Command-and-control is not only a combat function, but also a system that encompasses personnel, processes, communication and information system/CIS, as well as command posts/CPs, used to lead the tactical activities of the Land Task Force/LTF, in particular, and of any force structure, in general. Command-and-control, more than any of the combat functions, will decisively influence the outcome of military action.

In order to develop the present article, we have used a series of analysis and scientific research methods specific to sociology, but with applicability in the field of military science. For the analysis of command-and-control as a combat function, we have used the data collection method as well as the historical method to show what the roots of the mission command in military art history are. Subsequently, using the analysis method, we have managed to present the most important aspects regarding the organisation of the command-and-control system of the LTFs as well as a “code of good practices” regarding the organisation of the Battle Rhythm/BR and the decision-making during the execution of military activities.

An efficient command-and-control of the LTFs during military activities is the result of the compliance with the principles of command and control and the harmonisation of the staff processes carried out within the CPs deployed during military actions, in order to optimise the understanding – analysis – planning/synchronisation – decision – dissemination decision-making cycle.

Keywords: command; control; command post; decision; integrated cells; functional cells;
COMMAND AND CONTROL IN TACTICAL ACTIVITIES

Command-and-control is not only a combat function, as it is stated within the national doctrine specific to Land Forces/LFs as well as to NATO and US Army doctrine. It is also a system that encompasses all other combat functions, present in each of them, decisive for the outcome of any military activity. However, according to the doctrine specific to the United States Armed Forces, command-and-control is also part of the military structures combat power, along with leadership, data and intelligence, manoeuvre and mobility, fire support, sustainment, and protection (F.M. 3-0, Operations, 2017, pp. 2-21).

According to F.T.-2, Manual of the Staff Activity within LFs Headquarters during Operations, “command is the authority invested in a person, for directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces. The command is based on the interaction between the commander and the subordinates”. (2019, p. 13). Moreover, in accordance with the same doctrinal publication, “control is the continuous supervision, direction, and coordination of forces according to the commander’s plan and intent”. (ib., p. 14).

There are two types of command-and-control manifestation within LFs as well as within any NATO military structure: mission command and detailed command.

Mission command/MC is specific to NATO military structures and it is recommended that military leaders should use this way of exercising command and control. In this way, the subordinate commanders’ freedom of action is ensured as they receive only the higher echelon commander’s intent and the mission in order to let them choose how they will accomplish it, by planning and executing the tasks that will lead to the achievement of the military objectives.

Mission command traces its roots back to the German concept of Auftragstaktik, which is a form of military tactics in which the main effort is represented by the outcome of the fight and not by the specific
way it is conducted. Mission command was a result of the Prussian military reforms following the defeat of the Prussian Armed Forces by the French in the Battle of Jena in 1809. Under the command and coordination of Helmuth von Moltke, the military strategists in charge of issuing and implementing the reform within the Prussian Armed Forces thought of a different approach for the planning of military campaigns and commanding large armies in overextended theatres of operations. Thus, the main issue of the debate before the implementation of the mission command concept is represented by the fact that subordinate commanders to high-level military structures (army corps, LTF, Joint Task Force/JTF etc.) have a better understanding of the local operational environment than the staff of the higher echelon, which is an important prerequisite for being able to respond adequately, quickly, and effectively to threats or opportunities encountered on the battlefield. In other words, subordinate commanders (division, brigade commanders) must have the authority to make decisions in favour of the outcome of military operation, within the limitations imposed by the higher echelon commander’s intent and the mission received. After this concept was experimentally applied in the Danish-Prussian conflicts of 1864, the Austro-Prussian conflicts of 1866, and the Franco-Prussian conflicts of 1870, Auftragstaktik was codified in the 1888 German Drill Regulation. Since that time, in military history, there have been numerous examples of the successful use of mission command. Among them, a benchmark is the general plan issued by the Allied General Staff in 1944 for the invasion of Europe and the defeat of the German Armed Forces. Thus, using this concept, the Allied Forces’ fight was guided and directed from the beaches of Normandy to the west banks of the Rhine and beyond. Coalition Forces also used this concept in the confrontations with Iraqi Forces during the Gulf War to defeat them and occupy Baghdad.

Detailed command/DC, in fact, a Russian concept, is a way of exercising command and control that limits or even inhibits the freedom of action of subordinate commanders to whom very in-depth orders and coordinating instructions are specified, to fully synchronise the military activity.
the detailed command might be the guarantee of failure during military activity. The rapid changing of the conditions within the current operational environment does not help at all the LTF commander to get positive results on the battlefield using the detailed command.

**TYPES OF LTF COMMAND POSTS DURING MILITARY OPERATIONS**

In order to successfully exercise command and control, the LTF commander needs a command-and-control system consisting of personnel, processes, communication and information system/CIS, as well as command posts/CPs. The work carried out by the staff, under the command of the LTF commander, within the CPs, allows to carry out all staff processes in order to facilitate the decision-making cycle to plan, prepare, execute and assess the military operation.

Although there are several ways regarding the composition of a CP, we would like to remember the following five parts: staff personnel, workspaces, CIS, sustainment, and force protection within the CP.

To exercise the command and control of a military activity, the LTF will deploy several types of CPs, according to the specific doctrinal documents. Thus, four types of CPs could be deployed during a military activity: Main Command Post/MAIN CP, Alternate Command Post/ALT CP, Forward Command Post/FWD CP, and Assistance Command Post/ASISST CP (ib., p. 27).

In addition to these CPs, we would like to mention two more types of CPs that could help the LTF commander in exercising command and control: Tactical Command Post/TAC CP and Rear Area Command Post/REAR CP.

TAC CP is the smallest CP that the LTF can organise, having very high mobility, allowing the commander:

- to move across the area of operations/AOO;
- to get intelligence in a timely manner in order to complete the commander’s understanding of the operational situation;
- to get in touch with key leaders within the AOO, but also with the subordinate commanders;
- to influence the morale of subordinate forces through his presence.
In order to be able to perform these functions, TAC CP must have high mobility, an adequate level of protection, minimal functionality of the CIS, and also specialised staff officers to help the commander to understand the situation, command the military action and engage the targets on the battlefield.

REAR CP can be organised to control the combat activities in the rear area of the LTF AOO. To solve the problem of controlling the tactical activities in the rear area, the commander has two options: to hand over the control to REAR CP commanded by his deputy or to maintain the control by setting up a Rear Operations Coordinate Centre/ROCC within MAIN CP – under the command of Deputy Chief of Staff for Support/DCOS SPT. In case the LTF commander chooses the first option, then REAR CP will be a self-sustained CP, deployed to a different location than MAIN CP.

Regardless of the number of CPs organised by LTF, their existence and deployment must comply with several principles, as follows:

- **mobility** – the ability of any type of CP to deny the enemy’s attempts to find, fix, and engage it with indirect and direct fire. The smaller the CP’s physical, thermal, and electromagnetic footprint is, the harder it will be for the enemy’s Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance/ISR assets to find it. Also, the small size of a CP reduces the time to install and uninstall it;

- **dispersal** – a CP should be set up in a sufficiently large space so that if one of its parts has been destroyed by the enemy’s fires/attacks, another part should be able to take over its tasks in order to continue to perform the functions of that CP;

- **redundancy** – the operational need to always have a backup option if one of the CPs can no longer perform its functions because of different causes. Thus, at the level of LTFs, it is mandatory to have an ALT CP, deployed in a location difficult to detect by the enemy ISR assets. It must be adequately equipped so that the personnel can be aware of the operational situation within AOO, so, at any time, they are able to take over not only the MAIN CP functions but also those of another CP that cannot efficiently operate;

- **distributed command and control** – the ability to use the CIS to carry out the reach-back and reach-forward processes. Through them, one of the CPs carries out processes and develops products.
to support the other CPs. For instance, only one CP will be responsible for creating, maintaining, and distributing the Recognised Ground Picture/RGP to the other CPs through reach-back or reach-forward processes;

- dispersed command and control – the deployment of personnel and CIS applications in order to perform their functional tasks in all CPs organised by the LTF within AOO;

- force protection – the ability of any CP deployed in the LTF AOO to have a certain form of protection to deny the enemy’s ISR assets detection, enemy’s ground attacks, including those carried out by special operations forces/SOF, and by the enemy’s artillery assets and air platforms. Active and passive air defence measures and CBRN defence measures must also be put in place.

Any option regarding the LTF command-and-control system organisation as well as its deployment within AOO must consider the principles mentioned above. If the operational situation does not provide the conditions for compliance with those principles, the commander will have to assume certain risks regarding the command-and-control system organisation for a given military operation.

**LTF COMMAND-AND-CONTROL SYSTEM ORGANISATION**

An appropriate organisation of the command-and-control system with respect to the existence and type of CPs must come from an effective and critical analysis carried out by the staff. To provide an optimised LTF command-and-control system during operations, which has to effectively respond not only to the challenges of the current operational environment, but also to the needs of such types of forces, we will carry out a deductive analysis. When we talk about the LTF military activities, the command-and-control system (i.e., command posts) must perform a number of decisive functions to optimise the decision-making cycle, as follows:

- understanding the operational situation within the LTF AOO;
- long-term planning of military activities or the next phases/stages of an ongoing action;
- synchronisation of LTF activities within the medium-term planning horizon (24-96 hours);
• conducting the targeting process;
• allocation of resources to sustain the military activities of the LTF;
• control and coordination of current activities in the operation horizon of up to 24 hours;
• assessment of the LTF military activities.

In order to perform the first function, LTF should organise an analysis centre of the collected data within the AOO to issue the specific G2-Intelligence products (intelligence estimates, intelligence summaries etc.). The level of understanding of the operational situation within the headquarters must be better using these products so that the planning and synchronisation of the LTF activities are conducted in accordance with the best/updated available intelligence. Given the consistency and size of such an intelligence analysis centre (it includes all intelligence disciplines’ analysts), we support the idea that it should be part of the MAIN CP.

With regard to the command posts-specific planning function, there shall be a long-term planning module within the MAIN CP, responsible for planning the next military activity or phase/stage of the ongoing military action. This long-term planning module – Future Plans/FUPLANS will be set up having G5-Plans as the main branch and will include all functional areas subject matter experts – command and control, intelligence, manoeuvre, fire support, sustainment, protection, and information activities.

Synchronisation of the LTF activities in the medium-term planning horizon will be carried out by the special module organised within the MAIN CP, which is based on the G35-Future Operations/FUOPS structure. By augmenting the G35 with all functional areas subject matter experts, a capable integrating module will be created in order to meet the challenges of the synchronisation and medium-term planning processes for military activity, in the time frame of next 24 and 96 hours. In fact, the organisation of the FUOPS module must be a faithful replica of the FUPLANS module, with a plus in what means the targeting and intelligence structures within it that should be more numerous, given that the effort of the LTF during the execution of the military activity is represented by the medium-term planning in order
to create the favourable conditions for the subordinated combat force structures (divisions or army corps) to engage the fight with an enemy having a decreased combat power so that success is guaranteed.

The targeting process specific to the fourth function has two components: planned and dynamic targeting. For the planned targeting, the LTF fire support coordinating structure will augment the FUOPS and FUPLANS modules to pre-plan the targets for the fire support structures within the LTF. For dynamic targeting, a Fire Support Centre/FSC will be set up within the Current Operations Centre/COC. If the LTF will integrate joint level capabilities (ISR, air force/fixed wings etc.) within its military activities, for a limited period, then a Joint Air-Ground Integration Centre/JAGIC must be set up within the COC.

In order to allocate the necessary resources for the conduct of a military action by LTF, a resource module should be set up, either within the MAIN CP or REAR CP, which has to be responsible for generating material and human resources and conducting re-supplying activities in order to successfully execute the military activity. Of course, subject matter experts within the logistic structure will augment FUPLANS and FUOPS modules, as well as COC in order to provide the necessary experience for the planning, synchronisation, and controlling of military activities regarding resource allocation. For instance, within COC it is mandatory to have specialists from Movement and Transportation/M&T branch so that the personnel within COC can be aware of the flow and rate of movements in the LTF rear area. There should also be a Medical Operations Cell/MEDOPS Cell responsible for the control and coordination of medical evacuations within LTF AOO.

The control and coordination of current activities within the operations horizon of up to 24 hours must be carried out by the Current Operations Centre/COC. This centre should be part of FWD CP, so the commander will have the necessary tool to conduct military activities from a different location than MAIN CP when the situation requires:

- for conducting an action that demands a high degree of coordination in the LTF close area, such as a river crossing operation with two combat forces (divisions or army corps) in the first echelon at the same time;
• for conducting a Forward Passage of Lines/FPOL with at least two divisions or army corps in the first echelon.

Also, there should be a Current Operation Planning Team/COPT within FWD CP, in order to be responsible for planning military actions with effects up to 24 hours operation horizon, such as the situation that requires the use of LTF reserve in the battle and, subsequently, its regeneration.

Assessment of military activities, just like the targeting process, has two components: the current operations assessment and the general assessment of the LTF military activities. The current operations assessment is carried out within COC and is based on:

• assessment of losses caused to the enemy by friendly fire support assets – Battle Damage Assessment/BDA;

• assessment of the conditions established to be met within the operations horizon of up to 24 hours within the LTF AOO (they can be divided into conditions for the DEEP, CLOSE, and REAR areas, depending on the operational framework used by LTF).

The overall assessment of the operation is based on Measures of Performance/MoP and Measure of Effectiveness/MoE indicators used by the G5-Plans to determine the current state of the military action at a given time.

As we can see, there should be deployed several CPs during a LTF operation to support the commander in exercising command and control of military activities. Thus, in order to command and control the subordinate forces, a LTF should deploy MAIN CP, ALT CP, FWD CP, TAC CP, and REAR CP. The specific functions of the Assistance Command Post/ASISST CP, as described in the Romanian Army doctrine, can be fulfilled by TAC CP. (Ib., p. 29)

In turn, these CPs should be set up on both functional and integrated modules. In our opinion, the organisation using integrated modules, having one of the functional modules as a leader, around which the integrated module will be set up, is optimal. In this way, the integrated modules will be responsible for the LTF military activities in all-time horizons (current, medium, and long), with no possibility of remaining any uncovered part of the operation.
DECISION-MAKING CYCLE DURING THE EXECUTION OF LTF MILITARY ACTIVITIES

In addition to the organisation of the command-and-control system in such a way that the LTF commander is assisted in exercising it over subordinate units, it is necessary that the activity of the personnel, regardless of the CP where they perform their duties, should be regulated by a staff document that puts in order the sequence of carrying out the staff processes. The staff document regulating the activity of the headquarters is the Battle Rhythm/BR that aims to standardise the activities so that they are carried out in support of the LTF commander decision-making cycle – understanding, analysis, planning/synchronisation, decision, dissemination.

When we talk about BR, we must bear in mind two aspects. The first is that it must be organised in such a way that there is a logical sequencing of activities so that during decision-making meetings – Board (e.g.: Assessment Board, Targeting Board etc.), the staff is able to provide to LTF commander the best information to support his decision. Furthermore, the products issued following the meetings, working groups, and decision-making boards should provide useful information for the activities within the higher echelon BR. The second aspect is related to the speed of carrying out activities in BR. It is known that, within the current operational environment, the military structure that manages to impose the tempo of combat activities is the one that will win the initiative, further on the freedom of action, and will force the enemy to have a reactive attitude on the battlefield. Therefore, the tempo of activities in BR must be adjusted so that the LTF commander’s decision-making cycle is shorter than that of the enemy. In this way, the decision of the LTF commander is made faster than that of the enemy commander, forcing him to be constantly reactive. Of course, the speed of decision-making would not help much, if the staff were not able to analyse the situation correctly and as thoroughly as possible in order to offer the LTF commander as many options as possible, trying to problematise the fight, to find and provide the answer to as many “What if?” questions as possible in the time available.
The BR-specific staff activities and processes must be closely related to the LTF decision-making cycle, during the military action. Thus, as a rule, the BR cycle is triggered by an information meeting regarding the understanding of the current operational situation – Situational Awareness Briefing/SAB. During the SAB, the staff shall present to the commander the updated situation within the AOO and the main issues that may influence the LTF military activities for the coming period are identified. These problems can be of a smaller or larger scale and can be specific to any functional area. For instance, if the LTF is involved in a river crossing operation, over which it has set up several pontoon bridges, and the meteorological forecast announces large quantities of precipitation, with possible flooding of the riverbanks, a problem that will move further on throughout the decision-making cycle is related to the readiness state of the pontoon bridges over the river.

All issues identified during SAB will be the subject of deep analysis in the Daily Activities Synchronisation Working Group/DASWG. During the working group, each of the problems identified will become topics of debate, and the subject matter experts of each functional area will express their opinion regarding those issues. Normally, for the next 24-48 hours, there should not be issues that require the LTF staff intervention to fix them, but rather small synchronisations of the upcoming activities in time and space. The likely effects of the identified issues must be accurately determined/estimated so that the actions necessary to be conducted by the LTF in order to counteract these effects can be framed in time and space. To continue the issue regarding the riverbanks’ flooding mentioned above, let suppose that heavy rains will fall in the next 24 hours, and flooding of the riverbanks will have effects in the next 48-72 hours. At the end of this working group, the participants must determine what are the issues that will decisively influence the LTF future activities that they must consider for later, during the planning/synchronisation step, so as to present to the commander, within the decision-making board, one or more courses of action in order to deny/limit the effects of these issues.

The identified and analysed issues that deserve to become the subject of a planning/synchronisation process will be further addressed within the FUOPS or FUPLANS modules to provide suitable solutions to solve them. Some of the problems will require simple
solutions, only for synchronisation and minimal adjustments of the Operation Plan/OPLAN in terms of the scheme of manoeuvre, tactical layout or task organisation, but others will require the activation of integrated planning/synchronisation teams to provide at least two different courses of action to the LTF commander within the decision-making board. In this case, there will be fundamental changes in the scheme of manoeuvre, tasks of subordinate units, and coordinating instructions. In the case of heavy rainfall that will affect the riverbanks in the sector where pontoon bridges are in place, for the next 48-72 hours, it will likely be necessary to activate these integrated planning/synchronisation teams to develop courses of action regarding the LTF river crossing operation because the weather conditions will influence the execution of the tasks already received by the subordinate units, the scheme of manoeuvre as well as the coordinating instructions in terms of time and space.

The solutions found by the staff within the FUOPS and FUPLANS modules will be submitted to the LTF commander during the Daily Activities Synchronisation Board/DASB. During this meeting, the identified and analysed issues are presented in chronological order, starting from the next 24 hours until the next 120 hours. It is worth mentioning that normally the staff will seek to get the commander’s decision to synchronise the activities within the next 72-96 hours, given the fact that divisions or army corps are the LTF subordinate units. For less than 72 hours, it is unlikely that synchronisation of the activities can be achieved. For each of these problems, the solutions found by the staff to fix them are presented to the commander. If the staff must present two or more courses of action to solve the identified problems, there should be a complete presentation – the scheme of manoeuvre, the tasks/missions for subordinate units, the coordinating instructions, as well as the specific issues regarding each functional area. At the end of the DASB, the LTF commander must communicate his decision regarding the solutions suggested by the staff to fix the identified and analysed problems.

Further on, based on the decisions made by the commander, the LTF staff proceeds to implement them through Fragmentary Order/FRAGO, adjustments to the Scheme of Manoeuvre, Decision Support Matrix/DSM, Decision Support Overlay/DSO, and Synchronisation
Matrix/Synch Mat. The decisions made by the LTF commander, as well as the way in which they are implemented, will be disseminated to the subordinate units during the Commander Update Brief/CUB. During this meeting, the LTF commander informs the subordinate commanders/liaison officers the decisions he has made within DASB and lets the staff present the products developed in this regard.

All other meetings, working groups, or boards within the BR should be established considering the four meetings based on which the LTF commander decides during the execution of the operation. The BR must be a logical, simple, coherent, and “uncongested” document. The current tendency is to overload the BR to have as many meetings and products as possible, as well as because of the lack of staff experience.

**CONCLUSIONS**

Following the study of the literature regarding the organisation of the division, army corps, or LTF command and control system, as well as following the experience gained due to the participation in multiple national and multinational military exercises, we have identified a series of conclusions that will be presented in the following part of the article.

First, it should be taken into consideration that mission command is a key aspect of the manoeuvring approach during LTF and Land Forces operations. It gives subordinate commanders the flexibility and authority to exploit vulnerabilities in the adversary’s tactical layout as they are identified (F.T.-1, Doctrina operațiilor forțelor terestre, 2017, p. 59). For this concept to become a reality within military activities, the LTF staff and commander should focus on submitting the missions to subordinate units using *mission-type orders*. In this way, the subordinate commanders will know the mission they have to accomplish and its purpose, thus maximising their freedom of action regarding how to carry out the mission received. Such operations orders/OPORD emphasise the LTF mission, commander’s intent, the concept of operations, missions for subordinate units, and essential coordinating instructions for the execution of a military activity. Therefore, mission command entails a simplification of the OPORD issued by the LTF headquarters, without losing the essential details, in
the sense that, in paragraph 3 – Execution, the missions for subordinate units will have priority against a multitude of specified tasks that limit the subordinate commanders’ freedom of action in time and space.

Regarding the organisation of the LTF command-and-control system, our opinion is that it must include the following types of CPs:

- MAIN CP must be responsible for understanding the situation, long-term planning, medium-term planning and synchronisation of activities, the targeting process, as well as the overall assessment of the operation;

- FWD CP must be responsible for controlling and coordinating the current operations within the horizon of up to 24 hours across the LTF AOO, as well as for their assessment. Within FWD CP, COC will be deployed, as well as a Current Operations Planning Team/COPT responsible for planning the military activities with effects of up to 24 hours;

- REAR CP must be responsible for allocating resources for the LTF military activities, for planning and coordinating operations, as well as for the security in the rear area. For the planning purpose, REAR CP should coordinate with the FUOPS and FUPLANS modules within MAIN CP. To control and coordinate the operations in the rear area, REAR CP will cooperate with FWD CP, through the liaison officers/teams within COC. REAR CP is a very important piece within the LTF command-and-control system because a multitude of actions will be carried out in the rear area such as re-supplying activities, medical and damaged equipment evacuations, control and security of communication lines, key leaders’ engagements (within local civil and military authorities), control of prisoners of war etc. Therefore, it is recommended that this type of CP exists within the LTF command-and-control system, instead of using ROCC to coordinate activities in the rear area;

- TAC CP must be the mobile command element used by the LTF commander, for short periods of time, in which he wants to complete his situational awareness regarding the operational situation with useful and clear intelligence from the area where decisive actions are conducted on the battlefield, as well as when he wants to increase the morale of the subordinate units;

- ALT CP is responsible for keeping up to date the current operational situation within LTF AOO so that if one of the aforementioned
CPs cannot effectively perform its functions because of different causes, ALT CP becomes a viable option for the LTF commander. There are two solutions regarding its organisation within LTF command-and-control system. The first is the one in which REAR CP also performs the role of ALT CP, given that it is aware of the current situation in the entire AOO because of the liaison with FWD CP, but also with MAIN CP regarding the medium and long-term planning activities. Another solution for organising ALT CP is represented by splitting MAIN CP into two identical CPs so that in case either of them cannot properly work the other can perform the specific functions of MAIN CP.

To manage the activities within the five types of CPs proposed to be organised within the LTF command-and-control system, clear responsibilities must be established. Thus, we support the idea that the LTF commander should be in charge of FWD CP when he is not deployed with TAC CP. Also, running the activities within FWD CP should be the responsibility of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations/DCOS OPS. The commander of MAIN CP should be the LTF Chief of Staff/COS supported by his deputy for plans – Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans/DCOS PLANS to coordinate the medium and long-term planning processes carried out within it, as well as the targeting process. If the decision to split the MAIN CP into two identical structures is made in order to also set up an ALT CP, then the responsibility for running the activities within these CPs will be taken by each of the two decision-makers. The LTF deputy commander will be in charge of REAR CP, being supported by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Support/DCOS SPT.

A conclusion that we want to bring to the readers’ attention is related to BR. The responsibility for directing the development of the LTF BR lies with the COS. He will establish the working groups, meetings, and decision boards to be carried out taking into consideration two aspects: the LTF decision cycle and the higher echelon and subordinate units BR.
is 96 hours, being synchronised with the release of the Air Tasking Order/ATO cycle. During multinational exercises, when military structures are trained for high-intensity peer-to-peer conflict, there is a tendency to reduce the BR cycle, sometimes reaching up to 24 hours. This happens because of the intention to train the staff in rapid-changing conditions specific to the current operational environment as well as to reduce the necessary time of the LTF decision-making cycle below that required by the enemy commander to make a decision so that he is reactive on the battlefield.

Command-and-control is a decisive element of the combat power that LTF can use against the enemy in the operational environment. It is a combat function, but also a system at the same time, being present in any of the combat functions and in the staff processes of the LTF headquarters. Adaptability, creativity, and ensuring freedom of action are the keys to success in applying this combat function, as well as in organising the LTF command-and-control system taking into consideration confrontation with an agile, rapid, and adaptable enemy.

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