order to prevent irresponsible dictatorial regimes or international terrorist organisations from procuring, assembling and operationalising ballistic or cruise missiles. The author concludes that the threat of using ballistic and cruise missiles has been lately reconsidered by the main European and Euro-Atlantic bodies, air and ballistic missile defence systems being developed.

Keywords: ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, carrier vehicles, weapons of mass destruction, Cold War.

Introduction

Ballistic missiles represent a relatively new weapon in the arsenal of different armed forces, being developed during the Second World War as a more effective alternative way of transporting a powerful warhead to a distant target, beyond the front line, initially with a questionable precision that has been continually improved. According to US military experts, ballistic missiles are mainly used to launch nuclear, biological and chemical warheads, situation in which the precision is less important compared to the possibility of penetrating the enemy air defence systems. Twenty five years ago the arms race between the two superpowers (the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) was quite impressive in terms of possession and possibility to use ballistic missiles, starting from their range and precision up to the type and number of warheads.

In time, other factors have emerged in international arena – states or armed factions, which produce or possess ballistic missiles, the achievements in the field being thus diversified. The danger associated with the possession of such weapons is greater considering the potential possessors can produce or procure nuclear, biological or chemical warheads as well as appropriate transporting vectors. Such weapons of mass destruction vectors, which allow the possessing states to be inflexible while negotiating with powerful states (e.g. North Korea, Iran), are ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.

Since cruise missiles represent the privilege of the states that possess highly developed military space technology (e.g. the United States of America, the Russian Federation), ballistic missiles can be produced even by states that do not have such technology (e.g. Iran, North Korea, Pakistan).

Destination, Characteristics and Classification of Ballistic Missiles

The democratic states risk of being attacked by ballistic missiles is acknowledged, and these states theoretical and practical preoccupations to counter such strikes are highly intense¹. Ballistic missiles have continually

¹ An example is provided by the US airspace system called *Star Wars*.

developed all their essential parameters, having a standard ton load, 300 km range and 17 km precision – in the case of the German missile V1 in the Second World War, or a standard several tons load (nuclear – several kilotons), 10,000 km load and 100 m precision, in the case of US ballistic missiles “MINUTEMAN”.

Most of the states interested in developing such weapons have not equalled the US and the Russian Federation performance in terms of range and precision. However, in the case of nuclear, chemical or biological warheads, the missile precision in the order of metres is less relevant.

A classification of ballistic missiles depending on their range is as follows:

- *short-range ballistic missiles – SRBM: 0-600 km;*
- *medium-range ballistic missiles – MRBM: 0-1,350 km;*
- *intermediate-range ballistic missiles – IRBM): 0-5,500 km;*
- *intercontinental ballistic missiles – IBM): 5,500-10,000 km².*

US classical nuclear weapon as well as mass destruction systems were developed and deployed in all environments: land, maritime, air, and even in outer space, so that all the Earth surface can be covered. Important technological advances have also been made in the field of missile carrier vehicles, especially in the case of intercontinental ballistic missiles³.

Depending on their range, the following carrier vehicles can be mentioned:

- strategic carrier vehicles: ground-launched intercontinental missiles, submarine-launched intermediate-range or intercontinental missiles; strategic bombers. Such carrier vehicles can strike targets situated at intercontinental distances;
- theatre/continental carrier vehicles: intermediate-range and medium-range ground-launched missiles; operational-strategic bombers. Such carrier vehicles can be used in theatres of operations on the same continent;
- tactical carrier vehicles: short-range missiles; tactical bombers; large-calibre artillery pieces.

² Ion Puricel, *Combaterea rachetelor balistice cu rachete antiaeriene în operații multinaționale*, Editura Universității Naționale de Apărare “Carol I”, București, 2007, p. 48.

³ Niculae Tabarcia, *Considerații privind conceptul de scut antirachetă și influența evoluțiilor din acest domeniu asupra balanței de putere la nivel regional și global (I)*, in *Gândirea militară românească Journal*, no. 4, București, 2014, pp. 80-99.

The improvement of ballistic missiles correlated with the miniaturisation of warheads resulted in the possibility that a single intercontinental ballistic missile could carry several nuclear warheads.

In this regard, the first achievement in the field was the *Multiple Reentry Vehicle – MRV*, deploying multiple warheads in a pattern against a single target.

Subsequent research in the field of technology made possible the development of *Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle – MITRV*, containing several warheads, each capable of hitting one of a group of targets. Such ballistic missile is capable of hitting simultaneously and with high precision a number of 6-12 objectives, depending on the number of nuclear warheads that are carried.

Another military technological innovation was the development of ballistic missiles having nuclear warheads capable of autonomously tracking targets, namely *Manoeuvrable Reentry Vehicle – MARV*. This type of ballistic missile has a high precision and the ability to penetrate the missile defence systems. It can thus be used to hit targets in motion.

Therefore, the place from where carrier vehicles can be launched as well as the ways to launch them may be based on the ground (fixed or mobile platforms), on surface vessels or submarines, or on aircraft.

As far as propulsion is concerned, ballistic missiles can use engines with the following types of fuel:

- solid (more difficult to produce but more frequently used as it provides the ballistic missile with greater stability on the trajectory and greater ease in operation);
- liquid (less difficult to produce but less used, as it does not provide the ballistic missile with stability on the trajectory).

The *Intercontinental Ballistic Missile – IBM* is a ground-to-ground long-range (5,500 km-10,000 km) ballistic missile. Following the ascension phase, when the propulsion engine and the first march engine are used, the intercontinental ballistic missile leaves the atmosphere, follows the median trajectory, and, using the accumulated hypersonic speed, gets to the target, using a descendant ballistic trajectory. The ballistic missile navigation system is usually one of inertial type with a gyroscope, using geodetic data that are transmitted by geostationary or cosmic satellites or have been previously memorised by the target coordinate calculating device. Sometimes a combined astro-inertial system is used, which also contains astral celestial navigation systems. *IBM* may carry several warheads (3-12), conventional or nuclear/chemical/biological, each warhead being aimed at a separate target (e.g. MIRV).



V-1 and V-2, the First Missiles Used in a Conflict

It is known that ballistic and cruise missiles were first used during the Second World War. Thus, on 13 June 1944, it was the first German air attack using “V-1”-type⁴ missiles against the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland⁵. During the next 80 days, 8,564 German missiles “V-1” were launched not only against England but also against the Belgian city of Antwerp, resulting in more than 23,000 dead and wounded.

The UK Royal Air Force used the anti-aircraft artillery, air-inflated balloons that were raised at different heights in the cruise missiles direction of attack, and the hunting-intercepting aviation. It was executed fire against those targets, following the example of the British Air Force Captain Jerry Barry, as well as the bold method developed by the British Air Force Colonel Thompson. He suggested detouring a “V-1” German cruise missile by overlapping a horizontal plane of the hunting-intercepting aircraft under a missile wing. Then the pilot slightly raised the horizontal plane of own aircraft, which resulted in generating an ascending air flow for the German cruise missile. The manoeuvre continued so that the German cruise missile could be rotated horizontally (compared to its flight axis along the trajectory) to a value greater than 90 degrees. The mentioned manoeuvre generated a distortion of the German cruise missile direction and distance gyroscopes, fact resulting in changing the missile trajectory and its chaotically breaking down outside the area in which the target was located. However, the method ran the risk of accidental air collision resulting in the instantaneous explosion of the German cruise missile, thus endangering the hunting pilot life.

Following the air attack executed by the German armed forces using “V-1” cruise missiles, thousands of “V-2” ballistic missiles were launched against British cities⁶. The British air force could not counter such type of attack using that German ballistic missile, because of the high (hypersonic) speed of that air weapon that far exceeded the possibilities of combat and destruction executed using the anti-aircraft artillery or the hunting-intercepting aviation.

Allied intelligence services early warned the UK-US armed forces strategic command about the danger represented by those German air

⁴ It was the first cruise missile used in an armed conflict.

⁵ Liddell Hart, *Istoria celui de al Doilea Război Mondial*, Editura Orizonturi, București, 1997, p. 43.

⁶ It was the first ballistic missile used in an armed conflict, V-1, meaning vengeance weapon.

attack weapons. The mentioned aspect determined the Allies to launch the air operation “CROSSBOW” in December 1943. The operation was intended to destroy the German facilities producing cruise and ballistic missiles⁷. To that end, up to 6 June 1944, the UK-US strategic bombers executed a number of approximately 70,000 sorties and used more than 32,000 tons of bombs against the locations where the German “V” missiles were produced and launched. However, the Allied air attack operations did not succeed in preventing the Germans from launching “V-1” and “V-2” missiles. Moreover, the operational state of the German missile units and the missile production capacities were not diminished. Therefore, in spite of the fact that the Allies executed thousands of sorties/aircraft against more than 250 German targets on the occupied territories of France and the Netherlands, during the summer of 1944, the Germans could launch approximately 80 missiles per day.

Following the end of the Second World War, when the German archives could be publicly consulted, it was proved that between June 1944 and March 1945, the German armed forces launched more than 15,000 “V-1” and “V-2” missiles. The last German ballistic missiles were launched from the occupied Dutch territory and were stopped only after the *PENEMUNDE* launching range area was conquered by the Allied land forces, by developing the offensive after the naval landing operation in Normandy.

Involuntarily, by creating and developing such missiles, the Germans contributed to the emergence of the first air vectors to transport conventional or mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, biological) warheads.

In the post-action analysis, four lessons were identified to be learned, following the Allied air forces actions during the air operation “CROSSBOW”⁸:

- the air attack of the adversary missile infrastructure can be effective as a long-term strategy, but this action does not have an immediate effect in stopping ballistic and cruise missile launching;
- the effective air attacks against small and mobile ground targets that use camouflage and deception require direct

⁷ M. Kipphut, *Crossbow and Gulf War Counter-Scud Efforts: Lessons from History*, Air University, Maxwell Air Base, Alabama, 2003, pp. 56-58.

⁸ Ion Purice, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

air reconnaissance, as such targets are difficult to find and sometimes impossible to attack;

- the planning process requires comprehensive and continuous information support, as the enemy armed forces situation can continually change. The consequence of this fact is that the operational plans should always take into account the enemy actions and reactions;
- the pressure of public opinion, in conjunction with the political decision, can directly determine the allocation of the aviation resource to combat, neutralise and destroy the enemy ballistic and cruise missile production and launch facilities.

Arms Race – Missile Development during the Cold War

Immediately after the end of the Second World War, namely between 1946 and 1949, the USA was the only state that possessed the nuclear weapon and, in the event of a war, it could ensure victory considering it succeeded in striking the enemy vital centres. In this case, the carrier vehicles speed was less important than their range.

The development of the first Soviet nuclear missile changed the ratio of forces, internationally, which resulted in a new strategic nuclear theory, namely the country that won victory in a possible war was the country that could destroy the enemy before it could respond. Therefore, the closer to the enemy vital centres the nuclear bases were, the more advantageous position the bases possessor could enjoy.

The US air bases in Europe, Middle East and Far East provided the US nuclear forces with the ability to intervene in the shortest time possible, while the USSR strategic centres were spread across a large area, from the Urals to Siberia⁹. The US vital centres were concentrated in the northeastern part of the country (Industrial Belt) covering an area of about 1,000,000 km², but the Soviets did not have any air base close to those centres. They could rapidly and effectively strike all the objectives in Western Europe while they needed about 10 hours to get to the US vital centres, flying over the frozen continent near the North Pole.

To detect any aircraft coming from the north, the USA, in cooperation with Canada, established the *Detection Early Warning – DEW* line, approximately along the 70 degrees north of the Earth's equatorial

⁹ Z. Brzezinski, *Marea tablă de șah – Supremația americană și imperatiile sale geostrategice*, Editura Univers Enciclopedic, București, 1999, p. 84.

plane, thus having available minimum 3 hours to intercept the Soviet strategic bombers.

The mutual deterrence balance was not perfect, as the USA enjoyed a better geographical position than the USSR. Between 1957 and 1958 the Soviet armed forces were successful in improving their ballistic missiles. Thus, they could reach a speed of 6,000 km/hour and a range of 10,000 km, which made the interception of such a missile practically impossible at that time¹⁰.

The arms race continued, and the USA reduced the lag between 1958 and 1960, developing *Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles – ICBM* and *Intermediate- Range Ballistic Missiles – IRBM*. In order to be credible, the US nuclear force had to be able to strike all the enemy vital centres, including the USSR armed forces. However, the submarines equipped with missiles having nuclear warheads could prevent the single-shot destruction of all the enemy ballistic missiles launch ramps, because they were hard to detect.

Paradoxically, the technical advance required prudence: each of the two political-military blocs feared the adversary could launch own ballistic missiles before being destroyed. Thus the age of “*Mutual Nuclear Deterrence*” began. Soviet Marshal Georgi Malenkov, the leader of the Soviet armed forces between 1953 and 1955, understood that a possible nuclear war could have such unwanted consequences that victory could be meaningless. Therefore the idea of nuclear deterrence gained ground in Eastern Europe.

The ballistic missiles crisis in Cuba, in 1962, demonstrated the fragility of the balance of forces at international level. In this respect, to defuse the mentioned crisis, intense negotiations at high political level were conducted between the USA and the USSR, resulting in the Soviet armed forces withdrawing their ballistic missiles from the territory of Cuba, and the US armed forces withdrawing their ballistic missiles from the territory of Turkey.

The concept of “*Mutually Assured Destruction*”, introduced by Robert McNamara, the US Secretary of Defence, in 1962, provided details regarding the USA position in a possible nuclear conflict, stating that the USA was the only country to make decisions relating to the use of nuclear weapons in their bloc.

I consider that, following 1962, a new balance of nuclear forces was struck, taking into account the dramatic consequences of the possible massive use of nuclear weapons. One of them could be the cooling

¹⁰ Ion Puricel, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

Soviet Marshal Georgi Malenkov, the leader of the Soviet armed forces between 1953 and 1955, understood that a possible nuclear war could have such unwanted consequences that victory could be meaningless. Therefore the idea of nuclear deterrence gained ground in Eastern Europe.

of over 40 degrees of the environment, the so-called nuclear winter. Therefore, nuclear deterrence was strengthened at international level.

International public opinion became increasingly aware of the fact that the nuclear arsenals that were necessary to make the nuclear strikes against a possible enemy credible could no longer be used.

The arms race got accelerated even when the Americans and the Soviets were convinced that one day they had to destroy the weapons of mass destruction. The negotiations related to nuclear disarmament began in late '60s.

However, the President of the USSR, Nikita Khrushchev, rejected the US plan "*Open Skies*" meant to mutually survey nuclear arsenals, and the USA developed the new surveillance aircraft military technology, which enabled it to photograph and film the areas of military interest in the communist bloc, especially those in the USSR.

The mentioned strategy used to get information about the adversary was stopped for a short period of time in May 1960, when a *LOCKHEED U-2* US surveillance aircraft was shot down by Soviet missiles, and the pilot was taken prisoner and presented to international public in a televised press conference.

Nevertheless, the acute need for information collected from the air space of the adversary resulted in launching satellites. Therefore, each of the adverse camps could have knowledge of the other camp. Thus, the rapid evolution of reconnaissance satellites in the late '60s enabled the detection of some objects on the ground or at the surface of the water, as well as at a depth greater than 20 m.

Both the USSR and US armed forces tried to diminish the threat represented by the riposte from nuclear submarines, by precisely mapping the seas and oceans in order to know the delineation of the greatest maritime and oceanic depths, thus being able to choose the most discreet routes of own submarines as well as to place sonars in strategic points.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons Development

The balance of nuclear forces between the two adverse political-military blocs did not fundamentally change in the '70s. I consider the miniaturisation of atomic bombs and the limitation of their polluting effects were technological leaps resulting in the creation of tactical nuclear weapons. In this regard, remarkable progress has been made in the field of ballistic missile launchers. At first, for about 30 years, ramps on trucks were used. They were impossible to detect and quantify

by both opposite camps because their mobility and possibility to be masked.

The ballistic missile launchers on railway wagons further prevented the mutual control of nuclear arsenals. In this regard, I consider that the miniaturisation of weapons of mass destruction changed the possibilities to use them. Thus, a ballistic missile could have many warheads that could be dispersed in the proximity of targets, namely *Multiple Independently Reentry Vehicle – MIRV*. In the case of the mentioned type of ballistic missile, it is not sufficient to know their trajectory to find out the targets, which perturbs the warning system. I appreciate that miniaturisation allowed for the use of lighter aerial vectors that were technically more like aircraft, called cruise missiles¹¹. Such vectors were very precise (deviation from target < 50 m to 1,000 km) and they could be guided due to computer-based military technology at altitudes lower than 200 m, so that they could not be detected by adversary radars. Thus, "*surgical*" air strikes became possible.

I consider the Soviets had an advantage in the nuclear field, but the "*Mutual Nuclear Deterrence*" principle was not threatened. The US medium-range ballistic missile *PERSHING* having a programmed trajectory offset the advantages. They were relatively short-range missiles and became dangerous once they were placed in Europe, which generated new fiery debates and many public manifestations with regard to placing new weapons of mass destruction on this continent.

In my opinion, the "*Strategic Defense Initiative*", promoted by the US President Ronald Reagan, tipped the nuclear balance ("*Star Wars*") in favour of the USA. Thus, it became possible to survey and intercept ballistic missiles while flying, namely: on the propeller portion, on the ascending portion of the trajectory, on the average flight portion, and before the detachment of nuclear warheads (when entering the atmosphere).

The Soviet military programmes did not rely on information technology in the '60s and the '70s, and the military technological gap was difficult to bridge taking into account the economy of the eastern political-military bloc. In my opinion, since 1975 the ratio of forces evolved in favour of the United States of America, despite the Soviet arming effort. Thus, the miniaturisation as well as the precision of air strikes made possible conflicts in which nuclear arsenal

¹¹ The name was first used by the US Armed Forces.

and conventional weapons could be used simultaneously. Moreover, technical progress resulted in the possibility to disseminate nuclear weapons.

The Use of Missiles in the Operation “DESERT STORM”

I appreciate that the experience of the Allied armed forces in the operation “DESERT STORM” was different from the one in the Second World War, taking into account that the former was internationally legitimised by the UN Security Council to liberate Kuwait. Moreover, it was far from being a total war, the Iraqi enemy surrendering soon after the Allied land campaign began. Nevertheless, a large number of short-range “SCUD” missiles were launched by the Iraqi armed forces during the conflict in the Persian Gulf.

Moreover, I consider that the Allies had available the missile defence military technology to counter the ballistic missiles launched by the Iraqi armed forces. However, it was difficult for them to find and destroy the Iraqi mobile operational-tactical ballistic missiles.

Thus the shortcomings in stopping the launch of “SCUD” missiles by the Iraqi forces during the operation “DESERT STORM” were identified as follows:

- the insufficient priority given by the Allies to the Iraqi threat of using short-range ballistic missiles, as well as the failure in anticipating the political pressure generated by bombing the cities in Israel;
- the false assumption that the Iraqi armed forces could threaten Israel only from fixed positions;
- the false assumption that, if it was necessary to find and neutralise the Iraqi “SCUD” missile mobile launchers, the Allied military intelligence services could have the necessary information to destroy them using their combat aviation and special operations forces;
- the false assumption that the measures taken to mask them and to deceive the enemy could not significantly prevent detecting and striking the Iraqi ballistic missile launchers by the Allied combat aviation.

In my opinion, the final lesson learned from the operation “DESERT STORM” was that the “Air Supremacy” gained and maintained by the Allied air forces was not sufficient to guarantee the success of the operations conducted against the “SCUD”-type short-range ballistic missiles. I appreciate that the main effort made by the Allied air

forces, while enjoying undeniable air supremacy, was directed towards preventing ballistic missiles from being launched, namely towards destroying their production and assembly capabilities as well as the Iraqi launchers.

Moreover, I consider the concrete advantages enjoyed by the USA in the field of ground or sea-based defence missile complexes currently contributes to increasing the US defence potential. In my opinion, to gain the “Air-space Supremacy”, it is necessary to strike not only enemy land and naval task forces but also its space forces. In my opinion, it is expected that the enemy ground or naval task force could be destroyed using strategic conventional and nuclear armament, classical armed forces, special operations forces, as well as “space-to-ground” attack means. Moreover, I consider that offensive space operations and special deception operations could be conducted against enemy space forces, using anti-satellite forces and means. In my opinion, defence missiles such as *Ground Based Interceptor – GBI* ones could be used, as they can combat and destroy targets located at distances of about 4,000-5,000 km and heights of up to 1,500 km¹², as well as anti-missile missiles launched from satellites.

I believe that, in the fight against geostationary satellites, the maximum height to intercept them could be up to several thousand kilometres, the probability to meet the target could be 0.5-0.7, and the pace of launching anti-satellite missiles from the ground or the sea could be about 3-4 launches/satellite in 24 hours¹³. These are the possible answers related to the way Allied forces can combat the potentially adversary ballistic and cruise missiles.

Ballistic Missiles Trajectory

Ballistic missiles have a fundamental element in common, namely they follow a curvilinear (ballistic) trajectory comprising three phases:

- boost phase (introduction on the trajectory);
- midcourse;
- terminal phase.

The boost phase is the portion in the ballistic missile trajectory when the booster engine operates to obtain the acceleration that is necessary to enter the cinematic (ideal) trajectory, and the sustaining engine operates to allow for ascension on the medium trajectory. The boost phase usually lasts for 3-5 minutes, in the case of intercontinental

¹² Ion Puricel, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

¹³ *Ibidem*, p. 98.

ballistic missiles or intermediate-range ballistic missiles, and for 1-3 minutes, in the case of medium-range ballistic missiles or short-range ballistic missiles. During this phase the ballistic missile follows an ascendant course opposing the Earth gravity, and it either leaves the atmosphere, as it is the case of intercontinental missiles, or reaches the limit of outer space, as it is the case intermediate-range ballistic missiles, or reaches the limit of the tropospheric space, as it is the case of medium-range ballistic missiles, or the limit of ionospheric space, as it is the case of short-range ballistic missiles.

At the end of the boost phase, when the missile is launched on the cinematic trajectory using own propulsion system, the first component containing the sustaining engine is detached, and the ballistic missile flies for the longest part of its trajectory, known as the midcourse, using the two sustaining engines, in the case of intercontinental ballistic missiles and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, or the single sustaining engine, in the case of medium-range ballistic missiles and short-range ballistic missiles.

During the midcourse, the intercontinental ballistic missile and the intermediate-range ballistic missile will detach the second component, containing the first sustaining engine, and it will continue flying following the cinematic trajectory using the third component, containing the second sustaining engine.

The medium-range ballistic missile and the short-range ballistic missile, after the detachment of the first component, containing the booster engine, will fly in a dynamic mode (by propulsion) following the cinematic trajectory and using the second component, containing the sustaining engine.

The midcourse lasts for 10-20 minutes, in the case of intercontinental ballistic missiles and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, and for 5-10 minutes, in the case of medium-range ballistic missiles and short-range ballistic missiles.

The final phase of a ballistic missile trajectory is called terminal phase. During this phase, the ballistic missile enters the Earth atmosphere at a velocity of about 1.5-6 km/s. The terminal phase lasts for about 30-45 seconds, in the case of intercontinental ballistic missiles and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, and for 15-30 seconds, in the case of medium-range ballistic missiles and short-range ballistic missiles. In the terminal phase, the intercontinental ballistic missile and the intermediate-range ballistic missile, after entering the atmosphere,

continue flying using the remained fuel of the third component, containing the second sustaining engine, as well as inertially, so that the warhead can be carried to the target.

In the case of medium-range ballistic missiles and short-range ballistic missiles, the terminal phase of flying is within the Earth atmosphere and, during this phase, the missiles fly inertially as the flight resource of the second component, containing the sustaining engine, has been consumed.

There are advantages and disadvantages for each and every of the mentioned phases. They should be taken into account while deciding upon the actions of the structures responsible for missile defence. Thus, the possibility to perform actions meant to defend against attacking ballistic missiles in all the three phases of their flight results in achieving extended ballistic missile defence, which increases the chances to combat and destroy them. By combating and destroying enemy ballistic missiles in all their flight phases, all the opportunities that increase the ballistic missile defence advantages are capitalised on.

Specifically, there are several possibilities to intercept a ballistic missile as follows:

- the interception of a ballistic missile in the boost phase can result in its combat and destruction, regardless of the range or set target, and it can be achieved by global ballistic missile defence;
- the interception of a ballistic missile in the midcourse can be achieved by the extended ballistic missile defence of one/more region (s);
- the interception of a ballistic missile in the terminal phase can be achieved by ballistic missile defence in a determined area.

The increase in the probability to intercept ballistic missiles becomes extremely important when they have nuclear, chemical, biological/bacteriological warheads, being thus weapons of mass destruction. In such circumstances, it is always preferable trying to destroy a ballistic missile immediately after it has been launched to trying to combat and destroy it near the desired target.

Conclusions and Suggestions

The possibility of using ballistic missiles by state and non-state actors has currently become an important threat, especially considering the great number of potential possessors of weapons of mass destruction (states having dictatorial regimes as well as international terrorist organisations).

Therefore, important steps should be taken, at political-diplomatic level, a long time before the outbreak of an armed conflict in order to prevent irresponsible dictatorial regimes or international terrorist organisations from procuring, assembling and operationalising ballistic or cruise missiles. Moreover, once the conflict breaks out, at strictly military level, it is necessary to possess and use, at large scale, a combination of attack means (bombers, fighters, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and special operations forces) and ground- or sea-based air defence ones (air and ballistic defence missiles) as well as space defence means having increasing performance and effectiveness, so that the decrease in the ballistic or cruise missile threat can be expected.

I consider that the danger of using ballistic or cruise missiles is not directly linked to multinational operations or a specific theatre of operations. Because of the proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction and the use of ballistic and cruise missile technology, the threat of using ballistic and cruise missiles has been lately reconsidered by the main European and Euro-Atlantic bodies. In this respect, at international level, there have been created air and ballistic missile defence systems capable of combating and destroying the adversary ballistic and cruise missiles in a highly effective manner.

I appreciate that, by including ballistic and cruise missiles among the priority air targets, it has been generalised the use of air and ballistic defence missiles having very high flight speeds, booster engines with solid fuel and sustaining engines with liquid fuel, which do not need complex preparation operations such as the technological flows in technical subunits. Moreover, I consider that the mentioned types of defence missiles do not need an initial preparation cycle on the launchers lasting for tens of minutes, which considerably reduces their launching time and increases their combat capacity.

The increase in the nominal firing capability has also been influenced by the increase in the number of target-channels not only for combatting and destroying aerodynamical targets (aircraft, cruise missiles, helicopters, captive balloons) but also for ballistic targets (missiles).

In the current context of international and regional security, I consider it is necessary to present the following suggestions related to the establishment of a global ballistic and cruise missile defence system:

- the increasing risks and threats related to the air attacks executed by potential state and non-state actors using ballistic and cruise

missiles on political-economic and administrative objectives as well as on the armed forces and population;

- the systematisation, hierarchisation and redefinition of threats, as well as the re-evaluation of the possibilities of air and ballistic missile defence;
- in the current international security context it is necessary to approach the air and ballistic defence in a new, integrated, conceptual manner, aimed at the organisational and structural measures meant to achieve a modular and complementary structure of forces specialised in air and ballistic missile defence actions and operations;
- the air command and control systems of the states that participate in missile defence operations should be part of an integrated air and ballistic missile defence system that benefits from real and timely data related to the dynamics of the general air situation;
- it is necessary to equip all the armed forces of the highly industrialised states with modern military assets to meet the modern air and outer space environment requirements.

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ADAPTING NATO TO AN UNPREDICTABLE AND FAST-CHANGING WORLD

Julian LINDLEY-FRENCH

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The article addresses the need for the Alliance to radically change and further adapt to meet security and defence challenges of the current century.

In this context, he mentions a few topics such as Flexible Response 2.0, military ambition, counterterrorism, defence and dialogue, a broad security agenda, smart NATO, the partnerships with the EU, other countries around the world and the defence industry etc.

In the author's opinion, NATO must innovate as an alliance and streamline the delivery of new technology and equipment. Moreover, it needs a forward-looking strategy that sets out how the Alliance will meet the challenges of an unpredictable and fast-changing world.

Keywords: security and defence challenges, GLOBSEC NATO Adaptation Initiative, Artificial Intelligence, NATO-EU Strategic Partnership.

The article was featured in the *NATO Review*, 19/02/2018, <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2018/Also-in-2018/adapting-nato-to-an-unpredictable-and-fast-changing-world-defence-alliance-security/EN/index.htm>

The final report of the *NATO Adaptation Initiative* and a collection of supporting papers were presented to the NATO Deputy Secretary General in November 2017 (<https://www.globsec.org/news/globsec-nato-adaptation-initiative-final-report/>).

What changes does NATO need to embrace to be able to meet the security and defence challenges of the 21st century?

Leaders and thinkers from across the Euro-Atlantic community spent over a year considering the state of NATO and collective defence, as part of the *GLOBSEC NATO Adaptation Initiative*. Through a series of reports analysing shifting twenty-first century strategic, military, defence-industrial and technological changes, they offered food for thought on how the Alliance needs to further adapt to meet the challenges of a century in which the very idea of security and defence will be radically changed.

Fifty years ago NATO adopted two important changes to its defence and deterrence posture. Flexible Response moved the Alliance away from the automatic and mutual assured destruction implicit in Massive Retaliation to a more layered and nuanced form of defence. The December 1967 *Harmel Report* established the twin-tracks of sound defence and dialogue and the principles of European security which endured for much of the ensuing years. Not anymore.

NATO is at a crucial decision point. With new technologies such as *Artificial Intelligence and Quantum Computing* fast entering the defence domain, the role, function, method and structure of the Alliance must undergo radical change if collective deterrence and defence is to remain credible.

Yes, the Alliance has adapted well in response to the watershed events of 2014, rebuilding deterrence against threats from the East, increasing its engagement with the Middle East, and forging a closer partnership with the European Union – and it is already taking steps in some of the other areas set out in the recommendations below. However, as the Alliance approaches its seventieth birthday in April 2019, NATO risks falling behind the pace of political change and technological developments that could alter the character of warfare, the structure of international relations and the role of the Alliance itself.

Flexible Response moved the Alliance away from the automatic and mutual assured destruction implicit in Massive Retaliation to a more layered and nuanced form of defence.



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New strategic realities

Adaptation will only succeed if the Alliance confronts new geostrategic and transatlantic realities, including the need to deter a revisionist, militarily advanced Russia, while also projecting stability to NATO's South, and dealing with threats posed by states such as North Korea. To establish equitable burden-sharing between the United States and its allies, the *Defence Investment Pledge* made at the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales (allied leaders agreed to halt the decline in defence expenditure and aim to move towards spending 2% of Gross Domestic Product on defence and 20% of national defence budgets on major equipment and related research and development within a decade) must also be honoured in full and new money spent well.

Flexible Response 2.0

NATO's deterrence and defence posture must be strengthened if the Alliance is to prevent conflict and deter aggression. Enhancing the readiness and responsiveness of NATO conventional forces must be the Alliance's overarching priority. NATO's nuclear posture and strategy must also be modernised if the growing gap between the conventional and nuclear deterrents lowers the threshold for nuclear use.

Warfighting ethos

Along with powerful, agile and resilient conventional forces, Allies need to adopt a warfighting ethos as core Alliance doctrine. NATO must re-establish the capacity for the swift generation of force mass and manoeuvre if NATO is to meet the force-on-force challenge. NATO should promote integrated deterrence, building on reforms to the NATO Command Structure, as well as undertake more systematic contingency planning, to ensure effective command and control across the conflict spectrum.

Military ambition

NATO must at least be able to command simultaneously operations in a large-scale state-to-state conflict (a Major Joint Operation-Plus) and undertake a sustained strategic stabilisation campaign to NATO's South. NATO's crisis management mechanisms are still far too complicated. NATO's role in the defence of the global commons must also be enhanced with multi-domain forces able to operate to effect

across air, sea, land, space, cyber, knowledge and information. NATO must train and think as it plans to fight. Impediments to battle-critical information-sharing must also be removed.

Counter-terrorism

The terrorist threat to the Euro-Atlantic Area will increase. *NATO's Counter-Terrorism Policy Guidelines* and NATO's support for the *Global Coalition Against Daesh* are vital. NATO must also contribute more to preventing terrorist attacks on its members, including home-grown plots. While this is primarily a national and EU responsibility, with law enforcement and interior ministries in the lead, NATO's newly upgraded *Joint Intelligence and Security Division*, with its secure communications links to Allied capitals, could become a clearing-house for exchanging classified terrorist threat information.

Defence and dialogue

NATO must engage with Russia and Ukraine on the basis of principle: A new political strategy is needed for NATO to better engage with Russia. Dialogue must go hand-in-hand with defence with the goal of managing competition and reducing risks until fundamental differences that prevent a return to cooperation with Russia are resolved. At the same time, the Alliance must help Ukraine, Georgia, and other Eastern European neighbours to defend themselves and continue to promote the Euro-Atlantic integration of the Western Balkans. The Open Door policy, and the possibility of future membership, must also be upheld.

A broad security agenda

The enduring mission in Afghanistan is a reminder that the security of the Alliance does not stop at its borders. NATO needs a broader security role to reinforce the engagement of the Alliance across the Middle East, North Africa and beyond. Defence capacity-building to NATO's South will be an important contribution to peace and security, working closely with regional security institutions, such as the African Union and the Arab League, as well as with individual partner nations.

Smart NATO

If the Alliance is to both protect people and project influence and power, NATO should better integrate the many centres of excellence into a network of excellence, and establish new centres to address





new challenges. A bespoke *Hyper War Centre of Excellence* would help generate an urgently needed coherent approach to future war, including work on Artificial Intelligence and expanded NATO cyber defence within its defence and deterrence measures. Such a Centre would necessarily need to train and educate NATO's civilian and military leadership, and include staff courses for the North Atlantic Council, NATO staff and member nation civilians.

The vital NATO-EU Strategic Partnership

The European Union will become an increasingly important foreign and security actor and partner of NATO, with the NATO-EU strategic partnership increasingly important for the management of transatlantic relations. For many Europeans, the EU Common Security and Defence Policy will be a, if not the vehicle for defence policy. The European Defence Agency will also be the mechanism of choice for the development of military capabilities for many Europeans. Therefore, NATO and the European Union must overcome current barriers to foster a more substantial and mutually beneficial partnership and reinforce practical cooperation. A NATO-EU summit at heads of state and government level should be held at least once a year.

NATO's wider strategic partnerships

NATO must also create a world-wide network of strategic partnerships and institutions. Indeed, at a time of globalised security NATO needs to better forge functional political, civilian and military partnerships across the world. The creation of consultative councils with states such as Australia, China, India, Japan, and South Korea would be an important indicator of such ambition.

Equipping and affording NATO

NATO must innovate as an alliance and streamline the delivery of new technology and equipment. On average it takes 16 years from conception of military capability to operational effect, which is far too long. Capability fielding timelines must be shortened and commanders given a greater say in requirements development. NATO should promote a common standard for shared assessment, harmonised requirements and common specifications, and expand the use of common funding, and conduct an Alliance-wide platform and systems audit as part of a *Future Requirements Framework*.

Partnerships with defence industry – old and new

NATO must gain a far better understanding of the impact of new technologies such as Artificial Intelligence and Quantum Computing together with their defence applications. Many of the companies driving new technologies are not defence giants, nor are many of them defence-focused. Such companies will need to be sure that if they invest limited people and resources on NATO projects, their existence will not be threatened by sclerotic acquisition practices.

NATO and the future of war

NATO needs a future war strategy that fully integrates hybrid warfare, cyber war, counter-terrorism and hyper war, and the continuum between them. Critically, NATO must leverage the impact of new technologies on the security space and battlespace. NATO must better grip and exploit new information technologies, and systematically trawl newly-available artificial intelligence-powered capacities to exploit big data. To that end, NATO should consider creating an agency similar in mission to that of the *US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency*.

Next steps?

NATO leaders should commission a strategy review, which might be embodied in a new Strategic Concept. NATO needs a forward-looking strategy that sets out how the Alliance will meet the challenges of an unpredictable and fast-changing world.



WARFARE DEVELOPMENT FOR MAJOR JOINT OPERATIONS AND COLLECTIVE DEFENCE

Colonel Neil WRIGHT

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The author of this article writes about the role played by the Joint Warfare Center in joint and combined Warfare Development.

First, he outlines a few of the lessons learned/identified following Trident Javelin 2017 Command Post Exercise, in the autumn of last year.

Then, he writes about the enduring relevance of the JWC's six Big Rocks, as described in the JWC Operational Staff Handbook.

In the end of the article, he mentions the emerging themes in the context of Collective Defence and touches on the work ahead for the Joint Warfare Center, especially in the context of Exercise Trident Juncture 2018, pointing out that the fast-changing geopolitical landscape makes for interesting work in Warfare Development and a fascinating time to be serving in NATO's Warfare Centre.

Keywords: Joint Warfare Center, warfare development, collective defence, TRIDENT JAVELIN 2017, TRIDENT JUNCTURE 2018, JWC's Big Rocks.



A modified screenshot from JAVELIN (JTLS) showing red and blue forces. A Computer-Assisted Exercise (CAX) is a type of synthetic exercise where forces are generated, moved and managed in a simulated joint environment. CAX enables NATO Transformation to challenge and enhance capabilities, increase interoperability, save resources and reduce risk. Graphics by NATO



NATO Space-based early warning capability. The early detection is communicated to Ballistic Missile Defence Command Centres within a minute or two of the missile launch. Integration of Space in exercises started in 2016 with TRIDENT JUNCTURE. Graphics by NATO

Introduction

We live in interesting times, perhaps the most consequential for European security since the end of the Cold War. As NATO puts its weight behind assurance, deterrence and Collective Defence, so our work here at the Joint Warfare Centre (JWC) has adjusted from Crisis Management and Cooperative Security back to the challenges of facing a large and capable opponent. We find ourselves addressing once familiar aspects of major combat operations, like how to integrate joint actions to overcome layered defences¹, anti-submarine warfare, operating in contested airspace, massing logistics, speed of assembly, freedom of movement, deception, concealment and emissions control, to name but a few old faithfuls that deserve attention. Newer considerations have surfaced, such as the extent to which military commanders should wage “*information war*” to counter an adversary’s narrative, thrusting leaders into far more public roles, not to mention highlighting contentious normative, ethical and legal considerations. So, these are indeed interesting times calling for broad-minded

The article was featured in *The Three Swords Magazine*, nr. 33/2018, http://www.jwc.nato.int/images/stories/threeswords/Warfare_Development_2018M.pdf

¹ A2/AD or Anti-Access/Area Denial.



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JWC is far from simply being a training centre and the importance of our role in Warfare Development is, arguably, greater than ever as we refocus NATO's agenda for experimentation, interoperability and doctrine development against Collective Defence and Article 5 scenarios.

approaches to Warfare Development. And this is what staff in the JWC are attending to.

Whilst the JWC delivers higher command and staff collective training for 3- and 4-star NATO headquarters², it also leverages a huge dividend in research and development. Although our training exercises are the most conspicuous aspect of what we do, it is our role in joint and combined Warfare Development that offers an enduring dividend to the Alliance. As the diagram on the next page demonstrates, training and Warfare Development are inextricably linked. So, the JWC is far from simply being a training centre and the importance of our role in Warfare Development is, arguably, greater than ever as we refocus NATO's agenda for experimentation, interoperability and doctrine development against Collective Defence and Article 5 scenarios.

Having completed TRIDENT JAVELIN 2017 (hereafter abbreviated to JAVELIN) in the autumn of last year, a vast Major Joint Operation³ Command Post Exercise, involving, for the first time in more than two decades, all levels of the NATO Command Structure and a considerable proportion of the NATO Force Structure, we have a very rich seam to mine. This article draws upon that recent experience and our continuous adaptation since the 2014 Wales Summit, which identified the need to restore the Alliance's ability to warfight at scale against a near-peer adversary.

Lessons learned/identified for warfare development

Identifying the right areas for Warfare Development in the contemporary environment requires judgement. As the historian Michael Howard notes, differences brought by social and technological changes can be immense, even in the short term, and an unintelligent study can easily lead to inappropriate conclusions deduced from oversimplified generalisations. So, *"knowledge of principles of war must be tempered by a sense of change and applied with a flexibility of mind"*⁴. Carl von Clausewitz described this evolution in warfare as *"chameleon-like in character, because it changes its colour in some degree in each particular case"*. To that end, we must accept that change is constant and a critical factor to any analysis of the joint operational level and be

² Including Academic Packages, Key Leader Training, support to Operational Planning, advice to Battle Staff Training and Computer-Assisted Command Post Exercises (CAX/CPX).

³ Requiring Joint Force Command Brunssum to conduct a Washington Treaty Article 5 operation to defend and restore territorial integrity of NATO member states in the most challenging security environment.

⁴ Michael Howard, *"The Causes of Wars"*, Unwin, London, 1983, pp: 208-217.



The unique training infrastructure at the Joint Warfare Centre that connects "Training" to "Warfare Development".

circumspect in drawing the right lessons into our development work⁵. In such dynamic times it is important, therefore, to build from a solid foundation. That foundation is NATO Doctrine and, as Commander JWC, Major General Andrzej Reudowicz puts it, our role is to act as a *"guardian of NATO Doctrine and standards"*. For it is our doctrine that codifies what is known.

Indeed, as our own Doctrine Branch and Training Teams know, doctrine development never stands still. By stress testing NATO's body of functional and thematic doctrine in our exercises, the JWC can offer significant insights to the drafting and updating of Alliance doctrine; one recent example being our authorship of the Battlespace Management Section of Allied Joint Doctrine for Conduct of Operations⁶. Another example would be lessons from JAVELIN, highlighting the requirement for multiple Theatre Logistic Bases due to challenging geography and the size of the Joint Operational Area (JOA)⁷. It is here that observations from training have been drawn into revised doctrine for operational planning and execution; lessons identified, codified through doctrine to become lessons learned.

⁵ See Oxford University Changing Character of War Programme: www.ccw.ox.ac.uk/research.

⁶ AJP-3.

⁷ To be included in updating Allied Joint Doctrine for Deployment of Forces (AJP 3-13).



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And it is right to be doing this work at pace, for change is not unique to NATO; think about the quantum development in doctrine and capabilities in the Russian military in recent years under their dynamic chief, General Valery Gerasimov⁸. Our efforts will be marked and matched.

The JWC staff have enjoyed the privilege of being part of Warfare Development played out through JAVELIN. We have learned much from observing and contributing to the concepts and doctrine, not to mention witnessing three levels of command take it from drills and process to an expression of operational art. Here, we have seen *Generalship* in action. Commenting upon the scale and accomplishment of the exercise, Lead Senior Mentor, General (Ret.) Karl-Heinz Lather stated: *"From the Senior Mentors' perspective, Trident Javelin 17 has, without doubt, been a success. It has stretched and stressed Training Audiences and the JWC to improve conceptual understanding of Major Joint Operations"*.

The Article 5 JAVELIN scenario and story lines, worked by Messrs Derksen, Strina, Mientus and Ball and their teams, offered all PMESII⁹ challenges of a determined adversary willing to exploit deception and ambiguity through conventional and unconventional means. Moreover, the actions of *Winter's OPFOR* in JAVELIN were those of a peer enemy who gave as good as he got, using all levers of power; military, paramilitary, social, political and economic¹⁰. Their assertive military actions were centred upon achieving rapid foreign policy outcomes and their application of "information warfare" was not constrained by Western ideas of ethical norm or international convention. So, JAVELIN certainly focused the mind of the Joint Force Command (JFC) and its components in conceptualising the peer threat. We now have a great opportunity to develop this further in preparation for TRIDENT JUNCTURE 2018 through collaborative work with Partners, including the Baltic Defence College who have depth in this area¹¹.

⁸ Stephen R Covington, "The Culture of Strategic Thought Behind Russia's Modern Approaches to Warfare" Harvard Kennedy Belfer Centre, October 2016, and Romeo Squared, "General Gerasimov Describes State of Russia's Armed Forces", 16 November 2017 (www.romesquared.eu).

⁹ PMESII: Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure and Information.

¹⁰ Although Lt Cols Derksen, Mientus and Winter, Sqn Ldr Ball and Lt Cdr Strina are singled out here, there was a vast staff effort behind them from all Branches and the deployed Training Teams; all deserve special credit.

¹¹ See Baltic Defence College and Potomac Foundation "Baltic Security Net Assessment", 1 October 2017.

Enduring relevance of JWC's "Big Rocks"

The JWC's six "Big Rocks", elaborated below, have been well received throughout the NATO military community and their significance endorsed by Training Audiences¹². Fresh thinking has been given to their enduring relevance as we pivot towards Collective Defence, Article 5, and the challenges of the information battlespace. Our analysis suggests the "Big Rocks" remain relevant, albeit requiring different emphasis, as the character of warfare evolves to new geopolitical circumstances.

1/Information Management

Depending upon whose account you subscribed to, the *"Revolution in Military Affairs"* should by now have provided a utopian view of short, high-tech wars, well-ordered battlefields, complete situational awareness and a seamless decision-action loop. Alas, the human condition in peace and war is not so neatly addressed in the Information Age. The reality is one of "wicked" complex and unstructured problems and imperfect information with which to make decisions. Even where information is available, it is sometimes difficult to separate the wood from the trees.

Whilst the *"fog of war"* for Napoleon and von Clausewitz was due to a lack of information, now there is way too much and our capacity is finite. Acknowledging the limits of capacity, it is for joint commanders to identify and ruthlessly prioritise their Information Exchange Requirements (IER)¹³. If, once upon a time, this essential role was delegated to a technical guy to fill in the IER detail, this cannot be valid in the Information Age—Information Management (IM) is command sport and an essential prerequisite for operational art. We must not forget that IER and CIS¹⁴ planning for exercise is planning for war. It is a real-time operational planning activity involving the JFC, the components, the Communications Agency¹⁵ and others, and deserves close attention.

Moreover, commanders and staff should give similar scrutiny and analysis to classification and accessibility of information. These too are sometimes erroneously viewed as *"exercise-only requirements"*,

¹² JWC's "Big Rocks", described in our *Operational Staff Handbook*, are: Information Management; Battlespace Management; Civil-Military Integration; Strategic Communications (organisation and messaging); Battle Rhythm and Joint Targeting.

¹³ AJP 6, Allied Joint Doctrine for Communication and Information Systems elaborates requirements clearly.

¹⁴ Communication and Information Systems.

¹⁵ NATO Communications and Information Agency and NATO CIS Group.



NATO Military Doctrine: Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative, but requires judgement in application.



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Training Audience's
Combat Joint
Operations Centre
inside the JWC
Bunker.
Photo by JWC PAO



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but this denies the central importance and real-time criticality of command information. *Plan in haste—repent at leisure* might be an appropriate maxim for those who fail to give enough attention to what their information requirement is and how they expect to receive it. All commanders should spend a bit of quality time with their IM and CIS people in order to better appreciate and address their information priorities.

2/ Battlespace Management

This links closely to challenges of volume of information and staff capacity to process it. By definition, Joint Warfare is a collaborative endeavour that benefits from high degrees of orchestration. As JAVELIN proved, the larger and more complex the endeavour, the greater the challenge; a JOA encompassing tens of thousands of soldiers, thousands of air sorties and dozens of warships, not to mention complex civil and information overlays, becomes a huge challenge for any joint operational commander and staff. The tyranny of distance, and therefore apportionment, was a real operational dilemma for commanders in JAVELIN; air sorties could not be flexed or re-tasked over the vast JOA in the way that they have been on operations in recent years.

If there is to be any relief to such dilemmas it begins well before the troops, planes and ships are anywhere near the battlespace.

For it starts with a full and thorough Operational Plan Development¹⁶ where a relentless pursuit of simplicity must be front and centre in the planning effort, in order to de-conflict actions in the battlespace. The sequence by which joint actions are coordinated and synchronised in time and space sits at the heart of our exercises, particularly when confronted with the complexity of fire support coordination measures or the layered defences presented by the JAVELIN Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) challenges. The contested airspace and A2/AD bastions in JAVELIN were beyond the ability of any single component to fix and called for novel joint cooperation between air, land, maritime and Special Forces, not to mention Space and Cyber¹⁷.

3/Civil-Military Integration

Since conflict is shaped by political, economic and social factors, so we must integrate a constantly expanding roll call of participants throughout planning and execution of joint operations. Yet civil-military cooperation has taken a different hue in the context of major conflict and Article 5, and sometimes operational planning teams need to be reminded that they are no longer attending to Capacity Building and Security Sector Reform, *à la* Afghanistan. Now the cooperation is more about established governmental and civic bodies—with strong, long established notions of sovereignty and ownership.

The balance has, arguably, shifted from Non-Governmental Organizations (NG Os), International Organizations (IOs) and the like. This is a very different take on the Comprehensive Approach from recent campaigning and HQs have sometimes been required to adjust their approach quickly. So, whilst a great deal has been learned through the years of Crisis Management and Cooperative Security, care must be taken to draw only the right aspects of that experience into the new operational paradigm.

For instance, Collective Defence requires a huge effort to mobilise quickly, then move and sustain forces. The requirement outstrips the capacity of the military alone and depends upon a civil-military logistic structure and enabling capabilities. Senior commanders and military analysts continue to highlight the requirement to remove civil bureaucracy between NATO states and improve mobility

¹⁶ Phase IV of NATO Crisis Response Planning; development of the CONOPS and OPLAN.

¹⁷ See the article by Capt (US-N) Bill Perkins (JAPCC), also in this edition of the journal (Captain William A. Perkins, *Component Integration Challenges Presented by Advanced Layered Defence Systems (A2/AD)*, in *The Three Swords*, no. 33, March 2018 – translator's note).



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staff.



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on intra-European routes. Similarly, liberated space is required to be handed over to civil administration—the complexity of this “relief in place” cannot be underestimated, particularly where terrain, airspace or territorial waters have been cleared of conventional forces, yet asymmetric threats persist. It is too late to be thinking about this aspect of Command and Control (C2) once boots are on the ground.

In a speech to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, General Sir David Richards offered a clear sense of the priority he gives to C2 in the Information Age: “For some years, I have been paraphrasing that great American General Omar Bradley who emphasised that professionals should place logistics before tactics. My version is that professionals first and foremost sort out Command and Control, followed by logistics, followed by tactics. Get C2 right, putting the right people into it, and anything is possible”¹⁸.

The JWC exercises are starting to really stress Host Nation C2 dilemmas through planning phases and are revealing important themes in areas of civil administration and law during the transition from peace through the spectrum of conflict. Knowing who the key civilian interlocutors are—those “right people” that General Richards describes—and ensuring clear understanding of *modus operandi* for any particular nation’s Total Defence Concept is absolutely critical to effective C2. Interestingly, a recent NATO C2 Centre of Excellence paper has added considerable emphasis to this requirement to describe *who* is responsible *to whom*, *for what* in relation to civil-military cooperation in the era of Total Defence¹⁹.

JAVELIN saw the integration of forces between Host Nations and NATO with nine separate nations in play. Norway’s Total Defence Concept allowed complex aspects of Alliance command, control and coordination, not to mention cost of conflict analysis to be considered. This work breaks new ground in doctrine development, and, whilst JAVELIN took great strides, operational dilemmas will now be refined further for JUNCTURE 2018 to challenge processes with Host Nation resilience structures, including state of order and national law on transition. This is a theme to be developed with Joint headquarters during the Academic Study phase of exercise preparation.

¹⁸ General Sir David Richards, “Future Conflict and Its Prevention: People and the Information Age”. A speech to IISS on 18 January 2010.

¹⁹ NATO Command and Control Centre of Excellence Seminar Review 2017, page 52, “Considerations in the Re-establishment of Total Defence”.

4/StratCom and the Information Environment

This year’s SACT Strategic Foresight Analysis Report is revealing, particularly in Human and Technology themes²⁰. The report describes areas of conceptual understanding moving so quickly that time horizons become almost meaningless; the rapidly changing information environment and human communication is, probably, where evolution is most stark. As Hope Carr’s excellent article in our last journal (Issue No. 32, Pages 34-38)²¹ highlighted, the dawn of the information battlespace has resulted in commanders being drawn inexorably into areas of public diplomacy, which were previously the domain of statesmen and politicians. Not to participate is no longer an option; the “Battle of Narratives” is so dynamic and fundamental to theories of victory and defeat. Former SACEUR, General Philip Breedlove stated: “Battles will be fought on the ground, in the air, and at sea; but the next war will be won in the information battlespace”²².

Human communication is challenging at the best of times. It takes huge intellectual effort to stay ahead, delivering a proactive and assertive Strategic Communications (Strat-Com) narrative, rather than simply reacting to events. Think about the complexity of messaging at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Think about how communications might be refined and nuanced for domestic and international audiences, whilst ensuring consistency and avoiding contradiction. Think about the vast array of communication channels and how each and every one is viewed by different demographics and segments of a population, and one begins to appreciate the challenge to be confronted. JAVELIN allowed this dynamic, fast moving aspect of modern military affairs to impact the Joint Force Headquarters and components in a particularly challenging way. It was enlightening to see how forces adjusted to the environment, developing tools and procedures to effect behavioural change favourable to the Alliance; for instance, via social media with their “#PuttingTheRecord Straight” campaign. Our thinking is moving at pace and the JWC Information Environment Working Group is advancing in concert with HQ SACT to address this complexity and heighten awareness of non-lethal means;

²⁰ Strategic Foresight Analysis 2017 Report, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT), dated 4 October 2017.

²¹ Hope Carr, *Waging Information Warfare in the 21st Century*, in *The Tree Swords*, nr. 32/2017, pp. 34-38 (translator’s note).

²² General Philip M Breedlove during a visit to the JWC on 29 September 2014.



The JWC exercises are starting to really stress Host Nation C2 dilemmas through planning phases and are revealing important themes in areas of civil administration and law during the transition from peace through the spectrum of conflict.



Sun Tzu's notion of *"warfare as analogous to persuasion and a battle for hearts and minds"*²³.

Our drive to ensure that Training Audiences incorporate information activities coherently, rather than add them as an afterthought, has gained real traction. This dimension must be at the forefront of operational planning and calls for a mind-set shift and also an organisational switch—most likely felt in terms of battle rhythm. So, as we now bridge from JAVELIN 2017 to JUNCTURE 2018, it is encouraging to note that JFC Naples has requested additional focus be placed upon Soft Targeting for their exercise in Autumn 2018.

5/Battle Rhythm

If by rhythm we mean a pattern of recurring motion in the HQ, then it must also depend upon a sense of timing, flow and cadence. Whilst the former is about routine and *"going through the motion"*, it is those latter aspects of timing, pace and tempo in battle rhythm that support campaign synchronisation. For it is a flexible, adjustable rhythm that enables the *"kingfisher moment"* in operational art, rewarding the intuition of our very best generals:

"Nine-tenths of tactics are certain, and taught in books: but the irrational tenth is like the kingfisher flashing across the pool, and that is the test of generals. It can only be ensured by instinct, sharpened by thought practicing the stroke so often that at crisis it is as natural as a reflex". [T.E. Lawrence].

In exercises, we see the deliberate cycle of command and staff activities intended to synchronize current and future operations. These are the boards and working groups that coordinate activity according to different planning horizons and require a gearing mechanism to connect and synchronise them. Yet it is only the most agile headquarters that can gear shift in an accelerated environment and flex capacity of the staff across J3, J3/5 and J5 activities, depending upon changing events and priorities.

If the planning and assessment staff can adapt to a faster cycle, then they will allow that *"kingfisher moment"* of operational art in their commander, to exploit the fleeting opportunity. A set period Joint Coordination Cycle of, say, seven days, might limit the agility of the HQ and offer insufficient tempo to outpace an adversary. If we really are all about decision superiority and moving at the speed of relevance

²³ Steven Combs, *"Sun Tzu and the Art of War: The Rhetoric of Parsimony"*, Quarterly Journal of Speech 3: 276–94, August 2000.

through Boyd's Cycle of Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act, then adjustable battle rhythm must be practiced²⁴. This is as much about command culture, adaptability and the manner by which (traditionally) the Chief of Staff works up the team through Battle Staff Training and the like; what Lawrence described as *"thought practicing the stroke"*.

6/Joint Targeting

The importance of timely, accurate and intelligent targeting has been borne out in recent exercises, particularly where we have accentuated the grey areas between conventional and asymmetric threats and the requirement to coordinate and synchronise both lethal and nonlethal actions. Military professionals sometimes seem most comfortable at the kinetic end of the targeting spectrum. Perhaps this is because the principles of fire and movement are drilled into every new recruit from the outset of their military career and are therefore instinctive. What is less intuitive is the integration of information into the fires and manoeuvre mix. Yet, at the risk of stating the obvious, in the current Information Age this must become our foremost preoccupation.

So, we are consciously addressing fires planning to encourage appropriate balance between lethal-focused and non-lethal capabilities, ensuring that the latter is not simply added as an afterthought towards the end of the targeting process. We are tracking some exciting transformational thinking by Multinational Capability Development Campaign (MNCDC) into Integration of Lethal and Non-Lethal Actions (ILNA)²⁵. This seeks to establish a doctrine-based process for integrating lethal and non-lethal actions up front in the operational design and planning process. The aim is to enable commanders to engage an adversary using a multi-domain approach to solve the sort of complex operational problems faced now days; and not just use the *"hammer to crack the nut"*.

Moreover, the exploitation of lethal battlefield actions to accelerate non-lethal information effects and vice versa (Sun Tzu's hearts and minds) requires careful and detailed thinking. Appreciation of intended and unintended consequences is where operational art comes into play if military commanders are to wage *"information war"* to counter an adversary's narrative, not to mention protect vulnerabilities within their own Centre of Gravity (CoG).

²⁴ *"Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd"*, December 2006, Routledge.

²⁵ The US-led Multinational Capability Development Campaign (2017-2018), Integration of Lethal and Nonlethal Actions (ILNA). See www.act.nato.int/mcdc



If the planning and assessment staff can adapt to a faster cycle, then they will allow that "kingfisher moment" of operational art in their commander, to exploit the fleeting opportunity.

Human communication is challenging at the best of times. It takes huge intellectual effort to stay ahead, delivering a proactive and assertive Strategic Communications (Strat-Com) narrative, rather than simply reacting to events.

It is also worth noting that the sheer scale and tempo of major combat operations across a vast JOA might deny the luxury of centralised targeting processes, such as we have known on operations in recent years. It is becoming clear that fresh thinking may be required with regard to delegations and authority, in order to deal with the quantity, scale and speed of demands such as they were on JAVELIN. Agility is particularly critical to the exploitation of time sensitive and dynamic targeting opportunities. Moreover, these challenges of volume and scale also apply to the tasking of surveillance and reconnaissance assets in order to conduct Battle Damage Assessment. There is little point in targeting if no capacity exists to assess outcomes; a requirement sometimes overlooked.

Emerging themes in the context of Collective Defence

It is reassuring to note that so many of our observations from training ultimately coalesce around a relatively small number of themes; those hardy perennials we call our “Big Rocks”. That said, we cannot afford to stand still and must constantly review their relevance as we continue to evolve. With echoes of Bradley’s emphasis on logistics before tactics²⁶, there are new logistical and legal dimensions that warrant increased prominence as we adjust from expeditionary campaigning to operating within territory of NATO Member States.


Lieutenant General Ben Hodges (the outgoing Commander U.S. Army in Europe) captures the legal and logistical pressures evocatively: “NATO forces should be able to move as fast in Europe as a Polish truck with a load of apples on the way to Lisbon”²⁷. General Hodges’ campaign to highlight the lack of a “Military Schengen” has done a huge amount to unlock bureaucratic paralysis in legal and logistical areas. JAVELIN highlighted other areas in relation to states of emergency, conflict and war across Host Nations and concomitant impact upon the conduct of operations in the sovereign territory of NATO states. The stressing of the defence industrial base and other forms of support, including civil transportation, communications and energy infrastructure provided valuable stimulus, as did linkages with Norway’s Total Defence Concept at national, regional and local levels. This plays directly into the level of ambition set for JUNCTURE 2018, as will further work relating to risk appetite and thresholds in terms of casualties, platforms and materiel in Article 5 operations.

²⁶ *Op. cit.*

²⁷ Lieutenant General Ben Hodges, Commander US Army in Europe, “The Achilles Heel of NATO”, Reuters, 17 November 2017.

Know the enemy, know yourself

Given that the practical part of our exercises starts with Strategic and Operational Planning, and culminates with execution of the Operational Plan, the JWC staff are uniquely placed to assess coherence and consistency through all stages of the planning process. Perhaps the most obvious assessment of consistency in joint force planning is revealed through the CoG analysis. It is all too easy for the thread of continuity to become stretched or severed, resulting in incoherent planning against the wrong campaign end-state. CoG analysis is one of the best indicators of this. So, time spent in analysis is never wasted, particularly in relation to well considered CoG analysis, which really



Integration of lethal and non-lethal actions: Multinational Capability Development Campaign, Graphics by ACT/slightly modified for publication.

is a foundation for any plan. Doctrine describes the detailed consideration a Joint Force Commander must give to analysing both his own, and enemy CoG: Characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a... military force... derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight²⁸.

A CoG can sometimes unlock a campaign end-state and is worthy of close personal engagement by the Joint Force Commander. The commander must decide who, or what, has central importance within the context of the campaign, thus allowing him to allocate resources, either to protect the CoG of his own force or to attack that of his opponent. Perhaps it was ever thus, but CoG at the operational level seems to frequently focus upon intangibles relating to the battle

²⁸ AJP-5 Allied Joint Doctrine for Operational Planning, 2013, P 2-32.



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Lieutenant General Ben Hodges – “NATO forces should be able to move as fast in Europe as a Polish truck with a load of apples on the way to Lisbon”.

In the information environment tactical actions have strategic consequences and the “flash to bang” is measured in minutes rather than hours. We must know our vulnerabilities and ruthlessly protect them.

of wills and narratives. This could be to do with the ubiquity and all-encompassing nature of the information environment and social media phenomenon. Amongst Training Audiences the greater weight of analysis often seems to be given to enemy CoG, at the expense of consideration of own critical strengths and vulnerabilities. And yet the need to protect the CoG of friendly forces against, for instance, the tit-for-tat playground manipulations of “fake news” has never been more prescient. If not checked, such propaganda can drive a barb to the heart of morale, resolve and cohesion. This is about protecting the force, the mission and even the political state. In the information environment tactical actions have strategic consequences and the “flash to bang” is measured in minutes rather than hours. We must know our vulnerabilities and ruthlessly protect them. The simulated information environment on JAVELIN was relentless and unforgiving, just as in real world, and stretched every sinew of the Joint Force Commander, who responded positively to this reality of modern day campaigning.

To the work ahead

This article only really scratches the surface of Warfare Development and innovation in the JWC. With more time and space, it might have been possible to expand on the importance of exercise setting and scenario work, helping to conceptualise Major Joint Operations and Collective Defence. As one recent visitor put it, “scenario opens the door to interoperability”²⁹. In that sense, the new *Occasus* scenario for JUNCTURE 2018 represents a quantum step forward in exercising Collective Defence and our plans to build scenario material in TOPFAS are genuinely transformational³⁰.

Moreover, this article has touched doctrine development work only fleetingly in the context of Battlespace Management and Logistics, but doctrine imbues everything. As we were reminded on JAVELIN, it is our key to communication and interoperability. Discussion without definition is pointless and without prescriptive method we risk cross purpose communication and confusion. And whilst this article has covered some of the work in the so-called information environment, there is much else going on in our Concepts and Capability Integration area, not least in the Space and Cyber Domains, and enhancing the sophistication of Operations Assessment to assist commanders in making

²⁹ Brigadier General John Healy, Director ECJ7, US European Command (EUCOM).

³⁰ TOPFAS is NATO’s operational planning tool: Tool for Operational Planning Facility Area Service.

evidence-based decisions. These might be topics for future articles in this journal; suffice it to say there is much work to be done in the months ahead, it feels relevant, real and very much to the point of NATO’s current effort.

So, Europe may well have entered what analysts view as a dangerous new phase. The fast-changing geopolitical landscape makes for interesting work in Warfare Development and a fascinating time to be serving here in NATO’s Warfare Centre. We have a unique and privileged purview of *Generalship*, and the higher command and staff within NATO. We see the most talented commanders and staff operating in challenging and stressful conditions. It would be impossible not to be humbled and impressed by this. Yet the privilege comes with responsibility, which is to offer valid observations from training back into Warfare Development. It behoves us all to reflect upon this, the *raison d’etre* of training and warfare in NATO. That linkage must be self-evident and plays to the very heart of multi-nationality, interdependence and interoperability. We are limited only by our own imagination!

Recommended Reading

1. * NATO Strategic Foresight Analysis, 2017 Report
2. www.act.nato.int/images/stories/media/doclibrary/171004_sfa_2017_report_hr.pdf



Europe may well have entered what analysts view as a dangerous new phase. The fast-changing geopolitical landscape makes for interesting work in Warfare Development and a fascinating time to be serving here in NATO’s Warfare Centre.

COUNTERING ANTI-ACCESS / AREA DENIAL FUTURE CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS IN NATO

Andreas SCHMIDT

JAPCC – The Joint Air Power Competence Centre

The author presents different definitions of the term Anti Access/Area Denial (A2/AD), which has become more prevalent in military documents, articles and assessments over the past two decades. Moreover, it is shown that, despite A2/AD being prevalent in current studies and discussions, it is principally not a new threat. Simply put, A2/AD is the response to Western force projection, precision strike, and highly-networked C2 capabilities. Since attrition warfare must not be the first option for NATO, technical solutions and creative concepts have to be found to assure future mission success. Also, NATO doctrine should be reviewed in order to reflect the highly integrated joint and combined processes needed in countering A2/AD.

Keywords: Anti Access/Area Denial (A2/AD), Massive Retaliation, Flexible Response, Second Offset Strategy, Deterrence by Denial.

Introduction

The term Anti Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) has become noticeably more prevalent in current military documents, articles and assessments over the last two decades. However, does A2/AD constitute a new, unprecedented type of threat to NATO, or is it just a fashionable, new name for a not-so-new way of using existing military means? If it is something new, are NATO's current military capabilities and doctrine sufficient to counter this new threat, or does A2/AD require a paradigm change in how we fight future wars?

Amongst the many facets of A2/AD, this article focuses mainly on the use of symmetric military means. Aspects of asymmetric, hybrid, and cyber warfare (or the like) are outside the focus. Neither will the article discuss the support of A2/AD tactics by purely strategic means like Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles or strategic bombers.

To understand the current A2/AD issue, its implications, and why it has, in fact, a new quality, it is useful to first look at a definition of A2/AD. The role of conventional deterrence in the age of nuclear weapons, and the potential explanations for current A2/AD developments are also significantly important.

While NATO has not officially agreed on a definition of a A2/AD, a 2016 conference report from the NATO Defence College proposes the following: *“The objective of an anti-access or area-denial strategy is to prevent the attacker from bringing its forces into the contested region (A2) or to prevent the attacker from freely operating within the region and maximising its combat power (AD)”*¹. This explanation seems to characterise A2/AD as mainly defensive in nature. In comparison, in 2003 the Centre for Strategic Budgetary Assessment (CSBA) defined A2/AD as follows: *“Anti Access are enemy actions which inhibit military movement into a theatre of operations, and area denial are operations*

“The objective of an anti-access or area-denial strategy is to prevent the attacker from bringing its forces into the contested region (A2) or to prevent the attacker from freely operating within the region and maximising its combat power (AD)”.

Article originally featured for Joint Air Power Competence Centre, *Delivering Effective Solutions through Independent Thought and Analysis*, see <https://www.japcc.org/countering-anti-access-area-denial-future-capability-requirements-nato/>

¹ G. Lasconjarias and A. Marrone, *NDC Conference Report No. 01 / 16*, February 2016.



In the 1960s, NATO therefore replaced its previous “Massive Retaliation” strategy with “Flexible Response”, a more balanced deterrence posture using an arsenal of conventional and nuclear forces.

In the mid-to-late 1970s, the so called “Second Offset Strategy” came to the US national side, which predominantly emphasised tactical level superior technology in the conventional arsenal.

[...] that seek to deny freedom of action within areas under the enemy’s control”². This description, offers a more aggressive interpretation of A2/AD. Overall, most A2/AD definitions agree on the defensive character of A2/AD. It has been noted that whatever definition is preferred, A2/AD capabilities might be defensive in the first place but could be employed in conducting or supporting different types of offensive operations, too.

The Emergence of AD in the West

After World War II, the United States published the National Security Council Document NC 162/2 announcing the tenet of “massive retaliatory damage by offensive striking power”, including the use of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons in response to a Soviet aggression. This was the result of the perceived overwhelming conventional threat by the Soviet Union in comparison with the assessed conventional capabilities owned by the US and “the West”. Later on, diverse studies demonstrated a perceived moral taboo (especially in Western politics) to use nuclear weapons, which reduced their credibility and therefore utility³. Furthermore, nations with a nuclear arsenal may feel encouraged to attack with conventional force, by relying on their own nuclear deterrent⁴. This meant that a comprehensive build-up of conventional capabilities, in addition to its nuclear arsenal, was needed for the West, otherwise an early nuclear escalation would have become inevitable for most conflicts. In the 1960s, NATO therefore replaced its previous “Massive Retaliation” strategy with “Flexible Response”, a more balanced deterrence posture using an arsenal of conventional and nuclear forces. The premise of this strategy was to deter most conflicts by appropriate conventional force, while maintaining the nuclear option as a means of *ultima ratio*.

In the mid-to-late 1970s, the so called “Second Offset Strategy” came to the US national side, which predominantly emphasised

² Andrew Krepinewich, Barry Watts and Robert Work, *Meeting the Anti-Access and Area-Denial Challenge*, Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), 2011. Online at: <http://csbaonline.org/publications/2003/05/a2ad-anti-access-area-denial/>

³ Nina Tannenwald, *The Nuclear Taboo. The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons since 1945*, Cambridge University Press, 2007.

⁴ Glenn H. Snyder, *The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror*, 1965.

tactical level superior technology in the conventional arsenal. This new strategy focussed on four core areas:

- New Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) platforms and battle management capabilities;
- improved precision-strike weapons;
- stealth technology;
- the tactical exploitation of space for ISR, communications, navigation and timing.

The US thereby strongly enhanced its capability to achieve “Deterrence by Denial”⁵ and thus added a reliable AD facet to its conventional offensive portfolio as a serious force multiplier. This capability was combined with the US capability of global force projection with, for example, Carrier Strike Groups, strategic airlift, and long-range aviation enabled by air-to-air refuelling. Together, they created a dynamic, mobile “AD on demand” component, which made conventional deterrence a credible substitute before threatening with the nuclear alternative.

Adversary Reaction to Western AD

In order to counterbalance this higher level of conventional deterrence and maintain military relevance outside the nuclear realm, opposing actors in the global security environment had to develop an adequate response to those new Western power projection capabilities. This required both development of new arms technology and its effective employment with regard to the geographical features of the defended area. Therefore, the characteristics of each A2/AD composition vary by nature in between theatres, pending the assessed capabilities of the potential intruding force as well as the characteristics of the regional environment.

Today, the most significant, regional A2/AD configurations are deployed in the Asia-Pacific region (China)⁶ as well as on NATO’s

⁵ As further defined by Michael S. Gerson, *Conventional Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age*, 2009.

⁶ See Martin Menzel, *China’s Air Power 2015 / Reconnaissance-Strike Capabilities for and A2/AD Strategy*, 2015, in *Journal of the JAPCC Edition 21*, pp. 21-27, online at: <https://www.japcc.org/chinas-aerospace-power-2015/>



Today, the most significant, regional A2/AD configurations are deployed in the Asia-Pacific region (China) as well as on NATO’s eastern and south-eastern flanks (Russia, in Kaliningrad, Crimea and Syria).



eastern and south-eastern flanks (Russia, in Kaliningrad, Crimea and Syria)⁷, where a blend of state-of-the-art Air Defence Systems (ADS), advanced Offensive Counter-Air capabilities, powerful electronic jammers as well as the newest, most accurate theatre ballistic and cruise missiles prevents third-party military operations. Despite the fact that the effects of such A2/AD are limited to a certain region, their likely integration into overall military organisations and connection to rear areas (“strategic depth”) has to be considered as well.

Significant Russian and Chinese A2/AD Capabilities

Russia introduced the term “*Reconnaissance-Fire Complex*”⁸, describing the US-owned combination of Precision-Guided Ammunition (PGM), ISR capabilities, and automated Command and Control (C2), which needs to be interrupted.

Counter ISR. Since accurate targeting information is crucial for the opponent, the denial of ISR data collection is an efficient solution. This can be done by jamming sensors of land-, air-, sea- and space-based ISR assets in the whole electromagnetic spectrum (EMS). Current jammers are able to effectively deny the use of the EMS up to a range of several hundred kilometres including low-orbit satellites and means of communication for automated C2 systems. A study has shown jamming ISR satellites operating in the visual range of the EMS with laser is possible as well⁹. Also, the kinetic kill of air- and space-based ISR sensors by means of Air Defence or Anti-Satellite Systems is possible. These options would deny an adversary the gathering of necessary ISR data to execute the Reconnaissance-Fire Complex.

Counter PGM. Another option is to destroy the PGM or the carrier itself. ADS can engage targets of various types and at different ranges. The Russian S-300 (SA-20 Gargoyle) or Chinese HQ-9 can provide coverage of up to 200 km, the newly introduced S-400 (SA-21 Growler),

⁷ See Patrick Filbert, *Breaking Integrated Air Defence with UAV Swarms*, 2016, in Journal of the JAPCC Edition 22, pp. 85-88, online at: <https://www.japcc.org/breaking-integrated-air-defence-unmanned-aerial-vehicle-swarms/>

⁸ Barry D. Watts, *The Maturing Revolution in Military Affairs*, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), 201, online at: <http://csbaonline.org/search/?x=0&y=0&q=The+Maturing+Revolution>

⁹ WANG Si-wen, GUO Li-hong, GUO Ru-Hai, *Analysis of Laser Jamming to Satellite-based Detector*, 2009.

up to 400 km. This, in combination with other ADS like the Russian Pantsir-S1 (SA-22 Greyhound) or Man Portable ADS (MANPADS), can deny most aircraft the reach of their weapon delivery range, rendering them ineffective while imposing a high risk of attrition. E.g., when attempting to neutralise A2/AD offset-up in the Kaliningrad Oblast, a potential aircraft attrition rate of 20-30 percent is estimated¹⁰.

Politico-Military Benefit of Implementing Regional A2/AD

Considering no nation wants to start a regime-changing conflict against NATO Nations, the installation of regional A2/AD zones has to be considered defensive in the first place. Hence, A2/AD's main purpose is to prevent a potential adversary from reaching a certain military operational objective. Leaving the defender's strategic long-range (in particular nuclear) weapon arsenal aside, the main benefit of A2/AD appears to be “*Deterrence by Denial*” rather than “*Deterrence by Punishment*”¹¹.

This is especially true for nations that do not possess nuclear weapons, like Iran, where regime change is a perceived threat. An implemented A2/AD zone is then merely a fortification of national defence designed to maximise attrition of the attacker. While this is an ancient principle, the availability of modern weapon systems like long-range precision-strike missiles and ADS allows a defender to have deeper coverage inside the adversary's territory or his avenues of approach, and therefore the possibility to affect extended gradual attrition. Furthermore, the denial of precision strike capabilities increases the chance of regime survival for a longer time period.

For strong nuclear nations, like Russia or China, the threat of attacks against their territory is actually fairly low, due to their nuclear deterrent. The calculus for establishing regional A2/AD is therefore probably different. China's A2/AD posture in the Asia-Pacific region is often called “*Counter Intervention*”¹², which supports this conclusion. As for Russia, too, the concept of securing a “*fait accompli*” situation is a more plausible rationale. This concept foresees a military plan

¹⁰ Brig Gen Mehmet Yalinalp, *Air Command and Control for Operations in Contested Environments*, 2015.

¹¹ Difference further defined by *Ibid* 4.

¹² M. Taylor Favel and Christopher P. Twoney, *Projecting Strategy: The Myth of Chinese Counter Intervention*, 2015.



Leaving the defender's strategic long-range (in particular nuclear) weapon arsenal aside, the main benefit of A2/AD appears to be “Deterrence by Denial” rather than “Deterrence by Punishment”.

China's A2/AD posture in the Asia-Pacific region is often called “Counter Intervention”.



executed close to their homeland while timely, third-party intervention is prevented until the mission is complete. Afterwards, when the third party has managed to marshal its conventional intervention force, the nuclear deterrent might serve to discourage further encroachment.

Reflections on Countering A2/AD

Ends. Why would NATO as a genuinely defensive alliance launch military operations against A2/AD structures, such as those mentioned above? Despite the fact that aggression into other countries' sovereign territory is not acceptable in international law, *"fait accompli"* conditions such as the Crimean Peninsula and hypothetically emerging in the Baltic NATO Nations, could bring the Alliance into situations where A2/AD bubbles need to be offensively and defensively dealt with in the early phases of an intervention. However, the defeat of an A2/AD zone can only be one objective on the way to achieving the overall mission.

Ways. Fundamentally, there are two main options for countering A2/AD. These are the Inside-Out and the Outside-In approach¹³. Inside-Out is based on a technological advantage which strives for a short, high-intensity conflict, hitting the A2/AD system's centre of gravity with the factor of surprise and thus breaking the obstacle hindering the advance of friendly forces. In contrast, Outside-In chooses the potentially lengthy approach of dismantling the adversary's capabilities layer by layer. This bears the obvious risk of higher attrition and mission fatigue, which generally is not politically acceptable in NATO, and is therefore difficult to sustain. Therefore, Inside-Out seems to be the most logical and feasible method of countering A2/AD. To be successful with this approach, the necessary military effectors must penetrate the A2/AD bubble to get within their weapon engagement range. However, this is exactly what modern, highly-sophisticated A2/AD capabilities are designed to prevent. It has to be recognised these significant capabilities have most probably reduced the previous technological advantage of Western arsenals, to include the US resources for global force projection and precision strike.

¹³ Mike Pietrucha, *Strategic Architectures*, 2015.



Means. Consequently, NATO requires the following new capabilities:

- Stand-off strike capabilities with the range to engage from outside, or from the edge of, A2/AD zone in combination with A2/AD-resistant ISR means;
- Technology that can successfully penetrate an A2/AD zone and create a desired effect;
- New concepts for using existing technology;
- Counter A2/AD Capability Development – US Example.

In the latest *"Third Offset Strategy"*, the US laid out possible solutions to rebalance conventional deterrence in light of the A2/AD capabilities of potential adversaries. At the forefront are the *"Global Surveillance and Strike Concept (GSS)"*¹⁴, the *"Air Force's Global Strike Task Force"*¹⁵, and *"Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS)"*¹⁶. A 2010 study from the Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) depicts some elements of a potential long-range strike family¹⁷. Herein, new standoff munitions are being described which could defeat A2/AD strategies. For example, advanced tactical cruise missiles with a range around 500 NM or super-/hypersonic missiles with a range of up to 1000 NM could overcome the time/distance limitation of existing subsonic weapons. Also, the development of conventional long-range ballistic missiles, with new supersonic warheads based on the Navy's Trident or the Air Force's Minuteman II or Peacekeeper BM, are mentioned as a way to ensure global conventional strike capabilities. Another proposed technology, which would bring a new quality to the arsenal, is a *"New Penetrating Bomber"*. This asset should have, amongst others, the following abilities:

- Manned or unmanned;
- Unrefuelled range of at least 4000 NM;
- Broad-band, very low observability;

¹⁴ Robert Martinage, *Toward a new Offset Strategy*, 2014.

¹⁵ *Ibid 2*.

¹⁶ Amy F. Woolf, *Conventional Prompt Global Strike and Long Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues*, 2015.

¹⁷ Mark A. Gunziger, *Sustaining America's Strategic Advantage in Long-Range Strike*, Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), 2010.



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- On-board surveillance and self-defence capabilities to permit independent operations against fixed and mobile targets in degraded C4ISR environments.

This would allow this airframe to operate independently in an A2/AD environment with a significant probability of success. Subsequently, air superiority could be increased and temporary control of the air space achieved in order to start the Inside-Out approach.

Since the current US airframes for electronic warfare (EW), like the Growler, Prowler or EC-130H, lack the required range, persistence and survivability to handle modern A2/AD environments, the study¹⁸ recommends a new “Airborne Electronic Attack” Platform (AEA) designed to handle modern A2/AD systems.

Counter-A2/AD Employment/Deployment Concepts

In reaction to the Ukraine crisis, NATO invoked the Readiness Action Plan (RAP) which enhanced the NATO Response Force (NRF) Concept with the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) and procured the review of Graduate Response Plans (GRPs) in order to reassure Allied Nations. When these plans are executed, adversary A2/AD will target the forces deploying into the theatre. Therefore, NATO will have to achieve certain effects within the A2/AD zone to temporarily generate a favourable air, ground, or naval situation that allows starting the Inside-Out Approach. If this effect cannot be generated from outside of an A2/AD zone, the necessary capabilities need to be already in place (pre-deployed) to create favourable circumstances.

In the example of the Kaliningrad Oblast, a significant amount of Russian ADS create a hostile air space that reaches deep into NATO territory. Furthermore, land-based, anti-ship cruise missiles pose a severe A2/AD challenge to NATO maritime forces far into the Baltic Sea. Pre-deployment of adequate EW equipment (ground-, sea-, or air-based) in operational range to Kaliningrad could generate instant effects allowing for relatively protected mobility. Also, the use of Special Operations Forces could be very effective and precise, however, longer

¹⁸ IHS Jane's International Defence Review, *Hypersonic Hustle: Global Efforts Stepped-up to Satisfy Military Need for Speed*, 9 March 2016.

mission preparation and fill-in times would have to be calculated.

In essence, countering A2/AD has to be considered a joint force challenge requiring mission planning and coordination above single-service command levels and the combination of various tactical capabilities across the joint force. Based on experience in the Asia-Pacific arena, this issue has already been addressed in US Concepts such as “*Joint Concept for Access and Manoeuvre in the Global Commons*”; formerly known as “*Air-Sea Battle*”. The latter outlined solutions to combine and integrate existing capabilities from the services jointly in order to enhance the probability of success against concentrated A2/AD areas.

Conclusion

Despite A2/AD being prevalent in current studies and discussion, it is principally not a new threat. The notion that it significantly changes the way military capabilities are being used is also untrue. It is a mere logical consequence of the conventional arms and technology race which has been ongoing since the end of WWII. Simply put, A2/AD is the response to western force projection, precision strike, and highly-networked C2 capabilities. Greatly advanced features, such as extended detection and engagement ranges in combination with high mobility, low detection probability, and networked redundancy, have created new defence capabilities that need to be addressed. Since attrition warfare must not be the first option for NATO, technical solutions and creative concepts have to be found to assure future mission success. Specific counter-A2/AD capability gaps need to be clearly identified and filled by robust and appropriate means to maintain an acceptable level of conventional deterrence. This must take the immense technological innovation speed of our adversaries into account, demanding faster and more adaptive development and procurement procedures. Also, NATO doctrine should be reviewed in order to reflect the highly integrated joint and combined processes needed in countering A2/AD.



A2/AD is the response to Western force projection, precision strike, and highly-networked C2 capabilities.

THE POST-BREXIT EUROPEAN UNION: WHAT ARE OUR GEOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVES? (II)

Dr Pierre VERLUISE

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research fellow at the Foundation for Strategic Research, Paris*

In the second part of his article, Pierre Verluise writes about the possibility that the economy of the European Union might decline after the “Brexit”, giving a few examples in terms of gross domestic product based on the purchasing power parity and unemployment.

Then, he addresses the strategic perspectives of “Brexit”, asking himself whether this prospective withdrawal would mean abandonment or a strategic rebound for the European Union.

In the end of the article, he touches on the fact that there are many indicators suggesting that, after six decades of European construction, there has been a process of European deconstruction, wondering how far it will go. Yet, he mentions that all the difficulties encountered could become a great opportunity for the European Union to reinvent itself.

Keywords: Brexit, economic decline, unemployment, strategic rebound, European construction.

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II. An economic decline

The collapse of the relative economic weight of the European Union (A) and the relative deterioration of the factors of production (B) would be accentuated by the “Brexit” (C).

A. The collapse of the relative economic weight of the European Union...

The European Union is an important internal market. According to forecasts by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for 2016, its gross domestic product (GDP) based on the purchasing power parity (PPP)¹ increased mechanically through the various enlargements, will reach 19,748 billion dollars while that of the other two main economic powers of the Triad will remain lower – the United States, 18,558 billion dollars, and Japan, 4,901. However, China will be placed at 20,853 billion dollars, i.e. ranking first in the world, before the EU and the United States. However, the Union remains an attractive economic area, playing a major role regarding the destination of foreign direct investment.

From 1980 until 2004, the share of the EU-28 area in the world production of the purchasing power parity decreased from 31.2% to 18.3%...

Apart from Malta and Cyprus, the last three enlargements took place to the benefit of countries with more than four decades of planned economy and then experienced a difficult transition towards a market economy. As of 1 January 2004, the GDP of the ten acceding countries on 1 May 2004 represented only 4.7% of GDP in the EU-25 area, a much smaller share than their demographic weight (16.2%)².

¹ The purchasing power parity is a method used in the economic theory that compares different countries' currencies – *Ed.*

² Pierre Verluise, *Fondamentaux de l’Union européenne. Démographie, économie, géopolitique, Paris, Ellipses*, 2008, p. 115 and p. 47.

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INTERNATIONAL CONNECTIONS



The United Kingdom was the preferred destination for many Poles who settled there, almost a million of them... until the economic crisis of 2008, when the anti-immigrants feelings appeared, which contributed to the vote of 23 June 2016 in favour of the "Brexit".

Only two countries – the United Kingdom and Ireland – did not implement the safeguard clauses on labour flows in 2004. As a result, the United Kingdom was the preferred destination for many Poles who settled there, almost a million of them... until the economic crisis of 2008, when the anti-immigrants feelings appeared, which contributed to the vote of 23 June 2016 in favour of the “Brexit”. None of the countries that joined the EU after 2004 has become richer than the EU-28 average³.

Admittedly, these enlargements are part of the new geopolitics of geographical Europe⁴, but it is difficult to explain to the public opinion that the accession of countries that are poorer than the Union average enriches the latter. Especially since the figures prove the opposite. In 2008, the GDP per capita based on PPP of the EU-25 was still 11.4% lower than that of the former EU-15⁵. The gap – already very important – with the United States is increasing accordingly.

According to IMF forecasts for 2016, the GDP per capita based on PPP of the EU-28 stands at \$ 38,751 when in the US it is \$ 57,220 and in Japan, \$ 38,731. For information, China’s 2016 GDP per capita based on PPP would be \$ 15,095.

In a more dynamic perspective, there is also a relative decline in the economic weight of the EU-28 area in the world economy.

From 1980 to 2014, the share of the EU-28 area in world production in PPP decreased from 31.2% to 18.3%, which means that the relative size of the EU-28 area now represents less than two-thirds of what it weighed 34 years ago. Admittedly, this movement is part of the more general trend of the relative decline of developed countries, as a result of the upsurge of emerging countries. However, this relative decline affects the United States less severely than the EU and Japan.

³ However, in the context of the economic crisis occurred after 2008, most of the new member states continued the process of convergence towards the average GDP per capita of the EU. Pierre Verluise, “UE-27 Crise mais rattrapage des Nouveaux États membres?”, Diploweb.com, 18 November 2012 (<http://www.diploweb.com/UE-27-Crise-mais-rattrapage-des.html>).

⁴ Geographical Europe includes Russia and a part of the former Soviet republics such as Ukraine or Moldova.

⁵ Pierre Verluise, *Fondamentaux de l’Union européenne. Démographie, économie, géopolitique*, Paris, Ellipses, 2008, p. 117.



B. ... and the relative deterioration of the factors of production ...

The outlook is further clouded by the two main factors of production, capital and labour. In the first place, the share of the EU-28 area in global investment has steadily declined since 1980. While the EU-28 area then weighed 30.1% of global investment, in 2014 it was not more than 12.7%. Its decline in terms of this indicator is therefore even faster than for global production. During the same period, the United States went from 20.6% to 12.3%, a much smaller decrease than in the European area. On the other hand, the group Brazil-India-China (BIC), which was of 9.9%, now is of 39%, a four-fold increase, well above the relative weight of these states in the global economy.

Even in times of economic growth, the EU is the region of the world that is struggling the most to reverse the unemployment curve.

Second, the work factor evolves differently according to the spaces considered.

Since 2000, unemployment in the EU as a whole has never been less than 7%, according to the IMF. The average was close to 9% for the period 2000-2013, while the average over the same period was 6.4% for the United States and 4.7% for Japan. In October 2016, according to provisional data from Eurostat this time, the unemployment rate by gender would be 8.3% in the EU, 4.9% in the United States and 3% in Japan. Even in times of economic growth, the EU is the region of the world that is struggling the most to reverse the unemployment curve. The mass unemployment/long-term unemployment pair that seems to be settling in brings about the fear that part of the European labour force will become difficult to employ, which may have a lasting impact on the productive capacity of the area, in synergy with the effects of the already mentioned population ageing.

This leads to a combination in which not only the productive share of the EU in the world collapses, but also the state and prospects of the two main factors of production raise fears of a worsening of this dynamic.

In view of the forecasts for 2016, the EU-28 would represent 17.6% of world GDP based on PPP at that date. By the same date, the EU without the United Kingdom would represent only 15.2% of world GDP based on PPP.



Because the standard of living of the United Kingdom is 10% higher than the EU average, the per capita wealth of the EU without the United Kingdom would be 2% lower than the 28-state configuration.

C. ... would be accentuated by the “Brexit”

In this context, what would be the effect of “Brexit”? The United Kingdom is a major economic player in the EU, although it is not part of its euro area and trades with the EU less than the average of the EU member states, which is generally overlooked. The United Kingdom accounts for 14% of EU GDP. After the exit of the UK from the EU, the EU GDP without the UK would be 86% of its previous level. In other words, the relative downgrading of the EU-27 would be considerably accentuated, especially in relation to China and the United States.

In view of the forecasts for 2016, the EU-28 would represent 17.6% of world GDP based on PPP at that date. By the same date, the EU without the United Kingdom would represent only 15.2% of world GDP based on PPP.

Because, as we said before, the standard of living of the United Kingdom is 10% higher than the EU average, the per capita wealth of the EU without the United Kingdom would be 2% lower than the 28-state configuration.

Finally, let us consider the strategic perspectives.

III. Abandonment or strategic rebound?

Beyond the effects of the announcement, there are contradictions (A), psychological and budgetary constraints (B), but the year 2015 may represent a rebound, although the “Brexit” can produce significant effects (C).

A. Beyond the effects of announcement, there are contradictions...

The website of the European External Action Service (EEAS) wrote, in 2014: “*Since the creation of the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in March 2002, some 30 civilian and military missions and operations have been launched under the [Common Security and Defence Policy] CSDP*”⁶. The method of announcing a figure that aggregates missions of very different natures however leads

⁶ European External Action Service (http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/about-csdp/index_fr.htm) retrieved on 26 August 2014.

the citizens to overestimate the number of military operations of the European Union, which have actually been nine since 2003.

Still, are these EU military operations, usually combined with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the United Nations (UN), reflecting a controlled conception of force at the risk of paralysis? Thus, set by the European Union to intervene in Libya in 2011, the operation EUFOR-Libya aborted for not having received the green light from the UN. At the same time, powers like the United States and Russia sometimes allow the use of force without this precaution.

These EU military operations are still usually carried out together with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) or the United Nations (UN), which reflects a controlled concept of the force, at the risk of paralysis. That is why Operation EUFOR-Libya, set up by the European Union to intervene in Libya in 2011, aborted for not receiving the green light from the UN. At the same time, powers like the United States and Russia sometimes allow the use of force without this precaution.

The number of European soldiers engaged in EU military operations also remains modest, between 400 and 7,000 depending on the mission and the period, well below the target of 60,000 men announced in 1999 at the European Council of Europe in Helsinki. Currently, the European Union’s military missions still lack human and technical resources, but, above all, they lack political will.

Certainly, since 2009, the Union has had the European External Action Service (EEAS), headed by a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. However, the treaties very strictly regulate its attributions, in order to prevent its intrusion on the sovereign prerogatives of member states⁷. And the suspicion has weighed on the heads of state when they chose Catherine Ashton, a British personality without any diplomatic experience, as the inaugural High Representative, to prevent her from shadowing them. As a result, her first three years were considered mediocre.

But 2013 was marked by two positively perceived interventions, concerning the Serbia/Kosovo relations and in the context of relaunching

⁷ Pierre Verluise, *Géopolitique des frontières européennes. Élargir, jusqu’où?*, Paris, Argos, 2013 (see chapter 3: “*Quel service européen pour l’action extérieure?*”).



Currently, the European Union’s military missions still lack human and technical resources, but, above all, they lack political will.



the negotiations with Iran⁸. With no intention to diminish her merit, everyone will agree that it was in the interest of Serbia to temporarily appease its relations with Kosovo in order to formally obtain candidate status for the European Union. As for the negotiations with Iran, Ashton's appearance on the scene had been preceded by nearly a year of secret negotiations between Washington and Tehran.

22 of the 28 member states of the European Union are part of the world's first strategic alliance, NATO..., but it seems to become more fragile because of Donald Trump.

Of course, 22 of the 28 member states of the European Union are part of the world's first strategic alliance, NATO. The latter, with its 1999, 2004 and 2009 enlargements to countries formerly members of the Warsaw Pact, is said to have won the *Cold War* and the post-*Cold War* era.

However, the structural relations between the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance⁹ are both a guarantee of security and a facility that prevents the EU from asserting itself autonomously on the strategic scene. The Maastricht and Lisbon Treaties placed the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and then the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in a form of quasi-trusteeship of the North Atlantic Alliance. The European Union must, in fact, respect the obligations deriving from the North Atlantic Treaty, which remains, for the member states, *"the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation"*¹⁰. Taken literally, this wording in the singular form could prohibit any European initiative on defence. It remains to be seen what the new President of the United States, Donald Trump (2017 -), will make of NATO.

⁸ It is too early to assess the activity of Federica Mogherini, who has been in office since 1 November 2014.

⁹ Charlotte Bezamat-Mantes, Pierre Verluise, *"UE-OTAN: quels rapports ? Les élargissements de l'OTAN donnent le rythme de ceux de l'UE"*, Diploweb.com, 7 June 2014 (<http://www.diploweb.com/UE-OTAN-quels-rapports.html>).

¹⁰ *Treaty on the European Union (TEU)*, Article 42, para 7.

B. ... Psychological and budgetary constraints...

However, the strategic constraints weighing the heaviest on the European Union are the psychological ones. At the end of two world wars, the European construction was guided towards a form of renunciation of military power, first between member countries, then in relation to the world.

By aspiring to a form of *"perpetual peace"* between its members, the Union is conceived as a *soft power*, certainly not a *hard power*. Moreover, it has long refused to see the world as states do, pointing enemies and defining a real strategy. The European Union carries with it a form of voluntary renunciation of any power politics. Ontologically, it has no real desire for power. The promotion of ambiguous multilateralism serves as an excuse for this real tendency for weakness. If a conflict occurs on its borders, the European Union usually starts with endless discussions before arriving late at a declaration that is usually reduced to the lowest common denominator. Some hope, in general, that Washington will intervene instead, when others, more willingly focused on the action, desperately seek points of support.

Finally, the European Union still lacks military means and a European defence industry to assert itself autonomously on the strategic scene. The economic crisis, appeared in 2008, has increasingly reduced defence budgets of member states, globally decreased by 10% between 2010 and 2013. Only the United Kingdom still reached the target of 2% of GDP spent on defence in 2014 (excluding pensions). Five members – including France – allocate between 1.5 and less than 2%. Seven countries spend between 1 and 1.5% – including Germany, with 1.1%. All other member states spend less than 1% of their GDP on defence.

European industries are increasingly abandoning the manufacture of weapons equipment in favour of civilian products, at the risk of losing know-how and sectors of expertise. If the trend continues, European Union member states will be increasingly reduced to buying American N-1 *"off-the-shelf"* equipment. Which, to a certain extent, would not displease the US military-industrial system.



European industries are increasingly abandoning the manufacture of weapons equipment in favour of civilian products, at the risk of losing know-how and sectors of expertise.



On 8 March 2015, against the backdrop of the Ukrainian crisis, the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, took up the idea of creating a European army in order to give credibility to EU's foreign policy.

C. ... but the year 2015 may represent a rebound, although the “Brexit” can produce significant effects

In 2015, according to a study by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), published on 5 April 2016, all Eastern and Central European states continue to slightly reduce their military effort. However, confronted with Russia's behaviour in Ukraine (2014), several Eastern European countries are increasing their defence budget – it is true, not enough: Lithuania, Poland, Latvia and Estonia. In addition, after severe cuts, the three main military powers – the United Kingdom, France and Germany – are engaged in military reinvestment over several years. In France, the terrorist threat has led the head of state to stop cutting defence budget. Germany announced in the summer of 2016 its intention to carry its defence effort to around 2%, but we must see if this announcement is followed by effects. Will increasing Russia's defence budget (+ 90% in 10 years), challenging international borders, terrorist threats and geopolitical shocks to the South and Southeast of the EU allow a rebound of the spirit of defence in the EU states?

On 8 March 2015, against the backdrop of the Ukrainian crisis, the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, took up the idea of creating a European army in order to give credibility to EU's foreign policy, believing, moreover, that currently, “a chicken coop is a close combat formation compared to the EU's common defence”. The President of the Commission thus relaunched the debates on Europe of defence.

On 30 March 2015, a summit in the Weimar format, between France, Germany and Poland, reaffirmed a common ambition in this area. However, far from J.-C. Juncker's wish for a common army, the recommendation adopted at the end of the meeting favoured above all the development of the European weapon industry, with a view to exporting to defence markets, particularly African ones, and expressed the wish for a breakthrough in the field of Military Research and Development. The conclusions had already been drawn during the previous meeting of the triangle, in 2013. The revival of French-German cooperation for building a spy satellite was announced, which was not very innovative, the project existing for many years but could never succeed because there was no agreement on its financing.

The three countries of the Weimar Triangle also proposed to (finally) use the battlegroups of the EU, these European battalions of 1,500 troops mobilised in 10 days for a period of 4 months, which already formed an nucleus of the European army advocated by President Juncker.

These units reached full readiness in 2007, but they have not been mobilised up to now. The opportunities were not lacking: Mali, Central African Republic ... did not triggered the use of the Union's rapid intervention force.

The solitary French management of these crises also reveal that, despite official positions, Paris is hardly more inclined than London to European cooperation in operational matters. This shows that the main obstacle to Europe of defence is not the lack of means, but of political will. The use of permanent structured cooperation, established by the Treaty of Lisbon, would be another way to get around the blockages of the decision-making process and to set up a nucleus of pioneering states of the Europe of defence.

Between 14 November and 6 December 2016, the EU adopted – finally – a significant package of measures regarding security and defence: an implementation plan on security and defence; a European defence action plan presented by the Commission to maximise defence spending and cooperation; and an implementation plan for the EU-NATO declaration of 8 July 2016 based on 42 actual measures, notably on cyber security, military capabilities or research, representing the most significant step forward in the cooperation between the two organisations since the Berlin + 2003 agreements¹¹.

This mobilisation – whose results remain to be evaluated – is a response to the referendum of 23 June 2016 in favour of “Brexit”.

What could be the strategic consequences of “Brexit”? The vote of 23 June 2016 in favour of “Brexit” was very well received by Russia, Turkey and China. Pierre Razoux, in a “Strategic Research Paper of the Institute for Strategic Research at the Military School (IRSEM)”, published in early July 2016, presents the strategic consequences: “The

¹¹ Quentin Weiler, “La Stratégie Globale de l'UE: de quoi s'agit-il?” published on 3 January 2017 on Diploweb.com, <http://www.diploweb.com/La-Strategie-Globale-de-l-UE-de.html>.



In 2016, the EU adopted a significant package of measures regarding security and defence: an implementation plan on security and defence; a European defence action plan to maximise defence spending and cooperation; and an implementation plan for the EU-NATO declaration of 8 July 2016 based on 42 actual measures, notably on cyber security, military capabilities or research.



After the United Kingdom is out of the EU, France will be the only remaining nuclear power in the EU, with a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

“Brexit” risks increasing gaps within the EU. It encourages populism and suggests the demonetisation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), which automatically strengthens NATO’s role in Europe. It leaves France alone in front of Germany, and the United Kingdom threatened with downgrading both economically and strategically because of the likely independence of Scotland. If the “Brexit” should not affect the Franco-British defence cooperation (Lancaster House bilateral treaty, 2 November 2010), it suggests in the medium and long term a decrease in the British defence effort, as well as a risk of partial or total abandonment of nuclear deterrence by London. France would therefore become the only military nuclear power (within the European Union). In such a situation, the strategic connection between the United States and NATO would be profoundly weakened. To maintain a central role in Europe, France would have every interest in presenting itself as the natural intermediary between the United Kingdom and the EU”¹².

After the United Kingdom is out of the EU, France will be the only remaining nuclear power in the EU, with a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. If the countries do not hurry to share the funding of the French atomic weapon, other member states may be tempted to reinforce their recurrent pressures on Paris for the seat of France becomes that of the EU. Let us recall that Federal Germany does not have such a privilege because of its historical responsibilities in the outbreak of the Second World War. The exit of the United Kingdom cannot remain without consequences on the French-German relations. It remains to be seen whether Paris will carry out an analysis, a strategy and an implementation of this challenge: in an EU without the United Kingdom, how to rebalance French-German relations oriented in favour of Berlin for more than a decade?

How to maintain positive links with the United Kingdom in defence matters?

To which countries could France turn in order to revive the European common defence for the umpteenth time? In the autumn of 2016,

¹² Pierre Razoux, *“Brexit”: quelles conséquences stratégiques?”*, strategic research paper no. 27, 13 July 2016, published in I’IRSEM, 7 p.

Paris once again tried to pair with Germany, but the United Kingdom made it clear that it would sabotage these efforts to boost Europe’s defence as long as it remained in the EU. It is not forbidden to imagine that it will continue to do it once outside, through lobbying it controls properly.

The question is all the more worrying as the United States decided to “pivot” towards Asia and the borders of Ukraine were threatened and repeatedly breached by Russia in 2014. Ironically, the tensions with Russia have been beneficial in the last couple of year in that that they have contributed to the EU inviting some of its member states to commit for the coming years to increase the share of their GDP earmarked for defence. It remains to be seen which the consequences will be for several years. Since taking office on 20 January 2017, many expect the new President of the United States, Donald Trump, to redefine relations between NATO member states. It is too early to distinguish what remains of t the negotiating posture for obtaining more investment from other allies and what the actual consequences will be by the end of the decade. Will the EU be able to seize this opportunity?

*

Thus, before the “Brexit”, the EU was already engaged in a dynamic of relative decrease, in very significant proportions, of which we are not generally aware. It must be acknowledged that the European Union is on a visible regression in the international arena. Demographic, economic and strategic indicators all attest to this gradual decline.

More worryingly, the process is accelerating as a result of the crisis that began in 2008.

By 2019-2020, the “Brexit” will accentuate this dynamic of accelerated decrease in the relative weight of the European Union, on all the considered parameters: territory, demographics, economy, strategy. How would this affect the power of the EU in the world? Already, the “Brexit” weakens the image of the European Union in the world, especially in the representations of the new president of the United States. This dynamic strengthens some populist and sovereigntist movements in the EU member states. After six decades



The financial crisis that came from the United States, in 2008, generally had devastating effects on EU states, including the United Kingdom, with a dramatic drop in the standard of living.



of European construction, many indicators suggest that since 23 June 2016, the date of the referendum on “Brexit”, there has been a process of “European deconstruction”. How far will it go? The question is open and concerns many actors ... some of whom are willing to take advantage of this weakened EU.

Paradoxically, some might argue that these difficulties could become a great opportunity to reinvent the European Union, and, why not, make it stronger. It remains to be seen in what way. Should we go back, restore sovereignty to the member states and raise external trade barriers? Should we move towards more federalism – and at what cost, with which winners and losers? What level of solidarity should be kept? What shared sovereignty should be reinvented? In any case, with whom should we reinvent this European Union threatened with disappearance?

Indeed, the squaring of the circle is as follows: in the aftermath of the Second World War, the European Union was essentially built by some of the elites, avoiding the political debate, because the people would not have admitted to share sovereignty with some of yesterday’s enemies.

As a result, the European construction took a long time – in the context of The Glorious Thirty – thanks to a permissive consensus of a part of public opinion, which came in the form of indifference. An indifference that gradually turned into distrust, if we believe the increase in the rate of abstention in elections for the European Parliament and the entry of Eurosceptic deputies in this institution. The financial crisis that came from the United States, in 2008, generally had devastating effects on EU states, including the United Kingdom, with a dramatic drop in the standard of living. The economic and social consequences have favoured the populist parties, right-wing, left-wing or elsewhere. What is populism? It is primarily a movement built on the hatred and condemnation of the elites ... and their projects. And here is how the economic crisis turns into a political crisis that comes as a boomerang ... European construction, a project carried by some of the elites, has thus become detestable. For the time being, the sociological system of the EU is struggling to regenerate itself.

In this context, who will reinvent the European Union? How many



European citizens are concerned with this? The intention of the timetable for activating Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty in March 2017 is to clarify the situation for the elections for the European Parliament in spring 2019. No one knows at this moment how this process will unfold, nor what the rate of abstention in the elections for the next European Parliament (2019), the score of the Eurosceptic parties or the next European Commission will be. Hubert Védrine argues that in order to interest the peoples in the European project, it would be necessary to cross a political threshold, around a choice in terms of identity and sovereignty, through a refounding conference that would clarify the question of subsidiarity, decide what rests with the regions, and what rests with states and the EU. It should focus on three or four major missions.

For the moment, the political matrix of the European construction is undergoing a major crisis, which cannot remain without consequences for the geopolitics of the European Union and its relative weight in the world.

This makes a geopolitical analysis of the European Union and the implementation of a real strategy necessary more than ever.

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THE ACTIONS OF THE 9TH ARTILLERY BRIGADE IN THE 1916 CAMPAIGN

Dr Ion RÎȘNOVEANU

Romanian National Military Archives

In the 1916 campaign, the 9th Artillery Brigade conducted operations not only in Dobrudja, during the “Flămânda manoeuvre”, but also in the Prahova Valley. Regardless of the theatre of operations in which it was engaged, the unit demonstrated very good speciality training and spirit of sacrifice, succeeding in accomplishing the assigned missions and preventing the Central Powers troops from getting south of the Carpathian Mountains. The author concludes that the outbreak of the first world conflagration presented numerous political and military problems to the government in Bucharest as well as to the military decision-makers, and the deficiencies in organisation and infrastructure became evident early after Romania entered the war, being eased during the 1917 campaign.

Keywords: 9th Artillery Brigade; First World War; Dobrudja; Prahova Valley; cannon

Introduction

The outbreak of the first world conflagration on 28 July 1914, after Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, presented numerous political and military problems to the government in Bucharest as well as to the military decision-makers. Showing prudence in actions, on 21 July/3 August 1914, within the Crown Council in Sinaia, the Romanian political class opted for neutrality and *expectation regarding the border defence*. The refusal to implement the provisions of the Treaty with the Central Powers represented the affirmation of Romania’s policy aimed at liberating the territories it considered as its own but annexed by Austria-Hungary¹.

Romania’s Entry into the War

Although neutral, Romania was subject to great political, economic and military pressure from the two political-military blocs that had already been in conflict on both the Western and Eastern Fronts. Moreover, they considered our country as a factor capable of causing a radical change in the strategic situation in Eastern and Southeastern Europe, as the 1916 campaign, despite the belligerents efforts, did not result in notably overturning the ratio of forces².

The Entente Powers were successful as they not only guaranteed Romania’s territorial integrity but also supported the Romanian claims related to the recognition of our country’s rights over the territories inhabited by the Romanians in Austria-Hungary.

Under the mentioned circumstances, on 10/23 July 1916 it was signed, in Paris, in the presence of Colonel Vasile Rudeanu, a draft military convention between Romania and the Entente Powers, and, at the beginning of August, Raymond Poincaré, the President of France, intervened, again, to convince Tsar Nicholas II to conclude the Romanian-Russian agreement. Thus, after a two-year period

The refusal to implement the provisions of the Treaty with the Central Powers represented the affirmation of Romania’s policy aimed at liberating the territories it considered as its own but annexed by Austria-Hungary.

¹ *Istoria militară a poporului român*, Editura Militară, București, 1988, p. 318.

² *Ibidem*, p. 142.

After a two-year period of neutrality, on 4/17 August 1916, in Bucharest, it was signed the Alliance Treaty and the Military Convention between Romania and the Entente Cordiale member states.

On 14/27 August 1916, Romania declared war on Austria-Hungary, becoming a belligerent state in the first world conflagration.

of neutrality, on 4/17 August 1916, in Bucharest, Ion I.C. Brătianu, as President of the Council of Ministers, Stanislas Poklevski-Koziell, Count de Saint-Aulaire, Sir George Barclay and Baron Carlo Fasciotti signed the Alliance Treaty and the Military Convention between Romania and the Entente Cordiale member states. According to the agreements, on 14/27 August 1916, within the second Crown Council held at the Cotroceni Palace, it was decided that Romania should enter the war alongside the Entente³. Several hours later, Romania declared war on Austria-Hungary, becoming a belligerent state in the first world conflagration. On the same day, in the evening, the general mobilisation was decreed, and the Great General Headquarters established the *Romanian Armed Forces Order of Battle on 14 August 1916*.

According to the mentioned document, the 9th Artillery Brigade, under the command of Colonel Leonida Petcuș, was part of the 9th Infantry Division, under the command of Brigadier General Ioan Basarabescu, which in turn was part of the 7th Army Corps, under the command of Division General Ioan Rașcu⁴.

The 9th Artillery Brigade subordinated the 13th Artillery Regiment, under the command of Colonel August Stoica⁵, having 36 officers, 6 sergeant candidates and 1,135 troops, and a fire power of 24 cannons⁶, as well as the 18th Artillery Regiment, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Grigore Tomescu⁷, having 37 officers, 6 sergeant candidates and 1,038 troops⁸. Mention should be made that, to increase the brigade fire power, each regiment was attached an 87 mm battery and a *position battery with three cannons and two caissons*⁹.

³ *Ibidem*, p. 329.

⁴ Great General Headquarters, *Ordinea de bătae a Armatei Române din 14 august 1916*, pp. 22-23. See also Valeriu Avram, Lucian Drăghici, Gabriel-George Pătrașcu, Ion Rîșnoveanu, *Războiul de Întregire (1916-1919). Comandanți militari români*, Centrul Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, București, 2016, pp. 246-247.

⁵ Romanian Military Archives (further RMA), R.I.J.O. Collection – 1, File 1893 – 10th Infantry Division Operations Journal, p. 694. 13th Artillery Regiment had in its structure the 1st Battalion, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Valeriu Robescu, and the IInd Battalion, under the command of Major Ion Tănăsescu, each of them having three Krupp system 75 mm batteries, model 1904.

⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 695v. Plus 1,009 horses and 72 caissons.

⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 695. The 18th Artillery Regiment had in its structure the Ist Battalion, under the command of Major Nicolae Bottez, and the IInd Battalion, under the command of Major Nicolae Ianculescu, each of them also having Krupp system 75 mm batteries, model 1904.

⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 695v. Plus 1,215 horses and 72 caissons.

⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 694.



Photo 1: Krupp cannon, 75 mm calibre, model 1904

First Actions of the 9th Artillery Brigade

When the hostilities began, on 14/27 August 1916, the 9th Artillery Brigade, deployed in the Muntenia Plain, was waiting for the Great General Headquarters orders. Since early fighting the structure of the large unit was subject to change, namely the composing units became part of different divisions so that they could meet the requirements related to the situation on the front. Thus, on 26 August 1916, following the Great General Headquarters order, the 13th Artillery Regiment became part of the 16th Infantry Division, operating in different detachments within the Danube Defence Group. The situation lasted for only a few days as, on 4 September, the regiment became part of the 10th Infantry Division, which was deployed along the Danube line¹⁰.

It is interesting that, considering the heavy fights in Dobrudja, and the threatened defensive system in the southern part of the province, the 9th Artillery Brigade, which had a considerable fire power, was maintained in reserve, being quartered in Fundeni-Mitreni area between 23 August/6 September and 3/16 September¹¹. Only on 4/17 September, the 1st Battery within the 13th Artillery Regiment was deployed in Chirnogi, being followed by other pieces in the structure of the unit, which were brought in the province between the Danube and the Black Sea to consolidate the defensive alignment.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 696.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, pp. 696-697.

In the context of the enemy troops sustained offensive, beginning the next day, the 87 mm battery executed, without interruption, fire against the enemy infantry that advanced on the Amzacea-Topraisar roadway with the *intention to occupy the latter locality*¹².

On 8/21 September, several subunits belonging to the 9th Artillery Brigade that were deployed in Dobrudja conducted bloody fights. Thus, the 87 mm battery received the order to execute fire, at 11 o'clock, against two enemy squadrons advancing in the neighbourhood of the village of Carachioi, forcing the attackers to withdraw and causing them significant losses. Soon after it, the battery received the order to *immediately open fire against enemy artillery in the village of Agaplar*, succeeding in silencing it. During the fight, the 40th Infantry Regiment troops executed a surprise attack on the enemy positions. Under such circumstances, the battery was given the order to sustain with fire the advance of the Romanian troops. That is why it positioned itself along the alignment situated between Carachioi and Mustafaci¹³.

During the Romanian infantry attack, the enemy resorted to a trick to get closer to Romanian positions. Thus, *two enemy cavalry squadrons insinuated into the friendly infantry, pretending to be Russian cavalry, and got up to 500 m near the battery*. However, Lieutenant Beiu, the battery commander, identified the attackers and executed fire against them. The two enemy cavalry squadrons were almost destroyed, with the help of the infantry fire¹⁴. Unfortunately, following the enemy attack, Lieutenant Beiu was wounded and evacuated at the campaign hospital, the battery command being taken by Lieutenant Ion Borș.

Between 3/16 and 9/22 September 1916, local actions were conducted on the front in Dobrudja. The Bulgarian 3rd Army was compelled to defend the new alignment. That was why, in order to take the measures that were required to resume the initiative, Ion I.C. Brătianu, the President of the Council of Ministers, requested the sovereign to convene the Council of War. The meeting was held on 2/15 September in Periș, where the Great General Headquarters was deployed, being attended by all the Romanian Armed Forces important commanders.

¹² *Ibidem*, p. 697. Meanwhile, the position battery was given the order to transform in a manoeuvre battery and perform requisitions “not only for itself but also for the Russian battery deployed against the aircraft in Constanța, together with which it was to occupy positions 6 km south of Constanța on the road to Agigea, with a surveillance mission”.

¹³ *Ibidem*, p. 697v. The attack executed by the 40th Infantry Regiment subunits resulted in the enemy being rejected also due to the fact that “infantry was well supported”.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 697v.



Photo 2: De Bange long cannon, 120 mm calibre, model 1878-1916

The Centre of Gravity Was Moved from the Northern to the Southern Front

Following the exposition of the situation made by Brigadier General Dumitru Iliescu, Chief of the Great General Headquarters, as well as Division Generals Alexandru Averescu and Constantin Prezan, the Council of War initially decided to change the initial campaign plan, namely to move the military operations centre of gravity from the northern front to the southern one¹⁵.

Under the mentioned circumstances, the Romanian Great General Headquarters ordered the establishment of the South Army Group Command, led by Division General Alexandru Averescu, subordinating the Romanian 3rd Army, having Division General Gheorghe Văleanu as Commander, and the Dobrudja Army, having General A.M. Zaiocikovski as Commander¹⁶.

The plan developed by Division General Alexandru Averescu, Commander of the South Army Group, supported by the General Staff officers, stipulated a combination of the frontal strikes, executed by the Dobrudja Army against the German-Bulgarian troops in the province between the Danube and the Black Sea, and an attack behind the enemy front, conducted by the Romanian 3rd Army troops that were to cross the Danube. In order to accomplish the plan, the 5th Army Corps

¹⁵ *România în anii Primului Război Mondial*, Editura Militară, București, 1987, pp. 363-364. See also *Istoria militară a poporului român, op. cit.*, p. 427.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 365. The South Army Group was established following the order sent by the Great General Headquarters on 3/16 September 1916 to the Romanian 3rd Army Commander.

On 2/15 September, the Council of War decided to change the initial campaign plan, therefore the centre of gravity was moved from the Northern to the Southern front.



The 9th Artillery Brigade achieved one of its first successes on 12/25 September 1916. The 6th Battery within the 18th Regiment shot down a German aircraft.

and the 6th Army Corps came along it. They had in their composition five infantry divisions and a cavalry division¹⁷.

In this context, on 10/23 September 1916, the 9th Artillery Brigade received the order to organise the bivouac in the area of Pueni, the 6th Battery being deployed in Flămânda, where it conducted surveillance missions¹⁸.

The day of 12/25 September was extremely animated for the 6th Battery belonging to the 18th Artillery Regiment. Thus, at 7.15 o'clock, the battery was surveyed by two aircrafts that *could not be identified*. At 9.45 o'clock, *"a dense column of dust, about 300 m long, entered from the southeast of the village of Babovo, which made observation impossible"*. The possibility of a Bulgarian attack south of the Danube resulted in the Romanian battery strong riposte, thus succeeding in preventing a possible attack on the Romanian positions deployed on the Romanian bank of the river. The 6th Artillery Battery achieved another success on the same day, in the afternoon, more precisely at about 14.30 o'clock, when a group of seven German aircrafts flew over the Romanian positions on the south – north-west direction. Shortly after that, three German aircrafts detached from the fighting formation with the intention of striking the battery position. Under those circumstances, the Romanian artillery pieces executed fire mainly against *one of the aircrafts that lost stability*. The Romanian artillerists demonstrated their military skills by striking the aircraft that was broken down at a distance of about 3,000 m far from the Danube line¹⁹.

In keeping with the order given by the 9th Artillery Brigade Commander, on 13/26 September, the 6th Battery was replaced with the 3rd Battery. It got its baptism of fire on 14 September when, following a bombardment executed by eight enemy aircrafts, Corporal Oscar Iliescu and Private Zaharia Militaru were killed. Moreover, a private belonging to the 4th Battery and two sergeants belonging to the 5th Battery, which were deployed on the positions held by the brigade the day before, were slightly wounded, *"being cured at the infirmary of the corps"*²⁰.

¹⁷ *Istoria militară a poporului român, op. cit.*, p. 428. The 5th Army Corps had in its composition the 10th Infantry Division, the 21st Infantry Division, and the 22nd Infantry Division, while the 6th Army Corps had in its composition the 16th Infantry Division, the 18th Infantry Division, and the 1st Cavalry Division.

¹⁸ RMA, *loc. cit.*, p. 698.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 698-698v.

²⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 698v.

On 17/30 September 1916, the Commander of the 10th Infantry Division issued Order no. 78 through which, early in the morning, on 18 September/1 October, the 9th Artillery Brigade, having in composition the 13th Artillery Regiment and the 18th Artillery Regiment, was to cross the Danube to Bulgaria, using the pontoon bridge in Flămânda.

On the same day, during the morning, troops belonging to the 13th Artillery Regiment positioned near Flămânda, waiting for the pontoon bridge to be completed so that they could cross the Danube. Unfortunately, for objective reasons, the construction of the bridge was not completed, and the Romanian troops remained waiting on the left bank of the river. Under those circumstances, at about 11 o'clock, ten German aircrafts executed heavy fire against the positions occupied by the regiment, which resulted in wounding Sergeant Iancu Minea and Private Ivanciu Slav. Moreover, five horses belonging to the 3rd Battalion were killed, and nine were wounded²¹.

Despite the mentioned losses, the 4th, 5th, and 6th Batteries belonging to the 13th Artillery Regiment executed a strong barrage intended to a mixed Bulgarian brigade that came from Rusciuk. Helped by a Romanian officer, who signalled from the Bulgarian bank of the Danube, Romanian artillerists succeeded in disturbing the Bulgarian large unit, forcing it to withdraw.

On 19 September/2 October, during the morning, the two regiments belonging to the 9th Artillery Brigade started crossing the Danube, using the pontoon bridge built in the area of Flămânda. While they were marching, three Austrian monitors came near the bridge and opened fire, using the artillery on board, against the troops of the 18th Artillery Regiment. Following the incident, Private Vasile Dumitru in the 3rd Battery was killed, and Corporal Tudor Martin and Privates Ilie Busuioc and Petre Boiu were wounded²².

Under those circumstances, *on its own initiative*, the 4th Battery installed its pieces on the bank of the Danube and at the head of the bridge, *through vivid fire*, forcing the enemy monitors to withdraw. However, for objective reasons, the operation in Flămânda

²¹ *Ibidem*, p. 699v. Following the bombardment, there were important losses for the 18th Artillery Regiment. Thus, Major Ianculescu and Lieutenant Stelian Iorgulescu, *the Regiment cashier*, were killed. Moreover, the Brigade Chaplain and Platoon-candidate Martin Codreanu were wounded.

²² *Ibidem*, p. 700v. There were more ten wounded and five dead among the casualties of the 3rd Battery.

was stopped, following the Great General Headquarters Order no. 1453 on 20 September/3 October 1916, 15 o'clock²³. Therefore, the two regiments in the composition of the 9th Artillery Brigade received the order to withdraw north of the Danube, the withdrawal being concluded on 21 September/4 October, in the evening.

The 9th Artillery Brigade Actions in the Prahova Valley

On 24 September/7 October, after having three days to rest and recover, the Brigade Commander received the order to embark and deploy to Brașov Station, along with the 10th Infantry Division Command and its troops, in order to *“back the friendly troops there”*. One day later, the Brigade Command quartered at Predeal Monastery of the Prahova Valley, as it was to enter the Romanian defensive disposition in that area, while the troops of the 18th Artillery Regiment quartered north-east of Bușteni, in order to organise a defensive line²⁴.

Considering the precipitated events on the Prahova Valley, in keeping with the orders of the 1st Army, at 16.00 o'clock, the 3rd Artillery Battery started marching on the Cerbului Valley, entering in the composition of a detachment alongside a battalion belonging to the 70th Infantry Regiment. This unit, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Grigore Tomescu, had the mission to prevent the enemy from *crossing the border*. The precarious equipment of the Romanian artillery units and subunits became evident again. Thus, in the Campaign Report no. 1 on 25 September 1916, the Detachment Commander informed the 1st Army Command that, from the height of 982, the 3rd Artillery Battery could not advance, stopping *“at the beginning of the road in the Cerbului Valley, under Mount Diham, as it was impossible to climb the carriages on the steep slopes accessible only to mountain artillery”*²⁵.

²³ România în anii Primului Război Mondial, op. cit., p. 369. *“Following the yesterday verbal report, in which it was shown that the crossing of the Danube could not be accomplished, you will order: 1. The withdrawal of the 10th Division on the left bank of the Danube, during the night, on 20-21 September. 2. The immediate deployment of the infantry belonging to the 21st Division towards Dudești (Oltenița, București line), of the artillery and services of the same Division towards Mogoșoia (North București). 3. The immediate deployment of the 22nd Division in the Comana, Vidra area. The mentioned divisions are to be transported, starting the night on 21 to 22 current September, more precisely: the 22nd Division to the 1st Army and the 21st Division to the 2nd Army. The transport is organised by the Transportation Section within the Great General Headquarters and the details will be communicated in due time”*.

²⁴ RMA, op. cit., pp. 702-702v.

²⁵ Ibidem, p. 702v.

Under those circumstances, in keeping with the 1st Army Order no. 516 on 25 September, Lieutenant Colonel Grigore Tomescu ordered the battery to occupy positions around the point from which it was impossible to advance *“to serve as the infantry support, when there was a fight against the enemy in the nearby area”*²⁶.

On the same day, during the evening, the Romanian defensive disposition, ensured by the 9th Artillery Brigade, was supplemented by the 2nd Battery, which was debarked in Bușteni Station at 23.00 o'clock, while the 1st Battery was embarked in the train made available by the Transportation Section within the Great General Headquarters, from Mogoșoia to Bușteni.

It is interesting that the 9th Artillery Brigade managed to rapidly deploy its troops from the front in the south to the front in Transylvania, considering the German-Austrian-Hungarian troops started the offensive actions that were aimed at forcing the passes in the Carpathians and heading to the Muntenia Plain, on the general direction of Bucharest. Moreover, through a previous order, the 1st Division in the composition of the 13th Artillery Regiment became part of the 20th Infantry Brigade, under the command of Colonel Petre Popovăț. The mentioned large unit had the mission to cross the border and head towards Râșnov. However, following the reconnaissance missions performed by the Romanian patrols as well as the verbal report of the Division Commander, demonstrating that it was impossible for the batteries to *climb up to the frontier considering the rocky terrain*, General Artur Văitoianu, the 10th Infantry Division Commander, ordered the return of the troops on the former alignment in the Bușteni area²⁷.

Highly aware of the situation on the ground, General Artur Văitoianu ordered, on 28 September, that the troops belonging to the 18th Artillery Regiment should consolidate the occupied positions, having the mission to *“deny the access to the Azuga and Cerbului Valley Gorge – considering the enemy could get to that area. (That is why N.A.), combat and regimentation trains moved from Bușteni to Poiana-Țapului (Prahova Valley), where they established their bivouac”*²⁸.

²⁶ Ibidem. To back the defence position, an artillery piece belonging to the 3rd Battery occupied a position 200 m far from Mount Diham, from where Cerbului and Seacă Valleys could be seen.

²⁷ Ibidem, p. 703.

²⁸ Ibidem.



At the end of September and in early October, the 13th Artillery Regiment troops started to occupy positions in the Prahova Valley, while the 18th Artillery Regiment continued to survey the area of responsibility, especially the one situated south of Râșnov picket²⁹.

The first unit that received the baptism of fire on the new front was the 1st Battery, deployed at 1,297 height, which, on 6/19 October, at 11.45 o'clock, opened fire against the enemy, forcing it to withdraw. Moreover, at 15.15 o'clock, the battery prevented an infantry column from advancing towards the Romanian positions, forcing it to withdraw with important losses. On the same day, the Romanian troops deployed on the Prahova Valley responded to the enemy patrols that had the mission to test their reaction.

During the following days, offensive and defensive actions alternated, considering that, following the offensive reconnaissance missions, executed by different Romanian subunits, it was found that the enemy was strengthened, not only by performing engineer works but also by deploying an important number of machine guns and artillery pieces that manifested offensive tendencies³⁰.

On 13 October, the 9th Artillery Brigade ordered the 18th Artillery Regiment to deploy the 4th and 6th Batteries on Mount Clăbucet, establishing an alignment at 1,441 height. That order was given following the pieces of information gathered from the enemy prisoners, which led to the German troops imminent offensive, fact that was confirmed the next day, when the two batteries managed to reject the German units that executed a vigorous attack.

While the 13th Artillery Regiment troops were made available to either the 5th Infantry Division or the 6th Infantry Division, the subunits in the 18th Infantry Regiment consolidated their positions on Mount Clăbucetul-Baiului or in the Azuga Gorge³¹.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, pp. 703-704v. Between 27 September/9 October and 6 October/19 October, there were found serious deficiencies as far as the railway infrastructure to be used by the Romanian Army units was concerned. Thus, batteries belonging to the 13th Artillery Regiment received the order to leave the front in the south and occupy defensive positions in the Prahova Valley. However, considering the impossibility to embark in Grădiștea and Comana Stations, they moved to Jilava (Ilfov) Station, delaying the consolidation of the Romanian defensive alignment disposed in the Prahova Valley.

³⁰ *România în Războiul Mondial. 1916-1919*, vol. III, part I, chapters XX-XXIV, Monitorul Oficial și Imprimeriile Statului. Imprimeria Națională, București, 1940, pp. 517-518.

³¹ RMA, *op. cit.*, p. 706.

On 18 October, an enemy offensive started, followed by a Romanian troops counteroffensive, which did not have notable results as the enemy was superior. In the evening, in the 18th Artillery Regiment area of responsibility, the enemy executed an energetic attack that resulted in rejecting the Romanian infantry, due to the *artillery and infantry troops superiority*, and in approaching the positions of the 4th and 6th Batteries, which were about to fall prey to the enemy that occupied the Clăbucet-Baiu Height³².

Under the circumstances of the fights in the mountainous region and considering the deficit in the artillery able to support the infantry actions, the 2nd Army Corps Command ordered some batteries belonging to the 13th Artillery Regiment to become part of some other large units, depending on the needs of the moment and the nature of the assigned mission. Thus, the Ist Battalion was made available to the 5th Infantry Division, while the IInd Battalion became part of the 6th Infantry Division. If, in the short run, such changes met certain large units artillery needs, in the long run, the fire power of the brigade they were normally part of was weakened, as its operational capacity was altered.

It is interesting that, during the fights in the Prahova Valley, the 9th Artillery Brigade had available only the troops belonging to the 18th Artillery Regiment. Under such circumstances, it is easy to understand that the brigade fire power decreased significantly. That was the reason why the armament and part of the combat assets could fall prey to the enemy. After violent fights, in the context of the German troops continuous offensive, the 18th Artillery Regiment subunits experienced dramatic moments. Thus, the 1st Battery “*was in position in Bușteni passage, having the mission to deny the advance in the Azuga Gorge and, if necessary, it was destined to be a sacrifice battery in the event the friendly infantry was forced to withdraw towards Sinaia*”, while the 2nd and 3rd Batteries were headquartered south of Sinaia, in the Izvoarele area. The 4th Battery was in a difficult situation. After violent fights it succeeded in saving its four cannons deployed at 1,441 height (Clăbucetul-Baiului), *only the caissons being endangered*.

³² *Ibidem*. During the fights in the evening, on 18 October, Major Ion Munteanu, the IInd Battalion Commander was killed, and Second Lieutenants (r.) Ion Ionescu and Vasile Coman, as well as Platoons David Blainer and Nicolae Popa were wounded.





The 6th Battery was in a similar situation and it “*tried hard to save its material*”³³.

To counter the increasingly intense offensive of the German troops that intended to penetrate the Romanian defensive system in the Prahova Valley and to advance in the Muntenia Plain, the Romanian Great General Headquarters ordered the 10th Infantry Division to be supplemented. Thus, in the mentioned large unit area of operations other artillery brigade were deployed, as well as heavy artillery pieces, more precisely two 120 mm pieces, “*mounted on railway platforms and targeting behind the enemy towards Predeal*”³⁴.

A change of the situation in the theatre of operations in the Prahova Valley occurred on 25 October when the 10th infantry Division was replaced with the 16th Infantry Division. It is interesting that the 9th Artillery Brigade, which subordinated the 18th Infantry Regiment, maintained the initial positions, being part of the 16th Infantry Division.

Up to the end of November 1916, the troops of the 9th Artillery Brigade backed with fire the Romanian troops in the defensive system of the Prahova Valley to deny the German troops advancing and massing south of the Carpathians³⁵.

Conclusions

After almost two months of sustained efforts, the Romanian defence succeeded in preventing the German-Austrian-Hungarian troops from advancing to penetrate the Romanian defensive system in the Prahova Valley, thus denying their massing south of the Carpathians, on the general direction Bucharest.

Under such circumstances, the 9th Artillery Brigade was withdrawn from the area of operations in the Prahova Valley and deployed in the Mizil area. Thus, the mission of that large unit that, through

³³ *Ibidem*, p. 706v. On October 1916, the situation of the 9th Artillery Brigade was as follows: “The Brigade Command at “Ursul” Paper Mill in Bușteni. The 18th Artillery regiment in the Park in Bușteni, having the same mission. The 2nd and 3rd Batteries south of Sinaia (Izvoarele). The 4th Battery trying to save its caissons. The 5th Battery surveying west of Poiana Țapului (1 km south-east from the 975 height). The 6th Battery trying to save its material. Combat trains south of Sinaia (Izvoarele), and regiment trains south of Comarnic”.

³⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 707.

³⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 707v. Between 27 October and 15 November 1916, the 13th Artillery Regiment troops subordination was as follows: The 1st Division subordinate to the 5th Infantry Division, and the 2nd Division in the composition of the 6th Infantry Division. On 16 November 1916, in compliance with the order of the Great General Headquarters, the 13th Artillery Regiment got subordinated to the 10th Infantry Division, in cantonment in the area of Ploiești.

the officers, non-commissioned officers and troops advanced skills and spirit of sacrifice, prevented the Central Powers troops from getting south of the Carpathian Mountains³⁶.

In conclusion, the 9th Artillery Brigade troops that executed combat missions not only in the province between the Danube and the Black Sea but also in the Prahova Valley, during the 1916 campaign, demonstrated both very good speciality training and spirit of sacrifice, succeeding in accomplishing the assigned missions. However, as a negative aspect, the deficiencies in organisation and infrastructure became evident early after Romania entered the first world conflagration, but they were eased during the 1917 campaign.

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³⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 711v.



ANTI-ROMANIAN PROPAGANDA IN BASARABIA IN THE SPRING OF 1918

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The unification of Basarabia with Romania led to increasing anti-Romanian propaganda carried out by the internal and external forces that opposed to the decision democratically adopted by the legitimate representatives of the inhabitants of Basarabia at 27 March/9 April 1918.

Agents from the East or among the local population tried to lead Basarabians into believing that the Romanian authorities opposed the reforms, especially the agrarian reform and the universal suffrage. The leaders of the Basarabian Romanians and the civil and military representatives of the Romanian state made significant efforts to eliminate the effects of the anti-Romanian propaganda theses. Unfortunately, many of these theses are still used today in the media and online, highlighting the negative aspects of the Romanian presence in Basarabia at that time and deliberately ignoring the martyrdom of the Romanians from Basarabia during the Soviet occupations.

Keywords: 1918, Romania, Basarabia, unification, propaganda.

Introduction

On 10 January 1918¹, at the request of the authorities of the Moldavian Democratic Republic², the Romanian Armed Forces cross the Prut River to fight against the troops of Bolshevik soldiers of the Russian army, which, under the pretext of the revolutionary struggle, created a climate of chaos and terror in Basarabia. The proclamation issued to the population of Basarabia by the head of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, General Constantin Prezan, on 12 January 1918, states: *“These enemies have used your honest and trusting soul, and sought to create discord between you and us, saying that the Romanians come to rule your country, that they come to take possession of your lands, and that they have no other thought but to bring old rulers back in order to deprive you of your national and political rights won through the revolution”*³.

This phrase summarises the main theme of the anti-Romanian propaganda in Basarabia, according to which the Romanian Armed Forces will support the former landlords to recover their lands lost in the 1917 revolution. The anti-Romanian propaganda forgets to tell the Basarabian peasants that the Romanian Parliament voted on 30 July 1917, by amending Articles 19, 57 and 67 of the Constitution, the expropriation of 2.300.000 ha to accomplish a large land reform and change the voting system in order to introduce universal suffrage.

On 27 March/9 April 1918, the Country Council votes in Chişinău on Basarabia’s union with Romania, eliminating the effects of the arbitrary annexation of the territory of Moldova between the Prut and the Dniester by the Russian Empire in 1812.

But the implementation of the Union Act of 27 March 1918 has encountered many obstacles.

The main theme of the anti-Romanian propaganda in Basarabia is that the Romanian Armed Forces will support the former landlords to recover their lands lost in the 1917 revolution.

¹ All dates recorded are in keeping with the Julian calendar (*“old style”*). The dual dating, for instance 27 March/9 April 1918, is recorded in keeping with the Julian calendar and the Gregorian calendar, respectively (old style/new style).

² On 2 December 1917, the Country Council proclaims the establishment of the Moldavian Democratic Republic (as part of the Russian Democratic Federative Republic), which declares its independency on 24 January 1918.

³ Petre Otu, *Mareşalul Constantin Prezan. Vocaşia datoriei*, Editura Militară, Bucureşti, p. 222.



There are at least three external forces carrying out systematic anti-Romanian propaganda actions through agents coming from beyond the Dniester River or local ethnic minority population, to create an atmosphere that is hostile to the Union of 27 March 1918, with the final aim to separate this Romanian historical province from the mother country, Romania.

The Historical Background at the Time of the Union of Basarabia with Romania

At the time of the Union of Basarabia with Romania, the Romanian government holds peace talks with the Central Powers as a defeated country. Under the Peace Treaty of București on 24 April/7 May 1918, Romania suffers major territorial losses: Dobrogea, the peaks of the Carpathians, a part of northern Moldavia. On the other hand, the treaty does not recognise the union of Basarabia with Romania. Article IV of the Treaty states that Romanian divisions in Basarabia will remain between the Prut and Dniester Rivers, following the military operations conducted by the Central Powers in Ukraine, until *“there is no danger for Romania’s borders”*. At the same time, Article VIII of the Treaty states that the Romanian naval forces, either maritime or river ones, will remain intact *“until the conditions in Basarabia are clarified”*. Therefore, Germany and Austria-Hungary, who dominate the Eastern European area at that time both politically and militarily, do not recognise *de jure* the union of Basarabia with Romania, thus favouring anti-Romanian and anti-unionist propaganda actions in Basarabia.

In the former Tsarist Empire area, it is not clear what the result of the civil war between the *“Reds”* (the Bolsheviks) and the *“Whites”* will be. The *“Whites”* include several political and military groups of various orientations: conservative monarchists, liberal republicans, social democrats etc., fighting together or separately against the Bolsheviks. Had the Bolsheviks won, Basarabia would have been one of the main targets of the *“export of revolution”*. On the other hand, the main leaders of *“Whites”* publicly express their desire to preserve Russia’s territorial integrity between the borders before the Revolution of February 1917.

In turn, political leaders in Ukraine, whether left- or right-wing ones, fight, by more or less subversive means, for the annexation of Basarabia to Ukraine, which proclaims independence in November 1917.

Therefore, there are at least three external forces carrying out systematic anti-Romanian propaganda actions through agents coming from beyond the Dniester River or local ethnic minority population, to create an atmosphere that is hostile to the Union of 27 March 1918, with the final aim to separate this Romanian historical province from the mother country, Romania.

Main Topics of Anti-Romanian Propaganda

There is one unsigned document, named *“Project to organise propaganda by means of military authority and elements”*, dated 3 June 1918, which summarises the main topics of anti-Romanian propaganda. These topics are as follows:

- Romanian Kingdom – the land of landowners – will abolish the reforms made after the fall of the Tsarist regime⁴. These reforms will continue only in *“a re-established and democratic Russia”*.
- Lack of legitimacy of the Country Council: *“The Country Council is not made of deputies freely elected by the people [...], but by a group of people who imposed themselves. [...] The Country Council was bought in order to vote the Union with Romania”*⁵.

Mention should be made that the project’s author states that the wave of Romanian nationalism that culminates in the Act of the Union of 27 March 1918 has faded and it is now replaced by *“political turmoil based on parties and personal ambitions that sickened and inactivated (sic!) many of those who used to work honestly in favour of nationalisation”*⁶.

The presence of Russian officers from the former Tsarist army is an enabler for the development of anti-Romanian actions. Their influence spreads among Basarabian troops who served the military structures of the Moldavian Democratic Republic and were to be integrated in the Romanian Armed Forces. Thus, on 26 May 1918, the Intelligence Office of *“General Rășcanu”* Detachment reports to the 5th Army Corps Command that the officers of the Moldavian unit, led by officer Ledenuș, would not take the oath to King Ferdinand, because Russian officers told them that *“it is a possibility that Basarabia will be given to the Bulgarians or the Turks”*. These Basarabian officers are influenced by the members of the Russian committee for the liquidation of war warehouses, who *“call upon officers of the Moldavian regiment not to have any sympathy for the Romanian Armed Forces, to leave the military and not to take pledge their allegiance to King Ferdinand”*.

⁴ After the Russian Revolution in February 1917, the Provisional Government in Petrograd adopts universal suffrage and begins preparations for land reform. In the declaration for the establishment of the Moldavian Democratic Republic, on 2 December 1917, the Country Council mentions the need for carrying out land reform *without compensations* and introducing universal suffrage. After the union with Romania, Basarabians, regardless of ethnicity, fear that the conservatory government chaired by Alexandru Marghiloman will oppose to these reforms.

⁵ Arhivele Militare Naționale Române/Romanian National Military Archives, *Microfilme* Collection, reel F II 1.2602, c. 537.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 238.



The presence of Russian officers from the former Tsarist army is an enabler for the development of anti-Romanian actions.



The final part of the report states: *“This mentality and these anti-Romanian tendencies of Moldavian officers are the result of the relentless plotting and incitement representing the only field of activity of Russian officers, who will stop at nothing to create the most adverse situation for us [...], being known that most of them, and even those who are in our favour, are under the influence of Russophile feelings”*⁷.

Also, on 17 June 1918, the Commander of *“General Rășcanu”* detachment reports to General Commissioner of Basarabia, General Arthur Văitoianu⁸, that *“the foreign elements from Basarabia continue to stir things up against us, especially since they find support in our authorities, both in Basarabia and in the country [the Old Kingdom]”*⁹. An example in this respect is the case of some Russian and Ukrainian officers who, according to an ordinance issued by the General Commissariat of Basarabia, were due to leave the province’s territory until 15 June 1918. But, on 15 June, the Commandant Office of Chișinău Square receives a direct order from the Ministry of War by which the term is extended until 1 July 1918. Practically, every 15 days, the departure of Russian officers invoking the situation in Ukraine and Russia is postponed. On the other hand, the Russian officers in Basarabia are a destabilising factor for the authorities: *“They always stay here, defy us, take part in hostile demonstrations, and our prestige decreases, because, despite all the ordinances, they continue to stay here. [...] All these elements do nothing else but secretly turn the population against us and, at some point, they will surely lead the gangs that might revolt against our authorities”*¹⁰.

Social-Economic Features

Many inhabitants from Basarabia provide a genuine breeding ground for anti-Romanian propaganda, being unhappy with the precarious economic situation, especially with the fact that prices are on the rise.

⁷ Arhivele Militare Naționale Române, *Microfilme* Collection, reel F II 2.2748, c. 148-150.

⁸ On 13 June 1918, by High Decree no. 1448 bis, General Arthur Văitoianu, former Commander of Army Corps in Mărăști and Oituz, is appointed General Commissioner of Basarabia. His main assignment is *“to coordinate the activity and to harmonise the relations between civil authorities and military bodies in all matters concerning the reorganisation of Basarabia and implementation of administration measures”*. He leaves this position on 24 October 1918, to become Minister of Internal Affairs and ad-interim for Justice, in the government chaired by General Constantin Coandă. Between 27 September and 30 November 1919, General Arthur Văitoianu is head of the government that organised the first parliamentary elections in Romania based on universal suffrage. In 1947, at 83 years old, he is arrested and imprisoned in Sighetul Marmăției, from where he is released one year before dying, on 17 July 1956.

⁹ *Ibid.*, c. 316.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, c. 317.

This increase is determined by the high demand for products from the Austro-Hungarian and German economic commissions, which buy large quantities of cereals, horses and cattle at very high prices for the Central Powers stationed in Ukraine. For example, the Romanian authorities offer peasants a price of 6 roubles on a pood of wheat¹¹, while the Germans offer 15 roubles on the same amount¹².

In an intelligence note of 22 May 1918, received by the 2nd Intelligence Office of the Great Headquarters, it is noted: *“The evildoers exploit this circumstance to stir [the spirits] up against us, informing the population that we are exporting all the food there and therefore are to blame for the rising prices. Other agitators spread the idea that Basarabia was previously supplied with food by Ukraine, and the rise of food prices is due to the separation of Basarabia from this country. With all the stupidity of this thesis, there are enough naive people who also believe that”*¹³.

The existence of many social-economic problems facilitates the dissemination of anti-Romanian propaganda theses in Basarabia. For example, from the same intelligence briefing, we find that judges and post office clerks fear they will be fired and replaced with staff from the Old Kingdom. As a result, the author writes, *“it is easy to understand that the care for the future represses their barely revived nationalism”*¹⁴.

The railway workers are also dissatisfied because their salaries have not been paid for three months, and they were told that their working years would not be recognised. Because of this, many of them resign and leave for Ukraine, among them being *“many good Romanians, who, perhaps seeing us coming, had tears of joy in their eyes and now, disappointed, turn their backs on us, leaving their homes disillusioned to ensure the existence of their families, and it is natural that part of this disillusionment, dissatisfaction and bitterness spread over those that they have left behind, and thus we have lost so many good citizens”*¹⁵. The problems of Basarabian students of Romanian nationality who are not recognised their studies is just as serious. It is suggested that the Romanian government will intervene with the Chișinău authorities in this respect, *“by demanding only additional exams of Romanian language, national literature and history and eventually [Romanian] terminology of the respective faculty [specialty]”*¹⁶.

¹¹ 1 pood = 16.8 kg.

¹² Arhivele Militare Naționale Române, *Microfilme* Collection, reel F II 1.2602, c. 526.

¹³ *Ibid.*, c. 514.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, c. 516.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, c. 517.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*



The existence of many social-economic problems facilitates the dissemination of anti-Romanian propaganda theses in Basarabia.

[...] Basarabian students of Romanian nationality are not recognised their studies.



To counter anti-Romanian propaganda, it is proposed that the officers from the Romanian Armed Forces units deployed in Basarabian localities should undertake a systematic propaganda action, especially in the countryside.

The main actions carried out within this campaign consist of Romanian language and literature classes, as well as conferences regarding Romania's geography and history.

Actions Meant to Counter Anti-Romanian Propaganda

To counter anti-Romanian propaganda, the head of the 2nd Intelligence Office of the General Headquarters, Colonel Nicolae Condeescu¹⁷, proposes, in March 1918, that the officers from the Romanian Armed Forces units deployed in Basarabian localities undertake a systematic propaganda action, especially in the countryside, "to win the hearts of the villagers, to develop their trust in our intentions regarding them, to revive their national feelings and thus get them out of the state of numbness in which they were placed because of the circumstances and the hostile propaganda". It is expected that an officer is delegated from each regiment deployed in Basarabia in order to attend a special propaganda class. Once he is returned to his regiment, the officer must "organise propaganda centres in every battalion, under the direct supervision of the battalion commander, to lead the propaganda and, at the same time, to initiate the troops and officers regarding the propaganda that is about to be spread and the way in which they need to take action"¹⁸. The Great Headquarters did not follow up the proposal.

In the spring of 1918, the Directorate of Education¹⁹ in Basarabia organises a campaign of Romanian cultural propaganda. The main actions carried out within this campaign consist of Romanian language and literature classes, as well as conferences regarding Romania's geography and history. As far as the history topics are concerned, the organisers pointed out Moldavia medieval history, in order to prove Basarabia's centuries-old belonging to this Romanian principality. The content of these conferences is tailored to meet the target audience. For instance, in the case of important Ukrainian communities, the lecturer evokes especially the fights carried over the years by Moldovans and Cossacks against Tatars and Ottomans. In some cases, the organisers published regional newspapers in the Romanian language or bilingual ones, in Romanian and Russian, but they are not published on a regular basis due to the high printing prices and the paper crisis²⁰.

¹⁷ In the interwar period, Nicolae Condeescu is promoted up to Division General and is Minister of the Armed Forces between 14 April 1930 – 18 April 1931.

¹⁸ Arhivele Militare Naționale Române, *Microfilme* Collection, reel F II 1.2602, c. 513.

¹⁹ On 2 December 1917, the Country Council establishes the Council of General Directors, which functions as a government of the Moldavian Democratic Republic. After the union of Basarabia with Romania, the war and foreign affairs directorates are terminated. The Council of General Directors further functions as a local executive structure until 1920.

²⁰ Arhivele Militare Naționale Române, *Microfilme* Collection, reel F II 2.2748, c. 275.

The results of this campaign are modest, as it turns out from a report of July 1918, drafted by the General Commissioner of Basarabia, Army Corps General Arthur Văitoianu:

"The propaganda action initiated in Basarabia in March this year has not reaped the expected benefits nor has it achieved the necessary result; on the one hand, because of the lack of serious selection of personnel and, on the other hand, because of insufficient time and absolutely incomplete propaganda programme. However, the propaganda organisation has been fitting and certain extremely good elements have been sent, especially at the beginning of this endeavour.

Given the current situation, when the local spirits are neither quiet nor guided, when the enemy propaganda does not stop and we are unable to deter it rapidly, on the whole, the situation requires that a well-organised propaganda should continue for at least one year, until schools, administration and private initiative will be capable of working on their own in this respect.

To think that only the school and the administration or incomplete propaganda can currently acquire the needed results it would be only an error of assessment and a mistake considering the historical moment and the national interest we have in Basarabia. Therefore, comprehensive and immediate organisation of a propaganda service is required, sparing no expense in support of this organisation"²¹.

The General Commissioner of Basarabia suggests that propaganda is conducted by a central body placed under the direct control of the General Commissariat of Basarabia. The propaganda activity is set to take place at two levels:

„a) Official action, organised at hierarchical levels starting from the centre to counties, districts and communes and addressing topics such as: theatre, cinemas, celebrations, music societies, archery, gymnastics, scouting, women development (sic!), magazines, conferences, schools for grownups, popular universities.

b) Secret action organised from the centre with special means such as: press, travelling salesmen, paper sellers, country fiddlers (sic!), special agents etc."²².

The Effects of Romanian Cultural Propaganda on the Population

A review of the activity of this cultural propaganda service, established within the General Commissariat of Basarabia, can be found in a report drafted in November 1918 by Nicolae Mogoș, Chief of Propaganda

²¹ *Ibid*, c. 282.

²² *Ibid*, c. 283.



from Hănășeni, Cahul county, and sent to the Chief of General State Security in Basarabia²³:

„National cultural propaganda in Basarabia [...] starts at the beginning of March this year [1918] and is determined by the big ignorance of most of the population between Prut and Nistru regarding the past and the phases (!) of its origin.

[...]

Unfortunately for the enthusiasm of those who are naïve towards nationalist policies of the Directorate for Public Education, who were entrusted with this delicate and important mission [...], deception came flooding out on their beautiful springtime dreams, and except for certain isolated relatively successful cases, it all came down to preaching into the desert and a few celebrations, with speeches full of clichés, followed by dances such as: “Banul Mărăcine”, tango, the Roman (sic!) and waltz.

What next?... Nothing! Darkness! Therefore, the peasant class still persists in its first national recklessness, totally indifferent or feeling full of mercy for the writhing poor propagandists who give the impression, and this is a rather harsh expression, please forgive me for using it, of those who yell to attract customers at the stand with their new merchandise”.

According to this report’s author, among the causes for the relative failure of Romanian propaganda one can mention:

- uncertainty regarding Basarabia’s fate at the future press conference or in the case of Russia recovering its status of great power;
- poorly trained propagandists, especially those sent in the countryside. In many cases, as the report’s author mentions, they are seen by the intellectuals in the villages (priests, teachers, local clerks), most often Russified Romanians, “either with passionate goodwill or with painfully killing irony”;
- propagandists’ lack of control and guidance;
- propaganda centres do not provide the resources necessary for carrying out propaganda activities. For instance, they are not provided with means from transportation from one village to another. When asking gendarmes in the area for help, they refuse to make available the carriages used by constables, because they did not receive any orders in this respect;

²³ *Ibid*, c. 284.

- the lack of coordination between propagandists in the same county, “who are completely unaware of the others’ actions”;
- the lack of a county or regional newspaper that should make known the activity of each propaganda centre and perhaps the weaknesses in its activity.

At the same time, the author of the report mentions the “*lack of tact of the gendarmes, who, with few exceptions, beat, swear, and mock the villagers* (emphasis added in the original text) *to the detriment of the interests of our propaganda, when the gendarmes actions do not match the speeches of the lecturers*”. The author of the report states that the constables abuse their situation “*by acting like little tyrants in the villages instead of the Russian chinovniks*”.

Testimonies about abuses committed by a large part of the representatives of the Romanian state since the first months in which they made their presence felt in Bessarabia can be found in many documents of the time. This phenomenon unfortunately occurs throughout the interwar period. On the other hand, the transfer of an official of the Romanian state to the East of the Prut is often considered a disciplinary sanction.

Conclusions

The weaknesses of the Romanian administration in Basarabia at the end of the world increase the effects of anti-Romanian propaganda, which manifest, in the interwar period, especially under the form of the “*class struggle*”. Unfortunately, many of the theses of the anti-Romanian propaganda at that time are still spread on the territory between the Prut and the Dniester Rivers, through mass-media and the Internet. They emphasise and exaggerate the negative features of the 1918-1940 period, when Basarabia was included in the Romanian state, deliberately saying nothing about the martyrdom of the Romanians from Basarabia who were victims of the waves of terror during the Soviet occupation.

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2. Petre Otu, *Mareșalul Constantin Prezan. Vocația datoriei*, Editura Militară, București, 2008.



The weaknesses of the Romanian administration in Basarabia at the end of the world increase the effects of anti-Romanian propaganda, which manifest, in the interwar period, especially under the form of the “class struggle”.

RUSSIAN REVOLUTION OF 1917 AND ITS CONSEQUENCES ON THE ROMANIAN-RUSSIAN FRONT – ANGLO-SAXON PERCEPTIONS –

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A series of political-social events happened in the Russian Empire in 1917, during the First World War. These events made huge impact on the military situation on the Eastern front, causing Romania to sign the “peace” treaty imposed by the Central Powers, having immense reverberations in London.

The British war cabinet was alarmed by the consequences the Russian revolution had on the war effort of its Eastern ally and was also concerned about the danger that loomed ahead, namely the collapse of the Romanian-Russian front, where a big number of German-Austrian-Hungarian divisions were immobilised.

Keywords: Russian Revolution, Great Britain, France, First World War, Peace Treaty of București.

Introduction

The military action of the Romanian Kingdom in the summer of 1916, expected with much enthusiasm by the promoters of Romania’s alliance with the Entente, failed. Being in a critical situation, given the loss of more than two thirds of the national territory, including the capital of the country, and the government, the royal family and a part of the population in Moldova seeking refuge in Iași, Romania tried to resist with all its forces. The Romanian Armed Forces, despite low combat capacity, could not be eliminated by the Austro-Germans on the Eastern Front¹.

The main military force that could support Romania on the Eastern Front was Russia, its ally. The position of the Romanian Armed Forces was deeply affected by the attitude of the Russian troops during the spring, summer and autumn of 1917². The revolution launched on 3 March 1917 in Russia led to a continuous disintegration of the Russian state’s civilian and military institutions. Moreover, the attitude, the morale and, last but not least, the army’s combativeness began to collapse.

The constant disintegration of the Russian Army on the Eastern Front and the practical impossibility of counting on its support were a major blow for Romania. The spread of the Romanian Armed Forces frontline made the proper continuation of the war difficult, especially given that the collapse of the Russian front was doubled by anarchy and open hostility towards the former allies of the Russian troops that were withdrawing.

The Great Britain’s Position on Romania

The instable situation in Russia, having negative consequences on the common actions of the Allies in their fight against the Central Power, because of the decreased combat capacity of the Russian Army, led to the War Cabinet carrying out a detailed analysis on 20 May regarding

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The constant disintegration of the Russian Army on the Eastern Front and the practical impossibility of counting on its support were a major blow for Romania.

¹ Tiberiu Velter, *Relațiile româno-britanice între anii 1914-1924*, Presa Universitară Clujeană, Cluj Napoca, 2000, p. 84.

² George Cipăianu, *La răscruce (Toamna anului 1917 – Primăvara lui 1918). Marea Britanie și încheierea de către România a unei păci separate*, Editura Cogito, Oradea, 1993, p. 57.



The continuation of the war actions of the Romanian state was considered in London as being essential in order to prevent the Central Powers from releasing part of its forces from this theatre of war and heading westward where it could have exerted greater pressure on the allied armies.

The UK considered establishing a British mission to Romania. Its objectives: proof of Britain's sympathy towards Romania and a reason to encourage resistance to the Central Powers.

the future prospects of the Eastern Front³. Leo Amery, the author of the memorandum, reckoned that, despite the improvement of the political situation in Petrograd, the political forces in Russia would be preoccupied with their constitutional and social problems, until the end of the war. Leo Amery warned the War Cabinet that, even if it was highly unlikely that Russia would leave the war entirely, Western allies would no longer be able to count on an effective military cooperation from their part⁴. As an intelligence officer in the Balkans, Leo Amery took into account the possibility that Russia would sign a separate peace treaty with the Central Powers, in order to focus its attention on the “domestic front”. However, Russia would still be a factor of a “certain kind of usefulness” until the end of the war⁵.

In this context, the importance of maintaining Romania’s combativeness on the Eastern Front was appreciated by its true dimension. The continuation of the war actions of the Romanian state was considered in London as being essential in order to prevent the Central Powers from releasing part of its forces from this theatre of war and heading westward where it could have exerted greater pressure on the allied armies. Sir Edward Carson informed the War Cabinet, in a memorandum of 18 October 1917, of the situation in Romania, characterised as “one of the most deplorable results of the Russian collapse”⁶.

He noted the difficulty of Great Britain providing Romania with material support because of its geographical position. Sir Edward Carson considered it necessary to encourage the Romanian people to continue their resistance in front of the enemy. He also noted the lack of British propaganda in Romania, noting that “the French mission of General Berthelot placed France [...] in a more favourable light in the eyes of Romanians than we did”. He therefore proposed sending a British mission to Romania. The objectives of such a British mission were to be as follows: proof of Britain’s sympathy towards Romania and a reason to encourage resistance to the Central Powers; protection of British interests; organisation of British propaganda in Romania; establishment in Romania of an organisation similar to the Anglo-Romanian Society,

³ The British National Archives, Kew, CAB 24/14, Papers nos. 801-900, L.S. Amery, *The Russian Situation and its Consequences*, 20 May 1917, pp. 1-9.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ CAB 24/29, *Records of the Cabinet Office Series War Cabinet and Cabinet: Memoranda*, Piece Papers nos. 2301-2400, GT 2332, Edward Carson, *Proposed Mission to Roumania*, 18 October 1917, p. 1.

with the aim of cooperating between them in order to foster good relations between the two states; collection of information in order to identify the best means of granting economic assistance to Romania, as well as encouragement of Romanian-British trade relations in the future⁷.

Sir Edward Carson supported the approval by the British Government of sending a British mission to Iași, pointing out “the importance of giving Romanians a visible demonstration of our concern for their security and our determination that their integrity and independence could be restored with all the reparation for the hardships they have suffered [...], especially because of the fate that has so far fallen on the small states that joined the Allies and the repeated statements that protecting these small states is one of the essential goals of our war”⁸. In a note on Sir Edward Carson’s document, Lord Milner noted: “The Romanians feel very discouraged right now. One of the reasons for this is that they believe they have been forgotten by their Western allies or, in any case, by England”⁹. In his opinion, the role of the British Mission did not come down to the representation of a “purely platonic” sympathy. Lord Milner considered that: “We’re doing the best we can, despite great difficulties and huge drawbacks, long distance and lousy communication. If it is only for helping Romania understand all this as well as our willingness to help, and for finding out that there may be other ways of helping that we have not foreseen, I believe the Mission will be fitting”¹⁰.

The Consequences of the Russian-German Ceasefire

The Bolshevik coup on 7 November 1917 highlighted Romania’s difficult position. The new power in Petrograd issued the following day the “Decree on Peace”, through which Russia proposed to all warring peoples and their governments to sign at once a ceasefire agreement for at least three months, as a first prerequisite for beginning peace negotiations. Nicolae Iorga wrote in his personal journal about this: “Denize (Queen Maria’s doctor – A/N) breaks the news [...] that maximalists (the Bolsheviks – A/N) are in power in Petrograd, where, apart from Kerensky, who ran away, all the other ministers were arrested. The news proved to be true [...]. A telegram was received from the <Military

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*



Sir Edward Carson pointed out “the importance of giving Romanians a visible demonstration of our concern for their security and our determination that their integrity and independence could be restored with all the reparation for the hardships they have suffered [...]”.



Iorga wrote another significant episode in his journal: "In a train, in front of someone who spoke Russian, two Russian officers admitted that their people are the cause for our suffering and that <they deserved to be spit at>".

On 22 November/5 December 1917, Soviet Russia and Germany signed the Ceasefire Treaty, in Brest-Litovsk. The Russian-German treaty and the possibility that Romania might end military operations in the same way prompted the Allies' immediate reaction.

Revolutionary Committee> of the Soviets demanding <immediate democratic peace> and <immediate redistribution of land>, placing officers under the strict surveillance of soldiers and calling whoever would not communicate this act a <criminal>"¹¹. On the same day, Iorga wrote another significant episode: "In a train, in front of someone who spoke Russian, two Russian officers admitted that their people are the cause for our suffering and that <they deserved to be spit at>"¹². The two officers expressed with profound sincerity a harsh reality: Romania managed to bounce back militarily (Mărăști) and prevented being taken out of the war by stopping the attacks of Central Powers (Mărășești, Oituz)¹³.

On 22 November/5 December 1917, Soviet Russia and Germany signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk¹⁴. The Russian-German treaty and the possibility that Romania might end military operations in the same way prompted the Allies' immediate reaction.

Georges Clémenceau, who became head of the French government on 15 November 1917, concerned with the unfolding of events on the Eastern front, considered: "If the events bring about the inevitable consequence of the temporary abandonment of the Romanian territory, **the Romanian Armed Forces would have to continue to fight in Bessarabia and the Donets area, and concentrate there the core of forces kept under orders by the authority of certain convicts such as Kaledin¹⁵ and provide support that could prove decisive for Romania's destiny**"¹⁶. Mention should be made that, overestimated as a combat force, Kaledin's army was incapable of fighting the Bolsheviks nor was it able to create an anti-German front. As both Prime Minister and Minister of War, Clémenceau ordered General Henri Berthelot, head of the French Military Mission in Romania, to implement this formula.

¹¹ Nicolae Iorga, *Memorii*, vol. I, Editura „Națională”, S. Ciornei, București, f.a., p. 156.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ For a refreshing view of the 1917 Romanian Armed Forces campaign, see Glenn Torrey, *The Redemption of an Army: The Roumanian Campaign of 1917 in Romania and World War I*, Iași, Oxford, Portland, The Center for Roumanian Studies, 1998, p. 269.

¹⁴ On the consequences of the Russian abandonment, see Sorina Lacovei, *The Implications of Brest-Litovsk Peace over Romania*, in *La Roumanie dans la Grande Guerre*, edited by Dumitru Ivănescu and Sorin D. Ivănescu, Editura Junimea, Iași, 2005, pp. 73-84.

¹⁵ Serviciul Arhive Naționale Istorice Centrale (S.A.N.I.C.)/Central Historical National Archives Service, Henri Berthelot collection, *Jurnal. Misiunea Franceză în România Aliată. 1917-1918, 1 octombrie 1916-5 mai 1919*, p. 178.

¹⁶ Serviciul Arhive Naționale Istorice Centrale, Henri Berthelot Collection, *Jurnal. Misiunea Franceză în România Aliată. 1917-1918, 1 octombrie 1916-5 mai 1919*, p. 178.



No matter how disciplined and devoted General Berthelot was to the interests of his country, the contact with local realities showed him that Clémenceau's¹⁷ desire was unrealistic. He warned the French Prime Minister that the first condition for the implementation of the recommended plan was the existence of at least a few Russian units, beyond the Prut, uncontaminated by the revolution; at the same time, he drew attention to the weather conditions (the beginning of winter), the awful state of communications, the absence of supply depots, the hostile environment, governed by revolutionary propaganda among both Russian troops and civilians and possible desertions among Romanian troops¹⁸ (the last fear was unfounded, considering the conduct of the Romanian soldiers and officers so far).

Romania's Options in the New Context

The *Tiger's* stand¹⁹ put the Romanian government in great difficulty. In Iași, Ion I.C. Brătianu understood that the Romanian Armed Forces fulfilled their duty remarkably and that the moment of the ceasefire, no matter how painful, was approaching inevitably. Obviously thinking of his own political position, he would have wanted that the military commanders were the first to utter the dreaded word "ceasefire". In turn, the senior military commanders were afraid of being later accused of weakness and were consequently waiting for politicians to make the decision to put an end to the fight. The meetings initiated by Ion I.C. Brătianu to obtain a favourable opinion from the generals, to which General Berthelot would have been associated, did not lead to a clear and firm decision on the ceasefire²⁰.

On 6 December 1917, Victor Antonescu, Romania's ambassador to Paris, telephoned the Prime Minister, sending him the position of the French Government: "they are unanimous in declaring that Scerbacev's

On 26 November 26/9 December 1917, Romania and the Central Powers signed the ceasefire treaty in Focșani, as a consequence of the military conditions arising from the Russian-German ceasefire in Brest-Litovsk on 22 November/5 December 1917.

¹⁷ For Clémenceau, who was obsessed with the situation on the Western front – seen as the decisive one – and with his determination to lead the war until final victory („je fais la guerre”, he proclaimed when he became head of the government), the either Romanian or (General Berthelot's) French arguments leading to the conclusion that Romania was not able to carry on the military actions, were worthless. He escalated his threats, stating that if Romania ended its fight alongside the Entente, it would "scarify its future", meaning all the things demanded in the 1916 Treaty and acknowledged by the allies would not be recognised anymore.

¹⁸ Glenn Torrey, *Henri Mathias Berthelot. Soldier of France. Defender of Romania*, Iași, Oxford Portland, The Center for Romanian Studies, 2001, p. 207.

¹⁹ The tiger – French Prime Minister Georges Clémenceau's nickname.

²⁰ Idem, *Romania Leaves the War: the Decision to Sign an Armistice, December 1917*, in *Romania and World I*, p. 295.



Great Britain's position on the possibility of Romania getting out of the war, which had been prefigured, can be analysed in the light of two objectives of the London government: a) the existence of a East Carpathian front to hold back as many German troops as possible to weaken pressure on the West Front (common goal with France and Italy); b) the desire of the British cabinet to release itself from the obligations assumed under the 1916 Treaty with Romania, whose application would have resulted in the collapse of Austria-Hungary.

ceasefire is a disguised capitulation and that they cannot agree under any circumstances whatsoever with the capitulation of the Romanian Armed Forces..."²¹. On 26 November 26/9 December 1917, Romania and the Central Powers signed the ceasefire in Focșani, as a consequence of the military conditions arising from the Russian-German ceasefire in Brest-Litovsk on 22 November/5 December 1917.

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Moreover, from the telegram of the Romanian ambassador to London, on 24 December 1917, it was very clear that in Great Britain "they were... more reserved [in expressing opinions] than the French government, which is left with the whole initiative"²². "Unpleasantly surprised"²³ by Romania's decision – as Nicolae Mișu pointed out in the aforementioned document – the London government informed their leadership in Iași that it understood the difficulty of the country's situation and the "inevitable necessity to sign the ceasefire"²⁴, the Romanian diplomat being even asked "to assure Romania of England's deepest sympathy"²⁵.

On 21 December 1917, Ion I.C. Brătianu wrote from Iași to Nicolae Mișu, the Romanian ambassador in London, informing him about the more and more unfavourable evolution of political and military events on the Eastern Front. The Prime Minister warned of the difficulties encountered by the Romanian Armed Forces, lacking supplies,

²¹ Arhivele Diplomatice/Diplomatic Archives, Collection 71 / 1914, E2, second part, vol. 50, p. 5.

²² *Ibid*, p. 83 – Telegram of 11/24 December 1917, sent by Nicolae Mișu, Romanian ambassador to London.

²³ *Ibid*.

²⁴ *Ibid*, p. 83.

²⁵ *Ibid*.

confronted with the devastating acts of the Russian bands, but firmly reaffirmed Romanian government's determination to remain united with the Allies all the way through²⁶. In a telegram sent on the same day, Ion I.C. Brătianu drew attention to the fact that: "Romania cannot continue the fight alone, deprived of the supplies coming from Russia, the Russian artillery which has so far supported a certain part of our infantry and lacking its only way of communicating with the Allies. [...] The policy undertaken by the Romanian government, in agreement with its allies, is to gain time to allow them to do their best to prevent the Russian disaster"²⁷. To this end, Ionel Brătianu considered that "[...] unlimited and unconditional trust on the part of allied governments [...] in his loyalty and ability to face hardship and betrayal"²⁸ was absolutely necessary.

Knowing the situation on the ground and appreciating to its true value Romania's importance as a military factor for resisting on the Eastern front, the French ambassador in Iași, Count of Saint-Aulaire, warned the French government that "Romania, with its Armed Forces intact, being the only base of the whole reorganisation in the Eastern part, the fate of all Eastern fronts is being played here in this moment"²⁹.

Russia's exit from war triggered Romania's total isolation and, as a direct consequence, the end of the final resistance on the Eastern front, represented by the Romanian Armed Forces. This brought about a more dynamic stand from both Paris and London³⁰. The government in Paris considered that it was required to support all efforts aimed at getting in the way of Romania signing a separate peace with the Central Powers. Thus, it warned the government in București: "under no circumstance will France approve a peace treaty legally signed by the current King and a Government named by him and it is expected that the Allies will not approve such a procedure also"³¹. Still, this document – the telegram sent by Stéphen Pichon, France's Foreign Minister to the Government in Iași on 4 January 1918 – anticipated the possibility

²⁶ S.A.N.I.C., *Microfilme Anglia* Collection, Reel 389, c. 110.

²⁷ *Ibid*, c.111.

²⁸ *Ibid*, c. 112.

²⁹ 1918 la români. *Desăvârșirea unității național-statale a poporului român. Documente externe (1879-1916)*, vol. II, București, Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică, 1983, p. 1043 – Telegram of 20 December/2 January 1918, sent by Count Saint-Aulaire to the French Foreign Minister.

³⁰ Dumitru Preda, Vasile Alexandrescu, Costică Prodan, *În apărarea României Mari. Campania armatei române din 1918-1919*, București, Editura Enciclopedică, 1994, p. 19.

³¹ S.A.N.I.C., *Microfilme Anglia* Collection, Reel 389, c. 125.



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of an “illegal” peace treaty, concluded by a government appointed by Germany, “after the Royal Family and the Government had previously left the country and took all necessary measures to save the Romanian Armed Forces on the territory of Southern Russia”³². It was only in those circumstances, in which Romania would have remained on the allies side, that “they would be in the situation to fully support it, during the final peace conference, in order to change the provisional peace treaty and make sure Romania benefited from all the conditions it might be entitled to”³³.

More optimistic about Romania’s military situation, French General Henri Berthelot – as pointed out by the telegram from Sir George Barclay, UK ambassador to Iași, sent to the Foreign Office – appreciated that “we can stay in Romania until the end of April, even if Bolshevik Russians withdraw”³⁴, an opinion shared by the UK representative in Iași.

A political analysis of Romanian Prime Minister Ion I.C. Brătianu emphasises his concern that, if Romania were forced to conclude a separate peace – a possibility which seemed increasingly obvious for him, given that the Romanian Armed Forces could not continue the resistance much longer, without triggering total defeat, occupation of Moldova, ousting of King Ferdinand from the throne, and establishment of a government entirely subject to the Germans -, its interests at the next peace conference would not be affected, and the Allies would honour their commitments made back in 1916. The guidelines set by Ion I.C. Brătianu to Nicolae Mișu converge to this, the Romanian politician asking his ambassador in London to explain at the Foreign Office the difficult situation Romania was in.

In his weekly report on Romania, Walter Hines Page, the United States Ambassador to London, reviewed the events on the Eastern Front, discussing on the agreement given by Romania for a general ceasefire treaty with Germany, “because, given the presence of almost one million Russian soldiers in Romania, any other action would have been impossible”. In the opinion of the American diplomat, Romania had two options: “1. To shape its foreign policy in keeping with that of the Petrograd government. 2. Prepare for an inevitable clash with it”³⁵. A fine analyst of the situation on the Eastern Front, the same diplomat concluded: “If Russia declares separate peace, Romania

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ *Ibid.*, c. 153.

³⁵ George Cipăianu, *op. cit.*, p. 166.



will be entirely isolated. If, however, Ukraine refuses to conclude peace, Romania would follow the same path, but if Ukraine joins the rest of Russia in concluding a separate peace, Romania will be forced to follow its example or withdraw its armies in the Cossack territory, in which case it would be in the same situation as Serbia [...]”³⁶.

In turn, the British military attaché to the Romanian High Command made known to the British Government, on 31 January 1918, the information on the probability that Romania would conclude separate peace. Concerned about the prospect that the Romanian military deposits and the country’s economic resources would reach into the hands of the Central Powers, he urged the London government to agree to the conclusion of the separate peace by Romania, which would, in its opinion, guarantee that this did not happen³⁷.

France and Great Britain’s Position in the Context of Romania Signing the “Peace Treaty of București”

On 1 February 1918, wishing to inform London regarding the hopeless situation Romania was in, King Ferdinand sent a letter to King George V of England in which he asked him to try to persuade the British government to be more flexible regarding its attitude towards signing a separate peace treaty. Being under no illusions, the Romanian King understood the “hardships that hamper effective help from you (from England – A/N)”, but he requested, in turn, that “your government should consider in all honesty the inexorable reality of the situation created, on the one hand, by the German pressure, and, on the other hand, by the violent hostilities of the Russian anarchy and the impossibility, demonstrated today until obvious, to organise Ukraine, transformed into Austrian vanguard against us”³⁸. In this context, as King Ferdinand concluded, no more sacrifices could be demanded from Romania. Otherwise, they would have been useless “for the common cause”³⁹.

The consequence of this demand by the Romanian King was reflected, on 4 February 1918, in a letter from Sir Charles Hardinge of Penshurst, Undersecretary of State at the Foreign Office, to Arthur Balfour, in which he suggested that Great Britain could still make some

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ S.A.N.I.C., *Microfilme Anglia* Collection, Reel 389, c. 281-283.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, c. 303.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

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ROMANIAN
MILITARY
THINKING

Even though he felt sorry for the "dire situation" the Romanians were faced with, George V strongly recommended: "in all seriousness, you should maintain all the way this determination and strength which were an example for us all".

Aware of the difficult situation Romania was in, the Central Powers changed their attitude during the peace negotiations with Romania. During his meeting with King Ferdinand, on 14/27 February 1918, in Răcăciuni, Ottokar Czernin demanded imperatively that "peace should be signed immediately, under the conditions agreed upon by all four Allied Powers, conditions that cannot change a whit".

concessions to Romania. The British government could have allowed the Romanian government to negotiate an armistice with Germany, without any objection from London in the event of a prolongation. However, London's degree of flexibility regarding this issue was limited at this. The essential condition imposed on Romania was not to continue any negotiations without the allies consent, otherwise the government in Iași would assume "responsibility for any results that may arise"⁴⁰. The English diplomat thought that these concessions "can buy us time, the Romanian Armed Forces can be maintained and we could probably find out what the German conditions actually are"⁴¹. His proposals, which "did not lead to much"⁴², were not undertaken by the Foreign Office. Shortly after, allied ministers submitted a common letter to the Romanian Prime Minister, in which they opposed once again, on behalf of their governments, any peace negotiations⁴³.

Romania's request to sign the peace treaty, addressed to the Central Powers on 10 February 1918, triggered fast reactions in London. Although the country lacked any help from its allies, George V, King of the United Kingdom, wrote King Ferdinand of Romania, on 20 February 1918: "We have more and more clues that the war has entered its final stage"⁴⁴. He wrote about the "weariness and discontentment"⁴⁵ of the armed forces and peoples of the Quadruple Alliance. Even though he felt sorry for the "dire situation"⁴⁶ the Romanians were faced with, he strongly recommended: "in all seriousness, you should maintain all the way this determination and strength which were an example for us all"⁴⁷. He concluded his letter in the belief that "the winners in Mărășești will never accept, without the supreme sacrifice, the diktat of a ruthless and merciless enemy"⁴⁸.

Aware of the difficult situation Romania was in, the Central Powers changed their attitude during the peace negotiations with Romania.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, c. 299-301.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, c. 301.

⁴² George Cipăianu, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

⁴³ S.A.N.I.C., *Microfilme Anglia* Collection, Reel 389, c. 290, 296, 299, 300.

⁴⁴ *1918 la români...*, vol. II, p. 1063 – Telegram of 7/20 February 1918, sent by King George V to King Ferdinand.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*



The "Peace" Treaty of București was signed after the Russian Army exited the war and therefore it was impossible for the Romanian Armed Forces to continue fighting, as it was lacking any possibility of assistance from its allies, namely France and Great Britain. For that reason, the treaty was never signed and promulgated by the King nor ratified by the Romanian Parliament.

During his meeting with King Ferdinand, on 14/27 February 1918, in Răcăciuni, Ottokar Czernin demanded imperatively that "peace should be signed immediately, under the conditions agreed upon by all four Allied Powers, conditions that cannot change a whit"⁴⁹.

In London, mentioning the possible peace treaties between Russia and Romania, on the one hand, and the Central Powers, on the other hand, Lord Balfour promised, in a speech delivered on 28 February 1918, that "these countries could be forced into signing a peace treaty with Germany, but the matters would not be settled until the general Peace Conference"⁵⁰.

In mid-March 1918, the representatives of Entente governments, gathered in London, adopted a declaration regarding the dramatic situation Romania was in, determined by the defection of Russia, which got out of the war "through an absurd move, the strangest one in the whole history"⁵¹. The same declaration unequivocally stated, also referring to the peace that was to be imposed on Romania by Germany, that "we will not recognise all these types of peace treaties"⁵².

The signature of the separate peace treaty in București, on 24 April/7 May 1918 by Prime Minister Alexandru Marghiloman, who took upon him the burden of signing a painful treaty for Romania, triggered the UK's reaction. Thus, on 19 May/1 June 1918, Lord Robert Cecil, in a speech delivered in the British Parliament regarding the "peace" treaty imposed on Romania by the Central Powers, expressed the sympathy of the British government towards Romania, reckoning that, given the current situation, the Allies were left with the mission of making everything they could in a possible Conference to change the tough conditions imposed on our country.

Conclusions

The "Peace" Treaty of București was signed after the Russian Army exited the war and therefore it was impossible for the Romanian Armed Forces to continue fighting, as it was lacking any possibility

⁴⁹ *1918 la români...*, vol. II, p. 1080 – Note of 14/27 February 1918, on the meeting of Ottokar von Czernin with King Ferdinand, in Răcăciuni.

⁵⁰ *Arhivele Diplomatice*, 71/1914 Collection, E2, second part, vol. 50, p. 508 – 15/28 February 1918, Telegram sent from London, through Paris.

⁵¹ *Arhivele Diplomatice*, 71/1914 Collection, E2, second part, vol. 31, Telegrams from Paris 1917-1920, p. 369 – Encrypted radiogram on 6/19 March 1918, from the Romanian Embassy in Paris.

⁵² *Ibid.*



of assistance from its allies, namely France and Great Britain. The treaty was never signed and promulgated by the King nor ratified by the Romanian Parliament, despite pressures from Germany.

In the autumn of 1918, in the context of allied victories on combat fronts, King Ferdinand ordered the Romanian Armed Forces, on 28 October/10 November 1918, to re-enter the war. On the same day, French troops from the expeditionary corps commanded by General Franchet d'Espèrey led a bold thrust to the Danube at Giurgiu, forcing the German Army to withdraw from Transilvania.

On 18 November/1 December 1918, King Ferdinand entered București at the head of his forces. The Royal Family was welcomed at Mogoșoaia railway station, as mentioned in the memoirs of Queen Marie, by General Berthelot and a few French and British officers, alongside the Romanian Armed Forces generals, led by C. Prezan⁵³. The draconian “*peace*” treaty of București thus became painful memory.

⁵³ Maria, Regina României, *Povestea vieții mele*, first edition, Editura „Adeverul” S.A., București, f.a., p. 589.



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